成唯識寶生論

Sentient beings are constantly oppressed by suffering;

Blazing flames consume their inner hearts.

The compassionate resolve of virtuous ones arises,

As though they themselves endured it all.

Homage to those of good wisdom, the lineage of the Buddhas,

Who utterly eliminate all afflictions,

Provide refuge for those without support,

And bring peace to the hearts of the fearful.

With a smile they subdue the great armies of Mara;

Their luminous wisdom clearly comprehends and dispels all desires.

This is the abiding place of the Mahayana,

Profoundly understanding that the source of craving is only one’s own mind.

The Treatise states: That is, relying upon the Mahayana, it establishes the teaching that the three realms are consciousness-only.

Explanation: What is intended by the term “Mahayana”? It means being fundamentally in accord with a vast mind, steadfastly observing the precepts, and universally rescuing every class of sentient being, enabling them all to escape birth and death and attain the most excellent, difficult-to-attain fruition, free from faults, supremely wondrous and auspicious.

Wherever the Sugatas go, one follows accordingly; their great path is boundless, and they attain the highest, perfect fruition. What lies beyond this cannot be known: such is the meaning of Mahayana.

As a sutra says: The Mahayana is the path traveled by bodhisattvas and the supreme fruition of Buddhahood. To attain this aim, one must cultivate contemplation of consciousness-only. This is the correct and faultless path of skillful means.

For this reason, in order to clarify these skillful means, the sutras extensively describe various modes of practice, such as earth, water, fire, and wind, together with innumerable categories, for the directions and locations are boundless. Thus, upon careful examination, one understands that appearances are transformations manifested by one’s own mind. Therefore, everywhere and in every circumstance, one relinquishes external appearances and departs far from attachment.

Furthermore, contemplate the ocean of existence, in which movement and stillness are without distinction. Abandon that narrow path and aspire toward the Mahayana. Amid all forms of existence, contemplate every object of infatuation as a perilous cliff, give rise to fear, and wish only to proceed directly along the single path to the Middle Way.

If one knows that everything is fashioned solely by one’s own mind, it becomes easy to accumulate abundant provisions without having to spend a long time; with only a little exertion, one can accomplish a great undertaking. Wherever the Sugatas go becomes as clearly visible as the palm of one’s hand. Thus, wherever aspirations are made, they are completely fulfilled and unfold according to one’s wishes.

Although external things may exist, through the aspiration of the inner mind and the power of vast vows, one can reach the boundless farther shore of the six paramitas. If this is attained, everything relinquished is given away, even one’s body and life. How, then, could such giving not extend everywhere, bringing happiness to others and fulfilling the desires of their hearts, while generosity is practiced ceaselessly in every circumstance?

Furthermore, for the sake of broadly benefiting sentient beings, one observes morality and the other practices. Toward all unobstructed kinds of sentient beings, one satisfies them according to their inclinations and bestows right conduct in fulfillment of their aspirations, thereby swiftly gathering the provisions for perfect awakening. Since this depends solely upon one’s own mind, no external objects are required.

If external things are held to exist, this contradicts correct reasoning. Therefore, one should know that nothing about objects is excellent or wondrous. If one’s own mind falsely gives rise to discrimination, supposing that form exists and thereby producing the view of a self and so forth, all of this is unreal.

One need not wait for external sentient beings to become objects of cognition before giving rise to a mind that departs from defilement. Yet in acts such as generosity, whatever one does according to the circumstances yields its result; in truth, it does not depend upon illusory objects outside consciousness. If distinct objects existed outside consciousness, afflictions would arise in dependence upon them, and once those objects were apprehended, the mind would follow them and remain under their sway.

Having seen this fault, one gives rise to a mind of renunciation and does not fear great awakening.

Having abandoned the realm of sentient beings, how can one broadly carry out beneficial deeds?

This is accomplished by not appropriating sentient beings. If, with a narrow mind, one seeks only one’s own deliverance, the great practice is difficult to accomplish. Only when bodhisattvas proceed in reliance upon this can they nurture the provisions for bodhi.

That is, because they become disenchanted with conditioned things, which are adventitious defilements, they realize the unconditioned Dharma. Since the nature of the unconditioned Dharma neither arises nor develops, it is feared that those of narrow mind who seek quiescence will realize only one side, thereby submerging the mountain of unsurpassed awakening. If both attachment to and aversion toward external objects can be relinquished, perfect awakening is easily attained.

