十二門論

The Treatise states: I shall now briefly explain the meaning of the Mahayana (Great Vehicle).

Question: What benefit is there in explaining the meaning of the Mahayana?

Answer: The Mahayana is the profound Dharma treasury of the Buddhas of the ten directions and the three times, taught for those of keen faculties and great merit. In the final age of the Dharma, sentient beings have dull faculties and scant merit. Although they seek the words of the sutras, they cannot fully understand them. Out of compassion for such people, I wish to enable them to awaken. Furthermore, in order to proclaim the Tathagata’s unsurpassed Great Dharma, I shall therefore briefly explain the meaning of the Mahayana.

Question: The teachings of the Mahayana are immeasurable and boundless, beyond calculation. Even the Buddha himself could not expound them exhaustively; how much less could anyone explain and elucidate their meaning?

Answer: For that reason, I said at the outset that I would explain them only briefly.

Question: Why is it called Mahayana?

Answer: Because it is superior to the Two Vehicles, it is called the Great Vehicle. The Buddhas are the greatest beings, and because this vehicle can convey one to their state, it is called great. The Buddhas are great persons, and because they ride upon this vehicle, it is called great.

Furthermore, because it can eliminate the great suffering of sentient beings and bestow great benefit, it is called great. Bodhisattvas such as Avalokitesvara, Mahasthamaprapta, Manjusri, and Maitreya all rely upon this vehicle; because it is the vehicle of the Great Beings, it is called great. Furthermore, because this vehicle can reach the utmost limits of all dharmas, it is called great.

As the Buddha himself states in the Prajnaparamita Sutra, the meaning of the Mahayana is immeasurable and boundless. For these reasons, it is called great.

The profound meaning of the Great Vehicle chiefly teaches EMPTINESS. To comprehend this meaning is to comprehend the Mahayana, to perfect the six paramitas, and to be entirely unobstructed. Therefore, I shall now explain only the meaning of EMPTINESS. To explain the meaning of EMPTINESS, I shall use the Twelve Gates through which one enters into the meaning of EMPTINESS.

I—THE GATE OF CONTEMPLATING CAUSES AND CONDITIONS

The first is the gate of causes and conditions, meaning:

Dharmas arise from various conditions;

Thus they are without self-nature.

If they are without self-nature,

How could such dharmas exist?

Dharmas arising from various conditions are of two kinds: internal and external. Conditions are likewise of two kinds: internal and external.

External causes and conditions are exemplified as follows: a lump of clay, a potter’s wheel, a potter, and so forth come together, and thus a jar arises. Again, threads, a loom, a weaver, and so forth come together, and thus silk cloth arises. Again, digging the earth, laying a foundation, rafters, pillars, mud, grass, human labor, and so forth come together, and thus a house arises. Again, milk, curds, a cooking pot, a stirring stick, human labor, and so forth come together, and thus ghee arises. Again, a seed, earth, water, fire, wind, space, the seasons, human labor, and so forth come together, and thus a sprout arises. One should know that all external dharmas arising through causes and conditions are likewise so.

Internal causes and conditions are ignorance, formations, consciousness, name-and-form, the six ayatanas, contact, feeling, craving, clinging, becoming, birth, and aging-and-death. In every case, the cause comes first, and only afterward does the result arise.

Thus, since all internal and external dharmas arise from various conditions, are they not devoid of self-nature?

If a dharma’s self-nature is empty, then other-nature is empty, and the combination of self-nature and other-nature is also empty. Why? Because if something has other-nature, it cannot have self-nature.

If one claims that things exist through other-nature, then an ox should exist through the nature of a horse, a horse through the nature of an ox, a pear through the nature of a jackfruit, and a jackfruit through the nature of a pear; all other things should likewise be so, but in truth they are not. If one claims that a thing does not exist through other-nature but merely arises because of another, this is also untenable.

Why? If a mat exists because of rushes, then the rushes and the mat would be one substance and could not be called other. If one says that the rushes are other than the mat, then one cannot say that the mat exists because of the rushes.

Moreover, the rushes themselves have no self-nature. Why? Because the rushes also arise from various conditions and therefore lack self-nature.

Since they lack self-nature, one cannot say that the mat exists because of the rushes. Therefore, the mat cannot take the rushes as its substance. The same applies to jars, ghee, and all other external dharmas arising through causes and conditions: none can be apprehended.

Internal dharmas arising through causes and conditions likewise cannot be apprehended. As stated in the Treatise in Seventy Verses:

“Dharmas conditioned by causes do not truly arise.

If it is said that they do arise,

Do they arise within a single mind,

Or within many minds?”

These dharmas of the twelve links of dependent origination do not truly arise of themselves. If one says that they do arise, do they exist within a single mind or within many minds? If they existed within a single mind, cause and effect would arise simultaneously.

Yet it is impossible for cause and effect to exist simultaneously. Why? Because with all things, the cause necessarily precedes and the effect follows.

If they existed within many minds, the twelve dharmas of dependent origination would each be separate and distinct. When the preceding part had perished together with its mind, what could serve as the cause and condition for the subsequent part? A dharma that has perished is insentient; how could it serve as a cause?

If the twelve links of dependent origination existed beforehand, they would have to exist either within a single mind or within many minds, but neither is tenable.

Therefore, all conditions are empty. Because conditions are empty, the dharmas arising from conditions are also empty. Thus, one should know that all conditioned dharmas are empty. If even conditioned dharmas are empty, how much more so the self? It is on the basis of the five skandhas, the twelve ayatanas, and the eighteen dhatus—all conditioned dharmas—that a self is said to exist, just as burning is said to exist because of fuel. If the skandhas, ayatanas, and dhatus are empty, then there is no dharma that can be called a self. Without fuel, one cannot speak of burning. As the sutra states: “The Buddha told the bhiksus: Because there is a self, there are possessions of the self; if there is no self, there are no possessions of the self.”

Thus, because conditioned dharmas are empty, one should know that the unconditioned dharma of nirvana is also empty. Why? The cessation of these five skandhas, with no other five skandhas arising, is called nirvana.

Yet if the five skandhas have always been empty in themselves, what is there to cease that could be called nirvana? If the self is also empty, what could attain nirvana? Furthermore, the non-arising of dharmas is called nirvana.

If the arising of dharmas could be established, then the non-arising of dharmas could also be established. But the arising of dharmas cannot be established, as was already explained through causes and conditions and will be explained again below. Therefore, the arising of dharmas cannot be established.

It is only in relation to the arising of dharmas that non-arising is spoken of. If the arising of dharmas cannot be established, how could the non-arising of dharmas be established?

Therefore, conditioned dharmas, unconditioned dharmas, and the self are all EMPTY.

II—THE GATE OF CONTEMPLATING THE EXISTENCE OR NONEXISTENCE OF AN EFFECT

Furthermore, dharmas do not arise. Why?

If already existent, it does not arise;

If previously nonexistent, it also does not arise;

If both existent and nonexistent, it likewise does not arise.

What, then, could arise?

If the effect already exists within the cause, it should not arise. If the effect does not exist there, it should likewise not arise. If it both exists and does not exist there, it should also not arise. Why? If the effect already existed within the cause and yet arose, arising would be endless. If an effect that had not previously arisen were to arise, then after arising now, it would arise again. Why? Because it always exists within the cause; from that preexistent effect, it would arise again, and thus arising would be endless. If one says that what has already arisen does not arise, while only what has not yet arisen arises, there is no principle of arising in this. Therefore, the claim that what already exists beforehand arises is untenable.

Furthermore, if the effect already exists within the cause, yet one says that what has not yet arisen arises while what has already arisen does not arise, then both exist, but one arises and the other does not. This is unreasonable.

Furthermore, if what has not yet arisen definitely exists, then after it has arisen it must be nonexistent. Why? Because arising and not-yet-arising are mutually opposed. Since arising and not-yet-arising are opposed, these two characteristics must also be mutually opposed.

