中論
Chinese title:中論
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Section 22
An Analysis of the "Fully Completed" (Tathāgata-- the Buddha) In 16 verses
1.
That one who is "fully-completed" is not the "groups of universal elements" (skandha),
nor something other than the "groups";
the "groups" are not in him, nor is he in them;
The "fully completed" does not possess the "groups."
What, then, is the "fully completed"?
2.
If the Buddha exists dependent on the "groups," then he is not "that which exists by itself" (svabhāva)
And how can he exist as something else (parabhāva) ("other-existence") if he is not "that which exists by itself" (svabhāva)?
3.
That which exists presupposing another existent thing is properly called a "non-individual self" (anātma).
How will that which is a non-individual self become the "fully completed"?
4.
And if there is no self-existence (svabhāva), how would it have an "other-existence" (parabhāva)?
What would that "fully completed" reality be without either a self-existence or other-existence?
5.
If some kind of "fully completed" thing would exist without dependence on the "groups,"
It is dependent now; therefore it exists dependent on something.
6.
There is no kind of "fully completed" being which is not dependent on the "groups."
And whatever is not non-dependent—how will it become dependent?
7.
There is nothing whatever that is dependent on the "groups" and there is no thing whatever on which something does not depend.
There would not exist in any way a "fully completed" being without being dependent on the "groups".
8.
That fully completed being which does not exist by its actual reality (tattva) or by some other reality (anyatva) according to the five-fold examination—
How is the "fully completed" being perceived by being dependent?
9.
So when there is dependence, self-existence does not exist;
And if there is no self-existence whatever, how is an other-existence possible?
10.
Thus "dependence" and "that which is dependent" are completely empty (śūnya).
How is that empty "fully completed one" known through that which is empty?
11.
One may not say that there is "emptiness" (śūnya) (1)
nor that there is non-emptiness. (2)"
Nor that both exist simultaneously (3),
nor that neither exists (4);
the purpose for saying "emptiness" is for the purpose of conveying knowledge.
12.
How, then, will "eternity," "non-eternity," and the rest of the Tetralemma apply to bliss (śānta)?
How, then, will "the end," "without end," and the rest of the Tetralemma apply to bliss?
13.
That image of nirvāṇa in which the Buddha (Tathāgata) either "is" or "is not"—
By him who so imagines nirvāṇa the notion is crudely grasped.
14.
Concerning that which is empty by its own nature (svabhāva), the thoughts do not arise that:
The Buddha "exists" or "does not exist" after death.
15.
Those who describe in detail the Buddha, who is unchanging and beyond all detailed description—
Those, completely defeated by description, do not perceive the "fully completed" being.
16.
The self-existence of the "fully completed" being is the self-existence of the world.
The "fully completed" being is without self-existence and the world is without self-existence.
Section 23
An Analysis of Errors (the perverted views) In 25 verses
1.
It is said that desire (rāga), hate, and delusion are derived from mental fabrication (saṃkalpa),
Because they come into existence presupposing errors as to what is salutary and un-salutary.
2.
Those things which come into existence presupposing errors as to what is salutary and un-salutary
Do not exist by their own nature (svabhāva); therefore the impurities (kleśa) do not exist in reality.
3.
The existence or non-existence of the individual self (ātma) is not proved at all.
Without that individual self, how can the existence or non-existence of the impurities be proved?
4.
For impurities exist of somebody, and that person is not proved at all.
Is it not so that without someone the impurities do not exist of anybody?
5.
In reference to the view of having a body of one's own, the impurities do not exist in what is made impure according to the five-fold manner.
In reference to the view of having a body of one's own, that which is made impure does not exist in the impurities according to the five-fold manner.
6.
The errors as to what is salutary and non-salutary do not exist as self-existent entities (svabhāvataḥ)
Depending on which errors as to what is salutary and non-salutary are then impurities?
7.
Form, sound, taste, touch, smell, and the dharmas: this six-fold
Substance (vastu) of desire, hate, and delusion is imagined.
8.
Form, sound, taste, touch, smell, and the dharmas are
Merely the form of a fairy castle, like a mirage, a dream.
9.
How will "that which is salutary" or "that which is non-salutary" come into existence
In a formation of a magical man, or in things like a reflection?
10.
We submit that there is no non-salutary thing unrelated to a salutary thing.
And in turn depending on which, there is a salutary thing; therefore, a salutary thing does not obtain.
11.