If one does not constantly maintain mindfulness of great compassion within the mind, how can the ultimate fruition of a bodhisattva be accomplished? The teaching of consciousness-only would then instead become harmful.

However, the mind of great compassion must rely upon other bodies as its conditions. If external objects have already been eliminated, it can take only one’s own consciousness as its object. In that case, such a mind of great compassion would become great compassion directed toward oneself. The great practice of benefiting others, newly established, would amount only to benefiting oneself. Would this not truly contradict the vast vow?

Although such criticism may be voiced, there is in fact no such fault. With the external continuum serving as a dominant condition, the appearance of sentient beings manifests within one’s own consciousness. Taking that appearance as its object, one gives rise to great compassion and performs vast deeds benefiting sentient beings; thus, there is no contradiction. Since this is certainly so, please give rise to faith.

Even if one examines each instance of form and sound there, no self can be found. Even if they are gathered and combined, they still do not constitute a self; nevertheless, their intrinsic nature cannot be discarded. And if one has adopted non-self as one’s tenet, toward what does one give rise to great compassion?

Worldly people take the affective state produced by false attachment as their cognitive object and designate it a sentient being. Yet one should not say that this affective state of false attachment is an external object. Therefore, one should understand that, although one may be unwilling to accept it, the principle is certainly thus: it is solely within one’s own consciousness that the appearance of a sentient being manifests, and on that basis the appearance of form arises. Thus, one knows with certainty that no external objects exist. Apart from consciousness, there certainly are none. To believe otherwise is inversion.

What is meant by inversion?

Although external objects fundamentally do not exist, one sees them as real entities. If one does not falsely grasp them, one can ultimately attain the unsurpassed state. This may be called the view of consciousness-only that accords with reason, for it is the true view, and through those skillful means it becomes logically established.

How do we know that this is the true view?

Because it has been clearly stated that the three realms are mind-only. Every disputation intended to reach a definitive conclusion must rely upon two approaches: first, conformity with the Agama; second, conformity with correct reasoning. That is, in order to inspire others to believe and realize that the words spoken by the noble ones are not mistaken, one cites evidence from the Agama scriptures when transmitting the teaching.

If some remain unconvinced, correct reasoning is then clearly explained. Alternatively, both approaches may be presented for the sake of both kinds of people. Those who believe will thereby attain stability.

While presenting correct reasoning, the Agama is sometimes also cited to clarify the argument based upon that reasoning. This is because correct reasoning does not depend upon the transmission of the teaching. If one has not yet seen clearly, whatever one says is merely forced conjecture.

Therefore, one should know that the Agama serves as the foundation for correct reasoning. Alternatively, because one’s own school employs it extensively, the teaching of the Agama is presented first. In the foregoing, the expression “relying upon the Mahayana” is in the seventh grammatical case.

That is, if one wishes to realize the principle of the Mahayana, one contemplates consciousness-only. Because this is true and its nature is not false, the Agama is thereby established.

Furthermore, when speaking of the Mahayana in dependence upon verbal expression, just as the name “vehicle” is provisionally applied to its meaning, the expression is based upon the seventh grammatical case. That is, the doctrine is established in reliance upon the meanings of the phrases in the verbal teachings of the Mahayana. Yet because consciousness alone is used to elucidate the tenet, one aspect of the Mahayana is cited to clarify the doctrine being established, and this does not conflict with one’s own teaching.

Why is it called the Agama? And is this statement cited as scriptural evidence?

That is to say, from the speaker’s teaching in accordance with principle, one borrows that continuum as the contributory condition, and only then does this teaching arise. Its essence has the capacity to remain present within the differentiated consciousness of the listener, whether one hears it personally or hears it recounted by another. As for what is expressed, it possesses form and an ordered composition, like words written with a brush and clearly arranged into sentences and passages; hence it is called Agama.

Or at times one may recollect it oneself, in conformity with the original character of the consciousness that arises. Because it arises from this, it is called Agama. For example, the Self-Uttered teachings are words spoken by the Buddha.

The listener’s apprehension of their meaning and characteristics is the cause of knowledge; therefore it is called the provisions for knowledge.

Is everything, then, nothing but consciousness?

If not, would that not contradict what has been accepted and also contradict one’s own statement? The principle must certainly be so. Distinctions are established not because material form differs, but because consciousness differs. For example, there are distinctions even within the Formless Realm, although the Formless Realm truly has no material form. Merely through divisions of consciousness are the four spheres of emptiness established. The other realms are likewise.

