因明入正理論

The proof and the refutation,

Together with understanding their semblances;

Direct perception and inference,

Together with their semblances—are known only to oneself.

In this way are summarized the essential meanings of the whole treatise. Herein, the Thesis (pakṣa) and the rest are spoken of under many names in order to establish them. By means of the many words of Thesis, Reason (hetu), and Example (dṛṣṭānta), there is an opening of insight for those who wish to inquire but have not yet understood the meaning. Herein, the Thesis means: a thoroughly established property-possessor (dharmin) thoroughly established, distinguished by a particular difference, taken as its nature. Following one's own preference as the place wherein the nature is established—this is named the Thesis. As when one establishes that "sound is impermanent."

The Reason has three characteristics. What are the three? They are: being a property of the subject of the thesis (pakṣadharmatva); the assured presence in similar instances (sapakṣa); and the universal absence in dissimilar instances (vipakṣa). What is meant by "similar instance" and "dissimilar instance"? A "similar instance" means a category that has an equal share in the property to be established. This is named the similar instance. As when one establishes impermanence, taking for example a pot, which is impermanent—this is named the similar instance.

A "dissimilar instance" means that wherein the [property] to be established is not present. If it is present, then [the thing] is eternal and seen not to be produced, such as space and the like. Herein, the nature of being produced, or being a nature that arises through effort and without interruption, becomes the nature that is the property of the subject of the thesis. The assured presence in the similar instance and the universal absence in the dissimilar instance—this is the cause [demonstrating] impermanence.

The Example is of two kinds. The first is the homologous (similar) example; the second is the heterologous (dissimilar) example. The homologous example means: if it is a locus, then it manifests that the Reason is assuredly present in the similar instance. That is, wherever one sees something produced, it is impermanent, just like a pot and the like. The heterologous example means: in that which is spoken of as the [locus of] establishment, [the property] is not present, and the Reason is universally absent. That is, what is eternal is seen not to be produced, such as space and the like. Herein, "eternal" expresses what is non-impermanent; "not produced" expresses non-action. As with "being" and "non-being," this is named "non-being."

Having thus spoken of the Thesis with many words, when one awakens understanding in another, the Thesis is called the proof (sādhana). As when one says "sound is impermanent"—this means setting forth the statement of the Thesis. "Having the nature of being produced" means stating the Reason of the Thesis. "If it is seen to be produced, then it is impermanent, like a pot and like a person"—this is to state in accordance with the similar instance. "If it is eternal, then it is not produced, like space"—this is to depart [from it] in words. Although these are here divided into three, they are spoken of as the proof.

Although one delights in establishing [a thesis], because it conflicts with direct perception and the rest, it is named a semblance of a thesis (pakṣābhāsa). That is: contradiction by direct perception, contradiction by inference, contradiction by one's own teaching, contradiction by common worldly understanding, contradiction by one's own words; the qualifier being not thoroughly established; the qualified being not thoroughly established; both being not thoroughly established; and what is already thoroughly established to both [parties].

Herein, contradiction by direct perception is as when one says "sound is not an object of hearing." Contradiction by inference is as when one says "a pot is eternal." Contradiction by one's own teaching is as when a Vaiśeṣika establishes that "sound is eternal." Contradiction by common worldly understanding is as when one says "the hare's mark is not the moon," or again as when one says "the bones of a person are pure—living beings are distinguished thereby—just like a conch shell." Contradiction by one's own words is as when one says "my mother is a barren woman." The qualifier being not thoroughly established is as when a disciple of the Buddha, [arguing] against a Sāṃkhya teacher,

establishes that "sound perishes." The qualified being not thoroughly established is as when a Sāṃkhya teacher, [arguing] against a disciple of the Buddha, says "cognition (buddhi) is the self (puruṣa)." Both being not thoroughly established is as when a Vaiśeṣika teacher, [arguing] against a disciple of the Buddha, establishes "the self as the harmonious conjunction of causes and conditions." What is already thoroughly established to both is as when one says "sound is an object of hearing." Such words as these, having loci that are similar and dissimilar, are not readily established.

To establish what produces no result—this is named a semblance of a thesis. Having now spoken of the semblance of a thesis, we shall speak of the semblance of a reason. The unestablished, the inconclusive, and the contradictory—these are named semblances of a reason (hetvābhāsa).

