物不遷正量證

Surely, even praise is not enough to set forth its lofty beauty; and even refutation only serves the more to expand the realm of its subtle and wondrous discourse. The Treatise on the Immutability of Things by Venerable Sengzhao[1]—its meaning is profound and far-reaching, its words are elegant, its prose is concise, and its sense is all-encompassing; it is not only a compass for students but also the very essence of the ocean-treasury[2]. For several thousand years no one has been able to grasp the master's mode of discernment, and so they took the entire essential purport of "the emptiness of nature and the immutability of things" and made of it the fixed view of "settled, deathless permanence."

Chan Master Nguyệt Xuyên Trừng, grieving that this exquisite and profound meaning had been buried; sorrowing for those benighted ones difficult to instruct, and knowing that explanation would be of no avail to the despondent. Therefore the Chan master chose the method of refutation in order to bring forth and exalt the excellent beauty and subtle wonder of this treatise. This is called speaking the upright as though it were the reverse—using a wedge to remove a wedge. Even so, does he not indeed say this very thing? Let us now attempt to discuss it!

Master Trừng's compilation of refutations, though it amounts to no fewer than several tens of thousands of words, yet when we examine its essential point, it is merely the use of the "fallacious reason." Now I shall discuss only this essential point, while other matters should be passed over in brief. The "fallacious reason" is nothing else: it is that the Sūtras hold that all dharmas are "empty of nature," and so they are called "immutable"; whereas Venerable Sengzhao holds that all things have an "abiding nature," and so they are called "immutable." According to the intent of Master Trừng's refutation, "the emptiness of nature" and "the abiding of nature" are like water and fire.

But in truth, "the emptiness of nature" and "the abiding of nature" differ only in name, while in substance they are not different. The reason it is called "the emptiness of nature" is that the self-nature of form is itself empty—it is not that form is annihilated in order to become empty—and therefore it is called "the emptiness of nature." As the Prajñā Sūtra states: "Form is precisely emptiness, emptiness is precisely form." The reason it is called "the abiding of nature" is that all dharmas eternally abide in the "true emptiness, the real nature," and therefore it is called "the abiding of nature." As the Lotus Sūtra states:

This dharma abides in the dharma-position,

The marks of the world eternally abide.

If one is able to see in this way, then this is precisely the refuting reason of Master Trừng, and precisely the wondrous purport established by Venerable Sengzhao—how could there be admitted any point of difference or sameness within it? Yet, because Master Trừng feigned ignorance, he therefore wrongly explained "the abiding of nature" as follows: A thing of former times abides in former times and does not shift to the present; while a thing of the present abides in the very present and does not return to former times. And so too the new and the old, the young and the aged, the formed and the decayed, cause and effect, and so forth, of a thing—all abide in their own positions, and therefore it is called the abiding of nature. Alas! What a grievous injustice!

If the meaning of "the abiding of nature" were truly such, then setting aside Venerable Sengzhao's meaning of "immutability," would the tenet of the Lotus Sūtra—"This dharma abides in the dharma-position; the real mark eternally abides"—then be identical to the heterodox view of "deathless permanence" and to the "six categories establishing difference" of the Vaiśeṣika school? If it were so, then surely it would be the doctrine of the Immutability of Things held by certain masters of recent times, and not the doctrine of the Immutability of Things held by Venerable Sengzhao! Therefore Master Trừng said: "I do not refute Lord Sengzhao; the one who refutes is Lord Sengzhao himself!"—and indeed there is good reason for this!

Nonetheless, the passage: "A thing of former times abides in former times and does not shift to the present; a thing of the present abides in the present and does not return to former times, and so forth," is the very text within Venerable Sengzhao's own treatise. Here he uses the term "immutability" to explain the principle of "the abiding of nature." How can one be permitted to split it apart in order to refute it? For these words have never in truth differed, and the reason for speaking thus is the fear that they have never been the same.

Venerable Sengzhao says: "A thing of former times is of itself situated in former times—it is not that it is brought from the present into former times. A thing of the present is of itself situated in the present—it is not that it is shifted from former times into the present." These all together illumine the wondrous purport of "emptiness." But Master Trừng mistakenly gave rise to the one-sided attachment of "fixed difference and deathless permanence."

And so what wonder is there in saying that the abiding of nature and "the emptiness of nature" are not like water and fire! What wonder in saying that the abiding of nature does not contradict the emptiness of nature! To say "a thing of former times is of itself in former times" is to speak of the mark that presently exists; to say "it is not that it returns from the present into former times" is to speak of the substance that is silently still.

