成唯識論

I bow to the nature of consciousness-only,

And to those purified in full or in part.

I now explain their teachings,

For the benefit and happiness of sentient beings. (1)

– This treatise is now composed chiefly to enable those who are deluded about and misunderstand the principle of the “twofold emptiness” (emptiness of self and emptiness of dharmas) to regain correct understanding, and through correct understanding to eliminate the two grave obstructions. Because of attachment to self and attachment to dharmas, the two grave obstructions arise in full. If one realizes the principles of the emptiness of self and the emptiness of dharmas, those grave obstructions are immediately eliminated. The obstructions are eliminated so that the two supreme attainments may be realized. By eliminating the afflictive obstruction, which causes the continuity of birth and death, one realizes the fruit of true liberation; by eliminating the cognitive obstruction, which impedes complete understanding of objects of knowledge, one realizes the fruit of great bodhi.

Furthermore, it is composed to instruct those who mistakenly cling to the real existence of self and dharmas and are deluded about the principle of consciousness-only, so that they may awaken to the principle of the twofold emptiness and correctly know, just as it truly is, the principle of consciousness-only.

– Moreover, some are deluded about and misunderstand the principle of consciousness-only. Thus, some maintain that external objects, like consciousness, are not nonexistent; some maintain that internal consciousness, like objects, does not exist; some maintain that the functions of the various consciousnesses differ but their substance is identical; and some maintain that apart from mind there are no distinct mental factors. To refute such divergent attachments and enable them correctly to understand, just as it truly is, the profound and wondrous principle of consciousness-only, this treatise is therefore composed. (2)

I. BRIEF PRESENTATION OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF CONSCIOUSNESS-ONLY (*)

Question: If there is only consciousness, why do both the world and the sacred teachings speak of self and dharmas?

The verse replies:

Because self and dharmas are conventionally designated,

Their various characteristics come into operation;

They depend upon transformations of consciousness.

The transforming consciousnesses are three:

The retributive, the deliberative,

And the consciousness that discerns objects.

The treatise says: When the world and the sacred teachings speak of self and dharmas, these are merely conventional designations and do not possess real natures. “Self” means a sovereign agent; “dharma” means that which maintains its own character and provides a standard. Both manifest various characteristics in operation. The self has such characteristics as sentient being, living being, and so forth; stream-enterer, once-returner, and so forth. Dharmas have such characteristics as substance, quality, action, and so forth; skandhas, ayatanas, dhatus, and so forth. “Come into operation” means that various characteristics are provisionally established according to conditions.

Question: If such characteristics are conventionally posited, upon what basis can these conventional designations be established?

Answer: All such characteristics of self and dharmas are conventionally established in dependence upon the transformations of consciousness.

– “Consciousness” means knowing and cognizing. Here, the term consciousness also includes mental factors, because they are associated with consciousness.

– “Transformation” means that the substance of consciousness transforms into two resembling parts: the objective aspect and the perceiving aspect. Because both the objective and perceiving aspects arise in dependence upon the self-cognizing aspect of consciousness, self and dharmas are then provisionally established in dependence upon these two aspects. Apart from these two aspects—the perceiving and the objective—those selves and dharmas have no basis (the conventionally imagined).

Alternatively, internal consciousness transforms into what resembles external objects. Because of the power of discriminative perfuming concerning self and dharmas, when the various consciousnesses arise, they immediately transform into characteristics resembling a self and characteristics resembling dharmas. Although these characteristics of self and dharmas exist within consciousness, through discrimination they appear as though they were objects outside it (the causally produced conventional).

Since beginningless time, the various kinds of sentient beings have taken these characteristics resembling self and dharmas as their objects and clung to them as a real self and real dharmas. It is like a dreaming person: through the power of the dream, characteristics resembling external objects appear in the person’s mind, and, taking them as objects, the person clings to them as truly existent external objects.

The real self and real dharmas to which ignorant ordinary beings cling have no real existence whatsoever. They are merely fabricated according to deluded cognition and are therefore said to be conventional (the transformation through discrimination, the conventionally imagined). Although the internal consciousness that transforms into what resembles self and dharmas exists, it does not possess the real nature of self or dharmas. Yet because it appears as though self and dharmas existed, it is said to be conventional (the transformation through causes and conditions, the causally produced conventional).

External objects are fabricated according to deluded cognition and do not exist as consciousness does; internal consciousness, however, certainly arises in dependence upon causes and conditions and is therefore not nonexistent as external objects are. In this way, the two attachments of superimposition and denigration are refuted. (Self and dharmas are nonexistent, yet to cling to them as truly existent is the attachment of superimposition. Internal consciousness exists, yet to cling to it as nonexistent is the attachment of denigration.)

Objects are conventionally established in dependence upon internal consciousness; therefore, they exist only from the conventional standpoint (conventional truth). Consciousness is the basis upon which conventional objects are established; therefore, it also exists from the standpoint of ultimate truth (the ultimate principle). (3)

(*) The subsection headings, serial numbers, and the words “question” and “answer” were added by the translator.

II. REFUTATION OF ATTACHMENT TO SELF

– How is it known that external objects truly do not exist and that only internal consciousness arises resembling external objects, so that there can be no real self or real dharmas?

– Why can there be no real self?

– Attachments to a real self are, in brief, of three kinds:

1. The view that the substance of the self is permanent and all-pervasive, equal in extent to space, and that according to where it creates karma, it experiences suffering and happiness.

2. The view that the substance of the self is permanent, while its extent is indeterminate, expanding or contracting according to the size of the body.

3. The view that the substance of the self is permanent but extremely subtle, like an ultimate particle, secretly moving within the body and performing actions.

– The first view of self is contrary to reason. Why? If the self is held to be permanent and all-pervasive, equal in extent to space, then logically that self could not accompany the body in experiencing suffering and happiness. Moreover, if the self is permanent and all-pervasive, logically it could not move. How, then, could that self accompany the body in performing various actions?

Furthermore, is the self thus conceived identical or different among sentient beings? If it is said to be identical, then when the self of one sentient being acts, logically all the selves of other sentient beings would act; when one self experiences a result, logically all other selves would experience it; and when the self of one sentient being attains liberation, logically all the selves of other sentient beings would attain liberation.

If so, this entails grave errors. If, on the other hand, their substances are said to be different, while the selves of all sentient beings are each all-pervasive, then the substances of those selves would intermingle. Moreover, when one self creates karma and one self experiences its result, because that self occupies the same undifferentiated place as all other selves, logically it should be said that all selves create the karma and all selves experience the result.

If it is maintained that the creation of karma and the experience of its result each belong to a particular self, and therefore this error does not arise, that too is unreasonable. Since the substance of the selves of all sentient beings is all-pervasive, karma, its results, and the body would be united with the substance of every sentient being’s self. Thus, to say that creating karma and experiencing its result belong only to this self and not to another self is also contrary to reason.

When the self of one sentient being attains liberation, logically the selves of all other sentient beings should attain liberation, because the Dharma cultivated and realized would be united with every self.

– The second view of self is also unreasonable. Why? Because it maintains that the substance of the self is permanent. Since it is permanent, it cannot accompany the body in expanding and contracting. If it expands and contracts, then it is no different from air in a bellows and cannot be permanent. Moreover, since the self conforms to the body, it could be divided just as the body can. How, then, can the substance of the self be held to be one?

– The third view of self is likewise unreasonable. Why? Because if the self were extremely minute, like a particle of fine dust, how could it cause the entire large body to move? If it is said that although the self is minute, it circulates very rapidly throughout the body, like a whirling firebrand, and thus appears to move within the body, then that self would be neither unitary nor permanent, for whatever moves back and forth cannot be permanently one.

– There are also three kinds of attachment to self:

1. The view that the self is identical with the skandhas.

2. The view that the self is separate from the skandhas.

3. The view that the self is neither identical with nor separate from the skandhas.

– First, the view that the self is identical with the skandhas is unreasonable. For such a self, like the skandhas, would be neither permanent nor unitary. Moreover, the material forms within the body are not a real self, because, like material forms outside the body, they possess physical resistance.

Mind and mental factors are likewise not a real self, because they arise only in dependence upon conditions and cannot continue eternally and uninterruptedly.

The formations dissociated from mind, as well as the other forms included within the Dharma ayatana, are likewise not a real self, because, like empty space, they lack the nature of awareness and cognition. (How could that which is unaware and unknowing be a self?)

– Second, the view that the self is separate from the skandhas is also unreasonable. For if the self were separate from the skandhas, then, like empty space, it could neither perform actions nor experience their results.

– Third, the view that the self is neither identical with nor separate from the skandhas is also unreasonable. For if it is held that the self is established in dependence upon the skandhas, while being neither identical with nor separate from them, then such a self would be like a jar (a jar is made from clay; it is not the clay, yet neither does it exist apart from the clay), and would not be a real self. Moreover, since it cannot be said whether the self is conditioned or unconditioned (if the self were identical with the skandhas, it would be conditioned; if separate from the skandhas, it would be unconditioned; here, because the self is said to be neither identical with nor separate from the five skandhas, it cannot be said to be either conditioned or unconditioned), neither can it be said to be self or non-self.

Therefore, none of the foregoing views of self can be established.

– Furthermore, concerning the entities posited as truly existent selves: do they engage in thought and deliberation, or do they not? If the self engages in thought and deliberation, it must be impermanent, because it does not do so at all times. If the self does not engage in thought and deliberation, then, like empty space, it can neither perform actions nor experience their results. Therefore, this view of self cannot be established.

– Furthermore, concerning the entities posited as truly existent selves: do they have activity or not? If they have activity, then the self, like the hands and feet, must be impermanent. If they have no activity, then the self, like a hare’s horn, is not a real self. Therefore, the view that the self is neither identical with nor separate from the skandhas also cannot be established.

– Furthermore, concerning the entities posited as truly existent selves: are they objects apprehended by the view of self? If they are not objects apprehended by the view of self, how do you know that they are real selves? If the self is an object apprehended by the view of self, then anyone possessing the view of self should not belong to the class of those who are deluded, because such a person would know reality as it truly is. (If a real self existed, then anyone who held that a self exists and possessed the view of self would know reality as it truly is and would not be deluded.) If so, why are those who hold that a self exists censured by those who believe the teaching of non-self, while only those who do not cling to a self are praised with the words: “Those who do not cling to a self can realize nirvana, whereas those who cling to a self sink into the cycle of birth and death”? Surely it cannot be that persons holding the wrong view of a self realize nirvana, while persons possessing the right view and not clinging to a self sink into the cycle of birth and death!

