成實論

CHAPTER 45: THE FACULTIES AS CONVENTIONAL DESIGNATIONS

Question: Are the faculties such as the eye identical with the four great elements, or are they different?

Answer: Through the causes and conditions of karma, the four great elements become the faculties such as the eye. Therefore, they are not different from the four great elements. Furthermore, when the Buddha analyzed the eye, he said: “Whatever in the flesh of the eye is hard and dependent upon hardness is called the earth element.” Therefore, one should know that the faculty itself is the four great elements.

Why is this? Because apart from hardness and the other qualities, there is no eye. The Buddha spoke in this way because he wished to lead people to see that the eye is empty.

If this were not so, there would have to be hardness and the other qualities existing separately within the eye, or an eye existing separately within hardness and the other qualities. Merely analyzing hardness and the other qualities would then be of no benefit. Therefore, the faculties are not different from the four great elements.

Furthermore, the Sutra on the Six Elements says: “These six things constitute a person.” If the faculties were different from the four great elements, then the eye and the other faculties would not be called causes and conditions constituting a person. It is only by conventional designation based upon these six things that there is a person. Form and the other qualities constitute the four great elements; sound, too, is a cause and condition constituting a person.

It is only through the causes and conditions of these six things that a person is constituted. Therefore, one knows that the faculties are not different from the four great elements. Furthermore, a bhiksu asked the Buddha: “What is the eye?” The Buddha replied: “It is form produced by the four great elements, invisible but resistant; this is the eye.” Therefore, one knows that it is not different from the four great elements.

This bhiksu possessed keen faculties and wisdom, and so he had profound doubts concerning the faculties such as the eye. People in the world all see and know that the eye apprehends form, and likewise know that the body apprehends tangible objects. Yet this bhiksu wondered whether the eye and the other faculties existed or did not exist.

Why? Because some masters of treatises said that the five natures were the five faculties, while others said that there was only one nature. This bhiksu wished to test what the Buddha-Dharma taught, and therefore questioned the Buddha.

The Buddha wished to show clearly that all five faculties belong to the four great elements, and so he answered the bhiksu by saying that the eye is form produced by the four great elements, invisible but resistant. If a dharma truly existed, it would not be produced from causes. A conventional designation is produced on the basis of conventionally designated dharmas, just as a forest is constituted on the basis of trees.

Question: Some say that accomplished form is called the eye. What is the truth of this matter?

Answer: Whether accomplished or not accomplished, the four great elements born from the cause of karma are called the faculties such as the eye. If this were not so, this bhiksu’s doubts concerning the faculties such as the eye could never have been resolved. Why?

Because the Buddha taught him that the faculties such as the eye are produced from the four great elements. Thus, this bhiksu knew that the eye was not a real dharma. Therefore, one knows that the eye and the other faculties are not different from the four great elements.

Furthermore, in many places the Buddha analyzed the four great elements in order to reveal that the eye is empty. For example, it is said that to employ wisdom without conceptual proliferation means to contemplate this body by analyzing it into six things: hardness and that which depends upon hardness are called earth, and so forth. In this way one becomes disenchanted with and detached from five things, leaving only consciousness.

Likewise, the sutras give the simile of slaughtering an ox and the simile of an elephant walking in order to analyze the four great elements, without finding any eye apart from them. If an eye existed separately, it should also have been analyzed. Furthermore, the masters of treatises such as Hoa Ta all teach the same, for this position is free from error.

It should therefore be accepted with confidence.

Question: The five faculties are different from the four great elements. Why? Because the eye and the other faculties are included within the sense fields of the eye and so forth, whereas the four great elements are included within the sense field of touch. Moreover, the eye and the other faculties are internal sense fields, whereas the four great elements are external sense fields. The eye and the other faculties are faculties, whereas the four great elements are not faculties. Furthermore, the eye and the other faculties are accomplished derived form, whereas the four great elements are not so. Therefore, one knows that the faculties are not the four great elements.

Answer: According to causes and conditions, different terms should be applied to the same thing. For example, the five faculties beginning with faith are also called the formation skandha. Thus, the four great elements born from karma are included within the eye and the other sense fields; they are also called internal sense fields and are also called faculties. Moreover, the four great elements themselves constitute what is accomplished, just as wheels and other parts constitute a cart, and the wheels themselves are the cart. This matter is likewise.

Question: It is not so. A purified mind is called faith. Faith is different from the mind. This matter is likewise.

Answer: It is not so. It is like obtaining a water-purifying jewel: the water then becomes pure water, and that purity is the water itself. In the same way, when one obtains the jewel of faith, the pool of the mind becomes pure; this purified mind is the mind itself. Furthermore, in this treatise we do not say that there is a faith apart from the mind. Therefore, this analogy is not pertinent. Moreover, a faculty is a conventional designation, and it is not said to be different from the causes that constitute that conventional designation.

Question: Nor can they be said to be identical.

Answer: The conventional designation constituted from the four great elements is the faculty, yet the four great elements themselves are not called the faculty. Therefore, one knows that the faculties are not different from the four great elements.

CHAPTER 46: ANALYSIS OF THE FACULTIES

Question: Which of the great elements is predominant in these faculties?

Answer: None of the great elements is predominant.

Question: If the great elements are equal, why can some faculties see forms while others cannot?

Answer: All are born from karma. In the faculty of the eye born from karma, the power of the four great elements can see forms. The other faculties are likewise.

Question: If they are born from karma, why does a single faculty not apprehend all sense objects universally?

Answer: This karma has five distinct kinds. There is karma capable of serving as the cause of seeing; for example, by giving lamps and lights, one obtains the eye faculty as karmic recompense. The same applies to sound and the other objects. Because karma differs, the powers of the faculties also differ.

Question: If this is the power of karma, why must one rely upon the faculties? Through the power of karma alone, consciousness should be able to apprehend the various sense objects.

Answer: It is not so. We presently observe that without a faculty, consciousness does not arise. Why?

The blind do not see, and the deaf do not hear. In a matter that is directly observable, causal reasoning is unnecessary. Thus, this is not a valid objection.

Furthermore, such is the nature of dharmas: without the faculties, consciousness does not arise. Apart from the four great elements and the other conditions, no faculty arises. By the nature of things, it must depend upon these.

Moreover, the faculties also adorn the bodies of sentient beings, and therefore they arise from karma. For example, through the causes and conditions of karma one obtains rice, and thus rice grows; yet it also depends upon a seed, after which the sprout, stalk, branches, and leaves arise in sequence. This matter is likewise.

Question: Why is the mind not likewise? Just as eye-consciousness takes the eye as its faculty and also follows upon the preceding mind that has ceased, the mind takes only the preceding mind that has successively ceased as its faculty. Unlike the faculties such as the eye, it has no dwelling place. The reason for this must be explained.

Answer: There are definitely five sense objects and definitely five consciousnesses, but the mind is not like this. Furthermore, such is the nature of mental dharmas: they take only the preceding mind that has successively ceased as their faculty and require nothing else. Although past and future dharmas do not exist, the mental faculty can nevertheless take them as objects; mental dharmas are likewise. This matter is also so. Furthermore, this is also the same as your own doctrine. In your doctrine, consciousness arises in dependence upon both forms and the other sense objects and their faculties; mental consciousness can arise only in dependence upon the preceding mind that has successively ceased.

