十二門論

THE FIRST GATE

CONTEMPLATION OF CAUSES AND CONDITIONS

Bodhisattva Nagarjuna said: “I shall now explain the teachings of the Mahayana.

Question (the interlocutor): What are the benefits and significance of explaining the Mahayana?

Answer: The Mahayana is the exceedingly profound treasury of the Dharma of all Buddhas throughout the three times and the ten directions. It was taught for those of great merit and superior intelligence. Yet sentient beings in the age of the decline of the Dharma possess neither deep merit nor lucid faculties. Although they strive to seek out and study the scriptures, they still cannot fully understand them. I have compassion for these people and wish them to attain awakening. Moreover, I also wish to propagate and elucidate the supreme Dharma of the Tathagata. Therefore, I shall briefly explain the doctrines of the Mahayana.

Question: The doctrines of the Mahayana are immeasurable and boundless, beyond all reckoning. Even the teachings of the Buddha alone cannot be fully expressed. How, then, can you explain their meaning completely?

Answer: It is precisely for this reason that I said at the outset that I would offer only a brief explanation.

Question: Why is it called the Mahayana (Great Vehicle)?

Answer: The Mahayana is the higher of the two vehicles, and is therefore called the “Great Vehicle.” This vehicle can convey people to the utterly great fruition of the Buddhas, and is therefore called “Great.” It is the vehicle employed by the Buddhas and great beings, and is therefore called “great.” It can eliminate the great sufferings of sentient beings and bring them great benefit, and is therefore called “great.” It is the vehicle employed by great beings such as the bodhisattvas Avalokitesvara, Mahasthamaprapta, Manjusri, and Maitreya, and is therefore called “great.” This vehicle can encompass all dharmas without exception, including both the nature and the characteristics of dharmas, and is therefore called great.

Furthermore, in the Prajnaparamita Sutra, the Buddha himself taught that the meaning of the Mahayana is immeasurable and boundless. It is therefore called “great.”

One of the most profound doctrines of the Mahayana is called “emptiness.” If one can understand the meaning of emptiness, one can understand the Mahayana and comprehend the six paramitas without obstruction. Therefore, I wish to explain emptiness alone. To explain emptiness and penetrate deeply into its meaning, it is naturally necessary to employ the Twelve Gates.

The first gate concerns causes and conditions and is called the Gate of Causes and Conditions. It states:

Dharmas—all phenomena and all things—arise from various conditions;

Therefore, they have no intrinsic nature.

If they have no intrinsic nature,

How can such dharmas exist?

Dharmas—all things—arise through various conditions, and they are of two kinds: the first is “internal,” and the second is “external.” All conditions are likewise of two kinds: internal and external. External causes and conditions include, for example, clay, implements, and a potter; together, these produce a jar. Another example is a carpet, which is produced from the causes and conditions of thread, a loom, and a weaver.

Similarly, a house is formed through the conjunction of external causes and conditions such as preparation, selection of the site, laying the foundation, pillars, timber, mud, thatch, workers, and so forth. Another example is that such things as milk, a vessel, and human labor come together to produce cheese. Yet another example is that such things as seeds, earth, water, sunlight, wind, air, weather, and human labor come together so that plants may sprout and grow.

One should understand that all the external conditions of dharmas are likewise of this kind.

What are called internal causes and conditions comprise ignorance, formations, consciousness, name-and-form, the six sense bases, contact, feeling, craving, clinging, becoming, birth, and aging-and-death; each must first have a cause and only afterward arise.

Thus, both internal and external dharmas arise through the conjunction of various causes and conditions. Because they arise from various causes and conditions, they have no intrinsic nature.

If dharmas have no intrinsic nature, they cannot possess an extrinsic nature, nor can they possess both intrinsic nature and extrinsic nature. Why? Because what is called extrinsic nature necessarily also lacks intrinsic nature.

If we say that something exists by virtue of an extrinsic nature, then a cow would exist by virtue of the nature of a horse; a horse would exist by virtue of the nature of a cow; a peach would exist by virtue of the nature of an apple; and an apple would exist by virtue of the nature of a peach, and so forth. None of this can occur. One might say that a thing exists not by virtue of some “extrinsic nature,” but by virtue of some “other thing.” Yet this too cannot occur.

Why? If it is said that a mat exists because of certain rushes, then the rushes and the mat would be “one entity,” and the rushes could not be called “other.” If someone says that the rushes are “other” in relation to the mat, that person cannot say that the mat exists because of the rushes. Furthermore, even the so-called rushes themselves have no intrinsic nature.

Why? Because the rushes also arise from various causes and conditions. Once the rushes have no intrinsic nature, one cannot say that the mat exists by virtue of them.

Therefore, the rushes cannot be the essential substance of the mat. For the same reason, one cannot establish the arising of a jar, cheese, or other things produced through external causes and conditions.

Similarly, one cannot establish what is produced through internal causes and conditions. As stated in the Seventy Stanzas:

“The twelve links of dependent origination are in truth unborn. If it is claimed that they arise, do they arise at a single time or at multiple times—in a single moment of mind or in multiple moments of mind?”

What are called the links of dependent origination (the twelve links of dependent origination) in fact have no arising. But if there were arising, would that arising occur at a single time or over multiple times? If it occurred all at once, cause and effect would occur simultaneously.

But that is unreasonable. Why? Because the cause must precede the effect.

If arising occurred over many “mind-moments,” the preceding twelve links of dependent origination would have to be separate from one another. Each preceding link would have to occur within a certain mind-moment and cease together with that mind-moment. Then how could it serve as the condition for the links that follow it?

When something ceases together with a certain mind-moment, it no longer exists; how, then, could it give rise to other things? If the twelve links of dependent origination existed, they would have to occur either at a single time or over multiple times. Yet both alternatives are unreasonable.

[Commentary: Here Bodhisattva Nagarjuna wishes to show that the twelve links of dependent origination are merely “empty.” He also argues that one cannot use consciousness or any other intrinsic factor to explain the reality of the universe. “One mind” here means that cause and effect arise simultaneously at a single time.]

Therefore, all causes and conditions are empty. Since causes and conditions are empty, the things (dharmas) produced by causes and conditions are also empty. Thus, one should know that all “conditioned dharmas” (dharmas produced by causes and conditions) are empty. If conditioned dharmas are empty, how could the self be otherwise? On the basis of conditioned dharmas such as the “five skandhas,” the “twelve ayatanas,” and the “eighteen dhatus,” people suppose that a self exists. Only when there is something combustible can a fire occur. Thus, when the skandhas, ayatanas, and dhatus are all empty, there is nothing that can be called the self. If there is nothing that can burn, there can be no fire.

The sutra states: “The Buddha taught the bhiksus that when there is a self, there are things belonging to the self. If there is no self, there are no things belonging to the self.”

Therefore, when conditioned dharmas are empty, we should know that the unconditioned dharma of nirvana is also empty. Why? Because the cessation of the five skandhas without the arising of another group of five skandhas is called nirvana.

But the five skandhas are merely empty. What, then, must be extinguished for it to be called nirvana? Moreover, the self is also empty.

Who, then, could attain nirvana? Furthermore, non-arising dharmas are called nirvana; thus, if arising dharmas could be established, non-arising dharmas could also be established. As stated in the examination of causes and conditions, arising dharmas cannot be established.

Let it be stated once again that arising dharmas cannot be established. Because there are arising dharmas in the world, other dharmas can be called non-arising. If arising dharmas cannot be established, how could non-arising dharmas be established?

Therefore, all arising dharmas, non-arising dharmas, and the self are empty.

Notes:

-Arising dharma: A thing that undergoes arising

-Non-arising dharma: A thing that does not undergo arising

THE SECOND GATE

EXAMINATION OF AN EXISTENT EFFECT AND A NONEXISTENT EFFECT

It is stated once again that all dharmas are unborn. Why?

If an effect already truly exists,

it cannot arise.

If from the beginning the effect does not truly exist,

it also cannot arise.

If it both truly exists and does not truly exist,

it cannot arise.

How, then, could arising occur?

