成唯識寶生論

The treatise states: It is further said that the determination of place and time is like a dream. That is, just as waking people, although no such object exists, collectively determine it to exist. If time is determined, then there is also a spatial location; villages, gardens, and so forth are seen.

There is also a determined time, presently apprehensible, yet these do not truly exist. This statement clarifies that although there is an awareness of determinate time and place, because no object exists, that awareness is useless as a reason with respect to them. That very reason, which asserts that all objects are empty, would then entail that time and place are indeterminate.

Yet according to this principle, such determination does exist. Therefore, understand that speaking of their determination is not to assert that they exist, but to explain that those objects are empty and nonexistent.

This is unreasonable. Indeed, this presents no fault whatsoever in our tenet. Furthermore, when establishing a proposition, the proof may possess efficacy.

To say that the proposition to be established is nonexistent and that the means of proof is also nonexistent: if the transforming consciousness is nonexistent, then what is transformed is likewise nonexistent. Only then could one charge the other party’s tenet with fault. It is like a balance on which there is no weight: no distinction can be made.

Since both parties acknowledge that there is no weight, the object to be weighed must also be set aside. Yet this does not refute the other position and thereby establish one’s own. Because time and place are determinate, they can be established.

Now the object is said to exist, but this cannot be established by just anything. Just as the auditory nature of ear-consciousness cannot establish that sound is permanent: although its nature is to hear everything, this does not preclude impermanence. The other party establishes that external objects exist; we now wish to clarify that this is an inconclusive reason.

Even though there are no external things, within cognition one nevertheless perceives the meaning of determinate time and place.

Some maintain that only because the mind is confused does a determinate conception of time and place arise. Yet in a dream not a single truly determinate object can be apprehended. Therefore, how can what people commonly accept be compared with determinate things and regarded as a fault? If the perceptions in dreams were to be equated with waking cognition, then the dreaming mind would have to be mistaken. This is merely to judge others by one’s own conjecture, without truly understanding their original intention. It is not that the other party refuses to accept this; nevertheless, further distinctions are imposed in order to raise an objection.

To establish the correct principle, this matter has already been thoroughly explained above. Thus, with respect to determinate time and place and similar matters, there are no objects apart from the mind, and no further objection should be raised. When the mind becomes attached, appearances arise; what is unreasonable about this?

Furthermore, as previously stated, confusion is a determinate conception. It is accepted that apart from consciousness there is no determinate time or place, and nothing has ever been other than provisionally established; hence one is led to apprehend them. How could one fail to say that other phenomena are delusive? This accords with reason.

Yet if it is accepted that all these categories of form are not external objects, why must an improper place be required before a fault can be demonstrated? Likewise, in that dream there truly is no determinate place or time. Then, if it is said that the appearances exist within the mind, how can this be known?

As a verse says:

As one sleeps at night,

One sees the sun in the north.

When dream-time and place are disordered,

How can the mind possess determination?

This is not merely an allegation against what was said before and afterward, nor the empty clever speech of partisans who do not accept time and place. Rather, one should not demand determinate time and place in this case alone, because it is accepted that these do not correspond with other locations, as previously explained.

Others further maintain that the dreaming mind has objects because of recollection. On this basis, it may be known that place and so forth are determinate.

This is because objects previously experienced as conditions arise again; hence many objects are seen in dreams. Suppose one sees water flowing through the sky or a great fire burning upon the vast ocean: these too are things previously seen. Water, space, fire, and the ocean are all things that have been seen, though in different places. In a dream, recollection arises and apprehends in a single place both the sky and the river. If this were not so, one would have to accept that a person blind from birth can recollect the color blue and so forth. If this is not accepted, then in dream recollections a person blind from birth would nevertheless have to recollect blue and red.

Everything recollected is something previously experienced. Therefore, people blind from birth cannot imagine the color blue. This is an established principle. Or if one dreams that one is beheaded, this too is a combination of recollections of other things that possesses such an operative capacity, as previously explained. Or if one sees one’s own body being cut apart by another, one may contemplate a former life and understand it oneself: it was previously experienced and is now recollected. This also involves no contradiction.

If so, is it not precisely because one recollects things previously experienced that strange events are seen in dreams?

