成唯識寶生論

The treatise says: That consciousness arises from its own seed is because the nature of its cause is alike, being without substantial obstruction; it is the perceptual-object aspect of consciousness for the body of the five consciousnesses, their basis and their objective support. Just as with mind-consciousness, it does not depart from the essential nature of mind and mental factors, and, performing actions together with the eye-consciousness and the rest, it is able to be a productive cause; thus it is likewise the mind-base and the dharma-base.

This teaching expresses the intent of the sūtra. The sūtra speaks only of intent and does not establish a thesis; therefore what they wish to refute is also not established as it is here established. There is only a slight portion of meaning; if one were to establish this meaning, one ought not to say that the various treatises are composed at length.

How is this known?

Just as, speaking by hidden intent, fruit and realm are established. Entering into the selflessness of person, it speaks of the twelve bases in just this way. If one departs from the self-nature of the eye and the rest, then one can enter the principle of the selflessness of person.

Why is this so? This is by reason of the differences, inner and outer, of the twelve—namely the eye and the rest, and form and the rest, the six objects. Thus, in their successive arising, neither is it seen apart from those differences, down to the functioning of the eye-contact, the eye, and the rest; apart from this self-nature there ought not again to be any further activity.

If, relying upon the eye and the rest, one performs deeds and enjoys sovereign use, then this is called being bound by the grasping at self. Now herein there is only the harmonious sovereignty of the inner and outer bases. The functioning of the eye and the rest has arising and ceasing; therefore this too is not "my eye" acting as cause, for there is no contact-confrontation.

It is said to be cause only because it is constant and does not abandon sentient beings. Yet with respect to the one who is able to act, regarding the meaning of the bases such as the eye and the rest, it is likewise as before. Therefore it does not arise from those other kinds.

This alone is able to awaken and enter the principle of the selflessness of person. If one can subdue the selflessness of person, then one can enter into tranquil quiescence. Why is this so?

Because amidst birth-and-death one sees that sentient beings are oppressed and afflicted by suffering. Yet suffering is impermanent; amidst birth-and-death the mind gives rise to weariness and renunciation. The power of being without the view of self can swiftly forsake it.

Fearing the self, one severs it, and gradually the cause is exhausted, like the spent kindling and the extinguished flame. Therefore the Buddha said that it is for these kinds of people that the twelve bases are taught.

Someone says: Herein it is not for the sake of the principle of the selflessness of person that the twelve bases are taught. These two characteristics are equal and without difference. Because there is a nature of things, the view of self becomes inverted. In order to counteract it, it is taught according to this principle, just as one uses inversion to counteract inversion.

This is not perfect and also cannot be accepted. These bases and the rest that we establish here—how could they be without difference? Mind and mental factors are different in essence.

If, when there is delight within mind and mental factors, that delight resides neither in the eye-base nor in the ear-base and the rest—by this it is said there is difference; therefore this too is so. At the same time it is not that a single consciousness arises there as the eye-base and the rest, possessing the self-nature of delight and desire. Yet form and the rest, when abiding in the nature of gold, are not the nature of silver and the rest, which are not without difference among themselves.

This gold, once departed from form, cannot be said to be something else, as if there were another thing. The principle being thus, this absence of difference does not reside in the essential nature; if one were to say there is form and the rest residing there, then one would say it, and it would be inverted and unable to counteract. This is the same as the former grasping at the nature of sentient beings.

Just as those sentient beings, with respect to selflessness, see a self—this is the nature of inversion. Now seeing inversion, this can be dispelled, as the form-base and the rest serve to remove the inversion of self. If the mind, continuous and uninterrupted, were without inversion, this too would be contrary to reason.

Herein, the self-nature of delight and desire is similarly not inverted. This too is because earlier and later are not made clear. If there is a teaching that says that, as a skillful means for awakening and entering the selflessness of person, it speaks of the form-base and the rest as having nature—just as with the mind-base and the dharma-base—if mind and mental factors were the self-nature of the self, then those who delight and desire would not dispute.