The unestablished (asiddha) is again of four kinds. The first is that which is unestablished for both [parties]. The second is that which is unestablished for one [party]. The third is that which is unestablished because of doubt. The fourth is that whose basis is unestablished. As in establishing that "sound is impermanent," and also if one says "the eye has the nature of seeing."

That which is unestablished for both is the property of being produced with respect to the manifested sound. That which is unestablished for one is, with respect to vapor, the rising of a doubting perception, as when one speaks of fire arising from the conjunction of the great elements. The example being unestablished is as when one asserts that space really exists, being the support of qualities; for those who hold there is no [space], the support is unestablished.

The inconclusive (anaikāntika) is of six kinds. The first is the common (sādhāraṇa); the second is the uncommon (asādhāraṇa); the third is that which operates in part of the similar instances and operates throughout the dissimilar instances; the fourth is that which operates in part of the dissimilar instances and operates throughout the similar instances; the fifth is that which operates in part of both instances; the sixth is the contradictory-and-conclusive (viruddhāvyabhicārin).

This is the common: as when one says "sound is eternal, because it has the nature of being knowable." Both the eternal and the impermanent categories share in this Reason; therefore it is inconclusive. For example, a pot has the nature of being knowable, as do sound and the impermanent; for example, space has the nature of being knowable, and sound is eternal.

The uncommon is as when one says "sound is eternal, because it has the nature of being audible." Both the eternal and the impermanent categories are devoid of this Reason; apart from the eternal and the impermanent there is nothing else. This is the example of [an uncommon] reason. How is this nature of being audible an example here?

"That which operates in part of the similar instances and operates throughout the dissimilar instances" is as when one says "sound has the nature of impermanence, being produced without effort and without interruption." Herein, "produced without effort and without interruption" is taken as the [subject of the] thesis. As lightning, space, and the like are the similar instances of this: this nature of impermanence is present in lightning, but is absent in space.

"Produced without effort and without interruption" being taken as the [subject of the] thesis, a pot is taken as a dissimilar instance, and there [the Reason] operates throughout. Thus this Reason, in lightning and the pot, becomes a homologous property; and again it is inconclusive. For example, a pot has the nature of impermanence; it is "produced through effort and without interruption." For example, lightning has the nature of impermanence; it is "not produced through effort and without interruption."

"That which operates in part of the dissimilar instances and operates throughout the similar instances" is as when one establishes the thesis "sound is produced through effort and without interruption, because it has the nature of impermanence." With "produced through effort and without interruption" as the thesis, a pot is taken as a similar instance; here this nature of impermanence operates throughout. Lightning and space are taken as dissimilar instances; there, in one part—lightning—it is present, while in space it is absent.

Therefore, as before, it is again inconclusive. "That which operates in part of both instances" is as already stated: "sound is eternal, because it has no obstructing substance." Here "eternal" is the thesis; space and the atom are taken as similar instances. The nature of having no obstructing substance is present in space but absent in the atom.

The pot and pleasure are taken as dissimilar instances; in pleasure it is present, but in the pot it is absent. Therefore this Reason, being a homologous property both through pleasure and through the absence [of obstruction], is again named inconclusive.

The contradictory-and-conclusive is as when one establishes the thesis "sound is impermanent, because it has the nature of being produced, just like a pot," and there is also the establishment "sound is eternal, because it has the nature of being audible (the property of being heard), just like the nature of being audible." In this case, both are causes of doubt; therefore, fully [considered], it is named inconclusive.

The contradictory (viruddha) is of four kinds. They are: the contradictory with respect to the proper nature of the property, taken as a Reason; the contradictory with respect to a distinction of the property, taken as a Reason; the contradictory with respect to the proper character of the property-possessor, taken as a Reason; and the contradictory with respect to a distinction of the property-possessor, taken as a Reason.

Herein, "the contradictory with respect to the proper character of the property, taken as a Reason," is as already stated: "sound is eternal, because it has the nature of being produced," or "because it has the nature of being produced through effort and without interruption." This Reason, although [meant to establish eternality], is present in the dissimilar instances; therefore it is a distinction [that contradicts].

