因明正理門論本

In order to employ simplicity so that one may establish and refute the inner meaning of truth, this treatise was composed.

Originally, many statements are used to establish,

Within, one follows what one personally delights in.

Therefore, what is established and stated is called the thesis;

It is not that which is erroneous or correct in meaning.

At the foundation of this THESIS, many statements are used to establish it. Because the THESIS, REASON, and EXAMPLE are explained through many statements, yet their meaning is not brought to completion, many statements are employed here in debate in order to designate and establish it. Moreover, a single statement may establish it, revealing the whole as one establishing property.

Therefore, one should understand that establishment accords with the designation’s relation. With regard to that statement, a dispute concerning its meaning arises. Or a simple meaning may be used to designate one’s own THESIS.

Although the statement is simple, its meaning is specific, and it is revealed according to each meaning. Or debate may be unnecessary, and establishment may accord with the meaning of the THESIS. To establish according to what one delights in means not delighting in an establishing property.

Were it otherwise, it would be called an establishment, just as the REASON, the EXAMPLE, and also the THESIS are. Because it is revealed, separating it in order to formulate the THESIS entails no fault. A statement cannot be altered merely because there is error or correctness in it.

If the meaning is not erroneous, the statement may still be altered, as when one establishes that all statements are false. Or the previously established meaning of the THESIS may be correct or erroneous, as when one establishes that the cry of a young jackal is permanent. Furthermore, if there is no commonality in the THESIS, there is also no such comparison by which its meaning may be judged erroneous or correct, as when one says that the mark of a hare is not found on the moon.

Furthermore, when a dharma exists, it is with regard to that very dharma that this is established; in comparing this with that, there is the meaning of error or correctness. Thus, one may establish that sound is permanent because the sound of a jar is not heard. When the THESIS and the REASON contradict each other, that THESIS is not yet valid; it is therefore not a THESIS.

Here one establishes: “Sound is permanent,” yet everything is impermanent. The EXAMPLE is a means by which another dharma that must be established is shown through the EXAMPLE not to encompass everything. If this REASON were absent, sound would be present in everything.

Or one establishes only part of the meaning; because that meaning is not established, it loses the designation of REASON. The EXAMPLE is likewise lost. Because the preceding distinction in the dharma of the EXAMPLE reveals the absence of the THESIS, what follows states that the REASON is also absent.

Thus it is said that impermanence is present in everything. This means that there is nothing in which this meaning is absent. Therefore, conversely, it is said that everything is impermanent.

Yet in this EXAMPLE it is said to be present.

Thus, the THESIS and what resembles a thesis, the REASON and what resembles a reason, and the many dharmas of a THESIS have been discussed here. Their distinctions will now be revealed.

The dharma of the THESIS among similar instances

May be fully present or absent;

Among dissimilar instances there are three:

Present, absent, and both.

Is not everything one delights in establishing called a THESIS? Why, then, is the THESIS spoken of here while still maintaining that it possesses a dharma? Does this absence entail a fault? Every statement there varies and changes, as when one says, “Burn the robe.” Or there may be the THESIS “heard.” Although all dharmas are stated in full, within this THESIS the dharma is adopted in order to formulate an argument, and debate determines their similarity. In these instances, PRESENT, ABSENT, and so forth are likewise so. Why is this?

It is because we now rely upon the REASON as the means of ascertainment. This meaning is stated entirely through the power of cognition. It is not like a generative cause whose function arises from it; one should understand that the REASON is comprehended through cognition.

Therefore, it is said that only through the removal of a fault can this meaning be established. Yet this too is incorrect, for it causes one to recollect the original basis of the establishment. Therefore, although that is adopted here, the meaning is fully and definitively determined in this context.

This is a wholesome dharma. Thus, if something is dissimilar to it, it is certainly not a dharma of the THESIS, as when one establishes that sound is impermanent because it is visible to the eye. Moreover, if disputants present dissimilar arguments, one sets forth a manifest counterargument against them as its defining property.

It is also like a robe being burned. When doubt arises, one establishes that the substantial aggregate there is fire, because burning is presently occurring. Or there may be a locus in which the dharma is not established, as when one establishes that the self, whose substance pervades all places, gives rise to joy.

Therefore, it is said that although all classes are expressed in words, not all can establish. Among these similar instances there are PRESENT, ABSENT, and so forth, each likewise corresponding to what appears, as already explained. Regarding statements of a REASON together with its distinctions, and regarding indeterminate reasons, although words may be used definitively to designate what can establish or what can refute, without mutual relation nothing is established.

An example, too, as a verbal expression, still awaits establishment. In general, when a dharma is formulated as a THESIS, its interpretation must follow the dharma of the REASON in order to establish that dharma. That is, one establishes an EXISTENT dharma as EXISTENT, or establishes it as NONEXISTENT.

For example, one may establish that the Primal Principle exists because other things are presently seen to possess a universal class. Or one may establish it as nonexistent because it cannot be apprehended. What does this mean?