Question: If mental consciousness has no faculty, upon what does it depend?

Answer: It depends upon the body composed of the four great elements.

Question: Upon what does it depend in the formless realm?

Answer: Consciousness in the formless realm has no support. Such is the nature of dharmas: it abides without support. Why? Because the faculties differ, mental consciousness can know both existence and nonexistence. If form exists, it depends upon form; even when form does not exist, it can still abide. Furthermore, consciousness arises only when the various conditions come together. As the sutra says: “Dependent upon the mental faculty and conditioned by dharmas, mental consciousness arises.” Upon what place does it depend? It is not like a person leaning against a wall or the like. All dharmas abide in their own nature.

CHAPTER 47: THE FACULTIES AND THE FOUR GREAT ELEMENTS ARE THE SAME

Question: You non-Buddhists say that the five faculties are born from the five great elements. What is the truth of this matter?

Answer: This cannot be so. Why? Because space does not exist, as has already been clearly explained. Therefore, they cannot be born from the five great elements.

Question: The non-Buddhist schools say that the fire element predominates in the eye. Why is this? Because the karmic result resembles its karmic cause.

Through giving light, one obtains the eye as a karmic result. As a sutra says: “By giving clothing, one obtains beauty; by giving food, one obtains strength; by giving a vehicle, one obtains happiness; and by giving a lamp, one obtains eyes.” Therefore, the fire element predominates in the eye. Furthermore, the eye can see only with the aid of light; apart from light, it cannot see.

Hence it is known that the fire element predominates. Moreover, fire can illuminate things at a distance; because there is light within the eye, it can encounter forms from afar. It is also said that when a person dies, the eyes return to the sun.

Therefore, the sun is their original nature. Furthermore, the eye invariably sees forms; because form belongs to fire, it sees its own nature. In the same way, space, earth, water, and wind each predominate according to the corresponding faculty.

When a person dies, the faculty of hearing returns to space; the ear invariably hears sounds, and sound belongs to space. The other faculties are likewise. Therefore, among the elements composing each faculty, there must be greater and lesser proportions, must there not?

Answer: Your statement concerning resemblance to karma is unreasonable. Why? Because results are sometimes seen that do not resemble their karmic causes.

For example, it is said that giving food brings five kinds of karmic result. Moreover, if light predominated in the eye, the eye should not need external light from lamps, torches, and the like. Again, if fire is said to predominate because the eye depends upon external light, then space and the other elements should likewise predominate in the hand and the other faculties, and those faculties should not need external space and so forth.

Yet in fact they do depend upon external conditions. Therefore, your statement does not constitute a valid cause. Furthermore, water can benefit the eyes: when a person washes the eyes, they immediately become clear.

Should water, then, predominate in them? Fire can also harm the eyes, as sunlight does. If fire were their own nature, it should not harm itself.

Therefore, know that fire does not predominate in the eye. Moreover, the divine eye can see forms even without light. Therefore, the eye does not belong to fire.

Forms can also be seen by moonlight, yet the moon is not of the nature of fire. Furthermore, such is the nature of the eye: some eyes must await light before they can see, while others can see without awaiting light. Just as the eye, through conditions such as space, can see distant forms without reaching them, so is the nature of the eye.

One should not conceptualize and discriminate, calling this a predominance of the fire element. Furthermore, you say that without light there can be no seeing. Yet without space, attention, and form, seeing is likewise impossible.

Should space and the other factors, then, all predominate? Moreover, not all eyes depend upon external light. Birds such as the owl, and beasts such as cats and weasels, can see without relying upon external light.

Therefore, fire does not predominate. Furthermore, fire is luminous and invariably possesses the characteristic of heat. How could the eye be like this?

If you say that the eye possesses light and can therefore encounter forms at a distance, this has already been refuted, because the eye has no light. If you say that the eye returns to the sun, would the eye then be permanent? Moreover, the sun and the like are not faculties; how could the eye return to them?

Again, when the sun itself perishes, to what place would the solar faculty and the sun return? Therefore, this is unreasonable. Furthermore, when beings in the heavens die, where do their eyes return?

There is no sun there. Space, moreover, is unconditioned; where, then, would there be a place to which anything could return? Furthermore, the faculties do not travel anywhere, because conditioned dharmas perish moment by moment.

Again, you say: “The eye invariably sees forms; because form belongs to fire, it thereby sees its own nature.” This is unreasonable, because the alleged cause is useless. The same applies to sound belonging to space and so forth. Thus, your assertion that particular elements predominate within the five faculties has already been refuted.

Question: Some treatise masters say that each faculty has its own distinct nature. Because earth contains a greater measure of the guna of being a substratum and possesses odor, it can produce cognition of odor. Because water, fire, and wind possess taste, form, and tangibility, respectively, they can produce cognition of taste, form, and tangibility. What is the truth of this matter?

Answer: I have previously explained that this is not invariably so. Earth possesses odor, but other things also possess it. Therefore, this is not a valid cause. Furthermore, the elements arise in combination; earth is never seen apart from water and the other elements. If earth can produce cognition of odor because it possesses odor, it should also produce cognition of form and the other qualities, since earth contains all four gunas.

Question: Odor belongs exclusively to earth. Because the nose belongs to earth, is its tangibility capable of cognizing odor?

Answer: If the gunas in earth belong exclusively to earth, the nose should cognize them all. Furthermore, water possesses only cold tangibility, and fire only hot tangibility; these should then be cognized by the tongue and the eye, yet in fact they are not. Moreover, since there are no nine dravyas such as earth, there are no such faculties. Furthermore, the function of each faculty is to combine with its object so that cognition may arise. Since such combination has already been refuted, the faculties have no such function. Therefore, it is not the case that each faculty has one distinct nature.

CHAPTER 48: THE FACULTIES ARE WITHOUT COGNITION

Question: Do the faculties cognize their objects by reaching them, or can they cognize without reaching them?

Answer: It is not the faculties that cognize. Why? If the faculties were capable of cognizing their objects, they should cognize all objects simultaneously, yet this is in fact impossible. Therefore, cognition occurs through consciousness. You may suppose: “The faculty cognizes only in conjunction with consciousness, for a faculty cannot cognize apart from consciousness.” This is unreasonable, because no single dharma must await other dharmas before it can perform its own function. If the eye can cognize, why must it await consciousness? Moreover, if the faculty can cognize, one must distinguish: this is the activity of the faculty, and this is the activity of consciousness.

Question: Illumination is the activity of the faculty, while cognition is the activity of consciousness.

Answer: This does not provide a valid distinction. What is meant by illumination? In your doctrine, the ear and the other faculties are not of the nature of fire, so they cannot illuminate.

If the faculties together with consciousness are like a lamp, and the faculties in turn possess illumination, then, just as a lamp illuminates, there must be yet another illumination illuminating it. This would lead to an infinite regress. If there is no further illumination and only the faculty illuminates, then there should likewise be no need for a faculty, and consciousness alone should cognize.

Therefore, illumination is not the activity of the faculty. Furthermore, a faculty is incapable of cognition. A lamp can illuminate but cannot cognize.