"The contradictory with respect to a distinction of the property, taken as a Reason" is as already stated: "the eye and the rest must be for the use of another, because they have the nature of being an aggregate, like a bed and the like." This Reason, just as it can establish that the eye and the rest are for the use of another, can likewise establish the contradictory of a distinction of the property to be established—[namely, that] the aggregate is for the use of another. The bed and the like, being aggregates, are for the enjoyment and use of another.

"The contradictory with respect to the proper character of the property-possessor, taken as a Reason" is as when one speaks of "Being" [as a category], not substance, not quality, not action, having a single real existence, having quality and action, like the nature of generality and particularity. This Reason can establish the refutation of [its being] a substance; and likewise it can establish the refutation of [its being] "Being." In both cases it is conclusive.

"The contradictory with respect to a distinction of the property-possessor, taken as a Reason" is as when this Reason, just as in the foregoing Thesis, [is meant] to establish that the property-possessor has the distinction of being a connected existent; yet it can also establish the contrary distinction—that it makes for a non-existent—the nature of the connection. As with the refutation of substance and the like, in both cases it is conclusive. Having spoken of the semblances of a reason, we shall now speak of the semblances of an example.

The semblance of a homologous example is of five kinds. The first is the failure of the proving property to be established. The second is the failure of the property to be proved to be established. The third is the failure of both to be established. The fourth is the absence of connection (non-pervasion). The fifth is inverted connection.

The semblance of a heterologous example is likewise of five kinds. The first is the non-exclusion of the property to be proved. The second is the non-exclusion of the proving property. The third is the non-exclusion of both. The fourth is non-disconnection. The fifth is inverted disconnection.

The failure of the proving property to be established is as when one says "sound is eternal, because it has no obstructing substance; whatever has no obstructing substance is seen to be eternal, like the atom." But in that atom, the property to be established—the nature of eternality—is present, while the proving property—the lack of obstructing substance—is absent, since the atoms have obstructing substance as their nature.

The failure of the property to be proved to be established is as when one speaks of "cognition." That is, all cognition can establish the property of lacking obstructing substance [as present], yet the property to be established—the nature of permanent abiding—is absent, since all cognition is impermanent.

The failure of both to be established is also of two kinds: that which is existent and that which is non-existent. If one says "like a pot," it is the failure of both to be established with respect to an existent thing. If one says "like space," [arguing] against those who hold that there is no [space], it is the failure of both to be established with respect to a non-existent thing.

The absence of connection means that no conjoining [statement] is made there; yet in the pot the two properties—the proving and the proved—are simultaneously present. As when one says "in the pot is seen the nature of being produced and the nature of impermanence" [without stating the pervasion].

Inverted connection means that one ought to say "whatever is produced is all impermanent," but instead one says, in reverse, "whatever is impermanent is all produced." Such is named the category of the semblance of a homologous example.

Among the semblances of a heterologous example, the non-exclusion of the property to be proved—the obstruction—is as when one says of the various impermanent things that "in them there is doubt of obstructing substance, like the atom." Because in the atom one establishes the property [whereby] the proved nature is no different: the establishment that the atom is of eternal nature, while the proving property—the lack of obstructing substance—is absent.

The non-exclusion of the proving property is as when one speaks of "action." That which can exclude is what establishes; that which does not exclude is what establishes [improperly]. There it is said that the various actions lack obstructing substance.

The non-exclusion of both is, against those who maintain [the existence of] something like space, [arguing thus]: because that space does not exclude the nature of eternality and the nature of lacking obstructing substance, one says that space is of eternal nature and lacks obstructing substance.

Non-disconnection means saying, as when one sees that the pot is of impermanent nature, that it has the nature of obstructing substance [without disconnecting it from the dissimilar instances].

Inverted disconnection is as when one says "whatever has obstructing substance is all impermanent." Such are called the semblances of the thesis, reason, and example. They cannot serve as a proper proof.

Furthermore, in awakening understanding in oneself, one should know that there are two means of knowledge: direct perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna). Herein, direct perception means that which is free from conceptual construction and is correct cognition. With respect to form and meaning, apart from names and free from conceptual construction, the manifest [object] manifestly and distinctly operating—this is named direct perception.

