成實論

CHAPTER 24: THE EXISTENCE OF THE INTERMEDIATE EXISTENCE

The treatise master says: Some say that there is a body of intermediate existence, while others say that there is none.

Question: For what reasons is it said to exist, and for what causes and conditions is it said not to exist?

Answer: Those who say that it exists rely on the Buddha’s statement in the A-du-la-na Sutra: “When the father and mother unite, if that being is dwelling in some place, it immediately comes and takes refuge therein.” Therefore, one should know that there is an intermediate existence. Furthermore, the He-sa Sutra says: “If, after a sentient being has relinquished this body but has not yet received the mind of rebirth in the next body, during that interval I say that craving is the cause and condition.” This is called the intermediate existence.

Furthermore, among the seven kinds of noble persons, there is one who attains extinction during the intermediate existence. Furthermore, a sutra speaks of “variegated arising of karma, variegated reception of bodies, and variegated birth in the world.” Therefore, one should know that there is an intermediate existence. Furthermore, a sutra speaks of four existences: prior existence, existence at death, intermediate existence, and existence at birth.

It also speaks of seven existences: existence in the five destinies, karmic existence, and intermediate existence. Furthermore, it is said that King Yama rebukes sinners in the intermediate existence, and that the past lives of sentient beings are known, namely: this sentient being is born here, and that sentient being is born there. Furthermore, a sutra says: “With the divine eye, one sees sentient beings as they die and are born.” It is also said that sentient beings, bound by the skandhas, go from this world to another world.

Moreover, people in the world also believe in an intermediate existence. They say that when a person dies, there is a subtle body of the four great elements that departs from these skandhas. Furthermore, only if an intermediate existence exists can there be a future life.

If there were no intermediate existence, then after relinquishing this body but before receiving the body of the next birth, that interval would necessarily constitute a break in continuity.

For these reasons, one should know that there is an intermediate existence.

CHAPTER 25: THE NONEXISTENCE OF THE INTERMEDIATE EXISTENCE

Some say that there is no intermediate existence. Although you cite the A-du-la-da-na Sutra as teaching the existence of an intermediate existence, this reasoning is invalid. Why?

If a noble person did not know what it was or from where it came, then there would be no intermediate existence. If it existed, why would the noble person not know it? Furthermore, your citation from the He-sa Sutra is also invalid.

Why? In that sutra, one matter is asked about but another is answered. The brahmin He-sa held that the body was one thing and the spirit another, and therefore this answer was given: the skandhas in the intermediate existence and intermediate state.

Furthermore, concerning your statement that “there is one who attains extinction during the intermediate existence,” this refers to a person who, in the interval between the Desire Realm and the Form Realm, receives a body there and attains extinction; therefore, he is called one who attains extinction during the intermediate existence. Why? As a sutra says: “When a person dies, where does he go, where is he born, and where does he abide?” The meaning is no different.

Furthermore, concerning your words, “variegated reception of bodies and variegated birth in the world,” receiving a body and being born in the world are not different in meaning. Furthermore, concerning your mention of the “four existences and seven existences,” that sutra is incorrect because it does not accord with the characteristics of the Dharma. Furthermore, concerning your statement that “King Yama rebukes them,” that is the body of existence at birth, not intermediate existence.

Furthermore, concerning your statement that “the Buddha knows past lives by means of the intermediate existence,” this reasoning is invalid. Such is the power of noble wisdom: even without continuity, it can still discern and know. Furthermore, concerning your statement that “with the divine eye, one sees the time of death and the time of birth,” intending to be born is called the time of birth, and approaching death is called the time of death; this does not refer to an intermediate existence.

Furthermore, concerning your statement that “sentient beings, bound by the skandhas, go from here to there,” this was said merely to show that there is a future life, not to demonstrate the existence of an intermediate existence. Furthermore, concerning your statement that “at death there are subtle four great elements,” the perceptions and knowledge of ordinary people cannot be trusted; therefore, this cannot serve as a reason.

Furthermore, concerning your statement that “if there were no intermediate existence, the intervening period would constitute a break,” because of the power of karma, this person is born here and that person is born there, just as the past and the future, though they do not connect with each other, can nevertheless be contemplated and remembered. Therefore, there is no intermediate existence.

Furthermore, in the knowledge of past lives, it is said that one knows that this person died here and was born there; it is not said that the person dwelt in an intermediate existence. Furthermore, the Buddha taught three kinds of karma: karma yielding a result in the present life, karma yielding a result in the next birth, and karma yielding a result in a later life. He did not teach karma yielding a result in an intermediate existence.

Furthermore, if the intermediate existence possesses contact, it is called existence at birth. If it cannot make contact, then it does not exist; consequently, feeling, perception, and the rest would also be absent. How, then, could such a state exist?

Furthermore, if a sentient being receives the form of an intermediate existence, this itself is called receiving birth. As a sutra says: “If a person relinquishes this body and receives other bodies, I call this birth.” If no body is received, there is no intermediate existence. Furthermore, if there is falling away from the intermediate existence, it is itself called birth.

Why? Because one must first be born before one can fall away. If there is no falling away, it would be permanent.

Moreover, since birth occurs through the power of karma, what need is there for an intermediate existence? Furthermore, if the intermediate existence is produced by karma, it is existence at birth, since it is said to arise through karma as its cause and condition. If it is not produced by karma, from what could it arise?

An answer must be given at once.

The questioner replies: I maintain that there is a distinct form of existence at birth called the intermediate existence. Therefore, none of the aforementioned faults applies. Although this person is born in the intermediate existence, that existence differs from existence at birth. That which can cause consciousness to enter the kalala—the father’s essence and the mother’s blood, like a drop of curdled milk—is called the intermediate existence.

The treatise master objects: It is the power of karma that can cause consciousness to arrive there; what need is there to distinguish and posit an intermediate existence? Moreover, the mind does not travel to any place. Because of karmic causes and conditions, it merely ceases here and arises there. Furthermore, we presently observe the mind arising without continuity, as when a person’s foot steps on a thorn and pain is known in the head. The consciousness in the foot has no cause or condition by which it could travel into the head. It is only through the conjunction of various proximate and remote conditions that the mind arises. Therefore, there is no need to distinguish and maintain that an intermediate existence exists.

CHAPTER 26: SEQUENTIAL REALIZATION

The treatise master says: Some say that the Four Truths are seen sequentially, while others say that they are seen simultaneously.

Question: For what causes and conditions is it said that they are seen sequentially? And for what causes and conditions is it said that they are seen simultaneously?

Answer: Those who say that they are seen sequentially rely on a sutra that says: “If a person sees the arising of the world, he thereby eliminates attachment to nonexistence. If he sees the cessation of the world, he thereby eliminates attachment to existence.” One should know that the characteristics of arising and cessation differ. Furthermore, if a person can know that however many characteristics of arising there are, all are characteristics of cessation, this is called becoming free from defilement and attaining the purity of the Dharma eye.

It is also said that a person of keen wisdom gradually casts off evil qualities, just as a goldsmith can file away the impurities in gold. Furthermore, the Sutra on the Exhaustion of the Taints says: “Whoever is able to see attains the exhaustion of the taints.” A practitioner may not personally perceive that the taints are diminishing day by day, yet through constant cultivation, all the taints are eventually exhausted.

Furthermore, the Buddha said: “With regard to the Truths, the eye, knowledge, illumination, and wisdom can arise.” There are two aspects of the Truth of Suffering in the Desire Realm, and two in each of the Form Realm and Formless Realm. The Truth of Arising and the others are likewise. Furthermore, in the sutras, the Buddha himself taught that the Truths are seen gradually, just as a person ascends a ladder step by step.

Because of these sutras, one should know that the Four Truths are not seen simultaneously. Furthermore, with regard to the Four Truths, the afflictions involve four kinds of wrong practice: denying suffering, denying its arising, denying its cessation, and denying the path. Therefore, undefiled wisdom must also sequentially cultivate four kinds of right practice.

Furthermore, a practitioner must concentrate the mind and distinguish: this is suffering, this is the cause of suffering, this is the cessation of suffering, and this is the path leading to the cessation of suffering. If these were all contained within a single moment of mind, how could one decisively distinguish them in this way?

Therefore, one should know that they cannot be seen simultaneously.

CHAPTER 27: SIMULTANEOUS REALIZATION

Some say that the Four Truths are seen simultaneously, not sequentially. You say: “Upon seeing the arising of the world, the grasping at nonexistence ceases; upon seeing the cessation of the world, the grasping at existence ceases.” This would destroy your own doctrine, for if so, there would likewise be no need for sixteen kinds of mind and twelve practices in order to attain the Path. Again, some say: “When one knows that however many characteristics of arising there are, all are characteristics of cessation, one then attains the Dharma-eye.” If so, only two minds would be needed to attain the Path: first, the mind contemplating arising; second, the mind contemplating cessation.

Why, then, would precisely sixteen kinds of mind be necessary? Again, you cite the Discourse on the Exhaustion of the Taints, saying: “Whoever is capable of knowing and seeing attains the exhaustion of the taints.” Again, you cite the Discourse on the Exhaustion of the Taints, saying: “Whoever is capable of knowing and seeing attains the exhaustion of the taints.” If so, infinitely many minds would be required, not merely sixteen.

Again, you say that the Buddha himself declared that the Truths are seen successively, like someone climbing a staircase. I have not studied this discourse; even if it exists, it should be discarded, because it does not accord with the characteristics of the Dharma. Again, you speak of four kinds of wrong practice.