Its definite capacity to serve as the support of consciousness is what is called the activity of a faculty. Therefore, consciousness alone cognizes, not the faculties. When consciousness is present, there is cognition; when consciousness is absent, there is no cognition.

Just as when fire is present there is heat, and when fire is absent there is no heat, one should know that heat exists because of fire.

Question: A sutra says: “When seeing forms with the eye, one should not grasp their characteristics. The same applies to the ear and the other faculties.” Therefore, it is known that the eye can apprehend forms. Furthermore, the eye and the others are called faculties. If they were incapable of cognition, why would they be called faculties? A sutra also says: “My disciples can discern subtle matters as clearly as the eye sees them.” If the eye were incapable of seeing, the Buddha’s disciples would see nothing at all. This is impossible. Therefore, the faculties definitely apprehend their objects. Furthermore, the faculties apprehend objects, while consciousness discriminates them. Thus, the faculties and consciousness are distinct, are they not?

Answer: In a sutra, the Buddha himself said: “The eye is a doorway, because it enables forms to be seen.” Therefore, the eye itself cannot see forms. Because the eye is a doorway through which consciousness within sees outward, it is said that the eye sees.

Question: It is also said that the mind is a doorway because it cognizes dharmas. Should the mind, then, be regarded merely as a doorway and not as that which cognizes?

Answer: The faculty of mind likewise takes the immediately preceding cessation of mind as its gateway. Therefore, the faculty of mind cannot cognize; only mind-consciousness can cognize. Moreover, in the sutras the Buddha said: “The eye desires beautiful forms.” The eye is a material dharma and makes no discriminations; therefore, it truly neither knows nor desires.

It is consciousness that desires. Again, the Buddha said: “Form is that which is known by the eye.” It is consciousness that can know form; the eye itself truly does not know. Furthermore, because of worldly convention, people say that the eye sees and the ear hears, and the Buddha also spoke accordingly.

Why? Only form can be seen; the other objects cannot be seen. Yet the Buddha also spoke of seeing the faults of sensual desire and so forth.

Again, worldly people speak of “the end of the month,” and the Buddha also spoke accordingly. If a destitute person is given the name “Wealthy and Honored,” the Buddha also calls him by that name. The Buddha did not intend to dispute with the world, as in the case of the mother of Maghara and others.

Therefore, one should understand that this accords with conventional language, and it is for this reason that the Buddha said the eye sees.

Question: Why do worldly people speak in this way?

Answer: Because knowing depends upon the eye; the effect is spoken of in terms of this cause and is called seeing. Thus it is said that this person sees or that person sees. It is like saying that the Buddha and the devas see people performing meritorious and sinful deeds and so forth.

It is also said that one sees with the left eye or sees with the right eye. Again, it is said that one sees by sunlight or sees by moonlight; or that one sees through empty space; or sees by turning inward; or looks out through a doorway. In the matter of cooking something, it is said: This person cooks, or that person cooks.

It may also be said that grass and firewood cook, cow dung cooks, oil cooks, butter cooks, fire cooks, or the sun cooks. In truth, it is fire that cooks; the other things receive the designation only through association. In the same way, only consciousness can see, but the eye receives the designation.

Again, this is an abbreviated expression; strictly speaking, one should say that form is seen through the gateway of the eye. Moreover, the eye is a person’s instrument; the person is a nominally designated agent who requires an instrument. Again, because one sees by means of eye-consciousness, it is called the eye seeing, just as when a person sitting upon a bed laughs, it may be said that the bed laughs.

Again, because the activity of consciousness is connected with the eye, the activity of consciousness is attributed to the eye, just as the hands, feet, and so forth are connected with a person, and an activity belonging to the person is called an activity of the hand. Again, the eye is a cause of eye-consciousness, so the effect is spoken of in terms of the cause, as when it is said that a certain person burned a certain village.

It is like speaking of consuming gold, calling gold one’s livelihood, or calling grass cattle and sheep. In all these cases, the effect is spoken of in terms of the cause. In the same way, because consciousness arises from the eye and can see form, it is said that the eye sees.

Again, because consciousness sees form in proximity to the eye, it is said that the eye sees, just as when donkeys and oxen are near the water, one says that the oxen are in the water. Again, eye-consciousness is distinguished because of the eye. Therefore, the activity of eye-consciousness is elliptically attributed to the eye, as in the expression “the Brahmin’s staff.” Again, the eye enables eye-consciousness to arise; therefore, the activity of eye-consciousness is attributed to it.

This is also like calling a person diminished when his possessions are diminished, or calling a person increased when his possessions increase. Again, eye-consciousness operates in conjunction with the eye; therefore, its ability to see is called the eye seeing. It is like a stick working together with a person to strike, which is called the person’s stick striking.

Or it is like black dye combining with a robe, so that it is called a black robe. Again, dharmas may be spoken of interchangeably, as when the activity of wisdom is spoken of among feeling and the other factors. Again, one should say that eye-consciousness sees form, but because the expression is abbreviated, it is said only that the eye sees.

It is also like a medicinal compound being named after one of its ingredients.

Someone may say: If it cannot see, how can it be called a faculty? I shall now answer: These five dharmas—the eye and the other faculties—are superior to forms and the other objects, and therefore they are called faculties.

Question: The five dharmas beginning with the eye and the five beginning with form make ten dharmas, and none of them cognizes its object. If consciousness does not arise in the absence of the eye and the other faculties, and likewise does not arise in the absence of form and the other objects, then in what sense are the faculties called superior?

Answer: Because of the faculties, consciousnesses differ and are called eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, and so forth. It is like a drum being struck together with a drumstick and producing a sound: because the drum is predominant, it is called the sound of the drum. Or it is like soil combining with rice and other seeds to produce a crop: because the rice is predominant, it is called a rice sprout.

The consciousnesses are likewise. They receive their distinct names according to their respective bases, not according to their objective conditions. If one were to call it form-consciousness, doubt would easily arise: Is this eye-consciousness, mind-consciousness, or mind-consciousness taking form as its object?

Again, consciousness is present in the faculty, but not in the object. Moreover, deluded thoughts of self arise with regard to the eye and the other faculties. Again, it is the faculty, not the object, that is injured when consciousness is impaired.

Again, within the enumeration of what belongs to one’s own body, the faculty is included, but the object is not. Again, the person’s instruments are the faculties, not the objects. Again, the faculties belong to the category of sentient beings, but the objects do not.

Again, when the faculties are not keen, consciousness is unclear; when the faculties are pure, consciousness is lucid. Again, because the faculties may be superior, middling, or inferior, consciousness also differs accordingly. For these reasons, the faculties are called superior.

Furthermore, a faculty is not shared, whereas a single object may be commonly possessed by many people. Again, the faculty and consciousness are fruits of the same karmic retribution, whereas the object is not. Again, the faculty is the cause, while the object is a condition.

Why is this? Because differences in the faculties cause differences in consciousness, whereas differences in objects do not. It is like a seed being the cause, while soil and the other factors are conditions; differences arise according to differences in the seeds.