Furthermore, existence and nonexistence are mutually opposed, and nonexistence and existence are mutually opposed. If what has already arisen exists and what has not yet arisen also exists, then there should be no difference between the arisen and the not-yet-arisen. Why? Because what has already arisen exists, and what has not yet arisen also exists. What difference, then, could there be between the arisen and the not-yet-arisen? That there should be no distinction between the arisen and the not-yet-arisen is untenable. Therefore, an effect that exists within the cause does not arise.

Furthermore, if the effect already exists and has already been produced, why would it need to arise again? Just as what has already been done should not be done again, and what has already been produced should not be produced again. Therefore, if the effect exists in the cause, it does not arise. Furthermore, if an existing effect were to arise, then before it arose from the cause, the effect should logically be visible, yet in fact it cannot be seen. For example, the jar in the clay and the mat in the rushes should logically be visible, yet in fact they cannot be seen. Therefore, what exists does not arise.

Question: Although the effect exists beforehand, it cannot be seen because it has not yet undergone transformation.

Answer: If, before the jar arises, its substance has not yet been transformed into a jar and therefore cannot be seen, by what characteristic do you know and say that the jar already exists in the clay? Is there a jar because the characteristic of a jar is present, or is there a jar because the characteristics of an ox and a horse are present? If in the clay there is neither the characteristic of a jar nor the characteristics of an ox or a horse, should this not be called nonexistence? Therefore, your assertion that the effect already exists in the cause and then arises is untenable.

Furthermore, the transformed dharma is itself the effect; therefore, the transformation should already exist in the cause. Why? Because you say that the effect already exists in the cause. If the jar and so forth already existed, the transformation also should already exist; it should be visible, yet in fact it cannot be seen. Therefore, your assertion that it cannot be seen because it has not yet undergone transformation is untenable.

If you say that what has not yet undergone transformation is not called an effect, then the ultimate effect can never be obtained. Why? Because if that transformation did not exist before, it should not exist afterward either; therefore, the ultimate effect—the jar and so forth—could not be obtained.

If you say that what has undergone transformation is the effect, then it did not previously exist in the cause. Thus your position is indeterminate: either the effect previously existed in the cause, or it previously did not exist.

Question: The transformation already existed, but it could not be seen. Things may indeed exist and yet be imperceptible: something may be too near to be known, or too far away to be known; the sense faculty may be impaired, so it cannot be known; the mind may not be attentive, so it cannot be known; it may be concealed, so it cannot be known; it may be indistinguishable because it is the same, so it cannot be known; it may be overwhelmed by something stronger, so it cannot be known; or it may be too subtle, so it cannot be known.

Something too near cannot be known, as medicine placed in the eye. Something too distant cannot be known, as a bird flying aloft, far away in empty space. When a sense faculty is impaired, its object cannot be known: the blind do not see forms, the deaf do not hear sounds, a congested nose does not smell odors, a bitter tongue does not discern flavors, a numb and rigid body does not perceive contact, and a deranged mind does not know the truth.

Because the mind is not attentive, something cannot be known; for example, when the mind takes form and so forth as its object, it does not know sound. Because something is concealed, it cannot be known, as earth conceals an underground stream or a wall conceals an object outside. Because it is the same, it cannot be known, as when a spot of ink is placed upon a black object.

Because it is overwhelmed by something stronger, it cannot be known, as when the sound of bells and drums prevents one from hearing a sweeping sound or the ticking of a clock. Because it is too subtle, it cannot be known, as minute particles and so forth are not manifest. In this way, although dharmas exist, they cannot be known because of these eight causes and conditions.

You say that the transformed dharma cannot be found in the causes and conditions, and that the jar and so forth likewise cannot be found, but this is untenable. Why? Because although these things exist, they cannot be found on account of the eight causes and conditions.

Answer: The transformed dharma and effects such as the jar do not correspond to the eight causes and conditions whereby something cannot be found. Why? If the transformed dharma and effects such as the jar could not be found because they were too near, then they should be found when slightly farther away.

If they could not be found because they were too far away, they should be found when slightly nearer. If they could not be found because a sense faculty was impaired, they should be found when the faculty was sound. If they could not be found because the mind was not attentive, they should be found when the mind was attentive.

If they could not be found because they were concealed, then the transformed dharma and the dharma of the jar should be found when they were not concealed. If they could not be found because they were the same, they should be found when they were different. If they could not be found because they were overwhelmed by something stronger, they should be found when the stronger thing ceased.

If they could not be found because they were too subtle, then large effects such as the jar should be found.

If the jar cannot be found because it is small, then it should remain impossible to find even after it has arisen. Why? Because its smallness before and after arising would be the same, since it determinately exists both before and after arising.

Question: Before it arises, it is small; after it arises, it gradually becomes large. Therefore, it can be found after arising but cannot be found before arising.

Answer: If so, then the effect certainly does not exist in the cause. Why? Because largeness does not exist in the cause.

Furthermore, if largeness did not previously exist in the cause—if largeness had previously existed in the cause, you should not say it was small—then since the present effect is large, when you say it could not be found because it was small, that which was small cannot be called the effect. The ultimate effect should therefore never be found, yet in fact the effect is found. Thus it is not because of smallness that it could not be found. Accordingly, the claim that a dharma, though its effect already exists in the cause, cannot be found because of the eight causes and conditions is untenable.

Furthermore, if an effect already existed in its cause and then arose, the characteristic of the cause as cause would be destroyed, and the characteristic of the effect as effect would also be destroyed. Why? Silk in threads, or fruit on a plate, merely has a place in which it abides; that place is not called its cause. Why? Because threads and plates are not the causes of silk and fruit. If the cause is invalid, the effect is also invalid; thus threads and so forth are not the causes of silk and so forth. Since there is no cause, there is also no effect. Why? Because an effect is produced on account of a cause; if the cause is not established, how could the effect be established?

Furthermore, if something is not produced, it is not called an effect. Causes such as threads cannot produce effects such as silk. Why? Just as threads and so forth are not made by silk, yet are said to be capable of producing the effect of silk and so forth, there would thus be neither cause nor effect. If both cause and effect are nonexistent, one should not inquire whether the effect previously exists or does not previously exist in the cause.

Furthermore, if the effect already existed in the cause but could not be found, some sign of it should be manifest. For example, upon smelling a fragrance one knows that flowers are present; upon hearing a sound one knows that a bird is present; upon hearing laughter one knows that a person is present; upon seeing smoke one knows that fire is present; and upon seeing a heron one knows that a pond is present. In the same way, if the effect already existed in the cause, some sign of it should be manifest. But now neither the substance of the effect nor any sign of it can be found. Thus one should know that the effect did not previously exist in the cause.

Furthermore, if the effect already existed in the cause and then arose, one should not say that the cause of threads contains silk or that the cause of rushes contains a mat. If the cause does not produce it, neither does anything else. If silk is not produced from threads, could it be produced from rushes?

If neither threads nor rushes produce it, could one say that it is produced from nowhere? If it is produced from nowhere, it is not called an effect. If there is no effect, there is also no cause, as explained above.

Therefore, the claim that an effect already existing in its cause then arises is incorrect. Furthermore, if the effect is produced from nowhere, it must be permanent, like the nature of nirvana. If the effect is permanent, then all conditioned dharmas would be permanent.

Why? Because all conditioned dharmas are effects. If all dharmas were permanent, there would be no impermanence; and if there were no impermanence, neither would there be permanence.

Why? Because permanence exists in dependence upon impermanence, and impermanence exists in dependence upon permanence. Thus both permanence and impermanence would be nonexistent, which is untenable.

Therefore, one cannot say that an effect already existing in its cause then arises.

Furthermore, if an effect already existed in the cause and then arose, the effect would in turn serve as the cause of another effect: silk would serve as the cause of wearing, a mat as the cause of spreading it out, and a cart as the cause of carrying. Yet in fact they do not serve as causes of other effects. Therefore, one cannot say that an effect already existing in its cause then arises.

