方便心論

CHAPTER I: ON THE COMPOSITION OF THE TREATISE

If one understands this Treatise,

One will surely master the methods of debate.

Its meaning is profound;

I shall now expound it fully.

Question: One should not compose a treatise. Why is this? Generally, those who compose treatises often give rise to anger, arrogance, and pride. They trouble and confuse their own minds and seldom possess gentleness and harmony. They expose the faults of others while delighting in their own virtues. Scrutinizing the faults of others is something the wise rebuke. Therefore, all sages and noble ones employ innumerable skillful means to abandon disputation, always delighting in seclusion as though casting away something poisonous. Furthermore, one who composes a treatise may be inwardly harmonious and gentle, yet outwardly scrutinizes faults. Therefore, if one wishes to benefit oneself and others, one should abandon this practice of disputation.

Answer: That is not so. I now compose this Treatise not for victory or defeat, gain and support, fame or reputation, but solely to reveal the characteristics of good and evil. In the world, those who lack sound principles and are deluded will surely be driven mad and deceived by the perverse wisdom and cunning sophistry of the world; they will create unwholesome karma, revolve through the evil destinies, and lose true benefit. Those who master this Treatise will themselves discern the empty characteristics of good and evil, and neither the maras and non-Buddhist teachers nor those holding wrong views will be able to afflict or obstruct them. Therefore, wishing to benefit sentient beings, I compose this true Treatise.

Furthermore, I wish to cause the true Dharma to circulate and be proclaimed throughout the world. It is like wrapping the outside of an amra fruit intended for cultivation before planting it in a grove, in order to protect the fruit. My composing this Treatise is likewise: I wish to safeguard the true Dharma and do not seek fame or reputation. Your earlier statement concerning disputation does not apply here, for a treatise must be composed in order to protect the Dharma.

Question: You previously said that those who understand this Treatise will master the methods of all treatises. Please explain their characteristics.

Answer: This Treatise distinguishes eight kinds of meaning. Whoever can understand and thoroughly penetrate their purport will be able to comprehend other treatises. It is like planting rice: when irrigated with water, it will sprout and flourish, but if the weeds are not removed, the good seed will not grow. Although one may hear this Treatise, if one does not understand its meaning, one will harbor doubts concerning all other treatises. Whoever clearly understands these eight meanings will certainly master all methods of debate.

Question: You say that understanding this Treatise will ensure a clear understanding of the methods of debate. Do the non-Buddhist schools also possess methods of debate?

Answer: They do. For example, the Vaisheshikas teach six categories: Dravya, Guna, Universality, Particularity, Action, and Non-action. Teachings comparable to these are all called methods of debate. Yet even if one thoroughly masters them, one still may not clearly understand other sutras and treatises. I shall briefly explain these eight kinds of profound methods of debate in order to open the gateways of all treatises and put an end to frivolous discourse. The first is Analogy; the second, Accordance with What Is Maintained; the third, Proper Speech; the fourth, Faulty Speech; the fifth, Knowing the Causes; the sixth, Timely Speech; the seventh, Seeming Cause That Is Not a Cause; and the eighth, Objection Following the Words.

Analogy is of two kinds: first, a complete analogy; second, a partial analogy.

Accordance with what is maintained means the ultimate purport.

Proper speech is speech that accords with reason.

Faulty speech is speech that contradicts reason.

Knowing the causes means being able to recognize two kinds of cause: first, the generative cause; second, the revelatory cause.

Timely speech means this: if one first discusses the dhatus and ayatanas and afterward discusses the five skandhas, this is called untimely. If one knows the proper sequence of discourse, it is called timely speech.

A seeming cause is like a mirage that resembles water but is not truly water. If a debater embellishes his words and takes it to be water, this is called a seeming cause.

An objection following the words is like this: when someone says “a new robe,” one immediately asks, “A robe is not a period of time, so why is it called new?” Examples such as this are called objections made by following the words.

I have now briefly explained these eight kinds of meaning. I shall next explain their characteristics in order.

Question: You previously spoke of Analogy. What method should now be used when establishing an analogy?

Answer: When stating an analogy, it must first be something understood by both ordinary beings and noble ones; only then may it be stated. For example, if one says, “This mind is stirred like a powerful wind,” then because all ordinary beings know that wind moves, they will certainly understand that the mind is agitated. If they do not know this, it cannot serve as an analogy.

Question: Why not state only the principal meaning instead of giving an analogy?

Answer: Analogies are given to illuminate the principal meaning.

Question: You previously said that something understood by both ordinary beings and noble ones may serve as an analogy. What is called similarity, and what is called difference?

Answer: The preceding analogy of the wind is called similarity. Noble ones attain nirvana, whereas ordinary beings do not; this is called difference.

Question: The characteristics of Analogy have been explained. What are the characteristics of a tenet?

Answer: According to what is maintained, extensively cite causes and conditions to establish the meaning firmly. This is called the characteristic of a tenet.

Question: How many kinds of tenets are there?

Answer: There are four: first, complete agreement; second, complete disagreement; third, initial agreement followed by disagreement; and fourth, initial disagreement followed by agreement.

Question: You should now explain these four characteristics.

Answer: In general, when one wishes to establish a proposition, one must rely upon four kinds of knowledge and vision. What are the four? First, knowledge through direct perception;

second, knowledge through inference; third, knowledge through analogy; and fourth, knowledge according to scriptures.

Complete agreement is as follows: the proponent says, “There is neither self nor what belongs to a self,” and the questioner says the same. This is called complete agreement. Complete disagreement is as follows: the proponent speaks of plurality, while the questioner speaks of unity. This is called complete mutual disagreement.

