如實論

CHAPTER ONE: OBJECTIONS DEVOID OF REASON

The treatise states: You say that my statement is devoid of reason. If so, then your statement is also devoid of reason. If your statement is devoid of reason, my statement must be reasonable. If your statement is reasonable, yet you say that my statement is devoid of reason, this assertion is incorrect.

Furthermore, if that which is devoid of reason possesses reason within its own nature, then there is no “being devoid of reason.” If it possesses no reason within its own nature, then that which is “devoid of reason” must itself also be nonexistent. Therefore, your assertion that my statement is devoid of reason is incorrect.

Again, if you say that my statement is devoid of reason, you merely reveal your own lack of wisdom. Why is this so?

That which is devoid of reason must be nonexistent. Are a statement and the absence of reason one or different? If they are one, the statement itself is also nonexistent; how, then, can you say that my statement is devoid of reason? If they are different, the statement possesses reason; why, then, do you say that my statement is devoid of reason?

Furthermore, because statements would refute themselves, does your objection occur simultaneously with my statement, or not simultaneously?

If they occur simultaneously, your objection cannot refute my statement, just as the horns of an ox and the ears of a horse arise simultaneously and cannot refute one another. If they do not occur simultaneously, with your objection coming first and my statement afterward, then, before my statement has been uttered, what are you objecting to?

If they occur simultaneously, then between my statement and your objection—which is the objection and which is being objected to—no distinction can be made. It is like the waters of a river and the sea mingling together at the same time, so that they cannot be distinguished.

Again, when you say that my statement is devoid of reason, that itself is not a statement. If it is a statement, it cannot be devoid of reason. The existence of a statement and the absence of reason contradict one another, like a virgin who has a child: if she has a child, she cannot be a virgin; if she is a virgin, she cannot have a child. Virginity and having a child contradict one another.

Furthermore, it contradicts knowledge based on direct perception. When you say that my statement is devoid of reason, if you have heard it, then its existence is established by knowledge based on direct perception. Because the force of knowledge based on direct perception is greater, your statement must be invalidated. It is like someone saying, “Sound cannot be apprehended by auditory consciousness.” Yet the apprehension of sound by auditory consciousness is established by knowledge based on direct perception. Because the force of knowledge based on direct perception is greater, that statement must be invalidated.

Furthermore, it contradicts inferential knowledge. If you say, “I have made a statement,” then this is apprehended through inferential knowledge, and it must be known that there is reason. If there is no reason, there is also no statement; if there is a statement, one knows that there is reason.

It is like someone saying, “Sound is permanent because it arises from a cause.” Yet everything that arises from a cause must be impermanent. A tile, for example, arises from a cause and therefore cannot be permanent. Sound likewise arises from a cause and therefore cannot be permanent; if it were permanent, it could not arise from a cause. “Impermanence” is established by inferential knowledge. Because the force of inferential knowledge is greater, “permanence” must be invalidated.

The presence of reason is established by inferential knowledge; therefore, the absence of reason must be invalidated.

Furthermore, it contradicts worldly convention. In the world, four kinds of reason are established: first, the reason of cause and effect; second, the reason of mutual dependence; third, the reason of establishment; and fourth, the reason of suchness.

The reason of cause and effect is exemplified by a seed and its sprout.

The reason of mutual dependence is exemplified by long and short, and father and son.

The reason of establishment is exemplified by the five-membered statement that establishes a proposition.

The reason of suchness is of three kinds: first, suchness of self; second, suchness of impermanence; and third, suchness of tranquility.

In the world, a statement is the effect and reason is the cause. In the world, when an effect is seen, one knows that there is a cause; when a statement is heard, one knows that there is reason. Your assertion that my statement is devoid of reason contradicts worldly convention. There can be no statement without reason.

You say that my statement is different because it is incongruous. I shall now debate with you to determine what is correct. Whoever makes a different assertion must incur an error. You establish a thesis different from mine; it is therefore your own assertion, and it is a different assertion. Consequently, you are the one at fault. If your thesis differs from the thesis I myself have stated, then the fault of “difference” lies with you and has nothing to do with me. If it does not differ, then you must agree with me and there is no difference. Thus, when you say that I am different, yours is false speech.