If three are spoken of, does this cause any harm to consciousness?

For example, although sentient beings are not differentiated, the Desire Realm and the Form Realm are established as distinct. This is due to differences in their bondage with respect to material form. Therefore, although material form is not differentiated, distinctions may be established without fault.

Does not the teaching set forth say that there is only mind, whereas the present thesis asserts that there is only consciousness?

The claim that this contradicts the original teaching rests upon a false interpretation. There is truly no discrepancy, for was it not previously accepted that mind, mentation, and consciousness are one? Their names differ, but their essence is the same.

Their characteristics and names cannot be stated exhaustively. Therefore, other names must be used to express their meaning. Thus, the word “only” used here is not yet accepted by everyone.

To enable everyone to understand the meaning, words known to all must be used to clarify what remains. Repeating the two terms “mentation” and “consciousness” makes it still more evident that this does not contradict the sutras. How much more so when those two terms possess only one meaning and do not differ in essence?

This is their conclusion. If one wishes to understand clearly that this does not contradict the meaning of the sutras, one must understand that “mind” and “consciousness” are two terms with the same meaning; it is then evident that there is no contradiction with the scriptural teaching. The explanation is complete.

Why, then, must mentation and consciousness also be mentioned? If they are said to be different names for mind, then mind and mental factors can be distinct, like the various kinds of objects that arise together. Recalling a former dream, which has now become nonexistent—would this not make the earlier and later positions contradict one another?

There is truly no such fault, for there is a reason. Here, when mind is spoken of, its associated factors are included. That is, the term also encompasses consciousness.

If so, the intended meaning expresses objects external to consciousness, and is this why the word “only” is placed after “mind”?

The intention is to exclude the assertion that such objects are its result.

If there are no objects, the word becomes useless, for “only” excludes nothing. This would deserve the Tathagata’s reproach.

Since it presently excludes objects of cognition, how can it be said to be useless?

If it is explained in this way, then co-arising dharmas and objects of cognition each possess a separate essence apart from mind. Thus one is excluded while the other is seen to remain. Would this not be mere empty phrasing?

If there were no distinct intention, this question would likewise arise only from attachment to one’s own view. Yet because objects and mind converge as shared conditions, matters of the same kind are determined. Therefore, with regard to mental factors, the designation “mind” is provisionally employed.

Furthermore, to preclude error, the word “only” is placed after “mind.” Whatever one may argue would still be unreasonable and would also fail to apprehend mind. To say that they are not in one place is to clarify the true and the provisional; both matters can be shown to possess efficacy. It is like the terms “ox,” “cow,” and so forth.

With regard to mental factors, this mind is posited and called “mind,” thereby setting aside literal actuality. Just as at a frontier region, something may provisionally be called an ox or cow. Since the matter and its principle are excessively complicated, they should be set aside.

Some say that the original intention was to speak of both matters. One should therefore formulate another expression to indicate this meaning, or else it may be included within the term itself. This is a concise clarification in accordance with the conventional method of discourse, as when one wishes to use words to make distinctions. It cannot be adequately explained according merely to one’s own intention.

Does determination originally arise from the system itself?

Nor does it arise from speaking of the defiled, and so forth. The sutras speak of the defiled and so forth in order to exclude and dispel what lacks efficacy. They also say that objects exist; therefore objects likewise do not prevent the word “only” from becoming useless.

If external objects are said to be unreasonable, they must be excluded. There are not two expressions, Agama and Matra, because the two are one. If only one matter is excluded according to circumstances, there is no determinate reason.

Therefore, one must follow the interpretation of another school. Mind and mental dharmas are not separate in essence; they differ only in their states. Thus, the word “only” can exclude external things, for there is no co-arising dharma that it does not exclude.

The common characteristic of all words is called their expressive function. Their own referents are undifferentiated; it is not because of determination that all are present. Since this does not violate reason, they are jointly included.

To clarify this principle, mind is said to have associated factors. Apart from mental factors, there is no mind existing separately. Therefore, this objection should not be raised; this is also like dispelling matters that are excluded in common.

When explained in this manner, it truly has the efficacy of excluding only external objects. The meaning is thereby established. Therefore, the word “only” is used.