Here, although another thing is posited, there is certainly a REASON serving as the THESIS. The Primal Principle is not established, yet this entails no fault. If it is established as nonexistent, it is merely provisionally designated as an unapprehensible dharma. Therefore, there is likewise no existent dharma. If there is an EXISTENT dharma established beyond another EXISTENT dharma, one may establish this dharma as burning establishes fire, or establish fire because there is contact. What does this mean?

Now, if fire and contact, which are not established, are taken here as the THESIS, this establishment resembles an unapprehensible object. On the basis of smoke one establishes fire, and on the basis of fire one establishes contact as the THESIS; this means that one part serves as the REASON. Furthermore, these are not what one seeks to establish here. The properties of fire and contact are commonly known to exist. Moreover, when examining here how the posited dharma is constituted, there may be a dharma; what is not a quality may possess a quality; or there may be none. A verse further states:

An existent dharma is not established in an existent dharma,

And a nonexistent dharma establishes an existent dharma.

In every case, through that dharma this dharma is established;

Thus establishment occurs with respect to an existent dharma.

If one establishes:

– Sound is not permanent,

– Karma is permanent, because, being permanent, it can be apprehended.

– What, then, is the dharma of the THESIS?

What is stated here is expressed as an establishment through the gateways of the THESIS and the REASON in relation to the other position. The former establishes permanence and thereby refutes what is formless. The latter establishes a THESIS in order to refute those REASONS. Suppose one establishes:

– Sound is impermanent.

– Whatever is produced is not permanent, because what is permanent is not produced.

– What does this mean?

This EXAMPLE is an expedient dharma that expresses both the similar dharma and the dissimilar dharma, successively indicating that this REASON determines the THESIS, and that when the THESIS is absent, that REASON is necessarily absent.

In this demonstration, through conjunction and manifestation, the property of the REASON is established. Thus, this sound is certainly produced and is not unproduced. This property determines the THESIS. A verse further states:

When the REASON is stated, the THESIS follows it;

When the THESIS is absent, the REASON does not exist.

Relying on the five, the EXAMPLE is revealed;

Through conjunction, it is known to be the REASON.

Through this explanation, the refutational means is established. With respect to the property, it is the observation of impermanence; permanence is not observed. Thus, one establishes that sound is not permanent, taking nonexistence as the basis. Therefore, the means of conforming establishment and refutation is not something else used to explain the REASON. As I have already refuted the Samkhya doctrine and discussed it extensively, I shall not further expand that dispute here.

Thus, the Dharma of the THESIS comprises three distinct kinds: present in similar instances, absent, and both present and absent. Apart from the term mentioned previously, here those instances possessing the same Dharma as that which is established are grouped together and called Similar Instances. That is, all such instances are designated as one class.

If what is established is absent, they are called Dissimilar Instances. This does not mean merely that they contradict the similar instances. Whether distinct or contradictory should be concisely distinguished.

If they were merely distinct, the REASON would not be present. According to this principle, a property established as impermanent or non-self does not entail contradiction. If that Dharma can be established, then contradiction is established.

Therefore, because it is contradictory, it is said to resemble a REASON, like an inerrant Dharma. Contradiction is likewise so: it becomes an absent Dharma and is certainly nonexistent. It is not like a pot, in which the REASON is established, while among those other things there is successively no presence.

Taking this as the property, one directly observes that, apart from the pot, it is present in cloth. It is not separate from impermanence, non-self, and so forth. Thus, this REASON is present.

– How does a distinct Dharma operate in a distinct locus?

– Because its characteristic is similar to that other one, it is not given a different name but is spoken of as this. There is no fault in not calling it different.

– Why is this REASON called a Dharma of the THESIS?

– Here it is said definitely to be a Dharma of the THESIS, although one does not intend to say that it is the THESIS itself. Likewise, a similar instance is also designated in relation to the THESIS. It is not that, in a distinct locus, it is itself spoken of as the establishment. The reason is necessarily not different, and thereby this inference is accomplished. It is not the same. Furthermore, each of these has three kinds: it may be present in all similar instances, while in dissimilar instances it may be either present or absent; again, it may be both present and absent. Or it may be absent from similar instances, or both present and absent. Such are the three distinctions. Taking impermanence as the THESIS, all dissimilar instances are absent; in contrast, such things as space, which are not established as present, are discussed.

– How can it be said that, in comparison with this, it is absent there?

– If it is absent there, it does not operate there. There is no doubt whatsoever; it is simply absent there. In this way, nine kinds of Dharma of the THESIS are formed. According to their successive order, their characteristics are explained as follows:

1. - Sound may be established as Permanent on account of its being comparable.

2. - Or it may be established as Impermanent on account of its being produced.

3. - Or it may be established as Arising through vigorous, uninterrupted effort on account of its impermanence.

4. - Or it may be established as Permanent on account of its being produced.

5. - Or it may be established as Permanent on account of its being audible.

6. - Or it may be established as Permanent on account of its arising through vigorous, uninterrupted effort.

7. - Or it may be impermanent and not arise through vigorous, uninterrupted effort.

8. - Or it may be established as impermanent and as having the property of arising through vigorous, uninterrupted effort.

9. - Or it may be established as permanent because it is not subject to contact.