Initial agreement followed by disagreement is as follows: the proponent says, “All directly perceptible phenomena exist. Although the spirit is not directly perceived, it nevertheless exists.” The questioner may then say, “Directly perceptible phenomena may be said to exist, but if the spirit is not directly perceived, how can it exist? If you say that the spirit exists because it is known through inference, something must first have been directly perceived before it can subsequently be inferred.

Since the spirit is not a directly perceptible phenomenon, how can it be inferred? If you further use an analogy to prove that the spirit exists, there must first be a similar phenomenon before an analogy can be made. What kinds of spirit are there that could serve as analogies?

If you follow scriptures to prove that the spirit exists, that too is impossible, because scriptures are also difficult to interpret: sometimes they say it exists, and at other times they say it does not. How can they be trusted?” This is called initial agreement followed by disagreement.

Initial disagreement followed by agreement is as follows: the proponent says, “There is neither self nor what belongs to a self,” while the questioner says, “There is a self and there are persons.” Yet these two debaters both believe in the existence of nirvana. This is called initial disagreement followed by agreement.

Furthermore, tenets have innumerable characteristics according to their meanings, such as the twelve links of dependent origination; suffering, its origin, its cessation, and the path; the thirty-seven factors of enlightenment; and the four fruits of the renunciant. Teachings such as these are called the principal doctrines of the Buddha.

Such practices as paying reverence in the morning, killing living beings for sacrifice, burning various kinds of incense, and offering various oils—these four are called the fire worship of non-Buddhist practitioners. The sixty-three letters and the meanings of the four sentences belong to the non-Buddhist school of sound.

The teaching of medicine has six aspects: first, Name; second, Virtue; third, Medicinal Flavor; fourth, Medicinal Potency; fifth, Compounding; and sixth, Maturation. This is called the medical doctrine.

The Vaisheshikas teach the six categories. Their single doctrine of primordial intelligence is understood differently by the many selves. The Samkhya non-Buddhists teach eight principles, called the four great elements, space, mind, knowledge, and ignorance; and eight sovereign powers: first, the ability to become minute; second, to become vast; third, levitation; fourth, reaching distant places; fifth, acting according to one’s wishes; sixth, bodily mastery; seventh, supremacy; and eighth, disappearance. This is called the Yoga doctrine of the non-Buddhists.

Living, nonliving, sin, merit, influx, absence of influx, observance of precepts, complete bondage, and liberation.

Five kinds of knowledge: knowledge derived from hearing, knowledge derived from reflection, knowledge of self-awakening, wisdom-knowledge, and knowledge of meaning.

Six obstructions: the obstruction of not seeing, the obstruction of painful feeling, the obstruction of ignorance, the obstruction of the exhaustion of life, the obstruction of nature, and the obstruction of name.

Four poisons: anger, pride, greed, and deceit... All are called the doctrines of the Nirgranthas.

Furthermore, some say: All dharmas are entirely existent; therefore, one should know that they are only One. Again, all dharmas entirely possess gunas, and thus they are also called One. Again, all dharmas arise from the Primordial Principle; since their root is one, one should know that they are One. Again, the head, feet, and so forth constitute the body and are one with the body. Again, because that upon which they depend is empty space, one should know that they are One.

Views such as these are called the Monistic Reckoning of non-Buddhist schools.

Again, they say that all dharmas are different. Why is this? Because the head, feet, and so forth are different from the body.

Again, their characteristics differ; for example, an ox is not a horse. Therefore, one knows that dharmas are different.

Views such as these are called the Pluralistic Reckoning of non-Buddhist schools.

If it is said that all dharmas are existent because they are One, then existent dharmas are of two kinds: first, those that are conscious; second, those that are unconscious. How could they be One? Their causes are not the same.

All such doctrines have already been refuted.

The treatise author says: If someone says that such dharmas as the Twelve Links of Dependent Origination; suffering, its origin, its cessation, and the path; existence and nonexistence; and so forth are either one or different, neither claim constitutes a correct reason. Why is this? If one says they are one, one falls into the extreme of suffering; if one says they are different, one falls into the extreme of pleasure. Therefore, whether one says they are one or different, one falls into the two extremes; this is not the meaning of the Buddha-Dharma.

Furthermore, suppose someone says that the nature of nirvana is neither suffering nor pleasure. How is this known? In general, all dharmas involve suffering or pleasure because there is awareness of them. Nirvana has no awareness, so how can it be said to be pleasure?

Another proponent says that it is bliss. Why is this? Bliss is of three kinds: first, the bliss of pleasant feeling; second, freedom from affliction and harm; third, freedom from longing. Because there is no longing in nirvana, it is called bliss.

Again, someone asks: I already knew that nirvana is permanent. Now, in relation to conditioned formations, is it the same as them or not the same?

Answer: You already knew that nirvana is permanent, so how can you still say that it is the same as conditioned formations? The nature of conditioned formations is to flow on and decay, whereas the essence of nirvana is permanence and bliss. What wise person would say that it is the same as conditioned formations?

Again, someone asks: Although the nature of the Spirit-Self has form, it has not yet been determined whether it is permanent or impermanent.

Answer: All dharmas that offer resistance are entirely impermanent. Just as a jar, because it offers resistance, can certainly be broken, if the self were likewise, it too would certainly be impermanent. That the self has form is not written in the scriptures and has no rational basis (???). It is like taking sand and gravel and calling them precious jewels. You are the same; your words contain much falsehood.

Question: For what reason do you say that the self has no form?

Answer: I have already said that because a jar has form and offers resistance, it can be destroyed. If the self were likewise, it too could be destroyed. Why do you still ask why the self has no form?

Furthermore, there is also the indeterminate grasping at characteristics. For example, one might ask: If an object is taken to produce sound, is it permanent or impermanent?

Answer: Whatever is formed by division is entirely impermanent. Sound too is formed by division; how could it alone be permanent?

Question: What is called a sound-object?

Answer: If you have not yet distinguished it, on what basis do you pose the question?