We submit that there is no salutary thing unrelated to a non-salutary thing,
And in turn depending on which, there is a non-salutary thing; therefore a non-salutary thing does not obtain.
12.
If "what is salutary" does not exist, how will there be desire for it?
And if "what is non-salutary" does not exist, how will there be hatred for it?
13.
Even if the notion "What is permanent is in something impermanent" is in error,
How can this notion be in error since "what is impermanent" does not exist in emptiness?
14.
Even if the notion "what is permanent is in something impermanent" is in error,
Is not then the notion concerning emptiness, i.e., that it is impermanent, in error?
15.
That by which a notion is formed, the notion, those who have notions, and that which is grasped in the notion:
All have ceased; therefore, the notion does not exist.
16.
If a notion is not existing either as false or true,
Whose is the error? Whose is the non-error?
17.
Nor do errors of someone who has erred come into existence.
Nor do errors of someone who has not erred come into existence.
18.
And errors of someone who is at present in error do not come into existence.
Now you examine of whom do errors really come into existence!
19.
How in all the world will errors which have not originated come into existence?
And if errors are not originated, how can there be someone involved in error?
20.
Since no being is produced by itself, nor by something different,
Nor by itself and something different at the same time, how can there be someone involved in error?
21.
If the individual self, "what is pure," "what is eternal," and happiness really exist,
Then the individual self, "what is pure," "what is eternal," and happiness are not errors.
22.
But if individual self, "what is pure," "what is eternal," and happiness do not exist,
Then non-individual self, "what is impure," "what is impermanent" and sorrow (duḥkha) do not exist.
23.
From the cessation of error ignorance ceases;
When ignorance has ceased, conditioning forces (saṃskāra) and everything else cease.
24.
If any kind of self-existent impurities belong to somebody,
How in all the world would they be eliminated? Who can eliminate that which is self-existent?
25.
If any kind of self-existent impurities do not belong to somebody,
How in all the world would they be eliminated? Who can eliminate that which is non-self-existent?
Section 24
An Analysis of the Holy Truths (the noble truths) In 40 verses
1.
If everything is empty, there is no origination nor destruction.
Then you must incorrectly conclude that there is non-existence of the four holy truths.
2.
If there is non-existence of the four holy truths, the saving knowledge, the elimination of illusion,
The "becoming" enlightened (bhāvanā), and the "realization" of the goal are impossible.
3.
If there is non-existence, then also the four holy "fruits" do not exist.
In the non-existence of fruit there is no "residing in fruit" nor obtaining.
4.
When the community of Buddhists does not exist, then those eight "kinds of persons" i.e., four abiding in the fruit and four who are obtaining do not exist.
Because there is non-existence of the four holy truths, the real dharma does not exist.
5.
And if there are no dharma and community, how will the Buddha exist?
By speaking thus, that everything is empty certainly you deny the three jewels i.e., the Buddha, the dharma, and the community.
6.
You deny the real existence of a product, of right and wrong,
And all the practical behavior of the world as being empty.
7.
We reply that you do not comprehend the point of emptiness;
You eliminate both "emptiness" itself and its purpose from it.
8.
The teaching by the Buddhas of the dharma has recourse to two truths:
The world-ensconced truth and the truth which is the highest sense.
9.
Those who do not know the distribution (vibhāgam) of the two kinds of truth
Do not know the profound "point" (tattva) in the teaching of the Buddha.
10.
The highest sense of the truth is not taught apart from practical behavior,
And without having understood the highest sense one cannot understand nirvāṇa.
11.
Emptiness, having been dimly perceived, utterly destroys the slow-witted.
It is like a snake wrongly grasped or magical knowledge incorrectly applied.
12.
Therefore the mind of the ascetic Gautama was diverted from teaching the dharma,
Having thought about the incomprehensibility of the dharma by the stupid.
13.
Time and again you have made a condemnation of emptiness,
But that refutation does not apply to our emptiness.
14.
When emptiness "works", then everything in existence "works". (A)
If emptiness "does not work", then all existence "does not work". (B)
15.
You, while projecting your own faults on us, (i.e. objectifying emptiness)
Are like a person who, having mounted his horse, forgot the horse! (i.e. a tool)
16.
If you recognize real existence on account of the self-existence of things,
You perceive that there are uncaused and unconditioned things.
17.
You deny "what is to be produced," cause, the producer, the instrument of production, and the producing action,
And the origination, destruction, and "fruit."
18.
The "originating dependently" we call "emptiness";
This apprehension, i.e., taking into account all other things, is the understanding of the middle way.