But if, apart from mind and mental factors, there were separately a self-substance, truly there would be no example by which to speak of it. This discourse, as already differentiated, is a kind of general characteristic, and therefore is not the supreme meaning. If one says it is a skillful means for reaching the selflessness of person, this too is not so.

As one must observe, this subtle and skillful means is established. That is, wishing to cause entry into the selflessness of self, why trouble to say "mind-only"? This being already non-existent, how can one say the twelve bases are of hidden intent?

This too is contrary to reason, because it has already been said that dharmas are without self-nature. Because it is a most weighty matter to cause awakening and entry, the World-Honored One thereupon said that form and the rest, all dharmas, are without self-nature, so that those other great Bodhisattvas might attain that subtle, wondrous, and supreme stage of the Tathāgata, bringing great benefit throughout the realms of sentient beings.

How is this done?

That is to say, form and the rest, all dharmas, similarly appear present and are mind alone; apart from consciousness, there has never been a single thing that is the nature of form and the rest. This is something that can be seen; therefore one knows that form and the rest, all dharmas, are without self-nature. This makes clear that the self-nature of every matter arises and is born wholly by the power of one's own consciousness manifesting and transforming; the principle is assuredly thus.

According as every thing exists, according as we know it, all of it, apart from consciousness, there is nothing that can be grasped. It is solely because consciousness here manifests the various characteristics. Therefore one should know that truly there is no self-nature, and one will awaken and enter the principle of the selflessness of dharmas.

There is a teaching that says: If one awakens and enters the selflessness of dharmas, on this basis can it be said that one prevails?

The objects that we behold are merely confused and disordered errors. On the basis of the principle of the supreme meaning, the original nature is fundamentally empty. To proclaim this meaning accords with the Middle View, for there is no object beheld that is without consciousness.

This approach is still not settled. What is the intent of saying so? It is that the objects beheld by mind, mental factors, and dharmas do not correspond to those matters.

Falsely it is called apprehending and receiving; grasping at unreal characteristics is confused error.

Is it not then said to be consciousness-only? If you say that among dharmas there is not a single dharma, then what do you have to speak of? If the object is non-existent, then consciousness too is non-existent.

Taking the matter of dreams and the rest as an example can cause you to understand, as set forth before; there is no need to labor at it. Without awaiting an external object, there is only consciousness manifesting.

How again is this so? The meaning of consciousness is contrary to reason. If that meaning is, by reason of karma binding the body and the fruit of benefit, this saying thereby becomes the answer. Furthermore, because the essence has its own distinctness, it can become another teaching that says it is able to preserve its own essence. Herein too it is said to be the meaning of self-nature.

This too is as before, already analyzed. This meaning is not so. Apart from that instrument that performs the act, there must be another matter, and only then is it functioning.

Just as if one were oneself again to preserve one's own self—therefore it is incorrect. Because one wishes to give rise to awakening into the selflessness of dharmas, to say "consciousness-only" then accords. If one says there is utterly not a single dharma, that all are without self, this is called the selflessness of self.

This is then to mutually accept that the self-nature of self, all of it, is non-existent. Thus it becomes the selflessness of dharmas. Since dharmas are non-existent, one therefore knows consciousness is likewise so.

The nature being already non-existent, how does one here wish to establish that those dharmas are all non-existent? It is like the provisional self linked with nature. To be without self-substance is what is here accepted, and it is further linked with utter absence of nature.

This becomes the selflessness of dharmas, namely that all dharmas are without nature. Therefore one should know consciousness is likewise so.

This being already non-existent, how, relying upon this, does one wish to cause the deluded to enter into the selflessness of dharmas?

Because there is no self, one causes the realization and entry into the selflessness of all dharmas. To mutually accept it thus is a good skillful means.

How do you wish to establish it?

To accomplish that skillful means, one speaks of the twelve bases, realizing the selflessness of person. It is truly not that all dharmas are utterly nothing, which would then be called the selflessness of dharmas. Therefore one should know that dharmas are without nature: sound by itself has no nature that makes anything clear, and all dharmas are without self-substance. Linkage with words is likewise so. It does not wish to make clear that all are non-existent, but rather the intent is to say that dharmas arise from conditions and are without the nature of self.

