成唯識寶生論

The Treatise says: That consciousness arises from its own seeds is because the nature of the cause is the same and there is no obstruction of substance; it is the consciousness whose objective aspect is the body of the five consciousnesses, together with their bases of support and their conditioning objects. So too with the mind-consciousness (manovijñāna), which does not depart from the essential nature of mind and mental factors, and which, together with the eye-consciousness and the rest, performs activity and is able to be a producing cause—just as with the mind-base (manas-āyatana) and the dharma-base (dharma-āyatana).

This explanation discloses the intent of the scripture. The scripture speaks only of intent; it does not establish a thesis. Therefore, what they wish to refute is likewise not established in the way that this here is established.

There is only a small portion of meaning; if one were to establish this meaning, then it ought not to be said that the various treatises were composed at length.

How is this known?

Just as, by stating the hidden meaning, fruit and realm are established. As for entering into the selflessness of the person (pudgala-nairātmya), so it is said of the twelve bases (āyatanas) as well. If, apart from the intrinsic nature of form pertaining to the eye and the rest, one can thereby enter into the principle of the selflessness of the person—why is this so?

This is by reason of the inner and outer differentiation of the twelve, namely the eye and the rest, and form and the rest as the six objects. Thus the arising-in-succession is likewise not seen to come from that differentiation; and so on, down to the functions of the eye, eye-contact, and the rest. Apart from this intrinsic nature, there ought not again to be any further doing or making.

If, depending upon the eye and the rest, one does activity and freely enjoys, then this is called being bound by the grasping of self. Now here there is only the harmonious self-mastery of the inner and outer bases. The functions of the eye and the rest have arising and ceasing; therefore this too is not "my eye" acting as cause, since there is no contact-confrontation.

It is said only to be a cause that is constantly inseparable from sentient beings. Yet with respect to the one who is able to act, regarding the meaning of the bases such as the eye and the rest, it is just as before. Therefore it does not arise from those other sorts of things.

This alone is able to awaken and enter into the principle of the selflessness of the cause. If one can subdue the selflessness of the cause, then one can enter into quiescence. Why is this so?

Because in birth-and-death one sees that sentient beings are oppressed by suffering. Yet suffering is impermanent; amid birth-and-death the mind gives rise to weariness and renunciation. The power of having no view of self is able to bring about renunciation swiftly.

Fearing self, one severs it, and successively the cause is exhausted, like a remnant of firewood whose flame is extinguished. Therefore the Buddha said that it is for the sake of such persons that he spoke of the twelve bases.

There is one who says that here it is not for the sake of the principle of the selflessness of the cause that the twelve bases were spoken; these two characteristics are equal and without difference. Because there is the nature of things, the view of self is perverted. In order to counteract it, he therefore spoke according to this principle—as one uses inversion to counteract inversion.

This is not well done and also cannot be accepted. The bases and the rest that I here establish—how are they without difference? Mind and mental factors differ in their essence.

If, when there is a delight within mind and mental factors, that delight does not reside in the eye-base, nor in the ear-base, and so forth—by this it is said there is difference; therefore this too is so. Likewise it is not that a single consciousness arising there is the eye-base and the rest with intrinsic nature of pleasure and desire. But when form and the rest abide in the nature of gold, it is not the nature of silver and so forth—they are not without difference among themselves.

This gold, once apart from form, cannot be said to be something different, as though there were another thing. The principle being thus, this non-difference does not, with respect to essential nature, allow one to say there is form and the rest; if one were to say so, it would be inverted and could not counteract. This is the same as the prior grasping at the nature of sentient beings.

Just as those sentient beings, with respect to selflessness, see there to be a self—this is the nature of inversion. Now seeing inversion, this can be dispelled, like the form-base and the rest, which serve to remove the inversion of self. If the continuum of mind is without interruption and without inversion, this too is contrary to reason.

Herein, the intrinsic nature of pleasure and desire resembles non-inversion. This too is because the before and after are not understood. If there be a doctrine that says: as a skillful means for awakening and entering into the selflessness of the person, one says that the form-base and the rest have nature—just as with the mind-base and dharma-base.