19.
Since there is no dharma whatever originating independently,
No dharma whatever exists which is not empty.
20.
If all existence is not empty, there is neither origination nor destruction.
You must wrongly conclude then that the four holy truths do not exist.
21.
Having originated without being conditioned, how will sorrow (duḥkha) come into existence?
It is said that sorrow (duḥkha) is not eternal; therefore, certainly it does not exist by its own nature (svabhāva).
22.
How can that which is existing by its own nature originate again?
For him who denies emptiness there is no production.
23.
There is no destruction of sorrow (duḥkha) if it exists by its own nature.
By trying to establish "self-existence" you deny destruction.
24.
If the path of release is self-existent, then there is no way of bringing it into existence (bhāvanā);
If that path is brought into existence, then "self-existence," which you claim does not exist.
25.
When sorrow (duḥkha), origination, and destruction do not exist,
What kind of path will obtain the destruction of sorrow (duḥkha)?
26.
If there is no complete knowledge as to self-existence, how can there be any knowledge of it?
Indeed, is it not true that self-existence is that which endures?
27.
As in the case of complete knowledge, neither destruction, realization, "bringing into existence,"
Nor are the four holy fruits possible for you.
28.
If you accept "self-existence," and a "fruit" is not known by its self-existence,
How can it be known at all?
29.
In the non-existence of "fruit," there is no "residing in fruit" nor obtaining the "fruit";
When the community of Buddhists does not exist, then those eight "kinds of persons" do not exist.
30.
Because there is non-existence of the four holy truths, the real dharma does not exist.
And if there is no dharma and community, how will the Buddha exist?
31.
For you, either the one who is enlightened (Buddha) comes into being independent of enlightenment,
Or enlightenment comes into being independent of the one who is enlightened.
32.
For you, some one who is a non-Buddha by his own nature (svabhāva) but strives for enlightenment (i.e. a Bodhisattva)
Will not attain the enlightenment though the "way of life of becoming fully enlightened."
33.
Neither the dharma nor non-dharma will be done anywhere.
What is produced which is non-empty? Certainly self-existence is not produced.
34.
Certainly, for you, there is a product without the distinction of dharma or non-dharma.
Since, for you, the product caused by dharma or non-dharma does not exist.
35.
If, for you, the product is caused by dharma or non-dharma, be non-empty?
How can that product, being originated by dharma or non-dharma empty?
36.
You deny all mundane and customary activities
When you deny emptiness in the sense of dependent co-origination (pratītya-samutpāda).
37.
If you deny emptiness, there would be action which is un-activated.
There would be nothing whatever acted upon, and a producing action would be something not begun.
38.
According to the doctrine of "self-existence" the world is free from different conditions;
Then it will exist as un-produced, undestroyed and immutable.
39.
If non-emptiness does not exist, then something is attained which is not attained;
There is cessation of sorrow (duḥkha) and actions, and all evil is destroyed.
40.
He who perceives dependent co-origination (pratītya-samutpāda)
Also understands sorrow (duḥkha), origination, and destruction as well as the path of release.
Section 25
An Analysis of Nirvāṇa In 24 verses
(Which may originally have been the final chapter.)
1.
If all existence is empty, there is no origination nor destruction.
Then whose nirvāṇa through elimination of suffering and destruction of illusion would be postulated?
2.
If all existence is non-empty, there is no origination nor destruction.
Then whose nirvāṇa through elimination of suffering and destruction of illusion would be postulated?
3.
Nirvāṇa has been said to be neither eliminated nor attained, neither annihilated nor eternal,
Neither disappeared nor originated.
4.
Nirvāṇa is certainly not an existing thing, for then it would be characterized by old age and death. In consequence it would involve the error that an existing thing would not become old and be without death.
5.
And if nirvāṇa is an existing thing, nirvāṇa would be a constructed product (saṃskṛta),
Since never ever has an existing thing been found to be a non-constructed-product (asaṃskṛta).
6.
But if nirvāṇa is an existing thing, how could nirvāṇa exist without dependence on something else?
Certainly nirvāṇa does not exist as something without dependence.
7.
If nirvāṇa is not an existing thing, will nirvāṇa become a non-existing thing?
Wherever there is no existing thing, neither is there a non-existing thing.
8.
But if nirvāṇa is a non-existing thing, how could nirvāṇa exist without dependence on something else?
Certainly nirvāṇa is not a non-existing thing, which exists without dependence.
9.
