中論

CHAPTER FIFTEEN:

EXAMINATION OF EXISTENCE AND NONEXISTENCE

(To suppose that) intrinsic nature exists within conditions is erroneous, (because) an intrinsic nature that arises from conditions would itself be a conditioned dharma subject to arising and cessation (*a fabricated dharma: a dharma that has been produced, referring to conditioned arising and cessation).

How could it make sense for intrinsic nature to be something produced (for intrinsic nature to be a conditioned dharma subject to arising and cessation)? Intrinsic nature is precisely that which is not produced by causes and conditions and does not depend upon another dharma for its formation.

If a dharma has no intrinsic nature, how could it possess other-nature? For intrinsic nature in relation to other-nature is itself also called other-nature.

Apart from intrinsic nature and other-nature, how could there be dharmas? Dharmas could be established only if intrinsic nature and other-nature existed.

If existence (the real existence of intrinsic nature) cannot be established, how could nonexistence (the absence of intrinsic nature) be established? Because of existence (intrinsic nature), a dharma is said to exist; when that existence (intrinsic nature) is destroyed, this is called nonexistence (the absence of intrinsic nature).

Those who perceive (and cling to) existence (intrinsic nature) and nonexistence (the absence of intrinsic nature), and perceive intrinsic nature and other-nature in this way, do not perceive the true meaning of the Buddha-Dharma.

The Buddha was able to eliminate both existence and nonexistence, as the sutra recounts in the Blessed One’s instruction to the Venerable Katyayana to remain apart from both nonexistence and existence.

If a dharma truly possessed intrinsic nature, it should not subsequently undergo alteration. If intrinsic nature still bore the characteristic of alteration, this would be entirely unreasonable.

If a dharma truly possessed intrinsic nature, how could it undergo alteration? And if a dharma truly lacked intrinsic nature, how could it undergo alteration?

To determine that things exist is to fall into eternalism, while to determine that they do not exist is immediately to fall into annihilationism. Therefore, the wise should not cling to existence or nonexistence.

If dharmas possessed a fixed intrinsic nature, they would not become nonexistent but would be permanent; and if they existed before but do not exist now, that would be annihilation.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN:

EXAMINATION OF BONDAGE AND LIBERATION

If it is maintained that formations come and go (transmigrating through birth and death), there can be no coming and going in what is permanent. Nor can there be coming and going in what is impermanent; sentient beings are likewise (*meaning that there can be no phenomenon of coming and going within the round of birth and death).

If it is conceived that sentient beings transmigrate, then even by exhaustively applying the five modes of analysis to the five skandhas, the dhatus, and the ayatanas (*form is not the self; apart from form there is no self; without being separate from form there is no self; within the self there is no form; within form there is no self), one cannot find anyone who transmigrates through birth and death.

If one passes from this body to another body, then while transmigrating one would be without bodily form; and if that person had no bodily form, naturally there could be no transmigration.

If the formations were destroyed, this would be entirely untenable; and if sentient beings were destroyed, that too would be unreasonable.

The characteristics of arising and cessation belonging to the formations neither bind nor release; and sentient beings, as already explained, are in themselves neither bound nor liberated.

If the body is said to be bondage, then when the body exists it is naturally not bound (*because the body of the five skandhas exists first and bondage comes afterward). Without a body there is likewise no bondage. Where, then, could bondage exist?

If bondage existed prior to the object of bondage, that object should already have been bound. Yet in reality no prior bondage exists. Moreover, the other related aspects have all been answered in the discussion of what has moved, what is moving, and what has not yet moved (Chapter Two).

One who is bound is not liberated, and one who is not bound has no need of liberation. Only when there is someone bound could there be someone liberated; bondage and liberation would therefore necessarily occur simultaneously.

“If I do not appropriate any dharma, I shall naturally realize nirvana.” Whoever clings in this way will be subjected to bondage (*because clinging to the attainment of nirvana still binds one).