With regard to the five skandhas and all other phenomena, there should likewise be wrong practice, and wherever there is wrong practice, knowledge should arise accordingly. Thus, there would be no need for precisely sixteen kinds of mind to attain the Path. Again, you say that one should discern through concentration.

Form and all other phenomena must likewise be discerned. Therefore, there need not be sixteen kinds of mind. Furthermore, practitioners do not attain all the Truths; there is only one Truth, namely, seeing the cessation of suffering, which is called the initial attainment of the Path, because one sees the causes and conditions of all phenomena.

Beginning with the Dharma of Warmth and the other stages, practitioners progressively see the Truths and the Truth of Cessation, and only at the very end do they see the Truth of Cessation. Therefore, this is called attaining the Path.

CHAPTER 28: REGRESSION

The treatise’s author says: Some say that arhats regress, while others say that they do not regress.

Question: For what reasons is it said that they regress, and for what reasons is it said that they do not regress?

Answer: As to the claim that they regress, a discourse says: “After attaining liberation, an arhat may regress because of five causes and conditions”: delighting in work, delighting in recitation and study, delighting in adjudicating matters, delighting in traveling afar, and being frequently ill. A discourse says that there are two kinds of arhats: those liable to regression and those not liable to regression. Again, a discourse says: “It is possible for a bhikkhu to regress from the gateway of liberation.” Again, a discourse says: “Contemplate the body as a vessel; guard the mind as a fortified city; do battle with Mara by means of wisdom; preserve the victory without letting it be destroyed.” If there were no regression, there would be no need to preserve the victory.

Again, there are two kinds of knowledge: the knowledge of exhaustion and the knowledge of non-arising. If, after the knowledge of exhaustion has arisen, the taints do not arise again, what purpose would the knowledge of non-arising serve? Moreover, Udaya had difficulty attaining the concentration of cessation; this was a cause of regression.

Although this person regressed, he was still able to be reborn in the Form Realm.

For these reasons, one should know that regression exists.

CHAPTER 29: NON-REGRESSION

Some say that there is no regression from the Noble Path, but only from meditative concentration.

Question: If so, there would not be two kinds of arhats; there would only be those liable to regression, because all arhats can regress from meditative concentration.

Answer: They regress from mastery over meditative concentration, because not all arhats have attained such mastery.

Question: Was it not the bhikkhu Godhika who, after regressing six times, took a knife and killed himself? If he had merely regressed from meditative concentration, why would he have needed to kill himself? In the Buddha-Dharma, liberation is esteemed, not meditative concentration.

Relying upon that meditative concentration, he would attain the path of arhatship. When he lost that meditative concentration, he lost the untainted state; yet he did not produce it anew, because toward all forms of existence he had become utterly disenchanted and detached. Having completely extinguished all fetters, he had no further characteristic of arising.

Such strong ones are like a lamp whose flame has gone out. It is also said: “Just as a mountain rock cannot be moved by the wind, so such strong ones are not shaken by blame or praise.” Again, a discourse speaks of love giving rise to love and so forth. This arhat has utterly uprooted the root of craving; from what, then, could fetters arise?

It is also said: “One called a Noble One has reached the ultimate end and has completed what was to be done.” It is also said: “The Noble One has scattered and extinguished what will not gather again, and torn apart what will not be woven again.” Again, a discourse says: “Ignorance is the cause and condition for the arising of greed, hatred, and delusion.” In this arhat, ignorance has been utterly extinguished; how, then, could fetters arise?

Again, a discourse says: “If trainees seek the path to nirvana, I declare that they will certainly not become heedless.” Once the taints have been exhausted, they will never arise again; therefore, there is no regression. It is also said: “The wise person thinks well, speaks well, and performs bodily actions well; what he does is faultless.” It is also said: “A bhikkhu delights in the practice of heedfulness because he sees the fault in heedlessness;

thus he does not regress and draws near to nirvana.” Again, a discourse says: “Deer resort to the open fields, birds resort to the sky, phenomena return to discernment, and true persons return to cessation.” Furthermore, three causes and conditions give rise to the fetters: sensual desire has not been severed, desirable objects are present before one, and improper thoughts arise within the mind.

In this arhat, sensual desire has been severed; although desirable objects are present, improper thoughts do not arise. Therefore, fetters do not arise.

It is also said that when a bhikkhu wrongly contemplates phenomena, the three taints arise. This arhat has no wrong contemplation; therefore, the taints do not arise. Again, a discourse says: “If one has known by means of noble wisdom, there is no regression,” just as there is no regression from the fruit of stream-entry.

Moreover, an arhat properly knows the characteristics of the three kinds of feeling: their characteristic of arising, their characteristic of cessation, their gratification, their danger, and the way of escape. Therefore, fetters do not arise. It is also said: “If a bhikkhu has perfected the three things—morality, concentration, and wisdom—he does not regress.” Moreover, an arhat has severed the fetters that have already arisen and causes those that have not yet arisen not to arise.

Again, a discourse says: “A Noble One who practices in accordance with truth certainly does not regress.” An arhat has realized the Four Truths and completely extinguished the taints; therefore, he is called one who practices in accordance with truth. It is also said that the seven factors of awakening are non-regressing qualities. An arhat has fully perfected the seven factors of awakening; therefore, he does not regress.

An arhat has realized unshakable liberation; therefore, he does not regress. Moreover, within the Buddha-Dharma, an arhat has obtained the firm benefit called unshakable liberation. Again, just as a person whose hand has been cut off is always called one whose hand is cut off, whether he thinks of it or not, so too an arhat who has severed the fetters is always called one who has severed them, whether he thinks of it or not.

Again, a discourse says: “One whose faculties, beginning with faith, are keen is called an arhat.” One with keen faculties certainly does not regress. Moreover, an arhat is capable of severing craving through the unsurpassed Dharma; therefore, his mind is well liberated and has reached complete and final extinction. It is like a fire that burns what has not yet been burned: once it has burned it, it does not return to burn the same place again.

So too, because a bhikkhu has perfected the eleven qualities, he certainly does not regress.

Question: There are two kinds of arhats. The discourse you cited speaks of those who do not regress.

Answer: This statement describes the general characteristic: trainees certainly do not become heedless. There is no need to state separately that arhats possess the characteristic of non-regression. Again, the Buddha spoke this verse: “If victory arises again, it is not called victory; victory from which nothing can arise is called true victory.” Moreover, an arhat’s arising has ended; therefore, he no longer receives another body. Although your discourse says that an arhat may regress from the Dharma, he should be able to attain it again. If so, one who is capable of regression should also be capable of not regressing. If a bhikkhu is able to prevent all characteristics from arising, he is called an arhat; therefore, there is no regression.

CHAPTER 30: THE NATURE OF MIND

The treatise’s author says: Some say that the nature of mind is originally pure and becomes impure because of adventitious defilements. Others say the opposite.

Question: For what reasons is it said that the nature of mind is originally pure and becomes impure because of adventitious defilements? And for what reasons is the opposite said?

Answer: Those who maintain the opposite hold that the nature of mind is not originally pure and does not become impure because of adventitious defilements. Why is this? Because the afflictions always arise associated with the mind; they do not have the character of adventitious defilements. Again, there are three kinds of mind: wholesome, unwholesome, and karmically indeterminate. Wholesome and karmically indeterminate minds are not defiled, whereas an unwholesome mind is originally impure in itself, not because of adventitious defilements. Furthermore, this mind arises and ceases from moment to moment without awaiting the afflictions. If the afflictions arise together with it, they cannot be called adventitious.

Question: The mind merely cognizes form and the other objects, and afterward apprehends their characteristics. From these characteristics the afflictions arise and then defile the mind; therefore it is said that the mind is originally pure.

Answer: That is not so. When this mind and its mental factors have already ceased, there is as yet no characteristic of defilement. Once the mind has ceased, where could defilement permeate it?

Question: I do not maintain that the mind ceases from moment to moment when I speak thus; rather, I maintain that the continuum of mind is defiled.

Answer: This continuum of mind exists only according to conventional truth and not according to ultimate truth. Therefore this should not be asserted. Moreover, even according to conventional truth there are many faults: a mind that has arisen has already ceased, while one not yet arisen has not yet come into being; how, then, can there be continuity?

Thus, the nature of the mind is not originally pure and rendered impure by adventitious defilements. It is only because the Buddha taught beings that the mind continually abides that he said that when it is defiled by adventitious defilements, the mind becomes impure. Furthermore, because beings are indolent, if they heard that the mind is originally impure, they would immediately suppose that its nature could not be transformed and would therefore not arouse a pure mind.

Hence it is said to be originally pure.

CHAPTER 31: ASSOCIATED AND NOT ASSOCIATED

The author of the treatise says: Some say that the mind is associated with the latent tendencies; others say that the mind is not associated with them.

Question: For what reasons is the mind said to be associated with them, and for what reasons is it said not to be associated with them?

Answer: The position of those who say that the mind is associated with them will be explained later in the chapter on latent tendencies. Moreover, craving and the other afflictive karmic activities are associated with the latent tendencies. Although your doctrine says that the mind is not associated with the latent tendencies, you nevertheless claim that what is associated with the mind serves as a cause for the fetters.

This is unreasonable. Why? Because the sutras state that through ignorance, wrong mindfulness, wrong thought, and the like, craving and the other fetters arise; no sutra says that they arise from latent tendencies.

Although your doctrine says that when a fetter has been cultivated for a long time, it is called the arising of a latent tendency, this is unreasonable. Why? Because bodily and verbal karma also bear the characteristic of having been cultivated for a long time.