Furthermore, that which is different from difference is not different; therefore, there is no difference. If something is different from difference, it is not different. A human being and an ox, for example, are different: a human being is not an ox. If that which is different from difference is not different, then they must be one. If they are one, there is no difference. Why, then, do you say that I am different?

Furthermore, the reasoning is this: Because you and I debate within the sphere of reason, my statement differs from yours. If you did not differ from me, I would not debate with you, for I would be stating your own thesis.

If everything that is stated is different, then you too have something that is stated. Therefore, your statement is different, and the fault lies with you.

If you say, “I do not make a different assertion,” then I also say, “I do not make a different assertion.” Your assertion that I make a different assertion is incorrect; yours is false speech. The remaining implications are as already stated above.

You say that the thesis I state is not established. I shall now debate with you to determine what is correct.

If you say, “It is not established,” then this statement itself is uttered without being established. That which is stated but not established cannot be stated. If it cannot be stated, how can you say that what I state is not established? Thus, your assertion that it is not established is incorrect.

If nothing whatsoever is established, then the objection you state to challenge me is itself not established. If you say that the objection is not unestablished, then likewise my statement is also not unestablished. Your assertion that my statement is not established is therefore incorrect.

If that which is not established possesses establishment within its own nature, then there is no non-establishment. If that which is not established possesses no establishment within its own nature, then if establishment exists, non-establishment cannot exist. Therefore, there is no basis for your assertion that my statement is not established.

If you say, “Unless you recite my objection, you cannot comprehend my meaning,” I shall now debate with you to determine what is correct.

If I do not recite your objection, I cannot state the objection. Are you able to state the objection because you have recited my objection, or do you state the objection without having recited it? If you can state the objection without first reciting it, then I too can state the objection without reciting it.

If you can state the objection only after reciting it, then you must perpetually recite objections. Why is this so? Because one objection gives rise to another objection, objections must continue without end. There would never be a time when one was not reciting an objection, nor any time when one could not state an objection.

Furthermore, from the name of an objection there arises another name of an objection. If, because one recites the name of this objection, one can state the name of the objection, whereas without reciting it one cannot state the name of the objection, then only after reciting it can one state the name of the preceding objection, while the name of the subsequent objection has not yet been recited.

Only on the third occasion can one recite the name of the second objection, and only on the fourth occasion can one recite the name of the third objection. In this manner, one must continue reciting perpetually without end.

If you can now state the name of the objection without reciting it, then you should likewise be able to state the name of the first objection without reciting it. If you cannot state the name of the first objection without reciting it, then on the second occasion as well, without reciting it, you should be unable to state the name of the objection.

The second time, if one can state the objection without reciting the name of the objection, then the first time as well one should be able to state the objection without reciting its name.

But now, if the name of the first objection must be recited before the objection can be stated, then the name of the second objection must likewise be recited before the objection can be stated; it cannot be stated without recitation.

Furthermore, if one states an objection without reciting it, one falls into the position of defeat. Since you raise an objection without reciting it, your objection also falls into the position of defeat.

If you state an objection without first reciting it, yet this objection does not fall into the position of defeat, then when I likewise state an objection without reciting it, I also do not fall into the position of defeat.

Furthermore, I would have to recite every statement by which you object to me, and you would have to recite every objection by which I object to you. We could only receive and recite each other’s words and could never establish distinct objections. If we continually received and recited each other’s words, the principal meaning would be lost. It would be like two boats tied together: whenever they moved, each would pull the other back and forth.

Furthermore, all your words are sounds issuing from the mouth and therefore perish; how could I recite your words? Since sound is a perishing dharma and cannot be brought back, it cannot be recited again. If sound remained, it could not be recited anew. Because it is impermanent, when the words have perished, there is nothing that can be recited, for they no longer exist. If the sound has already perished, yet you make me recite it and then declare it to be your statement, this is erroneous reasoning.

