因明入正理論

Capable of establishing and capable of refuting

And rightly understanding the same;

Direct perception and inference,

Together with their semblances—each is known by itself.

In this way are gathered together the essential meanings of the treatise. Herein the Thesis (pakṣa) is given many names for the sake of establishment. Through the many words of the Thesis (pakṣa), Reason (hetu), and Example (dṛṣṭānta), there is disclosure for those who wish to inquire but have not yet understood the meaning. Herein the Thesis means: that the consummately established (prasiddha) subject possessing the property, and the consummately established differentiating distinction, are taken as its nature; and that, in accordance with one's own delight, it is taken as the locus of what is established as the nature. This is named the Thesis. As when one establishes that sound is impermanent.

The Reason has three characteristics. What are the three? Namely, the property must pervade the subject's nature (pakṣa-dharmatā); it must be definitely present in similar instances (sapakṣa); and it must be entirely absent in dissimilar instances (vipakṣa). What is meant by "similar instance" and "dissimilar instance"? The similar instance means an instance whose category equally possesses the established property. It is called the similar instance. As when one establishes impermanence, the example being the pot, which is impermanent. This is named the similar instance.

The dissimilar instance means that wherein there is nothing to be established. If there were, then it would be commonly observed not to be a product, like empty space and so forth. Herein the nature of being produced, or that which by effort is produced without interruption, is the nature of being able to arise, and pervades the nature of the subject's property. Definitely present in similar instances, entirely absent in dissimilar instances—this is the reason for impermanence.

The Example is of two kinds. The first is the homologous (sādharmya); the second is the heterologous (vaidharmya). The homologous means: if it is the locus, then it manifests that the reason is definitely possessed of the nature in similar instances. That is to say, if one observes that wherever there is the product, it is subject to impermanence, just as with the pot and so forth. The heterologous means: in that of which one speaks, what is established does not exist there, and the reason is wholly absent. That is to say, what is commonly observed to be eternal is not a product, like empty space and so forth. Herein "eternal" expresses that which is not impermanent; "not a product" the words express the non-made (asaṃskṛta). As "existent" and "non-existent" are named "non-existent."

Having thus spoken of the Thesis with many words, when one awakens others to it, the Thesis is called that which establishes. As when one says "sound is impermanent." This is the statement that establishes the Thesis. "The nature of being produced" is the statement of the property of the Thesis. "If it is observed to be a product, then it is subject to impermanence, like the pot, and like a human being"—this is the statement that accords with the similar instance. "If it is commonly observed, this is not a product, like empty space"—this departs from the statement. Though here it is divided into three, they are called that which establishes.

Although one may delight to establish it, yet because it conflicts with direct perception and is at variance, it is named the semblance-Thesis (pakṣābhāsa). Namely: variance with direct perception, variance with inference, variance with one's own doctrine, variance with the world, variance with one's own words; the differentiator not consummately established, the differentiated not consummately established, both not consummately established, and that which is consummately established by mutual accord.

Herein, variance with direct perception is as when one says "sound is not an object of hearing." Variance with inference is as when one says "the pot is eternal." Variance with one's own doctrine is as when a Vaiśeṣika establishes that sound is eternal. Variance with the world is as when one says "the hare-marked one is not the moon," or again as when one says "the bones of a human being are pure." Variance among sentient beings, as with the conch-shell.

Variance with one's own words, as when one says "my mother is a barren woman." The differentiator not consummately established, as when a disciple of the Buddha, against a Sāṃkhya teacher, establishes that sound is perishable. The differentiated not consummately established, as when a Sāṃkhya teacher, against a disciple of the Buddha, says that the cognizing faculty is thought. Both not consummately established, as when a Vaiśeṣika teacher, against a disciple of the Buddha, establishes that the self is the cause of the combination of conditions.

Consummately established by mutual accord, as when one says "sound is an object of hearing." Such are the many statements; they are dharmas that have something similar or different, and are not easily established. To establish what brings about no result is named the semblance-Thesis—this having now been spoken of as the semblance-Thesis. Now shall be spoken the semblance-Reason: the unestablished, the inconclusive, and the contradictory.