Accordingly, there should also be analogous latent tendencies consisting of formations not associated with mind, yet in truth none exist. If it were so, all dharmas would arise from present causes, without any past causes. Then there would also be no need for karmic retribution to arise from karma, nor for mental consciousness to arise from the mental faculty.

Furthermore, since these latent tendencies cease from moment to moment, from what cause do they arise?

Question: They arise by serving mutually as causes for one another.

Answer: That too is unreasonable, because cause and effect cannot coincide at the same time. This matter will be explained later through the analogy of a lamp. Therefore it should not be said that the latent tendencies are not associated with mind.

CHAPTER 32: PAST KARMA

The author of the treatise says: The followers of Kasyapiya say that past karma whose retribution has not yet been experienced exists, whereas all other past things do not exist.

Answer: If this karma has perished, it is past; if what is past has not perished, then it is permanent. “Perished” is merely another name for “past.” If, after having perished, it were to perish again, then this karma would serve as the cause of a retribution that had already ceased, since the retribution arises afterward. As the sutra says: “Because this exists, that is able to arise.” It is like the cessation of milk serving as the cause of curds.

Why, then, is it necessary to make a special distinction concerning past karma? If it is stated in this way, faults arise concerning causes: how could consciousness arise without a cause? Likewise, without milk, how could there be curds?

If the four great elements did not exist, upon what could bodily and verbal karma depend in order to exist? Yet if the principle is indeed thus, I have already explained the faults in asserting that the past exists; let those who hold that position respond.

CHAPTER 33: DISTINGUISHING THE TWO JEWELS

The author of the treatise says: The followers of Mahisasaka say that the Buddha is included within the Sangha.

Answer: If it is said that the Buddha is included within the four assemblies—namely, the assembly of existing beings, the assembly of living beings, the human assembly, and the assembly of noble persons—then there is no fault. But if it is said that the Buddha is included within the assembly of sravakas, this is faulty, because those who attain awakening by hearing the Dharma are called sravakas; and because the characteristics of a Buddha are different, he is not included within this assembly.

Question: The Buddha is the head of the Sangha, for there are people who make offerings to the Sangha.

Answer: To which class of the Sangha does this offering belong? There is a slight fault in this scriptural statement. It should therefore be said that the offering belongs to the Buddha and the Sangha.

Question: The Buddha told Gautami: “Give this robe to the Sangha; then you will be making an offering to me and also an offering to the Sangha.”

Answer: The Buddha’s intent was that the words were spoken as an offering to him, while the material object was offered to the Sangha. It is as stated in the sutra: “Whoever visits the sick visits me.”

Question: Those who have accomplished the noble qualities, such as Sariputra and the others, are all included within the Sangha. The Buddha is likewise included, since they share the same characteristics.

Answer: If mere similarity of characteristics were sufficient, ordinary persons and even non-sentient things could also be included within the Sangha, but that is impossible. Therefore it is known that the Buddha does not belong within the Sangha. Moreover, the Buddha does not participate in the Sangha’s karman proceedings and adjudications, nor does he share in the Sangha’s communal affairs. Furthermore, because the Three Jewels are distinct, the Buddha is not included within the Sangha.

CHAPTER 34: NON-SELF

The author of the treatise says: The followers of Vatsiputriya say that a self exists. All the others say that it does not exist.

Question: Which doctrine is true?

Answer: The Dharma of non-self is true. Why? As the Buddha said to the bhiksus in the sutra: “It is only because of a name, only because of a provisional designation, and only because of practical usage that it is called a self.” Since it is only a name and so forth, it is known that no real self exists.

Moreover, the sutra says: “Whoever does not see suffering sees a self.” If one sees suffering as it truly is, one no longer sees a self. If a self truly existed, one who sees suffering should also see the self. It is also said that noble persons speak of a self only in conformity with worldly convention.

Furthermore, the Buddha says in the sutra: “The self is a locus of agitation.” If it truly existed, it would not be called a locus of agitation, just as the eye, because it exists, is not called a locus of agitation. Moreover, throughout the sutras attachment to a self is rejected. Thus, the bhiksuni Sela told Mara: “What is called a sentient being is merely a wrong view, for all collections of conditioned dharmas are empty and contain no sentient being.” It is also said that the formations are merely conventionally spoken of when they come together; they are like an illusion that deceives ordinary people, all are enemies and bandits, like an arrow piercing the heart, and possess no true solidity.

It is further said: There is no self, nothing belonging to a self, no sentient being, and no person; there is only emptiness. There are merely the arising, cessation, decay, and destruction that characterize the five skandhas, together with karma and its retribution, but no agent can be apprehended. Through the coming together of conditions, the continuity of dharmas exists.

For these reasons, throughout the sutras the Buddha rejects attachment to a self. Therefore there is no self.

Moreover, the sutra explains the meaning of consciousness: What is called consciousness? It is that which can cognize form, up to and including dharmas; it does not say that it cognizes a self. Therefore there is no self.

The bhiksu Guna asked the Buddha: “Who eats? Does consciousness eat?” The Buddha replied: “I do not say that there is an eater of food.” If a self existed, he should have said that the self eats food. Since he did not say this, it is known that there is no self.

Furthermore, in the sutra concerning King Bimbisara welcoming the Buddha, it is said: “The Buddha told the bhiksus: Observe how ordinary people pursue a provisional name and believe that a self exists. Yet within these five skandhas there is truly neither self nor anything belonging to a self.” It is also said that, because of the five skandhas, there are various names: self, sentient being, person, deva, and so forth.

Such innumerable designations all exist on account of the five skandhas. If a self existed, the cause of the self should have been stated. Moreover, the elder Purnika told the non-Buddhist ascetics: “One who holds the wrong view takes what does not exist to exist.” The Buddha wished to eliminate this wrong conceit, not to annihilate sentient beings.

Therefore he taught that there is no self.

Furthermore, in the Yamaka Sutra, the Venerable Sariputra said to Yamaka: “Do you regard the form skandha as an arhat?”

Answer: No.

Question: Do you regard feeling, perception, formations, or consciousness as an arhat?

Answer: No.

Question: Do you regard the combination of the five skandhas as an arhat?

Answer: No.

Question: Do you regard what is apart from the five skandhas as an arhat?”

Answer: Neither is that the case.

Shariputra said: If so, since it cannot be ascertained through investigation, should one then say that after death an arhat no longer exists?

He answered: “Venerable Shariputra! Formerly I held a pernicious wrong view, but now, upon hearing this teaching, that wrong view has immediately ceased.” If there were a self, that view would not be called pernicious and wrong. Furthermore, among the four kinds of clinging, there is said to be “clinging to doctrines of self.” If a self truly existed, it should be called clinging to self, just as there is clinging to sensual desire and so forth; it should not be called clinging to doctrines of self.

Furthermore, as stated in the Vinaya Sutra: “Among the three teachers, if there is a teacher who does not apprehend a present self or a future self, I declare that teacher to be a Buddha.” Because the Buddha apprehends neither, one should know that there is no self. Furthermore, where there is no self, the perception of a self is regarded as a delusion. If you think that perceiving a self where there is a self is not a delusion, this is unreasonable.

Why? Because the Buddha said: “Whatever selves beings perceive are all perceived in relation to the five skandhas.” Therefore, there is no self. It is also said that whenever beings recollect their former lives, they are likewise recollecting the five skandhas.

If there were a self, they should also recollect that self. Since they do not recollect it, one should know that there is no self. You may think that there are also sutras that speak of recollecting beings, as when one says, “Among those beings, I was the being bearing such-and-such a name.” But this too is unreasonable.

Such statements are distinctions made according to conventional truth; in reality, what is recollected is the five skandhas, not a being. Why? Because it is mental consciousness that recollects, and mental consciousness takes only dharmas as its objects.

Therefore, there is no recollection of a being. Furthermore, anyone who asserts with certainty that a self exists must fall into one of the six wrong views. You may think that the assertion that there is no self is also one kind of wrong view, but this is unreasonable.

Why? Because there are two truths. If, according to conventional truth, one said there were no self, while according to the ultimate truth one said there were a self, that would be erroneous.

I now speak according to the ultimate truth, and therefore there is no error; according to conventional truth, it exists. Thus, there is no error. Furthermore, the Buddha taught that the root of the view of self must be uprooted, as in King Si’s question.

The Buddha replied: “King Si! If one single-mindedly contemplates all worlds as empty, one can uproot the view of self and will no longer see the king of death.” Furthermore, according to the various teachings, all such things as the sorrow and joy of a self, said to arise through causes and conditions, actually arise from the five skandhas. This teaching also refutes the causes and conditions underlying the various views of self held by non-Buddhists.

Therefore, there is no self.

CHAPTER 35: THE EXISTENCE AND NONEXISTENCE OF SELF

Question: Your assertion that there is no self is unreasonable. Why? Because of the four alternatives.

Answer: The fourth alternative is to set aside the question without answering. That is, concerning a person after death: either the person exists, or does not exist; both exists and does not exist; or neither exists nor does not exist. If there truly were no self, this mode of setting the question aside should not exist.

Furthermore, anyone who says that there is no being who receives a subsequent body thereby holds a wrong view. Furthermore, among the twelve divisions of scripture are the Jataka sutras, in which the Buddha himself said: “That King Mahasudarshana was my own former body.” Such accounts of former births exist. The present five skandhas are not the former five skandhas.

Therefore, there must be a self continuing from the past until the present. Furthermore, the Buddha said: “One rejoices now and rejoices hereafter; having done good, one rejoices in both worlds.” If there were only the five skandhas, he should not have spoken of rejoicing in both worlds. Furthermore, a sutra states: “When the mind is defiled, beings are defiled; when the mind is purified, beings are purified.” Again, when one person is born into the world, many people suffer distress; and when one person is born into the world, many people gain benefit.