Furthermore, you say that my earlier statement refutes my later statement. I shall now determine with you what is correct. If my earlier statement refutes my later statement, this accords with reason. Why is this so? My statement came first and yours came afterward. If my statement refutes the later statement, then my position necessarily prevails and your statement necessarily fails.

Furthermore, if you say, “Every earlier statement refutes a later one,” then your earlier statement must also refute your later statement. If your earlier statement does not refute your later one, then the statement I uttered earlier likewise does not refute my later one.

Furthermore, within its own essence, “the earlier refuting the later” contains no earlier refuting the later. If within its own essence there were an earlier refuting a later, then neither the earlier nor the later would exist. Therefore, your assertion that the earlier refutes the later is incorrect.

If within its own essence there is no earlier refuting the later, then, because there is no cause, the earlier refuting the later is also nonexistent. Your claim that my earlier statement refutes my later statement is erroneous reasoning.

You say that I have stated a different reason. I shall now determine with you what is correct. If anyone who abandons the former reason and establishes another reason falls into the position of defeat, then you necessarily fall into the position of defeat. Why is this so? Because you too abandon the former reason and establish another. If you abandon the former reason and establish another without falling into the position of defeat, then the same applies to me.

Furthermore, the reason I establish differs from the reason you establish. If I state a different reason, this accords with my reasoning. If I did not state a different reason, I would be stating your reason; then it would not oppose and contradict your position but would instead resemble your statement. Thus, your claim that I state a different reason is erroneous reasoning. If I established the same reason as you, then in refuting my reason you would necessarily refute your own.

Furthermore, if every statement is a different reason, then the statement you utter is necessarily also a different reason. Therefore, you fall into the position of defeat. If you utter a statement without falling into the position of defeat, yet claim that I fall into the position of defeat by establishing a reason, your position is incorrect.

If you say that I state a different meaning, I shall now determine with you what is correct. The meaning I establish differs from yours, and this accords with reason. You and I now oppose and contradict one another; therefore, I state a different meaning. If you think that my meaning does not differ from yours, then my meaning necessarily does not oppose and contradict yours. If you refute my meaning, you refute your own.

Furthermore, within its own essence, a different meaning contains no different meaning; thus, a different meaning is necessarily nonexistent. If a different meaning contained a different meaning within its own essence, then the different meaning would likewise be nonexistent. Therefore, your claim that I state a different meaning is incorrect.

Furthermore, if everything stated is a different meaning, then what you state is also a different meaning. If what you state is not called a different meaning, yet you claim that everything stated is a different meaning, your position is incorrect.

You say that my present statement is identical to my earlier statement and is not different. I shall now determine with you what is correct.

The meaning I establish opposes and contradicts the meaning you establish. If the meaning I myself establish is said to oppose your meaning, this is correct reasoning. Why is this so? My statements everywhere refute your meaning; therefore, I say there is no difference. If I had to state a different meaning, then because the meaning you establish differs from mine, my stating that different meaning would necessarily amount to stating your meaning and would not contradict you. Your objection to me would therefore necessarily be an objection to your own meaning.

Furthermore, as I stated before, sound is impermanent; therefore, that statement perishes and disintegrates by itself, and now another statement is uttered. Your claim that I am stating my former words is erroneous reasoning.

Furthermore, if you maintain that what I state is not different, then if my statement is different, it is different; and if the statement I make is not different, then it is not different. If my statement cannot be established, your assertion that my statement is not different is incorrect.

If you say, “I accept nothing whatsoever that is stated,” I shall now determine with you what is correct.

You say, “I accept nothing whatsoever.” Is this statement included among “everything,” or is it not included among “everything”? If it is included among everything, then you necessarily do not accept your own statement. If you do not accept your own statement, then my meaning is necessarily what you accept. My meaning is established by itself, and your statement immediately collapses. If it is not included among everything, then there is no “everything.” If there is no “everything,” then you do not reject everything. If you do not reject everything, then my meaning is not among the things you reject. My meaning is thereby also established, and your statement ultimately collapses.