If an effect already truly exists in a cause, it cannot arise. If from the very beginning the effect does not truly exist, it likewise cannot arise. If an effect both truly exists and does not truly exist, it also cannot arise. Why?

If an effect already truly existed in a cause and then became a product, this process would continue without end. If an effect that had not yet arisen became a product, then what had already arisen would necessarily have to produce yet another product. Why? Because from the outset they already existed within a cause. The effect of what had arisen would itself once again have its own product, and thus the process would continue without end.

If it is said that what has already arisen can never arise again, while what has not yet arisen may arise, then there would be no principle governing production. Therefore, it cannot be the case that an effect already exists in a cause and then becomes a product.

If it is said that an effect already exists in a cause, and that what has not yet arisen will arise, whereas the product that has already arisen will not arise again, this is meaningless. Since what has not arisen and what has arisen both truly exist, [they therefore possess the same nature]. There is no reason [for them to have different functions], such that one arises while the other does not.

[According to your reasoning,] if what has not yet arisen truly exists, then what has already arisen does not truly exist. Why? Because what has arisen and what has not arisen are opposites. Since what has arisen and what has not arisen are opposites, their modes of production must differ.

True existence and nonexistence are opposites. Suppose that what has arisen truly exists and that what has not yet arisen also truly exists; then they would not differ. Why? If both truly exist, in what respect would they differ? Yet in fact, they are not without difference. Therefore, if an effect truly exists in a cause, there still can be no arising.

Whatever truly exists has already been accomplished; why should it arise again? Just as what has already been done need not be done again, and what has already been attained need not be attained again, so whatever truly exists does not arise again.

If an effect truly exists in a cause, one should be able to perceive the effect before it arises; but in fact it cannot be perceived. For example, one cannot perceive a pot in clay or a mat in a bundle of grass. Therefore, if an effect truly exists in a cause, there is no arising.

Question: Although an effect exists beforehand, it cannot be perceived because it has not yet undergone transformation.

Answer: If the pot has not yet arisen, its form has not yet undergone transformation and therefore cannot be perceived. By what characteristic, then, do we know and say that the pot already exists in the clay? Is it by the characteristic of a pot, the characteristic of an ox, or the characteristic of a horse that we know the pot exists? If the clay contains neither the characteristic of a pot nor that of an ox or a horse, does this not mean that the pot does not exist? Therefore, it cannot be said that an effect already exists in a cause and will subsequently arise.

A thing that has undergone transformation is called an effect; therefore, the transformation must already have occurred within the cause. Why? Because you say that an effect already exists in a cause. If things such as pots had already undergone transformation and existed beforehand [within their causes], they should be perceptible. Yet in fact they cannot be perceived. Therefore, it cannot be said that an effect is imperceptible because it has not undergone transformation.

If that which has not undergone transformation is not called an effect, then ultimately no effect can ever be attained. Why? Because transformation occurs neither before arising nor after arising. Therefore, effects such as pots ultimately could never come into being.

If that which has undergone transformation is called an effect, then an effect does not exist within a cause. Thus, you cannot establish with certainty whether an effect already exists within a cause or does not exist within a cause.

Question: The transformation already exists but cannot be seen. A thing may truly exist even though its existence is not perceived. For example, a thing cannot be perceived because (1) it is too near or because (2) it is too far away; one cannot perceive a thing when (3) the sense faculties are impaired; or one may not perceive a thing because (4) one pays no attention to it.

One cannot perceive a thing because (5) there are obstructions or because of (6) similarity. One cannot perceive a thing because (7) it is overwhelmed by something else. A thing that is (8) too minute cannot be perceived.

Medicine applied to the eye is an example of something being imperceptible because it is too near. A bird flying extremely high and disappearing into the sky is an example of something being imperceptible because it is too far away. The following examples show that one cannot perceive a thing when the sense faculties are impaired: A blind person cannot see colors; a deaf person cannot hear; a blocked nose cannot smell odors; the mouth of a sick person cannot discern the taste of food; a paralyzed body has no sensation; and a deranged mind cannot perceive reality.

An example of our failing to perceive something because we do not attend to it is this: when we focus our attention on certain colors or objects, we do not hear a faint sound. Examples showing that we do not perceive something because of obstructions are these: the ground obstructs our view so that we cannot see floodwaters rising, and a wall obstructs us so that we cannot see the objects within. An example of our failing to perceive something because of similarity is a black spot against a black background.

An example showing that we do not perceive something when it is overwhelmed by something else is that we cannot discern a faint voice amid the sounds of bells and drums. An example of things being imperceptible because they are too minute is that we cannot see extremely fine particles of dust. Thus, although things exist, people do not perceive them because of the eight causes and conditions mentioned above.

You are therefore incorrect in saying that because the pot cannot be seen within its cause, the cause cannot contain its transformation. Why? A thing may exist yet remain imperceptible because of the eight causes and conditions mentioned above.

Answer: Our inability to perceive transformations and effects such as a pot is not due to the eight causes and conditions mentioned above. Why? Transformations and effects that are too near could be perceived if they were not so near, and those that are too far away could be perceived if they were brought nearer.

Although our physical faculties may not be sufficiently sound to perceive them, they could be perceived if those faculties were pure and sound. Although they are not perceived because the mind is distracted, they could be perceived if we paid attention. Physical obstructions may prevent us from seeing something, but transformations and effects could be perceived in the absence of such obstructions.

When objects resemble one another, we may fail to see them, but when they are dissimilar, we can see them. When objects are overwhelmed by something else, we may fail to perceive them, but when they are not overwhelmed, we can perceive them. A thing may be too minute to be seen, but a pot and other effects are sufficiently large to be visible.

If a pot were too minute to be seen within its cause, it could not be seen after it had arisen either. Why? Because that which has arisen and that which has not yet arisen would possess the same characteristic of minuteness, if both were real.

Question: A thing is minute before it arises, but it becomes large after arising. Therefore, that which has arisen can be perceived, whereas that which has not yet arisen cannot be perceived.

Answer: If so, the cause does not contain the effect, because nothing large exists within the cause.

Before arising, nothing large exists within the cause. If something large existed within the cause, you should not say that the effect is too minute to be seen. The effect is now large, yet you say that it is too minute to be seen; if so, that which is large cannot be called an effect. Then ultimately no effect could ever be attained. Yet in fact effects can be attained. You must therefore acknowledge that it is not because the effect is too minute that it cannot be seen. Consequently, it cannot be said that the cause contains the effect and that the effect cannot be seen because of the eight causes and conditions.

If a cause contains an effect and then gives rise to that effect, both cause and effect lose their respective characteristics. Why? It would be like a blanket within its threads or a piece of fruit within a bowl. In such cases, what is called the cause is merely a location and cannot be called a cause. Why? Because the threads and the bowl are not the causes of the blanket and the fruit. When a cause is destroyed, the effect is also destroyed. Something such as threads is not the cause of a blanket. Yet if there were no cause, there would be no effect. Why? Because an effect comes into being through causes and conditions. If the cause cannot be established, how can the effect be established?

If there is no production, nothing can be called an effect. Causes such as threads cannot give rise to effects such as blankets. Why? Threads do not give rise to a blanket, for they merely provide a location in which no effect exists. Therefore, there is neither cause nor effect. If there is neither cause nor effect, one should not inquire whether the cause contains or does not contain the effect.

Suppose a cause contains an effect, though the effect itself is not perceived. Nevertheless, the characteristics of the effect should be perceptible. For example, we smell a fragrance and know that there are flowers; we hear birdsong and know that there is a bird; we hear laughter and know that there is a person; we see smoke and know that there is fire; we see a crane and know that a lake is nearby. Thus, if a cause contained an effect, there would have to be signs of it. Yet now neither the entity nor the characteristics of an effect are present; therefore, we know that the cause does not contain the effect within itself.