Furthermore, the creation of wholesome or unwholesome karmic causes depends upon beings, not upon things outside the category of beings. Moreover, in many passages of the sutras the Buddha himself said: “I teach that there are beings capable of receiving a subsequent body,” and spoke of those capable of benefiting themselves but not others, and so forth. For these reasons, one should know that a self exists.

Although you previously said that it exists only as a designation and so forth, this is unreasonable. Why? Because the Buddha taught non-Buddhists that there is no self only because, apart from the five skandhas, they separately clung to a self characterized as permanent and indestructible.

He wished to eliminate this wrong view, and therefore taught that there is no self. We now say that the harmonious combination of the five skandhas is called the self; therefore, we do not incur this fault. Furthermore, although you have said that the self exists only as a designation and so forth, this statement should be carefully considered.

If beings existed only as designations, then just as killing a clay ox does not incur the offense of killing, killing a real ox should likewise incur no offense. Again, if a child offers something existing merely in name, there is no karmic result; therefore, when an adult makes an offering, that person likewise should receive no karmic result—yet in fact that is not so. Furthermore, if something exists only as a designation and, though nonexistent, is spoken of as existent, would sages not thereby speak falsely?

One is called a sage precisely because one speaks truthfully! Therefore, one should know that a self exists. Again, if sages perceive the real self but, in conformity with convention, say that a self exists, then their perception would be deluded, because what they say would differ from what they perceive.

Furthermore, if, merely to conform to convention, they speak of what is nonexistent as existent, then they should not also teach in the sutras the true meaning of the twelve links of dependent origination, the three liberations, the selflessness of all dharmas, and so forth. If someone asserts that there is a future life and one simply agrees that there is, then conversely, if someone asserts that there is none, one should likewise agree that there is none.

And if someone asserts that all things in the world are created by Ishvara, should one also simply agree? Should one similarly concur with all the scriptures and writings embodying such wrong views? None of this should be done.

Therefore, all the sutras you cited are comprehensively refuted. Consequently, it is not the case that there is no self.

Answer: You previously said that, because the Buddha declined to answer, it should be known that a self exists. This is unreasonable. Why?

Because this is an ineffable dharma. This will be extensively distinguished and explained later, in the section on the truth of cessation. Therefore, no real self exists.

Moreover, what is ineffable is spoken of only as a conventional designation; it does not truly exist. Furthermore, in your doctrine, the self is known by the six consciousnesses, as your scripture says: “Because the eye sees forms, the self deteriorates.” If so, regarding what is known by eye-consciousness, it should not be said that it is neither form nor non-form. The same applies to sounds and all the rest.

Furthermore, if the self is an object known by the six consciousnesses, this also contradicts the scripture. The scripture says that the five sense-consciousnesses cannot take one another’s five objects, because their domains are distinct. If the self could be known by all six consciousnesses, the six faculties would function interchangeably.

Moreover, your earlier and later statements contradict each other: that which is known by eye-consciousness is not called form. You also say, “The view of no-self is a wrong view.” Yet in the scriptures the Buddha himself told the bhiksus: “Although there is no self, because the formations continue in succession, birth and death are spoken of. With the divine eye, I see sentient beings as they are born and as they die.” He did not say that there is a self.

Moreover, your doctrine entails a fault. Your doctrine says that the self is unborn. If it is unborn, it has no father or mother; if it has no father or mother, there can be no heinous offense against one’s parents, nor any other sinful karma.

Therefore, your doctrine is itself a wrong view. You also speak of former births. Because of the five skandhas, one is called King Joyful Vision; because those same five skandhas continue in succession, one is called the Buddha.

Therefore, he said, “I was that king.” In your doctrine the self is one, so no such distinction should be made. You also say that one who does good rejoices in both lives. In the scriptures the Buddha himself rejected this, saying: “I do not say that there is someone who abandons these five skandhas and receives other skandhas.

It is only because the five skandhas continue in succession without being different that one is said to rejoice in both lives.” You also say that because the mind is defiled, the sentient being is defiled. From this it should be known that no real self exists. If a real self existed, it would be distinct from the mind, and one should not say that because the mind is defiled, the sentient being is defiled.

Why? Because it is impossible for one thing to be defiled while another undergoes the consequence. It is only through causes and conditions that the conventionally designated entity is defiled; hence it is said that the conventionally designated entity is defiled.

Therefore, the self is a conventional designation, not an ultimately real entity. Furthermore, according to your doctrine, the self is not the five skandhas. It would therefore neither arise nor cease and would have neither merit nor sin, entailing faults such as these.

We maintain that the harmonious combination of the five skandhas is conventionally designated as the self. Because of this self, there is arising and ceasing, as well as merit and sin. Thus, it is not that the conventional designation does not exist, but it does not truly exist.

Moreover, you previously said, “The Buddha taught no-self because he intended to refute non-Buddhist teachings.” This is merely your own deluded conceptual discrimination and is not the Buddha’s intention. Furthermore, all theories asserting a self are erroneous. You say that non-Buddhists separate the self from the five skandhas and then independently cling to its existence, but you do the same.

Why? The five skandhas are impermanent, whereas the self, you say, cannot be described as either permanent or impermanent; thus, it is separate from the skandhas. Furthermore, the skandhas have three divisions: morality, concentration, and wisdom; wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate; and those bound to the desire realm, the form realm, and the formless realm.

When they are distinguished in this way, the self cannot be apprehended among them and is therefore different from the five skandhas. Moreover, the self is a person, whereas the five skandhas are not a person; therefore, they are different. Furthermore, the skandhas are five, whereas the self is one; therefore, the self is not the skandhas.

If a self existed, then for all these reasons it would be distinct from the five skandhas. Moreover, nowhere in the world is there any dharma of which it cannot be said either that it is one with something or that it is different from it. Therefore, there is no ineffable dharma.

Question: Consider burning and that which can be burned—that is, the combustible object. They cannot be said to be one, nor can they be said to be different. Is the self not likewise?

Answer: This too is subject to the same doubt. What is burning, and what can be burned? If fire is what burns and something else is what can be burned, then the burning is different from what can be burned.

If fire itself is what can be burned, how can it be said that they are not one? If what can be burned is itself fire, then apart from fire nothing else burns; thus, this is said to be subject to the same doubt. If that which can be burned exists within the burning, just as form exists within the self, then this falls into the view of a personal body.

Moreover, there would have to be many selves. Just as the fire of wood differs from the fire of cow dung, so too would the self differ: the self based upon human skandhas would be different from the self based upon celestial skandhas. There would thus be many selves.

Furthermore, burning and that which can be burned exist throughout the three times; the self and the five skandhas would likewise have to exist throughout the three times, just as burning and that which can be burned do. Because burning and that which can be burned are conditioned, the self and the five skandhas would also have to be conditioned. Moreover, although you say, “Burning and that which can be burned are neither one nor different,” the eye nevertheless sees their characteristics as different.

The self and the five skandhas would likewise have to be different. Furthermore, the five skandhas perish, while the self does not perish, because it dies here and is born there, thus rejoicing in both lives. If the self perished and arose in accordance with the five skandhas, then it would be the same as the five skandhas and could not be said to rejoice in both lives.

What benefit do you gain by deludedly conceptualizing and discriminating a self? Furthermore, among the various objects there is no single object known by all six consciousnesses. If the self of which you speak can be known by all six consciousnesses, then it is not one of the six objects.

Moreover, it is not included among the twelve ayatanas and therefore is not an ayatana. Nor is it included within the Four Truths. Therefore, to say that a self exists is false speech.

Furthermore, your doctrine says that knowable dharmas fall into five categories: past, future, present, unconditioned, and ineffable dharmas. If the self belongs to the fifth category, it is different from the other four dharmas. You wish it to be different from the first four while not belonging to the fifth, but this is impossible.

Since asserting a self entails all these faults, what need is there to deludedly conceptualize and discriminate a self? Therefore, your previous statement, “Non-Buddhists separate the self from the five skandhas and independently cling to its existence, but we do not,” is unreasonable. Moreover, you previously said that, because the self is merely a conventional designation, its meaning must be carefully considered.

This is unreasonable. Moreover, you previously said that, because the self is merely a conventional designation, its meaning must be carefully considered. This is unreasonable.

Why? Because in the Buddha-Dharma, matters of conventional truth need not be carefully examined. The same applies to your statement concerning false speech and inverted views.

Moreover, you say, “The true meaning should not be taught in the scriptures.” Yet it should be taught, so that people may understand the ultimate truth. You also say that whatever is commonly said in the world should be accepted accordingly. But if it is said that all things are born from Isvara, this should not be accepted.

If a statement is beneficial and does not contradict the true meaning, it should be accepted. Thus, there is no fault. Whatever, within conventional truth, can produce virtue and bring benefit should be accepted.

This will be explained extensively later. You also say that killing clay oxen and the like does not incur the sin of killing. This can now be answered: In beings possessing consciousness, where the skandhas continue in succession, there are karma and karmic retribution; in clay oxen and the like, there is no such process.

Therefore, it should be known that the harmonious combination of the five skandhas is conventionally designated as the self, but no real self exists.

CHAPTER ON THE CHARACTERISTICS OF FORM, IN THE TREATISE ON FORM WITHIN THE GROUP OF THE TRUTH OF SUFFERING — CHAPTER 36

Question: You previously said that you would expound the Treatise on the Establishment of Truth. What, then, is established as true?