– Furthermore, views of self cannot take a real self as their object, because they have an object, just as the mind cognizes other dharmas. Moreover, the object of a view of self is certainly not a real self, precisely because it is an object, like form, fragrance, and other dharmas. Therefore, views of self do not cognize a real self. They cognize only the skandhas manifested through the transformations of internal consciousness, and then, in accordance with deluded notions, discriminate and cling to them in various ways. (4)

III. TWO KINDS OF ATTACHMENT TO SELF

– In brief, all attachment to self is of two kinds:

1. Innate.

2. Conceptually discriminated.

– Innate attachment to self is the attachment that, since beginningless time, has arisen through the power of deluded perfuming within the mind. It arises together with the body and does not depend upon false teachings and erroneous discrimination before it can arise. Rather, it manifests and operates spontaneously; therefore, it is called innate. This innate attachment is of two kinds:

1. The continuously operating kind: the seventh consciousness takes the perceiving aspect of the eighth consciousness as its object, produces within the seventh consciousness itself an appearance of that perceiving aspect of the eighth consciousness, and grasps that appearance as a real self.

2. The intermittently operating kind: the sixth consciousness takes as its object the appearance of the five appropriated skandhas manifested within itself. It may cognize all five appropriated skandhas together or each appropriated skandha separately, producing such an appearance within itself and then grasping that appearance as a real self.

These two kinds of innate attachment to self are subtle and therefore difficult to eliminate. Only later, during the stage of cultivation, through constant and thorough cultivation of the superior contemplation of the emptiness of persons (non-self of persons; at the stage of cultivation, the principle of the emptiness of persons is contemplated more deeply than at the path of seeing, and hence it is called the superior contemplation of the emptiness of persons), can they be eliminated.

– Conceptually discriminated attachment to self also arises through the power of present external conditions. It does not arise together with the body, but must await false teachings and erroneous discrimination before it can arise; therefore, it is called conceptually discriminated. This conceptually discriminated attachment to self exists only in the mental consciousness. It, too, is of two kinds:

The first takes as its object false teachings concerning the characteristics of the five skandhas, produces those characteristics within one’s own mind, and through discriminative conceptualization grasps them as a real self. The second takes as its object false teachings concerning the characteristics of a self, produces those characteristics within one’s own mind, and through discriminative conceptualization grasps them as a real self.

These two kinds of conceptually discriminated attachment to self are coarse and therefore easy to eliminate. During the cultivation of the aspect of the path of seeing, by contemplating all dharmas as suchness characterized by the emptiness of persons (the non-self of persons), they can be eliminated.

Regarding all the foregoing attachments to self in connection with the five appropriated skandhas: the appropriated skandhas outside one’s own mind may or may not exist, whereas the five appropriated skandhas that arise within one’s own mind always exist. (That the appropriated skandhas outside one’s own mind may or may not exist means the following: when one clings to a real self outside the mind, the entity of that self is wholly nonexistent, like a turtle’s hair.

When one takes as a self the appropriated skandhas that arise dependently through causes and conditions, belonging to the other-dependent nature, those appropriated skandhas truly exist, but the mind does not directly reach them, because they are the primary objects of cognition; hence they are also called external to the mind. A second meaning is this: when the seventh consciousness takes the eighth consciousness as its object and grasps it as a self, the eighth consciousness is outside the seventh consciousness and truly exists; but the sixth consciousness does not reach the eighth consciousness as its object, and thus for it the object does not exist.

Therefore, the underlying appropriated skandhas that serve as the primary objects may or may not truly exist; but the image—namely, the appearance-aspect of the appropriated skandhas transformed and produced within one’s own consciousness as the immediate object of cognition—always exists.)

Therefore, one should know that all attachment to self takes as its object the impermanent appearances of the five appropriated skandhas and falsely grasps them as a self. Yet all these appearances of the skandhas arise from conditions and exist only as illusions. Because one erroneously discriminates and grasps these five appropriated skandhas as a self, that self is certainly not truly existent. Therefore, the Sutra says: “Bhiksus, you should know that all the various views of self held by sramanas and brahmanas in the world arise by taking the appearances of the five appropriated skandhas as their objects.” (5)

IV. EXPLANATION OF AN OBJECTION

Question: - If there is no real self, how can there be such activities as remembering, knowing, reciting, learning, showing gratitude, and bearing resentment?

Answer: The real self as you maintain it to be, being permanent and unchanging, would remain the same afterward as it was before; therefore, such things as remembering, knowing, reciting, practicing, gratitude, and resentment could never occur. Alternatively, if it were the same before as afterward, remembering, knowing, reciting, practicing, gratitude, and resentment would always be present without interruption, because the essential nature of the self would not differ between the earlier and later times.

If you say that the functions of the self change between earlier and later times, but not the essential nature of the self, this reasoning is also incorrect. Since function is not separate from essence, function should be permanent like essence; and since essence is not separate from function, essence should be impermanent like function.

However, each sentient being has the eighth, fundamental consciousness, which continues from earlier to later in a uniform stream and itself preserves the seeds. These seeds and all presently active dharmas mutually serve as causes for one another. Through the power of such perfuming, remembering, knowing, and so forth become possible.

Therefore, the objection you have just raised constitutes a fault in your own doctrine, not in mine.

Question: If there is no real self, then who creates karma, and who undergoes its results?

Answer: The real self as you maintain it to be, being unchanging like empty space, could not possibly create karma or undergo its results. If the self underwent change, it would be impermanent—and thus could not be a real self.

However, because the mind and mental factors of sentient beings continue without interruption through the power of causes and conditions, there is the creation of karma and the undergoing of its results. This does not contradict reason.

Question: If there is no self, then what undergoes birth and death, revolving among the various destinies? Who becomes weary of suffering and seeks to realize nirvana?

Answer: The real self as you maintain it to be neither arises nor ceases; how, then, can it be said to undergo birth and death and revolve through samsara? Since the self is permanent like empty space, it cannot be afflicted by suffering. What would there be for it to reject in weariness and seek to realize nirvana? Therefore, your statement merely undermines your own position.

Nevertheless, because the bodies and minds of sentient beings continue under the power of afflictions and karma, there is revolving among the various destinies and the rejection of suffering in order to seek the realization of nirvana.

Therefore, it should be known with certainty that there is no real self. There are only the consciousnesses, which since beginningless time have continued in a succession wherein the earlier ceases and the later arises, with cause and effect following one another. Through the perfuming of deluded cognition, an appearance resembling a self manifests, and the foolish mistakenly cling to it as a real self. (6)

V. REFUTATION OF ATTACHMENT TO DHARMAS

—How is it that no real dharmas exist outside consciousness?

—Because the dharmas outside consciousness posited by non-Buddhist schools and the teachings of other vehicles do not, according to reason, exist.

—Why do the dharmas posited by non-Buddhist schools not exist?

The Samkhya school maintains: “The self is consciousness,” and it experiences the twenty-four principles, such as the Great Principle of Intellect and so forth. The three qualities—sattva, rajas, and tamas (vigor, agitation, and darkness; or greed, hatred, and delusion)—combine to produce them and so forth. Yet such principles as the Great Principle of Intellect are composed of the three fundamental constituents—sattva, rajas, and tamas—and are held to be real rather than provisionally designated, and apprehensible by direct perception.

That view is unreasonable. Why? Since such principles as the Great Principle of Intellect are composed of those three fundamental constituents, they are like an army or a forest: provisionally designated rather than real. How, then, can it be said that they are apprehensible by direct perception?

Moreover, if such principles as the Great Principle of Intellect really existed, then, like the three fundamental constituents—sattva, rajas, and tamas—they would not be composed of those three constituents. Again, if sattva and the others are themselves the Great Principle of Intellect and so forth, then, like the Great Principle of Intellect and so forth, they too should be composed of the three fundamental constituents and should also undergo change and be impermanent like the Great Principle of Intellect.

Moreover, each of the three fundamental constituents—sattva, rajas, and tamas—has many functions. Their essences should therefore also be multiple, because function and essence are held to be one. Further, since all three essences are held to pervade everywhere, when they undergo transformation in one place, they should also undergo transformation in all other places, because their essences are not distinct.

If the essences and characteristics of the three constituents are all distinct, how can they combine to form a single characteristic? It cannot be maintained that, upon combining, they transform into a single characteristic while their essences remain no different from when they had not yet combined. If you say that although the three constituents differ in essence, their characteristic is the same, this contradicts your doctrine that essence and characteristic are one.

The essences should be like the characteristic and be indistinctly one; the characteristic should be like the essences and be distinctly three. Therefore, it cannot be said that three essences combine to form one characteristic.

Moreover, the three constituents are the particulars, while the Great Principle of Intellect and so forth are the universals. Since the universal and the particulars are held to be one, they should be neither one nor three. When those three constituents transform, if they do not combine to form a single characteristic, they should remain as they were before transforming; how, then, do we directly perceive a single characteristic of form and so forth? If the three constituents combine to form one characteristic, they lose their original particular characteristics, and their essences should likewise be lost along with them.

It cannot be said that each of the three constituents has two characteristics—one universal and one particular—because the universal is identical with the particulars and thus should also be three. How, then, could one be perceived? If you say that the three essences each possess three characteristics which intermingle and are difficult to distinguish, and are therefore perceived as one, that also cannot be accepted. Since three characteristics are present, how could they be perceived as one? Moreover, how could it be known that the three constituents are distinct?

If each of those essences fully possesses all three characteristics, then each constituent by itself should be capable of producing form, sound, and so forth. What would it lack that would require it to await combination with the other two constituents? Each essence should also possess three characteristics, because essence is identical with characteristic.

Moreover, since such principles as the Great Principle of Intellect are all composed of the three constituents, they would not differ from one another. Consequently, cause and effect, the five subtle elements, the five gross elements, and the faculties would each be without distinction. If they were without distinction, one faculty could cognize every object, or one object could be cognized by every faculty. Thus, all sentient and insentient, pure and impure things in the world, whose essences are directly perceived or inferred, would be without any distinctions. This entails a grave error.

