Toh 128Kinh Cao Quý: Hiển Hiện Khác Nhau Với Mọi Người Mà Không Rời Xa Không Tánh, Bản Chất Của Pháp Tánh (Toh 128)

Summary

This short philosophical discourse opens with the Buddha described as
unmoving from the true nature of things. Although at this time he has no thought
of teaching the Dharma, different members of the audience nevertheless believe
that they have heard a teaching. On the basis of their differing perceptions,
five distinct philosophical views concerning the true nature of things come to
be held by different members of the audience. When Mañjuśrī, who is also in the
audience, becomes aware that they are harboring these different understandings,
he asks the Buddha why such different views have arisen, whether they are
equally valid, and whether such differences will be a matter of dispute in the
future. The Buddha replies that different understandings arise because of the
different inclinations and aptitudes of people; that of the five views only the
fifth is fully in accord with the experiential domain of all buddhas; and he
predicts that in the future such differences in understanding will be argued
about for a very long time. Mañjuśrī then asks one final question: if these
differing views all have a single basis, what is that basis? The Buddha’s answer
is that although all experience is based on the aggregates, the constituents,
and the sense fields, even these things must not be reified if one is to reach
unsurpassed, complete, and perfect awakening.

Acknowledgements

Translated, introduced, and annotated by George FitzHerbert, in
consultation with an incomplete draft translation by the Sakya Pandita
Translation Group.

The translation was completed under the patronage and supervision of
84000: Translating the Words of the Buddha. David Fiordalis, John Canti, and
Andreas Doctor edited the translation and the introduction, and Dawn Collins
copyedited the text. André Rodrigues was in charge of the digital publication
process.

Introduction

Appearing Differently to All While Not
Departing from Emptiness, the Essence of the True Nature of
Things concerns the emergence of different philosophical
interpretations of the Buddha’s teaching on the true nature of things. It
illustrates the paradoxical nature of the Buddha’s teaching and of reality
itself insofar as both are simultaneously one and many.

This short and dense discourse has a narrative frame in which the
Buddha is himself described as being unmoving from the true nature of
things, and as such, does not form any thought about teaching the Dharma.
Nevertheless, a teaching on the true nature of things is heard, but is heard
differently by the various members of the audience, based on their different
inclinations. These different understandings are then delineated as
five distinct philosophical views, or “analytic positions” or “ways of
examining” all
things, some of which resemble well-known philosophical positions that
emerged in classical Indian Buddhism.

When Mañjuśrī becomes aware that members of the audience are
harboring these different understandings of the Buddha’s teaching on the
true nature of things, he decides to question the Buddha about it, inquiring
as to why such differences have arisen, whether such diverse views are
equally valid as means for achieving awakening, whether they will persist in
the future, and whether such differences will be a source of dispute. The
Buddha’s replies indicate that although all the different analytic positions
may all be seen as correct insofar as they go, the first four constitute
something like progressive steps along the way to the fifth and final view,
which alone is described as the unmistaken view that is in accordance with
the experiential domain of all buddhas. The Buddha then offers a series of
analogies by way of illustration. He also makes the prediction that these
differing views will persist long after his own parinirvāṇa and that in the future they will be
exploited in competitive rivalries and disputes.

At the end of the sūtra, Mañjuśrī raises a final question: if these
different viewpoints all concern a single basis for all things, what then is
that basis? The Buddha’s answer, which is reminiscent of teachings on
emptiness found in the sūtras on the Perfection of Wisdom and elsewhere, is
that although the basis of all experience is the aggregates, constituents,
and sense fields, one must not reify even these if one is to reach
unsurpassed, complete, and perfect awakening.

Though not made explicit in its title, the content and position of
this sūtra in the General Sūtra section of the Degé Kangyur indicate that it
is considered a Mahāyāna sūtra. In the text itself there is mention
of followers of the Lesser Vehicle and the Great Vehicle. Nevertheless, the
discourse strikes a nonsectarian tone insofar as it gives some credence to a
number of different views and explicitly offers a critique of needless
dispute. At the same time, however, it does make the strong claim that there
is one unmistaken, undistorted point of view.

