因明正理門論

The Treatise states: In order to present concisely the true meaning of valid proof and valid refutation, this treatise has been composed.

The verse says:

Originally, many statements constitute a proof;

Within it, one follows what one oneself intends.

Therefore, what is established is called the THESIS,

Provided that its meaning is not contradicted.

The Treatise states: A valid proof is that which firmly establishes the true meaning. What this treatise now takes as the THESIS is established through many statements. Thus, these statements are expressions produced through modification.

Statements arise for the benefit of sentient beings; because they arise through conditions, they are said to be modifications. What is modified is the meaning, namely, the THESIS. It is the matter whose true meaning one wishes to determine.

If one wishes to make this meaning manifest, that manifestation is the result. In this treatise, it is first set forth in words. Because this meaning is revealed through them, it is like direct perception.

What meaning is being revealed, such that this treatise explains afterward what was first stated here? If it were otherwise, no analytical discourse would be possible.

An EXAMPLE is a statement through which the meaning is clearly seen. This REASON would then be unestablished. After the treatise has explained it, the meaning in question is illuminated, and awakened wisdom first hears the reasoning.

If it is not clearly understood, then at first no transformation occurs. According to this explanation, no analytical discourse could subsequently be made. This also is untenable.

To establish it according to such an intention would mean that it is not found in the sutras. Moreover, this explanation is not necessarily without constituent parts. Who is the one interpreting the sutra here?

Whose sutra is being interpreted here? Therefore, it should be understood that, like the statement of Devadatta, it cannot be divided separately. Treatises are established through such divisions into parts.

This REASON is also remote and therefore unestablished. Beyond this, it is indeed difficult to speak! Do not compose a treatise without reasons and so forth.

If, like the speech of a madman, one uses this to reveal the REASON, it is unestablished.

Reply:

This refers to the meaning of valid proof and valid fault-finding. If the statement were as you say, this treatise should not have been composed. It restates the matter and then reveals its meaning. As in the second gateway of reasoning, Akṣapāda stated the THESIS. That REASON reveals that the statement is unestablished. Is it not the case that a valid proof must truly establish a meaning? Yet if this treatise cannot establish the true meaning, it is unestablished. The essential point of the THESIS has already been discussed above. From this point onward, the text will explain it in sequence.

The many statements of the THESIS constitute a valid proof. The matter is expounded through the many statements of THESIS, REASON, and EXAMPLE, thereby disclosing a meaning not yet understood. Such a plurality of statements employed in analytical discourse is called a valid proof.

Yet a single statement may also be a valid proof, because it reveals the unified nature of valid proof as a whole. From this it should be understood that whatever is deficient may be called a valid proof. Within this, the statement initiates discussion of this meaning, or grasps the meaning in a concise manner.

The THESIS is the principal element. Although it is spoken of in this way, its meaning is distinguished concisely. It is revealed according to one’s own intention; it does not follow another’s thesis, but establishes what accords with one’s own intention and what one wishes to establish.

This means that one does not intend it to have the nature of that which establishes. If it differs from this, it is called that which is to be established. A semblance of a REASON and a corresponding semblance of an EXAMPLE may also be called a THESIS.

If what is revealed is separated from it, the establishment of the THESIS is lost. It is said that the intended meaning must not be contradicted or altered. If the meaning were not erroneous, one might say that sound is mutable, just as one might establish that all statements are falsehoods.

Or, as with a previously established THESIS, its meaning may be contradictory, as when the Vṛka proponent argues: “Sound is permanent.” Furthermore, if within it there is no commonly accepted inference serving as the supreme criterion, then that statement contradicts the meaning of impermanence, as when one says: “There is no hare on the moon.” Again, with respect to a property-bearer, what is established there may contradict the meaning established here by direct perception and inference, as when one establishes that sound cannot be heard or that a pot is permanent.

The Sarvāstivāda masters maintain:

When the THESIS and the REASON contradict one another, this is called a faulty THESIS. This fault arises from the THESIS. Here, one establishes that sound is permanent, yet all things are impermanent. The EXAMPLE is therefore the essential means for establishing another property. By means of this EXAMPLE, it is revealed that the claim does not apply to everything.

If this REASON is absent, sound is nevertheless included within “everything.” Or else it may concern only one part of the meaning to be established. This meaning is not established. When it is said that the Reason has been lost, the example is likewise lost.

Since, through another property, the preceding EXAMPLE has already shown that the THESIS is absent, the subsequently stated REASON is also absent. Therefore, it is said to be impermanent. “Everything” means that there is nothing not included within the meaning of “everything.” Thus, when stated conversely, this means: “Everything is impermanent.” Accordingly, the EXAMPLE here is likewise so.

Having thus spoken of the THESIS and semblances of a THESIS, the REASON and semblances of a REASON, together with the properties of the various theses, their distinctions will now be revealed. A verse says:

The property of the THESIS among similar instances

May be entirely Present or Absent.

Among dissimilar instances there are three:

Present, Absent, and Both.

The Treatise states:

Is it not the case that the entirety of what one intends to establish is spoken of as the THESIS? Why, then, is the THESIS here said to grasp an existent property? Would this not entail a loss? In the whole expression concerning sound, the parts separately undergo modification, as when one says, “Burn the robe.” Or the THESIS may be what is heard, while the property is its distinguishing attribute. Here, the property of the THESIS grasps what is alike in both the established position and the opponent’s decisively determined position. Among similar instances, whether it is present or absent, the same applies. Why is this so?