Therefore, it should be known that the real dharmas posited by the Samkhya school cannot be established; they are held to exist solely through the discriminations and attachments of deluded cognition. (7)

The Vaisheshika school maintains: “Most categories, such as Substance, Quality, and so forth, truly exist, possess intrinsic natures, and are apprehensible by direct perception.”

—This view is unreasonable. Why? Among those categories, whatever is permanent, if it can produce a result, must be impermanent (thesis), because it performs a function (reason), like the result that is produced (example). If it does not produce a result, it cannot possess a real intrinsic nature apart from consciousness, just as a rabbit’s horn does not.

Moreover, among impermanent things, whatever has material substance and offers resistance must have spatial direction and position. Whatever has spatial direction and position can be divided, like an army or a forest, and therefore does not possess a real nature. If it is nonresistant, like mind and mental factors, it cannot possess a real nature apart from mind and mental factors.

Moreover, the earth, water, fire, and air posited by the Vaisheshika school are not resistant material entities belonging to the category of Substance (thesis), because they are contacted by the bodily faculty (reason), like hardness, moisture, heat, and movement (example). Conversely, the very hardness, moisture, heat, and movement posited by the Vaisheshika school are not nonresistant entities belonging to the category of “Quality” (thesis), because they are contacted by the bodily faculty (reason), like earth, water, fire, and air (example).

As for the claim that earth, water, and fire, like blue and other colors, are all seen by the eye, it should be refuted according to the same reasoning. Therefore, it should be known that earth, water, fire, and air do not possess real natures distinct from hardness, moisture, and so forth, nor does the eye perceive any real earth, water, fire, or air.

Again, that Vaiśeṣika school maintains: “Among the entities included in the category of Substance, those that possess resistance and are permanent should in fact be impermanent (thesis), because they all possess resistance (reason), like gross earth and so forth (example). Among the categories, those dharmas that do not possess resistance but are apprehended by a material sense faculty should all possess resistance (thesis), because they hold that those dharmas are apprehended by a material sense faculty (reason), like earth, water, fire, and wind (example).

Again, that Vaiśeṣika school maintains five categories, such as Quality and Action, which are not included in the category of Substance. Logically, they cannot possess distinct natures apart from consciousness (thesis), because they are not included in the category of Substance (reason), like the child of a barren woman (example). Since the categories of Substance, Quality, and so forth are not included in universal existence, logically they cannot possess distinct intrinsic natures apart from consciousness (thesis), because they are not included in universal existence (reason), like a flower in the sky (example).

Again, concerning the universal existence maintained by the Vaiśeṣika school: “It has no distinct intrinsic nature apart from Substance, Quality, and so forth (thesis), because they hold that universal existence is not nonexistent (reason), like Substance and Quality (example). If it were apart from Substance, Quality, and so forth, it would not be universal existence (thesis), because they hold that universal existence is different from Substance, Quality, and so forth (reason), like absolute nonexistence (example).

Just as universal existence is not nonexistent—that is, it exists—without requiring another existence to make it existent, why should Substance, Quality, and so forth require a distinct existence to make them existent? If, apart from nonexistent dharmas, there were also a distinct nature of nonexistence, then because that is not so, how could this be so? Therefore, it should be known that the universal existence maintained by the Vaiśeṣika school is merely a fabrication of false conceptualization.

Again, that Vaiśeṣika school maintains: “The nature of commonality-and-difference belonging to Substance, Quality, and Action is distinct from the entities of Substance, Quality, and Action.” This reasoning is certainly incorrect. One must not say that this nature of commonality-and-difference is itself not the nature of commonality-and-difference belonging to Substance, Quality, and Action (thesis), because its entity is distinct from the entity of Substance (reason), like Quality and Action (example).

Again, it would logically follow that Substance, Quality, and so forth are not included among Substance, Quality, and so forth (thesis), because they are different from the nature of commonality-and-difference belonging to Substance, Quality, and so forth (reason), like Quality and Action in relation to Substance (example).

The mutual objections concerning the natures of commonality-and-difference belonging to earth, water, fire, and wind in relation to the entities of earth, water, fire, and wind should be understood by analogy with the foregoing. Just as the nature of commonality-and-difference belonging to Substance and so forth does not possess, apart from Substance and so forth, another distinct nature of commonality-and-difference that makes it a nature of commonality-and-difference, so too, apart from Substance and so forth, there should not be a distinct nature of commonality-and-difference belonging to Substance that makes Substance, Quality, and Action common and different.

If, apart from Substance, there were a distinct nature of commonality-and-difference belonging to Substance, then apart from non-Substance there should also be a distinct nature of non-commonality-and-difference belonging to non-Substance. Since that is not so, how could this be so? Therefore, it should be known that the “nature of commonality-and-difference” is merely a fictitious fabrication.

Again, the category of “Inherence” maintained by that Vaiśeṣika school certainly does not truly exist (thesis), because it is included among dharmas that are non-Substance and so forth (reason), like absolute nonexistence (example).

The Vaiśeṣika school claims: “Substance and so forth are known through direct perception.” Yet, when examined through reasoning, even these do not truly exist; how much less could the category of “Inherence,” which according to them is not known through direct perception, truly exist? Even if the category of Inherence were granted to be an object known through direct perception, by the reasoning just stated it still would not truly exist.

However, those categories of Substance and so forth are not intrinsically real entities outside consciousness that are known through direct perception (thesis), because they hold that they are objects of cognition (reason), like the hairs of a tortoise (example).

Again, the cognition that takes the “category of Substance” as its object is not included among cognitions of direct perception that apprehend the intrinsically real entity of the category of Substance outside consciousness (thesis), because it arises from a provisional combination (reason), like the cognition that takes the “category of Quality” as its object (example). Extending this explanation, even the cognition that takes the “category of Inherence” as its object is not included among cognitions of direct perception that apprehend the intrinsically real entity of the “category of Inherence” outside consciousness (thesis), because it arises from a provisional combination (reason), like the cognition that takes the “category of Substance” as its object (example).

Therefore, it should be known that the “categories of Substance and so forth” maintained by the Vaiśeṣika school are likewise merely fabrications arising from deluded conceptions. (8)

– Again, some maintain that there is a “Great Sovereign Deity whose real entity is all-pervasive and eternal and who gives birth to the myriad things.” That view is also unreasonable. Why? Because whatever is capable of producing must certainly be impermanent; whatever is impermanent certainly cannot be all-pervasive; and whatever is not all-pervasive is not truly existent. Moreover, if an entity is permanent and all-pervasive and is also endowed with every function, it should logically be present in every place and at every time and produce all dharmas simultaneously. But if it must wait for a volition and other conditions before it can produce, this contradicts the doctrine of a single cause. Alternatively, the volition and other conditions should also arise simultaneously, since they would always exist.

– In addition, some maintain that a “Brahmā,” “time,” “direction,” “the primordial origin,” “nature,” “space,” “self,” and so forth are permanent, truly existent, endowed with every function, and give rise to all dharmas. All such views are refuted in the same way as this one.

– Some maintain that “the particular class of sounds” in the five branches of knowledge—the Vedic treatises—is permanent and can serve as an authoritative measure for expressing all dharmas. Others maintain that “all sounds are permanent” and merely await the convergence of conditions to become manifest, whereupon they acquire the capacity to express.

Both of these views concerning sound are unreasonable. Why? The sounds in the five branches of knowledge that are capable of expression are not permanent (thesis), because they are held to possess the capacity to express (reason), like other sounds (example). Other sounds are likewise not eternally enduring entities of sound (thesis), because they must await conditions before they exist (reason), like jars and garments (example).

– Some non-Buddhists maintain that “the atoms of earth, water, wind, and fire truly exist, are permanent, and are capable of producing gross matter. The gross matter produced does not extend beyond the scope of its causes; therefore, although such gross matter is impermanent, its entity can truly exist.”

This view is also unreasonable. Why? If those atoms have spatial directions and positional parts, then, like a swarm of ants, their entities are not real. If they have no spatial directions or positional parts, then, like mind and mental factors, they cannot aggregate around one another to produce the effect of gross matter. Since they produce effects (reason), they are like the effects produced (example); how, then, can it be said that atoms are permanent (thesis)?

Furthermore, if the produced material effect does not extend beyond the spatial extent of its causal atoms, then, like the atoms, it cannot be called gross matter. Consequently, this material effect would not be apprehended by the material faculties, such as the eye, and this would contradict your own thesis. If it is said, “Because the material effect is conjoined with magnitude and quality, though not gross, it appears gross and can be apprehended by the material faculties,” nevertheless, since the posited material effect has the same magnitude as its causal atoms, it is like an atom and cannot be conjoined with grossness.

Or, if atoms are said to be conjoined with the property of grossness, then, like the gross material effect, they would occupy the same place. If it is said, “The material effect pervades the essential bodies of its causal atoms, and because the causes are multiple, it may be called gross,” then the substance of the material effect would not be one, just as the locations occupied by the causal atoms are distinct. If so, this material effect still cannot constitute gross matter and therefore cannot be apprehended by the material faculties.

If a material effect becomes gross through the combination of many parts, then when many causal atoms combine, they are no longer minute and are sufficient to constitute faculties and their objects; what need is there for a material effect? Since it is admitted to be constituted by the combination of many parts, it cannot truly exist. Thus it is known that your assertions contradict one another from beginning to end.

Furthermore, if both effect and cause possess resistance, they cannot occupy the same location, just as two atoms cannot. If it is said, “Effect and cause interpenetrate, as water enters sand and medicine enters molten copper,” who would accept that the substances of sand and molten copper contain water and medicine? Or, if water contains sand, the substance of the grains of sand has already changed and become separated and is neither one nor permanent. When molten copper contains medicine, the substance of the molten copper changes into gold and is no longer one or permanent.

Furthermore, if the substance of a gross material effect is one, then when consciousness apprehends one part of it, it should see all its other parts; for since this and that are one, that must necessarily be like this. If you do not accept this, you contradict observable fact. Thus, whichever way their position is examined, it cannot be established. It is merely a construction fabricated and grasped through deluded thought. (9)

Although the doctrines maintained by non-Buddhist schools are of many kinds, the entities they posit do not fall outside four categories:

– First is the assertion that an entity (such as the Great Principle and so forth of the Samkhya school) and the nature of existence (the Primal Nature of the Samkhya school) are substantially one, as maintained by the Samkhya school. This assertion is unreasonable. Why? Because one must not say that all dharmas are precisely the nature of existence. If all dharmas were precisely the nature of existence, they would all be like the nature of existence, with no differences in substance. This would contradict the doctrine that the three qualities (sattva, rajas, and tamas) and the self each have distinct substances, as held by the Samkhya school, and would also contradict the differences among dharmas directly observed in the world. Furthermore, if form and so forth were precisely the nature of form and so forth, then form should not exhibit such differences as blue and yellow.