CHAPTER TWO: OBJECTIONS CONCERNING REASONING

The Treatise states: Objections have three kinds of error: first, inverted objections; second, objections devoid of true meaning; and third, contradictory objections. If an objection possesses any of these three kinds of error, it falls into the position of defeat.

First, an inverted objection is an objection established in a manner that does not accord with the principal meaning; this is called an inverted objection. There are ten kinds of inverted objection: first, the objection from similarity of characteristics; second, the objection from difference of characteristics; third, the objection from extension; fourth, the objection from nondifference; fifth, the objection concerning attainment and nonattainment; sixth, the objection of absence of a cause; seventh, the objection that reveals a distinct cause; eighth, the objection from doubt; ninth, the objection concerning what has not yet been stated; and tenth, the objection from difference of instances.

1—The objection from similarity of characteristics consists in establishing an objection on the basis of an object possessing a similar characteristic; this is called the objection from similarity of characteristics.

The Treatise states: Sound is impermanent because it arises in dependence upon effort and arises without an interval. For example, a tile arises in dependence upon effort and, once arisen, breaks apart and perishes. Sound is likewise so; therefore, sound is impermanent. This proposition has thus been established.

The opponent says: If sound is impermanent because it has characteristics similar to those of an object, then sound is permanent because it has characteristics similar to space. Therefore, just as space is permanent, sound is also permanent. Their characteristic is similar in that both are incorporeal.

The Treatise states: Furthermore, sound is impermanent because it arises through exertion and arises without an interval. Whatever is permanent does not arise through exertion. For example, space is permanent and does not arise through exertion. Sound is not like this; therefore, sound is impermanent. This proposition has been established.

The opponent states: If sound is impermanent because it does not share the same characteristic as space, then what is the purpose of establishing the conclusion? If it shares the same characteristic as space, sound must be permanent. Their common characteristic is that they are incorporeal; therefore, sound is permanent.

The Treatise states: These two objections are inverted and do not constitute valid objections. Why is this? A definitely and uniformly established property is set forth as the reason, demonstrating that all things arising through exertion are impermanent—this is a reason that demonstrates impermanence definitely and uniformly.

Therefore, the proposition of impermanence is unshakable. In order to demonstrate things of the same class, objects such as tiles are cited as examples. The opponent, however, relies upon something not definitely and uniformly established to raise an objection, saying: “If you rely upon the meaning of a common characteristic to establish that sound is impermanent, I too rely upon a common characteristic to establish that sound is permanent.

If your proposition is established, then my proposition is also established.”

The Treatise states: Your objection does not accord with reality. Why is this? The reason you establish is indeterminate, because it demonstrates both permanence and impermanence. The reason I establish possesses three kinds of characteristics: it is present in the subject of the proposition, encompasses the similar class, and is absent from the dissimilar class. Therefore, the established reason is valid and unshakable. Your reason is not like this; therefore, your objection is inverted.

If the reason you established resembled my reason, your objection would indeed constitute a genuine objection. If the proposition established were impermanence and the objection established permanence, that objection would be valid. Why is this? To establish a reason for permanence in order to challenge a reason established for impermanence can by no means demonstrate that impermanence is erroneous or inverted, because the reason for permanence is not definitely and uniformly established, whereas the reason for impermanence is definitely and uniformly established.

2. The objection based on a dissimilar characteristic: To raise an objection on the basis of something that does not share the same characteristic is called an objection based on a dissimilar characteristic.

The Treatise states: Sound is impermanent. Why is this? Because it is produced by causes and conditions. Whatever arises in dependence upon causes and conditions is impermanent. Consider, by contrast, space: space is permanent and does not arise in dependence upon causes and conditions. Sound is not like this. Therefore, sound is impermanent.

The opponent states: If sound is impermanent because it does not share the same characteristic as permanently abiding space, then what further conclusion is reached? Because sound does not share the same characteristic as a tile, sound must be permanent. Their dissimilar characteristic is this: sound is incorporeal, whereas a tile is corporeal. Therefore, a tile is impermanent, while sound must be permanent.

The Treatise states: Sound is impermanent because it is produced by causes and conditions. A tile, for example, is impermanent because it is produced in dependence upon causes and conditions. Sound is likewise so.

