中論

CHAPTER SEVEN:

EXAMINATION OF THE THREE CHARACTERISTICS

(* Conditioned dharmas have three characteristics: arising, abiding, and ceasing.)

If arising is a conditioned dharma, it should possess all three characteristics. But if arising is an unconditioned dharma, why is it called a characteristic of the conditioned?

Whether the three characteristics—arising, abiding, and ceasing—are conjoined or separate (* conjoined: existing simultaneously at the same time, or occurring before and after), they still cannot constitute the characteristics of the conditioned and cannot have anything characterized by them. How, then, could all three characteristics exist together in the same place and at the same time?

If it is said that arising, abiding, and ceasing are conditioned dharmas, while also admitting that each of these conditioned characteristics separately possesses the conditioned characteristics of arising, abiding, and ceasing, this would lead to an infinite regress. And if there is an infinite regress, they cannot be conditioned.

Arising produces arising (* an initial cause arises and produces an effect; that effect then becomes a cause and produces another effect: the arising of arising). The arising that is produced arises from fundamental arising, while that which produces fundamental arising is in turn produced by what has just been produced. (The arising of arising produces only fundamental arising, and the arising of fundamental arising then produces the arising of arising.)

If it is maintained that what has the capacity to arise there, and what is arisen, can be produced from fundamental arising, then how can the arising that arises from fundamental arising produce fundamental arising itself?

If it is maintained that this fundamental arising—the first cause of arising—can be produced by that which fundamental arising itself produces, and that fundamental arising is produced by what fundamental arising produces, then how can that arising produce what is produced by fundamental arising? (* If it is said that “fundamental arising” is produced by the “arising of arising,” but fundamental arising has already been produced by the arising of arising, how can it produce the arising of arising?)

If, while what is being arisen is arising, it is said to be produced by fundamental arising, then at that moment what is being arisen does not yet exist. How, then, can it produce what is called fundamental arising?

If fundamental arising, while arising, already has the capacity to produce something else—the arising of arising—then at that moment fundamental arising does not yet exist. How, then, can it have the capacity to produce something else, namely the arising of arising?

It is just like a lamp: it can illuminate itself while also illuminating other things. Arising is likewise able not only to produce itself but also to produce other things. (* The opponent’s objection.)

Within the lamp itself there is no darkness, nor is there darkness anywhere reached by its light. Illumination is so called because it functions to dispel darkness; if there were no darkness as its object, there would be no such thing as illuminating and dispelling it. (* Bodhisattva Nagarjuna’s reply.)

How could the light of a lamp, at the very moment it first arises, already have the capacity to dispel all darkness? When the lamp’s light has only just arisen, it certainly cannot yet have reached the darkness.

If the lamp’s light can dispel all darkness before it has reached the darkness, then while remaining in a single place, it should be able to dispel darkness everywhere.

If a lamp can illuminate itself while also illuminating other things, then darkness should likewise obscure itself while also obscuring other things.

How could this arising produce itself while it has not yet arisen? And if that arising has already produced itself, why, once it has arisen, would it need to arise again?

Arising is not produced from what has already arisen, nor does it arise from what has not yet arisen; and what is presently arising does not arise either, as was explained in the examination of motion in Chapter Two.

If it is erroneous and untenable to say that dharmas arise from what is presently arising, why can it nevertheless be asserted that dharmas arise when conditions come together?

If dharmas are born from conditions—many factors and circumstances—then those dharmas are precisely of the nature of quiescent cessation. (* If they are quiescently ceased, they cannot arise; their nature is quiescent and empty, without intrinsic nature.) Thus both the arisen dharma and the so-called time of its arising are quiescently ceased, empty, and still.

Suppose there were some dharma that was going to arise. One might then say that there must certainly be something that arises. Yet this dharma would already have existed beforehand, so why would it still require arising?

If it is said that what is presently arising arises, and thus what is presently arising has the capacity to arise, then how can there be another arising capable of producing that presently arising?

Suppose there were yet another arising that produced this arising. Arising would produce arising, and arising would again produce arising, resulting in an infinite regress. But if arising existed apart from what is arisen—the arising of arising?—then all dharmas would be capable of producing themselves.

If a dharma already exists, it does not need to arise; if it does not exist, it likewise should have no need to arise. Neither what exists nor what does not exist arises, as explained previously.