There is no separate, independent realm of nirvana apart from or beyond birth and death. Such is the meaning of ultimate reality; how could there be discrimination within it?

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN:

EXAMINATION OF KARMA

Whoever is able to subdue and govern the mind and perform benevolent deeds that benefit sentient beings thereby plants the seeds of karmic recompense for two lives (this life and the next). (Another translation: Whoever is able to subdue the mind and do what benefits sentient beings is called one who performs benevolent deeds and plants karmic recompense for two lives.)

The Buddha taught that there are two kinds of karma: intention and that which arises from intention (*intention and what is born of intention. Intention is a mental factor whose function is to create; it can impel mental activity and initiate bodily action and verbal speech. Intention is the will that leads from thought and deliberation to a decision to act; therefore it is the motive force of karma. Because the activity of the mental factor of intention can manifest as bodily actions and speech, these are called that which arises from the mental factor of intention). The sutras separately distinguish and explain the particular characteristics of each kind of karma.

The Buddha taught that intentional karma, or volition, is what is called mental karma, while that which arises from intention is bodily and verbal karma.

Bodily karma and verbal karma, performed and nonperformed karma: within these four matters there are both wholesome and unwholesome kinds.

Merit arises from their active exercise; transgression arises in the same way. Together with intention, these constitute seven dharmas (*1. bodily karma, 2. verbal karma, 3. performed karma, 4. nonperformed karma, 5. wholesome karma, 6. unwholesome karma, and 7. intentional karma). These seven dharmas make clear the characteristics of karma.

If karma (its force) remained until its recompense was experienced, that karma would be permanent. If karma did not remain but ceased, there would be no karma; and without karma, how could recompense arise?

It is like the continuity of a sprout and so forth: all arise from a seed, and from that continuity the fruit arises. Apart from the seed, there is no continuity.

From the seed there is continuity, and from continuity there is fruit. The seed comes first and the fruit afterward, without annihilation and without permanence.

Likewise, from the initial moment of mind, mental dharmas arise in continuity, and from that comes the result. Apart from mind, there is no continuity.

From mind there is continuity, and from continuity there is the result. Karma comes first and the result afterward, without annihilation and without permanence.

Merit may be accomplished through the path of the ten pure karmas (*the ten wholesome deeds, pure and undefiled). The five kinds of sensual pleasure in two lives (this life and the next) are the recompense of pure karma.

If you (the non-Buddhist interlocutor) give rise to such discriminations, many grave errors follow. Therefore, the meaning of what you have presented is not as you claim.

Now the meaning of karmic recompense that accords with karma (*recompense attracted and received in accordance with karmic force), which the Buddhas, pratyekabuddhas, sravakas, sages, and noble ones have praised together, shall once again be explained.

The dharma of nonloss (referring to the uninterrupted continuity of karmic force) is like a contractual certificate of debt, while karma is like the money or property owed. The nature of the indebted party is indeterminate; when distinguished, there are four kinds (1. karma bound to the desire realm, 2. karma bound to the form realm, 3. karma bound to the formless realm, and 4. unconditioned karma).

Karmic force cannot be eliminated through the path of seeing (seeing the truths). It can be eliminated and brought to an end only through cultivating the path (the path of reflection). Therefore, through this dharma of nonloss, karma leads to recompense.

If seeing the truths (the path of seeing) could eliminate (bring to an end) this continuity of nonloss, similar karma would nevertheless still arise. This would entail many errors and would destroy the principle of karma.

All karmic formations, whether similar or dissimilar, belong to a single realm at the moment a body has newly been assumed; at that time only one recompense arises.

These two kinds of karma (according to Bhavaviveka: performed and nonperformed karma; according to Pingala: light and heavy karma; another teaching says similar and dissimilar karma) experience their recompense in this present life. Or it may be said that recompense has already been exhausted (recompense includes preliminary recompense, resultant recompense, and residual recompense), yet the karma still remains.