That state which is the rushing in and out of existence when dependent or conditioned—
This state, when not dependent or not conditioned, is seen to be nirvāṇa.
10.
The teacher Gautama has taught that a "becoming" and a "non-becoming" (vibhava) are destroyed;
Therefore it obtains that: Nirvāṇa is neither an existent thing nor a non-existent thing.
11.
If nirvāṇa were both an existent and a non-existent thing,
Final release (mokṣa) would be both an existent and a non-existent thing; but that is not possible.
12.
If nirvāṇa were both an existent and a non-existent thing,
There would be no nirvāṇa without conditions, for these both operate with conditions.
13.
How can nirvāṇa exist as both an existent thing and a non-existent thing,
For nirvāṇa is a non-composite-product (asaṃskṛta), while both an existent thing and a non-existent thing are composite products (saṃskṛta).
14.
How can nirvāṇa exist as both an existent and a non-existent thing?
There is no existence of both at one and the same place, as in the case of both darkness and light.
15.
The assertion: "Nirvāṇa is neither an existent thing nor a non-existent thing"
Is proved if the assertion: "It is an existent thing and a non-existent thing" were proved.
16.
If nirvāṇa is neither an existent thing nor a non-existent thing,
Who can really arrive at the assertion: "neither an existent thing nor a non-existent thing"?
17.
It is not expressed if the Glorious One the Buddha exists (1) after his death,
Or does not exist (2), or both (3) or neither (4).
18.
Also, it is not expressed if the Glorious One exists (1) while remaining in the world,
Or does not exist (2), or both (3) or neither (4).
19.
There is nothing whatever which differentiates the existence-in-flux (saṃsāra) from nirvāṇa;
And there is nothing whatever which differentiates nirvāṇa from existence-in-flux.
20.
The extreme limit (koṭi) of nirvāṇa is also the extreme limit of existence-in-flux;
There is not the slightest bit of difference between these two.
21.
The views regarding whether that which is beyond death is limited by a beginning or an end or some other alternative
Depend on a nirvāṇa limited by a beginning (pūrvānta) and an end (aparānta),
22.
Since all dharmas are empty, what is finite ? What is infinite ?
What is both finite and infinite ? What is neither finite nor infinite ?
23.
Is there anything which is this or something else, which is permanent or impermanent,
Which is both permanent and impermanent, or which is neither ?
24.
The cessation of accepting everything as real is a salutary (śiva) cessation of phenomenal development (prapañca);
No dharma anywhere has been taught by the Buddha of anything.
Section 26
An Analysis of the Twelve Components (the twelve spokes) In 12 verses
1.
"What is hidden by ignorance (1)" (avidyānivṛta) has caused the three kinds of conditioned things (2) (saṃskāra) to be made for rebirth —
By those actions it i.e., " what is hidden by ignorance" goes forward.
2.
Consciousness (3), presupposing that which is conditioned (saṃskāra), enters on its course.
When consciousness is begun, the "name-and-form'- (nāmarūpa) (4) is instilled.
3.
When the "name-and-form" is instilled, the six domains of sense perceptions (5) (āyatana) are produced.
Having arrived at the six domains of sense perceptions, the process of perception begins to function.
4.
Consciousness begins to function presupposing the eye, the visual forms, and ability of mental association—
Presupposing "name-and-form."
5.
That which is the coincidence (6) (saṃnipāta) of visual form, consciousness, and the eye:
That is sensual perception; and from perception, sensation (7) begins to function.
6.
"Craving (8)" (tṛṣṇā) for existing things is conditioned by sensation.
Certainly a person craves for the sake of sensation. The one who craves acquires the four-fold acquisition (9) (upādāna) namely sexual pleasure, false views, ascetic morality and vows, and the doctrine of self-existence.
7.
When the acquisition exists, the acquirer begins to function (10) (i.e. existence, becoming).
If he were someone without acquisition, that being would be released, and would not exist.
8.
That being is the five "groups of universal elements" (skandha). Because of a being, birth (11) begins to function.
Growing old, dying, sorrow (duḥkha) (12), etc., grief and regrets,
9.
Despair and agitation: all this results from birth;
That "produced being" is a single mass of sorrows (duḥkha).
10.
Thus the ignorant people construct the conditioned things (saṃskāra); that is the source for existence-in-flux.
The one who constructs is ignorant; the wise person is not one who constructs because he perceives true reality.
11.
When ignorance ceases, the constructed phenomena do not come into existence.
A person's cessation of ignorance proceeds on the basis of "becoming" enlightened through knowledge.