If it is said that fragrance already exists in earth, but without sprinkling water the fragrance does not manifest, and that the fruit is likewise—if the conditions have not yet converged, it cannot become a cause—this is not so. Why? As you have said, only when something has been completed is it called a fruit; thus, such things as jars are not fruits. Why? Because completion results from making. A jar does not exist before it is made; it must be made before it becomes a fruit. Therefore, the proposition that the fruit already exists in the cause and is then produced is untenable.

Furthermore, a revealing cause can only disclose something; it cannot produce a thing. For example, when a lamp is lit to illuminate a jar in the dark, it also illuminates bedding and other objects. When the various conditions are combined to make a jar, however, they cannot thereby produce bedding and other objects. Therefore, one should know that the fruit is not produced from having already existed in the cause.

Furthermore, if the fruit already existed in the cause and were then produced, there should be no distinction between what is presently being made and what will be made. Yet you accept that distinction. Therefore, the fruit is not produced from having already existed in the cause.

If it is said that the fruit does not previously exist in the cause but is nevertheless produced, this too is untenable. Why? If what does not exist could be produced, then a second head and a third hand should also be produced. Why? Because they too are nonexistent and would thus be produced.

Question: Jars and similar things have causes and conditions, whereas a second head and a third hand have no causes and conditions. How, then, could they be produced? Therefore, what you say is incorrect.

Answer: A second head, a third hand, jars, and the like are all nonexistent within their causes. Just as there is no jar within a lump of clay, there is also no jar within a stone. Why, then, is milk called the cause of curds and thread the cause of cloth, while curds are not called the cause of cloth?

Furthermore, if the fruit did not previously exist in the cause yet were produced, then every thing should produce every other thing. A finger, for example, should produce carts, horses, food, drink, and so forth. Likewise, thread should not produce cloth alone; it should also produce carts, horses, food, drink, and other things. Why? If what does not exist can nevertheless be produced, why can thread produce only cloth and not carts, horses, food, drink, and so forth? For all of them are equally nonexistent within it.

If the fruit did not previously exist in the cause yet were produced, causes should not each possess a particular power capable of producing a particular fruit. For example, one who needs oil extracts it from sesame seeds and does not press sand. If oil is equally nonexistent in both, why seek it in sesame seeds rather than press sand to obtain it?

If it is said that oil has previously been seen to come from sesame seeds but has never been seen to come from sand, and therefore one seeks it in sesame seeds rather than pressing sand, this is not so. Why? If the characteristic of production were established, one could say that at another time oil had been seen to come from sesame seeds but not from sand, and therefore one seeks it in sesame seeds rather than in sand.

Yet the characteristic of production of all dharmas is not established. Thus, it cannot be said that because oil was seen at another time to come from sesame seeds, one should seek it in sesame seeds rather than in sand. Furthermore, I am not refuting only one matter; I am refuting causes and fruits universally.

The production of a fruit that already exists in the cause, the production of a fruit that does not previously exist, and the production of a fruit that both exists and does not exist are all untenable. Therefore, when you say that oil was seen at another time to come from sesame seeds, you fall into the same uncertainty concerning the cause.

Furthermore, if the fruit did not previously exist in the cause yet were produced, the characteristics of causes could not be established. Why? If causes are devoid of any dharma, what could act? What could be accomplished? If there is neither action nor accomplishment, why call them causes? Thus, an agent could have no act, nor could one who causes another to act have any act.

If it is said that, were the fruit already present in the cause, there should be no distinct action, agent, and object of action, why is this so? If the fruit already existed, what need would there be to make it again? Therefore, you say that action, agent, object of action, and all causes cannot be apprehended.

Yet the view that the fruit does not previously exist in the cause is also untenable. Why? If someone accepts action and agent and distinguishes cause from fruit, such an objection should be raised against him.

I say that action, agent, cause, and fruit are all empty. If you refute action, agent, cause, and fruit, you establish my teaching; this cannot be called an objection. Therefore, the proposition that the fruit does not previously exist in the cause but is nevertheless produced is untenable.

Furthermore, such an objection should be raised against one who accepts that the fruit already exists in the cause. I do not say that the fruit already exists in the cause, so I do not accept this objection; nor do I accept that the fruit does not previously exist in the cause.

If it is said that the fruit both exists and does not exist in the cause and is then produced, this too is untenable. Why? Because existence and nonexistence are mutually opposed in nature. How could mutually opposed natures occupy the same place? Just as darkness and light, suffering and happiness, going and standing, bondage and release cannot occupy the same place, so neither a fruit that previously exists in the cause nor one that previously does not exist is produced. Furthermore, the proposition that the fruit both exists and does not exist in the cause has already been refuted in the section concerning existence and nonexistence.

Therefore, a fruit that already exists in the cause is not produced; a fruit that does not exist is not produced; and a fruit that both exists and does not exist is not produced. Here the reasoning reaches its ultimate point. Since the fruit cannot be found when sought anywhere, it is ultimately unproduced. Because it is ultimately unproduced, all conditioned dharmas are empty. Why? Because all conditioned dharmas belong to cause and fruit. Since conditioned dharmas are empty, unconditioned dharmas are also empty. If even conditioned and unconditioned dharmas are empty, how much more so the self?

III—GATE OF CONTEMPLATING CONDITIONS

Furthermore, the conditions of dharmas are not established. Why?

The conditions of dharmas, singly or collectively—

Within them there is no fruit.

If there is no fruit within the conditions,

How can it arise from conditions?

The fruit, such as a jar, is absent from each individual condition and is also absent from their combination. If it is absent in both cases, how can it be said to arise from conditions?

Question: What are called the various conditions?

Answer:

Four conditions produce all dharmas;

There is no fifth condition:

The causal condition, the immediately preceding condition,

The object-condition, and the dominant condition.

The four conditions are the causal condition, the immediately preceding condition, the object-condition, and the dominant condition.

– The causal condition is the dharma from which another dharma arises—whether it has arisen from it, presently arises from it, or will arise from it. That dharma is called the causal condition.

– The immediately preceding condition is the preceding dharma that, having ceased, gives rise in sequence to the next. This is called the immediately preceding condition.

– The object-condition is the dharma in relation to which, according to the relevant object, bodily karma arises, verbal karma arises, or mind and mental factors arise. This is called the object-condition.

– The dominant condition means that, because this dharma exists, that dharma is able to arise; this dharma serves as the dominant condition for that dharma.

Thus, within all four conditions there is no fruit in the cause. If the fruit existed within the cause, it should exist apart from the conditions; yet in truth there is no fruit apart from the conditions. If the fruit existed within the conditions, it should exist apart from the cause; yet in truth there is no fruit apart from the cause. If it is said that the fruit exists in both cause and conditions, reason dictates that it should be apprehensible. Yet when sought through reasoning, it cannot be found. Therefore, it is absent in both places. Since it is absent from each individual condition and also absent from their combination, how can it be said that the fruit arises from conditions?

If the fruit is absent from conditions,

Yet emerges from within conditions,

Why does that fruit not also emerge

From what is not a condition?

If it is said that the fruit is absent from conditions yet arises from conditions, why does it not arise from what is not a condition? For it is absent from both alike. Therefore, there is no cause or condition capable of producing a fruit. Since the fruit is not produced, the conditions likewise are not produced. Why? Because conditions precede and the fruit follows. Since conditions and fruit are empty, all conditioned dharmas are empty; because conditioned dharmas are empty, unconditioned dharmas are also empty; because conditioned dharmas are empty, unconditioned dharmas are also empty; since both conditioned and unconditioned dharmas are empty, how could there be a self?

IV—GATE OF CONTEMPLATING CHARACTERISTICS

Furthermore, all dharmas are empty. Why?

Conditioned and unconditioned—

These two kinds of dharmas are both without characteristics.

Because there are no characteristics,

Both kinds of dharmas are necessarily empty.

Conditioned dharmas are not established through characteristics.

Question: What are the characteristics of the conditioned?