Other matters can be inferred through reasoning: it excludes only presently asserted things and is not established merely by citing words. It is clearly known that other things exist, apart from mental factors. Thus, just as the sixfold body of consciousness is called the aggregate of consciousnesses.

When the skandha of consciousness is spoken of here, does it therefore include mental factors?

In principle, this is not so, because mental dharmas such as feeling, perception, and volition belong to other skandhas and are not included therein. If one speaks as in the case of the form skandha, it would be like taking a particular state of vijnana to be the form skandha. The same would apply to perception and so forth, yet the cases are not analogous.

Therefore, if distinctions of form are apprehended, then the term “consciousness” would be used to designate that consciousness skandha. Dharmas that are not form are the differentiated states of mind. It is as with perception: if distinctions are made according to differentiated states, differentiation has already been made according to the existing kinds of form.

To apply the term “form” to consciousness is likewise unreasonable and would amount to repudiating the aggregate of consciousnesses, since it would be divided by the terms form, feeling, and so forth. Nothing can be obtained apart from differentiated states. To posit a state of form outside the differentiated states of vijnana would be no different from sorrow and anguish appearing when the characteristic of happiness is manifest.

It is to apply the term “consciousness” to a characteristic, following the same principle as the words “ox” and “cow.”

If so, is the consciousness of the sixfold body of consciousness the consciousness skandha?

Their meanings differ. Eye-consciousness and the other consciousnesses manifest the characteristics of form and so forth. Therefore, since they all belong to the aggregate of form, the fault of confusion again arises. When such characteristics as blue and so forth arise, the form skandha and the formations skandha would become confused, whether contrary or concordant. In the same way, they would once again become such states as pleasure. The confusion of the characteristics of feeling and so forth should likewise be understood according to this principle, which refutes both the general and the particular meanings.

One teaching holds that consciousness is that which transforms and is therefore the general characteristic, while sound and the initial characteristic are particular characteristics. This means that form and so forth are causal in nature and manifest the differentiated characteristics of various states.

This, like the preceding case of feeling and so forth, again entails the fault of confusion. Therefore, it is spoken of apart from the nature of mental factors, just as the aggregate of form is established. The expression “mind-only” indicates consciousness-only.

Yet this still cannot dispel doubt concerning mental factors and objects of cognition. What can the word “only” exclude? Although it is said that mental factors are not separate from mind, this becomes mere empty speech.

Because their characteristics and substances are each distinct, they are spoken of as consciousness. “Mere” means contemplating the defiled natures of presently manifest objects. If one merely clings with craving and does not examine and contemplate them, how could one perceive this?

Thus, with regard to them, their substances are established as distinct. As for their mutual relations, many principles have already been explained, but these are not essential to the purpose of the fundamental tenet. Let us therefore cease discussing peripheral matters and speak directly of the principal doctrine.

If it is held that mind and mental factors have distinct substances, nevertheless the term “mind” already includes them. It should be known that this meaning has long been established. Wherever the proper names of the dharmas that are mental factors are not used, it should be understood that a general designation is being employed.

Thus, expressions such as “the assemblage of mind,” “disciplining the mind,” and so forth all refer to that mind. Since the term has become general, it should therefore be known that the word “mere” serves only to exclude external objects.

If there are no external objects, how can one distinguish and know what is blue and what has a sweet and pleasant taste? This is simply because reason cannot refute what is manifestly perceived.

Who says that manifestly perceived objects are refuted? It is only said that the appearance of an object is produced by one’s own consciousness. Having apprehended an appearance belonging to one’s own consciousness, one clings to a blue object and so forth as presently abiding externally. That is a false and deluded view, like seeing hairs, flies, and so forth. These are merely appearances of consciousness. When an appearance like that of a fly manifests, must one therefore cling to the existence of an actual fly?

Yet if flies and so forth possess no intrinsic nature externally, how can they serve as objects that cause consciousness to arise? If there is no object here, how can an appearance resembling it arise in consciousness?

There must first be an original appearance before an appearance resembling it can arise. Only then can it be said to resemble that thing. Such matters are universally accepted.

For example, it is said that a mirage resembles water. It is not that there is no such object, for that object can be seen. Likewise, when the cognitive appearance of a sattva arises, there is nevertheless no real sattva existing apart from the substances of form and so forth.