If mind and mental factors were the intrinsic nature of self, then those who love and delight in them would not dispute. If, apart from mind and mental factors, there separately exists a self-essence, truly there is no example by which to speak of it. This discourse, as already analyzed, is of the kind that is a general characteristic, and so is not the ultimate meaning.

If one says it is a skillful means for arriving at the selflessness of the person, this too is not so. As one ought to observe, this skillful and subtle means is established. That is, wishing to make one enter into the absence of intrinsic nature of self, what need is there to say "mind-only"?

Since this is already non-existent, how can the twelve bases be said to be a hidden intent?

This too is contrary to reason, since it has already been said that dharmas are without intrinsic nature. Because the matter is of the utmost importance—wishing to make one awaken and enter—the World-Honored One then said that form and the rest, all dharmas, are without intrinsic nature, so that the other great bodhisattvas might attain that subtle and supremely excellent stage of the Tathāgata, a great benefit pervading the realm of sentient beings.

How is this done?

That is, form and the rest, all dharmas, appear resemblingly before one and are only mind; apart from consciousness, there has never been a single thing that is the nature of form and the rest. This is a matter that can be seen; therefore one knows that form and the rest, all dharmas, are without intrinsic nature. This makes clear that the intrinsic nature of all things arises and is produced by the power of one's own consciousness transforming and manifesting; the principle is certainly thus.

Following whatever things exist, following wherever I know, all, apart from consciousness, can in no way be grasped. It is only this consciousness that manifests the various characteristics and conditions. Therefore one should know that truly there is no intrinsic nature, and one will awaken and enter into the principle of the selflessness of dharmas (dharma-nairātmya).

There is a doctrine that says: if one awakens and enters into the selflessness of dharmas, may it be said, on this basis, that one prevails?

The objects that I behold are only confused and disordered errors. Relying on the principle of the supreme meaning, their original nature is fundamentally empty. To proclaim this meaning accords with the Middle Contemplation (Madhyamaka). For there is no object beheld that is without consciousness.

This approach is still not settled. What does saying so mean? It means that the object beheld by mind and mental dharmas does not correspond to that matter.

Falsely it is called "receiving"; grasping at characteristics that are unreal is the error of confusion.

Is it not just said that there is only consciousness? If you say that among dharmas there is not a single dharma, then what do you have to speak of? If the object is non-existent, then consciousness too is non-existent.

Taking the matter of dreams and the like as an example can make you understand, as was presented before; there is no need to labor over it. Without awaiting an external object, there is only the manifesting of consciousness.

How again is this so? The meaning of consciousness is contrary to reason. If that meaning is by reason of karma's bordering upon the body and benefiting the fruit, then using these words it becomes the answer. Moreover, because the essence separately exists, it can become another doctrine, saying that it is able to maintain its own essence. Herein, too, it is said to be the meaning of intrinsic nature.

This too is as before, having already been analyzed. This meaning is not so. Apart from that instrument of doing-and-making, there must be some other matter for it to be a function.

Just as one's own self again maintaining one's own self—therefore it is not correct. Because one wishes to make arise the awakening to the selflessness of dharmas, saying "consciousness only" then accords. If one says that there is utterly not a single dharma, that all are without self, this is called the selflessness of the intrinsic nature of self.

This then is to jointly accept that the intrinsic nature of self—all of it—is non-existent. Thus there comes to be the selflessness of the intrinsic nature of dharmas. Dharmas being non-existent, therefore one knows that consciousness too is thus.

Its nature being already non-existent, how then can one here wish to establish that those dharmas are all non-existent? It is like a provisional self being linked with nature. Having no self-essence is what is here accepted, and again being linked with utter absence of nature—this becomes the selflessness of dharmas, namely that all dharmas are without nature.

Therefore one should know that consciousness too is thus.

This being already non-existent, how can one, relying on this, wish to lead the deluded to enter into the selflessness of dharmas?

Because there is no self, one is made to realize and enter into the selflessness of dharmas. To jointly accept it thus is a good skillful means.

How do you wish to establish it?

To accomplish that skillful means, one speaks of the twelve bases, realizing the selflessness of the cause. Truly it is not that all dharmas are utterly non-existent, that this is then called the selflessness of the intrinsic nature of dharmas. Therefore one should know that dharmas are without nature; sound itself has no nature that makes anything clear, and all dharmas are without self-essence. Their linkage with words is likewise so. It is not that one wishes to make clear that all are non-existent; rather, the meaning is that all dharmas are conditionally arisen and have no nature of self.