That is existent, and this self is without nature—then what is its characteristic?

That is to say, the self is called without self-nature, and therefore it is called the selflessness of person; it is not that dharmas are utterly without self-nature. Form and the rest, all dharmas, according to one part are said to be without self-nature, not utterly nothing. Therefore one should know that to speak of the selflessness of dharmas is not that they are utterly without substance. If one says that all dharmas are nothing, then one ought not to say "the selflessness of dharmas"; reasonably one should establish the teaching that all dharmas are nothing.

You, only because of grasping at the selflessness of dharmas, by the various efficacies in dependence have differences. Apart from that self-nature, to take up that real self-substance ever has no characteristic that is signified. This is the meaning of the selflessness of dharmas; it is not a hasty refutation that all is utterly nothing.

Then what are those graspings called?

As it is said, ignorance and inversion form deluded grasping; according as the seeds in one's own mind ripen, thereby they are transformed and manifest dissimilar characteristics. Grasping at the external object as having its own separate self-nature, just as inversion takes there to be an external characteristic. From what is seen there arises a fixed grasping, and that is called the grasped.

Furthermore, you say there is not a single thing; then how, being without a thing, is it called the grasped?

That is, of course. If, with respect to this grasping, there were a single real substantial thing, not false and deluded, then it ought not to be called the grasped.

Yet because in this meaning there is correspondence—because that grasping does not pertain to the self-substance of the truth—therefore if there were a real thing, it would not be called grasping. Because within this boundary it is the object seen near at hand, all of it is said to be the grasped. Suppose one takes consciousness as this object; when it is made the measured, this too completes the meaning of the grasped.

Therefore one should know that this grasped consciousness is also without nature. This is the very nature of consciousness-only. Thus one can awaken and enter the fact that all dharmas one possesses are without self-substance: the subtle, wondrous skillful means is merely the root-consciousness, which according to the place manifests characteristics, and not the slightest external object can be obtained.

From form down to consciousness, all is thus. It is not that the consciousness of the image-aspect that is able to manifest is itself also nothing. If one were to speak otherwise than this, then one merely removes form; to say this is only sound, only consciousness, then it does not accomplish consciousness conditioning consciousness, for, there being an object, it becomes consciousness conditioning form.

Thus there is an object.

What is it whose essence cannot be said to depart from that?

The Buddhas, World-Honored Ones, alone clearly know it.

How is this meaning to be understood?

Afterward I shall explain it clearly. This indeed has the true reality of the dharma of mind and mental factors arising, surpassing verbal designation; because the Way is of the nature of existence, it also does not become that all dharmas are utterly non-existent, the same as a hollow emptiness. Therefore one should know that to realize the truth and skillfully enter the skillful means is to teach the doctrine of consciousness-only. Attained thus, it accords with reason. Thereby, one after another, one can tear apart the nets of discrimination, attaining right conditions as the nature that is the productive cause.

If you grasp the cause that establishes the place apart from verbal designation as truly existent, then this in turn becomes like that form and the rest, having a true self-nature like consciousness.

If so, then one should ask again: Where does it attain this principle? It has never been that one sees them accept that there is a consciousness that is not signified, while causing form and the rest also to be removed in the same way. Because of fondness for honey and butter, it likewise gives rise to a mind of greed.

If again one shifts the grasping and says that those have an inseparable nature, like the sprout and the seed, having a function of cause that follows in giving birth to the fruit—if those say there is an inseparable nature, then it only displays one corner. Reckoning by reason, surely it is not mutually accepted. If one says that, as with consciousness when it shall be the object, by reason of grasping the essence it is called the grasped, the real characteristic being that which serves as its productive cause, then form too is the same in this: because of grasping at nature, it too should accord with conditioned arising and serve as the causal condition, like consciousness.

This becomes a slice without falsity, without delight; in those five aggregates all are dependently originated. These are the things that are accepted. The meaning of the dharma-nature discriminated by pervasive imagination can, by this reasoning, be the same as that, because there is present right teaching that says so.