These are named the semblance-Reason (hetvābhāsa).

The unestablished (asiddha) is again of four kinds. The first is that not established for both parties. The second is that not established for one party. The third is the unestablished through doubt. The fourth is that whose basis is not established. As when one establishes that sound is impermanent, or if one says that the eye possesses the nature of seeing.

That not established for both parties is when the nature of being produced is set against "sound" by the proponent of [sound's] manifestation. That not established for one party is when, regarding mist, doubt arises and gives rise to apprehension, supposing it to be the combination of great elements possessing fire, in order to speak thereby. The example's basis is unestablished: empty space truly existing, taken as the support of qualities—against those who hold space to be non-existent, this support is not established.

The inconclusive (anaikāntika) is of six kinds. The first is the common (sādhāraṇa); the second is the uncommon (asādhāraṇa). The third is that which proceeds through a part of the similar instances and proceeds throughout the dissimilar instances. The fourth is that which proceeds through a part of the dissimilar instances and proceeds throughout the similar instances. The fifth is that which proceeds through a part of both classes. The sixth is the contradictory-and-conclusive.

This is the common. As when one says "sound is eternal, because it possesses the nature of being measurable." Both the eternal and the impermanent classes share this reason; therefore it is inconclusive. For instance, the pot possesses the nature of being measurable, as does sound, and is impermanent; while empty space possesses the nature of being measurable, [and would make] sound eternal.

What is called the uncommon is as when one says "sound is eternal, because it possesses the nature of being audible." Both the eternal and the impermanent classes are alike free of this reason. Apart from the eternal and the impermanent there is nothing—this is the example-reason. How, then, can this nature of being audible serve as such an example?

That which proceeds through a part of the similar instances and proceeds throughout the dissimilar instances is as when one says "sound is impermanent in nature, because it is produced—without effort, without interruption—able to arise." Herein, "without effort, without interruption" is the locus of arising as the subject. As with lightning, empty space, and so forth, taken as the similar instances here: this impermanent nature is present in lightning, but is absent in empty space.

"Without effort, without interruption arising" is taken as the subject. As with the pot, taken as the dissimilar instance: therein it proceeds entirely. This reason, as with lightning and the pot, serves as a homologous case, yet it is again inconclusive.

For instance, the pot and the impermanent nature: it is that which arises through effort, without interruption. For instance, lightning and the impermanent nature: it is that which arises without effort, without interruption.

That which proceeds through a part of the dissimilar instances and proceeds throughout the similar instances is as when, establishing a Thesis, one says "sound is that which arises through effort and without interruption, because it is impermanent in nature." "That which arises through effort and without interruption" being the Thesis, the pot is taken as the similar instance: here this impermanent nature proceeds entirely.

Lightning and empty space are taken as the dissimilar instances: therein, in part, lightning possesses it, while empty space does not. Therefore, as before, it is again inconclusive. That which proceeds through a part of both classes is as already stated: "sound is eternal, because it is without material obstruction." Here "eternal" is the Thesis.

Empty space and the ultimate atoms are taken as the similar instances: the nature of being without material obstruction is present in empty space but absent in the ultimate atoms. The pot and pleasure are taken as the dissimilar instances: it is present in pleasure but absent in the pot. Therefore this reason, because of pleasure and because of empty space, serves as a homologous case; and again it is named inconclusive.

The contradictory-and-conclusive is as when, establishing a Thesis, one says "sound is impermanent, because it possesses the nature of being produced," just as with the pot; while another establishes "sound is eternal, because it possesses the nature of being audible (the nature of being heard)," just as with the nature of being audible. In this case both are causes of doubt. Therefore, taken fully together, they are named inconclusive.

The contradictory (viruddha) is of four kinds. Namely: the reason contradictory to the property's own nature; the reason contradictory to the differentiation of the property; the reason contradictory to the own-character of the subject possessing the property; and the reason contradictory to the differentiation of the subject possessing the property. Herein, the reason contradictory to the property's own character is as already stated: "sound is eternal, because it possesses the nature of being produced," or "because it possesses the nature of arising through effort, without interruption." This reason, though it is present in the dissimilar instances, is therefore differentiated [as contradictory].