That is existent, and this self is without nature—so what is its characteristic like?

That is, to call self "without intrinsic nature" is therefore called the selflessness of the cause; it is not that dharmas are utterly without intrinsic nature. Form and the rest, all dharmas, according to one portion, are said to be without intrinsic nature—not utterly non-existent. Therefore one should know that to say "dharmas are without nature" is not that they are utterly without essence. If one says that all dharmas are non-existent, then one ought not say "dharmas are without intrinsic nature"; reasonably one ought to establish the doctrine that all dharmas are non-existent.

You merely, by grasping the selflessness of the intrinsic nature of dharmas, find that conditioning the various capacities there is difference. Apart from that intrinsic nature, the selecting and grasping of that real self-essence as the true self never has a characteristic that is denoted. This is the meaning of the selflessness of the intrinsic nature of dharmas; it is not hastily to refute them as utterly non-existent.

So what are those graspings called?

As it is said, ignorance and inversion become deluded grasping; following the maturation of seeds within one's own mind, thereby it transforms and becomes the manifestation of differing characteristics. One grasps that the external object has a separate intrinsic nature, as in inversion one takes there to be an external characteristic. From what is seen there arises a fixed grasping; that is called the grasped (the object of grasping).

Moreover, if it is said there is not a single thing, then how can the no-thing be called the grasped? That is indeed so. If, with respect to this grasping, there were a single real substance, not false, then it ought not be called the grasped.

Yet because in respect of this meaning there is correspondence, since that grasping has no connection to the self-essence of the real fact, therefore if there were a real thing it would not be called grasping. By reason of this limit being the object of near seeing, all are therefore said to be the grasped. Suppose one uses consciousness as this object: when it acts as the measured, this too completes the meaning of "the grasped." Therefore one should know that the grasped consciousness too is without nature—that is, it is just the nature of consciousness-only.

Thus one is able to awaken and enter into the fact that all dharmas whatsoever are without self-essence. The subtle skillful means is that there is only the base-consciousness, manifesting characteristics according to place, while not the slightest external object can be obtained. From form down to consciousness, all are thus.

It is not that the consciousness of the seeing-aspect that manifests them—its essence too is non-existent. If one were to say otherwise than this, then one would merely remove form, saying this is only sound, only consciousness; then one would not accomplish "consciousness conditioning consciousness," for, there being an object, it becomes consciousness conditioning form. Thus there is an object.

What is it whose essence cannot be said to be apart from that?

Only the Buddhas, the World-Honored Ones, know it clearly.

How is one to understand this meaning clearly?

Afterward I shall explain it clearly. This indeed has the true reality of dharmas, of the arising of mind and mental factors, transcending verbal denotation; because the Way is of the nature of existence, it likewise does not become that all dharmas are utterly non-existent, the same as a hollow emptiness and vacuity. Therefore one should know: realizing the truth and skillfully entering into the skillful means, one speaks the doctrine of consciousness-only. Attaining it thus is then in accord with reason. Thereby, successively, one is able to tear apart the various nets of discrimination, and one obtains right conditioning as the nature that is the producing cause.

If you grasp that the cause, established as apart from verbal denotation, is really existent, then this in turn becomes like that form and the rest—having a true intrinsic nature like consciousness.

If so, then one should ask again: where did they obtain this principle? There has never been a case of seeing them accept that there is a consciousness that is non-denotable yet which makes form and the rest also be removed in the same way. Because, out of fondness for honey and butter, it also makes greed arise; if again one shifts the grasping and says that those have an inseparable nature, like sprout and seed, having the function of a cause that follows in producing the fruit.

If they say there is an inseparable nature, then it only displays one corner. Reasoning by principle, surely it cannot be jointly accepted. If one says it is like consciousness when it will be an object—because, by the essence that is grasped, it is called the grasped, the characteristic truly serving as that producing cause—then form too is thus, because it is the grasped nature, and likewise ought to accord with conditioned arising and act as cause-and-condition like consciousness.