Question: In a future age, will my body and life undergo suffering and pleasure alone, or together with the body?

Answer: After this body perishes, the self receives another body.

Question: What is the self that undergoes painful and pleasant feelings in a future age?

Answer: You previously spoke of the “self”; why do you now ask whether or not there is a self? This has no rational basis.

Question: The meaning of grasping has already been explained. Now, what is called the characteristic of good speech?

Answer: It does not contradict reason; it neither adds nor omits; it skillfully explains chapters and phrases; and it teaches the Dharma in accordance with the pertinent characteristics. The analogies presented contain no contradictions, and no one can disparage them. For these reasons, it is called good speech.

Question: What does it mean not to contradict reason?

Answer: Some regard consciousness as the self because conditioned formations are not empty and selfless. Yet not all conditioned formations abide in consciousness. This has no rational basis. Conditioned formations are the cause of consciousness. Since the cause is selfless, how could consciousness possess a self?

Question: All dharmas are entirely impermanent, but sound is not “all”; therefore, it is permanent.

Answer: When you say “all,” in what sense is sound not included in “all”? This doctrine has no supporting reason. Furthermore, all fabricated dharmas are entirely impermanent. It is like the “transmission of fire” (Transmission of fire: when the firewood is exhausted, the fire goes out, and the fire’s heat is transmitted to another object. This illustrates transformation)... Sound is likewise; therefore, it is impermanent. This is called the characteristic of noncontradiction.

Question: What is called “speech that neither adds nor omits”?

Answer: I shall first explain the characteristics of addition and omission. Omission is of three kinds: first, omission of the reason; second, omission in the statement; third, omission of the analogy.

If one says that the six consciousnesses are impermanent, like a jar, but does not state the reason, this is called omission of the reason.

If one says that this body has no self because it is formed through causes and conditions, and that sound also has no self because it arises from causes and conditions, this is called omission of the analogy.

If one says that the four great elements are impermanent, just like a fabricated jar, this is called omission in the statement.

The opposite of the foregoing is called completeness. Furthermore, completeness is as follows: If someone speaks of a “self,” one should ask: “Is the ‘self’ of which you speak permanent or impermanent?”

If it is permanent, then it must resemble conditioned formations and consequently be annihilated.

If it is permanent, then it is nirvana; what further need is there to seek anything?

This is called the characteristic of completeness.

Question: What is called addition in speech?

Answer: Addition is also of three kinds: first, addition of a reason; second, addition of an analogy; third, addition to a statement.

If one says that the dharma of sound is impermanent because it is formed through combination, just as a fabricated jar is necessarily impermanent, and then further says that sound is a guna of empty space, yet empty space has no material resistance while sound is a material dharma, so how could they correspond?—this is called addition of a reason.

If one says that the five faculties are impermanent like an echo, and that because sound is fabricated, it is likewise so, then asks, “How is this known? Because it is emitted by the lips, mouth, and so forth”—this is called addition of an analogy.

If one says that subtle atoms and all-pervasive, boundless empty space, these two dharmas, must be called permanent, whereas sound is not like them and is therefore said to be impermanent—this is called addition of an analogy.

Again, if one says that sound is permanent because it is formed through various conditions, then says that calling it permanent is incorrect—why? Because there are two kinds of cause: first, that which issues from form; second, that which is apprehended by a faculty—so how can it be said to be permanent? This is called addition to a statement.

Question: How should one speak so that people in the world will believe and accept it?

If one analyzes profound meanings for foolish people—namely, that all dharmas are entirely empty and quiescent, without self and without person, like illusions and transformations, and not real—such profound meanings can be understood only by the wise. If ordinary beings hear them, they will become bewildered, sink, and fall; thus, this certainly cannot be called speech appropriate to the occasion. If it is said that dharmas involve karma and its recompense, that there are agents and recipients, bondage and liberation, and so forth, then those of shallow wisdom, upon hearing this, will readily believe and accept it.

Just as fire can be produced when a fire drill and fire board are brought together, if what is expounded accords with the beings present, they will believe and delight in it. This is called speaking in accordance with the occasion.

Question: What is called substantiated speech?

Answer: Although many things may be said, they are all well remembered. When meanings are expounded, their characteristics are all deeply apprehended. What is established is firm and causes people to delight in it. For example, it is said that all dharmas are empty and have no master, because it is directly observed that all things arise through conditions. This is called substantiated speech.

Question: What is called defective speech?

Answer: What is contrary to the foregoing is called defective speech. Furthermore, two kinds of speech are also called defective speech. What are the two? First, repeatedly analyzing the same meaning; second, repeatedly analyzing the same word.

What is repeatedly analyzing a single meaning? For example, one says Kauśika, and also says Śakra, Lord of the Devas, and also says Purandara. This is called repeatedly analyzing one meaning under different names.

When the name and meaning are the same, it is like saying Indra and then saying Indra again. This is repeatedly analyzing a name and meaning that do not differ.

Furthermore, whenever speech merely embellishes words and possesses no meaningful purport, it is all called defective.

Moreover, although speech may have meaning, if it lacks proper sequence, it is also called defective speech, as the verse says:

It is like a man praising

The daughter of Śakra, Lord of the Devas,

Whose name is Golden-Hued,

Whose hands and feet are excellent,

And then going on to speak of

Śakra Devānām Indra

Destroying the three kinds of citadels

Belonging to the asuras.

This is called

Speaking without proper sequence.

Question: What is called knowing the reasons?

Answer: There are four means of knowing reasons: first, direct perception; second, inferential knowledge; third, knowledge through analogy; and fourth, reliance upon scriptures. Among these four kinds of knowledge, direct perception comes first.

Question: For what reason does direct perception come first?