If it is only after deliverance is attained (the four fruits and entry into nirvana) that karmic force is extinguished, or only after death that it is extinguished, then a careful distinction must be made between contaminated and uncontaminated karma (*when one realizes the four fruits and enters nirvana, one undergoes no further existence; karma is completely exhausted and is therefore called uncontaminated. When a sentient being dies because a particular recompense has ended, the karma of that single lifetime is extinguished; but because further existence is still undergone, it is called contaminated).

Even though it is empty, it is not annihilated; even though it exists, it is not permanent. Karma and its recompense are never lost: this is the Buddha’s teaching.

Karmas are originally unborn, because they possess no determinate nature (no fixed intrinsic nature). Karmas are also not extinguished, because they were never born.

If karma possessed intrinsic nature, it would necessarily be permanent. What is not created would also be called karma, because what is permanent and abiding cannot be created.

If karma existed without ever having been created, and one could still incur an offense without creating karma, it would be as though one incurred the fault of impurity without ever abandoning the pure life of brahmacarya.

This would destroy all worldly principles, customs, and conventions of language; there would then be no distinction whatsoever between committing transgressions and producing merit.

If karma were something determinate (fixed karma), possessing its own intrinsic nature, then even after its recompense had been experienced, it would have to be experienced again.

If worldly karmas arise from afflictions, yet the afflictions are not truly existent, how could karma be truly existent?

Afflictions and karmic recompense are described as the causes and conditions of embodied life (*because embodied life comes into being through the painful results of karma as its formative causes and conditions). Afflictions and karmas are themselves empty (without intrinsic nature); how much more so embodied lives?

Though obscured by ignorance and bound by the fetters of craving (the tight bonds of condensed sensual craving), the agent (the maker of karma), the action (the karma produced), and the experiencer (the one who experiences recompense) (*the three collectively called the original agent) are neither identical nor different.

Karma does not arise from conditions, nor does it arise from what is not conditions. Therefore, there is no one capable of bringing karmic recompense into being.

If there is no karma and no agent who creates karma, how could there be karma that produces recompense? And if there is no recompense, how could there be anyone who experiences recompense?

It is like the Blessed One using spiritual powers to conjure an illusory person, and that illusory person in turn conjuring another illusory person. The first illusory person is called the agent (the one who creates), and the illusory person that is created is called karma (the action itself). Afflictions and karma, the agent and recompense, are all like illusions and dreams, like a mirage (*in a desert, a mirage gives us the impression of seeing water ahead) and the reverberation of an echo.

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN:

EXAMINATION OF DHARMAS

(Atma-pariksa)

If the self is the five skandhas, then the self is precisely something subject to arising and cessation. If the self is different from the five skandhas, then it does not possess the characteristics of the five skandhas.

If there is no so-called self, how could there be the attributes of self (what belongs to the self)? Because the self and the attributes of self are eliminated, this is called realizing the wisdom of no-self. One who realizes the wisdom of no-self is called one who truly contemplates.

One who realizes the wisdom of no-self is exceedingly rare. Because inner mind and external objects, the self and the attributes of self (what belongs to “me”), are all utterly extinguished without the slightest remainder, all appropriations (the appropriations of a doctrine of self, sensual desire, views, and precepts and observances) are immediately extinguished as well. When appropriation ceases, the body ceases.

Because karma and afflictions cease, this is called liberation. Karma and afflictions are not truly existent; once one penetrates emptiness, all conceptual proliferation is immediately and entirely extinguished. The Buddhas sometimes teach self and sometimes teach no-self, yet they definitively affirm that within the true characteristic of all dharmas there is neither no-self nor that which is not self (neither selflessness nor non-selflessness).

The true characteristic of all dharmas cuts off the activities of mind and language (*thought and speech). It neither arises nor ceases and is quiescent like nirvana. Everything that is real and unreal, both real and unreal, neither unreal nor not unreal—that is the teaching of the Buddhas.

It is personally known and directly experienced, not understood through faith dependent upon another’s explanations. Quiescent, free from conceptual proliferation, without difference or discrimination—this is the true characteristic. If dharmas arise from conditions, they are neither identical with their causes nor different from their causes (neither identical nor separate); therefore this is called the true characteristic.