Answer: The Four Truths are true: suffering, the cause of suffering, the cessation of suffering, and the path to the cessation of suffering. The five appropriated skandhas are suffering. Karma and the afflictions are the cause of suffering.

The ending of suffering is the cessation of suffering. The Noble Eightfold Path is the path to the cessation of suffering. This treatise was composed in order to establish these dharmas.

The Buddha himself also established these teachings and, wishing to liberate sentient beings, taught them in various places. Furthermore, the Buddha briefly taught a Dharma treasury of eighty-four thousand teachings. Within it are the four reliances and the eight causes; some of these meanings were omitted and left unspoken, while others were taught only briefly.

I now wish to compile and arrange them systematically so that their meaning may become clear; therefore, I expound them.

Question: You say that the five appropriated skandhas are the truth of suffering. What are the five?

Answer: Form, consciousness, perception, feeling, and formations are the five skandhas. The form skandha consists of the four great elements and the phenomena produced from the four great elements; these phenomena are also formed from the four great elements, and all are collectively called form. The four great elements are earth, water, fire, and wind.

The four great elements are constituted by color, odor, taste, and tangible objects. From these four great elements, the five faculties, beginning with the eye, are formed. When these things strike one another, sound arises.

Earth is the aggregation of color and the other qualities in which hardness predominates, and therefore it is called earth. Likewise, that in which moisture predominates is called water; that in which heat predominates is called fire; and that in which lightness and motion predominate is called wind. The eye faculty is that which takes only color as its object and serves as the support of eye-consciousness; things of the same nature even when they do not serve as its support are all called the eye faculty.

The other four faculties are likewise. Color is that which serves only as an object of eye-consciousness; things of the same nature, even when they are not being cognized, are called color. Odor, taste, and tangible objects are likewise.

When these things strike one another, sound arises.

CHAPTER 37: THE DESIGNATION “FORM”

Question: The sutra says that all existing forms are the four great elements and the phenomena produced from the four great elements. Why does it say that all of them “are” so?

Answer: To say that all existing forms are so is to speak definitively of the characteristic of form, not of anything else. Some non-Buddhists maintain that there are five great elements. In order to reject this doctrine, the four great elements are taught. “Produced from the four great elements” means that the four great elements exist by provisional designation. Because they pervade everywhere, they are called “great.” Formless and shapeless phenomena have no shape; because they have no shape, they have no spatial direction; and because they have no spatial direction, they are not called “great.” Furthermore, because they appear grossly, they are called great. Mind and mental factors do not appear, and therefore are not called great.

Question: Why are earth and the other phenomena called form, while sound and the others are not?

Answer: Phenomena that offer resistance are called form. Sound and the others all offer resistance and therefore are also called form, unlike mind and other such phenomena. Because they possess shape, they are called form. Sound and the others all possess shape and therefore are also called form. Because they obstruct a place, they are said to possess shape.

Question: Color and the others do not all possess shape, while sound and the others are altogether shapeless.

Answer: Sound and the others all possess shape. Because they possess shape, offer resistance, and create obstruction, they cannot be heard when blocked by a wall.

Question: If sound and the others create obstruction, then they should not admit other things, just as a wall, because it obstructs, cannot admit anything.

Answer: Because sound is subtle, it can admit other things. Odor, taste, and the others are likewise subtle, and therefore can share the same shape without obstructing one another. Thus, because sound and the others create obstruction and offer resistance, they are all called form. Furthermore, because their characteristics can be damaged and destroyed, they are called form. All such things as cutting, severing, and injury depend upon form. Because the formless absorptions are contrary to form, they are called “formless.” Furthermore, because form reveals good and bad karma from previous lives, it is called form. It also reveals mind and mental factors, and therefore is called form. Furthermore, because it is designated by a name, it is called form.

CHAPTER 38: THE FOUR GREAT ELEMENTS EXIST BY PROVISIONAL DESIGNATION

Question: The proposition that the four great elements exist by provisional designation has not yet been established, for some people maintain that the four great elements truly exist.

Answer: The four great elements exist only by provisional designation. Why is this so? The Buddha taught the four great elements for the sake of non-Buddhists.

Some non-Buddhists, such as the Samkhya school, say that color and the others are themselves the great elements. Others, such as the Vaisheshika school, say that the great elements exist apart from color and the others. Therefore, this sutra definitively states that earth and the other great elements are formed from color and the others.

Thus, it is known that the great elements exist by provisional designation. Furthermore, the sutra says that the earth element is hardness and that which depends upon hardness. Therefore, it is known that hardness alone is not regarded as earth.

People in the world also all believe that the great elements exist by provisional designation. Why? People in the world speak of seeing earth, smelling earth, touching earth, and the odor of earth.

Furthermore, the sutra says, “Earth can be seen and touched.” Moreover, when one enters into the totality meditations on earth and the other elements, one sees the color of earth but does not see hardness and the other qualities. Again, one can point out the color of earth, the odor of earth, the taste of earth, and the tangible quality of earth; among phenomena that truly exist, one cannot point out anything else in this way.

Furthermore, the meaning of the word “great” is all-pervading. This characteristic applies to what exists by provisional designation, not merely to the characteristic of hardness. Furthermore, when it is said that earth rests upon water, it is provisionally designated earth that rests there, not hardness alone.

Again, when it is said that the great earth is entirely consumed by fire, with neither smoke nor charcoal remaining, it is provisionally designated earth that is burned, not hardness alone. Moreover, it is because of color and the other qualities that one believes in the existence of earth and the other elements, not merely because of hardness and the others. Furthermore, in the simile of the well, water is said to be both visible and tangible.

If moisture alone were water, it could not possess these two aspects. Why? The Buddha taught that the consciousnesses of the five faculties cannot apprehend one another’s objects.

Therefore, the Buddha said that water possesses eight qualities: lightness, coolness, softness, sweetness, clarity, absence of foul odor, producing harmony and ease whenever it is drunk, and causing no illness after it has been drunk. Of these, lightness, coolness, and softness belong to the tangible ayatana; sweetness belongs to the taste ayatana; clarity belongs to the form ayatana; absence of foul odor belongs to the odor ayatana; and producing harmony and ease and causing no illness are the powers of water.

The combination of these eight is collectively called water. Therefore, it is known that the great elements exist by provisional designation. Furthermore, all phenomena formed from causes exist by provisional designation and have no true existence.

As a verse says:

Again, as Ananda said:

Phenomena arise from many conditions;
The self has no fixed abode.

Furthermore, those who say that hardness and the other qualities are the great elements take hardness and the others as the supports upon which color and the others depend. If so, there is both a dependent thing and a master, and these cannot be real phenomena. Therefore, it is known that the four great elements all exist by provisional designation.

Moreover, among phenomena there are softness, fineness, smoothness, and the like, all of which are included in the tangible ayatana. What special significance do the four phenomena of hardness and the others possess that they alone should be regarded as the great elements? Furthermore, concerning a single thing, there are four kinds of attachment, all of which are erroneous.

Therefore, it is known that the four great elements exist by provisional designation. Moreover, there are the characteristics of real phenomena, the characteristics of provisionally designated things, and the capacities of provisionally designated things. These will be explained extensively later.

Therefore, the four great elements do not truly exist.

CHAPTER 39: THE FOUR GREAT ELEMENTS TRULY EXIST

Question: The four great elements truly exist. Why? The Abhidharma says, “The characteristic of hardness is the earth element; the characteristic of moisture is the water element; the characteristic of heat is the fire element; and the characteristic of motion is the wind element.” Therefore, the four great elements truly exist.

Furthermore, derivative forms such as color are produced from the four great elements. Something that exists merely by provisional designation cannot produce phenomena. Moreover, hardness and the other qualities belong exclusively to the four great elements.

What is called hardness and that which depends upon hardness is earth. Therefore, hardness and the other qualities are the real great elements. Furthermore, in a sutra the Buddha spoke of two things: hardness and that which depends upon hardness, moisture and that which depends upon moisture, and so forth.

Thus, it is known that hardness is a real phenomenon, whereas that which depends upon hardness exists by provisional designation. The other great elements are likewise. Therefore, hardness and the other qualities are the real great elements.

Those phenomena that depend upon hardness are called great elements only in accordance with conventional usage. Thus, there are two kinds of great elements: those that are real and those that exist by provisional designation. Furthermore, the Abhidharma says, “The spatial form is earth, while the characteristic of hardness is the earth element.” The other great elements are likewise.

Moreover, in a sutra the Buddha said, “Whatever hardness is present within the physical eye is earth; moisture and that which depends upon moisture are water; heat and that which depends upon heat are fire.” The physical flesh is earth. Since the Buddha said that the four great elements are present within this physical flesh, it should be known that hardness and the other qualities are the real great elements, whereas physical form is a provisionally designated great element.

Furthermore, the Buddha did not say that there is anything upon which wind depends, and therefore it is known that wind is a real great element. Moreover, if, as you say, the four great elements exist by provisional designation, then they would be separate from the characteristics of the great elements. If that which depends upon hardness is called the earth element, then when water depends upon a hard object, would that water itself be earth?

When a lump of mud depends upon moisture, would that mud itself be water? When a person suffers from a fever and the entire body becomes hot, would the body itself be fire? This is unreasonable.

Therefore, one cannot say that what depends upon hardness is the earth element; only hardness itself is the earth element. The other great elements are likewise.

Furthermore, the four great elements constitute living beings and therefore are not separate from one another. As stated in the sutra: “Whatever material form exists is all produced from the four great elements.” If one says that the four great elements are real, then they are not separate from one another. But if the four great elements are mere conventional designations, they should be separate from one another.