This becomes "no fragment, not loved," and in that group of five all are dependently arisen (paratantra). These are what is accepted. The meaning of the imagined-discriminated (parikalpita) nature of dharmas can, by this principle, be the same as that, for there is correct teaching now stating it thus.

If one says that that form also has a being-apart-from-consciousness, truly dependently arising, like feeling and the rest, then this intent has the fault of indeterminacy, because the portion that is grasped also has consciousness. That is, the conditionally arisen portion of feeling and the rest—this is the essential nature of the four aggregates. Yet here, that portion which manifests reflected characteristics arises in dependence on the aggregation of mind and mental factors.

By this principle, that example must be accomplished. But where what is established does not accord with the meaning, it too becomes a fault. The form of conditioned arising is also the intrinsic nature of feeling and the rest; therefore by that cause there comes to be difference in the cause.

Wishing to abandon that fault, one establishes it in consciousness, because the manifestation arises from grasping differing characteristics. This then removes that fault of indeterminacy. Yet what is jointly accepted is within the characteristic.

The self-essence of feeling and the rest is the nature of self-realization, because there is no object. This principle existing, it truly can be relied upon. But form separately has a non-different cause; because one reasons by meaning, therefore they are not the same.

If so, then all consciousnesses are without an object to be known.

How is this known? Furthermore, it is said that there are other consciousnesses that are made objects by yet other consciousnesses. Again, as some say, the realms of the Buddhas—those dharmas exist and are the objects of other consciousnesses.

If, with respect to the Buddha-realm, one does not take one's own mind as object, then there is nothing here to proclaim. To speak so is all to set up falsely. Just as, when there is thinking, verbal denotation issues forth, so the characteristic that is displayed by that verbal meaning is precisely consciousness-only manifesting many kinds of characteristics.

Though there is no resemblance, as though contacting an external object, consciousness is produced. This then is the cause of verbal discourse. Like a spoken sound, having arisen it immediately ceases.

Suppose the spoken sound were utterly cut off, then one ought to hear its echo. The cause is not something obtained within that feeling; yet therein together discourse is presented—the point being only that one can accept karma capable of doing-and-making, and that receiving is feeling. That then becomes the acceptance of a real self—how could there at that time be a separate true self?

One does not accept that two consciousnesses arise simultaneously; the uninterrupted essence of the other consciousnesses is destroyed. Thus, too, it is hard for them to correspond and accord, because the other consciousnesses do not correspond with this. These words also serve to block later doubts and difficulties.

As they say: if one knows that the object exists, then by what does one know it?

This too is, with respect to the object of common characteristic, set up and said to be "knowing." Again, together with them, one likewise makes a rebuke. As they say, denotation displays that the Tathāgata has the various excellent virtues; you too must realize and know those excellent virtues. By this it becomes that it is not the object of the Buddha.

Of course it is also not like the Sthitamati (i.e., the name of the founding master of the Vaiśeṣika school). This common characteristic is a really existent thing; therefore one knows for certain that it is not by the power of an external object appearing before one that one is able to understand clearly. Herein it is only by the constructing of the mind-aggregation that it arises.

This principle existing, then there is no doubt or difficulty regarding the Buddha-realm. This then is, in the discourse, a cause producing a discourse, by an adjacent meaning pervading everywhere. Yet one should state the cause of the fruit of hidden intent.

This hidden intent has two causes: first, the various teachings contradict one another; second, there is harm to right principle. To say that the teaching of consciousness-only is then contradictory, because the Āgama does not state it. Moreover, in that Net-of-Illusion Sūtra, the Buddha, for the sake of those who with respect to form and the rest, the various object-bases, give rise to discrimination, spoke thus.

That is, this form cognized by the eye-consciousness is not seen to be really existent and fixedly abiding; it is only in deluded feeling that one gives rise to wrong discrimination, making various decisive interpretations and producing discourse. Taking this as real, all the other meanings are not so. Thus, having presented it at length, down to the various dharmas, all are spoken of successively.

The learned disciple of the Buddha should study in this way: "I contemplate past, present, and future; the eye-consciousness contemplates those forms it conditions, yet there they are non-existent, ever fixed, truly obtainable, not false, not other. Whether as what is possessed, or as the non-inverted nature, all are non-existent. Only the Noble Ones, those who transcend the world, attain this reality." The World-Honored One said this is all false—contrary to the Āgama, contrary to right principle.