As will be outlined below, the provenance of this sūtra is somewhat
uncertain. This is noted by both Tibetan Kangyur scholars Chomden Raltri
(1227–1305) and Butön Rinchen Drub (1290-1364) and, in recent times,
Herrmann-Pfandt (2008, pp. 147–48) and Li (2021, p. 203).

In short, the complications arise from the fact that the Denkarma
catalog, which was compiled in the early ninth century ce, includes a text it classifies as having been translated from
Chinese that is very similar in title and length. Nevertheless, there
is evidence that the text existed in India in the eleventh
century, since it is cited (though without a title) in a commentary
translated into Tibetan that is attributed to Avadhūtipa, better known as
Maitrīpa (ca. 1007–85). The
sūtra is also mentioned by name in a treatise by Atīśa Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna
(982–1054), likewise extant only in Tibetan translation. Later, in the thirteenth century, Chomden
Raltri lists the sūtra among those Tibetan translations whose attribution is
unknown. Therefore, it seems that Chomden Raltri
had a version of the text in his possession, but that the translation lacked
a colophon to identify its translators. However, a few decades later, when
Butön compiled his History of the Dharma, he
lists the same text among “thirty-six sūtras that have not been found.” In
the same passage Butön notes that this sūtra “was certainly translated
previously, but these days it is not included in the Kangyur and cannot be
located.” Since he assumed that it had gone missing,
it follows that Butön did not have access to the text that Chomden Raltri
listed.

Its disappearance cannot have lasted long, however, because a
younger scholar in the next generation of Butön’s lineage, the important Prajñāpāramitā specialist Yaktön Sangyé
Pal (g.yag ston sangs rgyas
dpal, 1350–1414), includes the entire sūtra verbatim, with
intercalated comments of his own, in his commentary on the Abhisamayālaṃkāra. Yaktön was quoting it soon after the first appearance of a complete
Kangyur as a collection (the Tshalpa Kangyur was produced in 1347–51) and
well before the production of the Themphangma manuscript in 1431.

The text did eventually make it into the Kangyur collections (in
both Tshalpa and Thempangma recensions) that were compiled in the period
following Butön. However, the text in the Kangyur now appeared with a
translators’ colophon stating that the translation was produced in the early
ninth century by the Indian preceptor Dānaśīla and the Tibetan translator
and editor Bandé Yeshé Dé. If this colophon were
correct, this would of course mean that the translation was made from
Sanskrit, and not Chinese as stated in the Denkarma catalog.

Both Herrmann-Pfandt and Li note this discrepancy but suggest that
the puzzle can be solved either by viewing the Denkarma catalog’s
attribution as erroneous (Herrmann-Pfandt, 2008, p. 148), or by assuming
that the text in the Denkarma catalog is an altogether different text from
the one that appeared in the Kangyur collections after the fourteenth
century (Li, 2021, p. 203). Li does, however, acknowledge that neither of
these theories is fully convincing since they both fail to account for the
observation of Chomden Raltri, who seems to have had in his possession a
translation that lacked a translators’ colophon. Nor do they explain how the
version that was included in the Kangyur could reappear in the fourteenth
century, after having gone unnoticed by the compilers of the imperial
catalogs, as well as both Chomden Raltri and Butön, during the preceding
five centuries since it had purportedly been produced.

Unfortunately, no extant parallel versions of the text, in either
Chinese or Sanskrit, have been identified, which leaves the conundrum
concerning its translation into Tibetan difficult to resolve conclusively.
However, based on our work with the translation published here, we feel that
one cannot rule out the possibility that the version of the text that we
find included in the Kangyur is in fact, as stated in the Denkarma catalog,
related to, or perhaps an edited version of, the translation that was
produced from Chinese in the late eighth or early ninth century. If this
theory is correct, the colophon that is attached to the text in the Kangyur
would constitute a later, incorrect, editorial intervention, added at some
point after the time of Chomden Raltri. To add a translators’ colophon to a
text, or to modify an existing colophon, or even to merge several
preexisting colophons into one, was rather common practice in Tibet. Such
editorial interventions had already begun in the ninth century and
continued, until the period after Chomden Raltri and Butön, up until the end
of the fourteenth century.