If dharmas are in the process of ceasing, then while they are ceasing they should not arise. If dharmas are not in the process of ceasing, there can be no such situation at all.

A dharma that does not abide does not remain in one place; a dharma that abides does not abide; and while it is abiding, it also does not abide. Since there is no arising, how could there be abiding?

If dharmas are in the process of ceasing, there should then be no abiding ( because when a dharma has ceased, there is no dharma; if there is no dharma, what could abide?). And if dharmas are not in the process of ceasing, this can never be the case ( because conditioned dharmas are impermanent, arising and ceasing).

All conditioned dharmas bear the characteristics of aging and death—that is, arising and ceasing. No conditioned dharma is ever seen to abide apart from the characteristics of aging and death.

Abiding does not abide in its own characteristic, nor does it abide in another characteristic, just as arising cannot produce itself and cannot be produced from another characteristic.

A dharma that has ceased does not cease; a dharma that has not yet ceased does not cease; and a dharma presently ceasing does not cease. Since there is no arising, how could there be cessation?

If dharmas possessed abiding (* remaining fixed, without change or impermanence), they could not cease. If dharmas do not abide, then naturally they also cannot cease.

A dharma cannot cease at the very time when it abides; and if that dharma abides at another time, it cannot cease during that other time either.

Just as none of the dharmas can possess a characteristic of arising, because there is no characteristic of arising, they likewise possess no characteristic of cessation.

If dharmas exist intrinsically, then they cannot undergo cessation. How could the two characteristics of existence and nonexistence both be present in a single dharma?

If a dharma is truly nonexistent, then it cannot undergo cessation. This is like cutting off a person’s second head: because no second head exists, it cannot be cut off. (* Since a person has no second head, it cannot be cut off.)

Dharmas do not cease through their own characteristics, nor do they cease through other characteristics, just as dharmas do not arise through their own characteristics or through other characteristics.

Since arising, abiding, and ceasing cannot be established, there are no conditioned dharmas. And if there are no conditioned dharmas, for what reason would there be unconditioned dharmas?

They are like an illusion, a dream, or a city of the gandharvas (* unreal, like castles in the sky). The characteristics of arising, abiding, and ceasing that have been discussed are likewise so.

CHAPTER EIGHT:

EXAMINATION OF ACTION AND AGENT

(* Action: karmic activity, the karma that is produced;

Agent: the person who produces karma.)

An agent asserted to be definitely real ( the maker of karma, the acting subject) does not produce an action asserted to be definitely real ( for if the agent, the acting subject, definitely exists, then the action, the object produced, would likewise already definitely exist; action would therefore exist without the agent as its cause, which is unreasonable). And if it is asserted that there definitely is no agent, that agent likewise cannot produce what is called an indeterminate action (* an action that is not definitely real).

If action is definitely non-produced—if there is no action that is produced—then that action has no agent who produces it. If it is determined that an agent exists but does not act—there being no action produced—then the agent himself also has no action.

If both an agent and an action produced by that agent are asserted to exist definitely, then both the agent and the action fall into the error of being without a cause or origin.

If one falls into the view that things are without causes, there is no cause, no effect, no produced action, no agent who produces action, and no need for any act of production.

If there are no agent, action, or act of production, then there are neither transgression nor merit. Because transgression, merit, and so forth—the karmic causes—do not exist, the results of transgression and merit do not exist either.

If there are no results of transgression and merit, then there is also no nirvana. Thus all actions performed would be empty and without any result.

Whether an agent is held to exist definitely or not to exist definitely, that agent cannot produce what is called definitely existent action or not-definitely-existent action ( the two kinds of action: determinate and indeterminate). Since existence and nonexistence contradict one another, the two cannot occupy the same place ( the two natures of determinacy and indeterminacy).

An existent agent ( existence cannot produce nonexistence) cannot produce a non-produced action ( because only one who acts is called an agent). Where there is no agent, there can be no action produced (or: the agent cannot produce an action that already exists, because nonexistence cannot produce existence). If the agent and the produced action exist simultaneously, this again entails the errors described above.

An agent produces neither determinate nor indeterminate action (* neither truly existent nor not-truly-existent action; neither definitely real action nor the absence of definitely real action). The error concerning determinate and indeterminate action has already been explained.