Answer: Each of the myriad things has its own conditioned marks. For example, a cow has horns, a neck, a hanging dewlap, and hair at the tip of its tail; these are the marks of a cow. A jar has a flat bottom, a broad belly, a narrow neck, a round mouth, and a thick rim; these are the marks of a jar. A cart has wheels, an axle, spokes, and a yoke; these are the marks of a cart. A person has a head, eyes, a belly, a spine, shoulders, arms, hands, and feet; these are the marks of a person. In the same way, if arising, abiding, and ceasing are the marks of conditioned dharmas, are they conditioned or unconditioned? Question: If they are conditioned, what fault is there?

Answer:

If arising is conditioned,

It should also possess the three marks.

If arising is unconditioned,

How can it be called a mark of the conditioned?

If arising is conditioned, it should possess the three marks. Those three marks should in turn possess three marks, and so on without end. The same applies to abiding and ceasing.

If arising is unconditioned, how could the unconditioned serve as a mark of the conditioned? Apart from arising, abiding, and ceasing, what could make this arising known? Furthermore, for arising, abiding, and ceasing to be distinguishable, they must have arising; but the unconditioned cannot be distinguished and therefore does not arise.

The same applies to abiding and ceasing. Because arising, abiding, and ceasing do not exist, conditioned dharmas do not exist. Because the conditioned does not exist, unconditioned dharmas also do not exist, for it is in dependence upon the conditioned that the unconditioned is posited.

Since neither conditioned nor unconditioned dharmas exist, all dharmas are empty.

Question: You say that the three marks must themselves possess three marks and that this therefore leads to an infinite regress, so arising cannot be conditioned. I shall now explain:

What is produced by the arising of arising

Produces that fundamental arising;

What is produced by fundamental arising

In turn produces the arising of arising.

When a dharma arises, seven dharmas arise together, none possessing an independent essence: 1) the dharma, 2) arising, 3) abiding, 4) ceasing, 5) the arising of arising, 6) the abiding of abiding, and 7) the ceasing of ceasing. Among these seven dharmas, fundamental arising, excluding itself, can produce the other six dharmas. The arising of arising can produce fundamental arising, and fundamental arising in turn produces the arising of arising. Therefore, although the three marks are conditioned, there is no infinite regress. The same applies to abiding and ceasing.

Answer:

If it is said that the arising of arising

Can in turn produce fundamental arising,

Yet the arising of arising comes from fundamental arising,

How can it produce fundamental arising?

If it is said that the arising of arising can produce fundamental arising, then if fundamental arising has not produced the arising of arising, how could the arising of arising produce fundamental arising? If it is said that fundamental arising can produce that arising of arising, then since fundamental arising is produced by it, how could fundamental arising produce the arising of arising? If it is said that fundamental arising can produce the arising of arising, and that once the arising of arising has arisen, it in turn produces fundamental arising, this cannot be so.

Why? Because it is by producing fundamental arising that the dharma called the arising of arising is so named; yet before fundamental arising has actually arisen, how could it produce the arising of arising? If it is said that while the arising of arising is arising, it can produce fundamental arising, this also cannot be so.

Why?

While that arising of arising is arising,

It may be said to produce fundamental arising;

But the arising of arising has not yet arisen—

How could it produce fundamental arising?

While that arising of arising is arising, it may be said to produce fundamental arising; yet the essence of that arising of arising has itself not yet arisen, and so it cannot produce fundamental arising. If it is said that while the arising of arising is arising, it can produce itself and also produce the other—just as a lamp, while burning, illuminates itself and also illuminates other things—this cannot be so. Why?

Within the lamp itself there is no darkness,

Nor is there darkness where its light abides.

Only the dispelling of darkness is called illumination;

How, then, can the lamp illuminate?

There is no darkness within the lamp itself, nor is there darkness where its light abides. If there is no darkness within the lamp and no darkness where its light abides, why say that the lamp illuminates itself and also illuminates other things? Illumination is so called because it dispels darkness, but the lamp does not dispel darkness within itself, nor does it dispel darkness elsewhere. Therefore, the lamp neither illuminates itself nor illuminates other things. Thus your earlier assertion that a lamp illuminates itself and also illuminates other things, and that arising likewise produces itself and also produces other things, cannot be so.

Question: When a lamp is lit, it can dispel darkness; therefore there is no darkness within the lamp or where its light abides.

Answer: How can a lamp, while being lit, dispel darkness? When this lamp is first being lit, it cannot reach the place of darkness. If, while being lit, the lamp cannot reach darkness, then since it does not reach darkness, one should not say that it dispels darkness.

Furthermore, if the lamp can dispel darkness without reaching it, then a lamp in this place should dispel all darkness everywhere. If it is said that although the lamp does not reach darkness, its power can dispel darkness, then lighting a lamp in this place should dispel all the darkness in the world, since in every case it does not reach it. Yet in reality, a lamp lit in this place cannot dispel the darkness throughout the world. Therefore, your assertion that although the lamp does not reach darkness, its power can dispel darkness, cannot be so.

Furthermore, if a lamp can illuminate itself and also illuminate other things, darkness should likewise obscure itself and also obscure other things. If it is said that a lamp can illuminate itself and also illuminate other things, then darkness, being contrary to the lamp, should likewise be able to obscure itself and obscure other things. If, because lamp and darkness are opposed, darkness cannot obscure itself and obscure other things, then to say that a lamp can illuminate itself and also illuminate other things cannot be so. Thus your analogy is faulty.

As for the claim that arising can produce itself and also produce other things, I shall now explain further: If this arising has not yet arisen, how can it produce itself? If, having already arisen, it produces itself, what further need is there for arising? Before this arising has arisen, either it arises after having already arisen, or it arises while not yet arisen.

If it arises while not yet arisen, “not yet arisen” means that it does not yet exist; how could it produce itself? If it is said that it arises after having already arisen, then having already arisen means that it is already arisen; what need is there for it to arise again? Within what has arisen, there is no further arising, just as what has already been done is not done again.

Therefore, arising does not produce itself. If it does not produce itself, how could it produce other things? Your assertion that it produces itself and also produces other things cannot be so.

The same applies to abiding and ceasing.

Therefore, the assertion that arising, abiding, and ceasing are the marks of the conditioned cannot be established. Because arising, abiding, and ceasing cannot be established as the marks of the conditioned, conditioned dharmas do not exist. Because conditioned dharmas do not exist, unconditioned dharmas also do not exist. Why? The cessation of the conditioned is called the unconditioned nirvana; therefore, nirvana does not exist.

Furthermore, non-arising, non-abiding, and non-ceasing are called the marks of the unconditioned. But the absence of arising, abiding, and ceasing is no dharma, and what is no dharma cannot serve as a mark. If it is said that marklessness is the mark of nirvana, this cannot be so. If marklessness is the mark of nirvana, by what mark can one know that nirvana is markless? If through possessing a mark it is known to be markless, how can it be called markless? If through marklessness it is known to be markless, marklessness is nonexistence, and what is nonexistent cannot be known.

If it is said that among many robes, all have marks while only one robe is without a mark, and precisely because marklessness serves as its mark, when someone is told to take the unmarked robe, that person recognizes and takes it; similarly, arising, abiding, and ceasing belong to the conditioned, while that in which arising, abiding, and ceasing are absent should be known as the unconditioned, and therefore marklessness is nirvana—this cannot be so.

Why? Because arising, abiding, ceasing, and all their various causes and conditions are empty; the marks of the conditioned cannot be apprehended. How, then, can the unconditioned be known through them?

What determinate marks of the conditioned have you apprehended, such that you know that where those marks are absent is the unconditioned? Therefore, your use of marked and unmarked robes as an analogy for the marklessness of nirvana cannot be accepted. Moreover, the analogy of the robe will be discussed extensively later in the sixth gate.

Therefore, all conditioned dharmas are empty. Because conditioned dharmas are empty, unconditioned dharmas are also empty. Because both conditioned and unconditioned dharmas are empty, the self is also empty. Because these three are empty, all dharmas are empty.