Neither annihilated nor permanent, neither identical nor different, neither permanent nor annihilated—this is the ambrosial teaching of immortality taught by the Buddhas for the liberation of beings. If no Buddha appears in the world and the Buddha-Dharma has been extinguished (*meaning after the Buddha-Dharma has disappeared but before another Buddha manifests), the wisdom of the pratyekabuddhas will arise from seclusion (freedom from attachment to dharmas).

CHAPTER NINETEEN:

EXAMINATION OF TIME

If the present and future exist in dependence upon the past, then the present and future should already exist within the past.

If the present and future do not exist within past time, how could it be said that the present and future exist in dependence upon the past?

Without depending upon past time, there can be no future or present time. Thus, both times do not exist.

Through this meaning, it should be understood that the remaining two times, as well as concepts of upper, middle, and lower; identity and difference; and so forth—all these dharmas do not exist.

A period of time that remains still and unchanging cannot be found. Nor can a period of time that is always shifting and moving be found. If time cannot be found, how could the characteristics of time be discussed?

Time is known in dependence upon objects (and their alteration); apart from objects, how could time exist? Objects themselves do not exist—how much less could time exist? (If objects do not exist, how much less could time exist?)

CHAPTER TWENTY:

EXAMINATION OF CAUSE AND EFFECT

If an effect arises from the conjunction of conditions, then it must already exist within that conjunction; why, then, would it need to depend upon the conjunction in order to arise?

If no effect exists within the conjunction of conditions, how could that effect arise from the conjunction of conditions?

If the effect existed within the conjunction of conditions, it would necessarily be present within that conjunction, yet in reality it cannot be found.

If the effect does not exist within the conjunction of conditions, then causes and conditions would be identical to what are not causes and conditions.

If, before itself ceasing, the cause transfers to the effect the power by which it can produce it (and has completed the transfer), then the cause at that time would have two characteristics: that which is transferred and that which is destroyed.

If the cause has not transferred to the effect the power through which it can act as a cause, yet has already ceased, then the cause has been destroyed while the effect still arises. In that case the effect is without a cause.

If the effect arises simultaneously while the conditions are conjoined, then the producer and the produced exist at the same time.

If the effect arises first and the conditions are conjoined afterward, that would mean it is separate from causes and conditions and would indeed be an effect without a cause.

If the cause is destroyed and transforms into the effect, then the cause has entered the effect. Thus, the cause, though already produced beforehand, would be produced yet again after having been produced.

How could a cause that has ceased still be able to give rise to an effect? Moreover, if the cause exists within the effect, how could the cause produce the effect?

If the cause already encompasses the existing effects, why would it need to produce the effects? Whether the effect is seen or not seen within the cause, in neither case does it arise. (*If the effect is seen within the cause, then it already exists; if it already exists, it need not arise again. If the effect is not seen within the cause, then the effect could exist apart from the cause, since it does not exist within the cause, and vice versa. Thus, the effect does not arise from the cause, and the cause does not arise from the effect.)

To say that a past cause conjoins with a past effect, a present effect, or a future effect is entirely impossible. To say that a future cause conjoins with a future effect, a present effect, or a past effect is entirely unreasonable. To say that a present cause conjoins with a present effect, a future effect, or a past effect is entirely impossible (*this passage discusses the three times and the ninefold causes and effects).

If conjunction is impossible, how could a cause produce an effect? And even supposing there were conjunction, how could a cause produce an effect?

If the cause is empty and contains no effect, how could the cause produce an effect? And if the cause is not empty and contains an effect, how could the cause produce the effect?

An effect that is not empty cannot arise (*because not empty means existent; if it already exists, it does not arise). An effect that is not empty does not cease; because it is not empty, it neither arises nor ceases. Because the effect is empty, it does not arise; because the effect is empty, it does not cease. Because the effect itself is empty, it neither arises nor ceases.