It is not one and the same thing that was formerly seen. Nor, because it is indeterminate, is it necessarily only something previously experienced that is recollected. For example, something studied over many years may later be recollected with its order reversed, with words or meanings added, or with parts of what was learned forgotten.

If recollection is like this, it thereby becomes nonexistent. The object of recollection is empty. It is not like a real thing possessing its own distinct characteristics.

With regard to determination, the truth is that it is established by mental conception. For example, one has never seen horns on a horse’s head. Yet during recollection, such an object may be seen as though it had previously been experienced.

When recollecting, various unusual perceptions and understandings arise without taking external objects as their conditions. In dreams, however, inverted conceptions arise, producing recollections such as the sky and a river. This is likewise the case.

Even if a non-inverted perception occurs within a dream, and that apprehension arises in the continuum of consciousness, the appearances seen still do not exist outside consciousness. Therefore, one should understand that the proposition that recollections in dreams possess real objects cannot be established according to reason.

Yet the things seen in dreams—such as mountains and rivers appearing directly before one’s eyes—cannot be seen with such clarity when recollected while awake. Since there is no other appearance, what is the reason for this?

In a dream, the mind is confused by sleep and gives rise to recollection, so that the object is seen clearly before one’s eyes. But after awakening from the dream, the ordinary mind cannot see it in this way. Therefore, the objects that manifest clearly in a dream and those seen clearly while awake are certainly alike. From this it is inferred that the objects perceived by the mind in dreams are unrelated to recollection. Before dreaming, an object was previously seen. Later, within the dream, the earlier event is remembered. Yet this recollection within the dream is like that of a waking person: although the appearance of the recollected object seems to be present, because it is separated and distant in place and time, its forms and so forth cannot be seen clearly.

Furthermore, it is said in some places that people blind from birth see nothing at all in dreams. Although this is expressed in clever words, its reasoning cannot be established.

This likewise depends upon the efficacy of that person’s own seeds and thereby comes to fruition. Then, in a dream, one mentally sees blue and so forth; yet this is a blue of which one has never previously formed a conception. Although such people say that they see blue and so forth in dreams, this is merely how they speak, for it does not arise from any source.

Furthermore, most of the objects seen in dreams are things never experienced in the present life. Therefore, the dreaming mind is unrelated to recollective conception. If it is maintained that such recollection takes past objects as its conditions, then it follows that the objects of recollection are nonexistent.

Since the past and future are not present, they are likewise nonexistent. Thus, based on the facts, the meaning here is that although the objects apprehended while awake are nonexistent, their time and place can nevertheless be definitely determined. Therefore, it is accepted that the object existed previously and was seen only afterward.

It has not yet been able to do me any harm; what more is there to say? Because the dream obstructs the mind and possesses effective power, it temporarily arises. When the pure essence of consciousness manifests, it is unobstructed. It is like meditative concentration, which is the power of samadhi, because the contemplation of pure luminosity is unobstructed. It is as when, while inside a small house, one dreams of seeing a herd of elephants and other enormous objects. One may also dream that one has been reborn in another realm, and so forth.

Yet one cannot say that the bodies in those places—the bodies not appropriated—are one’s own body, as is the body experienced when one is not dreaming.

Nor is it reasonable to say that one abandons the body of this realm and appropriates a body in another realm. Moreover, it is not the case that birth and death occur at that time, for this would entail the error that a corpse should be seen.

Furthermore, if one admits that such birth and death occur, there is the fault of being born twice. Afterward, when one awakens, the former body has suffered no injury whatsoever.

Again, while the person is asleep, those lying nearby see nothing unusual about the body. Yet the slowness or swiftness of taking birth in such circumstances varies. Therefore, one should know that this is solely the efficacy of the imprints within consciousness. That the various forms and appearances are at that time clearly perceived in the mind is reasonable.

Furthermore, if, while lying upon an open plain, amid rocky mountains, or on a vast grassland, one beholds scenery of such immensity, this too is not material form, because it offers no resistance, just like feeling and so forth.

Moreover, if this is accepted, then the essence of material form in earth, water, and so forth must possess the nature of resistance. If this is not accepted, it loses the nature of mutual obstruction. Nor is it unmanifest form, for that would entail the fault of indeterminacy, since this and that follow the same principle.