Because a cause is superior to a condition, it is called a faculty. Someone cites the statement: “My disciple sees even subtle matters as though viewing them with his own eyes.” This is an expression that accords with convention. Because worldly people say that seeing occurs in the eye, it is said, “as though viewing them with his own eyes.” As the Buddha said in verse: “The discerning one, when close to wisdom, is like the tongue knowing flavors; although the tongue itself does not know, it is unlike a ladle.” This means that because tongue-consciousness arises in dependence upon the tongue, it is said that the tongue knows flavors; and because eye-consciousness arises in dependence upon the eye, it is said that the eye sees.

Therefore, it is said that the Buddha’s disciple sees as though viewing with his own eyes.

You say that the faculty apprehends the object and that consciousness then discriminates it. This has already been answered, for the faculty is insentient. Moreover, you yourselves do not say that the faculties think or know that the self possesses distinct characteristics.

Therefore, the faculties cannot apprehend objects. Again, according to your doctrine, cognition does not await the faculties in order to arise. Why?

Because the Great Principle, the Self, and the other principles exist before the faculties and give rise to them afterward. Furthermore, your great elements and truths, lacking an Original Nature, should all be nonexistent. In your doctrine, the Original Nature produces the Great Principle and the other principles, yet the Original Nature is a nonexistent dharma.

This has already been discussed. Therefore, there are no faculties.

CHAPTER 49: CONTACT AND SEPARATION OF THE FACULTIES

Question: You have established that consciousness can cognize, whereas the faculty cannot. Now, does consciousness arise because the faculty and its object come into contact, or does it arise while they remain separate?

Answer: Eye-consciousness cognizes its object without waiting for contact. Why? Because distant objects such as the moon can also be seen, and the moon’s form does not leave the moon and travel to the eye.

Moreover, form is seen by means of empty space and light. If the eye traveled to the form, it would obstruct the intervening empty space and light, just as when the eye is covered by a medicinal plaster, it cannot see. Therefore, one should understand that eye-consciousness cognizes without traveling to its object.

Ear-consciousness is of two kinds: sometimes it cognizes through contact, and sometimes it cognizes without contact. A sound uttered into the ear is known through contact, whereas thunder is known without contact. The remaining three kinds of consciousness cognize only when their objects come into contact with their faculties.

Why? Because it is directly observed that these three consciousnesses can cognize only when faculty and object are conjoined. Since the mind faculty is immaterial, it cognizes without traveling to its objects, for there is nowhere it does not reach.

Question: You say that eye-consciousness knows without reaching its object. This is unreasonable. Why?

Because there is light within the eye, and this light can travel forth and see forms. Light is of the nature of fire, and the eye is produced from fire, for fire possesses light. Furthermore, if the eye could see without reaching its object, why would it not see all forms?

Because the light of the eye travels forth but is obstructed and does not reach everywhere, it does not see all forms. Moreover, the sutra says: “Because three things come together, it is called contact.” If they do not reach one another, how can they come together? Furthermore, the five faculties are all said to possess resistance because they are obstructed by their objects.

Odor in relation to the nose, taste in relation to the tongue, tangible objects in relation to the body, form in relation to the eye, and sound in relation to the ear—if they did not reach the faculties, there would be no obstruction. Moreover, present cognition arises in relation to the five objects. Therefore, the five consciousnesses can know only when they reach their objects.

If they could know without reaching them, they should also know past and future forms, yet in truth they do not. Furthermore, cognition arises only when many conditions come together. Therefore, the light of the eye travels forth and joins with its object; because the light of the eye reaches the form, this is called coming together.

Likewise, sound is heard only because it reaches the ear. Why? When a person is far away and speaks softly, one does not hear him.

If sound, like form, were known without reaching the faculty, then even soft speech should be heard, yet in truth it is not. Thus, one knows that sound is heard only when it reaches the ear, and in that case there is a distinction between far and near. Moreover, when sound is blocked by a wall, it cannot be heard.

If it were heard without reaching the ear, it should still be heard despite the obstruction. Furthermore, when a sound is heard from afar, it is indistinct. If hearing occurred without the sound reaching the ear, there would be no such difference.

It is because sound reaches the ear that this difference exists. Thus, one knows that sound reaches the ear and is thereby heard. Moreover, a sound traveling with the wind is heard clearly, while one traveling against the wind is not clear.

Therefore, one knows that sound is heard only when it reaches the ear. Furthermore, a sound can be heard in its entirety. If it were heard without reaching the ear, it would not be heard in its entirety, just as a form seen without reaching the eye is not seen in its entirety.

Thus, one knows that sound is unlike form. If sound were still heard without reaching the ear, it would be the same as form. Just as one sees only a portion of a form, and the remaining portions must await illumination before they can be seen, sound should likewise be so; yet in truth it is not.

Therefore, if sound does not reach the ear, it is not heard.

You say that the hand and the other faculties know their objects without reaching them. This is unreasonable. Sound, odor, taste, and tangible objects must travel to the faculties; to suppose that the faculties travel forth is unreasonable.

The ear and the other faculties possess no light; only the great element of fire possesses light, and therefore they do not travel forth. Moreover, even when sound is obstructed by thick, opaque objects, water, and the like, the ear can still hear it. If the faculty possessed light, this could not occur.

Therefore, one knows that the faculty of hearing possesses no light. Furthermore, the ear can cognize its object even in darkness. If the faculty possessed light, it could not cognize in darkness.

Again, if a faculty possessed light, it would know only in a particular direction: it would perceive in one direction and could not simultaneously know all directions. For example, when a person faces east, he sees forms in the east but cannot see those in other directions. It is also said that the mind can travel; therefore, it knows its object only when it reaches it.

As the sutra says: “This mind travels alone to distant places, hidden and without form.” Moreover, this mind spreads outward like sunlight shining forth. Furthermore, this mind is constantly moving, like a fish deprived of water. Moreover, this mind originally follows the course of volition and perception.

Therefore, can the six objects be known only when they reach the faculties?

Answer: Your assertion that light travels forth and reaches its object is unreasonable. Why? Suppose someone sees a bare tree stump in the distance and suspects it to be a person.

If the light reached the object, how could such doubt arise? Moreover, when something is extremely close to the eye, it cannot be seen. For example, when medicinal paste is applied over the eye, how could it be seen?

Even if light traveled forth, because the object was extremely close, it still could not be seen. Furthermore, apart from illumination, the eye cannot see; yet when an object is extremely close, illumination is lost. Moreover, if the light reached the object, why would one see a large object but not a small one?

Furthermore, among forms there are differences in direction—forms to the east and forms to the west—as well as differences of distance, whether far or near. If the eye knew only by reaching them, there should be no such differences. Why?

Because no such differences exist with regard to odor, taste, and tangible objects. Therefore, the light of the eye knows without reaching the object. Moreover, if the light of the eye had already seen the object beforehand, why would it need to travel?

If it had not first seen the object, where would it travel? Furthermore, forms both near and far are seen simultaneously, but something that travels could not act in this way. Therefore, the light of the eye does not travel.

Moreover, if the light traveled, it should see forms along the way, yet in truth it does not. Thus, one knows that it does not travel. Furthermore, if the light traveled, it would have to separate from the body and then could no longer be called a faculty, just as a finger severed from the body no longer possesses bodily sensation.

Moreover, no eye is ever seen to abandon its supporting basis; without something of the same kind, there can be no supporting basis. Furthermore, since this light of the eye cannot itself see anything, it does not exist.