Whether the agent is determinate, indeterminate, or both determinate and indeterminate—whether definitely existent, definitely nonexistent, or both truly existent and truly nonexistent—the agent cannot produce action. This error has already been explained.

Because there is action, there is an agent; because there is an agent, there is action. It is only in this sense that action is established; apart from this, there is no other cause by which it can be established.

Just as the agent and the action produced have been refuted, so too are appropriation ( the five-skandha body that is the karmic result—a dharma) and the appropriator ( the person who experiences the karmic result). In this way, all dharmas should be examined and refuted.

CHAPTER NINE:

EXAMINATION OF THE PRIOR ABIDER

(* “Prior abider” is another name for the self or atman.)

The faculties of the eye, ear, and so forth, and dharmas such as suffering and happiness: whoever possesses such faculties and dharmas is called the prior abider, or self. (* “Prior” means originally and always existent, inherently existent, permanently abiding, and unchanging; “abiding” means settled and unmoving. This means that the faculties and the dharmas of suffering and happiness are established in dependence upon the self, the prior abider.)

If there were no prior abider, or self, who would possess the eye and the other faculties and dharmas? Therefore, it should be known that the prior abider, or self, originally existed beforehand. (* This means that without a prior abider, the six faculties and the dharmas of suffering, happiness, and so forth would have no basis of dependence; without such a basis, they could not be established.)

If the prior abider, or self, existed beforehand apart from the faculties of the eye and so forth and the dharmas of suffering and happiness, by what means could it be known? (* That is, how could there be seeing, hearing, sensing, and knowing? Only through the six faculties are seeing, hearing, sensing, and knowing possible, and only thereby could one know that the prior abider, or self, existed.)

If the prior abider exists apart from the faculties of the eye, ear, and so forth, then the faculties of the eye, ear, and so forth should likewise exist apart from the prior abider, or self.

Because there are dharmas, a person is known to exist; because there is a person, dharmas are known to exist. How could there be a person apart from dharmas, and how could there be dharmas apart from a person?

In all the faculties, such as the eye and ear, there is in fact no so-called prior abider, or self. The faculties of the eye, ear, and so forth each possess distinct characteristics by which they discriminate. (* Distinct characteristics: each faculty has a different discriminative function; the eye faculty discriminates visible forms, the ear faculty discriminates sounds, and so forth.)

If the faculties of the eye and so forth have no so-called prior abider, or self, then how can each faculty, such as the eye or ear, apprehend visible forms or other external objects?

The seer is precisely the hearer, and the hearer is precisely the experiencer (* one who experiences sensations of happiness, sorrow, and so forth. Feeling is threefold: pleasant feeling, painful feeling, and neutral feeling). If so, the faculties and so forth should possess a prior abider, or self.

If the seer and the hearer associated with each faculty are different, then the experiencers associated with each faculty are also different. Thus, when there is one seer, there should also be another hearer, and consequently there would have to be many selves.

The faculties of the eye, ear, and so forth and the dharmas of suffering, happiness, and so forth arise from the great elements (* earth, water, fire, air, and so forth), yet within those elements there is no self.

If the faculties of the eye, ear, and so forth and the dharmas of suffering, happiness, and so forth do not contain any so-called prior abider, self, or entity within themselves, then the faculties such as the eye should likewise not exist.

Since the faculties of the eye and so forth originally have no prior abider, or self, there is certainly none in the present or the future either. Because it does not exist in any of the three times (* past, present, and future), all dharmas are nonexistent; and because dharmas are nonexistent, there is no discrimination.

CHAPTER TEN:

EXAMINATION OF FIRE AND FUEL

If fire were identical with fuel, the action and the agent would be one and the same. If fire were not fuel but something different from fuel, then fire should naturally be able to exist apart from fuel.

Fire would then have to burn eternally by itself and would not need fuel as a cause for its arising. Nor would anyone need to kindle it; it would therefore be called unproduced fire—fire that was not produced.

If fire did not depend upon or rely upon fuel in order to exist, it clearly would not arise from causes and conditions. And if fire burned eternally by itself, what need would there be for human effort? Human effort would thus be empty and nonexistent.

If you say that what is presently burning is itself called fuel, then at that moment there would be only fuel. What, then, would burn the fuel?