The opponent states: If you establish that sound is impermanent because it shares the same characteristic as a tile, then what further conclusion is reached? Sound must be permanent because it does not share the same characteristic as a tile. Their dissimilar characteristic is this: sound is incorporeal, whereas a tile is corporeal.

The Treatise states: Both these objections are inverted. Why is this? The reason for impermanence that I establish is definitely and uniformly established.

The reason for permanence that you establish is not definitely and uniformly established, because it demonstrates both permanence and impermanence. Therefore, an indeterminate reason cannot challenge a determinate reason. The reason I establish is this: because it is produced by causes and conditions, sound is impermanent.

This reason is present in the subject of the proposition, encompasses the similar class, and is absent from the dissimilar class. Since it fully possesses these three characteristics, it cannot be shaken. The reason you establish is this: because it is incorporeal, sound is permanent.

The subject of this reason encompasses both the similar and dissimilar classes; therefore, it does not constitute a valid reason.

3. The objection based on an extended characteristic: To demonstrate a dissimilar characteristic within what shares the same characteristic is called an objection based on an extended characteristic.

The Treatise states: Sound is impermanent because it is produced through exertion, like a tile. Therefore, sound is impermanent.

The opponent states: You establish that sound and a tile share the same characteristic, namely, that they are produced through exertion. Yet there are other grounds of distinction: first, one can be heated while the other cannot be heated; second, one can be seen by the eye while the other cannot be seen by the eye. Thus sound and a tile each have their own distinct grounds.

Sound, though produced through exertion, is permanent; a tile, though produced through exertion, is impermanent. Therefore, sound is permanent.

The Treatise states: This objection is inverted. Why is this? The reason I establish is inseparable from impermanence and excluded from permanence.

Inferential knowledge demonstrates through this reason that sound is impermanent. It is like fire, which is demonstrated by the inference from smoke. Smoke is inseparable from fire.

Therefore, the reason I establish is valid and cannot be shaken. You separately demonstrate that sound cannot be heated and is therefore permanent; yet desire, anger, pleasure, wind, and so forth cannot be heated, but they are impermanent. Therefore, the inability to be heated cannot be established as a reason for permanence.

Invisibility to the eye likewise cannot be established as a reason for permanence. Why is this? Because desire, anger, pleasure, wind, and so forth are also invisible to the eye, yet are impermanent.

Your reason encompasses both the similar and dissimilar classes; therefore, it is invalid. If your reason resembled my reason, it could challenge the proposition I establish. The proposition I establish relies upon the three characteristics of a valid reason; therefore, they are not the same.

They are not the same, yet you claim that they are; therefore, your objection is inverted.

4. The objection of non-difference: To demonstrate that everything shares a common characteristic and thereby maintain that nothing has a distinct ground is called the objection of non-difference.

The Treatise states: Sound is impermanent. Because it depends upon different causes and conditions, sound accordingly differs. It is like a lamp: when the wick is large, its light is great; when the wick is small, its light is faint. This proposition has been established.

The opponent states: If, on the basis of a common characteristic, tiles and so forth are impermanent and sound is likewise impermanent, then all things must be no different from all other things. Why is this? Because every thing has a characteristic resembling that of every other thing. What is a resembling characteristic? When, from the existence of one thing, other things can be known, this is called a common characteristic.

If, despite resembling characteristics, all things remain different from all other things, then sound is likewise so: although sound shares a common characteristic with tiles and so forth, sound is permanent, whereas tiles and so forth are impermanent.

Why is this? Because throughout all instances of Being and so forth, distinct intrinsic natures exist within their common characteristics. In the case of lamps, sounds, people, horses, and so forth, inference based upon common characteristics cannot be established.

The Treatise states: This objection is inverted. Why is this? I do not deny that all things possess equal and resembling characteristics, but I examine whether differences exist.

When a common characteristic fully possesses the three characteristics of a valid reason, the proposition of impermanence is established. In saying that something is established as impermanent, one does not rely solely upon a common characteristic. If principles were investigated and discerned otherwise, there would be no other valid principle.