Why? Because all forms depend upon hardness, apart from all forms of moisture, and so forth. If this were so, the four great elements would not be present in the eye faculty, which would also contradict the sutra.

If you wish not to contradict the sutra, you should acknowledge that the four great elements are real. Previously, you said: “The four great elements were taught for the sake of non-Buddhist schools.” This is unreasonable. Why?

Because the non-Buddhist schools say that the four great elements are either identical with or different from material form and the rest. We say that a small portion included within the tactile ayatana constitutes the four great elements. Therefore, we do not incur this fault.

Moreover, we say that the perceptible qualities of hardness and the rest are the four great elements; this is unlike the Vaisheshikas, who say that the four great elements exist but are not perceptible. You also spoke of hardness and that which depends upon hardness. Dependence has two meanings.

As stated in the sutra, material form depends upon material form. It is also said that mind depends upon the great Dharma. In the present context, hardness itself is that which depends upon hardness; no other dharma is being spoken of.

If so, what fault is there? You also said that worldly people universally believe this, even to the point of saying that water has eight meritorious qualities. This is merely speech in conformity with worldly convention; it does not mean that they are real great elements.

You also said that all dharmas formed from causes are conventional designations. This is unreasonable. Why?

Because the sutra speaks of “the six ayatanas, or dharmas formed through the six ayatanas of contact.” Again, a bhikshu asked the Buddha, “What is the eye?” The Buddha replied, “The pure material form produced from the four great elements is called the eye.” In this way the twelve ayatanas are established. You also said that there is a possessor and a support. We do not say this; we merely say that one dharma abides within another dharma.

You further asked: “What meaning do hardness and the rest possess that they alone are called ‘great’?” Hardness and the rest have the following meanings: the characteristic of hardness is capable of supporting; the characteristic of water is capable of moistening; the characteristic of fire is capable of heating; and wind is capable of bringing things to completion. Therefore, the four great elements are real.

CHAPTER 40: REFUTATION OF THE FOREGOING PROOF

Answer: This is unreasonable. The four great elements are conventional designations. Although you cite the Abhidharma, which says that the characteristic of hardness is the earth element, and so forth, this is unreasonable.

Why? Because the Buddha himself said that hardness and that which depends upon hardness are earth, not merely the characteristic of hardness. Therefore, this is not a valid reason.

You also said that material form and the rest are produced from the four great elements. This is unreasonable. Why?

Because material form and the rest arise from karma, afflictions, food and drink, sexual desire, and so forth. As stated in the sutra: “From what does the eye arise? It arises from past karma.” It is also said that because the accumulation of craving and delight exists, the accumulation of material form exists.

Moreover, Ananda instructed a bhikshuni: “Sister, your body is born from food and drink, born from craving and conceit, and born from sexual desire.” Therefore, one should know that material form and the rest are not produced solely from the four great elements.

Question: Although material form and the rest arise from karma and so forth, surely the four great elements must also participate to some degree. For example, rice exists because of karma, yet this rice is also produced with the aid of seeds and other conditions. Likewise, although the eye and the rest arise from karma, the four great elements also participate as contributing causes.

Answer: Some things arise without causes and conditions. For example, after a kalpa has ended, at the beginning of the next kalpa there is a great rainstorm. From what does this rainwater arise? Again, whatever the devas desire is obtained as soon as they think of it. Likewise, meditators and persons of great merit obtain whatever they desire according to their wishes. From what conditions do all these things arise? Do they not arise solely from karma? Furthermore, after the continuity of material form has ceased, it arises again. For example, one born in the formless realm may subsequently be reborn in the form realm. What is the basis from which this material form arises?

Question: Why are some things produced solely by karma, while others must await external auxiliary conditions before arising?

Answer: When the karmic power of living beings is weak, it must rely upon seeds and various auxiliary conditions to bring things about. But when their karmic power is strong, external conditions are unnecessary. It is also natural for dharmas to be so: certain karmas, certain dharmas, or certain places of birth are attained solely through karmic power, without requiring external conditions.

Moreover, if causes and conditions are necessary, one should say that seeds serve as the causes of sprouts and the rest. Why must one say that they arise from hardness and the rest? Again, for what reason are material form and the rest produced from hardness and the rest, rather than hardness and the rest being produced from material form and the rest?

Furthermore, hardness and the rest arise together with material form and the rest. Why say that material form and the rest exist because of hardness and the rest, but not that hardness and the rest exist because of material form and the rest? Moreover, dharmas arising simultaneously cannot serve as causes for one another.

Just as two horns arise simultaneously, the left and right horn cannot be said to cause each other.

Question: Although a lamp and its light arise simultaneously, it is still said that the light depends upon the lamp, whereas the lamp does not depend upon the light. Is this matter not the same?

Answer: The lamp and its light are not different. A lamp is formed by the combination of two dharmas: material form and tactile qualities. Its material form is precisely its light; therefore, the light cannot be said to be different from the lamp. You have not considered this analogy carefully.

Question: This light proceeds from the lamp and spreads into various places. Therefore, must it not be different?

Answer: It does not proceed and spread into other places. This luminous material form is visibly present within the lamp. If it went elsewhere, the light would still be seen after the lamp was extinguished, but in fact it is not seen. Therefore, one should know that this light is not different from the lamp.

Question: There are also dharmas that arise simultaneously and yet serve as cause and effect for one another. For example, among conditioned things, consciousness takes the eye and material form as its causes and conditions, whereas the eye and material form do not take consciousness as their cause and condition.

Answer: That is not so. Eye-consciousness takes the preceding mental consciousness as its cause and takes the eye and material form as its conditions. Since the preceding mind has already ceased, how could they arise simultaneously?

Furthermore, if a dharma arises in dependence upon that which causes it, it is thereby something formed from causes. Since mind exists in dependence upon the faculties and their objects as its causes, it is a dharma formed from causes. Furthermore, the four great elements themselves are derived material form, because they too are produced from causes.

Moreover, things in the world are visibly produced from causes resembling themselves: rice is produced from rice, and maize from maize. Likewise, earth is produced from earth and does not produce water and the rest. Similarly, material form is produced from material form, and so forth.

Question: It is also seen that some things are produced from dissimilar causes. For example, when ox hair is planted upside down, bulrushes grow, and when a horn is planted, vĩ grass grows.

Answer: I do not say that things are never produced from dissimilar causes; I merely say that they can also be produced from similar causes. Therefore, it is said that material form and the rest are produced from material form and the rest, and not solely from the four great elements. Consequently, it cannot be asserted definitively that material form and the rest are produced from the four great elements.

Again, someone says: “The four great elements are indicated by hardness and the rest. Therefore, hardness and the rest are the real great elements.” This is unreasonable. Why?

Because the definite characteristics of hardness and the rest can be used to distinguish the four, whereas softness and the rest are not definite. Softness may be present where hardness predominates or where moisture predominates. Therefore, softness and the rest cannot be used to distinguish these elements.

The same applies to the other qualities. Moreover, among tactile qualities such as hardness and the rest, which are called softness and the rest, and why? Moisture can also produce pliancy, softness, slipperiness, and smoothness; because the characteristic of hardness predominates, there are hardness, coarseness, roughness, and so forth.

Therefore, only hardness is used to distinguish the four kinds. Moreover, as stated in the sutra: “The distinctions among the four great elements are indicated through that which depends upon hardness.” Therefore, one should know that the dharmas depending upon hardness are called the earth element, not merely the characteristic of hardness. Thus, the characteristic of hardness is said to be a cause forming earth.

Furthermore, among the causes forming earth, the characteristic of hardness is the predominant cause and is therefore mentioned separately. The same applies to the other characteristics. Moreover, by the establishment of names, everything that is hard or depends upon hardness is called the earth element.

Alternatively, some people say that only the characteristic of hardness is the earth element. To refute this interpretation, the Buddha taught that hardness together with what is based upon hardness constitutes the earth element. The other great elements are likewise.

Moreover, among the many characteristics associated with hardness, because hardness predominates, two modes of expression are employed. In every composite thing there are tactile qualities such as hardness and the rest: hardness together with what is based upon hardness is called the earth element; moisture together with what is based upon moisture is called the water element; heat together with what is based upon heat is called the fire element.

Furthermore, hardness is the predominant cause in the formation of earth; therefore, what is present therein is called earth-formed. Among the causes and conditions of conventional designation, there are conventionally designated names, as when one says, “I see a person cutting down the forest.” It is also said that there are two modes of expression. This is unreasonable.

If whatever is spoken of as an “element” is therefore real, then the twelve ayatanas and the rest would not be real. Thus, because eye-consciousness arises dependent upon the eye and form, it would not be real, since the word “element” is not used. This is a false doctrine.

Moreover, when the Buddha entered the fire-element samadhi, many forms of flame issued from his body. Which among them was the fire element? Fire is constituted by form and the other qualities, not by the characteristic of heat alone.

Furthermore, the Buddha said that this body is a small casket containing hair of the head, body hair, nails, and the rest. As a sutra says: “Within this body are hair of the head, body hair, nails, and the rest.” Therefore, hair of the head, body hair, nails, and the rest are the earth element; they are not called real dharmas merely because two modes of expression are employed. Again, the Seed Sutra says: “If there were the earth element but no water element, seeds could not grow.” What is the earth element here?

It means the conventionally designated field, not merely the characteristic of hardness. Water too is a conventional designation, not merely the characteristic of moisture. Furthermore, it is impossible for a single dharma to be of two kinds, both real and conventionally designated.

Therefore, form and the rest are real. Again, if the eye and the rest are conventionally designated, while the great elements are both real and conventionally designated, this too is a false doctrine.