V. THE GATE OF CONTEMPLATING MARKS AND MARKLESSNESS

Furthermore, all dharmas are empty. Why?

What has marks is not marked by marks;

What is markless is likewise not marked.

Apart from what has marks and what is markless,

Where could a mark perform the function of marking?

Within what possesses characteristics, a characteristic does not characterize. Why is this? If a dharma already possessed a characteristic beforehand, what further use would there be for a characteristic?

Moreover, if a characteristic existed within what possesses characteristics, and the characteristic itself were characterized, there would be the fault of two characteristics: first, the preexisting characteristic; second, the characteristic that further characterizes it. Therefore, within what possesses characteristics, a characteristic has no object to characterize. Within what lacks characteristics, a characteristic likewise has no object to characterize.

What dharma is called “lacking characteristics” such that a characteristic could be said to characterize it? For example, an elephant has two tusks, one trunk, three protuberances on its head, ears like fans, a spine like a bow, a large, pendulous belly, hair at the tip of its tail, and four thick, round legs: these are the characteristics of an elephant. Apart from these characteristics, there is no elephant that could be characterized.

A horse has upright ears, a hanging mane, hooves on all four feet, and hair along its entire tail. Apart from these characteristics, there is no horse that could be characterized. Thus, within what possesses characteristics, a characteristic has no object to characterize; within what lacks characteristics, a characteristic likewise has no object to characterize.

Apart from what possesses characteristics and what lacks characteristics, there is no third dharma that could be characterized. Therefore, there is no object to characterize.

Because characteristics do not exist, the dharmas characterized by them also cannot be established. Why is this? It is through characteristics that one knows what is called the characterized object.

Therefore, through causes and conditions, both the characteristic and the characterized object are empty. Because the characteristic and the characterized object are empty, all things are also empty. Why?

Apart from the characteristic and the characterized object, there is no thing. Because things are empty, non-things are also empty. It is because a thing ceases that it is called a non-thing; but if there is no thing, what could cease so as to be called a non-thing?

Because both things and non-things are empty, all conditioned dharmas are empty. Because conditioned dharmas are empty, unconditioned dharmas are also empty. Because both conditioned and unconditioned dharmas are empty, the self is also empty.

VI—CONTEMPLATION OF THE GATE OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE

Furthermore, all dharmas are empty. Why is this?

Characteristic and characterized object—

Neither their identity nor their difference can be found.

If neither identity nor difference exists,

How could these two be established?

As for the characteristic and the characterized object, their identity cannot be found, nor can their difference be found. If neither identity nor difference can be found, then these two certainly cannot be established. Therefore, both the characteristic and the characterized object are empty. Because the characteristic and the characterized object are empty, all dharmas are empty.

Question: The characteristic and the characterized object are always established. Why do you say they are not established?

You say that neither the identity nor the difference of the characteristic and the characterized object can be found. I shall now explain: In general, a thing’s characteristic may itself be the characterized object; or the characteristic may be different from the characterized object; or a small part may be the characteristic while the greater part is the characterized object. For example, the characteristic of consciousness is consciousness itself; apart from the functioning of consciousness, there is no consciousness.

The characteristic of feeling is feeling itself; apart from the functioning of feeling, there is no feeling. Characteristics such as these are themselves the characterized objects. As the Buddha said, the cessation of craving is called the characteristic of nirvana.

Craving is a conditioned and contaminated dharma, while cessation is an unconditioned and uncontaminated dharma. A person of faith has three characteristics: delighting in association with good people, delighting in hearing the Dharma, and delighting in practicing generosity. These three activities are karma of body and speech and thus are included within the skandhas, whereas faith is a mental factor and thus is included within the formations skandha.

This is called the characteristic being different from the characterized object. Right view, for example, is a characteristic of the Path, yet it is only a small part of the Path. Thus, a small part of the characterized object is called its characteristic.

Therefore, either the characteristic is itself the characterized object, the characteristic is different from the characterized object, or a small part of the characterized object is its characteristic. Your assertion that, because identity and difference cannot be established, the characteristic and the characterized object cannot be established is incorrect.

Answer: Your claim that the characteristic is the characterized object, as in the case of consciousness and so forth, is incorrect. Why is this? That which is known through a characteristic is called the characterized object, while that which serves to make it known is called the characteristic. In general, a thing cannot know itself, just as a finger cannot touch itself and an eye cannot see itself. Therefore, your claim that consciousness is both the characteristic and the characterized object is incorrect.

Moreover, if the characteristic were itself the characterized object, there should be no distinction between the characteristic and the characterized object. If a distinction is made between the characteristic and the characterized object, then one should not say that the characteristic is itself the characterized object.

Moreover, if the characteristic were itself the characterized object, cause and effect would necessarily be one. Why? The characteristic is the cause and the characterized object is the effect; these two would therefore necessarily be one. Yet in truth they are not one. Therefore, the claim that the characteristic is itself the characterized object is incorrect.

Your claim that the characteristic is different from the characterized object is also incorrect. You say that the cessation of craving is the characteristic of nirvana; you do not say that craving is the characteristic of nirvana. If you said that craving was the characteristic of nirvana, you could then say that the characteristic and the characterized object were different. But if you say that the cessation of craving is the characteristic of nirvana, you cannot say that the characteristic and the characterized object are different.

Furthermore, you say that a person of faith has three characteristics, yet none of them is different from faith. Without the characteristic of faith, these three activities would not exist. Therefore, you cannot say that the characteristic and the characterized object are different. Moreover, if the characteristic were different from the characterized object, the characteristic would itself need to have another characteristic, and this would lead to an infinite regress. This is untenable. Therefore, the characteristic and the characterized object cannot be different.

Question: Just as a lamp can illuminate itself and also illuminate other things, so too a characteristic can characterize itself and also characterize other things.

Answer: Your analogy of the lamp has already been refuted in the discussion of the three characteristics of conditioned dharmas. Moreover, it contradicts what you said before. Previously you said that the characteristic and the characterized object are different, but now you say that a characteristic can characterize itself and also characterize other things. This is incorrect.

Furthermore, your claim that a small part of the characterized object is its characteristic is also incorrect. Why? This meaning would have to fall either under identity or under difference, and the meanings of identity and difference have already been refuted. It should therefore be understood that the claim concerning a partial characteristic has also been refuted.

Thus, through these various causes and conditions, the identity of the characteristic and the characterized object cannot be found, nor is there any third dharma that could establish the characteristic and the characterized object. Therefore, both the characteristic and the characterized object are empty. Because these two are empty, all dharmas are empty.

VII—CONTEMPLATION OF THE GATE OF EXISTENCE AND NONEXISTENCE

Furthermore, all dharmas are empty. Why is this? Because existence and nonexistence cannot be found at the same time, nor can they be found at different times. As it is said:

Existence and nonexistence do not occur at the same time;

Apart from nonexistence, existence also does not occur.

Not apart from nonexistence, existence does not occur;

Existence would then necessarily be perpetually nonexistent.

Existence and nonexistence are contrary in nature and should not coexist within a single dharma, just as at the time of birth there is no death, and at the time of death there is no birth. This matter has already been explained in the Middle Treatise. If you say that existence apart from nonexistence entails no fault, this is incorrect.

Why? Apart from nonexistence, how could existence exist? As stated above, when a dharma arises, together with its own substance, nine dharmas arise simultaneously.

As stated in the Abhidharma Treatise: “Existence and impermanence arise together.” Impermanence is the characteristic of cessation and therefore is called impermanence. Thus, apart from nonexistence, existence certainly cannot arise. If existence arose without being separate from impermanence, it would necessarily be perpetually nonexistent.

If existence were perpetually nonexistent, it would have no abiding from the very beginning, because it would be perpetually disintegrating. Yet in truth it does abide. Therefore, existence is not perpetually nonexistent.

If existence arose apart from impermanence, this would be incorrect. Why? Because apart from impermanence, existence in truth does not arise.