Why is this? Because there is no thing that is neither similar to nor different from another thing. Therefore, if a common characteristic is encompassed by the similar class and excluded from every dissimilar class, and this is taken as the reason, then the reason is valid.

If one relies solely upon a common characteristic to establish a reason, it cannot be valid. Therefore, the objection is inverted.

Furthermore, the Treatise states: Sound is impermanent because it arises in dependence upon causes and conditions, like tiles and so forth. Therefore, sound is impermanent.

The opponent says: The reason and the proposition to be established—these two are not different. Why is this? What is meant by saying that something arises in dependence upon a cause? Before the causes and conditions have come together, sound has not yet arisen; because it has not arisen, that proposition does not exist. What is meant by saying that sound is impermanent? Sound, having previously not arisen, comes into being; once arisen, it immediately ceases; because it has ceased, that proposition does not exist. Thus, both the reason and the proposition to be established are nonexistent.

The Treatise says: This objection is inverted. Why? The nonexistence in the proposition I establish is nonexistence through destruction and cessation; the nonexistence in the reason I establish is nonexistence because something has not yet arisen. That what has not yet arisen is nonexistent is accepted by the entire world; therefore, the reason establishing impermanence is valid. As for nonexistence through destruction and cessation, the Sankhya school does not accept it; therefore, it has not been established. In order to establish it, it is set forth as the proposition.

If one takes what has already been established as the proposition and what has not been established as the reason, then your objection would indeed prevail and would not be inverted.

I say that all things did not exist previously and are later seen to become nonexistent; therefore, sound was nonexistent before and is also nonexistent afterward. If you do not believe that it was previously nonexistent, reflect for yourself: If sound had previously existed without anything obstructing it, why did the ear not hear it? Therefore, you should know that it previously did not exist, just as a snake’s feet do not exist. Some people, because their minds are intent upon contentious victory, are unable to establish their proposition. Though they wish to establish it, it accords with no sound principle. This proposition should be abandoned.

5. The Objection Concerning Reaching or Not Reaching: Does the reason reach the proposition to be established, or does it not reach the proposition to be established? If the reason reaches the proposition to be established, it cannot constitute a reason; if the reason does not reach the proposition to be established, it likewise cannot constitute a reason. Therefore, this is called the objection concerning reaching or not reaching.

The opponent says: If the reason reaches the proposition to be established and merges with it, the proposition to be established becomes intermixed and thus cannot be established. It is like river water entering the sea: it no longer remains river water. The reason is likewise and therefore cannot constitute a reason.

If the proposition to be established has not yet been established, the reason cannot reach it. If it reaches a proposition that has already been established, what further use is the reason? Therefore, the reason is not valid.

If the reason does not reach the proposition to be established, it is just like something unrelated and cannot constitute a reason. Therefore, the reason is not valid. If the reason does not reach it, it lacks the capacity to act, just as a knife that does not reach something cannot cut it.

The Treatise says: This objection is inverted. There are two kinds of reasons: first, a generative cause; second, a reason that reveals inseparability. If your objection is directed at a generative cause, it is a valid objection; if it is directed at a revealing reason, it is inverted.

Why? The reason of which I speak is not a generative cause. Its purpose is to cause others to believe the proposition to be established; it can reveal that proposition because the two are inseparable.

The proposition already exists, yet correct knowledge corresponding to its meaning has not arisen regarding that proposition. Why? Because of ignorance.

Therefore, the reason is said to be capable of revealing it. It is like using a lamp to reveal a form that already exists, rather than to produce that form. Thus, the objection applies to a generative cause; when directed at a revealing reason, it is inverted.

If you object: “If this reason is a revealing reason, then before cognition arises through this reason, for whom is this reason a reason? Therefore, it cannot constitute a revealing reason.”

If this is what you say, then the reply is: It is not yet designated a reason so long as the event has not occurred. Once the event occurs, it is designated a reason; because it can reveal the event, it is then called a reason. Before that statement, it was not yet called a reason; afterward, it is called a reason. Thus, if one says that the reason is earlier and the event later, there is no error.