If a cause contained an effect and then gave rise to that effect, one should not say that threads produce a blanket or that a bundle of rushes produces a mat. If the cause does not contain the effect, then nothing could give rise to the effect. For example, if there were a blanket not made of threads, could it be made of grass? If it were made neither of threads nor of grass, should we say that it was not produced? If it were not produced, could we call it an effect? If there is no effect, there is no cause, as previously stated. Therefore, it is not the case that a cause contains the effect within itself and then gives rise to the effect.

If an effect were not produced by anything whatsoever, it would have to be permanent, like nirvana. If the effect were permanent, all conditioned dharmas would be permanent. Why? Because all conditioned dharmas are effects. If all dharmas were permanent, there would be no impermanence. Yet if there were no impermanence, there would also be no permanence. Why? Because permanence exists in relation to impermanence, and impermanence exists in relation to permanence. If so, there would be neither permanence nor impermanence. But this is impossible. Therefore, one should not say that a cause contains the effect within itself and then gives rise to the effect.

If a cause contained the effect within itself and then gave rise to the effect, the effect would in turn give rise to another effect. For example, a mat would cause someone to sit upon it, a curtain would produce concealment, and a cart would produce transportation. But in fact these effects are not produced in this way. Therefore, one should not say that a cause contains an effect within itself and gives rise to the effect.

Someone might reason that earth possesses fragrance, but unless there is rain, that fragrance is not released. An effect is just like this: it will not arise unless causes and conditions come together. But this is not so. Why? As you say, something is called an effect only after it has been produced; if so, things such as a jar would not be effects. Why? Because whatever is produced comes into being through production. Yet according to your reasoning, things such as jars already truly exist and are not things that have been produced. Therefore, if an effect is something that has been produced, it cannot be said that the cause contains the effect within itself and produces it.

An illuminating cause can illuminate but cannot produce anything. For example, when a lamp is lit to illuminate a jar in the darkness, it also illuminates the bed and other objects in the room. The causes and conditions that come together to make a jar cannot produce a bed and other objects. Therefore, one should understand that a cause does not contain an effect within itself.

If an effect truly preexisted within a cause and was then produced, one could not distinguish between what has been produced and what has not yet been produced. But you do make such a distinction. Therefore, it is not the case that a cause already contains an effect and then produces it.

Now suppose that an effect does not preexist within a cause, yet the cause produces the effect. This is impossible. Why? If something could arise from nothing, then a person could grow a second head and a third hand. Why? Because something could arise from nothing.

Question: Things such as jars have causes and conditions, and therefore they can arise. But a second head and a third hand have no causes and conditions; how, then, could they arise? Therefore, what you have just said is incorrect.

Answer: A second head, a third hand, a jar, and other effects are all absent from their causes. For example, there is no jar in the clay, just as there is no jar in a rock. Why, then, do we regard clay as the cause of a jar but not regard a rock as its cause? Why do we call milk the cause of cheese and threads the cause of a carpet, but not call rushes its cause?

If a cause does not contain an effect within it, yet produces an effect, then anything could produce anything else. If so, a finger could produce carts, horses, food, and other things. Similarly, thread could produce not only a carpet but also carts, horses, and food. Why? If something can arise from nothing, why could thread not produce carts, horses, and food, but only a carpet—since none of these things truly exists within the cause?

If a cause does not contain an effect within it yet produces that effect, then the cause need not possess any particular power to produce any particular effect. Ordinarily, if we want oil, we extract it from sesame seeds, not from sand. But if they have no relation to each other, why do we obtain oil from sesame seeds rather than from sand?

Perhaps you say that we have seen sesame seeds produce oil, but we have never seen sand produce oil. Therefore, we seek oil from sesame seeds rather than from sand. This is unreasonable. Why? If there were what is called a “mark of production” (a sign of arising), one could say that because we have seen sesame seeds produce oil but have never seen sand produce oil, we seek sesame oil and do not seek it from sand. However, there is no “mark of production”; therefore, one cannot say that because we have seen sesame seeds produce oil, we seek oil from sesame seeds and not from sand.

I now refute not only one example of production from a cause, but all causes and effects. The propositions that a cause already contains an effect within it and produces the effect, that a cause does not already contain an effect and produces the effect, and that a cause both already contains and does not already contain an effect and produces the effect are all untenable. Your example—that you have seen sesame seeds produce oil [and therefore seek oil from sesame seeds]—is based on the notion of production from a cause, but that notion is untenable.

If an effect does not contain a cause within it and yet produces an effect, then the characteristic of a cause cannot exist. Why? If a cause has nothing [within it], how could it produce anything? How could it generate or bring anything about? If there is no making or production, how could it be called a cause? Therefore, an agent cannot make anything, nor can what is made make anything else.

If a cause already contains an effect within it, there is no distinction among the act of making, the agent, and the thing made. For if the effect already truly exists, why should it be made once again? Thus, you may say that because the act of making, the agent, the thing made, and other causes cannot be established, I must accept the proposition that a cause does not contain an effect within it.

Yet this is not necessarily so. Why? If one accepts a distinction between the act of making and the agent, as well as production from a cause, one must accept your argument.

But I maintain that the act of making, the agent, and cause and effect are all empty. Moreover, your refutation of the act of making, the agent, and cause and effect accords with my position and does not oppose it. Therefore, I still maintain that the proposition “a cause does not contain an effect and then produces the effect” is untenable.

If someone accepts that a cause contains an effect, you refute that notion. But I do not say that a cause already contains an effect within it; therefore, I need not accept your refutation, nor need I accept the thesis that a cause does not contain an effect within it.

The proposition “a cause both contains and does not contain an effect, yet produces the effect” is also untenable. Why? Because “containing” and “not containing” are contrary in nature. How could things contrary in nature coexist? Just as light and darkness, suffering and happiness, going and remaining, bondage and liberation cannot coexist, so a cause that both contains and does not contain an effect cannot produce it. Moreover, the proposition “a cause both contains and does not contain an effect” was already refuted above when we examined the cases of containing and not containing.

Therefore, if a cause does not contain an effect within it, there is no production. If a cause contains an effect within it, there is likewise no production. And if a cause both contains and does not contain an effect, there is likewise no production. No further argument is possible: we have examined every aspect and can find no production. Thus, ultimately, the effect is not produced.

Since ultimately there is no production of an effect, all conditioned dharmas are empty. Why? Because all conditioned things are causes and effects.

Since conditioned things are empty, unconditioned dharmas are also empty.

Since both conditioned and unconditioned dharmas are empty, is not the “self” also empty?

THE THIRD GATE

CONTEMPLATION OF CONDITIONS

The conditions of all dharmas cannot be established. Why?

In brief:

Conditions do not contain the effect.

If the effect is not present within the conditions,

how can it be said that the effect arises from conditions?

Effects such as a jar are not present in any individual condition, nor are they present in any combination [of conditions]. If they are present in neither, how can it be said that they arise from conditions?

Question: What are those conditions?

Answer:

Four conditions give rise to all dharmas;

there is no fifth condition.

The four conditions are: the causal condition,

the immediately antecedent condition,

the condition of the object,

and the dominant condition.

Those four conditions are: the causal condition, the immediately antecedent condition, the object condition, and the dominant condition. The “causal condition” is so called because it produces a result, such as what has been produced, what is being produced, and what will be produced. The “immediately antecedent condition” is so called because it causes successive events to occur. The “object condition” is so called because it provides the objective condition, as for bodily karma, verbal karma, and states of mind. The “dominant condition” is the condition through which other dharmas reach their culmination.

These four conditions show that a result is not contained within a cause. If a result existed within a cause, the result would exist even in the absence of conditions. But in fact, without conditions there is no result. If the result existed within the conditions, the result could arise without a cause. But in fact, no result exists without a cause. One might hold that the result exists within both the conditions and the cause. Yet, after rational analysis, this cannot be demonstrated. Therefore, neither case is correct. Thus, the result exists neither within each individual condition nor within the combination of conditions. How, then, can it be established that the result arises from conditions?

If the result does not exist within the conditions, yet the result arises from the conditions,

Could it then arise from nonconditions?

If it is said that the result does not exist within the conditions but is produced by the conditions, then why does it not arise from nonconditions? For it exists in neither of the two; therefore, there is no causal condition capable of producing the result.