If cause and effect were one and identical, that would be entirely unreasonable; and if cause and effect were different, that too would be incorrect. If cause and effect were identical, the producer and the produced would also have to be identical. If cause and effect were different, the cause would be the same as a noncause.

If the effect possessed a determinate intrinsic nature, how could the cause produce it? If the effect determinately lacked intrinsic nature, how could the cause produce it? If the cause does not produce the effect, it lacks the characteristic of a cause; and if there is no characteristic of a cause, to what could that effect belong?

If the conjunction is said to arise from causes and conditions, yet the conjunction itself does not arise, how could it produce an effect? Therefore, the effect arises neither from conjoined conditions nor from unconjoined conditions. If no effect exists, where could there be a dharma of conjunction?

CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE:

EXAMINATION OF ARISING AND DISSOLUTION

Apart from arising and their combination (dissolution and arising existing together at the same time), there is no dissolution. Apart from dissolution and their combination (dissolution and arising existing together), arising also does not exist therein.

If separated from arising, how could dissolution exist? This is incorrect, for it would be like claiming that death exists only apart from life. If arising and dissolution existed simultaneously, how could there be arising and dissolution (*because arising and dissolution have different characteristics; if they were one, they certainly could not be either arising or dissolution)? As with death and life in the world, it would be a grave error to say that the two occur simultaneously. How could arising exist if separated from dissolution? Never has it been seen that any dharma is without impermanence.

When arising and dissolution are combined (arising and dissolution appearing simultaneously), there is no arising; and apart from that combination, there is likewise no arising. Arising is found in neither place; how, then, could arising exist?

What has been completely extinguished cannot arise, and what has not been completely extinguished likewise cannot arise. In what has been completely extinguished, the characteristic of dissolution no longer exists; in what has not been completely extinguished, the characteristic of dissolution likewise does not exist.

Apart from arising and dissolution, no dharma whatsoever exists; and apart from dharmas, arising and dissolution cannot exist either.

If the intrinsic nature of dharmas is empty, what is it that undergoes arising and dissolution? And if the intrinsic nature of dharmas is not empty, arising and dissolution are likewise impossible.

If arising and dissolution were one and identical, that would be incorrect; and if arising and dissolution were different, that too would be incorrect.

To conceive that arising and cessation exist because the eye sees them is itself deluded conceptualization; because of delusion, one sees arising and cessation.

A dharma cannot arise from a dharma, nor can a dharma arise from that which is not a dharma. From that which is not a dharma, neither a dharma nor a nondharma can arise.

A dharma does not arise from itself, nor does a dharma arise from something else. Since it arises neither from itself nor from anything external, how could there be so-called arising?

If there is appropriation of dharmas (*appropriation: when the eye faculty meets a visible object, feeling occurs and one clings to that feeling), one thereby falls into eternalism and annihilationism. It should be understood that all appropriated dharmas are regarded as either permanent or impermanent.

Those who are entangled in the appropriation of dharmas yet do not fall into annihilationist or eternalist views maintain that this is because cause and effect are always continuous and therefore neither annihilated nor permanent.

If cause and effect involve an uninterrupted continuity of arising and dissolution, then the cause itself is annihilated; and because it has been annihilated, it cannot arise again.

If a dharma permanently abides in its intrinsic nature, there should be neither existence nor nonexistence; and the complete cessation of the continuum of birth and death in the realm of nirvana would fall into annihilation!

If there were dissolution at the beginning, there certainly could be no subsequent existence; and if there were existence at the beginning without dissolution, there likewise could be no subsequent existence.

If there were dissolution at the beginning yet arising still occurred afterward, then clearly one thing would be ceasing and another thing arising.

To say that arising and cessation occur simultaneously would be like saying that this skandha dies at the very moment this skandha is arising (birth and death occurring simultaneously).

The existence of a continuum cannot be found within the three times (past, present, and future). If continuity does not exist within the three times, how could there be what is called continuity?