In addition to the information found in the notes written by Chomden
Raltri and Butön, the Tibetan and Sanskrit titles of the text, as found in
the various sources, themselves also present some uncertainties. First,
regarding the Tibetan title, half of the title has been more or less stable
in all sources since the Denkarma catalog and up through the various
Kangyurs, while the other half of the title has varied considerably. As
such, the part of the title that we have here rendered “While Not Departing from Emptiness, the Essence of the True Nature of
Things” (chos nyid rang gi ngo bo stong
pa nyid las mi g.yo bar), has remained more or less stable in
the various sources, apart from the inclusion or absence of the word
“emptiness” (stong pa
nyid). The other half of the title, however, differs significantly
in the different sources. First, the titles listed in the Denkarma catalog
and Atīśa’s text are shorter than the titles given in the Kangyur
collections. It is in fact only from the time of Chomden
Raltri that we find the longer version of the title “Appearing Differently to All,” and even in these later sources
several minor variations are found. For example, in the Degé Kangyur the
title given at the end of the text is different from the title page insofar
as the word “emptiness” (stong pa
nyid) is absent and there is no dative particle (or la don) after the word “all”
(thams cad). The title
given in this colophon accords more closely with the title found in the Stok
Palace Kangyur and other Thempangma lineage Kangyurs.

In addition to these differences, the longer Tibetan title in the
various Kangyurs also contains some grammatical features that make it
difficult to interpret its meaning with certainty. Avoiding
these ambiguities, the sūtra is often referred to in later Tibetan sources
by the simpler short title The Sūtra of Not Departing
from the True Nature of Things (chos
nyid mi g.yo ba’i mdo). The longer English title that we have
presented here should therefore be seen as one interpretation among several
other possibilities. Why and how the title came to vary in these ways is
unclear to us at present and deserves further study.

The Sanskrit title as found in the Degé Kangyur also contains
elements that make it an unlikely title for an Indian manuscript. For
example, the title includes the word āloka (“light” or “illumination”) which, despite being a
plausible Sanskrit basis for the Tibetan translation snang ba had the content of the
text been different, is difficult to map on to the most likely meaning of the
Tibetan in this text, which is “appearing.” Moreover, the Sanskrit word
prati is not easily
translated into Tibetan as tha dad
par, considering the meaning that this Tibetan term occupies
in this particular text—where it seems to carry the sense of “differently”.
More generally, the Sanskrit title does not seem viable as a meaningful
title, and, notably, the Stok Palace version also bears no Sanskrit title.
It is, therefore, tempting to see the Sanskrit title as a later creation,
back-translated and added to the text at some point during its history in
Tibet.

Finally, there is also a feature in the Tibetan terminology used in
this text that may further hint at this text being originally a translation
from Chinese, even if it may subsequently have been edited. Of the eight
sūtras in the Kangyur where we find the Tibetan term rang gi ngo bo nyid, four of
these (if we include our text among them) are translations from Chinese (Toh
61, Toh 108, Toh 128, and Toh 135). Considering the
relatively small number of sūtras translated from Chinese compared to the
hundreds of sūtras that were translated from Sanskrit, this could be yet
another indication of the text’s possibly Chinese origins.

In light of all these considerations, one should perhaps not rule
out the Denkarma catalog’s classification of this text as a translation from
Chinese, especially considering that the Denkarma catalog was produced
shortly after the translation was made. The Denkarma catalog is a ninth
century historical document and, therefore, seems a more reliable source
than a translators’ colophon of which there is no trace in any source until
at least the fourteenth century.

Of course, neither the Tibetan or Sanskrit titles, the use of the
term rang gi ngo bo nyid,
or the classification of the Denkarma catalog, themselves constitute proof
that this text was translated from Chinese. It is also possible that the
original translation from the early ninth century might have been edited by
later Tibetan scholars, perhaps with reference to the Sanskrit passages
quoted by Maitrīpa. As such, the text in the Kangyur might be a result of
editorial interventions produced over several centuries. For the time being,
these questions cannot be resolved with certainty.