What is so extraordinary about this mind in a dream? It performs great works without relying on external forms. It may fashion things with exquisite skill and magnificence: walls nine ren high, roofs and rafters ten zhang tall, jade, red flowers, patchouli, and luxuriant feiwu, all resplendent—forms that even skilled artisans would find difficult to carve. That case is as difficult as this one.

That position does not incur this fault. Since such things arise without relying on external material forms or labor, they come about solely through the maturation of seeds; with consciousness serving as the condition, mental consciousness immediately manifests. Moreover, no sutra or treatise has ever been seen to state that some other material object is produced within a dream. Therefore, it is certainly difficult to employ ingenious arguments in defense of one’s own school. Even if one exploits loopholes as a means, ultimately one still cannot cause any separate material object to arise within a dream. Thus, the definite determination of place and time as in a dream has been established in principle.

That the body is indeterminate, as in the case of hungry ghosts, means this: in reality, the river water is clear and there is no other object there, yet all hungry ghosts see it as a stream filled with blood and pus; it is not merely one ghost that sees it in this way. But in reality there is not the slightest trace of blood or pus there, so how could a river full of it be flowing?

Although no real object definitely belongs to any one being, the reasoning still cannot be established. It should be understood that although the mind contemplating material form and so forth has no external object and no determinate nature, if with respect to the body the object is nonexistent, then there is no object that obstructs. Thus, the reason established by that position—that there is an object—incurs the fault of indeterminacy.

Where no object exists, many bodies may nevertheless jointly behold something indeterminate. How could it be that, although the blood and pus are unreal, the hungry ghosts do not see them differently?

Because they share the same karma, they all see the stream as blood and pus. Their karma of stinginess has matured, and thus they behold this suffering in common. Because in the past they all imprinted the same karma upon their own continua, the corresponding maturation manifests for all of them at that time. Those sentient beings see it in the same way, while in reality the external object neither increases nor decreases in the slightest. According to this principle, when an identical deed and its imprints mature, the objective aspect arises from consciousness, without there being material form or any other distinct appearance. Therefore, it is certain that consciousness does not arise only by virtue of an external object.

Is it not accepted that they are born within the same realm, but that those sentient beings do not necessarily share the same karma? For it is presently observed that people differ as rich or poor, noble or lowly, and that the objects of material form they perceive also differ. Since beings of the same general class come to see things differently, it should be understood that this kind and that kind are not identical.

Nor do their perceptions of material form and so forth arise through the power of external objects. Although hungry ghosts inhabit the same realm, their perceptions also differ. Because their karma differs, the appearances they behold differ accordingly.

Some see a vast mass of molten iron flowing along; others at times see a stream filled with filthy excrement. Thus, although people inhabit the same human realm, when a golden belt appears, those of meager merit see it as a red-hot iron chain that is difficult to approach, or as a serpent spitting poisonous fire. Therefore, it is certain that even those dwelling together in the human realm do not see things in the same way.

If beings of these kinds have perceptions that do not differ from one another, this is because they possess karma of the same kind. Yet through shared karma they are born in a shared realm, while through their particular karma they have differing perceptions. These two efficacies, each according to its own power, cause those beings to see things either similarly or differently.

This meaning may also be used to answer other statements.

One explanation says that sentient beings in different realms—such as hungry ghosts, animals, and so forth—because of differences in the maturational nature of the actions they have performed, do not have identical perceptions in one and the same place. There is karma through which they behold things in common, and there is also karma that does not differ; thus, these differences exist within the continua of sentient beings. Because karmic seeds accompany them, they can all arise in accordance with conditions.

Still others say that when hungry ghosts and so forth behold the same thing together, it is not that no external object exists. Rather, this realm is a birthplace for sentient beings who share common dominant karma. They must rely upon the actually existing clear river water before they can see that place as a stream of blood and pus, and so forth.

Because their merit is meager and they are defiled by stinginess and craving, they see this deeply unpleasant thing. If they do not see it as water, then these sentient beings, through their shared dominant power, collectively experience a common result. Yet because this reasoning remains incomplete, it should be understood that such beings possess that real object—blood, pus, and so forth—and that consciousness must rely upon this matter in order to arise.

Just as, within one’s personal continuum, one perversely and mistakenly clings to a self with certainty, there is no other thing that is jointly seen as blood and pus. Therefore, indeterminacy belongs to what arises within a single body. This perception occurs because the object of cognition is not clearly understood; only when the mind and mental factors clearly apprehend the appearance of the object before them can it be called an object of cognition.