Because the result does not arise, the conditions do not arise either. Why? Because conditions precede the result. Since neither conditions nor result exist, all conditioned dharmas (created things) are empty. Because conditioned dharmas are empty, unconditioned dharmas are also empty. When both conditioned and unconditioned dharmas are empty, is not the “self” also empty?

THE FOURTH GATE

CONTEMPLATION OF CHARACTERISTICS

All dharmas are empty. Why?

Both conditioned and unconditioned dharmas

are devoid of characteristics.

Because they are devoid of characteristics,

they are all empty.

Conditioned dharmas are not constituted by characteristics.

Question: What are conditioned characteristics (created characteristics)?

Answer: Everything has certain conditioned characteristics. For example, a cow’s horns are pointed, and there is a tuft of hair at the end of its tail; these are the characteristics of a cow. The base of a jar is flat, its belly is broad, its neck is narrow, and its mouth is round; these features are the characteristics of a jar. The wheels, axle, shafts, and so forth are the characteristics of a cart. A person has a head, eyes, torso, spine, shoulders, legs, arms, and so forth; these are that person’s characteristics. Now we ask: “arising, abiding, and ceasing” are the three characteristics of conditioned dharmas; are they conditioned or unconditioned?

Question: What is wrong with saying that the characteristics are conditioned dharmas?

Answer: If arising is a conditioned dharma, it must possess the three characteristics.

If arising is an unconditioned dharma, how can it be called a conditioned characteristic?

If arising is a conditioned dharma, it must possess the three characteristics—arising, abiding, and ceasing—and each of these three characteristics must in turn possess another three characteristics, continuing endlessly. This also applies to abiding and ceasing. If arising is an unconditioned dharma, how can the unconditioned be a characteristic of a conditioned dharma? Who could know arising if it had no arising, abiding, and ceasing? Arising, abiding, and ceasing are differentiated things, and each possesses arising. But unconditioned dharmas cannot be differentiated into arising, abiding, and ceasing; therefore, they cannot possess arising. This also applies to abiding and ceasing.

Arising, abiding, and ceasing are empty. Therefore, conditioned dharmas are empty. When conditioned dharmas are empty, unconditioned dharmas are also empty, because it is only in relation to the conditioned that the unconditioned exists. Since both conditioned and unconditioned dharmas are empty, all dharmas are empty.

Question: You say that each of the three characteristics possesses another three characteristics, and thus this continues endlessly. Therefore, arising cannot be a conditioned dharma. But it is said:

The arising of arising comes from fundamental arising (the first arising),

And fundamental arising is produced by what is produced by arising.

(Sanh sanh chi sở sanh/Sanh ư bỉ bản sanh/Bản sanh chi sở sanh/Hoàn sanh ư sanh sanh)

When a thing (dharma) arises, there are seven phenomena: (1) the dharma, (2) arising, (3) abiding, (4) ceasing, (5) the arising of arising, (6) the abiding of abiding, and (7) the ceasing of ceasing. Among these seven phenomena, fundamental arising (the first arising) can produce the other phenomena apart from itself. And the arising of arising can produce fundamental arising. Fundamental arising then again produces the arising of arising. Therefore, although these three characteristics are conditioned, they do not continue infinitely. The same applies to abiding and ceasing.

Answer: If it is said that the arising of arising produces fundamental arising, then how can the arising of arising produce fundamental arising if it is itself produced by fundamental arising?

If it is said that the arising of arising can produce fundamental arising, then how can the arising of arising produce fundamental arising when fundamental arising has not produced the arising of arising?

If it is said that fundamental arising

produces the arising of arising,

then how can fundamental arising

produce the arising of arising

if it is itself produced by the arising of arising?

If it is said that fundamental arising can produce the arising of arising, and that the arising of arising (which has already been produced) can produce fundamental arising, this cannot be correct. Why? The arising of arising is so called because it produces fundamental arising; but if fundamental arising has not yet been produced, how can it produce the arising of arising?

To say that while the arising of arising is being produced, it can produce fundamental arising also cannot be correct. Why?

While the arising of arising is being produced,

it can produce fundamental arising;

but how can it produce fundamental arising

if it has not itself yet been produced?

While the arising of arising is being produced, it is said to be capable of producing fundamental arising. But since the arising of arising has itself not yet been produced, it cannot produce fundamental arising (the fundamental source of production).

To say that while the arising of arising is being produced, it can produce itself and also produce other things—just as, when a lamp shines, it can illuminate both itself and other things—cannot be correct either. Why?

Within the lamp itself there is no darkness,

nor is there darkness in the place itself.

The dispelling of darkness is called illumination.

What, then, can the lamp illuminate?

The lamp itself contains no darkness. The place being illuminated likewise contains no darkness in itself. If there is no darkness within the lamp and no darkness in the place, how can one say that the lamp illuminates itself and other things? The dispelling of darkness is called illumination. Yet the lamp dispels neither its own darkness nor the darkness of other things. Therefore, your statement that “just as a lamp illuminates itself and other things, arising produces itself and other things” is untenable.

Question: When a lamp is lit, it can dispel darkness. Therefore, there is no darkness in the lamp or in the place.

Answer:

How can darkness be dispelled

by lighting a lamp,

when, as the lamp is being lit,

it does not come into contact with darkness?

If the lamp cannot come into contact with darkness when it is lit, and if it does not come into contact with darkness, then one should not say that it dispels darkness.

If the lamp could dispel darkness

without coming into contact with darkness,

then the lamp in this place

should be able to dispel all darkness.

If it is said that although the lamp does not come into contact with darkness, its power can nevertheless dispel darkness, then the lamp in this place should be able to dispel all the darkness in the world, because none of that darkness comes into contact with the lamp. But in fact, if you light a lamp in this place, it cannot dispel all the darkness in the world. Therefore, your assertion that “although the lamp does not come into contact with darkness, it can dispel darkness” is untenable.

If the lamp illuminates itself

and other things,

then darkness should likewise obscure itself

and other things.

If you say that the lamp illuminates both itself and other things, then darkness, which is contrary to the lamp’s light, should likewise be able to obscure both itself and other things. If darkness, which is contrary to light, cannot obscure itself and other things, then it cannot be said that light can illuminate itself and other things. Therefore, your analogy is invalid. It should be said:

If arising has not yet arisen,

how can it produce itself?

If it has already arisen and then produces itself again,

why would it need to be produced?

When this arising is about to arise, it is neither like what has already arisen nor like what has not yet arisen, and then it arises. If it is like what has not yet arisen, and then arises, how could it produce itself, since what has not yet arisen does not exist? If it is said that it is like what has already arisen and then produces itself, why would it need to arise? In it there is no further arising; in what has already been produced, there is no further act of production. Therefore, since arising does not produce even itself, how could it produce other things? You are mistaken in saying that arising produces itself and other things. The same applies to abiding and cessation.

Therefore, the assertion that arising, abiding, and cessation are the characteristics of conditioned phenomena is incorrect. Since the assertion that arising, abiding, and cessation are the characteristics of conditioned phenomena is false, conditioned phenomena are empty.

Conditioned phenomena are empty; therefore, unconditioned phenomena are also empty. Why? The cessation of conditioned phenomena is called unconditioned nirvana. Therefore, nirvana is empty.

Non-arising, non-abiding, and non-cessation are regarded as the characteristics of unconditioned phenomena. Yet no existing thing is without arising, abiding, and cessation. What does not exist cannot be the characteristic of anything.

One might say that “characterlessness” is the characteristic of nirvana, but this assertion cannot stand. If “characterlessness” is the characteristic of nirvana, by what characteristic do we know it to be “characterlessness”? If we know “characterlessness” by means of some characteristic, why call it “characterlessness”? If we know “characterlessness” by means of characterlessness, then it cannot be known, because characterlessness does not exist.

One might say that it is like garments, all of which have characteristics, except for one garment that is without characteristics because it takes “characterlessness” itself as its characteristic. If someone were to say, “Bring out the robe that has no characteristics,” we would know that this could be done. Similarly, arising, abiding, and cessation are the characteristics of conditioned phenomena.