The sūtra might also seem to present some conundrums of chronology
in terms of its doctrinal content. Its main theme is five “analytic
positions” that, at first sight—to readers in any age later than the tenth
or eleventh century—would have looked like the summarized views of the four
or five historically extant philosophical schools of thought (grub mtha’) constituting the
doxography widely adopted in the commentarial literature of the later
Madhyamaka. They are also given in the same progressive sequence as the
doxography attributes to those schools of thought. Yet the narrative is set
at the time of the Buddha, long before any of those schools came into being
and even longer before they were categorized and ranked schematically. Early
scholars, some of whom mapped the five positions on to the philosophical
schools, may have legitimately wondered if the text might have been redacted
to reflect that doxography despite the apparent anachronism. It could be
that the remark attributed to Dānaśīla in the editorial note added—rather
unusually—to the translators’ colophon was intended to dispel any doubts
regarding the sūtra’s canonicity on those grounds.

On the other hand, it is worth pointing out first of all that none
of the statements in this sūtra constituting the five “analytic positions”
say anything that cannot be found in other sūtras. It is only the way they
are set out in an explicitly progressive order that might be seen as a
reference to a doxographical classification of views. Indeed, Dānaśīla’s
remark points to how doubts invoking an anachronism might actually be
inverted. The sūtra’s canonical status itself can be deployed to demonstrate
that in it—documented as being witnessed and explained by the Buddha
himself—the fact that people experienced different views as they tried to
make sense of the phenomenal world with the guidance of his teachings was
simply a natural manifestation of their different human propensities. In
other words, this text might be the locus
classicus of how a range of views should be (and later were)
categorized into a doxography.

This approach is taken most directly by Amé Zhab (a myes zhabs ngag dbang kun dga’ bsod
nams, 1597–1659) in a long commentary on the Kālacakratantra. He specifically equates the
five “analytic positions” in the sūtra with the philosophical positions
respectively of (1) the Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika (don smra ba gnyis), (2) the
Cittamatra (sems tsam), (3)
the general Madhyamaka (dbu ma
spyi), (4) the “illusion-like” Madhyamaka (dbu ma sgyu ma lta bu), and (5)
the “nonabiding” Madhyamaka (dbu ma
rab tu mi gnas pa). However, he also makes the important
distinction between, on the one hand, these views arising in the minds of
individuals as they are here recorded as having done in the sūtra and, on
the other, their being adopted as views belonging to collective schools of
thought. He reinforces his argument by citing instances in other sūtras and
tantras featuring the terminology of these views: the Laṅkāvatārasūtra (Toh 107), Sumaghadāvadāna (Toh 346), Hevajratantra (Toh 417–418), Ḍākārṇava (Toh 372), and others.

However, such assumptions that the five tersely stated views in the
sūtra can be directly mapped on to the five well-known philosophical
positions do not seem to have been universally accepted. Maitrīpa simply
takes them all as a necessary, sequentially coherent, and sufficient set of
steps in establishing a correct view, with little reference to names of
schools other than Madhyamaka. Yaktönpa’s commentary goes into considerable
detail regarding the view, meditation, action, and result of the schools
(naming not only the Sautrantika, Cittamatra, and Madhyamaka, but also some
of their sub-schools), yet his approach uses the statements from the sūtra
to structure and illustrate his exposition, rather than using his exposition
to characterize the statements.

None of these commentators, therefore, interpret the five “analytic
positions” in ways that could be adduced as anachronistic, and there appear
to be no documented suggestions that the text could be apocryphal.

In any case, the fifth and final position upheld in this sūtra as
the true and correct one—that all things are unborn, nonabiding, without all
delimitations of action and activity, beyond conceptualization, and
unelaborated from beginningless time —has been cited and paraphrased by many
Tibetan scholar-adepts over the centuries, particularly those associated
with mahāmudrā or dzogchen. These include Gampopa Sönam Rinchen
(1074–1153), and Longchenpa Drimé Öser (1308–63), among others.

The sūtra has also been drawn upon by historians. Guru Tashi, the
early nineteenth-century historian, while discussing the duration for which
the teachings of the Buddha will persist, quotes the Buddha’s prediction in
this sūtra that for two thousand five hundred years after the Buddha’s own
passing there will still be those who follow and debate these different
philosophical views.

The sūtra does not appear to have attracted modern scholarly
attention apart from a single short study in Japanese published in
1971, and this is its first translation into English.