If one says that form too has departure from consciousness, truly dependently originated, like feeling and the rest, then this intent has the fault of indeterminacy, because the grasped portion too has consciousness. That is, the conditionally arisen portion of feeling and the rest—this is the essential nature of the four aggregates. Yet here, that portion which manifests reflected characteristics arises in dependence upon the aggregates of mind and mental factors arising.

By this reasoning that example must be accomplished. As for what is established that does not accord with the meaning, it too becomes a fault. The form of conditioned arising is also the self-nature of feeling and the rest; therefore by that cause it causes there to be difference in the cause.

Wishing to forsake that fault, one establishes it in consciousness, because it is presently produced by grasping the difference of characteristics. This then removes that fault of indeterminacy. Yet what is mutually accepted lies in the characteristic.

Feeling and the rest, their own essence, is the nature of self-cognition, because there is no object. Since there is this principle, truly it can be relied upon. But form separately has a distinctionless cause; because it is reckoned by meaning, therefore they are not the same as one another.

If so, then all consciousnesses are without an object to be cognized.

How is this known? Furthermore, is it said that there are other consciousnesses that can serve as objects to yet other consciousnesses? Again, as some say, the realms of the Buddhas—those dharmas exist and are the objects of other consciousnesses.

If, with respect to the Buddhas' realms, one does not take one's own mind's grasping as the object, then there is nothing here to proclaim. To speak thus is all to set up in a false and deluded manner. As when there is thought issuing forth in verbal designation, then the characteristic signified by that verbal meaning is precisely consciousness-only manifesting many kinds of characteristics.

Although there is nothing similar, as if upon contact with an external object consciousness is born—this is then the cause of discourse. Like the sound of speech, once born it then ceases. Suppose the sound of speech is cut off; then one should hear its echo.

The cause is not something that has attainment within that disposition, but therein, together setting forth discourse, it is only that one can accept that karma has the capacity to perform acts, and that apprehending and receiving is feeling. That then becomes accepting that there is a real self—how at that time could there be a separate true self? One does not accept that two consciousnesses arise simultaneously; the uninterrupted essence of the other consciousnesses is destroyed.

Thus too it is hard to correspond and accord, because the other consciousnesses do not correspond with this. This saying is also used to ward off later doubts and difficulties.

As they say: if one knows that the object exists, then by what is it known?

This too is, with respect to the object of the common characteristic, set up and called "knowing." Again it likewise, together with them, produces an objection. As they say, designation displays that the Tathāgata has the various excellent virtues; you too must verify and know the excellent virtues. By this it becomes not the object of the Buddha.

Of course it is also not the same as the Vaiśeṣika (that is, the name of the founder of the Vaiśeṣika school). This common characteristic is a real existent thing; therefore one knows for certain that it is not by the power of an external object present that one can clearly understand. Herein it is only by the construction of the mind-aggregate that it arises.

Since there is this principle, it does not become a doubt or difficulty with respect to the Buddha's realm. This is then a treatise born from the treatise of cause, pervading everywhere by the side-meaning. Yet one should speak of the cause of the fruit of hidden intent.

This hidden intent has two causes. First, the various teachings contradict one another. Second, there is harm to right principle.

To say that the teaching of consciousness-only is contradictory, because the Āgama does not say it. Furthermore, in that Illusion-Net Sūtra, the Buddha, for the sake of people who give rise to discrimination with respect to form and the rest, the various object-bases, spoke thus. That is, this form that the eye-consciousness cognizes is not seen to be truly existent and fixedly abiding; it is only in the deluded disposition that wrong discrimination arises, forming various definite understandings and giving rise to discourse.

Reckoned according to this, it is real, and the other meanings are all not so. Thus it has been set forth at length, down to all dharmas spoken of one after another. The Buddha's disciples, learned and widely heard, must study thus.

I contemplate past, present, and future: the eye-consciousness contemplates those forms that are its objective support, yet therein they are non-existent, ever fixed, truly to be attained, not deluded, not other. Whether as that which is possessed, or as the non-inverted nature, all of it is non-existent. Only the Noble Ones, who transcend and go beyond the world, attain this true reality.

The World-Honored One said that this is all false and deluded, contrary to the Āgama, contrary to right principle. Therefore, on account of that teaching, one gives rise to doubt and sets forth the various objections.