Question: When existence arises, impermanence is already present but has not yet become active. Only at the time of cessation does it become active and destroy existence. In this way, arising, abiding, cessation, aging, and acquisition each await their proper time before becoming active.

When existence begins, arising performs its function, causing existence to arise. During the interval between arising and cessation, abiding performs its function, preserving existence. At the time of cessation, impermanence performs its function, bringing existence to cessation.

Aging transforms arising into abiding and transforms abiding into cessation. Impermanence then destroys it. Acquisition continually brings the original event to fulfillment.

Thus, although a dharma and impermanence arise together, existence is not perpetually nonexistent.

Answer: You say that impermanence, which is the characteristic of cessation, arises together with arising; then, when there is arising, there should be destruction, and when there is destruction, there should be arising. Moreover, both arising and cessation are empty. Why?

At the time of cessation there should be no arising, and at the time of arising there should be no cessation, because arising and cessation are mutually opposed. Furthermore, according to your doctrine, impermanence arises together with abiding; then, when there is destruction, there should be no abiding, and if there is abiding, there should be no destruction. Why?

Because abiding and destruction are mutually opposed. At the time of aging there is no abiding, and at the time of abiding there is no aging. Therefore, your assertion that arising, abiding, cessation, aging, and impermanence have always arisen together is confused.

Why? If an existent thing arises together with impermanence, and impermanence is the characteristic of destruction, then ordinarily, when a thing arises, it has no characteristic of destruction; while it abides, it likewise has no characteristic of destruction. At such times, does it not lack the characteristic of impermanence?

Just as that which is capable of cognition is called consciousness, while that which is incapable of cognition lacks the characteristic of consciousness; that which is capable of experiencing is called feeling, while that which is incapable of experiencing lacks the characteristic of feeling; that which is capable of recollection is called perception, while that which is incapable of recollection lacks the characteristic of perception; origination is the characteristic of arising, and without origination there is no characteristic of arising; sustaining is the characteristic of abiding, and without sustaining there is no characteristic of abiding; transformation is the characteristic of aging, and without transformation there is no characteristic of aging;

the cessation of the life span is the characteristic of death, and if the life span does not cease, there is no characteristic of death—in the same way, destruction is the characteristic of impermanence, and apart from destruction there is no characteristic of impermanence.

If, during arising and abiding, impermanence is present but cannot destroy the existent thing, and only later can destroy it, what need is there for it to arise together with that thing? Thus, impermanence should exist only when the existent thing is being destroyed. Therefore, the proposition that impermanence arises together with an existent thing but destroys it only later is untenable. In this way, neither conjunction nor disjunction can be established; thus, both existence and nonexistence are empty. Because existence and nonexistence are empty, all conditioned dharmas are empty; because all conditioned dharmas are empty, unconditioned dharmas are also empty; and because conditioned and unconditioned dharmas are empty, sentient beings are also empty.

VIII—CONTEMPLATION OF INTRINSIC NATURE

Furthermore, all dharmas are empty. Why? Because dharmas have no intrinsic nature. As it is said:

Seeing that characteristics undergo change,

Dharmas have no intrinsic nature;

The dharma of lacking intrinsic nature is also empty,

Because all dharmas are empty.

If dharmas possessed intrinsic nature, they should not undergo change; yet all dharmas are seen to undergo change. Therefore, one should know that dharmas have no intrinsic nature. Moreover, if dharmas possessed a fixed intrinsic nature, they should not arise from conditions. If intrinsic nature arose from conditions, then it would be a fabricated dharma; but that which is not fabricated does not depend upon something else before it can be called intrinsic nature. Therefore, all dharmas are empty.

Question: If all dharmas are empty, then there is neither arising nor cessation, and consequently there is no Noble Truth of suffering. If there is no Noble Truth of suffering, there is no Noble Truth of the origin of suffering. If there are no Noble Truths of suffering and its origin, there is no Noble Truth of cessation.

If there is no Noble Truth of cessation, there is no path leading to the cessation of suffering. If dharmas are empty and lack intrinsic nature, then there are no Four Noble Truths. Because there are no Four Noble Truths, there are also no four fruits of the śramaṇa.

Because there are no four fruits of the śramaṇa, there can be no sages or noble ones. If these do not exist, the Buddha, Dharma, and Sangha also do not exist, and all worldly dharmas are empty. This cannot be right.

Therefore, dharmas should not be entirely empty.

Answer: There are two truths: first, conventional truth; second, the truth of the ultimate meaning. It is only through conventional truth that the truth of the ultimate meaning can be taught. If one does not rely upon conventional truth, the truth of the ultimate meaning cannot be taught; and if the truth of the ultimate meaning is not attained, nirvana cannot be attained.

If you do not understand the two truths, you know neither how to benefit yourself, how to benefit others, nor how to benefit both. Thus, one who knows conventional truth knows the truth of the ultimate meaning, and one who knows the truth of the ultimate meaning knows conventional truth. Now, upon hearing an explanation of conventional truth, you take it to be the truth of the ultimate meaning; therefore, you fall into error.

The Dharma of causes and conditions taught by the Buddhas is called the exceedingly profound truth of the ultimate meaning. Because this Dharma of causes and conditions has no intrinsic nature, I say that it is empty. If dharmas did not arise from conditions, each dharma should possess a fixed intrinsic nature.

If each dharma possessed a fixed intrinsic nature, the five skandhas should not possess the characteristics of arising and cessation. If the five skandhas neither arose nor ceased, there would be no impermanence; and if there were no impermanence, there would be no Noble Truth of suffering. If there were no Noble Truth of suffering, there would be no Noble Truth of the origin of suffering, which arises through causes and conditions.

If dharmas possessed a fixed intrinsic nature, there would be no Noble Truth of the cessation of suffering. Why? Because intrinsic nature does not change.

If there were no Noble Truth of the cessation of suffering, there would be no Noble Truth of the path leading to the cessation of suffering. Therefore, if one does not accept emptiness, there are no Four Noble Truths, and one cannot know suffering, abandon its origin, realize cessation, or cultivate the path. Since these would not exist, there would be no four fruits of the śramaṇa; and because there would be no four fruits of the śramaṇa, there would be neither those who have attained the fruits nor those progressing toward them.

If there were neither attainment nor progress toward attainment, there would be no Buddha. Because the Dharma of causes and conditions would be denied, there would be no Dharma; and because there would be no Dharma, there would be no Sangha. If there were no Buddha, Dharma, or Sangha, there would be no Three Jewels.

If there were no Three Jewels, conventional worldly dharmas would be destroyed. This certainly cannot be right. Therefore, all dharmas are empty.

Moreover, if dharmas possessed a fixed intrinsic nature, there would be no arising, no cessation, no wrongdoing or merit, and no karmic results of wrongdoing or merit; the world would eternally possess a single, unchanging characteristic. Therefore, one should know that dharmas have no intrinsic nature. If it is said that dharmas have no intrinsic nature of their own but exist through the intrinsic nature of another, this is untenable.

Why? If there is no intrinsic nature of their own, how could they exist through another's intrinsic nature? It is only because there is intrinsic nature of one's own that there can be another's intrinsic nature.

Furthermore, another's intrinsic nature is itself intrinsic nature. Why? Because another's intrinsic nature is that other's own intrinsic nature.

If intrinsic nature cannot be established, another's intrinsic nature also cannot be established. If neither intrinsic nature nor another's intrinsic nature can be established, then apart from intrinsic nature and another's intrinsic nature, where could any dharma exist? If existence cannot be established, nonexistence also cannot be established.

Therefore, when sought now, there is neither intrinsic nature nor another's intrinsic nature, neither existence nor nonexistence; all conditioned dharmas are empty. Because all conditioned dharmas are empty, unconditioned dharmas are also empty. If even conditioned and unconditioned dharmas are empty, how much more so the self?

IX—CONTEMPLATION OF CAUSE AND EFFECT

Furthermore, all dharmas are empty. Why? Because dharmas are intrinsically without nature and do not come from elsewhere either. As it is said:

Within the various conditions,

The effect ultimately cannot be found;

Nor does it come from elsewhere—

How, then, could an effect exist?