This translation is based primarily on the text in the Degé Kangyur,
but in consultation with the variant readings recorded in the Comparative
Edition (dpe bsdur ma) and in particular
the Stok Palace Kangyur, which in several places was found to have
preferable readings. Where the interpretation of the Tibetan text remains
tentative, or where the variant readings have been preferred, this has been
recorded in the notes.

The Translation

The Noble Sūtra

Appearing Differently to All While Not Departing

from Emptiness, the Essence of the True Nature of Things

Homage to all buddhas and bodhisattvas.

Thus did I hear at one time. At the Dharma Abode of the King of
Deer, upon a great throne of various precious
substances arising from the qualities of his wisdom, the Blessed One was
seated without departing from the essence of the true nature of things just
as it is.

At that time, limitless, innumerable great bodhisattvas and a great
host of gods, humans, asuras, and others were also assembled at that place.
Those gathered there all made repeated circumambulations of and prostrations
toward the Blessed One, then each took their place and, having paid
respectful homage, given veneration, and made excellent offerings, with
their heads bowed, they began to listen to the Dharma without weariness.

At that time, although the Blessed One formed no thought of teaching
a formulation or elucidation of the Dharma, by the power of his compassion
and vow, everyone in that audience heard him speak according to their own
individual
inclinations and attitudes. They
thought, “The Blessed One is teaching the Dharma to me, not to others.”

And so, some among that great gathering thought, (1) “He teaches the
Dharma that things are just as they appear,” and taking it as
certain, they formed that notion.

Some thought, (2) “He teaches the Dharma that all things are nothing
other than mind alone,” and taking it as certain, they formed that notion.

Some
thought, (4) “He teaches the Dharma that all things appear like illusions
and, like illusions, do not exist,” and taking it as certain, they formed
that notion.

Some thought, (5) “He teaches the Dharma that all things are by
nature unborn, by essence nonabiding, and being without all delimitations of
action and activity, transcend
concepts and the objects of conceptualization, and are completely free of
elaboration from beginningless time,” and taking it as certain, they
formed that notion.

Then, without departing from the essence of the true nature of
things just as they are, the Blessed One took on a compassionate form, and light rays
called clearing the darkness of conceptualization from those
assembled who have different views shone forth from his
tongue. The light rays were visible in all ten directions, and this roused
the bodhisattva Mañjuśrī, who was there in that audience. Being aware that
most of the audience held the five different understandings, the bodhisattva
Mañjuśrī thought, “Why are there different views and beliefs regarding a
single basis of all things? I will ask the Blessed One.”

When those light rays had gathered back again into the tongue of the
Blessed One, the bodhisattva Mañjuśrī asked the Blessed One, “Although the
Blessed One formed no thought of teaching a formulation or elucidation of
the Dharma, why, Blessed One, do those assembled here have different beliefs
and notions? Blessed One, are these five analytic positions concerning
things all correct, or
are some correct and some incorrect? Are these five analytic positions
concerning things equal when it comes to the attainment of complete
liberation, or, Blessed One, do these five analytic positions relate to
different types of persons? Is there some suitable analogy, Blessed One,
for how
these five analytic positions appear different? In the future, Blessed One,
will there still be people who will understand things according to each of
these five analytic positions? Blessed One, will people who train in these
five analytic positions argue about what they do and do not mean? Blessed
One, so as to banish the doubts of those gathered here, please explain.”

This is what he said, and the Blessed One replied, “Mañjuśrī, you
asked, ‘Although the Blessed One formed no thought of teaching a formulation
or elucidation of the Dharma, why do those assembled here have different
beliefs and notions?’ Regarding that, because of their purification through
practice, or lack thereof, there are those
with greater or lesser degrees of understanding and aptitude. Because
buddhas have purification and accumulation that is limitless, they remain at
all times, effortlessly, without departing from the essence of the true
nature of things just as they are. This is the experiential domain of all
buddhas. Since those of greater purification and those of just a little
purification similarly acquire that which is correct and that which is
incorrect from their lineage, they will have different beliefs and
notions.

“Mañjuśrī, you asked, ‘Are these five analytic positions concerning
things all correct, or are some correct and some incorrect?’ Regarding that,
when all of these five analytic positions concerning things are taken as
correct, there are some who think that the Dharma that has been taught is
that all things exist just as they appear. Why? This is because the four
elements and what they produce exist like different
illusions.