Thus, there are nine kinds, expressed in the following two verses:

Permanent, Impermanent, Vigorous Effort,

Capable of being firm in nature;

Not diligent, changing, unchanging—

Thus their number is nine (9).

That which is numbered is impermanent,

Audibility, vigorous arising,

Impermanent, Vigorous, Intangible—

Relying on permanence, these make nine (9).

Distinguished in this way, they are called REASONS, contradictory and inconclusive.

There is also the following root verse:

Verse:

In similar instances there are two;

Present in the dissimilar is not a reason.

What differs from this is called contradictory;

All the rest are inconclusive.

Here there are two kinds called REASONS. In the first, the REASON is present in all Similar Instances and absent from all Dissimilar Instances. In the second, it is present in some Similar Instances and absent from others, while being absent from all Dissimilar Instances.

Among the first and last three, each retains one. There are also two kinds called contradictory, for the two can establish the reverse: the REASON is present in Dissimilar Instances in two ways, while it is absent from all Similar Instances. Of the middle two groups of three, one takes the first, the last, or both.

The remaining five kinds of REASON are both contradictory and inconclusive. All are indeterminate. This is the doubtful meaning of a REASON.

Moreover, among all REASONS, those in the middle are alike. All are described by a single number as being similar; it is not said that two—similarity and difference—are gathered in one place. This serves as the REASON for an EXAMPLE.

Or when, with respect to a single characteristic, one thing serves as an invariable REASON, logically there should be four kinds called inconclusive reasons. Or all may be fully present. How is this to be understood?

– It is because of the term “exclusive.” From this exclusiveness, the Dharma is established. Because distinctions universally encompass everything, it becomes a doubtful REASON. Although the property is present there, it is itself included within what is encompassed. One alternative is separated, another is remote, while the others are all REASONS that cannot be simply distinguished. Although this is entirely noncontradictory with respect to that, it remains a doubtful property of the REASON. If, in this case, each distinction is present, it is also a conclusive REASON. Because it is selected and distinguished, it is therefore called a distinction.

If, with respect to the property of audibility, sound is permanent, this becomes a REASON. At that time, however, nothing there is indicated that could serve as a property of the REASON for impermanence. The content is that this meaning is present. Thereafter, one can fully obtain a contradictory meaning: it is not present there. This EXAMPLE is like the REASON.

Furthermore, here the power of the superior intention of the teaching is revealed. Relying upon this, conclusive inclusion is required, as stated in the following verse:

If a Dharma is exclusive,

Or common, conclusive, or contradictory,

And pervades all those instances,

It is in every case a doubtful property of the REASON.

A Dharma falsely proven, or a possessed Dharma,

Whether an intrinsic nature or a distinction—

This constitutes a contradictory REASON;

Otherwise, it does not cause contradiction or harm.

Clearly examine the Dharma of the THESIS;

If one delights in contradiction and harm,

Doubt and inversion arise.

Apart from this, it does not resemble a REASON.

This concludes the discussion of the REASON and the semblance of a REASON. I shall now discuss the EXAMPLE and the semblance of an EXAMPLE:

Verse:

When stating the REASON, the THESIS follows in every case;

Where the THESIS is absent, the REASON is absent.

These are the two kinds of example;

Here, each has its semblance.

There are two kinds of EXAMPLE: one based on Similar Dharmas and one based on Dissimilar Dharmas. A Similar-Dharma example is as follows: sound is established as Impermanent because it has the property of arising through vigorous, uninterrupted effort. Whatever arises through vigorous, uninterrupted effort is observed to be impermanent, as in the case of a pot and so forth.

A Dissimilar-Dharma example is as follows: whatever is permanent is observed not to arise through vigorous, uninterrupted effort, as in the case of space and so forth. The former proceeds by positive concomitance; the latter proceeds by cessation through negative concomitance. Through conjunction and disjunction, the meaning of the inference is established.

Because, in the contrary instances, such things as space truly exist but the REASON is shown to be absent, it follows that where the THESIS is absent, the REASON is absent. Furthermore, why does the first statement say that when the REASON is stated, the THESIS follows, while the second says that where the THESIS is absent, the REASON is also absent, instead of saying that where the REASON is absent, the THESIS is absent?

It is said in this way to demonstrate that the REASON is invariably PRESENT in similar instances and invariably ABSENT from dissimilar instances. The reverse is not asserted. Another verse states:

One should establish this permanence through absence,

Or establish what is produced as impermanent.

If one wishes to establish what cannot be stated,

It neither pervades nor accords with conjunction and disjunction.

Thus, having explained the two dharmas of conjunction and disjunction, together with the direct and contrary forms of the two examples, apart from this similarity, such is the meaning of the EXAMPLE.

– What is meant by this example?

– It means that, in that case, the object to be established and the reason are not of the same class. Although conjunction and disjunction are present, they are stated inversely. Or, in that case, conjunction and disjunction are not formulated, although both that which is to be established and that which establishes it are present, while in the dissimilar class both are ABSENT. Of these two dharmas, either one may fail to be established without being one-sided, or both may altogether fail to be established without being one-sided. For example, one establishes that sound is permanent by reason of being intangible. The example by Similar Dharma is the statement that whatever is intangible is seen to be permanent, like karma, like atoms, like a jar, and so forth.