– Second is the assertion that an entity (the substances, qualities, and actions of the Vaisheshika school) and the nature of existence (the universal category of existence of the Vaisheshika school) are substantially different, as maintained by the Vaisheshika school. This assertion is also unreasonable. Why? Because one must not say that all dharmas are devoid of the nature of existence. They would then resemble things that have perished, of which nothing can be apprehended. This contradicts the claim that the substance of the category of substance and the other categories is not nonexistent, and it also contradicts the existence of things directly observed in the world. Furthermore, if form were not the nature of form, then form should be like sound and should not be an object seen by the eye.

– Third is the assertion that an entity and its nature are both one and different, as maintained by the non-Buddhist school of the Unconscious. This assertion is also unreasonable. Why? Because asserting both oneness and difference incurs all the faults already explained above concerning oneness and difference. If the two characteristics are different, their substances must also be different. If oneness and difference have the same substance, neither can be established. One must not say that all dharmas share a single substance. Or, if oneness and difference are merely conventional and not real, yet are grasped as real, the principle cannot be established.

– Fourth is the assertion that an entity and the nature of existence are neither one nor different, as maintained by the non-Buddhist Ajivika school. This assertion is also unreasonable. Why? Because neither oneness nor difference is itself no different from asserting oneness and difference.

Is the statement “neither one nor different” a restrictive expression or an affirmative expression? If affirmative, one should not deny both. If restrictive, then nothing whatsoever is being asserted. If it is both restrictive and affirmative, it is self-contradictory. If it is neither restrictive nor affirmative, it becomes frivolous discourse. Furthermore, saying “neither one nor different” contradicts the common understanding in the world that things may be one or different. It also contradicts their own thesis that dharmas such as form are certainly and truly existent.

Therefore, it should be known that their statements are merely circuitous attempts to evade faults. Let the wise not mistakenly accept them. (10)

VI. REFUTATION OF THE DOCTRINAL ATTACHMENT TO DHARMAS IN THE OTHER VEHICLES

– The teachings of the other vehicles maintain that “apart from consciousness, dharmas such as form, fragrance, and so forth truly exist.” How can these dharmas be nonexistent?

– The dharmas posited by the Lesser Vehicle—form, fragrance, formations dissociated from mind, and unconditioned dharmas—are, according to correct reasoning, not truly existent.

The form and other phenomena posited by the Lesser Vehicle are of two kinds:

First is resistant form, which is composed of atoms.

Second is nonresistant form, which is not composed through the aggregation of atoms.

Such resistant form certainly does not truly exist, because the atoms that are supposed to constitute it do not truly exist. That is to say, if atoms possess resistance, they must be like a jar—conventional and not real. If they possess no resistance, they must be like nonmaterial phenomena; how then could they aggregate to constitute material things such as jars and garments?

Furthermore, if atoms have directions and spatial parts, they can certainly be divided and thus do not truly exist. If they have no directions or spatial parts, then they are like nonmaterial phenomena; how could they combine to form gross matter that casts a shadow when illuminated, as when sunlight shines upon a pillar and shadow and light appear respectively on its eastern and western sides? The eastern side receives the light, while the western side casts the shadow. Since the place receiving the light and the place where the shadow appears are not the same, those atoms must certainly have directions and spatial parts.

Furthermore, when the eye sees and the body touches such objects as walls, only the near side is seen and touched, while the far side is neither seen nor touched. Such objects are constituted precisely through the combination of atoms. Therefore, those atoms must certainly have directions and spatial parts.

Furthermore, wherever atoms are situated, there must certainly be distinctions of above, below, east, and west. Otherwise, atoms would be like nonmaterial phenomena, and their collective aggregation would be impossible. Or, if it is maintained that atoms interpenetrate one another, they could not constitute gross matter. Therefore, these atoms must certainly have directions and spatial parts. Moreover, it has already been maintained that resistant form consists precisely of atoms. If atoms had no directions or spatial parts, then resistant form, like the atoms, would offer no obstruction. But if it offered no obstruction, it would not be resistant form.

Therefore, the atoms posited by you must certainly have directions and spatial parts. Since they have directions and spatial parts, they can be divided; and since they can be divided, they are definitely not truly existent.

Consequently, the assertion that resistant form truly exists cannot be established.

Question: - Do not the five consciousnesses have form as their basis and their object?

Answer: Although it is not that form does not exist, that form is transformed by consciousness. That is, when consciousness arises, through the power of causes and conditions within the internal consciousness, it manifests appearances resembling the eye and visible form, taking those very appearances as the supporting faculty and the perceived object. Yet these faculties—the eye, ear, and so forth—cannot be known through direct perception; their existence is inferred only from their function of producing consciousness. They are merely a kind of functional capacity and are not produced from external form.

External obstructive form is logically untenable; therefore, it is only a manifestation transformed by internal consciousness. Because of its capacity to produce eye-consciousness, it is called the eye faculty, and so forth. It is the support upon which eye-consciousness and the other consciousnesses arise.

Logically, an external perceived-object condition for eye-consciousness does not truly exist. It must therefore be accepted that what is transformed by consciousness itself serves as the perceived-object condition—namely, the appearance resembling it that gives rise to consciousness. Your assertion that it is the perceived-object condition is incorrect, because the mere capacity to cause consciousness to arise does not make something a perceived-object condition.

Otherwise, causes and conditions and the like would also have to be regarded as perceived-object conditions of consciousness. (A perceived-object condition of consciousness must possess both of two meanings: first, it must be capable of producing consciousness; second, it must be an object apprehended by consciousness. The five faculties are capable only of producing the five consciousnesses and are not objects apprehended by those five consciousnesses; therefore, the five faculties cannot be called perceived-object conditions.

If the five faculties were called perceived-object conditions merely because they produce consciousness, then causal conditions and immediately antecedent conditions also have the capacity to produce consciousness—would they not absurdly all have to be regarded as perceived-object conditions as well?)

Some may hold that when the five consciousnesses—eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, and so forth—discern visible forms and sounds, they apprehend only the composite appearances of visible form and sound, which resemble the appearances of those atoms. This too is incorrect, because no separate real entity consisting of the composite appearances of visible form and sound exists apart from the atoms. When those composite appearances of visible form and sound are analyzed, the consciousness apprehending appearances of visible form and sound composed of atoms certainly no longer arises.

Since that composite appearance does not truly exist, it cannot be said to be a condition for the five consciousnesses. Otherwise, a second moon could also serve as a condition producing the five consciousnesses. (The second moon seen because of defective vision is only an object of perception; it does not truly exist and cannot serve as a condition producing consciousness.)

Nor can the atoms in a state of aggregation serve as perceived objects for the five consciousnesses, because no atomic appearance is perceived by the five consciousnesses. (Atoms are apprehended only by mental consciousness.)

Nor do the atoms inherently possess a composite appearance, because when they are not aggregated, that composite appearance does not exist.

Furthermore, the essential appearances of the atoms do not differ between the aggregated and unaggregated states. Therefore, whether aggregated or unaggregated, the atoms of visible form and the like are not the perceived objects of the five consciousnesses.

Some maintain: “When each atom of visible form and the like is not aggregated, it is not a perceived object of the five consciousnesses. But when atoms are aggregated, they mutually assist one another in producing a coarse appearance, which becomes a perceived object of consciousness. That appearance truly exists as a perceived object.”

This position is incorrect. The essential appearance of an atom remains the same whether it is aggregated or not. Moreover, since the atoms of such objects as jars and basins are identical, the consciousness apprehending their appearances should not differ. Also, in the aggregated state, each atom would have to relinquish its inherent subtle, rounded appearance.

Furthermore, a consciousness that apprehends a coarse appearance does not also apprehend subtle appearances. Otherwise, a consciousness apprehending these objects would also apprehend other objects, and a single consciousness would apprehend all objects. Even accepting the existence of atoms entails such errors; how much more so when no real atoms exist outside consciousness. (Why, then, maintain that atoms exist outside consciousness?)

Therefore, it is known with certainty that an appearance resembling visible form is manifested through the transformation of consciousness itself and serves as the perceived-object condition, because the perceiving aspect arises in dependence upon it while simultaneously bearing that appearance.

Yet when consciousness transforms, according to the magnitude of the object it immediately manifests a single appearance; it does not separately transform into many atoms and then combine them into one object.

Because people cling to coarse form as possessing a real entity, the Buddha taught atoms so that they might analyze and eliminate that attachment; the Buddha did not say that visible forms truly consist of atoms. Yogic practitioners use contemplative wisdom to conceptually analyze the appearance of coarse form, proceeding step by step until it can no longer be analyzed, and provisionally call that an atom. Although an atom still has direction and spatial parts, it can no longer be analyzed. If the analysis continues, an appearance resembling empty space will manifest and can no longer be called form. Therefore, the atom is said to be the ultimate limit of form.

It should therefore be known that all obstructive forms are manifested through the transformation of consciousness and are not composed of aggregated atoms.

Non-obstructive forms, being of the same category, likewise do not truly exist. Or, because they are non-obstructive like mind and mental factors, they are certainly not real forms.

Obstructive forms presently display visible appearances, yet upon logical examination they do not exist apart from consciousness. How much less could non-obstructive forms, which presently display no visible appearances, be said to be truly existent form-dharmas? (11)

Question: Are “manifest form” and “unmanifest form” not truly existent?

Answer: They are not truly existent. Why? Consider the manifest form of the body: if it truly existed, what would constitute its essential nature?

If bodily shape and dimensions were taken as its nature, then it would not truly exist, because shape and dimensions can be analyzed down to atoms, at which point length, shortness, and so forth could no longer exist. If bodily movement were taken as its nature, it likewise would not truly exist, because dharmas perish as soon as they arise, leaving no possibility of movement from place to place. Conditioned dharmas perish of themselves and need not await a cause or condition in order to perish.