What is called inference means observing the meaning by means of the marks gathered together. That mark is of three kinds, as stated before. Taking that [mark] as the Reason, by comparison with respect to the meaning, correct knowledge is born, and one then knows that there is fire, or that [something] is impermanent, and the like. This is named inference. With respect to these two means of knowledge, the [resulting] knowledge is named their fruit, for it is the mark of realization. Inasmuch as it manifests by way of functioning, it too is named a means of knowledge.

When, with respect to a conceptual cognition, [the cognition] operates differently with respect to the meaning, it is named a semblance of direct perception (pratyakṣābhāsa). That is, all such cognitions—as the cognition of a pot—arise dependent on conceptual construction. Because they do not take the particular [self-character] of the meaning as their object, they are named semblances of direct perception.

If, when a semblance of a reason is known, one has first given rise to various semblance-cognitions of the meaning, it is named a semblance of inference (anumānābhāsa). The semblances of a reason are of many kinds, as stated before. Taking such [a semblance] as the Reason, with respect to that semblance-inferendum, a cognition is born; and being unable to give correct understanding, it is named a semblance of inference.

Furthermore, if one correctly manifests the error in another's proof, it is named refutation (dūṣaṇa). That is: at the outset of proving, the fault of deficiency [in members], the fault of the thesis, the fault of being unestablished, the fault of an inconclusive reason, the fault of a contradictory reason, and the fault of the example—manifesting these words and opening up the inquiry: this is named refutation. If one does not truly manifest the faults in another's proof, it is named a semblance of refutation (dūṣaṇābhāsa).

That is: with respect to a complete proof, manifesting [it as having] the fault of deficiency; with respect to a faultless thesis, alleging a faulty thesis; with respect to an accomplished reason, saying it is not accomplished; with respect to a conclusive reason, saying the reason is inconclusive; with respect to a non-contradictory reason, saying it is contradictory; with respect to a faultless example, alleging a faulty example.

Speaking such words is named a semblance of refutation. For it cannot manifest the other's thesis as erroneous, since that [thesis] has no fault. Here the matter rests.

I have stated the meaning in a few phrases,

In order at the outset to set forth the direction.

Herein, the reasonable and the unreasonable,

Are to be discerned elsewhere, in another place.

The Nyāyapraveśa (Treatise on Entering Correct Reasoning through Hetuvidyā),

one fascicle, complete.

*

– *

Postface to the Nyāyapraveśa

The Nyāyapraveśa (Treatise on Entering Correct Reasoning through Hetuvidyā) is, as it were, a crown, and likewise a means of resisting and contending in debate; its aim and guiding principle is to crush the heterodox and manifest the orthodox, to sweep away thorns and brambles, and it is the cause for discourse, illuminating the truth. In the work "Manifest Proof, Revealing Principle, Entering by Words," the "correct" is defined as that which departs from the false.

The treatise says: comparing words in order to make the direction of return, so that the essential meaning is made clear. In ancient times it was used to aid the Way and to supplement the root meaning. When [the Buddha] had realized the Way at the Deer Park, he blew forth that wind, causing the six heterodox teachers to bow their heads and yield in truth; the ten sages returned and took refuge in the Buddha.

It was not a numinous talisman steeped in false light, scattering away the gravel and sand together with the evil that rose up; such ones as these fled away. Therefore Vasubandhu (Thế Thân) constantly transmitted and made this flourish in earlier times, and Dignāga (Trần Na = Diṅnāga) reckoned and understood such matters in later times. Raising high the correct and demolishing the false, hard to resolve and divide—coming to such a point, those spiritual powers gathered together in [his] treatise.

Then there came forth Bodhisattva Śaṅkarasvāmin (Thiên Chủ Bồ Tát), a near-sage (the "sub-holy one"), born and broadly experienced in the world, unprecedented from of old to now, selecting and abridging with subtle precision, suited to the occasion. All eight gates were thoroughly penetrated, of benefit on both sides. The faults of the five members were reduced and retained as three branches.

Its meaning is simple yet complete; its text is clear. The four quarters at that time were all shaken and looked up with deep reverence. He did not himself conceal these conventional rules and norms, [though] they were not yet sufficient to discourse upon what is lofty and far-reaching.