But if the hungry ghosts do not see the flowing water there, how could it be seen and made an object of cognition?

If a distinct aspect is employed—namely, that where there is water, blood and pus are seen—then on what basis can it be determined that what is seen is truly water? Yet not the slightest aspect of water is discerned; only that appearance is seen and taken as the object.

Some say that because consciousness possesses a corresponding appearance, it is called an object. Since the consciousness of blood and pus lacks that other appearance, it is thereby known that it does not take water and so forth as its object. This is like awakening from a dream; it does not establish the nature of an object-condition merely by being a cause.

This entails a grave error. It has already been clearly explained above that this external object has never added anything to the object-condition of the mind. If it is regarded merely as a cause, that too is a grave error, as already stated.

Again, some say that because it is produced through the shared aspect of karma, it must necessarily be seen.

This too is not so. Those who have not developed the divine eye cannot perceive distant regions. Beings born in the Formless Realm should also be able to see it.

If it is said that it is not produced by that karmic power, then upon passing into other kinds of rebirth it likewise would not be seen. If it is said that it arises only afterward, then our position is the same. Yet when beings are born in the Formless Realm, their rebirths are not without consequence.

The reasoning is likewise the same in the case of hungry ghosts. Moreover, the object of wrong view arises from oneself. According to the reasoning already cited, it does not take conditioned things such as form and so forth as its object, for it does not apprehend their appearances, just as one knows the unconditioned.

Therefore, it is certainly known that one who does not understand clearly oneself cannot enable others to understand clearly. Yet the words of the treatise are exceedingly clear. As a verse says:

Though river water is there, ghosts do not see it,

But see it transformed into another form.

Thus it is known to arise from former karma;

Karmic obstructions render their eyes unclear.

Although the object is nonexistent, through the fault of karma the faculty of sight, while existing, is unable to see it as it truly is; therefore, what is seen assumes another form. Hence it is known that blood and pus do not truly exist there, but are falsely perceived.

Still others say that the power of karma causes hungry ghosts’ eyes to perceive such appearances.

Although they are present at the same time, those among them who possess merit do not see them. Upon correct examination, this is indeed a repulsive object. From this it should be known that the minds of hungry ghosts take that real object as their condition.

We should now ask them whether it is the eye faculty that produces these false perceptions. Although there is no object before it, this is not something desirable, because such things truly exist in the object before it.

Does visual consciousness arise in dependence upon this and discern it?

The first alternative is unreasonable, for if one accepts a repulsive object, there can be no deluded mind. If it is said that this perception arises from differentiated conceptualization, and that in reality it does not conflict with the absence of an object before it, that is what we accept. As for the second assertion, how could that object manifest in this form? If it is said to arise from evil karma, how could many beings of the same kind dwell together in a single place?

It cannot be accepted that obstructive material things can occupy the same place, just as stones and bricks cannot occupy one and the same place. Therefore, it is known that blood and pus, being substantially different from water, could be seen in the same location only if this were reasonable in terms of material obstruction. Likewise, curds and so forth would become non-obstructive.

If it is said that blood, pus, and so forth are materially obstructive, then they cannot be seen in the same place, just as stones cannot. Therefore, it is known that seeing them in one and the same place conflicts with reason. If it is said that aggregated matter contains many gaps and much light enters through those empty spaces, then if the substances resembled one another no difference could be seen, just as when water and milk are blended together.

Again, although a diamond is extremely hard, it becomes otherwise when placed in fire. Furthermore, concentration is certainly the eye medicine of karmic power. From it the eye faculty arises and can assuredly observe objects before it, whether distant or near, coarse or subtle.

Regardless of whether they are agreeable or disagreeable, it can see them all according to the measure of its power.

There is indeed such a theory, but this position cannot be established in that way. One thing would enter again into the gaps within another. Although they occupy a single place, one may conceive of water alone and not the disagreeable blood and pus.

This amounts to accepting the real existence of external objects. When people look at something, they do not apprehend obstruction, and when they look at water they should see its various forms. The same applies to hungry ghosts when they look at water together.