Therefore, on account of that doctrine, one gives rise to doubting feelings and sets forth the various challenges.

How is it known that that doctrine is not in accord with the truth? Just as it is said that consciousness is what knows the verbal meaning of the statement of the twelve bases?

Because of oneness and non-oneness, when through reflective examination one takes it as object, since it is incapable—therefore one knows for certain that it is not as the meaning is stated; hence now let us deliberate. Where form and sound are produced, each follows its own essence, because at that consciousness their characteristics are produced. Form and the rest, the various phenomenal characteristics, are objects of consciousness.

The form-consciousness is called form, the sound-consciousness is called sound; the rest are all to be understood accordingly. These forms, sounds, and the rest must be without parts. Their essence is one.

If there were partite form, then because of this their own basis of support, since there is no nature of parts—yet this form and the rest are existent things, their essence has obstruction and interruption; within the same kind they have the nature of being in many places, and therefore can produce consciousnesses and the rest in non-identical places. (Here the meaning of the subtle particles, paramāṇu, is lacking.) Because by force of measure one decisively determines existence and non-existence, then among the means of valid cognition (pramāṇas), direct perception (pratyakṣa) is supreme.

If there is no external object, how can such awareness-feeling arise?

This matter is what is known by my distinct faculty. The distinct faculty, like in dreams and the like, though there is no external object, can yet obtain it. This is as stated before. When examined, it is to be discriminated.

If this is so—when it conditions, and afterward the beheld object has been lost—how is direct perception accepted?

Among the means of valid cognition, direct perception is the loftiest. If at that time there arises the cognizing awareness of direct perception, then that is precisely the cognizing awareness of my distinct faculty. At that time the object is no longer seen; it is only the determining of mind-consciousness, and therefore the eye-consciousness at that time has already ceased. The meaning is thus.

How is that object accepted as direct perception? Moreover, the other treatise-masters hold that all dharmas do not abide for a single instant (kṣaṇa).

When that cognizing awareness arises, form and the rest, the various objects, have all already ceased. By what then is the principle of direct perception accomplished? Though, as before, it has been skillfully explained, yet with respect to this profound dharma-meaning one cannot fathom it.

You again pose a challenging question. Because of force of measure one decisively determines that it exists; or because this contradicts inference (anumāna), therefore with respect to the form-base and the rest one blocks it, making it become non-existent. Even granting that it is truly by measure, then determining existence and non-existence is known by the inference of that distinct faculty, and according to correct teaching and the rest, among the means of valid cognition the distinct faculty is the most excellent. Because the object personally realized is the fruit-nature, therefore one must, where there is no contrariety or harm, establish it among the other means of valid cognition.

This then is that the distinct faculty has personally realized, with respect to the form-base and the rest—how could it make that contradict inference? Wishing to block the existence-nature of form and the rest—why does external form become the object of the distinct faculty?

If there is no object, one cannot here give rise to such cognizing awareness. This matter is known by my distinct faculty. This is said according to the intent: it is the characteristic of receiving, the distinct arising of self-realization, after which one again gives rise to the conditioning mind, and so it is stated clearly thus. Just as one has formerly received objects of suffering, pleasure, defilement, and the rest.

This of course is not so; other cases too are likewise. The distinct faculty, like in dreams and the like, is "seen to exist," as stated before. Within a dream one sees present various objects such as form and the rest; that is, as stated, taking the obscured mind and examining, one sees that they exist. Clearly this is a case where the established cause has the fault of indeterminacy. Yet it is because of the dream, because of eye-disease and the deficient damage of a transgressive mind. By this principle, the intent to establish that a real object such as form and the rest is apart from consciousness is the fault of contrariety—it is only out of arrogant pride and nothing more.

This too has the fault of the cause being unaccomplished. This cognizing awareness, after conditioning, the beheld object having been lost—how is direct perception accepted? The consciousnesses such as the eye and the rest, when they see form, truly cannot produce a severing. This is only by reason of the nature of the inner-realized aspect, the seeing-aspect (nimitta-bhāga), distinctly. On account of this, the prior mind-consciousness, following after, grasps the fixed characteristic, gathers and reflects, and only then is able to decisively determine. Furthermore, at that time consciousness does not arise conjointly.