– Although this presently depends only upon the REASON, it is thereby comprehended and verified. This is because the meaning is expressed through the power of discerning wisdom. It is not that the REASON arises in that manner; rather, its function arises through its efficacy. If it has already been grasped, wisdom has already understood the REASON. The statement here would then lose its capacity to establish the meaning. But this is not so. It causes the other party to recollect the original basis upon which the decisive point was formed. Therefore, although that is grasped here, this statement still possesses a clear meaning and is thus correctly expressed. Consequently, if that property is present while this one is dissimilar, it is certainly not a property of the THESIS. For example, when establishing that sound is impermanent, the eye and visible objects are also such. Furthermore, if the opposing argument is dissimilar, it may be set against this to reveal the nature of what is produced here. Again, if there is doubt, it is like relying upon smoke to give rise to the uncertain cognition through which one establishes that a large aggregate contains fire—that is, because smoke is presently seen. Or the property-bearer there may be unestablished, as when one establishes that the self within this body pervades all places and therefore gives rise to happiness. Thus, in every category, all statements that are incapable of establishing what is intended are described in this way. Within the similar instances, presence, absence, and so forth are likewise stated in whatever manner necessarily applies. Therefore, it is further said that the REASON, together with contradiction, falls within the indeterminate. Only words accompanied by certainty are called a valid proof. Alternatively, they may be called a valid refutation. Without mutual relation, nothing is established. Words expressing doubt likewise do not await establishment.

In general, when establishing the property of a THESIS, the principle is that a property serving as the REASON should be conjoined with it in order to establish that property. If existence itself is established, then that existent property must necessarily exist. Or one may establish what does not exist, as when one establishes that the Primal Principle is existent. From presently seeing distinct things, one knows the aggregate. Or, if it is established as nonexistent, it cannot be apprehended. What does this mean?

Here, although a distinct entity is posited in order to determine that there is a REASON serving as the THESIS, the Primal Principle cannot thereby be established, and this nonexistence is also lost. If it is posited as nonexistent, then even a provisional designation cannot establish a property. Therefore, there is no existent property either. If an existent property is established, that existent property becomes superfluous. Or one establishes this property as smoke establishes fire, or as fire establishes contact. What does this mean?

Here, fire and contact are not established as the THESIS; rather, one establishes only their manifest correspondence with an object. If this were not so, then relying on smoke to establish fire and relying on fire to establish contact would constitute the meaning of the THESIS, while one part of it would be the REASON. Moreover, here one does not seek to establish that fire and contact possess a nature identical with the cognition of existence. Furthermore, here establishment is made through perception. The property to be established possesses a subject but not an attribute, or possesses an attribute but not a subject. A verse further says:

Verse:

A property-bearer is not established in a property-bearer;

Nor does this property establish a property-bearer.

Because through that property this property is established,

Thus it establishes the property-bearer.

Treatise:

If one establishes that sound is not permanent, then action would be permanent. Permanence is something that may be apprehended. How, then, can it be called the property of the THESIS? It is said that because the REASON establishes something belonging to that THESIS, it is spoken of thus. The earlier establishment of permanence is an uncertainty concerning what is imperceptible. Although the THESIS is subsequently established, it refutes the REASON for that position. If so, establishing sound as impermanent makes it nonpermanent, whereas permanence cannot be produced. Again, what does this mean?

The EXAMPLE, together with the methods of agreement and difference, successively explains this REASON here. That THESIS is determined in accordance with it; where that THESIS is absent, it is determined that the REASON is absent. Here, conjunction is used to reveal and establish the nature of the REASON. Thus, this sound is certainly produced. It is not unproduced; this property of being produced determines the property of the THESIS.

Another verse says:

The stated REASON depends upon the THESIS;

Where the THESIS is absent, the REASON does not exist.

Relying on the five members, the EXAMPLE is revealed;

Through their conjunction, the REASON is known.

Treatise:

By this, after explaining, one refutes in turn: by the method of reasoning, the nature of impermanence that is produced is seen, whereas permanence is not seen. Thus it is established that sound is not permanent. Therefore, it is not unproduced. Accordingly, the methods of agreement and counter-refutation do not separately explain the REASON. As in refuting the Sāṃkhya doctrine, which I have already explained extensively, this dispute should therefore cease.

Thus, the property of the THESIS has three kinds of distinction: it is present in similar instances, absent, or both present and absent. As before, except for the wording, what is here called an “instance” refers to what is akin to the property to be established and is therefore called a similar instance. Every meaning may be called an instance of what is to be established; it is not said that another instance is established.

What is dissimilar conflicts with the similar instance. Or, if something different conflicts with it, it should be distinguished separately. If it is different, there is no REASON.

According to this principle, the nature of being produced may establish impermanence, non-self, and so forth without contradiction. If a property capable of establishment contradicts what is to be established, that contradiction is itself called a semblance of a REASON; likewise, a property that does not differ yet contradicts it is also so called. It then becomes an absent property, definitively determining that the property is absent.

Unlike the pot, which as a REASON creates doubt there, turning successively from existence into nonexistence, the nature of being produced is directly perceived apart from the pot and depends upon what exists; it is not apart from impermanence and non-self in relation to this existing REASON.

Why, then, does the distinct property here operate separately? Because its similarity is stated without mentioning difference, the statement itself is not lost. If no difference is stated, why is this REASON called a property of the THESIS?