It is like cooking fragrant oil: everyone smells its fragrance. If it is said that, although there is no other cause or condition, solely because of karma they see water, blood, and pus within the same object, this surely contradicts what is commonly accepted and unreasonably delights in blood and pus. Yet when the seeds within one’s own consciousness, shared through karma with others of the same kind, ripen, various appearances arise according to the conditions present.

Why not believe this wondrous principle? Moreover, there are guards of terrifying appearance who brandish sharp blades, hold ropes and lassos, and drive the hungry ghosts away, preventing them from approaching. Even if at that time the hungry ghosts resist, they still cannot argue their case.

Because the evil karma of these beings serves as the dominant condition, what did not exist before suddenly comes into being. This directly supports consciousness-only and jointly establishes the true doctrine. According to this reasoning, the appearances transformed and manifested by consciousness naturally involve no contradiction.

Thus it should be known that the inconclusive reason pertains to the body: although there is no external object, the event is accomplished within consciousness.

Just as harmful effects occur in a dream, although there is no external object, the principle is still established. In a dream, when a man and woman engage in intercourse, one’s own faculties come into contact with one another. Although there is no external object of contact, an effect nevertheless occurs and impure fluid is emitted. This is merely an appearance of one’s own consciousness, converging to perform that action.

As it is with this matter, so it is with other matters. In a dream, one may see harmful things—blades and weapons, mist, and hailstones—that cause injury. Although there are no external objects and the harmful things, blades, weapons, and so forth exist solely in dependence upon that consciousness, why should such effects not occur?

Since it is accepted that an event can be accomplished even though there is no external object, how can this still be regarded as a fault in our doctrine? If they insist that an effect cannot be accomplished, then even when things are spatially separated, various contacts appear within the aspect of consciousness in forms such as these. Thus their own doctrine incurs the fault of inconclusiveness. Yet it is solely within consciousness that the emission of impure fluid occurs.

There is also a theory that such thoughts and memories are not seen among living beings at all times. Yet what is stated here cannot establish the reason and entails the fault of inconclusiveness. Waking cognition also produces effects with respect to things. The transformation of consciousness is the cause of emission.

Furthermore, the claim that concentration is the cause but cannot produce an effect is based only on the general aspect of consciousness.

To say that the differentiation of consciousness cannot be established provides, upon initial examination, no analogous example. Therefore, it is said that consciousness can produce effects. That dominant consciousness can also give rise to them. If the second assertion is adopted, then that consciousness can perform all the effects attributed to it; moreover, together with the reason alleging that an event cannot be accomplished, it incurs the fault of inconclusiveness.

If so, how could it be determined that in such cases the event equally lacks an object? Or, when conditions are present, why can an effect occur in some cases but not in all?

It is because the capacities differ. Capacities differ according to the various conditions, and effects are produced in accordance with those capacities. Furthermore, you and the other masters maintain that external objects exist. If the reasoning is analogous and objects exist equally, why do all things not arise at all times? Therefore, you must accept that, in particular circumstances, when the capacity to produce an effect is present, distinct appearances arise. This is precisely the view shared by the proponents of consciousness-only.

Still others say that, in truth, it is not reasonable that contact with a woman can produce impure fluid.

The same is true when one is awake. Yet because intense lustful defilement manifests, the sign of emission occurs. In a dream, it is through the distinctive power of the immediately antecedent condition that improper mental attention is aroused; taking this as the cause, one then experiences emission. If, in a dream, although there is no real object, one can nevertheless emit impurity, be poisoned, eat and drink, touch a female form, and so forth; if the body can become hot or cold, the faculties vigorous, and perceptions of male and female arise, and so forth—then those events in the dream would have to be real. Therefore, it is certainly known that emission in a dream has efficacy despite there being no object.

To say that, while awake, there can be efficacy without an object is unreasonable.

Although that object does not exist, the efficacy of consciousness is nevertheless accomplished. If, while awake, one admits that although there is no object, the function of consciousness alone can be accomplished, would this not accord perfectly with Consciousness-Only? Why, then, would the treatise masters who maintain that there are no external objects not accept it?

If it is said that this has a different purport, then every instance of contact would have to depend upon an external thing in order to produce an effect, and thus the principle that there is consciousness only would not be established. For example, sandalwood may be ground into a paste and applied to the body, dispelling feverish heat and producing coolness; but to say that this emission arises solely in dependence upon consciousness is not yet satisfactory in principle.