“There are also some who think that the Dharma that has been taught
is that all things are nothing other than mind alone. Why? This is because
the habitual tendencies of the mind to assign permanence to various imputed
things make it appear that those things persist through time as a self or as
a thing,
even though they are merely conventional designations that in reality are
without intrinsic nature and do not exist beyond mere mind.

“There are also some who think that the Dharma taught to us is that
even mind itself is unborn. Why? This is because it has no form or color, no
past, present, or future, and no center or edges.

“There are also some who think that the Dharma that has been taught
is that all things appear like illusions and, like illusions, do not exist.
Why? This is because all things arise from causes and conditions.

“There are also some who think that the Dharma that has been taught
is that all things are inherently unborn, essentially nonabiding, and, being
without all delimitations of action and activity, they transcend concepts
and the objects of conceptualization, and are completely free of elaboration
from beginningless time. Why? This is because that is the essential nature
of all things without any distortion.

“Mañjuśrī, there are also some who have not grasped the positions
correctly. These are the understandings of those of lesser purification, inferior aptitude, and
poor discernment. There are also some of middling purification, aptitude,
and discernment who have such understandings. The rest are correct in their
understanding, which is excellent.

“Mañjuśrī, you asked, ‘Are these five analytic positions concerning
things equal when it comes to the attainment of complete liberation?’
Regarding that, apart from the correct understanding of those whose
discernment is excellent, the other four positions, though sequentially
distinct in terms of their proximity to the correct understanding, may be
seen as equal when it comes to the attainment of complete liberation.

“Mañjuśrī, you asked, ‘Are these five analytic positions concerning
things for different kinds of people?’ Regarding that, once they have
progressed through four of the five analytic positions concerning things,
both those who follow the Lesser Vehicle and those who follow the Great
Vehicle will realize that only the last one reflects the correct,
undistorted experiential domain of the buddhas.

“Mañjuśrī, you asked, ‘Is there a suitable analogy for how
these five different analytic positions concerning things appear?’ Regarding
that, the rising of the sun over Jambudvīpa is an analogy that illustrates
how there are different understandings concerning the single basis of
things. When the ascending sun rises over Jambudvīpa from the sky forty
thousand yojanas away, everyone thinks that the sun is rising over their own
town from their own mountain. In the same way, everyone present at this
gathering has their own notions concerning the single basis of things.
Everyone sees it in their own way, and everyone grasps it in their own way.

“Just as one cannot say without analysis that the sun does not rise
from the mountain of one’s own town, Mañjuśrī, in the same way, these other
four analytic positions concerning things likewise appear—aside from the
correct, undistorted experiential domain of the buddhas.

“Just as it is not the case that the sun truly rises from the
mountain of one’s own town, Mañjuśrī, in the same way, the four positions
appear as stages of realization even though they do not convey the true
meaning.

“How these five analyses are comparable with regard to attaining
complete liberation, Mañjuśrī, may be illustrated by the analogy of valuable
gems. For, with regard to valuing gems, too, there are those who rely on
this work and those who do not.
People with no notions and those with wrong notions, who do not depend on
the five analytic views concerning things, are like those people who do not
do this work and so do not find anything valuable. Those who find no meaning
in them do not think to examine them, and thus they will not be liberated
from the three realms.

“As for those who do such work, however, there are those who are
specialist collectors, those who
collect many, and those who collect just a few. Just as their gems will be
valued in three tiers, so, too, may the correct and undistorted position,
the other four positions, and the analyses of the Lesser Vehicle and Great
Vehicle likewise be evaluated in three levels, as in the analogy.

“An analogy to illustrate how I have expounded the twelve types of
discourses
and the five analytic positions concerning things is the way that rivers
descend in four directions from the great lake.
Although the
four rivers, each with many tributaries, descend in four directions, they
are united in descending from
the great lake, and thus the great lake is the foundation of all the rivers
flowing in the four directions—it is what they have in common. In the same
way, though the five analytic positions concerning things are different,
they are reliant upon the twelve types of discourses that I have expounded,
and thus the twelve types of discourses are their foundation—are what they
have in common.