Here, it is said that it is definitely a property of the THESIS; the intention is not merely to say that it happens to be a property of the THESIS. If it is a similar instance, the designation “THESIS” is likewise applied. It is not that, elsewhere, the REASON establishing that thesis is different from this inference; therefore, they are not merely similar.

Moreover, each of these has three kinds. Namely, it may be present in all similar instances, while in dissimilar instances it may be present, absent, or both present and absent. Or it may be absent from all similar instances, or both present and absent among them.

Such presence comprises three kinds of distinction. If impermanence is the THESIS, then there is no contrary dissimilar instance at all; one should not posit the existence of space merely for the sake of argument.

How can it be said that it is absent there but present here? If it is absent there, it does not operate there at all; thus there is no doubt that it is absent here. In this way, there are altogether nine kinds of properties of the THESIS.

Following their order, their characteristics are discerned. Namely: one establishes that sound is permanent because it is measurable; or one establishes it as impermanent because it is produced; or one establishes it as impermanent because it arises from uninterrupted effort; or one establishes it as permanent because it is produced; or one establishes it as permanent because it is audible; or one establishes it as permanent because it arises from uninterrupted effort; or one establishes it as impermanent because it does not arise from uninterrupted effort; or one establishes it as impermanent because it arises from uninterrupted effort; or one establishes it as permanent because it is not subject to contact.

These nine kinds are expressed in the following two verses:

Impermanent, permanent, and forcefully arising,

Whether in a rigid nature,

Not moved by effort, and unchanging—

Thus, with respect to measure, there are nine.

With respect to measure: produced and impermanent;

Produced nature, audible, and forcefully arising;

Impermanent, forcefully arising, and not subject to contact—

Relying on permanence, there are nine.

Treatise:

Such distinctions are spoken of as REASONS. Because they are contradictory or inconclusive, the root verses state as follows.

Verse:

In similar instances, both are present;

In dissimilar instances, neither is a REASON.

The former is called contradictory;

Those found in both are all inconclusive.

Here, although there are two kinds called REASON: namely, it is universally present throughout all similar instances and universally absent from dissimilar instances. Furthermore, among similar instances, it extends to both presence and absence; among dissimilar instances, it is universally absent. In the first and last of the three kinds, each adheres to one side.

Again, although two kinds are spoken of, their designations are contradictory, or they may be reversed. That is, among dissimilar instances there are two kinds, while among these similar instances it is universally absent. Of the second and third kinds, taking the first and middle produces five kinds of REASON, all mutually contradictory and indeterminate.

This is the doubtful meaning of a REASON. Furthermore, all REASONS are alike. All that is spoken of constitutes one class of the same kind; it is not said that there are two distinct characteristics.

They thus mutually contradict one another when a single instance serves as the REASON, or when one shared characteristic is taken as an invariable REASON establishing the matter. In principle, there are four kinds, called indeterminate REASONS, in which both alternatives are present. Why is sound so, on account of being uncommon?

If it is uncommon, then all the particular variations possessed by the property to be established pervade everything. All are doubtful REASONS. Although it possesses that nature and is included therein, one side tends toward exclusion, while on the other side the REASON does not distinguish anything at all.

Its completeness there does not conflict with its nature as a doubtful REASON. If both alternatives are also fully present here, there is instead a decisive REASON, because it makes a particular distinction. Therefore, it is called a distinction.

However, regarding the proposition that sound is permanent, this becomes the REASON. If no manifestation exists there, then the nature of being produced is taken as the REASON for impermanence. Within this meaning alone can there fully be obtained a single incompatible, contradictory meaning among existing things as a doubtful REASON.

Furthermore, herein is manifested the surpassing power of instruction, based upon reflective inquiry and decisive adherence.

Verse:

If a Dharma is uncommon,

And equally entails contradictory conclusions,

Pervading everything therein,

It is wholly a doubtful REASON.

Taking the probative Dharma and the existent Dharma,

Whether as intrinsic nature or distinction,

This becomes a contradictory REASON,

If it cannot cause injury.

Clearly examine the Dharma of the THESIS;

If one desires to cause injury,

It becomes inverted uncertainty.

Anything else is not like a REASON.

Treatise:

Having thus discussed the REASON and what resembles a REASON, I shall now discuss the EXAMPLE and what resembles an EXAMPLE. The verse says:

A stated REASON follows the THESIS;

Where the THESIS is absent, the REASON is absent.

These two are called examples;

All are alike.

Treatise:

There are two kinds of EXAMPLE: one of similar Dharmas and one of dissimilar Dharmas. An example of similar Dharmas is as follows: when establishing that sound is impermanent, strenuous uninterrupted production is taken as the nature of arising. Whatever is produced through strenuous uninterrupted effort is seen to be impermanent, as, for example, a pot.

An example of dissimilar Dharmas is as follows: wherever a permanent nature is observed, there is no strenuous uninterrupted production, as with empty space and so forth. The former statement prevents error, and the latter restrains unwarranted extension. Hence they respectively express conjunction and separation.

Through this contrast, the example is not established on the basis of something real; rather, empty space and so forth are thereby indicated. Where the THESIS is absent, the meaning of the REASON is not established. Again, why does the first part say that the REASON follows the THESIS, while the second says that where the THESIS is absent, the REASON is absent?