Whenever there is non-arising, non-abiding, and non-cessation, we can know these to be the characteristics of unconditioned phenomena. Therefore, the state in which characteristics are absent is nirvana. But this assertion cannot stand.

Why? Are causal conditions such as arising, abiding, and cessation not empty? The characteristics of conditioned phenomena cannot be established.

How, then, can unconditioned phenomena be recognized? By what valid characteristics of conditioned phenomena do you know that “the absence of those characteristics indicates the existence of unconditioned phenomena”? Your assertion that “the robe without characteristics among the garments is an analogy for the characterlessness of nirvana” is untenable.

The issue concerning this analogy of garments will be discussed in detail in Chapter Five (The Fifth Gate).

Therefore, all conditioned phenomena are empty. When conditioned phenomena are empty, unconditioned phenomena are also empty. When conditioned and unconditioned phenomena are empty, the self is also empty. When all three of these are empty, all dharmas are empty.

THE FIFTH GATE

CONTEMPLATION OF HAVING CHARACTERISTICS OR BEING WITHOUT CHARACTERISTICS

All dharmas are empty. Why?

If a dharma already has a characteristic,

what need is there to produce a characteristic?

If a dharma has no characteristic,

no characteristic can be manifested.

(How, then, could a characteristic have a characteristic?)

Apart from these two cases, what else could manifest a characteristic?

When a dharma already possesses characteristics, there can be no production of characteristics. Why? If dharmas already possess characteristics, what need would they have for additional characteristics? If characteristics were still produced when a dharma already possessed characteristics, confusion would result, for there would be two kinds of characteristics: the characteristics the dharma already possessed and the characteristics used to produce characteristics. Therefore, characteristics cannot be produced when a dharma already possesses characteristics.

Nor can characteristics be manifested when a dharma has no characteristics. How could something without characteristics manifest characteristics? An elephant has two tusks, a long trunk, a large head, ears like fans, a spine curved like a bow, a large belly, a tuft of hair at the end of its tail, and four sturdy, rounded legs; these features are the characteristics of an elephant.

If these characteristics were absent, there would be no elephant whose characteristics could be manifested. A horse has upright ears, a mane on its neck, four hoofed legs, and a tufted tail. If these characteristics were absent, there would be no horse whose characteristics could be manifested.

Thus, there is no production of characteristics either when dharmas possess characteristics or when they do not possess characteristics. Apart from these two cases—possessing characteristics and lacking characteristics—there can be no third case in which characteristics might be manifested. Therefore, “characteristics have nothing that they characterize.”

Because there is no manifestation of characteristics, there is no “something capable of being characterized” (no “characterizable” dharma). Why? It is by virtue of characteristics that something is regarded as “characterizable,” as capable of manifesting characteristics.

Yet because of causes and conditions, both characteristics and the “characterizable” are empty. When characteristics and the characterizable are empty, all things are empty. Why?

Because there can be nothing without characteristics and the characterizable. When all things are empty, there can be no “non-thing.” The destruction of a thing is called a “non-thing.” But if the thing does not exist, what is there to be destroyed? What could be called a non-thing?

Both thing and non-thing are empty. Therefore, all conditioned dharmas are empty. When conditioned dharmas are empty, unconditioned dharmas are also empty.

When both conditioned and unconditioned dharmas are empty, the self is also empty.

THE SIXTH GATE

CONTEMPLATION OF IDENTITY OR DIFFERENCE

All dharmas are empty. Why?

Characteristics and the characterizable

are neither identical

nor different.

If they are neither identical

nor different,

How can either of them be established?

Characteristics and the characterizable are neither identical nor different. If neither their identity nor their difference can be established, they cannot be established. Therefore, characteristics and the characterizable are both empty. When characteristics and the characterizable are empty, all things are empty.

Question: Characteristics and the characterizable are commonly held to be established. Why do you say that they are not established? You say that characteristics and the characterizable are neither identical nor different. You should now explain whether the characteristics of anything are neither identical to nor different from the characterizable, or whether a thing is partly characteristic and partly characterizable. For example, the characteristic of consciousness is the state of cognizing; if there is no state of cognizing, there is no consciousness. The characteristic of sensation is the state of sensing; if there is no state of sensing, there is no sensation. Thus, the characteristic is identical to the characterizable.

The Buddha taught that the extinction of craving is the characteristic of nirvana. Craving is a conditioned “outflow dharma” (a conditioned dharma that flows outward). The extinction of craving is an unconditioned “non-outflow dharma” (an unconditioned dharma that does not develop outwardly). A person of faith has three characteristics: they wish to associate closely with virtuous people, they desire to hear the truth, and they wish to practice generosity. These three are bodily and verbal karma and belong to outward forms. Faith, however, is in the mind and belongs to mental activities. Here, the characteristics and the characterizable are different.

Right View is one characteristic of the Noble Eightfold Path and is partly identical to the Noble Eightfold Path. Arising, abiding, and ceasing are distinct characteristics of conditioned dharmas; they are in some respect identical to conditioned dharmas. Therefore, the characterizable is partly identical to the characteristics.

Thus, characteristics are either identical to, different from, or partly identical to the characterizable. Your argument that “because identity and difference cannot be established, characteristics and the characterizable cannot be established” is untenable.

Answer: Your argument that characteristics are the characterizable, as in the case of consciousness and so forth, is untenable. Why? That which can be known through a characteristic is called the characterizable; that by means of which it is known is called a characteristic. But a thing cannot know itself. For example, a finger cannot touch itself, and an eye cannot see itself. Therefore, your argument that consciousness is both the characteristic and the characterizable is untenable.

If the characteristic and the characterizable were identical, cause and effect would also be identical. Why? Because the characteristic is the cause and the characterizable is the effect; the two would be one. But in reality they are not one. Therefore, it is incorrect to say that the characteristic and the characterizable are one.

Your argument that the characteristic and the characterizable are different is also incorrect. You say that the extinction of craving is the characteristic of nirvana, not that craving itself is the characteristic of nirvana. If one were to say that craving is the characteristic of nirvana, then the characteristic would be different from the characterizable. But if one says that the eradication of craving is the characteristic of nirvana, one should not say that the characteristic is different from the characterizable.

You also say that a person of faith has three characteristics. In reality, a person of faith and those three characteristics are not different from one another. If there were no faith, those three things would not exist. Therefore, the characteristic and the characterizable cannot be different. Moreover, if the characteristic and the characterizable were different, a characteristic would possess other characteristics, and this would continue without end; but that is impossible. Therefore, the characteristic and the characterizable cannot be different.

Question: Just as a lamp can illuminate itself and other things, so a characteristic can characterize both itself and other things.

Answer: Your analogy of the lamp was already refuted earlier, when we discussed the three characteristics of conditioned phenomena. Moreover, you appear to contradict your own position: earlier you said that the characteristic and that which is characterized are different, but now you say that a characteristic can characterize itself and other things. This cannot be established.

You say that the characteristic is a constituent part of that which is characterized. This cannot be established. Why? Because the meaning depends upon either identity or difference. The notions of identity and difference were refuted earlier. Therefore, the view that the characteristic is a constituent part of that which is characterized is also refuted.

Thus, the characteristic and that which is characterized among causes and conditions are neither identical to nor different from one another. Nor can there be any third alternative. Therefore, both the characteristic and that which is characterized are empty. Since both are empty, all dharmas are empty.

THE SEVENTH GATE

CONTEMPLATION OF EXISTENCE AND NONEXISTENCE

All dharmas are empty. Why? Existence and nonexistence cannot be apprehended at the same time, nor can they be apprehended at different times. As stated in the following verses:

Existence cannot be together with nonexistence,

nor can there be existence without nonexistence.

If existence could be together with nonexistence,

then existence would always be nonexistence.

Existence and nonexistence are contrary in nature. A single dharma cannot include both. For example, when there is life, there is no death; when there is death, there is no life.

This has already been discussed in the Treatise on the Middle Way. Perhaps you hold that there is no error in saying that when existence is present, nonexistence is absent. But this is not so.