Nor is it the case that form and so forth, whether collectively or individually, possess an intrinsic nature that can be analytically distinguished as having the nature of alteration and decay. As for mind, its fundamental nature likewise truly cannot be discarded. Alternatively, it may be said that a sattva has concealed conventional existence.

According to this principle, I maintain the same. The distinctive natures of form and so forth produced from consciousness have concealed conventional existence. It is like relying upon forms and then conceiving them to be a cart and so forth.

Through the conceptual attachment of sentient beings, however, the true nature of form and so forth is concealed. They construct intrinsic appearances upon the various objects of cognition and place them there as though they were external. Then, precisely there, they see a cart and so forth.

It is not yet clear what “concealed conventional” means.

It means concealing while conforming to conventional sentiment. Because carts and so forth are conceived to possess intrinsic nature, this concealed conventional existence obscures their real substance and gives rise to various attachments. Thus, that deluded sentiment establishes various appearances and first grasps them as actual things. Although no real appearance exists, it deludedly conceives an object. Again, such presently manifest appearances as permanence and so forth have no original appearance to which they might conform. Therefore, there are no real objects outside consciousness. They are appearances manifested through the transformation of consciousness. This principle is thus established.

Alternatively, the expression “resembling an appearance” here may be said to conform to an inverted understanding of a thing’s meaning. For example, when speaking of a mirage, one understands it to mean water and then forms the conception of water. Consciousness gives rise to inverted, deluded notions regarding the appearances of form and so forth; hence they are called manifest appearances. This also does not contradict what has been said here.

One theory holds that such inverted objects must also depend upon real things before mind can arise.

This attachment is the same as the preceding one and is equally blameworthy.

Moreover, non-Buddhist schools maintain that, apart from form, there exists a separate substance of self. On what basis, then, does this inversion arise?

The sutra says that it depends upon the internal. This is also not mistaken. That is, the view of a self in the body arises innately.

Speaking implicitly, it is therefore said: “With regard to the self, one should properly direct the mind and will see it as manifestly perceived.” In such cases as associating with bad companions, however, it is said: “With regard to the self, one should speak in this way.” Yet those ordinary and inferior persons deludedly generate such consciousness and then give rise to an inversion that takes the appearance to be an external object.

Or, conforming to how the matter is established for them, they formulate verbal expressions. Thus, when people in the world commonly accept a certain thing as an object, consciousness alone arises with regard to that thing. Therefore, because this is an appearance resembling an object, the consciousness that takes form and so forth as its objects does not apprehend an external object.

It is like a person afflicted with an eye disorder seeing hairs, flies, and so forth. Such external objects are empty; there is consciousness alone. This is the tenet.

It is precisely on account of this meaning that an objection is raised, saying that this analogy is not established. The deluded discrimination that conceives an appearance of hairs within a clear visual field arises because the faculty of sight is impaired.

Some hold that another great element is produced and thus becomes visible, causing the deluded mind to conceive it as hairs and so forth. If one establishes in this way an appearance resembling a manifest object, then, if there is consciousness alone, it would be unreasonable to determine where and when that appearance manifests.

If it is said that objects such as form and so forth exist apart from consciousness, then those forms and so forth must assuredly have a definite location, direction, shape, and measure.

It is precisely because consciousness determines shape, measure, direction, and location that an appearance resembling them arises. In accordance with reason, it is thus.

If one does not accept that, without depending upon external objects, consciousness alone gives rise to a deluded conception from which the appearance of form is produced, then why do manifest appearances of consciousness not arise elsewhere according to shapes and measures and at definite times and places?

They are determined at whatever location in which they are seen, in accordance with where they occur, rather than occurring everywhere.

If the object is not determined, then it should also be possible either to see it or not see it in other places.

Yet their position is that consciousness does not arise by apprehending an external object. Cognition produced where no object exists has never been definitively determined as to where and when it will occur. It is a fact that, because the object is said to be empty, there can be no definite appearance that manifests at a particular place and time. But this is not so.

Since this mind that sees form and so forth is indeterminate, it is of a nature inseparable from them. Therefore, one should not maintain that the object is nonexistent. Having twice denied such attachment, one plainly incurs the fault of contradicting the established tenet. If it is said that the analogy is valid, then the indeterminacy of the bodies contradicts reason. Time and place must correspond, and observation must occur in conjunction, without favoring only one side.

Because this object is perceived, such a position is unreasonable. For since the object has been accepted as nonexistent, if the object does not exist, it must be of another kind.