The substance that is silently still is the abiding of nature; the mark that exists is the wondrous function. Because it is wondrous, therefore though it exists it is ever silently still. Because the nature is empty, therefore though it is silently still it is ever illuminating.

This is in every case to converge emptiness and existence upon a single purport; to gather substance and function into a single utterance. Taking this intent to explain "the abiding of nature," then "the abiding of nature" is the true cause of immutability. So then, how could it be the same as what Master Trừng says: "The abiding of nature is fixed permanence, and each abiding in each position is fixed difference"?

Therefore the Nirvāṇa Sūtra calls the transformation-body precisely the true; the Lotus Sūtra holds that all marks are wondrous. The Treatise on the Immutability of Things likewise states: "To speak of going is not necessarily going; to speak of abiding is not necessarily abiding." "One can only apprehend it with the mind, and not seek it through phenomena"—thus Venerable Sengzhao has already made it clear.

Furthermore, how can one cling to the traces of things in order to interrogate the principle of the emptiness of nature and the immutability of things?

Master Trừng says: "Sengzhao seeks a thing of former times. He has said: 'In former times it was never absent; in the present it has never existed.' Then this thing existed of old and is absent now." What a grievous wrong, O Master Trừng! Is this indeed the intent of Master Sengzhao?

Venerable Sengzhao only says: "In former times it was never absent," but does not say that it definitely exists; he only says: "In the present it has never existed," but does not say that it definitely is absent. For to say "never absent" is in order to remove the "emptiness" of the view of nihility and the view of annihilation—it is not to grasp at existence as in the view of being and the view of permanence. To say "never existed" is to remove the existence of the view of being and the view of permanence—it is not to grasp at absence as in the view of annihilation and the view of nihility.

How could it be like those refuters who take "existence" to be the existence of existence, and take "absence" to be the absence of absence? Therefore the treatise states: "Where they arrive has never differed; what they see has never been the same; to go against it is called obstruction, to go along with it is called penetration." So then, what the treatise calls "a thing of former times has never had existence or absence" is originally without penetration or obstruction; that penetration and obstruction arise solely from the mind's going against or going along, in human beings alone.

The Treatise on the Immutability of Things states: "Effect does not coexist with cause; it is through cause that there is effect. Because it is through cause that there is effect, the cause of old does not perish. Because effect does not coexist with cause, the cause does not shift into the present." Not perishing and not coming over—these are clearly the essential purport of immutability.

But Master Trừng objects in turn: "If the cause of old does not perish and does not change, then sentient beings would eternally have no principle by which to become Buddhas." This is all because Master Trừng has misunderstood the intent of the treatise, and so he reproaches Venerable Sengzhao with fault.

Venerable Sengzhao says: "Effect does not coexist with cause," which means that at the very moment the effect manifests, the mark of the cause has already perished. To say "through cause there is effect" means that although the effect is not the cause, the function of the cause is in no way lost. Therefore he says: "Through cause there is effect; the cause does not perish in former times." This too is what the Vimalakīrti Sūtra calls: "Though the nature is silently still, that which is wrought is not lost." Because "effect does not coexist with cause," therefore though it exists it does not exist. Because "through cause there is effect," therefore though it is absent it is not absent. "Neither existent nor absent"—this is clearly the essential purport of immutability.

Must there definitely be a thing that does not perish and does not change before it can be called immutable? Must one hold that the cause of old definitely undergoes annihilation before it can be called "the emptiness of nature"? If one insists that only after the cause perishes does the effect then arise, how is this different from hoping for a dead hen to give voice to its crowing, or seeking a rotted seedling to bear fruit!

Knowing that by the principle of the cause of old neither perishing nor changing sentient beings forever do not become Buddhas, then if the cause of old has become annihilated, sentient beings likewise would have no principle by which to become Buddhas! This is all because Master Trừng knows only that the point of the awl is sharp, but does not know that the head of the chisel is square.

Again it is said: since there is cause and effect, this is impermanence. Impermanence means shifting, altering, transforming—so how can it be called "the immutability of things"? It is because Master Trừng does not know that the permanent and the impermanent, the mutable and the immutable, are clearly not two dharmas, and only because of delusion does he take them to be different.

If one can know precisely the essential meaning of impermanence, then one can awaken to the principle of the emptiness of nature. Having awakened to the emptiness of nature, then one forever abides at rest in the abiding of nature and sees that things do not shift or alter. Thus immutability, the abiding of nature, impermanence, and the emptiness of nature—though four utterances—combine into one.