Why does it not say that where the REASON is absent, the THESIS is absent? Because this statement can show that the REASON is present throughout similar instances and absent throughout dissimilar instances. It is not an inverted statement.

Another verse says:

That which is not produced proves permanence,

Or that which is not impermanent becomes produced.

If it could be established, it would not be stated;

Without invariability, conjunction and separation are not accepted.

Treatise:

As stated above, examples may employ the conjunction and separation of two Dharmas, whether in the direct or inverse order. Apart from these, what herein resembles an example has the same meaning. What, then, is superfluous here?

It is that the locus of what is to be established and that which establishes it are not similar instances. Although conjunction and separation are present, they are stated inversely; or conjunction and separation are applied where they should not be. Although what is to be established and that which establishes it are manifested, both are likewise not dissimilar instances.

Thus, of these two Dharmas, one may fail to be established and be non-invariable; or both may fail to be established and be non-invariable. For example, in establishing that sound is permanent because it is intangible, the example of similar Dharmas says: “Things of this kind are seen to be permanent because they are intangible, such as karma, atoms, pots, and so forth.” The statement concerning dissimilar Dharmas says: “Things of this kind are impermanent, for they are seen to be tangible, such as atoms, karma, empty space, and so forth.” Therefore, it is said that within an example of similar Dharmas, a Dharma may fail to be established—namely, in regard to what is not permanent, such as empty space and so forth—thereby constituting a defect in both respects.

Only then does the statement of an example establish that which establishes. As with this REASON, it may be stated according to either one. If fully conforming to right reasoning, both should be stated completely.

This complete statement demonstrates that what is to be established is not separate from this REASON. It fully demonstrates that the REASON is certainly present among similar instances and universally absent among dissimilar instances. It can properly counteract contradiction and indeterminacy.

If one part of this is already widely established, stating the other part is sufficient to accomplish the proof. If these two meanings concerning sound are both complete, they need not both be stated. Either a single meaning alone can demonstrate both, or, although this principle is observed in inference, when this locus and this characteristic have been ascertained, one recollects that this determination is present in other instances of the same kind.

Since there is no locus there for recollecting this doubt, it becomes absent throughout. Therefore, the explanation of that certainty arises here. Another verse says:

Just as one has oneself ascertained,

Wishing another to engender certainty,

One states the commonality of the Dharma of the THESIS,

And thereby establishes the exclusion of what lies outside it.

Treatise:

Because it demonstrates the nature of the Dharma of the THESIS in the object of comparison, it is called the REASON. Because it demonstrates that this is never separate from that nature, it is called the EXAMPLE. Because it is demonstrated through comparison, it is called the THESIS.

In that object of comparison, apart from this there is nothing else. Whatever lies outside this constitutes the ancillary parts. Through this, the examination and conjunction are altered.

If it is said that the EXAMPLE is not a separate part, this means that it demonstrates the REASON. Though this is true, when this REASON has been stated, it merely demonstrates the nature of the Dharma of the THESIS. It does not thereby demonstrate presence among similar instances and absence among dissimilar instances; hence, examples of similarity and dissimilarity are stated according to those distinctions.

If, although it is a REASON, it is stated differently in order to reveal the meaning and is then called a REASON, what is present here would be lost. What, moreover, would be gained? Therefore, the EXAMPLE should be separately distinguished and designated.

Otherwise, conventional modes of expression would be incompatible with the meaning of this REASON. What, then, would be lost?

This statement would be like classifying what is to be established, devoid of meaning and efficacy. Moreover, it would lack the meaning of that which establishes. Therefore, the nature of being produced is stated. Among things of the same Dharma, if that which establishes is not stated, the meaning cannot be established. Furthermore, if the REASON and EXAMPLE are separately established in this manner, similar and dissimilar Dharmas ultimately cannot be demonstrated. There would be no common nature or exclusion between the REASON and the matter being established. Therefore, the various meanings ordinarily established would necessarily lack efficacy. Why would they lack efficacy?

Because a similar example is not a Dharma of the THESIS identical in meaning to the thesis. Otherwise, this would continue without end in the process of establishment. Moreover, the various classes would not be determinate. If it is not a dissimilar instance, absence of the nature is not demonstrated. Here, concise discrimination can serve as the example. Thus, the verse says:

If the REASON, though belonging to what is established,

Differs in kind or category,

Examples would continue without end,

And dissimilar instances would likewise be altered.

Treatise:

Although worldly discourse presents the hetu in the dissimilar class, in the same locus there is the nature of a dissimilar dharma as the example. Where there is neither the thesis nor its locus, the hetu has no such nature. Moreover, it certainly cannot establish the thesis. If, however, the dharma of the thesis is the nature of the hetu, then this indeterminate factor would also become a hetu. Why, when both the property to be established and the establishing property, together with the two dharmas of the example in the dissimilar class, are fully present, should this be discarded?

If, at that time, the dissimilar class of the property to be established is not of a single kind, then this is discarded. As with the first and last of the three types, the final example for the three types of certainty is similar in serving to reveal the hetu. According to this principle, although everything is distinguished, that which can function as the hetu reveals what is to be established.

Nevertheless, a statement that excludes one part is called a hetu. Briefly stated, the thesis is likewise similar. Here, these many statements are termed a proof and a semblance of proof.

In accordance with this, they serve to enlighten another. These are called a proof and a semblance of proof. For self-enlightenment, although there are direct perception and inference, the term “example” subsumes them here.