Answer: Because the latter three kinds of knowledge all depend upon direct perception, it is called the first. For example, after seeing that fire has smoke, when one later sees smoke, one knows that there is fire. Therefore, direct perception is superior. Again, on seeing a mirage, one can use it as an analogy for water. Thus, one knows that direct perception comes first and analogy can arise only afterward. Only after direct perception can one begin to know what is real.

Question: It is already known that these three matters are known through direct perception. Why, then, is this direct perception the truest?

Answer: The knowledge of the five faculties is sometimes false and deceptive. Only the wisdom that rightly contemplates all dharmas is called supreme. Furthermore, one may see a whirling firebrand, a mirage, or a city of the gandharvas. Although these are called direct perceptions, they are not real. Again, because an appearance is unclear, it may be mistakenly perceived, as when one sees a dangerous beast at night and uncertainly takes it to be a person. Pressing a finger against the eye causes two moons to appear.

If one attains the wisdom of emptiness, this is called true seeing.

Question: The characteristics of direct perception are now understood. What, then, are the characteristics of inference?

Answer: They were analyzed previously, but they will now be explained further. There are three kinds of inferential knowledge: first, inference from the past; second, inference regarding the future; and third, inference by similarity.

Inference from the past is as follows: one sees a young boy with a boil on his head and six fingers. Later, upon seeing him grown and hearing the name Devadatta, one recalls the six fingers seen before as though seeing them in the present. This is called inference from the past.

Inference regarding the future is as follows: after drinking seawater and tasting its saltiness, one knows that all the rest of the seawater likewise has a salty taste. This is called inference regarding the future.

Inference by similarity is as follows: just as this very person travels from one place to another, the moon and sun high above rise in the east and set in the west. Although their movement is not seen, one knows that they must certainly travel. This is called inference by similarity.

Question: What is knowledge through hearing?

Answer: If one truly sees????? the Buddhas and bodhisattvas, and receives the sutras and Dharma by hearing them from the worthy ones and sages, one can give rise to knowledge and vision. This is called knowledge through hearing. Just as a skilled physician thoroughly knows medicinal prescriptions and teaches with a compassionate heart, this is called good hearing. Furthermore, the worthy ones and sages have realized all dharmas and possess great wisdom; hearing from them is called good hearing.

Question: What are the characteristics of analogy?

Answer: If all dharmas are empty and quiescent, like illusions and transformations; if perception is like a mirage, formations are like the trunk of a banana tree, and the characteristics of sensual desire are like sores and poison—these are called analogies.

These four matters are called reasons. One who can fully comprehend them is called one who knows the reasons.

Question: What is called a specious reason?

Answer: Specious reasons are grave faults in the methods of debate. One should recognize them and swiftly abandon them. I shall now explain such specious reasons.

According to their characteristics, specious reasons have immeasurable meanings, but in brief there are only eight: first, producing a fault arbitrarily by following another's words; second, producing a fault on the basis of similarity or difference; third, a specious reason that produces doubt; fourth, untimely speech; fifth, sameness of category; sixth, sameness of statement; seventh, what is called difference of wording; and eighth, contradiction.

Question: Please analyze these eight methods.

Answer: The expression na-bà has four designations: first, new; second, nine; third, not possessed by you; and fourth, not worn.

Suppose someone says, “What I am wearing is a na-bà robe.” One challenges him, saying, “What you are wearing now is only one robe; how can you say it is nine?” He answers, “When I say na-bà, I mean a new robe; I do not mean nine.” One challenges him, “Why is it called new?” He answers, “Because it is made from na-bà wool, it is called new.” One challenges him, “There are truly innumerable strands of na-bà wool; why, then, do you say ‘na-bà wool’ here?” He answers, “I said before that ‘new’ is called na-bà; it does not refer to a number.” One challenges him, “It is now known that this robe belongs to you; how can you say that it is not my robe?” He answers, “I said that it is a new robe;

I did not say that this object is not yours.” One challenges him, “It is now directly seen that your body is wearing this robe; how can you say that it is not worn?” He answers, “I said that it is a new robe; I did not say that it was not worn.” This is called a specious reason, and it is also called producing a fault by following another's words.

Furthermore, producing a fault by following another's words is like saying, “Burn the mountain.” One challenges, “In truth, only the grasses and trees are burned; how can you say that the mountain is burned?” This is called producing a fault by following another's words. The same applies to all dharmas.

Furthermore, there are two kinds of producing a fault by following another's words. The first is as previously explained. The second is producing a fault through similarity and difference. For example, it is said, “All conditioned dharmas are empty and quiescent, like empty space.” One then asks, “If so, both kinds are empty and nonexistent; dharmas lacking intrinsic nature are therefore identical to empty space.” This is producing a fault through similarity and difference.

Question: Why is it called arising?

Answer: Because there is existence, it is called arising. For example, because clay possesses the nature of a jar, it can produce a jar.

One challenges: If clay possesses the nature of a jar, then clay itself is a jar, and there is no need to depend upon a potter, mold, and cord coming together. If clay, because it exists, can produce a jar, then water also exists and should likewise produce a jar. If water exists but does not produce a jar, how can clay alone produce a jar? This is called seeking faults through similarity and difference by following another's words.

Question: What are the characteristics of a specious reason that produces doubt?

Answer: It is like a tree stump resembling a person. If someone sees it at night, he wonders, “Is it a stump or a person?” This is called a specious reason that produces doubt.

Question: What is called a specious reason involving untimeliness?

Answer: It is like saying, “Sound is permanent; because the Vedic scriptures arise from sound, they too are called permanent.”

The challenger asked: You have not yet established the cause and conditions proving that sound is permanent, so how can you immediately declare that the Vedas are permanent?

The reply was: Just as space, being without visible form, is permanent, so too sound, being without visible form, is permanent. Although this statement was made afterward, its meaning is still established.