12.
Through cessation of every component none functions;
That single mass of sorrow (duḥkha) is thus completely destroyed.
Section 27
An Analysis of the Views About Reality (dogmas) In 30 verses
1.
Those views relating to the limits of the past reality are: "The world is eternal," etc.,
And "I have existed in the past," "I have not existed in the past," etc.
2.
The assertion: "I will not become something different in a future time,"
"I will become something different," and the alternative, etc., are relating to an end in the future.
3.
The assertion: "I existed in a past time (1)" does not obtain,
Since this present being is not (i.e. "ii" is not the same as "i") that one who was in a former birth.
4.
Were he in a previous birth, that individual self (ātma) which he acquires in coming into existence would be different.
Moreover, what kind of individual self is there without acquisition (upādāna)?
5.
If it were held that: "There is no individual self without the acquisition,"
Then the individual self would be only the acquisition or it is not an individual self at all.
6.
The individual self is not the acquisition, since that acquisition appears and disappears.
Now really, how will "he who acquires" become "that which is acquired?
7.
Moreover, it does not obtain that the individual self is different from the acquisition.
If the individual self were different, it would be perceived without the acquisition; but in fact it is not so perceived.
8.
Thus that individual self is not different from nor identical to the acquisition.
The individual self is not without acquisition; but there is no certainty that "It does not exist."
9.
The assertion: "I have not existed in a past time (2)" does not obtain,
For that one now living is not different (i.e. "ii" is not different than "i") from that one who was in a former birth.
10.
If that present person were different, he would exist in exclusion of that former one.
Therefore either that former person persists, or he would be born eternal!
11.
-- note 4 : Verse 11 is not available in the Sanskrit test, but it is known from the Tibetan translation
12.
There is no existing thing which is "that which has not existed prior." Therefore, the error logically follows that
Either the individual self is "what is produced" or it originates without a cause.
13.
Thus the view concerning the past which asserts "I have existed (1)," or "I have not existed (2),"
Both "existed and not existed" (3) or neither (4): this does not obtain at all.
14.
The views: "I will become something in a future time (1'),"
Or "I will not become (2') something," etc. (3') (4'), should be considered like those views of the past.
15.
If "This is a man, this is a god" obtains, then eternity (i) exists,
For god is un-produced, and certainly something eternal would not be born.
16.
If man is different from god, there would exist something non-eternal (ii).
If man is different from god, then a continuity does not obtain. (i.e. they cannot be different)
17.
If one part were divine and another part human, (i.e. a man with an eternal soul)
Then there would be something non-eternal together with that which is eternal (iii); but that is not possible.
18.
If something both non-eternal and eternal were proved,
Then, no doubt, something "neither eternal nor non-eternal (iv)" is proved.
19.
If someone, having come from somewhere, in some way goes somewhere again,
Then there would be existence-in-flux with no beginning; but this is not the case.
20.
If someone who is eternal does not exist, who will exist being non-eternal,
Or who being both eternal and non-eternal, or devoid of these two characteristics ?
21.
If the world would come to an end, how would an other-world come into existence?
If the world would not come to an end, how would an other-world come into being?
22.
Since the continuity of the "groups of universal elements" (skandhas) from one moment to the next functions like flames of lamps,
The view: "both having an end and not having an end" is not possible.
23.
If the former "groups" would disappear, those new "groups" which are dependent on those former "groups" would not arise;
Therefore, the world would come to an end (ii).
24.
If the former "groups" would not disappear, these new "groups" which are dependent on those former "groups" would not arise;
Therefore, the world would be eternal (i).
25.
If one part were finite and the other were infinite,
The world would be both finite and infinite (iii); but this is not possible.
26.
Therefore, how can it be that one part of "one who acquires" karma will be destroyed, (i.e. the body – man ?)
And one part not destroyed? (i.e. the very subtle mind -- the divine part ?) This is not possible.
27.
How, indeed, can it be that one part of the acquisition of karma (i.e. the learning stored in the body) will be destroyed,
And one part not destroyed? (i.e. the learning stored in the mind) That, certainly does not obtain.
28.
If the view "both finite and infinite" were proved,
Then no doubt, "neither finite nor infinite" (i.e. nothing at all) could be proved.
29.
Because of the emptiness of all existing things,
How will the views about "eternity," etc., come into existence, about what, of whom, and of what kind?
30.
To him, possessing compassion, who taught the real dharma
For the destruction of all views—to him, Gautama, I humbly offer reverence.
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