Therefore the Sūtra of Perfect Enlightenment states: "To know they are sky-flowers[3] is not to revolve in cyclic flow." Hence each single utterance of Venerable Sengzhao necessarily cuts off "absence and existence" at the incipient pivot[4], and freely penetrates "the real and the conventional" beyond language. Moreover, the chapters and commentaries must rely upon language in order to eliminate error—how could one follow along with it to seek out faults?

Master Trừng deliberately points to a deer and calls it a horse—but would Venerable Sengzhao then consent to submit? Nonetheless, all these matters are Master Trừng's use of skillful means, feigning ignorance—it is the method of using a bandit to attack a bandit, using error to remove error. Is it indeed truly so?

Someone says: "From the time Master Trừng refuted that treatise until now, the great elders and venerable patriarchs of the land who have refuted what Master Trừng refuted number some scores of persons. Why is it that they have all been unable to stop up Master Trừng's mouth?" But each round of deliberation has only served to make the style of Master Trừng's argumentation the more keen; and likewise to make the faults attributed to Venerable Sengzhao increase the more.

Thus, is it that the understanding of the venerable patriarchs is truly not the equal of Master Trừng's, or that the meaning of immutability has some error that definitely cannot be remedied? Neither of these is the case at all! For those scores of venerable patriarchs are all great beings who have forgotten name and fame, who for the sake of the Dharma and for the sake of beings, seeing that the meaning of Master Trừng's refutation had points not fully complete, and that this master's understanding had points not yet thoroughly clear, therefore each one pointed it out so that Master Trừng might elaborate it further.

How could it truly be that, their learning being insufficient, their understanding falls short? How could the meaning of "immutability" have some error? If it were not so, then why is it that the venerable patriarchs have only a heart of compassion for Venerable Sengzhao but no means of aiding Venerable Sengzhao?

Moreover, the science of Logic (Hetuvidyā) has rules for refuting and establishing—it is the excellent method for refuting the false. Master Trừng relied upon it as the foundation to refute Venerable Sengzhao's treatise. But the masters all passed it over and did not discuss it.

How is this different from wishing to rescue the army of a million at the city of Changping, yet using empty hands to resist the mighty hosts of Qin? How is this different from Gongshu, just as he takes up his tool to straighten the timber, having Lilou—presuming upon his keen sight—obstinately remonstrate to stop him? Although Lilou's keen sight would surely not mistake the fine and flawed points of the timber, yet this would not be that which Gongshu inwardly submits to, nor would it be the timber itself knowing its own nature.

To aid Sengzhao by this method—not only can a few venerable patriarchs not accomplish it, but I fear that were one to grind the great-thousandfold world into dust, and each mote of dust were a venerable patriarch, and each venerable patriarch had mouths as numerous as those motes of dust to deliberate, it would only make the faults of Venerable Sengzhao increase the more, and would still be insufficient to subdue Master Trừng's mode of argumentation.

I know that none of this is the intent of the venerable patriarchs. They all feign deafness and feign muteness because they wish together to bring forth the excellent beauty and profundity of the principle of immutability.

Master Trừng has used Logic to refute the Thesis of Venerable Sengzhao. Now I too borrow Logic to establish the meaning of immutability. This is called borrowing a hand to throw a punch, following the road to return home. The Thesis and Reason that Master Trừng establishes and refutes are fully set out in his refutation-treatise, and they are all errors that Master Trừng has feignedly set up.

Now I shall briefly cite one item to attempt a discussion. The first is "contradiction with the proper mark of the dharma." The Reason: "Seeking a thing of former times in former times, then in former times it was never absent; seeking a thing of former times in the present, then in the present it has never existed." Then it existed of old yet is absent now. This Reason has shifted over to the example of the dissimilar class, and therefore commits the fault of "contradiction with the proper mark of the dharma." This is truly incorrect.

For according to the method of Logic, "self-acknowledgment" is the borrowing of words to eliminate fault. Venerable Sengzhao does not say "it exists" but says "it has never been absent"; he does not say "it is absent" but says "it has never existed." These are two utterances converging into one—absence and existence mutually penetrating. To say "never absent" is in order to remove the view of annihilation for people—how could it then grasp at existence and be entangled in permanence?

To say "never absent" is to bar people's mind that grasps at permanence—how could it fall into "absence" so as to admit annihilation? Thus one knows that the phrase "never" is precisely the borrowing of words to eliminate fault. In this way the three members—Thesis, Reason, and Example—of Venerable Sengzhao are originally perfect, and so the faults that the refuter sets forth are truly displayed in vain. The remaining faults of the "contradictory reason" are all likewise the same as this, and so I shall not cite many.