The challenger said: This statement is untimely, like fetching water to extinguish a house only after it has burned completely. You are likewise. This is called being untimely.

Question: What is similarity of kind?

Answer: Because the self and the body are different, the self is permanent, just as a jar is different from space and therefore the jar is impermanent. This is called similarity of kind.

Question: If the self is called permanent because it is different from the body, then a jar is also different from the body and should likewise be called permanent. If a jar is impermanent although it is different from the body, then how can the self be permanent even though it is different from the body? This is called similarity of kind.

Question: What is similarity of assertion?

Answer: It is like saying that space is permanent because it offers no resistance to contact, and that consciousness is likewise. This is called similarity of assertion.

Question: What is dissimilarity of statement?

Answer: It is like saying that the five sense objects are impermanent because they are cognized by the faculties, and that the four great elements are likewise and are therefore impermanent. The challenger says: “A turtle’s hair and the fragrance of a salt field do not exist, yet they are apprehended by consciousness. Are they then impermanent?” This is called dissimilarity of statement.

Question: What is contradiction?

Answer: Contradiction is of two kinds: first, contradiction in the example; second, contradiction in principle. It is like saying that the self is permanent because it has no obstructing form, like an ox. This is called contradiction in the example. Contradiction in principle is like a brahmin administering the affairs of a king, slaughtering mice to instruct the kshatriya caste, or practicing seated meditation while recollecting concentration. This is called contradiction in principle.

Foolish people, failing to understand these two kinds of propositions, take them to be true. This is called contradiction.

Question: What, then, is called noncontradiction?

Answer: Whatever differs from the two kinds described above is noncontradiction.

These are called fallacious reasons.

CHAPTER TWO: ON GROUNDS OF DEFEAT

The author of the treatise says: The eight kinds of methods of disputation have been explained above. There are also many ancillary methods, which will now be set forth.

Question: What is called a valid statement?

Answer: It is like saying that the four great elements are mere designations. Why is this so? Because they are constituted by form, and so forth. Another person may say that the four great elements truly exist. How is this known? Because hardness is the nature of earth, and so forth, through to motion being the nature of wind; therefore, one knows that they truly exist. When further opposing contradictions arise, a dispute ensues. For example, someone may say that earth is a cause and condition forming the body, and that the remaining great elements are likewise.

The challenger says: Earth and the others can also form all things, so why say only that they form the body? This is called an invalid statement. If it is not like this, it is called a valid statement.

Question: What is called a defeat?

Answer: It is like saying that sound is permanent because, like space, it has no visible form. The challenger says: Although sound is formless, it is cognized by a faculty, encounters opposition, and is obstructed. Like a jar, it is something produced; but the nature of space is not a produced dharma. How, then, can it serve as an example? This is called a defeat. The proposition maintains that a jar, being visible, can be impermanent, whereas sound is a formless dharma; how, then, can the jar serve as an example? The challenger says: Although sound differs from a jar, it has the characteristic of being cognizable and is apprehended by the ear; therefore, it is impermanent.

Question: What propositions do not fall into a ground of defeat?

Answer: All conditioned formations and consciousness are produced and therefore impermanent; nirvana is unproduced and therefore permanent. The proper import of statements such as these is called freedom from a ground of defeat.

Question: What statements may be challenged?

Answer: If a statement is inverted, its reason is improperly established, or its example is inapplicable, it may be challenged. For example, if one says, “Perception can eliminate the fetters,” the questioner will challenge: “How can perception be used to eliminate the fetters?” Because it was not previously stated that wisdom arises from perception, and only perception itself was directly mentioned, the statement is inverted and may therefore be challenged.

Question: For what reason is this point stated again?

Answer: It is stated so that people may know that if one establishes a proposition but cannot uphold it, one necessarily falls into a ground of defeat. Furthermore, failing to ask when one should ask, failing to answer when one should answer, or stating an essential doctrine three times without enabling another to understand it, while that person, even after hearing the doctrine stated three times, remains unable to discern it—these are all called grounds of defeat. Again, if, when debating another person’s deficient proposition, one does not recognize the other’s position but says, “This proposition is erroneous, yet you do not know it,” one thereby falls into a ground of defeat.

Again, to regard another person’s correct proposition as giving rise to an error is also to fall into a ground of defeat.

Again, if a proponent makes a statement that everyone understands, but one person alone fails to comprehend it, that person also falls into a ground of defeat; the same applies to questioning. In comparison with these grounds of defeat, this treatise on reasoning is vast in scope. One should understand them and quickly abandon them.

Question: How many kinds of questioning are there?

Answer: There are three kinds: first, agreement in statement; second, agreement in meaning; and third, agreement in reason. If disputants do not employ these three kinds in their questions and answers, their exchange is called contradictory and confused. If even one of the three kinds is missing from an answer, the answer is incomplete. If someone says, “I am not broadly versed in these three kinds of questioning and will engage in questions and answers only according to what I understand,” there is no fault in this.

Agreement in statement means that if someone states “non-self,” and one subsequently bases one’s questions and answers upon that statement, it is called agreement in statement.

Agreement in meaning means taking the intended meaning alone; this is called agreement in meaning.

Agreement in reason means knowing the reason from which another person’s intention arises; this is called agreement in reason.

If one can proceed in this manner, it is called freedom from a ground of defeat. If one speaks too rapidly and the listener does not understand, one also falls into a ground of defeat.

Question: Are these the only cases, or are there others?

Answer: There are others, namely: saying too little, saying too much that is irrelevant, speaking at an improper time, repeating words or meanings, abandoning one’s original thesis, and so forth. All are called grounds of defeat. If one presents such things to those before one, one also falls into a ground of defeat.

Question: What is called contradicting the original thesis?