If the effect is absent within each individual condition, then it is also absent within their combination, as explained previously. Moreover, that effect does not come from elsewhere. If it came from elsewhere, it would not arise from causes and conditions, nor would it arise through the combined conjunction of the various conditions. If the effect is absent within the various conditions and does not come from elsewhere, it is therefore empty. Because the effect is empty, all conditioned dharmas are empty; because all conditioned dharmas are empty, unconditioned dharmas are also empty. If even conditioned and unconditioned dharmas are empty, how much more so the self?

X—CONTEMPLATION OF THE AGENT

Furthermore, all dharmas are empty. Why? Because production by oneself, production by another, production by both, and production without a cause cannot be found. As it is said:

Produced by oneself or produced by another,

Produced by both or produced without a cause—

None of these can be found;

Thus, suffering does not exist.

That suffering is produced by itself is untenable. Why? If it were self-produced, it would itself create its own substance; yet a thing cannot use itself to create itself, just as consciousness cannot cognize itself and a finger cannot touch itself. Therefore, it cannot be said to be self-produced. Production by another is also untenable. How could another produce suffering?

Question: The various conditions are called “other.” Because the various conditions produce suffering, it is called production by another. Why do you say that it is not produced by another?

Answer: If the conditions are called “other,” then suffering must be created by the conditions. Yet suffering arises from the conditions and thus is the nature of those conditions; why, then, should they be called “other”? Just as, in the case of an earthen pot, the clay is not called other; and again, just as, in the case of a golden bracelet, the gold is not called other; suffering is likewise. Since it arises from the conditions, the conditions cannot be called other. Furthermore, those conditions themselves have no self-nature and therefore are not autonomous. Thus, it cannot be said that the result arises from the conditions. As the Treatise on the Middle Way says:

A result arises from conditions,

Yet those conditions are not autonomous;

If the conditions are not autonomous,

How can conditions produce a result?

Thus, suffering is not made by another; nor is it made by oneself or made jointly, for these involve the two faults. If it is said that suffering is made by oneself and made by another, this incurs the faults of being made by oneself and made by another; therefore, suffering made jointly is also untenable. Nor is it tenable that suffering arises without a cause.

As stated in the sutra: “The naked ascetic Kassapa came and asked the Buddha: ‘Is suffering made by oneself?’ The Buddha remained silent and did not answer. ‘Blessed One! If suffering is not made by oneself, is it made by another?’ The Buddha again did not answer. ‘Blessed One! If so, is suffering made both by oneself and by another?’ The Buddha again did not answer. ‘Blessed One!

If so, is suffering made without cause or condition?’ The Buddha again did not answer.” Since the Buddha did not answer any of these four questions, one should know that suffering is necessarily empty.

Question: In that sutra, the Buddha did not say that suffering is empty. He spoke in that way only in accordance with the sentient being who was to be liberated.

Answer: That naked ascetic Kassapa held that a person is the cause of suffering and, believing in a self, said: “Good and evil are all created by the spirit. The spirit is eternally pure and has no suffering or affliction. Everything that knows and understands is the spirit.

The spirit creates good and evil, suffering and happiness, and then assumes various bodies.” Because of this wrong view, he asked the Buddha whether suffering is made by oneself. Therefore, the Buddha did not answer, for suffering is truly not made by a self. If the self were the cause of suffering, the self would be impermanent.

Why? If a dharma is a cause, and what arises from that cause, both are impermanent. If the self were impermanent, then offenses, merit, and their karmic results would all be annihilated, and the merit and reward of cultivating the holy life would also be nonexistent.

If the self were the cause of suffering, there would be no liberation. Why? If the self creates suffering, apart from the body there is no self that could create suffering, because there would be no body.

If it could create suffering without a body, then those who have attained liberation should also suffer; thus, there would be no liberation. Yet liberation truly exists. Therefore, suffering is not made by oneself.

Nor is suffering made by another, for apart from suffering, where could there be a person who creates suffering for another?

Furthermore, if suffering were made by another, this would mean that it was made by Ishvara. Since the question arose from such a wrong view, the Buddha likewise did not answer. Yet in truth it is not made by Ishvara. Why? Because the characteristics would contradict one another, just as a calf is itself a cow. If all things arose from Ishvara, they should all resemble Ishvara, for they would be his offspring. Furthermore, if Ishvara created sentient beings, he should not inflict suffering upon his children. Therefore, it should not be said that Ishvara creates suffering.

Question: Sentient beings arise from Ishvara, and suffering and happiness also arise from Ishvara. Because they do not know the cause of happiness, he gives them suffering.

Answer: If sentient beings are the children of Ishvara, he should use only happiness to prevent suffering and should not give them suffering. It should be that merely by making offerings to Ishvara, suffering would be extinguished and happiness attained. Yet in truth this is not so.

Beings themselves perform the causes and conditions of suffering and happiness and themselves undergo the corresponding results; these are not created by Ishvara. Furthermore, if he were sovereign, he should have no needs. One who has needs is not called sovereign.

If he has no needs, why would he transform himself to create the myriad things, like a child at play? Furthermore, if Ishvara created sentient beings, what in turn created Ishvara? If Ishvara created himself, that is untenable, for just as a thing cannot create itself, he could not be called sovereign.

Furthermore, if Ishvara were the creator, there would be no obstruction in the act of creation: whatever he thought, he could immediately accomplish. As the Ishvara Scripture says: Ishvara wished to create the myriad things, practiced various austerities, and thereupon produced the creatures that crawl upon their bellies. He again practiced austerities and produced the birds. He again practiced austerities and produced humans and devas. If, by practicing austerities, he first produced venomous creatures, next produced birds, and afterward produced humans and devas, one should know that sentient beings arise from the causes and conditions of karma and do not come into being through austerities.

Furthermore, if Ishvara created the myriad things, in what place did he create them? Was that dwelling place created by Ishvara or by someone else? If Ishvara created it, in what place did he create that place? In this way, there would be an infinite regress. If someone else created it, there would be two sovereign creators, which is untenable. Therefore, the myriad things in the world were not created by Ishvara. Furthermore, if Ishvara is the creator, why do people practice austerities and make offerings to him, wishing to please him so that their desires may be fulfilled? If their austerities are needed by him, one should know that he is not sovereign.

Furthermore, if Ishvara created the myriad things, then once he had created them at the beginning, their natures would have been fixed and should not undergo change: a horse would always be a horse, and a human would always be a human. Yet now beings undergo changes according to karma. Therefore, one should know that they were not created by Ishvara. Furthermore, if Ishvara were the creator, there would be neither offenses nor merit, neither good nor evil, neither excellence nor inferiority, since all would have been created by Ishvara. Yet offenses and merit truly exist. Therefore, they were not created by Ishvara.

Furthermore, if sentient beings arose from Ishvara, they should all revere and cherish him, just as children cherish their father. Yet in truth this is not so: some hate him and some love him. Therefore, one should know that they were not created by Ishvara. Furthermore, if Ishvara were the creator, why did he not create only happy people? One should know that beings arise from love and hatred; therefore, he is not sovereign, and because he is not sovereign, they were not created by Ishvara.

Furthermore, if Ishvara were the creator, sentient beings themselves should be unable to create anything. Yet sentient beings create various things through their own means. Therefore, one should know that they were not created by Ishvara. Furthermore, if Ishvara were the creator, good and evil, suffering and happiness would come of themselves without being produced. In that case, the worldly Dharma would be destroyed, and observing the precepts and cultivating the holy life would be entirely without benefit. Yet in truth this is not so. Therefore, one should know that they were not created by Ishvara.

Furthermore, if through the causes and conditions of meritorious karma Ishvara came to be exalted among sentient beings, then sentient beings who perform meritorious karma should likewise become exalted. Why, then, should Ishvara alone be honored? If he were sovereign without causes and conditions, all sentient beings should likewise be sovereign. Yet in truth this is not so. Therefore, one should know that they were not created by Ishvara. If Ishvara obtained his status from another, and that other in turn obtained it from another, there would be an infinite regress; and if there is an infinite regress, there is no cause.