Although there are these two means of valid cognition, through them the common characteristic can be clearly understood. Apart from these two discriminations, this means of cognition reveals the other, beyond which no further means of cognition is established.

An ancient verse says:

Direct perception excludes discrimination;

The rest arises from the stated hetu.

The treatise states:

Here, “direct perception excludes discrimination” means that when cognition apprehends form and its object, it is free from every kind of name, conceptual imputation of nonexistence and difference, and discriminative approach. Because it does not take these as its conditions, it appears without undergoing discriminative transformation and is therefore called direct perception. A verse then says:

An existent dharma has no single characteristic;

Originally, it does not encompass all activities.

Though inwardly realized and beyond words,

It is the object-domain of the faculty of sight.

The treatise states:

The mental faculty also has an aspect separated from discrimination, although it realizes the transformations produced by various activities. Moreover, in attachment, there are the various aspects of self-awareness. The determinations of practitioners, being free from verbal instruction and discrimination, are all direct perception.

Furthermore, here the non-discriminative fruit of cognition is itself the essence, resembling the arising of its object. It is as though it possessed a function. Provisionally it is called cognition; likewise, attachment and the various aspects of self-awareness are also direct perception.

Why is discriminative cognition excluded here? Because within this there is the direct perception of non-discriminative self-awareness. Although the object of discrimination is understood herein, this is not called direct perception.

Therefore, recollection, comparison, fear, expectation, doubtful cognition, and confused cognition concerning what is pleasing and so forth are all not direct perception. They arise and transform according to previously received discriminations. Thus, all conventional cognitions—such as cognitions of the existence of a jar and other things, which posit the quality of existence and the quality of being a jar—are all semblances of direct perception.

With regard to this reality, they fashion an additional mode of appearance and discriminatively transform through the meaning borne by provisional combinations.

Having discussed direct perception, inference is then discussed. “The rest arises from the hetu” means that subsequent cognition is prior cognition. As already stated, the establishing hetu that gives rise to it is the condition for that object.

There are two kinds: the discerning cognition arising from direct perception, or that arising from inference. Together with recollection of this hetu, the thesis to be established is not different and is not separated from that recollection. Thus, it is established previously; afterward, through the power of recollection, it is stated that the hetu is certainly present in the similar class, and so forth.

Whether the comparison with this hetu is proximate or remote, all such cognition is called inference. This is said with reference to the action and the agent. Thus, it should be understood that inference is not apart from this and can thereby become a proof.

Therefore, a verse says:

One thing possesses many dharmas,

Yet the similar does not encompass all activities.

Although distinguished by excluding others,

It can express what is determinate or consequent.

Thus it can be similar,

While also possessing many other dharmas.

Though not exceeding this characteristic,

It can indicate the absence of what is other.

The treatise states:

Why, together with the preceding establishment of direct perception, are two distinct approaches presented here? Here, inference should also be explained by comparison with its result. There, likewise, direct perception should be explained here by presenting its hetu; neither should be omitted. Next are explained proof and semblance of proof, as well as refutation and semblance of refutation.

A verse says:

Refutation exposes faults in statements;

Semblance of refutation consists of the various categories of meaning.

The treatise states:

Here, “refutation exposes faults” means the faults in the preceding statements—undifferentiated errors. Each and every statement of them is collectively called a refutation, because each can reveal that the preceding thesis has not been properly stated. A semblance of refutation means the various other categories.

Since dharmas of similarity and the various categories are such, they are called semblances of refutation. For the most part, they arise because one is confused by another’s well-formed inference and then formulates them. They cannot demonstrate that the preceding theses are faulty.

Therefore, one who does not understand them refutes and rejects them. Those employed in argument against a refutation—the various other categories therein—are called categories of error. If an inference is established contrary to reason, such categories are formulated within it.

Either the error of inference is not understood, or the erroneous approach itself is exposed. This is not called being excessively mistaken.

A verse says:

This dissimilar class is demonstrated

Through establishing difference by similarity of dharmas;

The similar dharma resembles what is other,

Through discrimination among dharmas.

Difference is termed discrimination;

Thus one is established as not different.

Apart from the hetu revealing what is to be established,

What is named may appear similar.

When the meaning is difficult, difference gives rise to doubt about the hetu;

Therefore it is called uncertainty.

To state the meaning of the dissimilar class

Without approving it is called that meaning.

The treatise states:

Here, demonstration of the dissimilar class is accomplished through establishing difference by a common dharma and through similarity with a common dharma. Because it establishes things in an inverted manner, it is called establishing difference. This is said with reference to the action and the agent. A common dharma is itself similarity; therefore it is called similarity with a common dharma. All that is included among these establishments consists of categories of similarity such as these. “Similarity” does not mean the speech of a person, but rather that which can refute its characteristic. Or it may be spoken of according to the result. What is similarity with a common dharma?