Answer: It is like saying that consciousness is a permanent dharma. Why is this so? Because the essence of consciousness is of two kinds: first, the arising of the essence of consciousness; second, the functioning of the essence of consciousness. A jar also has two aspects: first, the arising of the jar’s essence; second, the functioning of the jar’s essence. Yet because consciousness functions as soon as it arises, it is called permanent. The essence of a jar arises first and functions only afterward, so it is impermanent.

The objection is: If functioning as soon as it arises is what makes something permanent, then a lamp, which functions as soon as it arises, should also be permanent.

The reply is: A lamp is seen by the eye, whereas sound is heard by the ear, so how can it serve as an example? This is an abandonment of the original thesis and falls into a ground of defeat.

Again, someone says that the spirit is permanent. How is this known? Because it is not cognized by the faculties. Just as space is not cognized by the faculties and is therefore permanent, so too is the spirit.

The challenger says: Atoms are not cognized by the faculties, yet they are impermanent, are they not?

The reply is: The spirit is unproduced and therefore permanent, whereas atoms are produced and therefore impermanent.

The challenger says: You previously said, “It is not cognized,” but now you say, “It is unproduced.” This contradicts your original thesis.

The reply is: You say that I contradict my original thesis, but since you oppose my statement, are you not likewise contradicting it?

The challenger says: How could such an assertion be reasonable? When you are said to contradict yourself, it means that what you now say contradicts the meaning of your previous statement; hence it is called a contradiction. Moreover, because your former statement made no clear distinction, doubt arose in me; it is not I who contradict you. Thus, taking doubt to be contradiction also results in falling into a ground of defeat.

CHAPTER THREE: DISCUSSION OF CORRECT REASONING

The author of the treatise says: If someone says, “There are sentient beings, and even experiencers and living beings,” how is this known? Because they are known by the faculties. Since, for example, nirvana without remainder is not known by the faculties, it is incorrect to say that there are no sentient beings.

Therefore, it is known that there is a Self and that it is an eternal dharma. Why is this so? The fruit of arhatship exists only in the present, but does not exist before or afterward; therefore, it is known to be nonexistent.

Things such as a second head or a third hand originally did not exist but now exist; therefore, it is known that formerly they did not exist but now do. Having come into existence, they again cease; therefore, it is known that afterward they no longer exist. The Self is not like this and is therefore eternal.

The objection is raised: Roots of trees and water beneath the earth are unseen, yet one does not say that they do not exist. An arhat is likewise not a nonexistent dharma. Since you have not personally realized it, the proposition you establish is incorrect. Water is unseen because it is obstructed by the earth. What obstruction now prevents an arhat from being seen, such that you again claim that no arhat exists?

The challenge is raised: If, because you cannot see a second head or a third hand, you say that no arhat exists, this is incorrect. Although there is no second head, it is not the case that there is no first head. Yet you say that no arhat exists and thereby claim that there is none whatsoever; how can this serve as an analogy?

Furthermore, you say that because nirvana is not perceived, it does not exist. This is incorrect. Suppose one does not know how many drops of water are in the great ocean; can one therefore say that they do not exist?

If one does not know the number of drops in the ocean, should one say that, just like the ocean, nirvana also does not exist? Although it cannot be perceived, it truly exists in itself. If you say that it does not exist, you must state the cause and conditions; if you cannot do so, your thesis refutes itself.

This is called reasoning in accordance with the Dharma.

Furthermore, if you use the non-perception of nirvana to prove that it does not exist, others will inevitably give rise to doubt. It is like seeing a tree at night and then wondering, “Is this a beast or a person?” It should be understood that this tree is not a determinate cause for concluding that it is a person, nor a determinate cause for concluding that it is a beast. If you now take non-perception as a determinate cause for the nonexistence of nirvana, doubt cannot fail to arise.

Furthermore, because karmic retributions cannot be destroyed, nirvana exists. Why is this so? It is like a great fire burning a mountain forest; the fire is therefore the cause of its destruction. As for these karmic retributions, what cause of destruction could destroy them? If nirvana is attained, they will then disperse and disintegrate. Thus, one establishes that a cause of destruction truly exists, though it is unseen because of obstruction.

The objection is raised: If nirvana exists but is unseen merely because of obstruction, then, moreover, since you have not analyzed whether the various kinds of karma have a cause of destruction, your thesis refutes itself. If you do not speak of it because no cause of destruction exists, then there is also no obstruction; why would it be necessary to speak of one? Because of these conditions, it is known that karma is not destroyed. This is called reasoning in accordance with the Dharma.

The proponent says: If, because the ocean exists, you establish that nirvana exists, would this not also entail that a second head exists? If a second head cannot possibly exist, how could nirvana alone exist? Your ocean cannot even establish that nirvana exists, so how could it establish that a second head exists?

The objection is raised: If your position is that nirvana does not exist, is it that what exists is nonexistent, or that nonexistence itself is nonexistent? If there is no nonexistence, how can you perceive that nirvana does not exist? If this nonexistence exists, how can you say that nothing exists at all? If you say that although there is existence, it is nonexistent, and that the dharma of nirvana is as though nonexistent in itself, then since existence itself can be nonexistent, why could nirvana not exist? You must state the cause and conditions. If you cannot do so, it should be known that nirvana is certainly real and existent. This is called reasoning in accordance with the Dharma.

Question: Is the Self eternal or impermanent? Proposition: Because the Self is unconditioned, it is eternal; a pot and the like are conditioned dharmas and are therefore impermanent.

The objection is raised: If you use being unconditioned to prove that the Self is eternal, this is incorrect. How is this known? Because people give rise to doubt. If being unconditioned meant that the Self is necessarily eternal, there would be no need for doubt as to whether the Self is eternal or impermanent. Since doubt arises, it should be known that there is a fault.