The statement of the example by Dissimilar Dharma means that whatever is seen to be impermanent is tangible, like atoms, like karma, like space, and so forth. From what has now been said, it follows that within the example there may be a dharma that is not established. That is, for those who do not accept the permanence of space and so forth, both formulations of the example must be provided in order to constitute that which establishes.

Having formulated the reason in this way, one may then state either one accordingly. If the correct principle is to be fully established, both should be stated. By their completeness, they show that what is to be established is inseparable from this reason.

Their completeness shows that the reason is certainly present in the similar class and entirely absent from the dissimilar class, thereby correctly counteracting contradiction and inconclusiveness. If one part has already been established in a given case, then stating the other part accordingly can again constitute that which establishes. If this statement has two meanings that are both accepted, neither can be expressed except through its meaning.

By virtue of this meaning, one statement can reveal both.

Furthermore, although this principle is discerned within the comparison, if, in this case, this characteristic is ascertained to resemble that one, it should be known that this is certainly present and absent wherever that is absent. Understanding this, one knows that it is invariably absent. Therefore, through this, decisive understanding that resolves doubt arises. Thus there is a verse:

Having first determined it for oneself,

Wishing determination to arise in another,

One states the THESIS and the characteristics of its dharma;

What is to be established is otherwise excluded.

To reveal the dharma-nature of the THESIS in this case, the REASON is stated. To reveal that this is inseparable in nature, the EXAMPLE is stated. To reveal this, it is called the THESIS; within it, what is absent and what is merely a component are excluded.

Hence there arise one-sidedness, examination, and so forth. These are again brought into conjunction. When stating the EXAMPLE, it should be distinguished without discrepancy so as to reveal the meaning of the REASON.

Although this is true, the statement of the REASON reveals only the nature of the dharma of the THESIS. If it does not reveal whether the reason is present or absent in the similar and dissimilar classes, the separate statement of similarity and dissimilarity is called the EXAMPLE. Although the REASON is stated to indicate and clearly explain the meaning, it is therefore called the REASON.

What is lacking here, and what is gained, such that the part called the EXAMPLE must be separately stated as a quality? Thus, in ordinary usage, an expedient and the entire meaning of this REASON are not the same. If it is said that something is lost, this assertion should be rejected, for the meaning to be established would have no efficacy, and the meaning of that which establishes would also be absent.

This is because it states the nature of being produced. What is excluded by the Similar Dharma does not establish the meaning by stating that which establishes. Moreover, if the REASON and the EXAMPLE differ, then the Similar Dharma and Dissimilar Dharma of what is to be established ultimately cannot show that the REASON and WHAT IS TO BE ESTABLISHED are not mutually separable in nature.

Therefore, although the meaning of WHAT IS TO BE ESTABLISHED is again present, it has no efficacy. Why does it have no efficacy?

Because what is similar in the EXAMPLE is not the dharma of the THESIS. The meaning of the THESIS is distinct. Moreover, if this were established merely through an example, an infinite regress would follow. Furthermore, the various classes are not necessarily present; what is not a dissimilar class does not reveal the nature of Absence. Briefly distinguishing these points, the two examples are expressed in a verse:

If the REASON, though belonging to what is established,

Differs in species or class,

Examples would become infinite;

And the dissimilar class would continually change.

Although worldly convention reveals that the THESIS, REASON, and DISSIMILAR CLASS occur together, the presence of a different dharma serving as an example does not establish the THESIS; where there is no locus, the REASON has no presence. Therefore, it is certainly without efficacy.

Although being a dharma of the THESIS is a characteristic of the REASON, if it is inconclusive, it may still constitute a reason. Why, then, are there two kinds of examples—the dharmas of what is to be established, of that which establishes, and of the dissimilar class—such that this defect may arise? If, at that time, the dissimilar class of what is to be established is not of a single kind, this defect results, as in the final three types of examples mentioned above.

The three characteristics certainly reveal the REASON. According to this principle, although every part can reveal what is to be established through the REASON, one part alone is designated the REASON; this is a concise statement. The THESIS and so forth are likewise.

Thus, these several statements are called that which establishes and what resembles that which establishes. Accordingly, one should cause another to awaken to this and say that this is that which establishes and that it accords with that which establishes.

For awakening oneself, although there is direct perception and also inference, the statements concerning examples of those two are included here. Since there are these two means of valid cognition, one should know that self-awakening and awakening another are alike and do not depart from these. If one separately establishes an object of cognition, it should be understood that another means of valid cognition must be set forth for it. The root verse continues:

Direct perception is free from conceptualization;

Inference arises from the REASON as stated.

Here, direct perception is free from conceptualization. This means that there is cognition with regard to form and other objects, apart from every kind of verbal designation and from the differentiations provisionally established through the various faculties. Because it is not transformed by conceptualization arising through dissimilar conditions, it is called direct perception. Another verse states:

An existent dharma does not have a single characteristic;

Originally, it is not all conditioned activity.