“Another kind” means that when a different appearance is seen, impairment of the faculty serves as its condition, as in the case of a person with an eye disorder. Nor should all persons capable of seeing be afflicted with eye disorders. Yet appearances arise at corresponding times and places, though indeterminately among different bodies and locations; and the consciousness capable of seeing form and so forth arises. By inference from this, one should know that external objects are nonexistent.

With regard to the thing serving as the object of valid cognition, because its arising is not perceived indeterminately among different bodies, this is the same fault in the tenet as in the preceding objection. Moreover, practical functions would also be unreasonable. Real hairs and so forth that are manifestly seen can, for example, be reflected in a mirror. Why cannot this conscious appearance of hairs be used in the same way? Although it is not a real thing, its function may nevertheless operate and arise.

This too is unreasonable, because it possesses no efficacy. If that aspect of consciousness possesses efficacy, why do the hairs seen by a person with an eye disorder have no function?

The similarity here consists in having an appearance resembling hairs; thus it is also like the preceding case. Since the functional efficacy of the object of cognition cannot be perceived, a fault arises in the thesis. Relying on three analogies concerning three dissimilar matters, it takes unreal objects as the three analogies, based on differences in the functions of the faculties and their objects.

It should be understood that faculties are of two kinds: first, material faculties; second, nonmaterial faculties. When the first kind of faculty is impaired by dimness, one falsely sees in this manner; hence the first analogy is established. Next, through the second kind of faculty, one sees distinct objects in dreams; this constitutes the second analogy. Because such an object possesses the power to produce an inverted perception, the third analogy is cited.

The foregoing is the explanation of another school. Some other commentators say that, because time and place are determinate, the minds that take forms and so forth as their objects depend upon external supports; it is not merely an internally manifested event that serves as their object. This is like a mind taking those chapters and phrases as its objects; yet within the mind, the arising is based upon the initial moment, and the object is apprehended according to what presently appears. Moreover, for awakened beings there is a determinate time, but how could there be a determinate place within the mind?

It is not that there is no spatial location. Things possessing spatial location may be determinate or indeterminate. Therefore, based on dharmas as they exist in relation to their objects, one provisionally speaks of a location within the mind. Nor is there any fault in this, because this location can produce a manifest appearance and is therefore called a determinate place.

Whatever event causes a mind to arise is called its object. This is said to establish the separate existence of external objects. What is mutually accepted is taken as the analogy.

Since those abiding at corresponding times and places all produce appearances that do not differ, an external event serves as the cause of minds taking forms and so forth as their objects, just as fellow students all rely upon the teachings and their principles. A mind arises through the dominant condition of consciousness and is produced in accordance with the function of its own characteristic; hence it is known that forms and so forth exist apart from consciousness.

One should not establish that cognition of those appearances lacks the efficacy of hairs and so forth, or that the nature of cognition is like awakening from a dream. Most of what was previously stated establishes positions contrary to reason. The intention was to avert the fault of indeterminacy in that position.

Still others say that these two—time and place—possess real meaning. Yet precisely because they are determinate at that time and place, they must be established as nonexistent.

Since the cause does not admit the existence of an objective event, neither does it admit distinctions based upon it; why, then, should one formulate a fault on that account? If this is nonexistent, then the positions already accord. It is like a captured thief who is forced to cry out in pain.

To establish the thesis reluctantly as before is truly crude, for it does not accord with reason. If one says that the appearances transformed and manifested by consciousness are accepted but are unreasonable, then however eloquently and beautifully this may be presented, it does not differ from the previous explanation. Alternatively, one may regard as determinate the particular time and place appropriate to events occurring at different times and places.

Even if truly existent external objects are admitted, it is still unreasonable to hold that forms and so forth are invariably determinate, since they are sometimes seen at other times and in other places. Suppose they are always seen to exist here but not elsewhere; why are they not shared objects elsewhere? Could they not be separately determinate?

Can reason refuse to accept this? Therefore, appearances manifest solely within consciousness.

Again, someone formulates a contradictory reason as a challenge. Just as one establishes that the object is not devoid of self, one in turn establishes that determinate time and place are nonexistent.

If that time and place are mutually accepted as that very time and place, then the mutually accepted position itself establishes the refutation and exclusion. For only when there is no difference in standpoint can the two be said to contradict each other. If what is asserted is not accepted by many, then it is wholly nonexistent, which is not what we intend. For this reason, the challenge is ineffectual.