The proponent says: This fault is not mine alone; all disputants have this fault. For example, one says that sound is eternal because it has no visible form, or that a past body exists because it is known through knowledge of former lives. Propositions established in this way give rise to doubt just as before; therefore, this fault is found everywhere.

The objection is raised: An analogy is used to resolve doubt. If the analogy you cite causes me to give rise to doubt, it does not constitute a valid analogy. If the analogy is invalid, your thesis necessarily refutes itself, and you fall into a point of defeat. Moreover, when you say that everyone has this fault and that it is not yours alone, this means that you yourself are mistaken, not that others are at fault. Why is this so? It is like a person who has been deceived but does not himself understand this and instead says that everyone without exception is a robber. It should be known that this very person is himself a thief. You are likewise and therefore fall into a point of defeat.

Now, if you wish to vindicate yourself, the preceding reasoning has already been exhausted; if you attempt to speak again, you will necessarily fall into many faults. You first established your proposition, and the second statement has already refuted it. I then challenged the meaning of the third statement. If you wish to use a fifth statement to halt the fault, it will not go beyond either your initial position or your subsequent thesis and will therefore be a repetition. If there is the fault of repetition, you fall into a point of defeat.

Question: Suppose there is a sixth speaker; may that person raise a further challenge?

Answer: The fifth speaker has already incurred a fault; how could a sixth speaker raise a challenge? If the sixth speaks, it will necessarily resemble the preceding fault. Since the question already contains a fault, the respondent should remain silent. Furthermore, the fifth speaker may not object to the sixth speaker’s fault. Why is this so? It is because of the fifth speaker that the sixth speaker is challenged. Since the fifth speaker already has a fault, on what basis could that speaker fault the other? Reasoning in this sequence is reasoning according to the true Dharma.

CHAPTER FOUR: CORRESPONDENCE

Question: You have already analyzed true reasoning in accordance with the Dharma. What is meant by the meaning of correspondence?

Answer: There are twenty kinds of corresponding questions and answers. If someone can use these twenty principles to assist in elucidating right reasoning, that person is called one who truly understands reasoning. Otherwise, that person is not said to comprehend the Dharma of disputation.

These twenty kinds have two essentials: the first is difference, and the second is similarity. Using similarity to reveal a meaning is called similarity; using difference to reveal a meaning is called difference.

Every meaning necessarily relies upon these two kinds; therefore, these two kinds pervade all twenty methods.

What should be considered similarity? For example, it is said that where afflictions are completely extinguished, there is nothing whatsoever; the nature of empty space also has nothing whatsoever. This is called similarity.

What is called difference? For example, when it is said that nirvana is eternal because it is unconditioned, it is thereby known that all conditioned formations are impermanent because they are conditioned. This is called difference.

Question: How are these meanings of similarity and difference used to raise challenges?

Answer: If one wishes to challenge similarity, one says: Visible form is seen by the eye, while sound is heard by the ear; how then can they be said to be similar? If visible form differs from sound and visible form itself is impermanent, then sound should be eternal.

If one wishes to challenge difference, one says: Because visible form is perceived by a faculty, it is impermanent; because the Self is not perceived by a faculty, it is eternal. A pot and the Self both exist, and their existence is alike; since the pot is impermanent, the Self should likewise be impermanent. If it is said that the existence of the pot differs from the existence of the Self, then one may say that the Self is eternal; but since the pot is impermanent and their existence is alike, the Self should also be impermanent.

Such objections are of twenty kinds: first, excessive augmentation; second, diminution; third, asserting sameness or difference; fourth, asking much and answering little; fifth, asking little and answering much; sixth, sameness of cause; seventh, sameness of result; eighth, sameness in pervasiveness; ninth, sameness in non-pervasiveness; tenth, sameness of time; eleventh, non-reaching; twelfth, reaching; thirteenth, contradiction; fourteenth, non-contradiction; fifteenth, doubt; sixteenth, absence of doubt; seventeenth, refutation by analogy; eighteenth, sameness of scriptural testimony; nineteenth, difference in scriptural testimony; and twentieth, non-arising. These are called the twenty methods of question and answer.

Question: These twenty methods should be analyzed.

Answer: Excessive augmentation is as follows. Suppose one says, “The self is permanent because it is not apprehended by the faculties. Space is not apprehended, and therefore it is permanent. Everything not apprehended by the faculties is invariably permanent. Since the self is not apprehended, is it not therefore permanent?” The objection is: Space is insentient and therefore permanent, but the self possesses cognition, so how can it be said to be permanent? If one says that space possesses cognition, this is certainly unreasonable. If the self is insentient and can thus resemble space, then by this one knows that it must be impermanent. This is called excessive augmentation.

Diminution is this: If space is insentient while the self possesses cognition, how can space be used as an analogy for the self? This is called diminution.

Sameness or difference is this: Suppose one establishes that the self is permanent and cites space as an analogy. If space and the self are identical, they are one and the same phenomenon, so how can space be used as an analogy for the self? If they are different, they cannot serve as analogies for each other. This is called sameness or difference.

Furthermore, you establish that the self is permanent, saying that it is not apprehended by the faculties, just as space is permanent because it is not apprehended by the faculties. Yet things not apprehended by the faculties are not necessarily all permanent. How can this serve as proof? This is called “asking much and answering little.”

Furthermore, you establish that the self is permanent, saying that it is not apprehended by the faculties. Yet phenomena not apprehended by the faculties are of two kinds: atoms are not apprehended by the faculties but are impermanent, while space is not apprehended by the faculties yet is a permanent phenomenon. How, then, can you say that something is permanent because it is not apprehended by the faculties? This is called the fifth method, asking little and answering much.

Furthermore, if you take non-apprehension as the cause by which one knows that the self is permanent, space and the self are different; how can non-apprehension serve as the same cause for both? This is called sameness of cause.