If cessation still had to await a cause, it would not be cessation. If one said that there is a form that is neither color nor shape, but is produced by the mind and moves the hands and feet, and that this is called bodily manifest karma, this too would be unreasonable. If that form were movement, it would be refuted as above.

If it were the cause of movement, it would be wind; but wind manifests nothing and therefore cannot be called manifest. Moreover, if this wind were bodily tangibility, tangibility does not possess both wholesome and unwholesome natures, whereas bodily karma can be either wholesome or unwholesome. Furthermore, if it were odor or flavor, these are not visible forms and are known through contact.

Therefore, bodily manifest karma does not truly exist.

Nevertheless, with mind as the cause, the fundamental consciousness transforms and manifests appearances of form in the hands and feet. These arise and cease in succession, passing from one position to another so that movement appears to occur and the mind is thereby expressed. This is provisionally called bodily manifestation.

Verbal manifest karma likewise does not truly possess the nature of sound taken as verbal manifestation, because a sound lasting a single instant cannot express anything, while a succession of many instants is not real. Furthermore, external obstructive form has already been refuted above. Nevertheless, with the sixth consciousness as the cause, the fundamental consciousness transforms and manifests what resembles sound. This arises and ceases in succession and appears to express meaning; to designate it provisionally as verbal manifestation does not contradict reason.

Since manifest form is not real, how could unmanifest form be real? Nevertheless, based upon mental intention and aspiration, and upon the distinct limitations of good and evil, it is provisionally designated “unmanifest.” In principle, this is not contradictory. That is to say, this unmanifest form is established either on the basis of the increase of the seed of volition, which is capable of giving rise to good and evil bodily and verbal acts; or on the basis of the presently active mental factor of volition during meditative concentration, which is capable of restraining evil bodily and verbal acts. Therefore, it exists only provisionally.

Question: In the sutras, the Blessed One taught that there are three kinds of karma. Now, by refuting bodily karma in this manner, do you not contradict the sutras?

Answer: This does not deny its existence; it only says that it is not real form. The mental factor of volition that moves the body is called bodily karma; the mental factor of volition that gives rise to speech is called verbal karma. Deliberative volition and decisive volition, being associated with and acting upon the mind, are called mental karma.

When the mental factor of volition arises through body and speech and performs an action, it is called karma. Body and speech are the courses along which deliberative volition and decisive volition proceed. Furthermore, because that good or evil karma, as a cause, produces painful or pleasant karmic results, it is also called a path; collectively, these are called paths of karma.

Therefore, the aforementioned seven paths of karma—the three bodily and four verbal—also all take volition as their intrinsic nature. Alternatively, bodily and verbal manifestations, which are not themselves karma, are set in motion by the mental factor of volition and are provisionally called karma. Since they are the paths traversed by volition, they are called paths of karma.

Thus one should know that there is in reality no external form; it is only produced through the transformation of inner consciousness and appears as though it were external form.(12)

– The factors dissociated from mind are likewise not truly existent. Why? Because factors dissociated from mind, such as “acquisition,” “non-acquisition,” and so forth, do not, like form, mind, and mental factors, possess clearly discernible characteristics. There cannot be factors dissociated from mind that are distinct from form, mind, and mental factors and possess functions of their own. Therefore, one should know that factors dissociated from mind are not truly existent. They are only provisionally established on the basis of particular states of form, mind, and mental factors. They certainly cannot possess real substance and real function apart from form, mind, and mental factors (thesis), because they are included within the formations skandha (reason), like form and mind (example). Or, because they are not included within mind, mental factors, form, or the unconditioned, they are like utterly nonexistent entities and therefore certainly are not truly existent. Or, because they are not included among other real dharmas, they are like other provisional dharmas and do not possess real substance.

Treatise Master: How, then, do they of the Lesser Vehicle know that “acquisition” and “non-acquisition” possess real substance and function apart from form and mind?

The Lesser Vehicle replies: Because the scriptures say so. For example, a sutra says: “A pudgala—an ordinary person, a sentient being—acquires good and evil qualities, while a noble one acquires the ten dharmas of one beyond training” (the Noble Eightfold Path, together with right liberation and right knowledge; an ordinary person does not possess these). It also says: “Ordinary beings do not acquire the noble dharmas, while arhats do not acquire the afflictions.” Here the terms “acquire” and “do not acquire” reveal the meanings of “acquisition” and “non-acquisition.”

Treatise Master: The sutras do not say that “acquisition” and “non-acquisition” possess real substance and function apart from form and mind. Therefore, the citation above does not establish your claim. A sutra also says: “A Wheel-Turning King possesses the seven treasures.” Does this mean that he literally acquires other persons and insentient things? (The first five treasures are other persons, and the last two are insentient things.) If you say that, because he exercises sovereign power over the seven treasures, he is provisionally said to “possess” them, why do you not similarly allow the expression to be used provisionally with regard to good and evil dharmas, instead of insisting that “acquisition” truly exists?

If you say that the seven treasures are present and therefore can provisionally be said to be “possessed,” how do you know that the good and evil dharmas that are acquired exist apart from the present? If they were apart from the present, then good and evil dharmas could not reasonably have real existence. In the present, seeds of good, evil, and so forth certainly exist.

Furthermore, what extraordinary function does “acquisition” perform in relation to dharmas? If you say that “acquisition” is capable of serving as a cause for the arising of dharmas, then it should also be able to serve as a cause for the arising of unconditioned dharmas. Moreover, insentient things, which have no “acquisition,” should never arise; and things not yet acquired or already lost should never arise again. Yet in fact they do arise. If you say that they arise because “co-arising acquisition” serves as their cause, then the two kinds of arising you posit—arising and the arising of arising—become useless.

Furthermore, if a cause possessing all three natures—good, evil, and indeterminate—is taken to be co-arising acquisition, then good, evil, and indeterminate dharmas should arise all at once. If they must await other conditions before arising, then “acquisition” becomes useless. If “acquisition,” in relation to a dharma, is precisely the cause that prevents its loss, and sentient beings thereby acquire good and evil qualities, nevertheless all the good and evil dharmas that can be acquired are never apart from sentient beings. Apart from sentient beings, there is no real “acquisition” whatsoever. Therefore, “acquisition” is useless in relation to dharmas.

Since “acquisition” is not truly existent, “non-acquisition” is likewise so.

Nevertheless, based upon the dharmas that sentient beings are capable of acquiring, three kinds of acquisition are provisionally established according to their particular states: first, acquisition as seed; second, acquisition as mastery; and third, acquisition as present activity. In opposition to these, the designation “non-acquisition” is provisionally established. Although there are many kinds of this, here, with regard to the state in which the seeds of the afflictions of the three realms that are to be abandoned through seeing have not yet been permanently destroyed, “non-acquisition” is provisionally established and is called the “nature of an ordinary being,” because the noble dharmas have not yet been acquired.

Furthermore, how do they of the Lesser Vehicle know that, apart from form, mind, and mental factors, there truly exists a dharma called “commonality”? Because the scriptures say so. For example, a scripture says: “This is the commonality of celestial beings; this is the commonality of human beings,” and so forth in detail. (It is the common feature shared among celestial beings, or among human beings.)

Treatise Master: This sutra does not say that, apart from form, mind, and mental factors, there truly exists a separate dharma called commonality. Therefore, the citation above does not establish your claim.

If you say that common cognitions and common expressions arise because of “commonality,” and that one should therefore know that “commonality” truly exists, then by the same reasoning grasses and trees should also possess commonality. (According to the definition, commonality applies only to sentient beings.) Furthermore, if cognitions and expressions of sameness arise because of “commonality,” then “commonality” should in turn possess another “commonality.” Yet since that is not so, how could this be so?

Furthermore, if you say that common actions and common intentions arise only because “commonality” serves as their cause, and that one should therefore know that the “dharma of commonality” truly exists, this too is unreasonable. Common actions arise because previous habituation serves as their cause; what need is there to posit a separate, truly existent dharma called “commonality” as their cause?

Nevertheless, based upon the particular states in which the bodies and minds of sentient beings resemble one another, “commonality” is provisionally established.

Furthermore, how is it known that, apart from form, mind, and mental factors, there truly exists a “life faculty”? They of the Lesser Vehicle reply: Because the scriptures say so. For example, a scripture says: “Vitality, warmth, and consciousness are three” (life span, warmth, and consciousness). Therefore, one should know that there is a “life faculty” called vitality.

Treatise Master: This sutra does not say that, apart from form and mind, there truly exists a separate substance of life span. Therefore, that citation does not establish your claim.

Furthermore, it has already been established above that “form, namely warmth, is not separate from consciousness.” One should therefore know that, apart from consciousness, there is likewise no life faculty here, because the life faculty is one aspect of form.

Furthermore, if the “life faculty” truly existed apart from consciousness, then, like feeling, perception, and so forth, it would not truly be the “life faculty.”

Question: If these three dharmas do not exist in that way, why does the sutra say that there are the three dharmas of life span, warmth, and consciousness?

Treatise Master: Because their meanings differ, they are spoken of as three, just as the four right efforts are taught as four because their meanings differ, although they consist solely of diligence.

Question: — (If there is no consciousness), then in the state of no-mind, should not vitality and warmth also be absent?

Answer: — Does not the sutra say that consciousness does not depart from the body?

Question: — If (consciousness does not depart from the body), then why is it called the state of no-mind?

Answer: — In that state, only the manifesting consciousnesses cease, and therefore it is called no-mind; it is not that the alaya-consciousness ceases. The reasons for the existence of this alaya-consciousness will be explained clearly below. This very alaya-consciousness is fully capable of serving as the basis for the three realms, the six destinies, and the four modes of birth. It is the pervasively present and continuously enduring maturation-result; therefore, there is no need laboriously to posit a separate, truly existent “life faculty.”

Nevertheless, based on the seeds that directly generate this eighth consciousness, and on the distinct potency of previous karma that draws it to a particular place and sustains it for a definite period, the “life faculty” is provisionally established.

Furthermore, how do (the adherents of the Lesser Vehicle know that) the two “no-mind concentrations” (the concentration of non-perception and the concentration of cessation) and the maturation-result of the heaven of non-perception are distinct from form, mind, and mental factors and possess a truly existent intrinsic nature? (The Lesser Vehicle answers:) — If the two no-mind concentrations and the maturation-result of non-perception did not truly exist, they could not prevent mind and mental factors from manifestly arising. (The author of the Treatise replies:) If, in a state of no-mind, there were a real dharma distinct from form and mind, capable of preventing mind and mental factors from arising, and it were therefore called a no-mind concentration,

then when one is in the formless realm, should there not likewise be a separate formless dharma, distinct from form and mind, that obstructs form and is therefore called a formless concentration?