Question: The eye possesses light, but because it is overwhelmed by the sunlight, it cannot be seen, just as the stars cannot appear in the light of the sun.

Answer: If that were so, it should be visible at night.

Question: Visible forms must depend upon external illumination before they can be seen. At night there is no external light, and therefore they are not seen.

Answer: If this light cannot function either by day or by night, then it can never see anything at all.

Question: But the light in the eyes of cats, foxes, mice, and other creatures that move by night can be seen, can it not?

Answer: This visible form abides within the eyes of cats and the like, just as the luminous color of a firefly resides in its body; it is not light. Moreover, creatures that move by night can see in darkness, whereas human beings cannot. Thus, only those species possess such a luminous appearance, while other beings do not. Such is the natural principle of things. Furthermore, you say: “If the eye can see without reaching its object, it should see all forms.” If a form lies within the sphere of cognition, then it can be seen. As the sutra says: “If the eye is unimpaired and form lies within the sphere of cognition, then it is seen.”

Question: What is called the sphere of cognition?

Answer: Whenever form and the eye come together, that is called the sphere of cognition.

Question: If the eye does not reach the form, how can there be a time when they come together?

Answer: This is just like your own assertion that the eye travels forth and reaches form: sometimes it can see, and sometimes it cannot. For example, though the eye travels forth to the sun, it can see the disk of the sun but cannot see the sun’s activity. I say the same: although the eye does not travel forth, if a form lies within the sphere of cognition, it can be seen; if it does not lie within the sphere of cognition, it cannot be seen.

Question: The light of the eye travels far, and because its power becomes exhausted, it cannot see the sun’s activity.

Answer: If its power were exhausted, it should fail to see that subtle activity; but since the disk of the sun is vast, why would it not see it? This is unreasonable. Moreover, if light can see by reaching its object, why can it see the distant disk of the sun but not the villages and settlements near Pataliputra? If you maintain that the villages around Pataliputra are not seen because they do not lie within the sphere of cognition, I likewise maintain that the eye does not reach its objects, and that these forms are not seen because they do not lie within the sphere of cognition.

Question: It is now understood that forms are seen only when they lie within the sphere of cognition. Why, then, are some forms seen while others are not?

Answer: Because it is obstructed by time, it is not seen, as with forms of the past and future. Because it is overwhelmed by brilliance, it is not seen, as when sunlight obscures the stars and the light of jewels, fire, and the like. Because it is not manifest, it cannot be seen.

Because its realm is superior, it is not seen, as the eye of the first dhyana does not see the eye of the second dhyana. Because it is obstructed by darkness, it is not seen, as with darkness inside a jar. Because of supernatural power, it is not seen, as with the bodies of ghosts.

Because of a dense obstruction, it is not seen, as with a form on the far side of a mountain. Because it is distant, it is not seen, as with other worlds. Because it is extremely near, it is not seen, as when one closes one's own eyes.

Because its proper sequence has not yet arrived, it is not seen, as motes are visible in a ray of light but are not seen outside that light. Because it is subtle, it is not seen, as when the bare end of a tree resembles a person and cannot be distinguished. Because it is among many similar things, it is not seen, as when a single grain of rice is mixed into a great heap of rice, or when a single bird flies into a flock of birds.

Conditions contrary to those above are called being within the knowable object.

Question: What is meant by an impaired eye?

Answer: Wind, heat, cold, and other illnesses impair it. When the eye is impaired by wind, one sees blue and black forms revolving about. When the eye is impaired by heat, one sees blazing yellow and red forms.

When the eye is impaired by cold, one sees pools of water and many white forms. When the eye is impaired by strain, one sees the bases of trees swaying. When the eye is impaired by exhaustion, forms are not seen clearly.

If one rubs one eye with one's hand, one sees two moons. When seized by ghosts, one sees strange phenomena. Through the power of sinful karma, one sees hideous forms.

Through the power of meritorious karma, one sees exquisitely subtle forms. When the eye is impaired by hot vapors, one sees blazing red forms. Moreover, because beings acquire eyes that are not fully developed, they do not see completely.

Again, when a cataract grows over the eye, one does not see. Or, because the eye faculty is impaired, one does not see. This is called an impaired eye.

Conditions contrary to those above are called unimpaired. The ear and the other faculties should likewise be distinguished according to this principle.

Question: It has already been explained that the five sense objects can be known only when they are within the knowable object. In what way is a dharma-object said not to be within the knowable object?

Answer: Because its level is superior, it is not known, as the mind of one in the first dhyana does not know dharmas belonging to the second dhyana and above. Because the faculty is superior, it is not known, as the mind of one with dull faculties does not know the dharmas within the mind of one with keen faculties. Because the person is superior, it is not known, as a stream-enterer does not know the dharmas within the mind of a once-returner.

Because powers differ, it is not known. Although mental consciousness is present, it may be powerless with respect to that dharma, and therefore mental consciousness does not know it. Thus, when the mind is collected, mental consciousness can know a dharma, whereas when the mind is distracted, mental consciousness cannot know it.

The mental consciousness of a pratyekabuddha can know dharmas that the mental consciousness of a sravaka cannot know. The mental power of a Buddha can know dharmas that the mental power of sravakas and pratyekabuddhas cannot know. Mental consciousness of an inferior grade cannot know a dharma of a superior grade.

Moreover, because a dharma-object is subtle, it cannot be known. As stated in the Abhidharma: “What thoughts can be conceived? Those concerning things that one has previously and clearly experienced can be conceived.

Things not previously experienced, such as the return to life of a dead person, cannot.” A dharma that has previously been experienced can be conceived, but one never experienced cannot be conceived. Noble ones, whether they have previously experienced something or have never experienced it, can conceive and know it because of the power of noble wisdom. Moreover, because the object is superior, it can be known, as when a mind of the form realm knows a dharma of the desire realm.

Again, because one is obstructed by inverted views, it is not known, as one who holds the view of a self and takes the five skandhas as its conditions does not perceive non-self; the same applies to impermanence and suffering. Again, because one is obstructed by a stronger power, it is not known, as a person with dull faculties may be hindered by one with keen faculties, causing the mind not to know. Conditions contrary to those above are called being within the knowable object.

Question: What is meant by an impaired mind?

Answer: Madness, possession by ghosts, arrogance, heedlessness, loss of mental composure, intoxication with liquor, or drugs that stupefy and derange the mind. Or greed, anger, and other afflictions may blaze fiercely, and heedlessness may impair the mind, as in the case of the Baga practitioner and the fisherman. Or one may be afflicted by the disease called na-nhã-bà, which can destroy the mind.

Old age, illness, and death can likewise destroy the mind. If the mind abides in wholesome dharmas, or is not submerged in morally neutral dharmas, it is called unimpaired. For reasons such as these, even though an objective field is present, it still cannot be known.

Therefore, your statement, “If sight can occur without reaching its object, why does it not see all forms?” is incorrect. Again, you said, “Because the three things unite, it is called contact.” Whenever a faculty cognizes an object, that is called contact; they need not actually reach one another. Why?

The mental faculty also involves the union of three things, yet in that case it is not called contact because they reach one another. Again, you said, “Because they reach one another, they are called mutually resistant.” This is incorrect, for it has already been explained that this is not the characteristic of mutual resistance. Again, you said that cognition arises in the present.