– A refutation of the action and the assertion that it is capable of acting. Its arising is successively transmitted, acting thus and being stated thus. Since what follows depends upon it, it is likewise stated in this way. Here, because the establishment is made through an inverted example of the homogeneous Dharma, it is called similarity to the homogeneous Dharma. For example, one establishes that sound is impermanent because it has the nature of being produced through forceful, uninterrupted effort. Here, space differs from the Dharma of the EXAMPLE. Yet space is presented as an example of the homogeneous Dharma, and sound is established as permanent on the basis that it lacks such a nature. Thus, this amounts to saying that the REASON as found in a pot accords with the homogeneous Dharma, while space, which belongs to the dissimilar class, is described as the homogeneous Dharma. For this reason, it is called similarity to the homogeneous Dharma. Furthermore, through the dissimilar Dharma there is similarity to the dissimilar Dharma. Apart from the preceding similarity to the homogeneous Dharma, the dissimilar class is presented through an inverted EXAMPLE of the dissimilar Dharma and thereby established. The two kinds of EXAMPLES have been set forth as above. Since the pot is the dissimilar Dharma, this is called similarity to the dissimilar Dharma. Such differentiation of distinctions is called differentiation. Previously it was called presentation; now it is called differentiation of distinctions. One should understand differentiation of the distinctions within the homogeneous Dharma as follows: as previously stated, the pot belongs to the homogeneous Dharma. Within that homogeneous Dharma, however, there is the distinctive meaning of being combustible. Therefore, the pot is impermanent, but sound is not. Sound should thus be permanent, for it lacks the distinction of being combustible. Because this is established through inverted differentiation, it is called similarity through differentiation. The statement that these become one and are not different refers to the preceding presentation of the homogeneous Dharma. Because of this, the two are made into one.

Who, then, is that person who has not heard of another means? Because of their proximity, it should be understood that the THESIS becomes nondifferent: it is not different from this, nor is it different from that. Through this statement, its meaning can be understood even though its name is not explicitly stated.

When any one thing and any other thing are said to become nondifferent and without distinction, then all of this and all of that become everything. For example, one may say: If the pot is seen to possess a homogeneous Dharma, it is then united with all the remaining dharmas without distinction. All the dharmas of the pot are sound, and all are present.

This means that all mutually similar dharmas are made into a single nature. There, this is pressed into becoming devoid of any further distinction. It also reveals distinctions between the pot and sound, yet does not differ from the preceding similarity through differentiation; therefore, it is called differentiation.

If forceful, uninterrupted effort and production are established as impermanent, and one wishes to disclose this fully, then they are not ultimate natures. The THESIS and the REASON would thereby become nondifferent. Suppressing this distinction so that they become devoid of differentiation is therefore called nondifference.

The similarity consists in stating that this REASON is the means of establishment, while the Dharma to be established is itself again the means of establishment. This contradictory relation between the dharmas arises from their lack of distinction. Therefore, it is called similarity through nondifference.

When the object to be established is shown to exist apart from the REASON, this is termed similarity through availability. That is, if one shows that what is to be established possesses a REASON outside the Dharma of the THESIS, it is said to be similarity through availability. Thus, the Sarvastivadins hold, as previously established, that sound is impermanent.

But this is not a proper REASON, because in the light of lightning impermanence is observed through the phenomenon itself, and apart from this REASON, impermanence can still be established. If that can be ascertained independently of this, then this is not the REASON for that. Furthermore, with respect to this, another distinct means is devised.

That is to say, this is not the proper REASON for that impermanence, because the underlying principle is invariable. It is like saying that throughout a forest there is meditative concentration, while sleep is also present at the same time. When the distinct meaning is difficult to determine and the REASON is doubted, this is called uncertainty.

Nothing corresponds to it, as when one speaks of the voice of a woman. Here, by differentiating the meaning of the THESIS and separating it from the REASON, the latter becomes inconclusive. Therefore, it is called similarity through uncertainty.

Alternatively, by separately differentiating the various meanings of the REASON, it is termed similarity through uncertainty, apart from the other kinds. Thus, the Sarvastivadins hold, as previously established, that sound is impermanent because forceful, uninterrupted effort is the nature of its production. Yet when one examines forceful effort, interrupted effort, and nonproduction, uncertainty arises as to whether it is manifestation or generation.

What is presently established may be either manifestation or generation; therefore, such a REASON cannot prove the meaning of impermanence. To state the meaning of the dissimilar class is not to cherish the mere designation of that meaning. The Sarvastivadins say: If something is produced through forceful, uninterrupted effort, it is said to be impermanent.

This would mean that if something is not produced through forceful, uninterrupted effort, flashes of lightning and the like would all be permanent. This is called similarity in meaning. One should understand that the subsequent clauses have been omitted here; hence, uncertainty is implied.

What, then, does this mean? Here, the homogeneous Dharma and the analogous excessive objection differ from what the masters of logic successively describe as a similar refutation of homogeneity. A verse says:

Because its Dharma is the same as this,

Many doubts arise that it resembles that.

The treatise states:

The expression “many statements” indicates either that there are other objections, or that similarity is shown not to constitute a fault in the REASON. Here, regarding the four preceding kinds of argument, I have said that all the means involving examples are incongruous. For the moment, consider the conventional means of example employed in the world.

Although it does not explicitly reveal the decisiveness of the REASON, it nevertheless subsumes this nature and calls it something produced. Because inconclusiveness is used, the homogeneous Dharma is joined with the REASON. The establishment of this THESIS is used as a means of stating that.

There is also this Dharma. Because of this, a similar inconclusiveness is established. Alternatively, a similar contradiction is swiftly and decisively established.

Although it is said to establish a particular THESIS, why is inconclusiveness called a refutation? It is not that this very statement itself is the refutation. Rather, an objection concerning inconclusiveness is called “inconclusiveness.” Where change is possible, it is said to change; apart from this, there is no error.