Someone objects: “If so, then the event does not arise from the cause.”

This likewise does not constitute an objection. Why? This thing existed previously and was afterward designated a cause. If the thing had already ceased and the event arose only afterward, then the objection would be valid. But this is not so: it existed previously but had not yet received the designation; when the later event occurs, it receives the designation. Therefore, the effect arises from the cause.

7. The Objection That a Different Reason Reveals the Property: The fact of impermanence is revealed in dependence upon a different reason; therefore, this is not a reason. This is called the objection that a different reason reveals the property.

The opponent says: If sound is impermanent because it depends upon exertion, then wherever there is no exertion, sound must be permanent. Yet lightning, wind, and so forth do not arise in dependence upon exertion, but are still included among impermanent things. Therefore, to establish impermanence, there is no need to depend upon exertion, for exertion is not a reason. If it were a reason, then apart from exertion, impermanence should not exist elsewhere. This is like establishing fire by means of smoke: smoke is a true reason for fire because smoke and fire are inseparable. Exertion is not like this and therefore does not constitute a valid reason.

Furthermore, exertion cannot establish the proposition of impermanence. Why? Because it is not universally present.

If arising in dependence upon exertion were universal, it could establish impermanence; if it is not universal, it cannot establish impermanence. It is like someone who establishes the proposition: “All trees possess consciousness.” Why? Because trees are capable of sleeping, as in the case of the sirisa tree.

Another person objects: “The consciousness of trees is not established.” Why? Because the reason is not universally present. One sirisa tree sleeps, but other trees do not sleep.

This sleeping is not found among all trees; therefore, it cannot establish that all trees possess consciousness. Arising in dependence upon exertion is likewise: because it is not universally present among all impermanent things, it cannot establish impermanence.

The Treatise says: This objection is inverted. I do not say this; I do not say that the reason, “arising in dependence upon exertion,” alone can reveal all impermanence while no other reason can do so. If there is another reason capable of revealing impermanence, I shall indeed rejoice, for my proposition will thereby be established.

The reason I establish can reveal my thesis, and another reason can also reveal it. Thus, the proposition I establish is proved. For example, one knows that there is fire by relying upon smoke; if one says that seeing the firelight also proves it, my proposition is likewise.

Arising through the application of effort can reveal impermanence; if another reason can reveal impermanence, the proposition of impermanence is also proved. Therefore, your objection is inverted, because it does not accord with my intended meaning. If I had said, “Everything is impermanent because it arises through the application of effort,” you could object, “This reason—arising through the application of effort—does not pervade all cases and therefore does not prove the thesis.” Such an objection would indeed prevail.

But I say, “Whatever sound or other thing arises through the application of effort is entirely impermanent”; I do not say, “Everything impermanent arises through the application of effort.” Therefore, your objection is inverted.

8. The objection from doubt is this: concerning things of a different kind that share a common characteristic, one raises an objection based on doubt.

The Treatise states: Sound is impermanent because it arises through the application of effort, like a tile and so forth. This proposition has been established.

The opponent says: What has already arisen may be manifested through the application of effort. For example, roots, water, and so forth are manifested through the application of effort; they are not produced through the application of effort. Sound is likewise.

Therefore, establishing “the application of effort” as the reason does not determine whether something had not yet arisen or had already arisen. Consequently, relying upon this reason, doubt arises concerning sound: How is this sound to be definitively understood? Does it arise after not yet having arisen, like a tile and so forth, or does it already exist and merely become manifest, like roots, water, and so forth?

Thus, it is indeterminate. If reliance upon this reason gives rise to doubt, one should know that it is not a reason capable of establishing the proposition. Why?

Because it may produce or it may manifest.

The Treatise states: This objection is inverted. Why? I do not say that sound is manifested through the application of effort.

I say that sound is produced through the application of effort and is therefore impermanent. To what are you objecting? If you say, “The operation of effort is of two kinds: first, production; second, manifestation.

Production is like that of a tile and so forth; manifestation is like that of roots, water, and so forth. Sound is something connected with the operation of effort; therefore, doubt arises as to whether it is permanent or impermanent,” this proposition is incorrect. Why?