Though inwardly realized and beyond words,

It is the sphere of the faculties apprehending form.

The mental faculty, free from conceptualization, directly realizes the various conditioned activities. Moreover, the self-cognizing aspects of greed and the other mental factors, and all meditative cultivations free from doctrinal conceptualization, are direct perception. Furthermore, within this, the result of cognition is not distinguished from the means of cognition.

This very essence resembles the meaning that arises. Just as an axe is used to cut, it is provisionally described as a means of cognition. If the self-cognizing aspects of greed and the other mental factors are all direct perception, why is conceptual cognition excluded here?

Within this, self-cognition cannot be obtained as nonconceptual direct perception. Moreover, clear comprehension of a divided object in this case is not called direct perception. Therefore, accumulated cognition, recollection, anxious searching, doubtful cognition, confused cognition, and so forth, arising amid attachment and defilement, are all not direct perception.

They are transformations of conceptualization based on what was previously apprehended. Likewise, all conventional notions concerning a jar—its quantities, comparisons, existence, and the cognition of the jar—appear to be direct perception. Yet, in reality, the meaning is transformed by conceptualization into a constructed appearance formed through combination.

Having explained direct perception, inference is then explained. The remaining phrase says that it arises from the reason. This means knowing this on the basis of what was previously known.

Thus, it is said to arise from the reason that establishes, because that reason is its condition. This is of two kinds: comparative cognition that examines reality and arises either from direct perception or from inference; and recollection that this REASON is inseparable from the THESIS TO BE ESTABLISHED. Through this recollection, together with the force of prior statements, one remembers that the REASON is certainly present in the similar class, and so forth.

Whether the statement is proximate or remote, the REASON is taken as the standard of comparison. Therefore, it is called inference. This designation is made with reference to its function; it should be understood in this way.

Understanding that inference to be inseparable from this can, in turn, constitute that which establishes. Therefore, a verse states:

One thing possesses many dharmas,

Not resembling all conditioned activities;

Though expressed through different distinctions,

Its indication is definite or follows accordingly.

Thus, that which can serve as an analogue

May also possess many further dharmas;

Though these do not exceed what is analogized,

It can indicate nothing else.

Why, then, is prior direct perception also present here?

They are separately established to reveal the two Dharma-gates. Here, one should further compare it with its result and call this inference. There, one may further speak of the cause of this direct perception and call it direct perception; neither is obstructed. Then there are the true proof and the semblance of a proof, and also the true refutation and the semblance of a refutation.

The verse says:

A true refutation exposes errors in words;

Semblances of refutation comprise various meanings.

Within true refutation, “errors” means the verbal errors already discussed above. None of all the distinctions is omitted. Every such statement is called a true refutation, because each can reveal that the preceding THESIS has not been properly stated.

A statement resembling a refutation refers to various kinds. Because these resemble the various kinds of homogeneous Dharma, they are called semblances of true refutation. For the most part, they rely upon valid inference, but, being confused about it, they set forth such statements. They cannot reveal, as above, that the THESIS is invalid. Because they refute irrationally, they reject it and fabricate arguments in the guise of true refutation. These are their various kinds, called kinds of faults. If an inference is established irrationally, then among such fabrications either the inference has been misunderstood and lost, or precisely the Dharma-gate revealing that loss is set forth. This is not called a kind of fault.

Verse:

By displaying the heterogeneous instances,

And establishing difference through homogeneous Dharma,

There is the semblance of homogeneous Dharma;

Through distinctions concerning heterogeneous Dharma,

The differentiation is called discrimination.

Thus, one becomes not different from the other.

Showing a reason apart from what is to be established

Is called the semblance of the impossible.

When the meaning is difficult and the reason gives rise to doubt,

It should therefore be stated through an example.

To state the meaning of a heterogeneous instance

In an unwelcome sense is called that meaning.

Here, heterogeneous instances are displayed by establishing difference through homogeneous Dharma. Because homogeneous Dharma is established in an inverted manner, this is called establishment through difference. This is spoken in dependence upon the complete action of the agent and is called homogeneous Dharma. That very resemblance is called the semblance of homogeneous Dharma. It encompasses all analogous kinds of faults in establishment. “Resemblance” is not a masculine expression; it is because it corresponds to what is capable of refutation, or because it follows the concluding verse.

– What is a semblance of refutation based on homogeneous Dharma?

– Since it functions with regard to an action, it is an agent. It turns and arises, and a statement is then made accordingly; afterward, whatever appears in response is likewise stated. Here, because a homogeneous EXAMPLE is now established in an inverted manner, it is called a semblance of homogeneous Dharma. For example, someone establishes that sound is impermanent because it is produced through vigorous, uninterrupted effort and because of its nature. Space is here the heterogeneous EXAMPLE. Yet space, being without material substance, is presented as the homogeneous EXAMPLE, and sound is established as permanent. Thus, within this REASON, the jar should be a homogeneous instance, while the heterogeneous instance, space, is said to be homogeneous. Therefore, this is called the semblance of homogeneous Dharma.