Why? How could there be existence without nonexistence? As previously stated, when a dharma arises, seven phenomena arise together with it.

As stated in the Abhidharma Treatise, existence and impermanence arise together. Impermanence is the characteristic of cessation and is therefore called impermanence. Thus, if there were no nonexistence—and no impermanence, its characteristic—existence could not arise.

If existence could arise together with impermanence, then existence would always be nonexistence. If existence were always nonexistence, there could be no abiding, because continuity would be destroyed. Yet abiding does in fact occur.

Therefore, existence is not always nonexistence. To say that existence can arise without impermanence is incorrect. Why?

Because without impermanence, existence could not arise.

Question: When existence arises, impermanence is already present within it, but has not yet become active. When cessation occurs, impermanence becomes active and existence is destroyed. Thus arising, abiding, cessation, and aging must await their respective times to become active.

At the beginning, arising is active and therefore brings existence into being. In the interval between arising and cessation, abiding is active and therefore existence is maintained. At the end, impermanence is active and therefore existence is destroyed.

Aging is the change from arising to abiding and from abiding to alteration and cessation. Impermanence destroys continuity, thereby allowing these four phenomena to occur. Therefore, although dharmas arise together with impermanence, existence is not always nonexistence.

Answer: You say that impermanence is also the characteristic of cessation and arises together with existence. Then, at the very time existence arises, it is also being destroyed; and at the very time it is being destroyed, existence is also arising.

Arising cannot occur together with cessation. Why? At the time of destruction, there can be no arising; and at the time of arising, there can be no cessation, because arising and cessation are contrary to one another.

You say that impermanence and abiding arise together. But at the time of cessation, there can be no abiding, and at the time of abiding, there can be no cessation. Why? Because abiding and cessation are contrary to one another. At the time of aging, there is no abiding, and at the time of abiding, there is no aging.

Therefore, your argument that impermanence arises together with arising, abiding, cessation, and aging is unreasonable. Why? Suppose that existence arises together with impermanence. Impermanence is the characteristic of cessation. When a thing arises, it does not possess the characteristic of cessation; and while it continues to exist, it likewise does not possess the characteristic of cessation. At what time, then, could impermanence be present?

Because there is the state of consciousness, there is consciousness; if there were no state of consciousness, there could be no characteristic of consciousness. Because there is the capacity to feel, there is feeling; if there were no capacity to feel, there would be no characteristic of feeling. Because there is the capacity to recollect, there is memory; if there were no capacity to recollect, there could be no characteristic of memory.

Origination is a characteristic of arising; non-origination is not a characteristic of arising. Endurance is a characteristic of abiding; non-endurance is not a characteristic of abiding. Change is a characteristic of aging; absence of change is not a characteristic of aging.

The destruction of life is a characteristic of death. The non-destruction of life is not a characteristic of impermanence. If there is no destruction, there is no characteristic of impermanence.

Suppose that impermanence is present but does not destroy existence at the times of arising and abiding, and only destroys it later. Why, then, do they arise together? Impermanence is required only at the time when existence is destroyed. Therefore, it is incorrect to say, “Impermanence arises together with existence and destroys it later.”

Therefore, neither the conjunction of existence and nonexistence nor their separation can be established. Consequently, existence and nonexistence are empty.

Since existence and nonexistence are empty, all conditioned dharmas are empty, and all unconditioned dharmas are also empty. Since conditioned and unconditioned dharmas are empty, all sentient beings are also empty.

THE EIGHTH GATE

CONTEMPLATION OF INTRINSIC NATURE

All dharmas are empty. Why? Because all dharmas are without intrinsic nature. As stated in the following verses:

Seeing that the characteristics of all dharmas change,

we know that all dharmas are without intrinsic nature.

Whatever is without intrinsic nature is merely empty;

therefore, all dharmas are empty.

If dharmas had an inherent nature, they would have to be unchanging. Yet we see that all things are constantly changing. Therefore, we know that they have no inherent nature.

If dharmas had a fixed inherent nature, they would not arise through conditions. If an inherent nature arose through conditions, it would be something produced. But [by definition], inherent nature is that which is not produced by anything else and does not depend upon anything else. Therefore, all dharmas are empty.

Question: If all dharmas are empty, there can be neither arising nor cessation. If there is neither arising nor cessation, there can be no “truth of suffering.” If there is no truth of suffering, there can be no “truth of the origin of suffering.” If there is neither the truth of suffering nor the truth of its origin, there can be no “truth of the cessation of suffering.” If there is no cessation of suffering, there can be no “path to the cessation of suffering.” If all dharmas are empty and have no inherent nature, the Four Noble Truths cannot exist.

If the Four Noble Truths do not exist, the “Four Fruits of the Sramana” cannot exist. If the Four Fruits of the Sramana do not exist, there can be no noble sages. If none of these exist, there can be no Buddha, Dharma, and Sangha, nor can there be any worldly dharmas.

But this is not so. Therefore, dharmas cannot be empty.

Answer: There are two truths: conventional truth and ultimate truth. Through conventional truth, ultimate truth can be attained. Without relying upon conventional truth, ultimate truth cannot be attained.

If ultimate truth is not attained, nirvana cannot be attained. Those who do not understand the two truths cannot understand benefit for themselves, benefit for others, or benefit for all. Therefore, those who understand conventional truth will understand ultimate truth, and those who understand ultimate truth will understand conventional truth.

Now you hear conventional truth spoken of and call it ultimate truth; therefore, you go astray. The teaching of causes and conditions taught by the Buddhas is a profound truth. Causes and conditions have no inherent nature; therefore, I say that all dharmas are empty.

If dharmas did not arise from conditions, they would have to possess fixed inherent natures of their own.

The characteristics of arising and cessation could not exist within the five skandhas. If there were no arising and cessation within the five skandhas, there could be no impermanence. If there were no impermanence, there could be no truth of suffering.

If there were no truth of suffering, there could be no truth of the origin of suffering. If dharmas had fixed inherent natures, there could be no truth of the cessation of suffering. Why?

Because inherent nature cannot change. If there were no truth of the cessation of suffering, there could be no path to the cessation of suffering. Therefore, if we do not accept the doctrine of the absence of inherent nature, the Four Noble Truths cannot exist.

If the Four Noble Truths do not exist, there can be no realization of the Four Noble Truths. If there is no realization of the Four Noble Truths. If there is no realization of the Four Noble Truths, there can be no such things as knowing suffering, eliminating the root of suffering, realizing the cessation of suffering, and cultivating the path—the way or method—to the cessation of suffering.

If these things do not exist, there can be no “Four Fruits of the Sramana.” If the Four Fruits of the Sramana do not exist, there can be no orientation [in cultivation]. If there is no orientation, there can be no Buddha. If the Dharma of causes and conditions is rejected, there can be no Dharma of the Path.

If there is no Dharma of the Path, there can be no Sangha. If there are no Buddha, Dharma, and Sangha, there can be no Three Jewels. If there are no Three Jewels, worldly dharmas are destroyed.

But this is unreasonable. Therefore, dharmas are empty.

If dharmas had fixed inherent natures, there would be no arising, no cessation, and neither good nor evil. If there were no reward or punishment—karmic retribution—for good and evil, the world would be only a single realm. Therefore, we should know that dharmas are without inherent nature.

If it is said that dharmas have no inherent nature and are produced by other-nature, this too is incorrect. Why? If there is no inherent nature, how could dharmas arise from other-nature? For other-nature exists only in relation to inherent nature. Why? Because other-nature is the inherent nature of other things.

If inherent nature cannot be established, other-nature also cannot be established. If there is neither inherent nature nor other-nature, how could anything exist? If existence cannot be established, nonexistence also cannot be established.

Therefore, we infer that if there is no inherent nature, no absence of inherent nature, no existence, and no nonexistence, then all conditioned dharmas are empty.

When conditioned dharmas are empty and unconditioned dharmas are empty, how could there be a self?