How is it known that that teaching does not accord with the truth? As when one says consciousness knows the verbal meaning that speaks of the twelve bases?

By reason of oneness and non-oneness, when by reflection one observes and takes it as object, because it is not capable—therefore one knows for certain it is not as that meaning is stated; and so now let us try to deliberate. Where form and sound are born, each follows its own essence, because in that consciousness it produces characteristics. Form and the rest, the various matter-characteristics, are objects of consciousness.

The form-consciousness is called form, the sound-consciousness is called sound; the rest are all reckoned according to this. These forms, sounds, and the rest must be without parts. Their essence is one.

As for that which has parts of form, it is by reason of this its own basis, because there is no nature of parts. Yet this form and the rest is an existing thing; its essence has substantial obstruction and has cutting-off; among its own kind it has the nature of many places, and therefore it can produce consciousness and the rest that are not in the same place. (Herein the meaning of the subtle particle is lacking.) Because by reason of valid cognition one decides existence and non-existence, then among the valid cognitions, direct perception is the most excellent.

If there were no external object, how could one give rise to such awareness?

This matter is what is cognized by my distinct faculty. The distinct faculty, like dreams and the rest, although without external object, can yet attain it. This is as said before. Examined closely, it is to be differentiated.

If, here, when it conditions, afterward the object beheld is already lost, how can one accept direct perception?

Among the valid cognitions, direct perception is the loftiest. If at that time there arises the cognitive awareness of direct perception, then that is precisely the cognitive awareness of my distinct faculty. At that time the object is no longer seen, but it is only the determination of mind-consciousness; therefore the eye-consciousness at that time has already ceased. The meaning is thus.

How can one accept that object as direct perception? Moreover, the other treatise-masters hold that all dharmas do not abide for a single instant.

When that cognitive awareness arises, form and the rest, the various objects, have all already ceased. By what is the principle of direct perception accomplished? Although as before it has been skillfully explained, yet with respect to this profound meaning of the dharma one cannot probe and examine it.

You again pose a further difficulty. By reason of valid cognition one decides that it exists; or because this is contrary to inference, therefore with respect to the form-base and the rest one wards it off and causes it to become non-existent. Even granting that it is truly by valid cognition, then to determine existence and non-existence is known by the inference of that distinct faculty, and according to right teaching and the rest—then among the valid cognitions, the distinct faculty is the most excellent. Because the object personally verified is the nature of fruit, therefore one must here, being already without error or harm, establish it among the other valid cognitions.

This is then that the distinct faculty has personally verified the form-base and the rest—how could it cause them to be contrary to inference? Wishing to ward off the nature of existence of form and the rest, why does external form become the object of the distinct faculty?

If there were no object, one could not give rise to such cognitive awareness here. This matter is known by my distinct faculty. This is said according to the intent of the Way: it is the characteristic of apprehension and self-verification, separately and distinctly born, and then again giving rise to the conditioning mind, and so it is made clear thus. Just as one has at times apprehended the objects of suffering, pleasure, defilement, and the rest.

This, of course, is not so; the other places are likewise so. The distinct faculty, like dreams and the rest, seeing existence, has been said before. Within dreams one presently sees the various objects such as form and the rest; that is, as has been said, taking the mind that is obscured and observing, one sees that they exist. Clearly this is where the established cause has the fault of indeterminacy. But it is by reason of dreams, by reason of eye-disease and the offending, contrary mind, that there is impairment. By this reasoning, the intent to establish a real object such as form and the rest as departing from consciousness—this is the fault of mutual contradiction, only by reason of arrogant pride and nothing more.

This too has the fault of the cause not being established. This cognitive awareness, after it conditions, the object beheld being already lost, how can one accept direct perception? The consciousnesses such as the eye and the rest, when they see form, truly cannot give rise to a cutting-off. This is only by reason of the nature of the image-aspect, inwardly verified separately and distinctly. On account of this, the prior mind-consciousness, following after, grasps the fixed characteristic, gathers and reflects, and only then can it decide. Furthermore, at that time consciousness does not arise jointly.