The sixth consciousness also exists, but it knows only the present, as does the knowledge of another's mind. Again, you said that cognition arises when the conditions unite. This has already been answered in the discussion of the sixth, mental faculty.

Namely, whenever an object is cognized, this is called union. Again, through the mental faculty taking a dharma as its condition, mental consciousness arises. The expression merely indicates an empty designation, since there is no actual going to the object.

Moreover, because the relation is definite, it is called union. Visual consciousness relies only on the eye and not on anything else, yet neither does it arise without reliance. It takes only form as its condition and not anything else, yet neither does it arise without an object.

Mental consciousness is likewise so.

CHAPTER 50: THE SRAVAKA

You said, “When a person far away speaks softly, one does not hear him; therefore, it should be known that sound reaches the ear.” This is incorrect. Why? As you say: “The words of a person far away depend upon sounds arising in succession; they gradually become fainter, and when no further sound arises, they are not heard.” I say the same.

Although the ear does not reach the sound, the sound is too faint and therefore is not heard. Again, you say that although the light of the eye reaches its object, it sees only the orb of the sun and does not see the activity of the sun. I say the same.

Although the ear does not reach the sound, a loud sound can be heard, whereas a faint one cannot. Again, someone may say: “Although the light of the eye travels far, it cannot reach hundreds of thousands of myriads of yojanas. Although sunlight can be seen through obstructions such as crystal, it cannot be seen through obstructions such as walls.

And although one can see the sun, one cannot see the activity of the sun.” My account of the ear is likewise. Although it does not reach the sound, a loud sound can be heard, but it cannot be discerned in detail. Again, you say that sound is clear when carried downwind.

This is incorrect. Why? No one is entirely unable to hear against the wind.

Just as a fragrance is not smelled against the wind, so too, if sound were the same, not even the slightest sound should be heard against the wind; yet in fact it is heard. Therefore, it should be known that sound is heard without reaching the ear. If less of the sound is heard, this is because the wind obstructs it.

Moreover, sound is not like fragrance, which is blown by the wind; why, then, must one distinguish whether the wind is favorable or contrary? Again, you said, “A sound can be heard in its entirety; therefore, it should be known that it travels to the ear and is unlike form.” This is incorrect. Why?

It is the nature of sound to be heard in its entirety, whereas the nature of form is otherwise. All things have characteristics of similarity and difference. Thus, the objects' being objects is their similarity, while being known in their entirety or not in their entirety is their difference.

Their difference is not that they reach or do not reach the faculty. Again, if someone wishes to hear the inside of a bell, the sound of the bell can indeed be heard. How is this known?

If one wishes to hear inside the bell, one must bring one's ear to the bell. Moreover, sound has a locus upon which it depends, and therefore it does not travel, for dependent karmic activities are non-manifest karma.

Question: Does sound travel because successive sounds arise from a sound's locus, like waves upon water?

Answer: How can sound be compared with the analogy of waves? When the characteristics of water are stirred by wind, waves arise; but what sound is there within sound that can produce another sound? If you maintain that one sound can produce another, why does it not arise in the original place, nor yet arise in another place?

Waves arise only when water strikes against water. If it is said that a person produces sound, then the ear ought to identify that person. But in fact it does not.

Therefore, it is known that sound does not travel while sounding. Furthermore, the sound of a bell arises gradually in an uninterrupted succession. The bell is not without sound, as it would be if sounds arose successively from one another.

Still water has no waves; similarly, since the bell has sound, it would follow that the bell should be without sound, but in fact this is not so. Therefore, it is known that sound resides within the bell. Furthermore, because the sound ceases when the bell is grasped, it is known that sound always depends upon the bell.

If sound depends upon the bell and also separates from it, then when the bell is grasped, the sound dependent upon the bell ought to cease, while the sound separated from the bell ought to remain. Moreover, it is evident in speech that sounds do not arise successively as they do from a bell. Furthermore, sound differs according to direction: there are sounds from the east and sounds from the west, and there are also near sounds and distant sounds.

If sound traveled to the ear, there would be no such distinctions. Again, if sound traveled to the ear, the divine ear would be useless. Why?

How could sounds from many hundreds of thousands of worlds travel here? Furthermore, when one shoots at a sound, one can strike the place from which the sound comes. If sound traveled to the ear, the ear itself ought to be struck.

If this were not so, it could not be called shooting at a sound. Moreover, sounds both distant and near can be heard. Furthermore, because sound perishes from moment to moment, it cannot produce another sound.

No phenomenon that perishes from moment to moment is seen to be capable of producing another phenomenon. Therefore, one sound does not produce another. Just as karma, perishing from moment to moment, cannot produce another karma, sound is likewise: because it perishes from moment to moment, it cannot produce another sound.

If sound could produce another sound, karma ought likewise to produce another karma. The assertion that karma does not produce karma would then be invalidated. Furthermore, in your doctrine, one sound is opposed to another sound.

They are opposed because the two do not occupy the same place; if one sound and another occupied the same place, they would not be called opposed. If they do not occupy the same place, then the preceding sound has already perished before the subsequent sound arises by itself. Therefore, one sound does not produce another.

Furthermore, sound is a single phenomenon; how could it produce another sound? No single thing is seen to possess the power of production.

Question: Conjunction is a single thing, yet it can produce a composite thing. Sound is likewise: although it is a single phenomenon, it can produce another sound.

Answer: You hold that conjunction, a single phenomenon, possesses the power to produce; and that sound is likewise. Form is also a single phenomenon and therefore ought to produce another form. Odor, taste, and touch should likewise do so.

Dravya would then be the lord of all things, and might possess five qualities, three qualities, or two qualities. Furthermore, because sound and karma are alike, sound shares the same characteristics as karma. Although it is said that the guna of sound ceases, it is the same as karma.

For example, when a knife is flicked with a finger, the movement of the knife is called karma, and the sound of the movement also does not depart from the knife. Sound is likewise: when the knife is grasped by the hand, both the sound and the movement cease. Therefore, it is known that karma does not produce another karma, and sound likewise cannot produce another sound.

If you distinguish them by saying that the force of the initial karma subsequently produces the later karma, then similarly the later sound would also be produced by the force of the initial sound, and that same force would produce all subsequent karmas. Here there is no other force by which the subsequent causal karma is produced. Karma can produce force, but sound cannot.

Furthermore, because the karma has ceased, it cannot be called the cause of the dravya. Why? The preceding karma has already ceased before the dravya arises.

Sound is likewise: the preceding sound has already ceased before the subsequent sound arises by itself; thus the subsequent sound would have no cause. If you still maintain that the preceding sound produces another sound, sound could not be said to perish from moment to moment. Why?

The arising of this sound is the first moment; its producing another sound is the second moment; the arising of that other sound is the third moment; and the perishing of the preceding sound is the fourth moment. Therefore, it does not perish from moment to moment. Furthermore, how could one sound oppose another?

Is it as poison opposes an antidote, or as medicine opposes disease? If not, a bell should not have two sounds. If in a single moment a bell has two sounds, then throughout a thousand moments it should likewise have only two sounds.