Further, “through heterogeneous Dharma” means a semblance of heterogeneous Dharma, whereas the preceding semblance of homogeneous Dharma displayed a heterogeneous Dharma. Through the inverted establishment of a heterogeneous Dharma EXAMPLE, the two kinds of EXAMPLES are arranged as above. The jar is a heterogeneous Dharma; therefore, this is called the discrimination of a semblance of heterogeneous Dharma.

“The differentiation is called discrimination” refers to what was displayed above. Now, when speaking of discriminating a difference, it should be understood as discriminating a difference within homogeneous Dharma. That is, as previously stated, the jar is a homogeneous Dharma.

Yet within that homogeneous Dharma there is a distinction in the meaning of combustibility. A jar is impermanent, makes no sound, and can be burned; sound is permanent and cannot be burned. Thus there is a difference.

Because establishment is made through this inverted discrimination, it is called a semblance of discrimination. The statement that one may become not different from another reveals that the preceding homogeneous Dharmas, as stated, thereby become one with each other. Who is that other?

It is one who immediately fails to hear what differs from the expedient that is close at hand. One should understand that the thesis becomes nondifferent and the person establishing it becomes nondifferent. The meaning should be understood precisely through these words.

Furthermore, it does not say who becomes nondifferent from whom. Since no difference is stated, this entire thing is therefore identical with that entire thing. For example, someone says:

– If one sees that a jar possesses a homogeneous Dharma, then the remaining Dharmas are likewise made indistinguishable from it. All the Dharmas of a jar are present in sound. This means that all mutually homogeneous Dharmas become a single nature. Here they become indistinguishable. This also reveals the distinction between sound and the jar. Because this is largely no different from the preceding semblance of discrimination, it is stated separately. If vigorous, uninterrupted production establishes impermanence, then, when one wishes to reveal it completely, it has no wholly distinct nature. Thus the THESIS and the REASON become nondifferent. This is constrained so as to establish a nature without distinction. Therefore, it is called the semblance of nondifference. Furthermore, this REASON is spoken of as both that which establishes and the Dharma that is established. It also establishes what contradicts this Dharma; because there is no difference between them, it is called the semblance of nondifference.

Displaying what is to be established as the reason is called the semblance of the impossible. This means showing that, apart from the Dharma of the THESIS to be established, another REASON can be found. Therefore, it is said to be capable of resemblance.

That is, to say, as established above, that sound is impermanent is not a correct REASON. Consider the light of lightning: because impermanence is directly seen to be obtainable apart from that reason, if the latter can be obtained without the former, then the former is not the reason for the latter. Apart from the former, a distinction is fabricated as an expedient.

This means that the former is not the latter; impermanence is not a correct REASON because it is not invariably concomitant. It is like saying that every forest has deliberation and sleep.

When the meaning is difficult and the REASON gives rise to doubt, this is called the class of faults arising from hesitation. The term is expressed in the feminine gender. Here, distinguishing the meaning of the THESIS as different from the REASON makes it inconclusive.

Therefore, it is called the semblance of hesitation. Alternatively, the meaning of the REASON is distinguished as entirely different. This is called the same class as the semblance of hesitation.

That is, as stated above, sound is established as impermanent because it depends for its production upon vigorous, uninterrupted effort. Yet it is directly observed that what depends upon vigorous, uninterrupted effort for its production may either be manifested or generated, and thus doubt arises. Here the establishment concerns manifestation and generation.

Therefore, such a REASON cannot establish the meaning of impermanence.

To state the meaning of the Heterogeneous Instance is to state it in an unwelcome sense. That is, if something is produced through vigorous, uninterrupted effort, it is said to be impermanent. The intended meaning may be that whatever is not produced through vigorous, uninterrupted effort—such as the light of lightning—is entirely permanent. This is called the semblance of meaning and should be understood in this way. Here, the subsequent statements are given only in brief. Therefore, the meaning is called doubtful. Furthermore, for what reason is the semblance of homogeneous Dharma classified differently here? The masters of hetuvidya say as follows:

– It is because the semblances of refutation are alike.

Verse:

Because this and the various Dharmas

Give rise to many doubts, they are therefore refuted.

“Many” is stated to reveal that there may be other difficulties, as well as a semblance of a REASON that is not established. Here, the first four, together with the expedients of examples that I have stated, are all incongruous; nevertheless, examples and expedients are used in accordance with worldly convention. Although they do not reveal that the reason possesses a determinate nature, this substance must nevertheless be accepted, and the statement is made in this manner.

Because its FUNCTION is inconclusive, the THESIS is established separately through a homogeneous Dharma together with the REASON. The expedient states that the same Dharma also exists there. It thereby becomes similar to an inconclusive reason.

Alternatively, it becomes similar to a decisively contradictory reason. Although this statement establishes one’s own thesis:

– Why can the inconclusive nevertheless be called a true refutation?