Furthermore, in the Sutra of the Six Elements, the Buddha called hair of the head, body hair, nails, and the rest the earth element. The Sutra of the Elephant-Footprint Simile likewise says that hair of the head, body hair, nails, and the rest are the earth element. Moreover, on what grounds do you say that “element” is real rather than conventionally designated?

This meaning is not recorded in the sutras. Again, as for your statement, “The Buddha said that whatever hardness and what is based upon hardness are present in the configuration of the eye are earth, and so forth,” the Buddha used these words to show that the five faculties are constituted by the four great elements. Some say that the faculties arise from a self; some claim that faculties exist separately from the great elements; and some say that the faculties arise from various distinct natures—that the olfactory faculty and the rest arise from the great element of earth.

Wishing to put an end to these attachments, the Buddha taught that the eye and the other faculties are constituted through the combination of the four great elements; thus, within a hair there is no real dharma. Furthermore, since a conventional designation is established through conceptual differentiation, even that conventional designation has no inherent existence. Again, within this configuration of flesh are four aspects—hardness and what is based upon hardness, and the rest.

The Buddha used these words to show that the existence of things arises from the four great elements. Again, you say, “Because the Buddha did not speak of anything based upon wind, it is therefore called a real great element.” This is unreasonable. Why?

Because lightness is the predominant characteristic of wind, but there is no dharma of lightness based upon it; with earth and the other elements, however, the dharmas based upon hardness and the rest predominate. Wind is not so. Moreover, because dharmas based upon lightness are few, they were not mentioned.

Again, you say, “If the four great elements are conventionally designated, they would be separate from the characteristics of the great elements.” This is unreasonable. Hardness together with what is based upon hardness, being produced from the four great elements, is called the earth element. It is not that some other thing comes and rests upon another.

If dharmas had different characteristics, they would not be called mutually based; they would simply be separate.

Question: If something is produced, it is not called “based upon”; rather, “based upon” means that one thing comes and rests upon another, does it not?

Answer: The term itself is “based upon”; it does not mean that one thing comes and rests upon another, because the dharmas produced are distinct. It is like saying that empty space reaches everywhere, although in reality it reaches nowhere. Again, your assertion that the four great elements arise together is unreasonable.

In sunlight there is only form and the perceptible tactile quality of heat; there is no other dharma. In moonlight there is only form and the perceptible tactile quality of cold; likewise, there is no other dharma. Therefore, the four great elements are not present in every thing.

Some things, such as diamonds and the like, have neither odor nor taste. Some things, such as gold, silver, and the like, have no odor. Some things, such as warmth within a house and the like, have no form.

Some things, such as the moon and the like, have no heat. Some things, such as fire and the like, have no coldness. Some things, such as wind and the like, move one another.

Some things, such as square, level slabs of stone and the like, do not move. Thus, some things are not hard; some things are not moist; some things are not hot; and some things do not move. Therefore, it is not the case that the four great elements are inseparable from one another.

Question: It is through external causes and conditions that the natures of the great elements become manifest. For example, gold within ore and the like possesses the characteristic of fluidity, which becomes manifest when fire is present. Water possesses the characteristic of hardness and, through cold, becomes ice.

Wind possesses the characteristics of cold and heat, which become manifest through water and fire. Grass and trees possess the characteristic of movement, which becomes manifest when wind is present. Therefore, their intrinsic natures already exist beforehand and subsequently become manifest in dependence upon external conditions.

Thus, it should be understood that the four great elements cannot be separated from one another. If their fundamental natures did not already exist, how could they become manifest?

Answer: If that were so, when fragrance is present in the wind, fragrance ought to exist within the wind; and when fragrance permeates oil, fragrance ought to exist within the oil. This is unreasonable. Moreover, derived form is not produced by the great elements in such a manner as moisture producing moisture. Rather, form likewise produces form. Again, if they were inseparable, the effect would exist within the cause, as a young maiden would already have a child within her, and food would already contain impurity, and so forth. We do not say that the effect exists within the cause. Although butter is not present in milk, butter arises from milk. Why, then, is it necessary to imagine and conceptually discriminate that the four great elements arise inseparably from one another?

CHAPTER 41: CLARIFYING THE FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINE

Previously you said: “We do not say that the four great elements and form are either identical or different; therefore, there is no fault.” This is unreasonable. Why? Because the non-Buddhist schools, wishing to establish their doctrine of a spiritual self, use the identity or difference of the four great elements as an analogy.

Therefore, within conventional designation, the Buddha used the four great elements as an analogy and thus expounded the meaning of the four great elements. If this were not so, he should not have spoken of them. People in the world naturally know the four great elements—earth and the rest—but do not comprehend their true nature.

Therefore, they were taught about them, whereas hands and the like were not discussed. If hardness and the rest are themselves the four great elements, what benefit would there be in teaching this? Furthermore, you said that there are two meanings of dependence, and that the great elements are real.

This also has not been clearly understood. You should know that this meaning of dependence is distinct; it is precisely a conventional designation. Furthermore, you said that expressions used according to worldly convention do not refer to real great elements.

This is unreasonable. Why? Because neither in the scriptures nor among people in the world does anyone establish the names of the four great elements within form and the rest without causes and conditions.

For example, a person in the world says, “I see a person.” The name “person” is applied to form and the rest, not without reason. If names were arbitrarily imposed without any basis, then upon seeing a horse one could call it a person, but in truth this cannot be so. Moreover, why is speech not called earth?

People in the world commonly speak of the sound of earth, but never say that sound itself is earth. If names were arbitrarily imposed without any basis, sound too could be named earth. Yet in truth one cannot speak in this way.

Therefore, the four dharmas—form and the rest—are earth. Within the constituent parts of earth, the name “earth” is applied. Just as form is a cause constituting the conventional designation, and within it the name “person” is applied; just as the name “forest” is applied to trees; and just as the name “Sangha” is applied to bhiksus—so too, within such dharmas as form and the rest, the names of the four great elements are applied.

Furthermore, you said that the six bases of contact are perhaps constituted by the six bases of contact. This scripture does not apply. In your doctrine, produced form has nothing that it can produce.

So too in my doctrine, within a conventional designation there is nothing further produced. Therefore, this scripture should not exist; or, if it does exist, its meaning should be changed. Furthermore, you said: “Because the form produced from the four great elements is pure, it is called the eye.” Furthermore, although you said, “A dharma abides in a dharma, without dependence and without a master,” there is in fact dependence and a master, for the meaning of “abiding” is “depending,” and the dharma depended upon is the master.

Furthermore, you said that the characteristic of hardness is capable of supporting, yet it also relies upon many other causes and conditions. The other elements are likewise. Therefore, the four great elements exist as conventional designations.

CHAPTER 42: THE NONEXISTENCE OF THE CHARACTERISTIC OF HARDNESS

Question: You say, “A multitude of hard forms constitutes the earth great element. Therefore, earth and the rest are conventional designations.” This is unreasonable. Why?

Because even the dharma of hardness does not exist, much less the conventional designation “earth.” If a ball of clay is hard, that very ball of clay is also soft. Therefore, one should know that the characteristic of hardness is not fixed. Moreover, a cognition of hardness arises because of a small number of causes and conditions.

For example, when atoms are loosely combined, this is called softness; when densely combined, it is called hardness. Therefore, it is not fixed. Furthermore, one dharma does not contain two tactile qualities that cause this mind to produce cognition, and thus the body’s hardness and softness are not fixed.

They exist only in relation to each other. For example, upon seeing a kambala cloth, one considers cotton cloth soft; but upon seeing cotton cloth, one considers the kambala cloth hard. A tangible dharma should not exist merely in relation to another.

Furthermore, merely upon seeing gold or stone, one knows it to be hard to the touch, although hardness cannot be apprehended by the eye. Therefore, hardness does not exist. For these causes and conditions, such tangible qualities as softness and the rest also do not exist.

CHAPTER 43: THE EXISTENCE OF THE CHARACTERISTIC OF HARDNESS

Answer: The characteristic of hardness truly exists. Although you say that a ball of clay is hard and that this same hard ball of clay is soft, this is unreasonable. Why?

Because we do not maintain that a ball of clay is a real dharma. It is only a conventional designation for a combination of dharmas, and therefore we do not incur this fault. Furthermore, you said that cognition of hardness arises because of a small number of causes and conditions.

This is unreasonable. Within atoms that are densely combined, I establish the characteristic of hardness, and therefore it is called hard; within those that are not densely combined, the characteristic of softness is established. Therefore, there is no fault.

If a dharma can be established, it is called existent. You also said that one dharma does not contain two tactile qualities. This is unreasonable.

Within a single dharma, I can apprehend many tactile qualities: it is both hard and soft. You also said, “Because hardness and softness exist in relation to each other, they are not fixed.” This is unreasonable, for such qualities as length and shortness also exist in relation to each other. Moreover, upon tasting white rock sugar, one considers dark sugar bitter; but upon tasting haritaki, one then considers dark sugar sweet.

If something did not exist because it exists in relation to another, taste too would not exist.

Question: Dark sugar contains two kinds of taste: both sweet and bitter.

Answer: Cotton cloth likewise has two tangible qualities: both hard and soft. Moreover, when it is said that one sees a stone and knows it to be hard, this knowledge arises by comparison with previous tactile experience. It is like seeing fire and knowing it to be hot, although heat cannot be seen.

Furthermore, when a person sees kambala cloth, doubt arises as to whether it is hard or soft. Therefore, tangible qualities cannot be seen by the eye. Consequently, such tangible qualities as hardness and the rest exist.