The reason contradictory to the differentiation of the property is as already stated: "the eye must serve the purpose of that other, because it possesses the nature of being an aggregate, like a bed and so forth." This reason, just as it can establish that the eye is for the use of another, can likewise establish the contrary of the established property's differentiation—namely, that the aggregate is for the use of another, that beds and the like, being aggregates, are received and used by another.

The reason contradictory to the own-character of the subject possessing the property is as when one says "existence is non-substance, non-quality, non-action, because there exists a single substance, and because there exist quality and action, like the universal and the particular." This reason can establish the negation of substance; in the same way it can establish the negation of existence. Both are determinate.

The reason contradictory to the differentiation of the subject possessing the property is when this very reason, just as in the foregoing Thesis, gives the subject a differentiation that constitutes the existence of a connecting nature; yet it can likewise establish, with respect to that very differentiation, the constituting of a non-existent, connecting nature—as with the negation of substance and so forth. Both are determinate. The semblance-Reason having now been spoken of, the semblance-Example shall now be spoken.

The semblance of the homologous example is of five kinds. The first is the non-establishment of the establishing property. The second is the non-establishment of the property to be established. The third is the non-establishment of both. The fourth is the absence of connection (ayoga). The fifth is the inverted connection (viparīta-yoga).

The semblance of the heterologous example is likewise of five kinds. The first is the non-exclusion of the property to be established. The second is the non-exclusion of the establishing property. The third is the non-exclusion of both. The fourth is the non-separation (avyāvṛtti). The fifth is the inverted separation (viparīta-vyāvṛtti).

The non-establishment of the establishing property is as when one says "sound is eternal, because it is without material obstruction; all things without material obstruction are observed to be eternal, the example being the ultimate atoms." But in those ultimate atoms, the property to be established—the nature of eternality—is present, while the establishing property—being without material obstruction—is absent, since the ultimate atoms take material obstruction as their nature.

The non-establishment of the property to be established is as when one speaks of cognition. For all cognition can establish the property of being without material obstruction—it is present; but the property to be established, the nature of permanent abiding, is absent, since all cognition is impermanent.

The non-establishment of both is likewise of two kinds: the existent and the non-existent. If one says "like the pot," that is the non-establishment of both where the example exists; if one says "like empty space," then against those who hold space to be non-existent, that is the non-establishment of both where the example does not exist.

The absence of connection means that therein there is no joining together, while in the pot there are co-present both the property that establishes and the property that is established—as when one says "in the pot one observes the nature of being produced and the nature of impermanence."

The inverted connection means that one ought to say of all that is produced, "it is impermanent"; but contrary to this one says "what is impermanent is in every case produced." Such is named the semblance of the homologous example.

Within the semblances of the heterologous example: the non-exclusion of what is to be established, the obstruction [of the example], is as when one says "all the impermanent are observed to have the quality of material obstruction, like the ultimate atoms." Because, regarding the ultimate atoms, the established property's nature is no different, the establishing of those ultimate atoms as eternal in nature [stands], while the establishing property—being without material obstruction—is absent.

The non-exclusion of the establishing property is as when one speaks of action. That which excludes [should also] establish, and that which does not exclude [should] establish; but he says "all action is without material obstruction."

The non-exclusion of both is as when, against the proponent of existence, one takes empty space; since that empty space does not exclude the nature of eternality nor the nature of being without material obstruction, one says "empty space is eternal in nature, and without material obstruction."

The non-separation means saying "as one observes, the pot is impermanent in nature, and possesses the nature of material obstruction."

The inverted separation is as when one says "all that has material obstruction is impermanent." Such are named the semblances of Thesis, Reason, and Example—they are not correct establishments.