The Emperor of the Great Tang, seizing the moment, issued a sacred edict; using a golden mirror to illumine and to turn the wheel of the Dharma, bringing [it] into the place of brightness; using a jade drum to sound it, lighting a golden torch to harmonize and accord [things]; soaking and saturating the moral transformation, conveying literary culture, bringing the lamp of wisdom of the scriptures into the dark city; using the boat of wisdom to ferry people across the sea of suffering.

Our Tripiṭaka Dharma Master Xuanzang (Huyền Trang) was one of supreme awakening, who beat back every hindering condition and became a place of shelter and refuge for all classes. He did many things as though he could not keep pace, using the three theses as if [skilled in] inquiry. In the land of the Han he had earlier attained the various specialized disciplines.

By the clarity and minuteness of what his eyes beheld, he placed it in his mind and found it marvelous; not minding the remoteness of the sacred nature, [yet living] in the age of the Counterfeit Dharma, not yet thoroughly steeped [in it], it was not that, doubting [mere] erroneous and insipid phrasing, he doubted the grand meaning. Looking up to the mountain peak and seeing afar, as toward Gṛdhrakūṭa (Vulture Peak), he set forth—braving death and risking life amid so many perils—seeking masters and inquiring of the Way.

He came to the country of Kaśmīra (Ca Thấp Di La) in north India, and met the Great Treatise-Master Saṃghayaśas (Tăng Già Da Xá). Bowing his head, he received the resolution of doubts concerning the eight treasuries, and examined thoroughly the five vehicles. The Treatise-Master, for the sake of the great meaning and his deep faculties, applied his mind to guiding him; only the subtle art of hetuvidyā, in its teaching, he could not yet expound exhaustively—using the Brahmic sounds without ceasing to rest, like flowing water that does not stop.

Afterward he came to the country of Magadha (Ma Kiệt Đà) in central India, and met Bodhisattva Śīlabhadra (Thi La Bạt Đà La = Silabhadra, "Giới Hiền"), who then explained this matter broadly. The matter thus went on expanding ever further, excellent and supple. There he then had audience at the place of numinous efficacy and fervently sought to inquire.

Again he met the heart-and-bosom [master] whose discriminative explanation none before had possessed. The wind that drives off the false and proclaims and exalts the reverence for [right] reasoning—this indeed is the place where the grand transformation was made fully round, and where blessings gathered and flourished.

In the twenty-first year of the Zhenguan era (the year 647), on the sixth day of the eighth month, when autumn was coming on, at the Hongfu Monastery, receiving the sacred edict, [the Emperor] convened [a company] to translate. The Śramaṇa Mingjun of the Hongfu Monastery took up the brush and attested the text. The Śramaṇa Xuanmo of the Hongfu Monastery attested the Sanskrit.

The Śramaṇa Xuanying of the Da Zongchi (Great Dhāraṇī) Monastery corrected the characters. The Śramaṇa Daohong of the Da Zongchi Monastery; the Śramaṇa Mingyan of the Shiji Monastery; the Śramaṇa Huigui of the Luohan Monastery; the Śramaṇa Faxiang of the Baochang Monastery; the Śramaṇa Wenbei of the Hongfu Monastery; the Śramaṇa Daoshen of the Kuozhou Dharma-Lecture Monastery; and the Śramaṇa Shentai of the Puzhou Xiyan Monastery—all attested the meaning clearly.

Xu Jingzong—Silver-and-Blue Resplendent Grand Master of the Glittering Office, Acting Vice-Director and Tutor to the Heir Apparent, Baron of Gaoyang County and Founding [Officer] of the Realm—respectfully, by imperial command, supervised and verified the translation anew. The Tripiṭaka Dharma Master then explained the obscure meanings and made them clear. The meaning, vast as the sea, has nowhere that is without its root and origin; the words, lofty as a mountain summit, are hard to scale, towering before one's gaze.

Of the fine and beautiful things of that [land], all that was received from what was seen and heard was written down and made into sentences and texts, to be left for the ages. Except for those places forgotten and unclear, he then lamented and wept, praying that the meaning be made clear so as to attain attestation of the text, and receiving aid and blessing in the writing—the essential aim being to preserve it for later generations.

The good cause whereby superiority and inferiority are not confused arrives and abides in this very place.