Furthermore, everything formed from the five great elements is impermanent. Space and the self are also formed from the five great elements, so how can they be said to be permanent? This is called sameness of result.

Furthermore, you take space to be permanent because it is not apprehended, yet space pervades every place. Is this entity called “every place” not apprehended? This is called sameness in pervasiveness.

Furthermore, atoms do not pervade everywhere and are not apprehended by the faculties, yet they are impermanent phenomena. If the self is not apprehended by the faculties, how can it be permanent? This is sameness in non-pervasiveness.

Furthermore, you establish that the self is permanent, saying that it is not apprehended by the faculties. Is this in the present, the past, or the future? If you say it is in the past, the past has already ceased. If you say it is in the future, the future does not yet exist. If you say it is in the present, then it certainly cannot serve as a cause, just as two horns arising together cannot serve as causes for one another. This is called sameness of time.

Furthermore, you establish that the self is permanent and take the faculties’ inability to reach and apprehend it as the cause. Do they not reach it? If they do not reach it, this certainly cannot constitute a cause, just as fire that does not reach something cannot burn it and a knife that does not reach something cannot cut it. If the faculties do not reach the self, how can this serve as a cause? This is called non-reaching.

Furthermore, if they reach it in order to serve as a cause, then at the moment they reach it, the meaning of “cause” no longer applies. This is called reaching.

Furthermore, if you argue, “All things are impermanent; the self is not included among all things and therefore is permanent,” then the self exists and must therefore be impermanent. This is like saying that a small amount of cotton is burned, but a large amount is not burned and thus is called “unburned.” This is called contradiction.

Furthermore, if you say that the self, like space, is not apprehended by the faculties, then since space has no cognition, the self must likewise have no cognition. If the self possesses cognition, space must also possess cognition, for with respect to suffering and pleasure, space and the self would not differ. This is non-contradiction.

Furthermore, because the self resembles existent things, it cannot be definitively determined to be permanent, and the possibility arises of doubting whether it is permanent or impermanent. This is called doubt.

Furthermore, you say that the self exists but is not apprehended by the faculties. This can certainly give rise to the doubt: What obstruction prevents it from being apprehended by the faculties? A cause and condition must be stated. If there is no cause or condition, the doctrine of the self refutes itself. This is called absence of doubt.

Furthermore, if you take the self to be permanent because it is not apprehended by the faculties, then tree roots beneath the earth and water are likewise not apprehended by the faculties, yet they are impermanent. How, then, can the self be permanent? This is called refutation by analogy.

Furthermore, if you rely upon a scripture that says the self is permanent because it is not apprehended by the faculties, other scriptures also say that there is neither self nor anything belonging to a self; and the doctrine of the Nirgranthas says that the self is not permanent. If the self were permanent, the scriptures ought not to differ but should agree with one another. This is called sameness of scriptural testimony.

Furthermore, if you believe one scripture that holds the self to be permanent, you must also believe another scripture that says the self is impermanent. If both are believed, one and the same self must be both permanent and impermanent. This is called difference in scriptural testimony.

Furthermore, if you infer the existence of the self from the existence of a cause, then because the seed of the banyan tree already exists, it should give rise to a palmyra tree. If, by means of nonexistence, you know something to be nonexistent, then since the form of the tree is absent within the palmyra seed, the tree should be unable to arise. Thus, whether it exists or does not exist, it does not arise. The self is likewise so. If it is definitively existent, there is no need to take its non-apprehension by the faculties as a cause. If it is definitively nonexistent, taking its non-apprehension by the faculties as a cause still cannot make it existent. This is called non-arising.

If someone further establishes that sound is permanent, the thesis may likewise be refuted by employing the twenty methods concerning sameness and difference explained above.

Question: Do these twenty methods also include causes and conditions that explain themselves?

Answer: They inherently do. One should therefore ask: If you say that the self exists, you may refute the self; but if there is no self, what are you refuting? Since there is that which refutes, there must be that which is refuted.

The objection is: In truth, there is no self. It is only because you arbitrarily claim that it exists that I raise an objection against you. You say that because there is something refuted, the self must exist; yet because there is that which refutes, one may likewise know that there is no self. If you say that I rely upon your doctrine of the self in order to speak of no-self, this is incorrect. I am not employing your doctrine; rather, you yourself are now arguing from an attachment to what you have heard. How do you know that I accept your doctrine? You must state the cause and conditions.

The objection is: I previously said that I do not accept your doctrine. You accepted and established it, so why do you now ask, “How do I know that you accept my doctrine?” Your statement contradicts itself, and thus you fall into a point of defeat. Moreover, at first you took non-apprehension by the faculties as the reason for knowing that the self truly exists, but afterward you employed various phenomena to prove it.

Your stated reason is therefore inconclusive; it is contradictory and undermines the meaning of your thesis, so you also fall into a point of defeat. Your doctrine has already collapsed. If I say anything further, it will merely exceed the proper limit of accepting too many statements at the outset.

In all questioning and answering, the replies should extend to no more than five rounds. Any discourse exceeding this is called excessive.

A person endowed with wisdom who deeply reflects upon principles and meanings may understand the meaning through extensively stated analogies, yet the matters debated do not go beyond these methods.

The author of the treatise says: The essential doctrines of the treatises have been expounded above. This essential treatise is the foundation of all treatises. Through this treatise, questions and answers arise extensively, and wisdom increases.

It is like planting a seedling: if it encounters good soil, its roots will flourish; if it is planted in poor soil, it will bear no true fruit. This Dharma is likewise. If one possesses wisdom and is able to reflect and reason skillfully, one will certainly give rise to extensive discourse.

If one is foolish and possesses little wisdom, then although one studies this treatise, if one cannot comprehend it, one cannot be called a true good and wise spiritual friend. Therefore, those who wish to engender genuine wisdom and discern good from evil must diligently cultivate this true method of reasoning.