THE NINTH GATE

CONTEMPLATION OF CAUSE AND EFFECT

All dharmas are empty. Why? Dharmas themselves have no inherent nature, nor do they possess an inherent nature coming from elsewhere. As stated in these verses:

The effect cannot exist within all the conditions.

Nor does the effect come from elsewhere.

How then could an effect arise?

As stated previously, the effect does not exist within any single condition, nor does it exist within the combination of conditions. Nor does the effect come from elsewhere. If it came from elsewhere, it would arise through causes and conditions, and the combination of the various conditions would have no function. If the effect exists neither within the conditions nor comes from elsewhere, it is empty.

The effect is empty; therefore, all conditioned dharmas are empty. If conditioned dharmas are empty, unconditioned dharmas are also empty.

Since even conditioned and unconditioned dharmas are empty, the self is also empty.

THE TENTH GATE

CONTEMPLATION OF THE AGENT—(CONTEMPLATION OF CREATION)

Are all dharmas empty? Why? Because a dharma cannot be produced by itself, by another, by both itself and another, or without any cause whatsoever. As stated in these verses:

Suffering is not produced by itself,

nor is it produced by another,

nor is it produced by both itself and another.

Therefore, suffering does not exist.

Suffering cannot produce itself. Why? If it produced itself, it would be producing its own essential nature. But a thing cannot use itself to produce itself. For example, consciousness cannot be conscious of itself, and a finger cannot touch itself. Therefore, nothing can produce itself.

Nor is suffering produced by something else. How could it be produced by something else?

Question: Conditions are called “other.” Conditions produce suffering; this is called “production by another.” How can you say that suffering is not produced by another—by something else?

Answer: If the conditions are called other, and suffering is produced by conditions, then if suffering arises from conditions, its nature is that of the conditions. If its nature is that of the conditions, why are the conditions called other? For example, in a clay jar, the clay is not called other; in a gold bracelet, the gold is not called other. The same applies in the case of suffering. If it is produced by conditions, the conditions cannot be called other.

Conditions have no intrinsic nature. They do not exist in themselves. Therefore, it cannot be said that the effect arises from conditions. As stated in the Treatise on the Middle Way:

The effect arises from conditions,

yet conditions do not exist in themselves.

If conditions do not exist in themselves,

how can conditions give rise to an effect?

Therefore, suffering cannot be produced by another. Nor can it be produced by both itself and another, for both are erroneous. Thus, it cannot be said that suffering is produced by both.

It is also incorrect to say that suffering is produced without any cause, for such an assertion leads to infinite error.

As taught in the sutra: A naked Tirthika ascetic asked the Buddha, “Is suffering self-produced?” The Buddha remained silent and did not answer. “Blessed One! If suffering is not self-produced, is it produced by another?” The Buddha again did not answer. “Blessed One! Is it then produced by both itself and another?” The Buddha still did not answer. “Blessed One! Then does it arise without any cause?” The Buddha still did not answer. Because the Buddha did not answer these four questions, we should understand that suffering is empty.

Question: In the sutra, the Buddha did not say that suffering is empty; rather, he taught the Dharma according to the capacity for awakening of sentient beings [in this case, the Tirthika ascetic].

Answer: The ascetics of the Tirthika schools hold that the person is the cause of suffering. Those who believe that the self truly exists say that good and evil are created by the self. They believe that the self is pure and free from suffering and afflictions; that the self possesses the capacity for cognition; that it creates good, evil, suffering, and happiness; and that it manifests in various forms. Because they held such mistaken views, they asked the Buddha, “Is suffering self-produced?” The Buddha did not answer. Suffering is not produced by the self.

If the self were the cause of suffering, then the body would arise on account of the self. The self would therefore be impermanent. Why? If dharmas are causes and arise from causes, they are all impermanent. If the self were impermanent, then the karmic results of good and evil would all be annihilated. If so, the merits of those who practice the Brahmanical path would also be empty.

If the self were the cause of suffering, liberation would be impossible. Why? If the self creates suffering, then if there were no suffering, there would be no self that creates suffering; and if there were no self, who would attain liberation? If suffering were produced without a self, suffering would remain even after liberation, and there would be no true liberation. Yet liberation does in fact exist. Therefore, it cannot be said that suffering arises from itself.

Nor does suffering arise from another. If suffering came separately from another, how could one self create suffering and then transmit it to someone else?

The statement “suffering arises from another” may imply that suffering was created by God (Ishvara). Some who held this wrong view questioned the Buddha, but he did not answer. In truth, suffering is not created by God. Why? Because the natures of God and suffering are contradictory. A calf born from a cow is still a cow. If sentient beings were born from God, they would have to resemble God, for sentient beings would be God’s children.

If God gave birth to all sentient beings, he would not have caused them to suffer. Therefore, one should not say that God created suffering.

(*Here, Ishvara means God or a creator who can exist independently, without depending upon other causes and conditions.)

Question: All sentient beings are born from God (Ishvara), and suffering and happiness are also caused by God. Because sentient beings do not know the cause of happiness, God creates suffering.

Answer: If sentient beings were God’s children, God would have used happiness to conceal suffering and would not have caused sentient beings to suffer. Moreover, those who worship God should not undergo suffering but should experience only happiness. Yet this is not what actually happens. People act for themselves and experience both happiness and suffering, and they receive their recompense according to the law of causes and conditions. None of these things is created by God.

If God existed independently, surely he would need nothing. If he needed anything, he could not be regarded as independently existent (Ishvara). If he needed nothing, why would he perform acts of transformation, like a child at play, to create sentient beings?

If God created all sentient beings, who created him? To say that God created himself cannot be correct, for nothing can create itself. If he was created by another creator, then he does not exist independently.

If God were an omnipotent creator, there could be no obstacle in the process of his creation; he could create everything instantaneously. Scriptures concerning God state: God wished to create the myriad things. He practiced austerities and created the insects that crawl upon the ground. Then he again practiced austerities and created all the birds that fly. Then he again practiced austerities and created human beings and gods. If insects, birds, human beings, and gods were each in turn born from acts of austerity, then we should understand that sentient beings are born from karma and causes and conditions, rather than being created by God through his practice of austerities.

If God were the creator of the myriad things, where did he create them? Did he himself create that place, or did someone else create it? If that place was created by God, where did he create it? If he stood in another place to create this place, who created that other place? These questions would require there to be two Gods, but this cannot be correct. Therefore, the myriad things in the universe were not created by God.

If God is the creator, why must He practice asceticism, as though He were worshiping and supplicating some other being in order to fulfill His wishes? If He must practice asceticism and seek the favor of another, then we should know that God is not self-existent.

If God created all things, they would have fixed natures from the moment they arose and would not change. A horse would always be a horse, and a human being would always be a human being. Yet now all things change according to karma. Therefore, we should know that all things were not created by God.

If God were the creator, there would be neither sin nor merit, for good and evil, beauty and ugliness, would all have been created by God. Yet in reality, sin and merit do exist. Therefore, all things were not created by God.

If all sentient beings were born from God, they would revere and cherish God, just as children cherish their father. Yet in reality this is not so: some people hate God, while others cherish God. Therefore, we should know that all things were not born from God.

If God were the creator, why would He not make everyone happy or everyone miserable? Why would He make some people happy and others suffer? We see that God would be acting out of love and hatred; therefore, God is not self-existent. Since God is not self-existent, all things were not born from God.

If God were the creator of all things, no living being could create anything. Yet in reality, each living being can produce other things. Therefore, we should know that all things were not born from God.

If God were the creator, good and evil, suffering and happiness would come of themselves and would not be brought about by human beings. But then there would be no worldly law [whereby those who do good are rewarded and those who do evil are punished]. If so, the ascetic life and meritorious practices of virtuous Brahmins would be useless. Yet this is not so. Therefore, we know that all things were not born from God.

If, through causes and conditions, God became supreme among sentient beings, then any sentient being who practiced meritorious deeds would likewise become supreme. Why should only God possess causes and conditions? If God were self-existent, then all sentient beings would also have to be self-existent. Yet in reality this is not so. If God came from another source, that source would in turn come from yet another source; thus the regress of origins would be endless. If the regress of origins were endless, there would be no cause at all.