It has not been admitted that efficacy occurs in dependence upon objects of contact and so forth. Since the existence of contact with external objects is not admitted, yet one wishes to make that efficacy arise in dependence upon such contact, it therefore should not be used to establish against the other position the fault of nonexistence.

For those who maintain Consciousness-Only hold that things possess efficacy and that all their distinctions arise from consciousness. Here the following question is asked: If there are no external objects, how could anything apart from consciousness possess efficacy and accomplish an event?

Since this question has been asked, let the following example be given. It is like experiencing harm in a dream. Here consciousness alone can possess efficacy.

As already explained, if in a dream you see yourself consume poison, your body will become ill, for here too consciousness alone possesses efficacy, just as objects are experienced as having definite determinations. The following reply can remove the preceding doubt. At times poison and so forth are perceived and, although no real object exists, an effect nevertheless occurs.

For example, merely seeing oneself bitten by a snake and suspecting that there is venom may cause one to faint, break into a sweat, and lose consciousness. The incident of the snakebite is like an event in a dream. Through the empowering force of a mantra, one may become satiated, vigorous, and strong.

Have you not heard of a woman seeking a child who hid beneath a bed, dreamed that she had intercourse with a man, and afterward bore a child?

How is it known that being poisoned, wounded, and so forth in that dream was nonexistent?

Because after awakening, it is not seen.

The matter now under discussion is likewise comparable to those events. While awake, one regards poison and so forth as real, but that apprehension is mistaken, because when one awakens to true wisdom, they are not seen. Just as things in a dream are not real in essence, though forms are taken as real while dreaming, so too it is here. Things that are disagreeable, such as poison, nevertheless truly produce their effects. If this is denied, then only the appearance of poison exists, while the effects of poison and so forth do not.

But this account of the condition of poison again becomes contradictory. To admit the appearance of poison would then be pointless.

For upon that consciousness, the substance of the poison does not exist. Therefore, it is certainly known that in truth there is no external object; it is merely the mind while awake that produces that effect. The same is true upon awakening from a dream. This indeed accords with reason.

The foregoing discussion followed the particular cases, using dreams and hungry ghosts as examples; thus all four questions mentioned earlier have been illustrated. Now the example of Naraka is again used to answer the questions. This successfully establishes the matter. Because extremely evil sentient beings, extremely cruel hell wardens, and so forth are seen with definite and indefinite place and time, all without being apart from consciousness, yet possessing different forms; and because dogs, crows, and so forth create various painful circumstances for sinners, this example can answer the questions above. This should be contemplated.

Furthermore, in truth there are no extremely cruel hell wardens, as has already been stated. From what cause, then, do the definite and indefinite features arise? Yet it is also there that the mind's activity gives rise to this cause, and at the appropriate time the effect is produced.

The many differences among the beings perceived there arise by virtue of latent capacities and the mental continuum, with the varying power of karma that turns accordingly serving as the principal cause, while favorable conditions such as appropriation and so forth provide assistance. Thus, according to the particular circumstances, perceptions and so forth arise, develop into various ripened results, and all become manifest.

Therefore, although hell wardens do not exist, beings there, through the empowering force of their own similar evil karma, perceive together definite places and so forth, and their minds then produce effects in relation to them. These are merely forms appearing to those beings; they are not real external objects but clearly arise from consciousness. This proof is established in order to clarify this meaning.

Yet if one does not depend upon an object apart from consciousness as that which transforms, the fault of contradiction follows. If tactile objects and so forth are forms possessing intrinsic nature, then the thesis is established. If one says that only the fixed apprehension of them as real things is being established, then what was to be established has already been established.

Since the opponent's fault is presented as an expedient, it should be understood that this clarifies the established characteristic of one's own thesis. Here an accordant reason is set forth, using dream consciousness and so forth as examples. Thus this very assertion clearly shows that, according to this meaning, entities exist at definite places and times.

Because their appearances manifest to the mind, they pervade the mind just as in a dream. After one has awakened from a dream, the forms seen while awake are in truth likewise not apprehended as external objects.

Form is not consciousness; yet it does not necessarily require manifest forms and other such objects.