If fuel were something different, fire could not reach it. If fire could not reach it, the fuel could not catch fire. If it could not catch fire, it would not be extinguished; and if it were never extinguished, it would be permanent and unchanging.

If fire and fuel were different, fire could approach fuel just as one person ( the Sanskrit text specifically says a woman) approaches another ( the Sanskrit text says a man), and that other person—the man—approaches the first—the woman.

If fire and fuel are held to exist separately from each other, then fire could come into contact with and ignite the fuel.

If fire exists because of fuel, and fuel exists because of fire, then one of the two must definitely appear first in order for fuel and fire to exist.

If fire exists because of fuel, then fire, already established, would have to be established once again. It would also follow that there is no fire in the fuel.

If a dharma is established through mutual dependence, that dharma itself becomes something dependent. Yet at present there is no cause on which it can depend, and thus no dharma is established through such dependence.

If a dharma is established by relying upon mutual dependence, then before it is established, how can the two depend upon each other? But if it is only after being established that such mutual dependence occurs, then, once it has already been established, what need is there for mutual dependence?

Fire does not exist because of fuel, nor does fire exist without fuel. Fuel does not exist because of fire, nor does fuel exist without fire. (Another translation: Because of fuel, there is no fire; without relying upon fuel, there is also no fire. Because of fire, there is no fuel; without fire as a cause, there is also no fuel.)

Fire does not come from some other place outside itself in order to enter the fuel. Nor is there fire within the fuel. (Fire does not come from elsewhere, and there is no fire within fire.) Fuel is likewise so. All other aspects have already been discussed in the chapter on Going and Coming (* Chapter Two: Motion and Non-motion).

Moreover, fuel itself is not fire, yet apart from fuel there is no fire. Fire does not exist in fuel, fuel does not exist in fire, and fire is not contained within fuel.

The teaching concerning fire and fuel is used to explain appropriation and the appropriator (* appropriation: the five skandhas; appropriator: the person). It also explains the pot, cloth, and so forth—in short, all dharmas.

If anyone declares that there is a truly existent self and that dharmas possess distinct characteristics, it should be understood that such people have not tasted the flavor of the Buddha’s Dharma and have not comprehended the Buddha’s teaching.

CHAPTER ELEVEN:

EXAMINATION OF THE PRIOR LIMIT

(* In Sanskrit, Pùrvàpara-koti-parĩksa means “the limits of before and after.”)

The Great Sage, the Buddha, taught that the most fundamental and earliest limit cannot be found, because samsaric birth and death have no beginning and also no end.

If there is no beginning and no end, how could there be a middle between beginning and end? Therefore, within it there is no before, middle, or after—the three limits.

Suppose that because birth occurred first, aging and death occurred afterward. It would then follow that life and growth existed beforehand without aging and death, and that aging and death existed without birth.

If aging and death existed first and birth came afterward, they would be without a cause: one would never have been born, yet aging and death would still occur.

Birth, aging, and death cannot occur simultaneously, for then the very moment of birth would also be the moment of death, and both would be causeless.

If the suppositions of the former ( birth first and death afterward), the latter ( death first and birth afterward), and the two together (* life and death appearing simultaneously) are all untenable, why engage in conceptual proliferation by asserting that birth, aging, and death exist?

Causes and their effects, characterized dharmas and their characteristics, appropriation and the appropriator, and all other existent dharmas: not only can no fundamental and earliest limit be found for them within samsaric birth and death, but all dharmas are likewise without any such prior limit.

CHAPTER TWELVE:

EXAMINATION OF SUFFERING

Some hold that suffering is created by oneself, created by other conditions or factors, created by both together, or created without any cause. Such views concerning suffering are wholly incompatible with the effect called suffering.

If suffering were created by oneself, it would not arise from conditions, for it is in dependence upon these skandhas that those skandhas arise. (* “Ấm” means skandha. “Ấm,” meaning to obstruct or conceal, was the term used by Master Kumarajiva. “Uẩn,” meaning an accumulation, was used by Master Xuanzang to translate skandha; some others translate it as “aggregate.”)

If these five skandhas are held to be entirely different from those five skandhas, it should then be said that suffering is created by other factors.

If suffering is created by the person himself, then apart from suffering, how could the person exist? How could there be a person of whom it could be said that he creates suffering for himself?