Since that is not so, why should this be so?

Moreover, why must there be a real dharma to obstruct the mind? Just as a dike, though a provisionally existent dharma, can still serve as an obstruction. That is to say, when cultivating concentration, one applies effort toward concentration, becomes disenchanted with coarse and agitated mind and mental factors, and gives rise to a superior aspiration to restrain mind and mental factors, causing them gradually to become subtle.

This perfumes the maturation-consciousness and forms an extremely powerful seed of disenchantment with mind. By impairing and subduing the seeds of mind, coarse and agitated mind temporarily does not manifest; and based on that state in which mind does not manifest, the two no-mind concentrations are provisionally established. Because this seed is wholesome, the concentration is also called wholesome.

Those who cultivate the concentration of non-perception first seek the fruition of non-perception, thereby perfuming and forming seeds that induce the maturation-consciousness in the heaven of non-perception. There, the coarse and agitated perceptions that depend upon the maturation-consciousness no longer manifest. On that very state, the concentration of non-perception is established. Because it is established on the basis of the maturation-consciousness, it is called a maturation-result.

Therefore, it should be known that the three dharmas—the “concentration of non-perception,” the “concentration of cessation,” and the “maturation-result of non-perception” (the fruition of non-perception)—also do not truly exist.

(End of Fascicle One of the Chinese Text)

NOTES

(1). It is customary for treatise masters, whenever composing a treatise, to begin with words of reverence and refuge to the Three Jewels.

So it is here as well. When the treatise masters Bandhushri, Citrabhana, and others undertook to compose treatises explaining Bodhisattva Vasubandhu’s Thirty Verses on Consciousness-Only, they likewise began with this four-line verse to express their reverence and refuge to the Three Jewels.

The nature of Consciousness-Only is the perfectly accomplished nature, the nature of suchness. As a line in this verse says: “This is the ultimate meaning of all dharmas; it is also precisely suchness. Because its nature is eternally thus, it is the true nature of Consciousness-Only.”

The nature of Consciousness-Only is the true nature of suchness of all dharmas, the basis of both delusion and awakening, and that which is realized by noble ones.

To pay homage to the nature of Consciousness-Only is to pay homage to the Jewel of the Dharma. To realize the nature of Consciousness-Only completely is to have transformed the eight consciousnesses into the four wisdoms and attained the transformation of the basis: relinquishing the defiled portion dependent upon the fundamental consciousness and attaining the purified portion dependent upon the fundamental consciousness, thereby becoming liberated from cyclic birth and death and transformational birth and death.

One who has completely realized the nature of Consciousness-Only is a Buddha, the Jewel of the Buddha. Those who have only transformed the sixth consciousness into the wisdom of wondrous observation and the seventh consciousness into the wisdom of the nature of equality, have eliminated the ten major obstructions and realized the ten aspects of suchness, but have realized the nature of Consciousness-Only only in part, are the bodhisattva members of the noble Sangha, the Jewel of the Sangha.

(2) This passage states three reasons for composing the Treatise:

a. To show sentient beings that attachment to self and attachment to dharmas are erroneous and inverted forms of attachment. It is precisely because of attachment to self that greed, hatred, and delusion arise, becoming the afflictive obstruction, which prevents the realization of liberating nirvana. It is precisely because of attachment to dharmas that the cognitive obstruction arises, preventing one from seeing ultimate truth and realizing great bodhi. If one clearly understands the emptiness of self and the emptiness of dharmas, one will destroy attachment to self and attachment to dharmas, completely eliminate the afflictive and cognitive obstructions, and realize nirvana and bodhi, liberation, peace, and bliss (this is the view of Treatise Master Sthiramati).

b. Attachment to self and attachment to dharmas arise because the principle of Consciousness-Only is not correctly understood. If one understands the principle of Consciousness-Only, the maladies of attachment to self and attachment to dharmas disappear, and one is no longer bound within the cycle of birth and death (this is the view of Citrabhana).

c. To eliminate four erroneous forms of attachment that arise solely because the principle of Consciousness-Only is not correctly understood. For example, the Sarvastivada school relies on the Agama sutras, in which the Buddha taught the twelve ayatanas and so forth, and then maintains that all twelve ayatanas—including both mind and its objects—are equally real.

They fail to understand that the Buddha taught the twelve ayatanas for the purpose of revealing the principle of no-self, not to assert that the twelve ayatanas truly exist. If one clearly understands the principle of Consciousness-Only, one will understand that the six sense objects are all objective aspects transformed by consciousness, while the five sense faculties exist only as the potency of the seeds of form dependent upon the fundamental consciousness.

Or, for example, the Bhavaviveka school relies on the Mahayana teaching that all things are devoid of intrinsic nature and consequently repudiates all form and mind as entirely nonexistent: not only is the ultimate truth empty, but the conventional truth is empty as well. If one clearly understands the principle of Consciousness-Only, one will understand that the dependently arisen nature—its perceiving aspect and objective aspect arising through conditions—does exist; it is not empty and nonexistent like the imaginary constructions produced by attachment to self and attachment to dharmas.

Or, for example, a class of bodhisattvas of the provisional vehicle relies on the Mahayana teaching, “Mind gives rise to all dharmas,” and then maintains that there is only one mind whose functions assume many different forms. They fail to understand that the Mahayana teaching speaks of the one mind, suchness, and the Tathagata-garbha in order to show that the principle and essence of all dharmas are nondual, not to say that the eight consciousnesses lack their own distinct seeds, modes of activity, and objects.

From the standpoint of ultimate truth, their essential nature is nondual; but from the standpoint of conventional truth, their characteristics and functions differ. Therefore, regarding the consciousnesses, the Lankavatara Sutra says: “Mind, manas, and consciousness: conventionally, their characteristics differ; ultimately, their characteristics do not differ, because both the characterizing and the characterized are empty.” Within ultimate truth, neither subject nor object has any characteristic; therefore, they cannot be said to be either one or different, and attachment to either unity or difference is erroneous.

Yet within the conventionally existent realm of conditioned arising, to insist that they are neither one nor different is also incorrect. If one clearly understands the principle of Consciousness-Only, this attachment will no longer remain. Or, for example, the Sautrantika school relies on the sutra’s words, “Defilement and purity depend upon mind,” and consequently maintains that mental factors are merely attributes of consciousness and have no distinct essence or function.

They fail to understand that the sutra says defilement and purity depend upon mind; it does not say that they depend upon mental factors. This is because mind is the master and is preeminent, whereas mental factors are servants and subordinate. If one clearly understands the principle of Consciousness-Only, one will understand that mind and mental factors each have their own distinct place (this is the view of Dharmapala).

(3). This is the most essential passage, encompassing the entire meaning and principle of the Treatise; the passages that follow are extensive explanations of this passage.

At the outset, the author of the Treatise poses a question himself in order to provide an occasion for an answer that will clarify the principle of Consciousness-Only.

Question: If there is only consciousness and nothing whatsoever exists apart from it, why then do ordinary people, and even Buddhists, speak of the existence of a self and of dharmas?

Things and phenomena are limitless and boundless, yet the single word “dharma” encompasses them all. A dharma is “that which maintains its own nature and provides a standard by which understanding arises.” Anything whatsoever—whether visible or invisible, conditioned or unconditioned, sentient or insentient, material or conceptual, temporal or spatial, truth or law, essence or phenomenon, provisional or real, and so forth—that maintains its own distinctive nature and serves as an object of cognition whereby it is known as what it is, is called a dharma.

Here, however, “dharmas” are divided into two categories: sentient beings and insentient things. To perceive an individual selfhood in a sentient being is attachment to self; to perceive an individual, real substance in an insentient thing is attachment to dharmas. Thus, speaking of self and dharmas encompasses all things and phenomena.

According to the principle of Consciousness-Only, nothing exists or is present apart from consciousness. Why, then, do worldly people and Buddhists alike still speak of self and dharmas? Do those selves and dharmas not exist outside consciousness?

The verse replies:

Because selves, dharmas, and so forth are provisionally designated...

This reply in verse is by Vasubandhu. It opens the Thirty Verses, and the essential doctrine of Consciousness-Only is contained entirely within these first six lines of verse.

The author of the treatise does not deny that worldly people and Buddhists speak of self and dharmas, but such selves and dharmas are merely provisional designations. A provisional designation exists only in verbal convention, not in actuality. If, relying on the verbal designations “self” and “dharmas,” one searches for where the real substances of self and dharmas may be found, it is no different from hearing of a turtle’s hair and then going in search of it—an utterly mistaken endeavor. They are spoken of even though they do not truly exist; hence they are called provisional designations. Provisionally designating self and dharmas is synonymous with provisionally designating all things and phenomena.

The self and dharmas spoken of by worldly people are entirely fabricated through deluded imagination, without being based on any actual substance; these are provisional designations that have no real basis and merely accord with subjective conceptions.

The self and dharmas spoken of in Buddhism are provisionally established on the basis of dependently arisen material and mental phenomena. The noble ones have realized that all dharmas arise dependently and are born of conditions. Within the five skandhas, twelve ayatanas, eighteen dhatus, and so forth, there is nothing that can definitively be identified as a self or as dharmas belonging to a self. Nevertheless, the Buddha provisionally spoke of self and dharmas as an expedient means for guiding sentient beings. Therefore, these too are called provisional designations; they are provisional designations established upon an existing basis.

The characteristics of self spoken of in Buddhism include the following: one who has completely eliminated the afflictions of views is said to have attained the fruit of stream-entry; one who has eliminated the first six grades of the afflictions of thought in the Desire Realm is said to have attained the fruit of once-returning; and so forth, up to those who have completely eliminated the two obstructions—the afflictive obstruction and the cognitive obstruction—and are called arhats, pratyekabuddhas, Tathagatas, and so forth.

The characteristics of dharmas spoken of in Buddhism include the five skandhas, twelve ayatanas, eighteen dhatus, Four Truths, twelve links of dependent origination, six paramitas, and so forth. All such characteristics of self and dharmas are provisionally established in dependence upon the transformations of consciousness.