“Mañjuśrī, you asked, ‘In the future, will there still be people who
will understand things according to each of these five analytic positions?’
Regarding that, if, while I am still teaching on the essence of things just
as they are, there are those in the assembled audience who acquire different
notions in this way, then, after I have passed beyond suffering, there will
not only be such differences, there will be many more! Mañjuśrī, for five
hundred years after I have passed beyond suffering, and for nine hundred,
and for one thousand nine hundred, and for two thousand, and for two
thousand five hundred years, there will still be successive generations of
people with their own notions regarding these five analytic positions
concerning things.

“Mañjuśrī, you asked, ‘Will people who train in these five analytic
positions concerning things argue about what they do and do not mean?’
Indeed, in the future, once I have passed beyond suffering, they will argue
for five hundred years. At that time, because of the greater or lesser level
of people’s aptitude and discernment, and irrespective of whether or not
they have understood the undistorted meaning, they will be sure about what
is not the true meaning, and having established what is and is not the
meaning espoused by others, they will argue. And when they present their
arguments in front of others, those who listen to them, even without
intending to be adherents of positions, will become adherents of positions
based on their regional affiliations and kinship.

“Even those who know the undistorted meaning will argue, not for the
sake of teaching those who do not know, but for the sake of disheartening
and dissecting the views of others. They will demand, ‘Explain how you see
the essence of your meaning!’ Although the answers may not be wrong, they
will be disputed based on other discourses, and with cries of, ‘You said this,’ they
will proclaim the mistakes of others. They will think, ‘How pleasant it is
when others do not know, and I alone know.’ They will proclaim such things
not for the sake of enlightenment, but for the sake of material things.”

This is what he said. Then Mañjuśrī asked, “Blessed One, if these
five analytic positions concerning things, though different, rest on a
single basis of things, then what is that basis of things? If whichever way
one examines, one is still deluded, then what is the unmistaken
essence?”

The Blessed One replied, “Mañjuśrī, the basis is the aggregates, the
elements, the constituents, and the sense fields. However,
one will be mistaken if one takes even these things as permanent and
unchanging, since they too are like illusions and are merely conventional
designations. If one examines what is inherently unborn without being clear
about its appearance as a conventional designation, one will also be
mistaken. The basis, the unmistaken essence, is the inherently unborn state
of those things.”

Mañjuśrī asked, “If the basis of delusory sensory objects does not
exist, then how is it that there is what is known as the
appearance of delusory sensory objects?”

The Buddha replied, “Understand that things are like illusions,
merely conventional designations that are perceived by the deluded mind as
existing. Not apprehending this, and not understanding that things are
inherently unborn, objects of perception that appear to the deluded mind as
deluded perceptions are seized upon as permanent and unchanging things. Why
must you understand this? Because one remains in saṃsāra if one takes things
as permanent and unchanging. If one is in saṃsāra, the aggregates, the
constituents, and the sense fields will exist. If these exist, there will be
the experience of joy and sorrow. However, if one is aware that things are
inherently unborn, and one has cleared away both the extremes—of permanent
unchanging substantiality and of the nonexistence and negation of
things— then one will reach the highest perfect
and complete awakening. With that, the attainments, the major and minor
marks, and the buddhafields in their complete perfection will appear.

“In brief, Mañjuśrī, not understanding the inherently unborn nature
of things, grasping to things as permanent and unchanging, and being in
saṃsāra—this is what is known as the perception of the deluded
mind toward the appearance of things. However, it is not the
case that things appear from nothingness, like primordial space, by the
power of the deluded mind alone. Even in the perception of saṃsāra and
nirvāṇa, by means of pure and impure vision, Mañjuśrī, the object of
perception is known as an appearance to the mind.”

This is what he taught, and the audience gathered there rejoiced and
greatly praised what the Blessed One had said.

Colophon

Translated, edited, and finalized by the Indian preceptor Dānaśīla
and Bandé Yeshé Dé. It is said that Dānaśīla himself said that the piṭaka treatises and different
views of Madhyamaka developed from this.

Notes

Bibliography

Source Texts

Other Tibetan Texts

Modern Scholarship and Translations

constituents

Bandé Yeshé Dé

ban de ye shes sde
བན་དེ་ཡེ་ཤེས་སྡེ།