Rather, because beings are drawn together through the ripening of shared karma, when they experience things in common, those things arise within each individual mental continuum without being determinately confined to only one. This is like hungry and thirsty ghosts who share the same evil karma and see rivers of blood and pus, and so forth, or like those in the extremely evil realms who all see the fierce hell wardens.

Both should be established here, because the object manifests as something visibly possessing efficacy. Thus, in a dream, there is only the appearance within consciousness of having intercourse with a woman; likewise, one sees the hell wardens inflicting punishment. Both cases may be cited. Is it not necessary first to establish that the extremely cruel hell wardens are nonexistent before using this as a probative example? Since this has not been established, it follows that their nonexistence is not established. The example therefore shares the same fault, and thus an error follows.

This is because these things are also taken to be sentient beings. Likewise, they are not said to be apart from what is appropriated, because they are not objects of experience. Yet they too are not things appropriated, just as bricks, stones, plants, trees, and anthills are not sentient beings.

For what reason, then, is it not admitted that the hell wardens, dogs, crows, and so forth are sentient beings? They are commonly seen to possess the forms and movements of sentient beings, and do they not, like other sattvas, also depend upon the power of external conditions? If so, are these reasons not unestablished?

This question is unreasonable. The activities of those in Naraka do not require external conditions. Their own previously committed evil karma sets the beings in Naraka in motion. Just as the shadow of a tree moves, so too do the appearances of those beings.

Furthermore, because they are certainly not sentient beings—for they are not included among the five destinies—they are like wood and stone. From this it is known that they are certainly not of the same class as evil sentient beings. All evil sentient beings born in that place undergo its sufferings together, whereas they do not undergo those sufferings and do not share in the common suffering of the sentient beings of that realm. Just as the Garland-Bearing Devas and others are not beings of Naraka who undergo suffering together with evil sentient beings, they are born together in that place because of their common karma.

If it were otherwise, even birth there would be difficult to establish, much less their being harmed.

Although this reasoning exists, the prison guards and others do not undergo the sufferings there, and so there is no shared formation.

This is not yet the correct doctrine. They enter that place without undergoing the same sufferings. They are harmed because there is no one capable of harming them, and thus they in turn are harmed by those beings. Yet they equally undergo the suffering of scorching heat. If so, they also torment and harm one another; therefore, it must be accepted that at times they undergo suffering.

This too is unreasonable. For when they harm one another in succession, the respective functions of “this one is a being of Naraka” and “this one is a Pāla” would be lost, since they could harm one another and could serve as causal conditions for one another.

They are called prison guards. What is true of one prison guard is likewise true of the other prison guards. Both would thus possess the nature of prison guards. They would therefore not be distinct from the essential nature of beings in Naraka, and this would result in error. Consequently, they do not possess the nature of beings in Naraka, just as the devas of the Heaven of the Thirty-Three do not. The intention is to clarify the statement that beings in Naraka are those who are harmed.

If it is accepted that they harm one another, then while inflicting harm, one who considers himself strong in power and physique would look down upon the other rather than fear him. Even if he saw that the other had a large body, he might think that through his own courage and bravery he would prevail. Knowing himself to be thus, why would he still be afraid? How could this resemble beings in Naraka when they see the prison guards and others? Much less could the sight of another cause fear when their physical forms, strength, and vigor are no different.

Furthermore, if all were prison guards, their physical forms and strength would be alike, and their power would also be equal, without any being stronger or weaker. There would have to be differences in their bodily size, courage, and vigor before the sight of one could produce fear in another. Thus, when beings in Naraka undergo punishment and see those prison guards approaching, fear arises in them.

The fire of anxiety bursts forth within their minds and burns their entire bodies as they continuously undergo punishment. In this way, sentient beings with evil karma undergo suffering. Even wise, discerning, and intelligent persons cannot fully know all those circumstances.

The principles governing these different states must necessarily differ, and such things can also be observed in the world. A person of malicious intent, harboring a venomous desire to harm another, causes fear to arise. Even in a place of utmost terror, when one is tightly bound in fetters, degrees of dread and fear are not the same.

The prison guards have hardened hearts, whereas beings of the Naraka class undergo punishment in terror. Therefore, these beings in Naraka are not those capable of inflicting harm. The prison guards are like butchers who bind animals to posts: they are the cause of fear, not those who undergo punishment.

The Treatise on the Jewel-Born Establishment of Consciousness-Only, Fascicle II