Granting this is so, with there being an object such as form and the rest—after consciousness has ceased, what is it that one sees? The seer being non-existent, can there be the accomplishing of seeing? Just at this moment, what is hoped for? The consciousness having already ceased, how can it be capable of seeing? Moreover, form and the rest cease together with consciousness. Therefore one should know that here one cannot see form and the rest, the various objects.

Borrowing that examining mind's capacity-for-seeing power to contemplate form and the rest—how is it accepted as the valid-cognition-nature of the distinct faculty? Furthermore, at that time the mind-consciousness is severed and is not jointly accepted as the direct-perception-nature; therefore there is no capacity for seeing, and both have already ceased.

There are other masters who say: at the very first, when one receives the object, it is not defiled by discrimination; therefore it surely conditions the real object of external form.

This too is contrary to reason and therefore unaccomplished, since it is not the case that they accept it as apart from verbal denotation. Form and the rest, the external object, are the known of consciousness. Yet because within there is self-realization, at that time one does not give rise to reflection but immediately conditions the differing characteristics of the various objects.

They only accept that there is inner conditioning of this kind. This too is following whenever that characteristic appears, depending only upon consciousness, just as suffering, pleasure, defilement, and the rest are all accomplished. But to take that external object of form and the rest as the measure of the distinct faculty is only false grasping.

Just as with the number and measure of karma and the rest, again they take these challenges and attach them to other doubts. As for the things seen in a dream: after awakening from the dream one again conditions and recollects; though at that time there is no object, yet there is the distinctness of the higher mind, and direct perception is likewise so. By this cause, the later mind-consciousness decides clearly that it is not non-existent.

They too do not utterly refute the measure of the distinct faculty. With respect to one's own inner realization, the arising of mind and mental factors, not apart from self-realization there is direct perception—this is what is accepted. But to take the external object as direct perception only increases false grasping all the more; this is what must be blocked.

As before there is the fault of being unaccomplished, and no resolving words have yet been seen. They merely favor empty talk; truly there is nothing apt. They utterly do not accept that there is an external object and the rest, yet they wish, relying on this, to make clear that there is direct perception.

But what is established cannot escape the fault of being decried and refuted. Therefore, if this is so, the mind-consciousness that has never received the prior object cannot give rise to the notion of recollection—this must decisively be accepted.

They have formerly received the external object, and therefore can see form and the rest, the various objects, accepting the distinct-faculty-nature.

This is precisely unaccomplished. To say that one must have formerly received the object before one can recollect—why is this so?

Because there is a reason.

It has already been said that it is like the characteristic of consciousness, namely that although there is no external object, as the object's characteristic appears, the consciousnesses such as the eye and the rest are then produced, as stated before. Next, why does there arise from that the notion of recollection? It is because from this consciousness, afterward, it corresponds with mindfulness; that is, with respect to this characteristic there arises the discriminating mind-consciousness.

"Because one receives that object, mindfulness then arises"—that meaning is unaccomplished. If so, then with respect to the form-base and the rest, by the direct-perception-nature one decisively understands clearly, because there is a characteristic producing the recollection-nature. Just as with pleasure and the rest, on the basis of recollection one sets up and places an image and receives it, decisively determining the prior characteristic, understanding the inner self-realization—yet it is not that one does not receive.

Just as with a stone, for instance: it has its fire; when consciousness arises, it too cannot produce a recollection like this. By this, decisively, relying on the power of inference with respect to form and the rest, the various objects, there must necessarily be personal receiving. If it were otherwise than this, then the accepted recollection would become non-existent.

Again, by this, the object received becomes direct perception. Worldly discourse calls this "seeing." If with respect to form and the rest there is the recollection-nature, as is mutually accomplished, this fault could occur. That is, by this, the external form and the rest, the various bases, being received and recollected, reasonably ought not be accepted as accomplished, for there is a reason: as apart from the object one obtains that seeing, recollection too is thus.

Because their ability to establish is therefore not mutually accomplished. The thesis and the example by which they wish to awaken understanding—with respect to the object there is utterly no function of receiving.

Cheng Weishi Baosheng Lun (Treatise on the Precious Production of the Establishment of Consciousness-Only), Scroll IV