It may also be established elsewhere. If a valid cognition is established, there is a distinction in what is inconclusive. Alternatively, when the homogeneous Dharma is decisively joined with the REASON, that which is thereby established is called a refutation.

These are the objections. If the power of an inference that is presently perceived cannot alter this nature, then one should similarly establish that sound is not an object of hearing, using a pot and the like as the EXAMPLE, even though one recognizes that sound is an object of hearing. This should not be taken as a property of audibility that distinguishes it from impermanence.

Although no distinction is observed, it does not follow that it is therefore different from permanence.

The second kind, similarity through non-difference, resembles the fault of an unestablished REASON. Its basis is that, from nonexistence, increase and establishment arise. It then sets up a THESIS and a REASON in order to depart from unity.

In its basis, this arises from nonexistence without limit, thereby constituting the dharma of the REASON. What is realized undergoes destruction and is ultimately nonexistent. Thus, establishing that can constitute an effective refutation.

The third kind is similarity through absence of difference. It establishes harmful consequences in formulating objections. Similarity is established because of ardency and indeterminacy.

If it were determinate, it could establish contradiction through similarity. When established as indeterminate, it becomes similar to this. If the REASON establishing permanence could also establish a second effective refutation, this would be possible.

Although it is invariable, apart from the various kinds of nonexistence, it resembles the fault of being unestablished. If what is to be established does not exist, it is called an effective refutation. It is not intended here to establish that everything is impermanent.

Similarity through doubt means that the force of uninterrupted production establishes destruction. If arising and increase are what is to be established, this commits the fault of indeterminacy. This resembles indeterminacy.

If no distinction arises concerning what is to be established, but one merely distinguishes the arising of the REASON as an objection, this resembles the fault of being unestablished. For here it is not intended that arising, once established, is then destroyed. Whether arising or manifestation occurs, everything is thereby destroyed; hence this is not indeterminate.

This is what is meant by similarity. It means inverted indeterminacy: an objection resembling indeterminacy. If there is no forceful, uninterrupted production, one establishes permanence or impermanence; or although there is forceful, uninterrupted production, it is impermanent.

Apart from this, nothing can constitute an effective refutation.

The verse says:

If the REASON reaches or does not reach,

In the three times no acceptable statement can be made;

Whether reaching or not reaching, there is no REASON—

This is called similarity that refutes the REASON.

The treatise states:

If, concerning whether the REASON reaches or does not reach, no acceptable statement can be made in any of the three times, then there is no REASON. An unacceptable assertion is made concerning reaching and not reaching. If the establishing REASON reaches what is to be established, then the established THESIS is not distinct from it and thus there is nothing to be established.

It is like the waters of a lake and the sea merging together without distinction. Furthermore, if it has not been established, it cannot be said to have reached it. If what is to be established has already been established, of what is this the REASON?

If the establishing REASON does not reach what is to be established, then, because it does not reach it, it is not a REASON. Since there is no distinction, it does not constitute a REASON. This is called similarity through reaching and not reaching.

Again, an unacceptable assertion is made concerning the three times. If the establishing REASON exists before what is to be established, then what is to be established does not yet exist. Of what, then, is it the REASON?

If it is said to exist afterward, what is to be established has already been established; what further need is there for a REASON? If both exist simultaneously, the REASON and that which possesses the REASON are both unestablished, like the two horns of an ox. This is called SIMILARITY THROUGH ABSENCE OF A REASON.

Here, as explained above, the alternatives differ successively. Therefore, stated fully, this is called the fault of similarity concerning the REASON. Why is this so?

Because it irrationally repudiates every REASON. For what reason, then, is reaching not the same here? Although there is an appropriate REASON, why is it not called a REASON?

Likewise, why is that which exists here before what is to be established not called a REASON and therefore incapable of establishing it? Moreover, a distinctive fault of self-injury also occurs here. Thus, when a statement of the REASON together with cognition establishes something, there is a fault resembling the REASON through difference.

In the meaning of this REASON there is a similarity that is unestablished. There is no principle by which the dharmas of all REASONS may be repudiated. It is like the two preceding REASONS.

When the meaning to be established is already complete, no further action is performed. That which performs an action should not be regarded as correct reasoning. If it accords with correct reasoning, then when it repudiates something it is called an effective refutation.

The verse says:

Because before it is stated there is no REASON,

There is therefore nothing to be established;

This is called Similarity Through No Statement.

Arising and non-arising are likewise.

A slight difference in what is produced

Is used to show that what is to be established is unestablished;

This is called similarity concerning what is produced,

And is said to resemble similarity concerning the THESIS.

The treatise states:

As stated above, the REASON is not connected with nonexistence, yet there is something to be established; this is called Similarity Through No Statement. That is, the Sarvastivadins maintain: if what was previously to be established—namely, impermanence—is demonstrated by this as the REASON, then before this was stated, both were devoid of real existence. Since the reason had no real existence, it was not impermanent.

This is called Similarity Through No Statement. Arising and non-arising are likewise. Before arising there was no REASON, and therefore nothing was to be established.

This is also called Similarity Through Non-Arising and is explained in the same way. The example of sound was previously given: when the REASON does not exist, what is to be established also does not exist. Here, since there is nothing to be established, one should understand that what is claimed to be established is contradicted.