– It is not that stating this constitutes a refutation. An objection alleging indeterminacy is called “indeterminate.” Where there is susceptibility to variation, it is said that the locus of variation does not extend beyond this. In other loci, it is likewise established in this way. If there is indeterminacy regarding the measure of what is to be established, or if it is instead determined that the homogeneous cases accord with the REASON, then what is established is thereby called a REFUTATION. Such is called an objection. Or, when something is compared by inference with the force of direct perception, its nature cannot be altered. For example, one may establish that speech likewise cannot be heard, using such things as a jar as the EXAMPLE. Yet it is directly perceived that such a sound is heard. It cannot be said that audibility is its nature merely because it varies and is impermanent. Although the variation is not seen, variation is still possible. If this were not so, it could alternatively vary while being permanent. The second, the fallacy of similarity through non-difference, resembles an unestablished REASON. In that case, what originally did not arise is established through arising and increase, making the THESIS and REASON one. Here, original non-arising becomes the property of the REASON, proving that afterward the thing does not exist. If this is established directly, it can serve as a REFUTATION in that case. In the third, the objection of similarity through difference is established by impairing what is to be established. Its establishment is similar to combustibility and is therefore not determinate. If so, it can certainly establish a contradiction. Because it can resemble what is to be established, it is indeterminate. Its establishment is similar to this. If it is the REASON for what is to be established, then with regard to permanence it can again serve as a REFUTATION. Although the second may be invariable, the others are not so, just as something may fail to take shape. If that which is TO BE ESTABLISHED does not exist, it may be called a REFUTATION. Yet the intention there is not to establish that everything is impermanent. The fallacy of similarity through doubt means that something forcefully and uninterruptedly produced ceases after having been established. If its arising and increase are what is to be established, it becomes indeterminate. This similarity is indeterminate. If no distinction is made concerning the arising of what is to be established, then simply objecting that the REASON arises is an objection. This too resembles the unestablished. For this reason, one does not intend to establish destruction through arising. If arising or manifestation occurs, then everything would have to be destroyed. Otherwise, it is indeterminate. Such is the meaning of similarity: an inverted lack of determination constitutes an objection resembling indeterminacy. If the production is not forceful and unobstructed, it may be permanent or impermanent. Or although it is forcefully and uninterruptedly produced and is impermanent, this cannot constitute a refutation.

Verse:

If the REASON reaches or does not reach,

In the three times no pleasing statement can be made;

Reaching or not reaching, there is no REASON—

These are named the fallacies resembling a REASON.

If the REASON reaches or does not reach in the three times, no acceptable statement can be made; yet it is not thereby necessarily not a REASON. With respect to reaching and not reaching, an unacceptable assertion is formulated. If the ESTABLISHING REASON reaches the THESIS to establish it, there is then no difference.

Consequently, there is nothing TO BE ESTABLISHED, just as the water of a pond and the water of the sea are alike and without difference. Furthermore, if it has not been established, it lacks the characteristic of reaching. If what is to be established has already been established, for whom is this a REASON?

If the ESTABLISHING REASON does not reach what is TO BE ESTABLISHED, then what does not reach is not a REASON. Since there is no distinction, one should know that the REASON is not established. Hence these are called the fallacies of similarity through not reaching and reaching.

Furthermore, in relation to the three times, an unacceptable assertion is made. If the establishing REASON exists before what is TO BE ESTABLISHED, then what is TO BE ESTABLISHED does not yet exist. For what, then, is it a REASON?

If it is said to exist afterward, what is TO BE ESTABLISHED has already been established; what further use is there in calling it a REASON? If a complete REASON and that which possesses the REASON are both unestablished, like the two horns of an ox, it is therefore called the fallacy resembling the absence of a REASON. Here, as explained above, because the alternatives differ successively, the complete set is called the fallacies resembling a REASON.

Why is this so?

– It is unreasonable to repudiate all REASONS. Here, what principles accord with a REASON yet are not called a REASON? Likewise, by what principle may something established earlier not be called a REASON? It would then not be an ESTABLISHING FACTOR. Moreover, there is here a self-defeating variation and distinction. Thus, when the REASON and WISDOM are said to be established, there is variation in the REASON. Within the meaning of the REASON, there is an unestablished similarity. It is unreasonable to repudiate all properties of a REASON. As with the two preceding REASONS, in establishing the meaning they would be neither an agent nor capable of being an agent. This is not reasonable. If one repudiates them in accordance with reason, however, this may be called a refutation.

Verse:

Saying that previously there was no REASON,

Therefore nothing existent could be established,

Is named the fallacy of similarity through non-statement;

Arising and non-arising are likewise so.

A slight difference in what is produced

Is presented to show that what is to be established is unestablished;

This is named the fallacy of similarity in what is produced,

And its many forms resemble statements of the THESIS.

As stated above, if there is no REASON, there is nothing to be established; hence this is called the fallacy of similarity through non-statement. This means asserting that previously there was what is now to be established. If impermanence is proved by this REASON, then before it was stated, nothing whatsoever existed here. Since there was no reason, it would therefore not be impermanent. Hence this is called the fallacy of similarity through non-statement.

Arising and non-arising are likewise so. Before arising, there was no REASON, and therefore nothing could be established. Hence it is called the fallacy of similarity through non-arising.

This statement is also like the class of examples involving sound. When the preceding reason does not exist, there is nothing to be established. Here and now it is likewise: there is nothing to be established.