Consciousness has the nature of discerning and cognizing. All eight primary consciousnesses and their associated mental factors possess this nature of discerning cognition. How does this discernment occur?

The essential nature of consciousness is discernment. When it undergoes transformation, two aspects appear: one aspect has the capacity to discriminate and cognize, and is called the perceiving aspect; the other lacks the capacity to discriminate and merely serves as the object of the perceiving aspect, and is called the perceived aspect. In other words, these are the knowing aspect and the known aspect.

These two aspects always arise and cease together: when one exists, the other exists; when one is absent, the other is absent. In themselves, neither of these two aspects is a self or a dharma. Yet deluded ordinary beings rely on the knowing aspect and cling to it as a self, and rely on the known aspect and cling to it as dharmas.

This is a contrived provisional establishment; apart from these two aspects, the knowing and the known, there is nothing that can be called self or dharmas. Thus, self and dharmas are provisionally established on the basis of the perceiving and perceived aspects of internal consciousness. Such self and dharmas therefore exist only in the conventional sense; that is, they are false and are counteracted by the noble path.

Internal consciousness, however, arises through conditions and exists both in the conventional sense and in the ultimate sense. As the Buddha taught, the nature of dependent origination of all dharmas abides perpetually; it does not come into existence when a Buddha appears in the world, nor cease to exist when no Buddha appears in the world.

(4). This passage presents various forms of attachment to self in order to refute them. One point requires attention: Does the substance of the self to which one clings serve as the object of the view of self? If it does not serve as the object of the view of self, then it is something without any trace whatsoever; how could one know it to be a real self? If it truly exists, leaves discernible traces, and serves as the object of the view of self, then would those who perceive a self be perceiving correctly, and, because they perceive correctly, attain liberation and nirvana, while those who perceive non-self would be perceiving incorrectly and, because they perceive incorrectly, remain submerged in birth and death? How could this be so!

Furthermore, the view of self cannot take a real self as its object, because it has its own distinct object, just as the mind takes other dharmas as its objects. When the mind takes other dharmas as its objects, such as forms, sounds, and so forth, it takes as its object only the perceived aspect manifested within consciousness; it does not take as its object any form or sound outside consciousness. Likewise, when the view of self takes a self as its object, it takes as its object only the appearance of a provisional self manifested within consciousness, not any real self outside consciousness.

Moreover, the object of the view of self is certainly not a real self. If the object of the view of self were a real self, that real self would become an object of cognition. Once the real self had become an object of cognition, it would become an insentient, unknowing object, like the other dharmas that are objects of consciousness, and would no longer be a real self.

A real self would have to be the sovereign agent, the subject, rather than an insentient object.

(5). This passage distinguishes the characteristics of attachment to self. In summary, there are two kinds of attachment to self:

a. Innate attachment to self is attachment whose seed or latent potential already exists within the storehouse consciousness and arises together with the body. This means that whenever there is a body, this attachment is present; it does not need to await exposure to false teachings or discriminative mental activity before arising. It is therefore called innate.

This innate attachment is of two kinds:

– The first is continuously present. It occurs because the seventh consciousness takes the perceiving aspect of the eighth consciousness as its object and clings to it as a self. This is the source of delusion, fundamental ignorance, exceedingly subtle, hidden, firm, continuous, and constant. It can be eliminated, and the fruit of arhatship realized, only through sustained and profound contemplation of the principle of the emptiness and non-self of persons. Because the seventh consciousness, manas, and the eighth consciousness, the storehouse consciousness, are uninterrupted, they remain continuously present whether one is awake or asleep, dying or living, unless one has thoroughly realized the principle of non-self.

– The second is intermittent. It occurs because the sixth, mental consciousness takes the five external skandhas as its objects and clings to them as a self, after which this is perfumed into a seed within the storehouse consciousness. Whenever there is a body, this attachment is present. Yet because the five skandhas are impermanent and the sixth consciousness is subject to change, the appearance of self to which it clings is also intermittent. Nevertheless, because it has long been deeply rooted, it too can be eliminated only through a thorough realization of the principle of non-self.

b. Discriminatively produced attachment to self is an attachment of the mental consciousness. It does not arise together with the body, but must await exposure to false teachings and discriminative mental activity before attachment occurs. Without the external condition of false teachings and without discriminative mental activity, this attachment does not arise. It too is of two kinds:

– The first arises when one hears false teachings declaring that the combination of the five skandhas is the self, or that the combination of the four great elements is the self, and consequently clings to such a self.

– The second arises when one hears false teachings declaring that there is a small self, a soul existing apart from the physical body, and consequently clings to such a self.

Both kinds of discriminatively produced attachment to self are coarse and easy to eliminate. Once one learns to contemplate the principle of the emptiness of persons—the emptiness of self and the non-self of the person—and attains the path of seeing, they are immediately eliminated.

The seventh consciousness takes the presently functioning view-part of the eighth consciousness as its object and grasps it as a self. This is an error, because the view-part is merely the view-part; it is not a self. The sixth consciousness takes the five skandhas as its object and grasps them as a self.

This too is an error, because the five skandhas are impermanent and unreal. As the Agama Sutras teach: “Contemplate form as a mass of foam, feeling as a bubble upon water, perception as a mirage in the heat, formations as a plantain tree, and all consciousnesses as an illusion” (contemplate the form skandha as foam upon water, the feeling skandha as a water bubble, the perception skandha as a mirage, the formation skandha as a plantain tree—when peeled to the very center, it has no core—and contemplate the consciousness skandha as an illusory performance).

(6). This passage answers three objections. It has long been believed that the self is the sovereign, eternal principle and the fundamental capacity underlying all acts of remembering, knowing, reciting, learning, and so forth. If it is now said that there is only consciousness and no self, how could remembering, knowing, reciting, learning, and so forth occur? These doubts may be summarized in three questions:

– The first question concerns the three times:

– If there is no self, how can one remember past events, know present events, and recite and learn things for the future? Therefore, must there not be a single, real, permanent self extending throughout the three times for these activities to be possible?

Answer: No. If there truly were a single and permanent entity called the self, unchanged from beginning to end, neither increasing nor diminishing and always remaining exactly the same, how could remembering, knowing, reciting, and learning occur? Sometimes there is remembrance and sometimes there is not; sometimes there is knowledge and sometimes there is not; sometimes there is recitation and learning and sometimes there is not.

Otherwise, one would either always remember, know, recite, and learn, or never remember, know, recite, or learn at all. If it is maintained that the entity of the self is single and permanent, while the functions of the self are impermanent and subject to change, and that remembering, knowing, reciting, and learning are thereby possible, this too is incorrect. Function is not separate from its essence: as the essence is, so must its function be.

How, then, could the function differ from the essence?

– The second question concerns the creation of karma and the experiencing of its results:

– If there is no self, who creates karma, and who undergoes its results?

Answer: If one grasps as real a single, permanent, unchanging self like empty space, how could it create karma or undergo its results?

– The third question concerns samsara and nirvana:

– If there is no real self, who undergoes samsara, and what attains nirvana?

Answer: If one grasps as real a single and permanent self that neither arises nor ceases, like empty space, then there could be no birth, death, or samsara. If there were no samsara, there could be no nirvana, for it is because there is samsara that samsara may be brought to an end and nirvana entered. If there were no samsara, what could be ended in order to enter nirvana?

Nevertheless, each sentient being has consciousness and mind. Although these are impermanent, they continue from before to after as a succession of the same kind and are capable of being perfumed by acts of remembering, knowing, reciting, and learning, as well as of creating karma and thereby experiencing the results of birth and death and attaining nirvana. As the Great Nirvana Sutra teaches: “Bodhisattva Lion’s Roar addressed the Buddha: ‘World-Honored One, the five skandhas of sentient beings are empty, and nothing truly exists. Who, then, receives the teachings and cultivates the path?’

“The Buddha said: ‘Good man, all sentient beings possess a mind of mindfulness, a mind of wisdom, a mind that arouses aspiration, a mind of diligence, a mind of concentration, and so forth. Although such dharmas arise and cease from moment to moment, those before and after resemble one another and continue without interruption. Therefore, there can be the receiving of teachings and cultivation of the path.

It is like the flame of a lamp: although it arises and ceases from moment to moment, its light can dispel darkness. It is also like sentient beings eating: although food changes from one instant to the next, it can still satisfy the hungry. It is also like medicine used to treat illness: although it changes from moment to moment, it can still cure the illness.

Or it is like the light of the sun and moon: although it arises and ceases from moment to moment, it can still cause plants and trees to grow. The minds of sentient beings are likewise. Although they arise and cease from moment to moment, they continue without interruption and can therefore cause remembering, knowing, reciting, learning, and so forth to develop.’

(7). This passage presents and refutes the attachments held by non-Buddhist schools. It first refutes the Samkhya school’s attachment to the twenty-five principles.

Samkhya is an ancient Indian philosophical school that arose before the time of the Buddha. The Vietnamese term Số, or Tăng-khư, is a phonetic rendering of the Sanskrit “Samkhya,” a doctrine propounded by Kapila. Through the cultivation of meditative concentration, he gained the ability to know events extending eighty thousand kalpas into the past, but beyond that everything was obscure and unknowable to him.

He regarded this as the Primordial Principle (also called the Primordial Principle of Illumination, the Nature of Illumination, Primordial Nature, or Supreme Nature). From the Primordial Principle arises the great intellect; from the great intellect arises the ego-mind; from the ego-mind arise the five subtle elements (form, sound, smell, taste, and touch); from the five subtle elements arise the five great elements (earth, water, fire, wind, and space); from the five great elements arise the five cognitive faculties (eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body); from the five cognitive faculties arise the five faculties of action (mouth, hands, feet, the excretory passage, and the urinary passage); from the five faculties of action arises the impartial mind (the faculty of mentation);

and finally there is the personal self.

Together these constitute the twenty-five principles (abodes of Brahma), the source of the myriad dharmas.

The inherent nature of the spiritual self is “thought”: it thinks of desirable objects in order to enjoy them. The three qualities within the Nature of Illumination—sattva, rajas, and tamas—then combine to produce the twenty-three principles (of the twenty-five, when the Nature of Illumination and the spiritual self are excluded, twenty-three remain). When the spiritual self enjoys those objects, it becomes bound and cannot attain liberation. If the spiritual self brings “thought” to an end—that is, if it no longer thinks of and constructs objects—it attains liberation.