Furthermore, it is not that a guna and dravya, together with fire, conjoin and thereby produce something. When the guna ceases, the original black color subsequently gives rise to a red color. Sound is likewise: after the preceding characteristic ceases, another sound arises.

If this were not so, there ought to be two sounds in the bell in a single moment, but in fact there are not two. Therefore, this reasoning is untenable. Again, if one sound produced another, sound would not conform to its cause.

But in fact sound arises from the bell, and thus it does conform to its cause. Moreover, this other sound ought not to be the sound of the bell. Indeed, this other sound definitely would not be the sound of the bell.

Furthermore, this other sound should never cease, since there would be no cause for its cessation.

Question: From this initial sound, progressively softer sounds are produced; therefore, the sound eventually ceases.

Answer: Why are progressively softer sounds produced? Are they not produced according to the force of the impact? The initial sound arises according to the impact, and all the second, third, and subsequent sounds likewise arise according to differences in the impact.

Since there is no further cause of striking, the force of the impact constitutes the striking; and because the striking accords with that force, the sounds become progressively softer. Furthermore, if one sound produced another, form should likewise produce the form of water in a mirror. The moon reflected in water and an image reflected in a mirror are both called forms.

The scriptures of the Vaisheshikas would then all be rendered invalid. Furthermore, you say that sound arises from separation. This too is unreasonable.

Why? Sound does not arise because a hand separates; rather, sound occurs through conjunction. When parts of knives, bamboo, and the like strike one another, sound occurs as they separate after contact.

Moreover, we do not say that conjunction produces sound. Why? When a finger conjoins with empty space, no sound arises.

If fingers do not strike one another, no sound arises either. Therefore, sound is not produced by conjunction. It is only when the four great elements either conjoin or separate that sound arises.

The activities of the great elements always remain; the great elements do not depart.

CHAPTER 51: HEARING ODOR

Question: You say that odor reaches the nose and is smelled. This too is unreasonable. Why? Just as sound can be heard from afar, odor should likewise be smelled from a distant place. Perhaps you maintain that this odorous object produces a continuous succession of odor-causes; but the fault in such successive production has already been explained in relation to sound.

Answer: How, then, is odor smelled?

Question: Subtle particles of the flower travel outward, and the odor depends upon them and travels along with them.

Answer: That is not so. If particles of the flower traveled outward, those flower particles would be form and ought to be visible. Yet in fact they are not seen; therefore, it is known that they do not travel.

Question: These particles of the flower’s form are too subtle to be seen.

Answer: Odor is likewise subtle and therefore should not be smelled.

Question: The potency of odor is strong and great, and therefore it can be smelled. For example, asafoetida in a bowl of soup can be smelled even though its form cannot be seen.

Answer: We presently see form following the particles of a flower, and we also smell its odor. Why, then, are the subtle particles of form not seen? Furthermore, when a fragrant flower is burned, its odor intensifies while its form only perishes. Therefore, odor is not a particle of the flower. Again, if odor were a particle of the flower, it should be smelled only faintly, but in fact it is not. Furthermore, if particles of the flower traveled outward, the flower should diminish, but in fact it does not diminish. How is this known? A single piece of turmeric continually emits fragrance, yet its weight still remains a full catty as before.

Question: Because only a small amount is lost, it cannot be detected, just as when a single drop of water falls from a jar, how could one know that the water has diminished?

Answer: If it were continually diminishing, nothing of the flower would remain, much less would the loss be imperceptible. Moreover, if the flower were continually diminishing, it could no longer be seen or smelled, because continual diminution means perishing from moment to moment. Since it perishes from moment to moment, a different dravya should arise, much less would a different guna fail to arise. Yet this flower can in fact still be seen and smelled. Therefore, one knows that no part of the flower travels away.

Question: If only the fragrance travels, the fragrance should also be exhausted, because it is continually diminished. Moreover, since fragrance has no parts, it should be exhausted in its entirety.

Answer: We do not maintain that parts of the flower travel with the wind, nor do we maintain that the wind blows the flower’s fragrance away. It is only that the fragrance within the flower gives rise to another fragrance. Because of the wind, this fragrance in turn gives rise to yet another fragrance, which reaches the nose and is smelled.

Therefore, the fault you allege does not arise. How is this known? The fragrance smelled in sesame seeds is not the fragrance of parts of the flower, for it arises because the sesame seeds have been perfumed with flowers.

If it consisted of parts of the flower, how could the sesame seeds be perfumed? Thus one knows that this fragrance does not reside in parts of the flower. Moreover, the fragrance of the flower is destroyed when the flower is rubbed, crushed, or placed in heat.

If it resided within the sesame seeds, it could not be destroyed in this way. Furthermore, this fragrance is found only in the oil and not in the residue, so it is not a part of the flower. Again, this fragrance remains in the sesame seeds for a long time, whereas it cannot remain in the flower for long.

Therefore, it is not a part of the flower.

Question: If it is not a part of the flower, then whose fragrance is it?

Answer: It is called the fragrance of sesame, which arises because of the flower and cannot exist apart from the sesame. In the same way, because of the wind and the flower’s fragrance, another fragrance arises. This matter is now clear.

Moreover, sometimes a hot or cold wind can be felt, although the forms of fire and water within it cannot be seen. Therefore, one should know that another tangible quality arises within the wind, and that the wind does not blow parts of water or fire along with it. If the sensation of heat in the wind belongs to fire, the sensation of cold belongs to water, and the sensation that is neither hot nor cold must be known to belong to earth.

Just as the forms of water and fire cannot be perceived, the form of earth, being subtle, likewise cannot be perceived. If this were so, however, wind would have no tangible quality, and that would be a fault. One might also say that because wind combines with water and fire, it possesses the tangible qualities of cold and heat.

In the same way, because wind combines with earth, it possesses a tangible quality that is neither cold nor hot. Yet there is no definite reason here why parts of water and fire can travel with the wind while parts of earth cannot. As your scripture states, there is a tangible quality that touches the body but is not earth, water, or fire.

Therefore, one knows that wind has the characteristic of being invisible. According to this statement, these three tangible qualities in relation to wind may either be adventitious or not adventitious. Why?

Because if these three tangible qualities have the characteristic of being invisible, they are wind. Moreover, according to your view, if you maintain that because the tangible qualities of cold and heat are seen in water and fire, they are not parts of wind, then likewise, because the tangible quality that is neither cold nor hot is seen in earth, it too should not be a part of wind. If water alone were seen to possess the tangible quality of wind without being combined with earth, one could say that this tangible quality belongs to wind.

But in fact this has never previously been observed. How, then, can it be known that the quality which is neither cold nor hot is solely the tangible quality of wind and not a part of earth? Furthermore, we also say that form, fragrance, taste, and tangible quality belong only to earth and cannot be possessed by water and the other elements.

If you maintain, ‘Although form and the other qualities are seen in water and the other elements, this is because they are combined with earth; thus, what is seen in water and the other elements does not belong to water and the other elements themselves, just as the characteristic of heat in water does not belong to water,’ there is no definite reason here why water, when combined with fire, possesses the characteristic of heat, yet when combined with earth does not possess form and the other characteristics.

Water and the other elements have never previously been seen existing separately without being combined with earth. Since these qualities have been observed in them, one should say that this form belongs to water and not to earth. Water and the other elements should likewise be distinguished in this way.