Furthermore, hardness and the rest truly exist. Why? Because they can give rise to a discriminating mind.

If hardness did not exist, how could it be discriminated? Furthermore, hardness can serve as a condition for the mind and can also perform other actions, such as striking and throwing. Furthermore, because it is opposed to softness and moisture, it is called hardness.

Furthermore, we directly know hardness; with regard to what is directly known, no further causes or conditions are required. Furthermore, because it accomplishes worldly functions, it is called hardness. The other qualities are likewise.

Therefore, one knows that hardness exists.

CHAPTER 44: THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FOUR GREAT ELEMENTS

Question: I now know that this dharma of hardness exists, but I see that gold melts when heated and water becomes ice when cooled. Does this gold belong to earth because it is hard, and to water because it melts?

Answer: Each dharma has its own distinct characteristic. The dharma of hardness, with hardness as its basis, is the earth element; moisture, with moisture as its basis, is the water element; and so forth.

Question: When hard gold melts and moist water hardens into ice, how is it that the great elements do not abandon their own characteristics? As a sutra says: “The characteristics of the four great elements may undergo change. What else could one who has attained the four kinds of faith apprehend?”

Answer: The Abhidharma says that moisture is the characteristic of water. Some say that flowing is the characteristic of water. A sutra says that permeation is the characteristic of water. Which of these statements should be regarded as correct?

Answer: Flowing, moisture, and permeation are all different names for water.

Question: Flowing is the activity of water, for it is a dharma perceived by the eye. Therefore, flowing is not moisture or permeation, is it?

Answer: Because of moisture and permeation, water flows; because it is moist, it flows downward. Therefore, flowing is itself permeation. Moisture and permeation are also characteristics of water, while flowing is the activity of water.

Question: Regarding wind, lightness and movement are said to be its characteristics. Lightness is one thing and movement another. Lightness belongs to the tactile ayatana, whereas movement belongs to visible form in motion. Should both now be regarded as dharmas of wind?

Answer: Lightness is the characteristic of wind, while movement is the activity of wind. The characteristic and activity are spoken of together.

Question: There is no characteristic of movement, because all dharmas perish moment by moment and therefore should not proceed to another place. Only when something reaches another place is it called movement. Reaching, going, and moving all have the same meaning, do they not?

Answer: I call it an activity only according to conventional truth, not according to ultimate truth. Because of this dharma of lightness, the arising of a dharma in another place is called its activity. At that time, it is called going.

Question: The characteristic of lightness is not fixed. Why? Because it exists only in relation to something else. For example, an object weighing ten catties is light in relation to one weighing twenty catties, but heavy in relation to one weighing five catties?

Answer: Heaviness, measure, and other such dharmas exist through the mind and through the mutual dependence of dharmas. For example, some dharmas are called long in relation to others, while some are called short in relation to others. A particular characteristic exists only because the mind relies upon a general characteristic.

If lightness did not exist because it depended upon comparison, then all these other dharmas should likewise not exist; yet this is not so. Therefore, mutual dependence is not the principal cause. Moreover, lightness does not exist through mutual comparison; it exists because the object cannot be weighed.

An object that cannot be weighed is like wind in an inflated bag. Therefore, it does not come into existence through mutual comparison. Only heavy things are compared with one another, for there is no heavy object that cannot be weighed.

Question: If that which cannot be weighed is called light, then apart from heaviness, all visible material dharmas that cannot be weighed should be light; yet this is not so. Therefore, what you have stated cannot be the characteristic of lightness.

Answer: We maintain that apart from form and the other such dharmas, there is no distinct dharma called heaviness. Form and the other such dharmas may give rise to the property of being weighable. Hardness or lack of hardness, strength or lack of strength, newness or age, decay or lack of decay, dissolution or lack of dissolution, coarseness, softness, and so forth—all possess the characteristic of heaviness without being separate from form and the other such dharmas. Likewise, form and the other such dharmas, when belonging to earth and water, can be weighed; when belonging to wind and fire, they cannot be weighed.

Question: If the heaviness of form is not separate from form and the other such dharmas, then lightness likewise should exist without being separate from form and the other such dharmas.

Answer: Indeed, apart from form and the other such dharmas, there is no separate dharma of lightness. It is only the combination of form and the other such dharmas that is called light.

Question: That is not so. To distinguish heaviness from lightness, one must necessarily employ the faculty of touch. Therefore, heaviness and lightness are not form and the other such dharmas.

Answer: In distinguishing hardness and the like, one may use the eyes, the ears, or the other faculties. Yet hardness and the like are not separate from form and the other such dharmas. The same is true of lightness and heaviness. Although the faculty of touch is employed, there is no other characteristic within them. Moreover, unless the faculty of touch makes contact, tactile consciousness does not arise; yet this characteristic of heaviness can give rise to cognition even before the body has made contact. For example, although one holds a heavy object through its wrapping, one still knows that it is heavy.

Question: Is it not precisely at that moment that one knows the characteristic of heaviness?

Answer: Just as one may know whether a person wearing clothes is strong or not even though there is no direct contact, so it is with lightness and heaviness. Why is this? Because various kinds of contact give rise to various kinds of bodily cognition: through pressing and squeezing, cognition of hardness and softness arises; through lifting and moving, cognition of lightness and heaviness arises; through grasping, cognition of strength and weakness arises; through contact, cognition of cold and heat arises; through stroking and rubbing, cognition of roughness and smoothness arises; through pressure, cognition of firmness and frailty arises; and through cutting and slashing, or through whips and staffs, other kinds of cognition arise.

Some kinds of contact are continually present within the body, unlike cold, heat, and the like, which come from outside. These include comfort, fatigue, lack of fatigue, sickness, recovery, bodily acuity, bodily dullness, lethargy, heaviness, dimness of the eyes and ears, headache, ailments of the feet, groaning, grimacing, hunger and thirst, satiety, craving, lack of craving, obscurity, and other kinds of contact—all of which give rise to distinct cognitions.

Question: If the characteristics of lightness and heaviness are present within form and the other such dharmas, how can they be apprehended within form and the other such dharmas by tactile consciousness?

Answer: Form and the other such dharmas are not apprehended by tactile consciousness. Only a small portion of these tangible qualities is apprehended by tactile consciousness. Hardness, lack of hardness, and the like, though present within form and the other such dharmas, may also be known through sight. Likewise, comfort and the like arise from form and the other such dharmas, yet they are also distinguished by tactile consciousness. This matter is the same.

Question: If lightness and heaviness are merely tangible qualities, what fault would there be in saying so? Why must they be distinguished as form and the other such dharmas?

Answer: People in the world speak of new grain and old grain. The characteristics of newness and age would then have to be distinct from form and the other such dharmas, but in truth they are not. Form and the other such dharmas that have only recently arisen are simply called new. If this characteristic of newness is itself a characteristic of form and the other such dharmas, why should the characteristic of heaviness not be so as well?

Question: If form and the other such dharmas are themselves lightness, heaviness, and the like, and if lightness is the characteristic present in fire and wind, then wherever light form and the other such dharmas predominate, that should be called wind.

Answer: Whichever characteristic predominates determines the name of the great element. Fire also possesses the characteristics of heat and lightness. Because heat predominates, it is called fire; it cannot be called fire merely because lightness predominates. In wind there is only lightness and no heat. Therefore, it is named solely on the basis of lightness. Moreover, we do not call something wind merely because it is light. If lightness and heaviness serve as causes of motion, it is also called wind. As a sutra states: “The characteristics of lightness and motion are called wind.” Here, the characteristic of lightness is wind, while motion is the activity of wind.

Question: Wind can cause mountains to collapse. If it is light, how can it cause a mountain to collapse?

Answer: A violent wind possesses great strength, and its power is capable of doing so. Some winds can only stir small blades of grass, while others can topple mountains. One should understand that the activity and function of wind are thus.

Question: Are the great elements—earth and the others—all merely form, odor, taste, and tangible quality, without distinction?

Answer: This is not fixed. It is said that earth may possess form, odor, taste, and tangible quality; or it may possess only form and tangible quality, as in gold, silver, and the like. Water may possess form, odor, taste, and tangible quality; or it may possess three: form, taste, and tangible quality. Fire may possess form, odor, taste, and tangible quality; it may possess three—form, odor, and tangible quality—or only form and tangible quality. Wind may possess tangible quality without odor, or it may possess both odor and tangible quality. Therefore, this is not fixed.

Question: What are the tangible qualities of wind?

Answer: Cold, heat, hardness, softness, weakness, and other tangible qualities. When they are known according to the uninterrupted continuity of the great elements, they are the tangible qualities of the great elements.

Question: Some physicians say that the color of wind is black. What is the truth of this matter?

Answer: Cold is not called wind; although ice and snow are cold, they are never called wind. Moreover, wind and cold have different names. Why is this? Hot wind, cold wind, and wind that is neither hot nor cold are all called wind. Therefore, it is necessary to designate wind on the basis of lightness and the other such qualities. Furthermore, that which gives rise to form, tangible quality, and the other such dharmas is called wind; cold itself is not wind.

Question: What fault would there be if wind possessed form and taste?

Answer: Form and taste cannot be found in wind. If one says that they are present but cannot be known because they are too subtle, then one should at least be able to recollect, conceive, and distinguish within the mind that such form and taste exist. Yet this is likewise unreasonable. Moreover, we do not say that the effect exists within the cause. Therefore, if something can be found in the effect, it need not already have existed in the cause. This is called establishing the reality of the four great elements.

End of Fascicle Three of the Satyasiddhi Śāstra.