Granting it is so, there being an object such as form and the rest, after consciousness has ceased, what is seen? The seer being non-existent, can there be an accomplished seeing? At this very moment, what is hoped for? The consciousness having already ceased, how can it have the capacity to see? Still more, form and the rest cease together with consciousness. Therefore one should know that here one cannot see form and the rest, the various objects.

Borrowing the mind that examines that power of seeing, to observe form and the rest—how can one accept it as the valid-cognition nature of the distinct faculty? Furthermore, at that time mind-consciousness is cut off and is not mutually accepted as the direct-perception nature; therefore it has no capacity to see, and all have already ceased.

There are other masters who say: At the very first moment, when receiving the object, it is not defiled by discrimination; therefore it certainly conditions the real object of external form.

This too is contrary to reason, and therefore not established. Because they do not accept departure from verbal designation. Form and the rest, the external objects, are what is cognized by consciousness.

But because within there is self-verification, at that time not giving rise to reflection, it forthwith conditions the differentiated characteristics of the various objects. They only accept that there is such inner conditioning. This too is, according as those characteristics manifest, only relying upon consciousness, just as suffering, pleasure, defilement, and the rest are all accomplished.

But to take that form and the rest, the external objects, as the valid cognition of the distinct faculty—this is only false and deluded grasping. Just as with the valid cognition of number, of karma, and the rest, again they lodge these difficulties into other doubts. The things seen within dreams—from the dream one awakens, and afterward again one conditions and conceives; although at that time there is no object, yet there is the distinct higher mind, and direct perception too is so.

By reason of this, afterward mind-consciousness decides clearly that it is not non-existent. They too do not utterly refute the valid cognition of the distinct faculty. With respect to one's own inner verification, the arising of mind and mental factors does not depart from self-verification and yet has direct perception; that is what is accepted.

But to take the external object as direct perception, then false grasping increases all the more; that is what must be warded off. As before, there has been the fault of non-establishment, and no explanation has yet been seen. They only esteem empty talk, with truly nothing apt.

They utterly do not accept that there are external objects and the rest, yet they wish, by means of this, to make clear that there is direct perception. But what is established cannot far depart from the fault of being disparaged and refuted. Therefore, if so, mind-consciousness, never having apprehended the prior object, cannot give rise to the thought of recollection; one must decisively accept this.

They have apprehended the external object before, and therefore can see form and the rest, the various objects, accepting the nature of the distinct faculty.

This is then not established. To say that, only having apprehended the object before, one can recollect—why is this?

Because there is a reason.

It has already been said: like the characteristic-consciousness, that is, although there is no external object, as the object-characteristic manifests, the consciousnesses such as the eye and the rest then come to arise, as said before. Next, why does there arise from it the thought of recollection? It is because from this consciousness, afterward, corresponding with mindfulness, namely upon this characteristic, there arises a discriminating mind-consciousness.

Because one apprehends that object, mindfulness then arises—that meaning is not established. If so, then with respect to the form-base and the rest, using the direct-perception nature to decide the clear cognition, because there is a characteristic giving rise to the nature of recollection. Just as with pleasure and the rest, on the basis of recollection an image is set up and apprehended, deciding the prior characteristic, understanding the inner self-verification, yet it is not without apprehension.

Just as a stone, for instance, has its fire within; when mind-consciousness arises it too cannot give rise to recollection like this. By this it is decided that, relying upon the power of inference, with respect to form and the rest, the various objects, there must be a personal, direct apprehension. If it were otherwise, then the recollection that is accepted becomes non-existent.

Moreover, by this, the object apprehended becomes direct perception. Worldly discourse calls this "seeing." If, with respect to form and the rest, there is the nature of recollection, as it is mutually accomplished, this fault can occur. That is, by this, external form and the rest, the various bases, apprehending and recollecting, reasonably ought not to be accepted as accomplished.

Because there is a reason. As, apart from the object, one attains that seeing—recollection too is likewise so. Because their establishing is not mutually accomplished.

The thesis and example wish to awaken them: with respect to the object, there is utterly no functioning of apprehension.

Cheng Weishi Bao Sheng Lun, Volume IV