Therefore, all things arise from various causes and conditions. You should say that all things were not created by God and that God does not exist. When a person holding a wrong view asked the Buddha whether suffering was produced by another, He did not answer.

Nor can something be produced by both itself and another, for that would entail both errors [already discussed above].

The conjunction of causes and conditions gives rise to all dharmas; therefore, nothing arises without a cause. Hence, the Buddha likewise did not answer that question.

Question: Then the scriptures merely refute the four wrong views [of the Tirthaka ascetics] and do not say that suffering is empty.

Answer: Although the Buddha taught that the conjunction of causes and conditions gives rise to suffering, refuting the four wrong views is also equivalent to saying that suffering is empty. Suffering is empty. Why? Because whatever arises from causes and conditions has no intrinsic nature. Whatever has no intrinsic nature is empty.

If suffering is empty, you should know that all conditioned dharmas, unconditioned dharmas, and sentient beings are empty.

THE ELEVENTH GATE

CONTEMPLATION OF THE THREE TIMES

All dharmas are empty. Why? A cause does not exist before, after, or simultaneously with its effect. As stated in these verses:

Whether the cause precedes the effect, follows the effect, or exists simultaneously with the effect,

None of these possibilities can be established.

How, then, could a cause produce an effect?

To say that the cause exists before the effect is incorrect. Why? If a cause existed first and an effect subsequently arose from it, then the effect would not have existed at the outset; of what, then, would it be the cause? If an effect existed before its cause, then the effect would already have been established before the cause existed; why, then, would it need a cause? If cause and effect existed simultaneously, there would be no production. For example, the two horns of an ox arise simultaneously; the left horn and the right horn do not produce one another. Therefore, it may be inferred that when two things arise simultaneously, they do not stand in any of the relationships of the “three times”—before, after, or simultaneous—between cause and effect.

Question: Your refutation of the causal relationship within the three times also cannot be established. If the refutation precedes that which can be refuted, then there can be nothing to be refuted; what, then, is there for the refutation to refute? If that which can be refuted precedes the refutation, this means that it has already been established; why would it need to be refuted? If the refutation and that which can be refuted exist at the same time, then there is likewise no causal relationship. For example, the two horns of an ox arise simultaneously; the left horn and the right horn do not produce one another. Therefore, the refutation does not produce that which can be refuted, nor does that which can be refuted produce the refutation.

Answer: Your refutation and that which can be refuted are both subject to the same error. If all dharmas are empty, then neither refutation nor that which is refuted can exist. Now you say that my refutation is empty, which means that what I say is correct [for I say that all dharmas are empty]. If I asserted that refutation and that which can be refuted must exist, I would fall into the error you describe. But I do not assert that refutation and that which can be refuted must exist; therefore, you cannot charge me with that error.

Question: We observe that a cause may precede an effect; for example, a potter makes a jar. A cause may also come after an effect; for example, “because there are disciples, there is a teacher,” and they are regarded as disciples only after they have received instruction. A cause and an effect may also exist simultaneously; for example, a lamp and its light exist at the same time. Therefore, it is incorrect to say that a cause neither precedes, nor follows, nor exists simultaneously with an effect.

Answer: Your example of a potter making a jar is incorrect. Why? If the jar does not yet exist, of what is the potter the cause? As in the case of the potter, nothing can be a cause before its effect.

Nor can a cause come after its effect. If there are no disciples, who could be a teacher? Therefore, a cause cannot come after its effect.

If you say that, like a lamp and its light, cause and effect exist simultaneously, then the cause of which you speak is still untenable. Granted that the lamp and its light exist simultaneously, how could they give rise to one another?

Therefore, causes and conditions are empty. Thus, you should know that all conditioned dharmas, unconditioned dharmas, and sentient beings are empty.

THE TWELFTH GATE

CONTEMPLATION OF ARISING

All dharmas are empty. Why? Because that which has already arisen, that which has not yet arisen, and that which is presently arising are all unobtainable. That which has already arisen does not arise again. That which has not yet arisen has not arisen. That which is presently arising also does not arise. As stated in the verses:

An effect already arisen does not arise again;

that which has not yet arisen has not arisen.

[If there is nothing already arisen

and nothing not yet arisen,

that which is presently arising does not arise.

That which has already arisen is an effect that has already come into being. That which has not yet arisen is what has not come into being, or does not arise, or does not arise, or does not exist. That which is presently arising is what is beginning to arise but is not yet complete.

The effect of arising is not produced, because what has already been produced is not produced again. Why? Because if it were produced again, this would lead to the error of an infinite regress. If that which has already been produced produces a second thing, the second produces a third, and then the third, having arisen, produces a fourth. This would be like the original thing having produced a second product and then continuing to produce without end; but this is impossible. Therefore, that which has already been produced does not arise.

If you say that what has already been produced arises again, and that what it employs in order to arise is the arising of what has not yet arisen, this is impossible. Why? Because employing what has not yet been produced to produce entails two kinds of production: namely, that what has already been produced is produced and that what has not yet been produced is produced. Your position changes and cannot stand.

It is like the following: what has already been made need not be made; what has already been burned need not be burned; what has already been demonstrated need not be demonstrated. Therefore, what has already been produced need not arise. Thus, what has already been produced does not arise.

That which has not yet been produced is likewise not produced. Why? Because it has no relation to arising. Otherwise, it would follow that everything not yet produced would be produced. If that which has no act of production. Therefore, there is no act of production.

If there were production without an act of production, there would be making without an act of making, going without an act of going, and eating and drinking without acts of eating and drinking. If this were so, the conventions of the world would be destroyed; this is incorrect. Therefore, that which has not yet been produced is not produced.

If what does not arise were to arise, then all things that do not arise would arise. All ordinary beings who have not given rise to supreme enlightenment (Anuttara-samyak-sambodhi) would give rise to supreme enlightenment; an arhat of perfect conduct who does not give rise to malice would give rise to malice; rabbits and horses, which do not grow horns, would grow horns. But such things are impossible. Therefore, you should not say that what does not arise will arise.

Question: What does not arise arises only when causes and conditions come together. If such causes and conditions as time, place, agent, and suitable means are all present, then some things that have not arisen will arise, but not everything will arise. Therefore, you should not refute my view by saying that all things will not arise.

Answer: Suppose that what has not arisen will arise when suitable causes and conditions—such as time, place, agent, and effective means—come together. There is no production when it exists [before a product]. Nor is there production when it does not exist before [the product]. Nor is there production when it both exists and does not exist before [the product]. Thus, production cannot be obtained in any of the three cases discussed above. Therefore, what has not arisen will not arise.

That which is presently arising also does not arise. Why? Because this entails the error that what has already arisen arises again, and it also entails the further error that what has not yet arisen nevertheless arises. As stated above, what has already arisen—which is one part of what is presently arising—does not arise. And, as stated, what has not yet arisen—which is another part of what is presently arising—also does not arise.

If there were something presently arising without an act of production, then what is presently arising would arise. But in fact, if there is no act of production, there can be nothing presently arising. Therefore, that which is presently arising does not arise.

If someone says that there is an act of production within what is presently arising, then there are two acts of production: (1) that which is presently arising is produced, and (2) that which is presently arising produces. But neither of these can be established; how, then, could one say that these two acts of production exist? Therefore, there is no production within what is presently arising.

If there is no production, then there is nothing presently arising. Where does production take place? If there is no place in which the product is produced, there can be nothing presently arising. Therefore, that which is presently arising does not arise.

Thus, that which has already arisen, that which has not yet arisen, and that which is presently arising cannot be established. When the very act of arising cannot be established, arising, abiding, and ceasing likewise cannot be established.

When arising, abiding, and cessation cannot be established, conditioned dharmas cannot be established. When conditioned dharmas cannot be established, unconditioned dharmas cannot be established. When conditioned and unconditioned dharmas cannot be established, no sentient beings can be established.

Therefore, you should know that all dharmas are unborn; ultimately, they are all empty and quiescent.