That is, the Sarvastivadins maintain: regarding what was previously to be established, if sound had not yet arisen, there would be no forceful, uninterrupted production, and thus it would not be impermanent. Moreover, if what is not forcefully and uninterruptedly produced is consequently permanent, this is called Similarity Through Non-Arising. Producing some slight difference in order to show that what is to be established is unestablished is called similarity concerning what is produced.

That is, the property of being produced, which is established, resembles that of a pot, and sound is impermanent. If a pot is impermanent because it possesses a property of being produced that differs from that of sound, how can this be presumed of sound? This is called similarity concerning what is produced.

As repeatedly stated, it resembles similarity concerning the THESIS. Thus, Similarity Through No Statement and its many distinctions resemble the stated similarity concerning the establishment of what is to be established. That is, the unestablished REASON is demonstrated through an excessively elaborate faulty statement.

Or there are other similarities, but here Similarity Through No Statement increases by inference. That is, when the disputant makes a statement to establish the property of impermanence, the objection that the REASON did not exist before it was stated is raised. Therefore, this also resembles the locus of non-establishment or resembles a fallacious REASON.

That is, prior to being stated, there was no increase and no capacity to establish. If the meaning of nonexistence is demonstrated here and another inference is established without the use of words, it may constitute an effective refutation. As for Similarity Through Non-Arising: before sound arose, the increase had already been posited, and the objection was that the REASON did not exist.

If the term in question is refuted by establishing and demonstrating its nonexistence, this can constitute an effective refutation. If, before it arose, it was not forcefully and uninterruptedly produced, then that objection distinguishes it as permanent. This also resembles indeterminacy.

Similarity concerning what is produced is likewise of three kinds. If the objection is that the pot and the property of being produced do not exist in sound, this similarity is also unestablished. If the objection is that the property of sound being produced does not exist in the pot, this similarity becomes contradictory.

If the objection is that this itself is permanent as above, yet it does not share the same similarity, that similarity is indeterminate. Or it is like the fault in the EXAMPLE that leads to the homogeneous dharma. Why is this so?

Although an inference is established by grasping the generality of dharmas, it does not grasp their distinctions. If the meaning of the distinctions were grasped, then inference would certainly cease to exist because of those differences. The verse says:

Though complete, one still seeks a REASON;

This is called Similarity Through the Fault of Arising.

Here, it is difficult to demonstrate in the EXAMPLE;

It is said to resemble similarity concerning the EXAMPLE.

The treatise states:

To seek completeness in the REASON is called the fallacy of resemblance in production. That is, as in the foregoing proposition, the thesis establishes that the jar is impermanent. Yet what, then, does the REASON prove?

– Here, a challenge is raised against this EXAMPLE, called resemblance to an EXAMPLE. That is, the impermanence of the jar is wholly established, yet the statement is not established, just like the challenge concerning the EXAMPLE. Regarding resemblance to an EXAMPLE, a verse says:

The nature of impermanence may accord with it;

It is called resemblance to permanence.

This would establish the nature of permanence,

And is called stating a different THESIS.

The treatise states:

This means that a challenge is raised against the previously established thesis that sound is impermanent: it may be that permanence and impermanence are conjoined in nature, while the intrinsic nature of all dharmas is never separated from permanence. Therefore, sound should also be permanent. This is precisely resemblance to permanence, being similar to something different from the THESIS, and augmenting what is established with respect to impermanence.

Here, no distinction is made between the two. The nature of actual impermanence depends upon this continual change. Its intrinsic nature was originally nonexistent; therefore, what now exists returns again to nonexistence.

This is also called impermanence. This particular phase, being conditioned by its intrinsic nature, is called the nature of impermanence. If that nature differs from what has been stated, and many aspects are taken to constitute the resemblance employed by the refutation, then that nature is established in the utmost degree.

Other masters of the treatises have said that it should likewise be distinguished and established in this manner. This extends still further: through a few differing expedient means, innumerable distinctions and categories may be established. They are therefore not discussed here.

Thus, in this context, the Sarvastivada has spoken of augmentation and diminution, manifestation and non-manifestation, and the production of conceptual distinctions, examples, analogous categories, and so forth. Because everything is spoken of in this way, the truth of ultimate reality should accordingly be distinguished from what is unskillful. Such means of inference were formulated, expressed, and successively transmitted.

As for the other treatises on this subject, their explanations are boundless and therefore cannot conveniently be related in full. Moreover, concerning those deficiencies, the ancient masters of Buddhist logic have already spoken. Some fall under refutation and are subsumed therein; some are excessively abstruse; and some are unreasonable, such as various kinds of deceptive speech.

None of these are copied here. Furthermore, regarding the meaning of the clauses employed by other masters concerning the THESIS, distinctions should likewise be established in this manner. All such discriminations arising from imagined attachment are contrary to reason.

Every assertion of what is wrong or right is called ignorance, for true understanding remains exceedingly remote. Furthermore, if these distinctions result in defects of expression, I myself have formulated many methods of argument by which they may be overcome. In this treatise, without intending to do so, I have refuted the ancient treatises on Buddhist logic and fully established the required distinctions.

For now, let us conclude with this verse:

To awaken the wisdom of those poisoned by delusion,

I have composed this Dharma gateway of wondrous and correct meaning.

May those deluded adherents of the Sarvastivada and non-Buddhist paths

Pass beyond mistaken ways and enter the true meaning.

Treatise on the Gateway to the Correct Principles of Buddhist Logic

(End of the single fascicle)