Furthermore, for awakening oneself, one should know that there are two pramāṇas: direct perception and inference. Herein, direct perception (pratyakṣa) means: free from conceptual construction, possessing correct knowledge, with respect to form and meaning, apart from names and apart from conceptual construction. It manifests, presenting each thing distinctly as it proceeds; this is named direct perception.

What is called inference (anumāna) means: through the marks already grasped, one contemplates the meaning. Those marks are of three kinds, as stated before. Taking them as the reason, with respect to the meaning one compares, and correct knowledge arises, so that one knows there is fire, or impermanence, and so forth. This is named inference. With respect to these two pramāṇas, the very knowing is named the result, for it is the realizing mark. As when there is an operation that is made manifest, this too is named pramāṇa.

When, in conceptual knowledge, with respect to the meaning, the cognition proceeds otherwise, it is named the semblance of direct perception (pratyakṣābhāsa). That is to say, the various cognitions, such as the knowing of a pot, arise in dependence upon conceptual construction. Because therein, with respect to the meaning, the own-character is not taken as the object, it is named the semblance of direct perception.

If, regarding the semblance-reasons, the knowing has first given rise to various cognitions of semblance-meanings, it is named the semblance of inference (anumānābhāsa). The semblance-reasons are of many kinds, as stated before; taking these as the reason, with respect to that semblance which is to be inferred, knowledge arises, but it cannot rightly comprehend; this is named the semblance of inference.

Furthermore, if one rightly makes manifest that the establishing is faulty, then it is named refutation (dūṣaṇa). That is to say: that the original establishment has the fault of deficiency, the fault of the Thesis, the fault of the unestablished, the fault of the inconclusive reason, the fault of the contradictory reason, and the fault of the example. To make manifest these statements and disclose them to the inquirer is therefore named refutation.

If one does not truly make manifest the faults of the establishment, it is named the semblance of refutation (dūṣaṇābhāsa). That is to say: where the establishment is complete, to make manifest a deficiency; where the Thesis is without fault, to allege a fault in the Thesis; where the reason is accomplished, to say it is not accomplished; where the reason is conclusive, to say the reason is inconclusive; where the reason is not contradictory, to say it is contradictory; where the example is without fault, to allege a fault in the example.

Such statements are named the semblance of refutation, for they cannot make manifest the error of the other's Thesis, that Thesis being without fault. Here the matter rests.

The meaning has now been stated in but few words,

So as first to establish the direction;

What is reasoned here, and what is not reasoned,

The discernment thereof lies beyond this place.

The Treatise on Entering the Right Principle of the Science of Reasons (Nyāyapraveśa)

One fascicle—complete.

*

– *

Preface to the Latter Portion of the Treatise on Entering the Right Principle of the Science of Reasons

The Treatise on Entering the Right Principle of the Science of Reasons is the very crown, and is also the means of contending in debate, the aim and the guiding tenet, by which to crush the wrong and make manifest the right, to sweep away the thorns and brambles, and the very cause for discourse, illuminating the truth. In the work "Bearing Witness, Manifesting the Principle, Entering by Words," it is defined that the right is to depart from the wrong.

The treatise holds that one weighs and compares words so as to make the direction of return; it makes clear this essential meaning. In olden times it was used to aid the Way and to supplement the root meaning. When [the Buddha], having realized the Way, set blowing that wind in the Deer Park, He caused the six masters of the outer paths to bow their heads and yield in truth.

The ten sages returned and took refuge with the Buddha. Was it not a marvelous talisman, steeping the light of the wrong so as to scatter and disperse the gravel and stones, together with the evil that arose? Such ones fled away.

Therefore Vasubandhu ever transmitted and made flourish this matter in earlier times; Dignāga reckoned and understood such matters in later times. Raising high the right and casting away the wrong, the difficult was disentangled. Coming to such a pass, those spiritual powers combined together in the treatise.

Then there arose the Bodhisattva Śaṅkarasvāmin, a sub-sage, born into the world, of broad mastery, such as had never been from of old; selecting and abridging with refined precision, fitting to the occasion. The eight gateways were all thoroughly penetrated, benefiting both ways. The faults of the five members were corrected and three branches retained.