Question: Why can another fragrance arise within wind, while another tangible quality, form, or taste cannot arise within it?

Answer: Such is the nature of dharmas. Dharmas include many inconceivable things. Other substances can give rise to tangible qualities, forms, and tastes. For example, when flowers perfume sesame seeds, a pungent or bitter taste arises; when an amalaka fruit is soaked in milk, it becomes sweet; when rouge is used to perfume seeds of the ma-dau-lau-gia plant, red leaves arise; when blue pigment is mixed with orpiment, a green color is produced; and when blue and red colors are combined, they change into purple. In all such cases, different tastes and colors arise within other substances.

Question: You say that another fragrance arises within the wind. This is unreasonable. Why? Because one can smell a distant fragrance while the wind is inside a house. Moreover, a fragrance can be smelled upwind, like the fragrance of the pārijāta on the heavenly stove. Therefore, one knows that another fragrance does not arise within the wind; rather, another fragrance should arise only by virtue of the original fragrance as its cause.

Answer: There are two kinds of fragrance: either another wind-borne fragrance arises within the wind, or, when there is no wind, one fragrance gives rise to another. What fault is there in this? You previously said that because a fragrance can be smelled from afar, it need not reach the nose.

This is unreasonable. Why? Because fragrance is not the same as form.

If fragrance could be smelled without reaching the nose, this would be the same as form being seen without reaching the eye. Moreover, when fragrant smoke is seen from afar, it cannot yet be smelled; only when it arrives can it be smelled. Therefore, one knows that if it does not arrive, it is not smelled.

Furthermore, because there is no faculty of a divine nose, one knows that fragrance must arrive before it can be smelled. If it could be smelled without arriving, there should be a divine nose, just as there are the divine eye and divine ear.

CHAPTER 52: COGNITION OF TANGIBLE QUALITIES

Question: A tangible quality should likewise be cognized without reaching the body. Why? Because the sun’s heat is far away.

Answer: How is the sun’s heat cognized?

Question: A portion of fire travels from the sun to the body, and only then is it cognized.

Answer: If a portion of fire traveled from the sun, then after the sun had set that portion of fire should remain, but in fact it does not remain. Therefore, one knows that it does not arrive.

Question: Although the sun has set, its heat still remains, as is known through touch.

Answer: If that were so, then there would be fire without form. In your scriptures, there is no fire without form, and this is therefore a fault.

Question: There is a subtle form within it.

Answer: Fire has much form but little tangible quality, just as one may see the form of a lamp before being able to feel its tangible quality.

Question: Is a tangible quality definitely cognized only when it reaches the body?

Answer: A tangible quality is definitely cognized only when it reaches the body. Why? Just as, because of fragrance, another fragrance arises within the wind, so too, because of the sun, another fire arises.

Question: Is a tangible quality definitely cognized only when it reaches the body?

Answer: A tangible quality is definitely cognized only when it reaches the body. Why? Just as, because of fragrance, another fragrance arises within the wind, so too, because of the sun, another fire arises.

Question: When the sun has set, why is the form of fire not seen?

Answer: Some fire possesses only tangible quality and has no form, such as the hot air after the sun has set; the fire that abides in the body of a person suffering from a fever; and the warmth remaining in a house after the fire has gone out. The heat in boiling water and other such things also possesses tangible quality but has no form. Therefore, it should be accepted that fire may either possess form or be without form.

CHAPTER 53: THE MIND

You say that the mind travels. This is unreasonable. Why?

Because the mind arises and ceases from moment to moment, like the wind and like karma; a dharma that ceases from moment to moment has no characteristic of traveling. Furthermore, concerning this traveling of the mind: does it travel after already knowing, or does it simply travel without knowing? Neither alternative is tenable.

If it already knows beforehand, what need is there for it to travel? If it simply travels without knowing, then to what place does it travel? Furthermore, if the mind is located at the eye, how can it then reach the mind?

If the mind gives rise to the thought, “I shall go to the ear,” then it has already thought of the ear. If it is said that it wishes to hear a sound, then it has already thought of the sound. If the mind is located at the eye, it cannot give rise to thought; the same applies to the other faculties.

Therefore, one should know that the mind does not travel.

Furthermore, when a person has previously seen cities, towns, villages, and so forth, and now thinks of what was seen before without knowing what is present, one should thereby know that the mind does not travel. Furthermore, if a dharma traveled, it should first be near and afterward far away; yet now one thinks of both what is far and what is near. Therefore, one should know that it does not travel.

Furthermore, if a dharma traveled, it should perceive the sense objects along the way, just as a traveler perceives the forms of various things along the road; but the mind is not like this. Furthermore, the mind can know nonexistent things, such as the past, the future, a rabbit’s horn, a turtle’s hair, a snake’s legs, the red color of wind, the fragrance of salt, and so forth; yet in knowing them, it does not travel to them.

Therefore, one should know that it does not travel. Furthermore, if the mind reached its objects, there should be no failure to know, erroneous thought, or false cognition; yet these actually exist. Therefore, one should know that it does not reach them.

Furthermore, the mind takes nirvana as its object. If the mind traveled there, this would be to bring the conditioned into the unconditioned, which is impossible. Then, for it to return from the unconditioned and enter the conditioned would likewise be impossible.

Furthermore, if, when the thought of a future life arises, the mind immediately travels to that future life, then this body should die and could never live again. Therefore, it does not travel. Furthermore, if the mind, when thinking of the future, immediately reached the future, this would be to turn a present dharma into a future one.

Furthermore, if the mind, when thinking of the past, immediately abided in the past, this would be to turn past and future dharmas into present ones, which should not be so. Therefore, one should know that it does not travel. Furthermore, because of a desirous mind, the countenance changes; the same is true of an angry mind and so forth.

If the mind traveled elsewhere, the countenance should not change. Therefore, one should know that it does not travel. Furthermore, when the mind is engaged with an object, this is called feeling.

These three kinds of feeling—painful, pleasant, or neutral—would not exist if the mind traveled elsewhere. Therefore, one should know that it does not travel. Furthermore, the mind depends upon the body, as a sutra states: “The mind depends upon name-and-form.” Therefore, it does not leave the body and travel elsewhere.

Furthermore, because the body is conjoined with consciousness, it is called a living body. If the mind were elsewhere, the body would be without consciousness; when an object is conjoined with consciousness, it is said to be conscious. Therefore, the mind does not travel.

Question: In dreams, does the mind travel in all directions?

Answer: No. Such things as nocturnal emissions in dreams and other events all result from bodily derangement: one imagines traveling somewhere, but in reality one does not travel. Furthermore, activities in dreams are all false and unreal, as when a person dreams of drinking water but never thereby relieves thirst. Furthermore, sexual activity and the like in dreams are not considered transgressions. Therefore, one should know that even in dreams the mind does not travel. Furthermore, the mind operates only with regard to dharmas previously seen, heard, or known; it does not travel to any other dharma. If it traveled to them, it should also know other dharmas.

Question: There is a Spirit that directs the mind and enables it to travel in other directions.

Answer: How can this be so? This will be extensively analyzed in the chapter refuting the Spirit. Therefore, one should know that the mind does not travel.

End of fascicle four of the Satyasiddhi Shastra.