Nonetheless, let me now proceed to argue according to what Master Trừng establishes. But in sum, all these are not the original intent of Venerable Sengzhao. If one establishes according to the treatise, then one must say:

Thesis: A thing (the subject) is immutable (the predicate).

Reason: Because each one abides in the nature of true emptiness, which is itself silently still.

Similar example: Like rivers and streams contending in their flow, yet the current remains calm and moist.

Dissimilar example: Like a great flood surging and welling up—that is, the waves move in accordance with the wind.

This argument has clear textual basis—it is precisely the "true establishment." So then, the thing is the thing of the nature; the nature is precisely the nature of the thing. Raise a single thing, and the whole of that thing is precisely the nature. Speak of the nature, and all things are complete therein.

Therefore, the moment one holds up a single thread of cloth or a single strand of hair, one suddenly awakens to the original mind; one blows out a single lamp, and the great-thousandfold world blazes with light. To speak of the abiding of nature in this way—then the Lotus Sūtra has the true words "This dharma abides in the dharma-position." To speak of the emptiness of nature in this way—then the Prajñā Sūtra utters the teaching "Form is itself emptiness, emptiness is itself form"; the Avataṃsaka Sūtra says "Each one does not come over to the other"; the Vimalakīrti Sūtra says "The action-cause is not lost." These are the passages of scripture that Master Trừng cited as evidence in order to refute the tenet of immutability.

I too rely upon these very passages to demonstrate the meaning of immutability. Is this not what is meant by "that which is wrought has never differed; that which is seen has never been the same"? Even so, how could Master Trừng truly have any point of difference?

For there is this treatise, but there is no such refutation. Nonetheless, I too have looked it over only cursorily, like the masters of recent times, and so I say: "Surely, even praise is not the equal of refutation, but one need only attend to how that refutation is carried out." Therefore one should know that Master Trừng's refutation-treatise is not a refutation of the doctrine of immutability; on the contrary, it explains immutability all the more thoroughly.

Could the reader of the Treatise on the Immutability of Things possibly pass it over? So then, the meaning of immutability must surely be the wondrous principle of the emptiness of nature in the Great Vehicle.

Why then does National Teacher Qingliang Chengguan also say: "It overlaps loosely with the ordinary view of being held by the Lesser Vehicle"? The words of National Teacher Qingliang are already clear—it is only the reader who is deluded. For since he says "overlaps loosely," it is surely not truly the same. It is like saying jade-stone overlaps loosely with jade, or the eye of a fish overlaps loosely with a pearl. Are pearl and jade truly the eye of a fish and jade-stone? The reason National Teacher Qingliang says "overlaps loosely" is his fear that students would mistakenly identify it with the masters of recent times. How can one do the reverse, and take this to prove that it is an error?

Alas! Relying upon the meanings set forth above, one knows that what National Teacher Qingliang proclaimed before, what Chan Master Nguyệt Xuyên Trừng harmonized after, and even the venerable patriarchs who assailed it from the side—in their words they differed like Hu and Yue, but in their intent inner and outer mutually accord with one another. Yet all of it is essentially the wish together to bring forth the beauty and profundity of the principle of immutability. Therefore I too, for the sake of this, offer my demonstration.

Notes:

[1] Sengzhao 僧肇 (384–414): an eminent monk of China, who lived during the Eastern Jin period, of the Zhang family, a native of Chang'an.

[2] Ocean-treasury 海藏: a metaphor for the Buddha's preaching of the Dharma. The great ocean of the Buddha-Dharma does not discriminate between good and bad, nor does it divide the sentient from the insentient; all are contained within the Buddha-Dharma, and therefore the ocean is used as a metaphor.

[3] Sky-flowers 空華 (S: Khapuṣpa): blossoms appearing in empty space. In empty space there are originally no flowers, but because of a person's diseased eyes, they falsely see illusory blossoms manifesting. The Buddha often uses this term as a metaphor for a realm that is originally unreal; because of mistaken understanding one sees a permanently abiding self, or a real substantial entity—this is called "sky-flowers."

[4] Incipient pivot 機先: a term of Chan usage. The omen that precedes the turning-point of things. The Chan school borrows this term to describe the state in which a single thought has not yet stirred, a single word has not yet issued forth; that is, before we have given rise to discriminating cognition. This is a term synonymous with "before heaven and earth had come to be."