If suffering were created by another person and then assigned to this person, then while separated from suffering—in the interval of its transference—how could there be a person who experiences this suffering?

If suffering were created by another person and then assigned to this person, how could there be a person who, while free from suffering, still had the capacity to transfer suffering to this person?

If self-creation cannot be established, how could one create suffering for another? And if that other person creates suffering, that suffering would likewise be called self-created (* because, having created it himself, his own act of creation is truly self-creation).

Suffering cannot be said to be self-created—as something that forms or creates itself—because a dharma cannot create itself. Likewise, since suffering has no intrinsic entity, how could it have the capacity to create suffering?

If suffering were produced by both this and that ( self-creation and creation by another), there should be suffering produced by their joint action ( self and other together producing suffering). Yet if neither this nor that—neither oneself nor another—can produce suffering, how much less could suffering be produced without a cause?

Not only can suffering not be established according to these four propositions (* self-created, other-created, jointly created, and causelessly created); all external things also cannot be established when examined according to these four propositions.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN:

EXAMINATION OF CONDITIONED PHENOMENA

As the Buddha taught in the sutras, what is false and unreal ( deceptive—Mrsà) is the deluded grasping at perceptible characteristics ( Mosadharma), the phenomena that appear. Because conditioned phenomena are grasped through deluded thought, they are called deceptive and false.

Regarding the false and unreal characteristics grasped by deluded thought—what within these conditioned phenomena is the object being grasped? The Buddha taught these matters in order to reveal the meaning of emptiness (* the meaning of the nature of emptiness).

Because conditioned dharmas all arise, cease, and undergo continuous change, it should be known that they are without intrinsic nature. Moreover, even the so-called dharma of having no intrinsic nature is itself nonexistent; therefore, all dharmas are empty and have no real entity.

If dharmas have no intrinsic nature, how can it be said that they undergo many changes from infancy until old age? (* From the birth of an infant until old age, many changes still occur.)

If dharmas possessed intrinsic nature, how could they undergo change? And if dharmas have no intrinsic nature, why is there change?

A dharma itself does not undergo change, and a changed dharma likewise does not undergo change, just as youth does not produce old age, nor can youth produce youth. (* A mature adult cannot produce old age, and old age cannot produce maturity.)

If the intrinsic entity of a dharma were itself change, then milk should itself be butter. Yet apart from milk, what other dharma could be made into butter?

If there were a dharma that was not empty, there should also be some dharma called empty. But in reality no dharma called nonempty exists; how, then, could there be a dharma called empty?

The Great Sage, the Buddha, taught the Dharma of emptiness for the relinquishment of all views. But those who in turn adopt the view that emptiness exists cannot be brought to liberation even by the Buddhas.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN:

EXAMINATION OF CONJUNCTION

Seeing ( the eye faculty), the object seen ( visible form), and the seer (* eye-consciousness): each of these three occupies a different position. Since these three dharmas are distinct in this way, there can never be a time when they come into conjunction.

Craving, the object of craving, and the one who craves should be examined in the same way. The other ayatanas (* the other five entrances; “entrance” refers to the interaction of coming and going, as in the scriptural expression “the six entrances”), the afflictions, and so forth should likewise be examined in this way.

If dharmas were different, there would naturally be conjunction. Yet seeing and so forth possess no characteristics of difference. Since characteristics of difference cannot be established, how could seeing and so forth come into conjunction?

Not only can no characteristic of difference be found in the object seen, the seer, and so forth; no characteristic of difference can be found in any existent dharma whatsoever.

Difference (* disparate conditions combining to form a dharma) is said to exist because of a cause of difference—the combination of disparate causes. Yet difference separated from what is different is no longer difference. If a dharma arises from a cause, that dharma is not different from its cause.

If a different dharma still existed apart from that which is different, difference would exist outside difference. But separated from what is different, it is no longer difference; therefore, difference does not exist.

Within what is different there is no characteristic of difference; nor is there such a characteristic within what is not different. Since there is no characteristic of difference, there is no difference between this and that.

The intrinsic entity of a dharma cannot conjoin with itself, nor can a different dharma conjoin with it. The dharma conjoined, the time of conjunction, and the agent that brings about conjunction cannot be found—the conjoining agent, the time of conjunction, and the dharma conjoined.