Again, someone claims that the intention is solely to refute and exclude: where no object exists, a consciousness taking nonexistence as its object has no determinate time or place; therefore, because forms and so forth are perceived together at a determinate location, external objects are established as truly existent. It should also be understood that the conclusion can be established apart from that argument. Nevertheless, the attempted refutation and exclusion are unreasonable.

This single line of reasoning cannot cause the opponent to give rise to right understanding. It is not true. Furthermore, according to the meaning of the thesis previously established, when Timira damages the eye so that the eyeball has a thin, white, netlike film, one looks outward through openings into the light and sees what appear to be hairs and so forth. Yet if this is used as an analogy in establishing the thesis, the reasoning thereby becomes deficient.

One should now ask the opponent: if shapes resembling hairs and so forth are seen in sunlight, this is unreasonable. Some people see sunlight as yellow and others as red, while hairs and so forth may be seen as black, as various colors, or as resembling the bow of Śakra, and so forth. Yet those with clear vision see no such different appearances in that light.

Considering this, one may say that the light seen through an opening is mistakenly regarded as hairs, and in this way the appearance of hairs is produced. The mind that sees those hairs has as its object something devoid of intrinsic nature; the light is not of the nature of the appearance of hairs. Moreover, the manifested appearance resembling hairs is not merely a cause capable of producing cognition and thereby made into the nature of an object-condition.

Otherwise, consciousnesses that do not take forms and so forth as their objects would instead take the faculties such as the eye as their objects, since the meaning of causation would be the same. Or perhaps a distinct intention is possible here: inverted perception arises only by relying upon a real event, whereas otherwise it does not. If this statement is true, it too rests upon something.

Seeds established within are brought to maturity without awaiting any external object. In discussing an object, its own characteristic must first be established within the mind; only thereafter can it possess the nature of an object-condition.

That arisen portion of luminosity is unrelated to the mind; how, then, could it possess the nature of an object-condition?

This is still unsatisfactory. Someone then maintains that, when a person suffers from an eye disorder, the great elements become abnormal and the eyeball is damaged. Consequently, various appearances arise, causing another configuration of the great elements to arise in the external object. Because the faculty of consciousness has deteriorated, the person sees it in that manner. It is therefore known with certainty that a person afflicted with Timira has an awareness that takes a truly existent external object as its object.

Those who maintain this commit a grave error.

Every cognitive state arising from distortion and inversion is subject to this challenge. When pleasure and so forth are perceived inversely, upon what supporting condition do those appearances and objects arise?

Although no external object exists, false perception occurs; this is inversion and is nonexistent.

If one says, “Whatever is not commonly accepted by the conventional world, I regard as an inverted wrong view,” an even greater error follows.

Views concerning suffering and emptiness, when taking satya as their object, and other such cases, would effortlessly be seen as erroneous and inverted. If all those fully possessed of afflictions already realized the truth, then the Tathagata’s appearance in the world and proclamation of the true Dharma would yield no beneficial result whatsoever.

Whence do such determinations arise? They merely incline toward the case of diseased eyes and submit to deluded wrong views.

Furthermore, among sentient beings possessing such appearances, they see beings flying back and forth, causing waking observers to see them fluttering about. Since these sattvas arise from the great elements, why not admit that they possess life? Suppose hundreds of thousands of people suffering from diseased eyes gathered together in one place: the forms perceived by each would all be individually different. At that time, what kind of obstructive material thing could there be that they could not jointly drive away?

This statement likewise arises from the condition of impaired vision. Thus, just as Để-mật-la-đa, through the cultivation and practice of magical arts, can cause the intrinsic nature of dharmas to change, or cause them to be perceived as without material obstruction; because they are unobstructed, like non-greed and so forth, they are therefore not of the nature of form. How, then, does this differ from the Treatise on Consciousness-Only?

Furthermore, there is no need to labor over where those great elements are admitted to exist. In each case, they are not in themselves of the nature of blue and so forth. It is only through the power of the convergence of various causes and conditions that the visual consciousness and the other consciousnesses arise by taking those appearances as their objects. This is the meaning of the fundamental doctrine of this school: whatever is an aggregate has no real entity. Thus, what consciousness takes as its object is not a real entity; establishing this does not require such arduous effort.

Treatise on the Jewel of the Establishment of Consciousness-Only, Fascicle I