The meaning is simple, yet complete; this text is clear. The four quarters in that age were all shaken and revered it deeply. Not concealing this customary rule, it was not yet sufficient to discourse upon the lofty and distant.

The August Emperor of the Great Tang, seizing the moment, sent forth his sacred decree, using a mirror of gold to cast forth its brightness and turn the wheel of the Dharma, bringing it into a place of light; with a drum of jade to sound it, kindling a torch of gold to harmonize it; moistening the transforming influence, conveying the literary patterns, bringing the lamp-book of wisdom into the city of darkness, and using the boat of wisdom to ferry beings across the sea of suffering.

Our Tripiṭaka Dharma Master Xuanzang was one of surpassing awakening, striking down every hindering condition, becoming the shelter and covering for every rank. He did many things as though he could not keep pace, and used the three "honored ones" as one who asks well. In the land of the Han he first attained the various specialized disciplines.

By his eyes seeing clearly and in fine detail, taking it into his mind so that it became marvelous, not minding that the sacred nature was far away—it being the age of the semblance Dharma, not yet steeped through—he did not let mistaken phrases without savor make him doubt the great meaning. Gazing up at the mountain peaks, seeing afar as though it were Gṛdhrakūṭa, he set forth, treading between death and barely-living amid so many perils, seeking masters and inquiring after the Way.

Going to the country of Kaśmīra in northern India, he met the Great Treatise Master Saṃghayaśas. Bowing his head, he had his doubts resolved concerning the eight piṭakas and examined thoroughly the five vehicles. The Treatise Master, on account of the great meaning and the deep root, applied his heart to guiding him.

Only the marvelous art of the science of reasons (hetuvidyā) had he taught, but he could not yet exhaust the explanation. Using the brahmic sound without rest, like flowing water that does not cease. Thereafter, going to the country of Magadha in central India, he met the Bodhisattva Śīlabhadra, who then expounded this broadly.

The matter thus went on ever broadening, excellent and supple. There he straightway had audience at the place of efficacious power and ardently sought and inquired. Again he met with that heart-and-bosom discernment such as none had had before.

The wind that drives away the wrong and proclaims and reveres the established doctrine—this was indeed where the vast transformation came full circle, and where blessings gathered and prospered.

In the twenty-first year of Zhenguan (the year 647), on the sixth day of the eighth month, as autumn came, at Hongfu Monastery, upholding the sacred decree, the translation assembly was convened. The Śramaṇa Mingjun of Hongfu Monastery held the brush and bore witness to the text. The Śramaṇa Xuanmo of Hongfu Monastery bore witness to the Sanskrit.

The Śramaṇa Xuanying of Da Zongchi Monastery corrected the characters. The Śramaṇa Daohong of Da Zongchi Monastery; the Śramaṇa Mingyan of Shiji Monastery; the Śramaṇa Huigui of Luohan Monastery; the Śramaṇa Faxiang of Baochang Monastery; the Śramaṇa Wenbei of Hongfu Monastery; the Śramaṇa Daoshen of the Dharma-lecturing [hall] of Kuozhou; the Śramaṇa Shentai of Xiyan Monastery in Puzhou—all bore witness to the meaning clearly.

The Silver-and-Azure Glory Grandee of Splendor, Acting Tutor of the Heir Apparent, of Gaoyang County, Baron Who Opens the State, the Minister Xu Jingzong, by imperial command supervised and certified the translation anew. The Tripiṭaka Dharma Master explained the obscure points of meaning and made them clear. The meaning is broad as the sea, with nowhere lacking a root and origin; the words are lofty as a mountain's summit, hard for the gazing face to scale.

The fine and beautiful things of that land were all reported from what was seen and heard, written down into phrases of text and left for the world. Where there were lapses, forgotten and unclear, they would weep and lament, praying for the meaning to be made plain, so as to bear witness to the text and receive the empowering aid in transcribing it, that it might be preserved for ages to come. The good cause—superior and inferior unconfounded—came to rest here.