For these various reasons, one should know that the myriad things do not arise from Ishvara and that Ishvara himself does not exist. Because the question whether suffering was made by another arose from such a wrong view, the Buddha likewise did not answer.

Nor is suffering made jointly, for this involves the two faults.

It arises through the conjunction of causes and conditions; therefore, it does not arise without a cause. Thus, the Buddha likewise did not answer.

Question: Thus, this sutra merely refutes four kinds of wrong views; it does not say that suffering is empty.

Answer: Although the Buddha said that suffering arises from various causes and conditions in order to refute the four kinds of wrong views, this itself is to declare emptiness. To say that suffering arises from various causes and conditions is to express the meaning of emptiness. Why? If it arises from various causes and conditions, it has no self-nature; to have no self-nature is precisely to be empty.

Just as suffering is empty, one should know that all conditioned dharmas, unconditioned dharmas, and sentient beings are likewise empty.

XI—CONTEMPLATION OF THE THREE TIMES

Furthermore, all dharmas are empty. Why? Because a cause and the dharma caused by it—the result—cannot be found to arise before, after, or simultaneously. As it is said:

Whether before, after, or together,

In every case, it cannot be established.

How, then, can a dharma

Arising from a cause be established?

That the cause exists first and the effect afterward is untenable. Why? If the effect subsequently arises from a prior cause, then when the cause exists first, the effect certainly does not yet exist; of what, then, could it be the cause?

If the effect exists first and the cause afterward, then the effect has already been established when there is no cause; what use would there be for a cause? If the cause and effect exist simultaneously, there is likewise no causal relation, just as the two horns of an ox arise simultaneously and the left and right horns cannot be causes of one another. In the same way, the cause is not the cause of the effect, and the effect is not the effect of the cause, because they arise simultaneously.

Therefore, cause and effect cannot be apprehended in any of the three times. Question: Your refutation of cause and effect in the three times is likewise untenable. If the refutation exists first and what is refuted afterward, then before there is anything to be refuted, what does that refutation refute?

If what is refuted exists first and the refutation afterward, then what is to be refuted has already been established; what use would there be for a refutation? If the refutation and what is refuted exist simultaneously, there is likewise no causal relation, just as the two horns of an ox arise simultaneously and the left and right horns do not cause one another. In the same way, the refutation does not cause what is refuted, and what is refuted does not cause the refutation.

Answer: Your distinction between refutation and what is refuted has the same fault. If all dharmas are empty, there is neither refutation nor anything refuted; your assertion of their nonexistence thus establishes precisely what I maintain. If I asserted that refutation and what is refuted definitely exist, you could raise this objection. Since I do not assert that what is refuted definitely exists, you should not raise this objection.

Question: The eye perceives causes that precede their effects, as when a potter makes a jar. There are also causes that come afterward, as when a disciple has a teacher: only after instructing the disciple does one later come to be known as the disciple’s teacher. There are also simultaneous causes, such as a lamp and its light. Therefore, the claim that prior, subsequent, and simultaneous causes cannot be apprehended is untenable.

Answer: The analogy of a potter making a jar is invalid. Why? If the jar does not yet exist, of what could the potter be the cause? As with the potter, no prior cause whatsoever can be apprehended. Therefore, your assertion that the cause precedes and the effect follows does not accord with reason. A subsequent cause is likewise impossible to apprehend: if there is not yet a disciple, who could be the teacher? Therefore, a subsequent cause also cannot be apprehended. If you claim that there are simultaneous causes, such as a lamp and its light, this too is a dubious causal relation. Since the lamp and its light arise simultaneously, how could they cause one another?

For reasons such as these, one should know that all conditioned dharmas, unconditioned dharmas, and sentient beings are also empty.

XII. CONTEMPLATION OF ARISING

Furthermore, all dharmas are empty. Why? Because arising cannot be apprehended in what has arisen, what has not arisen, or what is arising. What has arisen does not arise; what has not arisen also does not arise; and what is arising likewise does not arise. As it is said:

What has arisen certainly does not arise;

What has not arisen also does not arise.

Apart from what has arisen and has not arisen,

What is arising likewise does not arise.

“What has arisen” means that the effect has emerged. “What has not arisen” means that it has not yet emerged. “What is arising” means that the effect, not previously existent, has just begun to emerge but is not yet complete.

Here, what has arisen does not arise, because it has already arisen and therefore does not arise again. Why? Because this would entail the fault of an infinite regress, of doing again what has already been done.

If the first arising, having arisen, were to produce a second arising, and the second arising, having arisen, were to produce a third arising, and the third arising, having arisen, were to produce a fourth arising—just as the first arising would be followed by a second—then arising would continue without end. This is untenable. Therefore, what has arisen does not arise.

Furthermore, if you claim that what has arisen arises again, requiring another arising to cause it to arise, then that arising would itself arise while it had not yet arisen. This is untenable. Why?

Regarding the first arising before it has arisen, would there then be two kinds of arising: arising after it has already arisen and arising before it has arisen? Thus, what you previously declared to be definite has now become indefinite. Just as what has been done should not be done again, what has been burned should not be burned again, and what has been realized should not be realized again, so too what has arisen should not arise again.

Therefore, a dharma that has arisen does not arise. A dharma that has not arisen also does not arise. Why?

Because it is not conjoined with arising, and because this would entail the fault that everything which has not arisen would arise. If a dharma has not arisen, then it has not arisen. If arising could exist apart from arising, then doing could exist apart from doing, going apart from going, and eating apart from eating.

This would destroy conventional dharmas, which is untenable. Therefore, a dharma that has not arisen does not arise. Furthermore, if a dharma that has not arisen could arise, then all dharmas that have not arisen should arise.

For example, all ordinary beings who have not yet given rise to unsurpassed, complete, perfect enlightenment should give rise to it; arhats whose afflictions have not arisen, without destroying them, should give rise to them; and a horse’s horns, which have not arisen, should arise. This is untenable. Therefore, one should not say that what has not arisen arises.

Question: What has not arisen does arise, as when causes and conditions come together and an activity is then produced. When all the necessary means are complete, this is what it means for what has not arisen to arise; it does not mean that everything which has not arisen will arise. Therefore, you should not make the arising of everything that has not arisen into an objection.

Answer: If a dharma arises when the necessary means and various conditions newly come together to produce it, then within this process, what previously definitely existed does not arise; what previously did not exist also does not arise; and what both existed and did not exist likewise does not arise. When arising is sought among these three alternatives, it cannot be apprehended, as explained above. Therefore, a dharma that has not arisen does not arise.

What is arising likewise does not arise. Why? Because this would entail the faults of arising arising again and of what has not arisen arising. In a dharma that is arising, the portion already arisen does not arise, as explained above, and the portion not yet arisen does not arise, as explained above. Furthermore, if there were a state of arising apart from arising itself, then the state of arising should arise; but in truth, apart from arising itself, there is no state of arising. Therefore, what is arising likewise does not arise.

Furthermore, if someone says that what is arising arises, there would be two arisings: first, the arising that constitutes the state of arising; and second, the arising of what is in the state of arising. Since there are not two dharmas, how can one say that there are two arisings? Therefore, what is arising likewise does not arise.

Furthermore, before arising exists, there is no state of arising. Where, then, could arising occur? If arising has no place in which to occur, there is no arising. Therefore, what is arising likewise does not arise.

Thus, what has arisen, what has not arisen, and what is arising are all untenable. Therefore, the arising of dharmas is not established. If arising is not established, abiding and cessation are likewise not established.

Because arising, abiding, and cessation are not established, conditioned dharmas are also not established. Because conditioned dharmas are not established, unconditioned dharmas are also not established. Because conditioned and unconditioned dharmas are not established, sentient beings are also not established.

Therefore, one should know that all dharmas are unborn and ultimately empty and quiescent.