One should know that this also contradicts what is to be established. This means asserting that previously there was what is now to be established. Before an audible sound has arisen, there is no forceful and uninterrupted production.

Therefore, it is not impermanent. Moreover, because it is not forcefully and uninterruptedly produced, it must be permanent. This is named the fallacy of similarity through non-arising.

By making a slight distinction in what is produced, one shows that what is to be established is unestablished; hence it is called the fallacy of similarity in what is produced. This refers to the property of being produced. Just as a jar is produced, sound is impermanent.

If the jar differs in the locus of the property of being produced, it may be impermanent. How, then, could sound be the same? This is named the fallacy of similarity in what is produced.

Just as many THESES stated in this way do not speak of similarity, but are mostly established by speaking of resemblance. That is to say, such a thing does not constitute a REASON. Numerous statements indicate that they may be similar in this way.

Here, the similarity is not said to increase in comparison with inference. That is, when a disputant can formulate an expression to establish the nature of impermanence, it is truly difficult to say beforehand that the REASON does not exist; thus, this similarity is not established. Or else the REASON is different.

That is, because no prior increase has been stated, it is thereby established. If, in this case, the meanings of existence and nonexistence are revealed and a measure of knowledge is again established, it cannot be said to be capable of REFUTATION. The similarity of non-arising is that sound had not yet arisen before.

What had not previously arisen is increased and established. It is difficult to maintain that the reason is nonexistent; this is called resemblance to that. If, at the time of establishment, this is shown to be nonexistent, it can constitute a refutation.

If it had not previously arisen, it would not issue forth forcefully and without interruption. It is difficult to construe it as permanent. Or, when resemblance to the indeterminate is employed as a similarity, there are three kinds.

If the objection is that a jar is something having the nature of being produced, then sound in that respect is dissimilar, and therefore the thesis is not established. If the objection is that the produced nature of that sound does not exist in the jar, there is no contradiction here. If the objection is that this itself is permanent, yet it is also nonexistent in the foregoing case, then there is no similarity.

Therefore, resemblance to the indeterminate may resemble the EXAMPLE insofar as it follows the homogeneous Dharma. Why is this so? Although all dharmas are admitted in establishing an inference, they are not admitted individually.

If an individual meaning were admitted, there would certainly be a distinction, and inference would likewise not exist.

Fully demanding a REASON

Is called resemblance through generation of fault;

Here it is difficult to establish the EXAMPLE,

And this is called resemblance to the EXAMPLE.

Admitting that one may fully demand a REASON is called resemblance through generation of fault. That is, one raises the objection: As previously established, the jar is impermanent; but what further REASON proves this here? Because the example is difficult to establish, this is called resemblance to an example. That is, the impermanence of the jar is not established merely by stating it fully. It resembles an objection concerning an example, as in the following example:

Verse:

That which follows the nature of impermanence

Is called resemblance to permanent abiding;

Thus establishing that nature as permanent

Is called resemblance to what the THESIS states.

That is, one objects to what was previously established: sound is impermanent. Here it would accord with permanence and the nature of impermanence, because the intrinsic nature of all dharmas is never relinquished; hence it is said to be permanent. This is called resemblance to permanence, as it resembles a component of the THESIS.

In increasing the established nature of impermanence here, there is altogether no distinction in the real nature of impermanence, which proceeds in dependence upon permanence. That is, its intrinsic nature originally did not exist; now, having come into existence, it again becomes nonexistent, and is therefore called impermanent. This particular state, conditioned by intrinsic nature, is called the nature of impermanence, just as a nature is the fruit.

Thus, all the various statements in full mostly resemble refutations. Once that most direct nature has been established, it is again distinguished and established in the same way within doctrinal discourse. The classifications here arise merely from slight differences in method.

Since boundlessly diverse types are established in this way, they are not set forth. Thus, this THESIS is said to encompass increase, diminution, manifestation, non-manifestation, generation of understanding, distinct examples, resemblance of categories, and so forth. Through these, all are examined in accordance with actuality, together with transformations of existence, unwholesomeness, and the methods of inference.

Having been stated in this way, they were transmitted and disseminated in succession. The remaining doctrines concerning this are endless and cannot all be stated. Moreover, what is omitted here was already explained in ancient times by masters of hetuvidya.

Some say it concerns what can refute or encompass an intention; some say it is exceedingly subtle; and some say it is unreasonable, like deceitful speech, and so forth. These are not transcribed here. The masters of the THESES relied upon the meanings of such sentences to distinguish and establish them, thereby dividing conceptually imputed attachments into theories.

Both error and resemblance are called ignorance. Such theorizing is exceedingly remote from reason. Furthermore, this is lost in words, whereas what I myself have clarified belongs to reasoned discourse, by which most of what lies within has been subdued.

Furthermore, here I have refuted the ancient treatises on hetuvidya; the distinctions within them have been fully explained, and I shall stop here.

To open wisdom in those poisoned in understanding,

I have elucidated the wondrous meaning of the Gateway to Right Reasoning;

All who rely on external measures of knowledge are deluded—

May this lead them out of falsehood and into the true meaning.

Treatise on the Gateway to Right Reasoning of Hetuvidya

(original text)