According to Samkhya, the Nature of Illumination is permanent, while the three qualities undergo transformation to produce the other twenty-three principles. Those twenty-three principles, being composed through the combination of the three qualities, are impermanent. Whether permanent or impermanent, however, all are regarded as truly existent dharmas.

The author of the Treatise takes their attachment as described above and refutes it, showing them that the twenty-five principles are not real but are merely erroneous attachments produced by deluded sentiments.

(8). This passage refutes the various attachments to real existence held by the Vaisesika school.

– Vaisesika, also rendered Vệ-thế-sử-ca, is translated from the Sanskrit “Vaisesika.” It arose around the first or second century CE and was propounded by Uluka, or Kanada. This doctrine was recorded in the Vaisesika Sutra. According to it, the myriad things are not abstract concepts but possess real substance. They are subsumed under six fundamental categories (six abodes of Brahma): Substance, Quality, Action, Universality, Particularity, and Inherence.

a. Substance is the real entity of dharmas and serves as the basis for Quality and Action (essence).

b. Quality is the characteristic quality (characteristic).

c. Action is function (function).

d. Universality is the single nature of existence.

e. Particularity is the sameness and difference among things: earth in relation to earth is the same, while earth in relation to water is different.

g. Inherence is the property of combination that enables things to subsist.

The category of Substance comprises nine kinds: earth, water, fire, wind, space, time, direction, self, and mind.

The category of Quality comprises twenty-four kinds: color, smell, taste, touch, number, magnitude, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, proximity, cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, heaviness, fluidity, viscidity, disposition, merit, demerit, and sound.

The category of Action comprises five kinds: upward movement, downward movement, contraction, expansion, and locomotion.

– The category of Universality is one alone.

– The category of Particularity is one alone.

– The category of Inherence is one alone.

All are objects for the enjoyment of the self. Before liberation, the self is bound by these six categories; after liberation, it no longer requires them.

According to the Vaisesika school, the six categories are the source and governing principles of the arising and transformation of all things.

The author of the treatise: First, he sets forth the characteristics of permanence and impermanence, corporeality and incorporeality among the categories in order to refute them generally. Next, he refutes the categories of substance, quality, and action, as well as universal existence, identity-and-difference, and inherence. All of them are false constructs projected upon one’s own consciousness through deluded discrimination and taken as objects of cognition; they have absolutely no existence outside consciousness. Therefore, they are not known through direct perception, but are fabricated solely through the erroneous discriminations of invalid cognition.

(9). This passage continues the refutation of erroneous attachments. Some maintain that Maheshvara, the Great Self-Mastering Deity, truly exists and is the source from which all things arise. Others maintain that Brahma, time, direction, the primal origin, nature, space, the self, and so forth truly exist and are the sources from which all things arise. The Grammarians maintain that sound truly exists eternally and serves as the authoritative standard by which all things are expressed. Others maintain that atoms—as in modern atomic theories—are the ultimate, eternally enduring, immutable entities and the foundation of all things.

The author of the treatise presents and refutes all the foregoing attachments concerning dharmas, showing that they are irrational and untenable.

(10). This passage continues the refutation of non-Buddhist attachments concerning dharmas. All the foregoing attachments concerning dharmas may be subsumed under four views: First is the view, held by the Samkhya school, that produced dharmas and the productive nature—the Primordial Principle—are one. Second is the view, held by the Vaisheshika school, that produced dharmas and the productive nature—universal existence—are different. Third is the view, held by the Shameless non-Buddhists, that produced dharmas and the productive nature are both one and different. Fourth is the view, held by the Ajivika non-Buddhists, that produced dharmas and the productive nature are neither one nor different.

The author of the treatise clearly shows that all four views are irrational. Those who possess wisdom should not mistakenly follow these four evasive and circuitous views. So long as one remains heavily burdened by deluded attachment and regards every dharma as truly existent, permanent, and unitary, then to say otherwise, to say that they are both one and different, to say that they are neither one nor different, to negate, or to affirm—all are incorrect.

This is not the same as what is taught in the Buddha-Dharma. Whenever the Buddha-Dharma speaks of ultimate truth, it often says that it is neither identical with—neither one with—nor separate from—neither different from—phenomenal dharmas, and that dharmas and dharma-nature are neither one nor different. These are all apophatic, or negative, expressions.

Once one has realized that all dharmas arise through conditions, lack intrinsic nature, are like illusions, and have no true existence, then whether one calls them one or different, annihilated or permanent, existent or nonexistent, none of these assertions is correct, for there is nothing to be attained. Since there is nothing to be attained, affirmation is incorrect, and negation is likewise incorrect. Yet affirmations are easily misunderstood, whereas negative expressions are more effective in revealing that conditionally arisen dharmas lack intrinsic nature and in eliminating deluded attachment.

Therefore, the Buddha-Dharma frequently employs negative expressions through such terms as “not,” “non-,” and “without.” If, however, the mind is awakened and free from attachment, then neither saying “is” nor saying “is not” entails any fault. Thus, one may say that dharmas and their nature are one, as waves are precisely water; or that dharmas and dharma-nature are different, as waves are not water; or that dharmas and their nature are both one and different, or neither one nor different.

All these statements accord with the meanings that, while responding to conditions, it remains immutable, and while remaining immutable, it responds to conditions. They are not expressions of doubt or evasive circumlocution.

(11). This passage refutes the attachments concerning dharmas held by the schools of the Lesser Vehicle. The Mahayana Consciousness-Only teaching states that all dharmas comprise one hundred dharmas. The schools of the Lesser Vehicle teach seventy-five dharmas, comprising one mind-dharma, forty-six mental factors, eleven forms, fourteen formations dissociated from mind, and three unconditioned dharmas, making seventy-five in all. Apart from mind and mental factors, they regard form-dharmas, formations dissociated from mind, and unconditioned dharmas as truly existing outside consciousness. Here the author of the treatise refutes these three attachments in sequence.

First, he refutes the attachment that form-dharmas truly exist.

There are three kinds of form: resistant and obstructive form, such as the five faculties and five sense objects; non-resistant and non-obstructive form, namely the objects of mental consciousness; and manifest and unmanifest form.

First, he refutes the true existence of resistant and obstructive form, because the atoms whose combination produces it do not truly exist. Why do atoms not truly exist? If atoms possessed resistant and obstructive substance, then, like jars and tables, they would be provisional rather than real.

If atoms lacked resistant and obstructive substance, then, being like mind and mental factors, how could they combine to form jars and tables? Moreover, if an atom occupied a position in space and had eastern, western, southern, and northern aspects, then it would be like a pillar: when light shone upon its eastern side, a shadow would appear on its western side. It would therefore still be divisible.

If it remained divisible, it would no longer be an atom, an extremely minute entity. How, then, could atoms truly exist?

Question: If form does not exist, what serves as the faculties upon which the five consciousnesses rely and as the objects they apprehend?

Answer: The faculties upon which consciousness relies and the objects it apprehends are merely functional powers and objective aspects manifested through transformation when consciousness arises, due to the power of causes and conditions accumulated through perfuming. They do not derive from external forms. It is not through direct perception that one knows the faculties to be functional powers; rather, one infers that they are faculties by comparing their functions in eliciting consciousness.

Moreover, only the objective aspects manifested within consciousness constitute the object-condition of the five consciousnesses, because an objective aspect possesses both required meanings: it is capable of giving rise to consciousness, and it serves as the object apprehended by consciousness. Other things, such as atoms, may only elicit the arising of consciousness; consciousness does not apprehend atoms, and no image of atoms appears within the five consciousnesses.

Thus, in relation to the five consciousnesses, atoms have only the one function of eliciting their arising, just as the causal condition and the immediately antecedent condition can only elicit the arising of consciousness and cannot be called the object-condition of the five consciousnesses. Even if atoms combine and aggregate to form jars and tables, these aggregates have only the one meaning of serving as objects apprehended by the five consciousnesses, like a second moon, and therefore are likewise not the object-condition of the five consciousnesses.

Through examining the matter again and again in this way, one clearly sees that resistant and obstructive forms, down to the atoms said to produce those forms, do not truly exist but are merely manifestations transformed by consciousness.

Since the resistant and obstructive forms apprehended by the five consciousnesses are not real, the non-resistant and non-obstructive forms that constitute objects of mental consciousness are likewise not real.

(12). This passage continues the refutation of the Lesser Vehicle attachment to “manifest and unmanifest form.”

Manifest form is the outward manifestation of bodily activity. In relation to the body it is called manifest bodily karma; in relation to speech it is called manifest verbal karma. It is also called manifest form.

Actions that remain as latent forces within and are not outwardly manifested through the body are called unmanifest bodily karma, or unmanifest form. The Lesser Vehicle regards such manifest and unmanifest forms as truly existent, without understanding what could constitute bodily manifestation as form. If a jar were taken as bodily manifestation, the jar could be analyzed into parts and therefore would not be real.

If movement were taken as bodily manifestation, movement would perish immediately upon arising; how, then, could movement be established? Furthermore, among forms there are visible colors such as blue, yellow, red, and white; shapes such as long, short, square, and round; and things that are neither color nor shape, such as sound, odor, taste, and tangible objects. If manifest bodily karma is said to be form, to which of these three categories of form does it belong?

Therefore, one should know that it is incorrect to say that manifest bodily karma is truly existent form. The attachment to the existence of manifest verbal karma as form is erroneous in the same way.

Just as this is true of manifest form, so too is it true of non-manifest form: there is nothing that can be called non-manifest form. It is only on the basis of the mental factor of volition, which is capable of restraining the body from committing evil and the mouth from speaking evil, that the provisional designation “non-manifest form” is established; in reality, no form whatsoever exists there.

In the sutras, the Blessed One taught three kinds of karma, which are simply the mental factor of volition—mental consideration and activity—at three stages. First, one examines and reflects; this is called deliberative volition. Next, one decides whether or not to act upon what has been examined and considered; this is called decisive volition. These two kinds of volition, when occurring in the mind, are called mental karma. When volition sets the body in motion, it is called bodily karma; when it sets speech in motion, it is called verbal karma. These two kinds of outward activation are collectively called activating volition. The Buddha did not teach that any of these three kinds of karma is form.