Because roots, water, and so forth are not operations of effort. If you say, “Roots, water, and so forth clearly manifest the operation of effort,” this also does not challenge my proposition. Why?

What is clearly manifested is that something which had not yet arisen is produced through the application of effort. Therefore, because things produced through the operation of effort are all of one kind—impermanent—your objection is incorrect.

If you further declare, “Things associated with the operation of effort have two kinds of impermanence: the production of a tile and so forth is impermanent, whereas the destruction of a tile and so forth is permanent; sound is likewise,” this proposition is also incorrect. Why? Because it is not established.

If your destruction of a tile and so forth exists, then there is existence within destruction; because there is existence, the meaning of destruction necessarily cannot exist. If there is no existence within destruction, then this destruction itself does not exist. Why?

Because it has no substance. If you say, “It is like darkness: because there is no light within darkness, darkness exists. Destruction is likewise: because there is no existence within destruction, destruction exists,” this proposition is incorrect.

In that case, such things as a flower in empty space, the child of a barren woman, and a hare’s horn, which do not exist, would necessarily have to exist. If you do not accept that a flower in empty space and so forth exist, the destruction of a tile and so forth is likewise and cannot be said to exist.

Therefore, because things produced through the operation of effort are uniformly impermanent, your doubt is incorrect. You do not believe this; therefore, to cause you to believe, I state a revealing reason that discloses impermanence. Why? Previously there was no obstruction, yet through the application of effort it was caused to arise and become manifest; therefore, one knows that sound did not exist, just like a tile.

You establish that “being obtained through the application of effort” and “being produced through the application of effort” are two different propositions, but this is incorrect. What is the correct proposition? Everything obtained through the application of effort is impermanent. Why? Because what had not yet arisen is caused to arise, and once arisen, it then ceases. Therefore, roots, water, and so forth are likewise impermanent. What need is there for your assertion that what is clearly manifested is permanent?

9. The objection concerning the time before the statement is this: Before it was stated, impermanence did not yet exist; this is called the objection concerning the time before the statement.

The Treatise states: The original proposition is as stated above.

The opponent says: If the statement “through the application of effort” is relied upon as the reason for the impermanence of sound, what follows? Before the statement “through the application of effort” was uttered, sound was permanent; this is what the proposition implies. Since sound was previously already permanent, how could it be made impermanent?

The Treatise states: This objection is inverted. Why? The reason I establish serves to reveal the proposition; it neither produces nor destroys it. If I had established a reason that causes destruction, your objection would indeed prevail. If you objected that before I spoke, the impermanence of sound was not yet understood, that proposition would be plausible. But if you use a cause of destruction to object to me, this objection is inverted.

10. The objection from difference of things is this: The tile is one kind of thing, while sound is not like it; this is called the objection from difference of things.

The Treatise states: Sound is impermanent because it arises in dependence upon causes and conditions, like a tile. This proposition has been established.

The opponent says: Sound is one kind of thing, while a tile is another. Since the things are different, they cannot both be impermanent.

The Treatise states: This objection is inverted. Why? I do not say that sound is impermanent because it is the same kind of thing as a tile. I say that all things produced in dependence upon causes and conditions are impermanent; it is unrelated to their being the same kind of thing. A tile is an example. Therefore, sound is impermanent. Smoke is a thing different from fire, yet it can reveal fire. A tile is likewise able to reveal the impermanence of sound.

Furthermore, it is said that the objection from difference of things has other grounds. It is said that sound is permanent because it depends upon space. Space is permanent; if any other thing depends upon space, that thing is consequently permanent. For example, an atomic aggregate is permanent: because atoms are permanent and the aggregate depends upon atoms, the aggregate is consequently permanent. Sound is likewise: because it depends upon space, it is permanent.

Furthermore, sound is permanent. Why? Because it is heard by the ear. For example, the generic nature and the distinctness of sound are apprehended by the ear and therefore are permanent. Sound is likewise; therefore, it is permanent.

In establishing this alternative proposition, the Vaiśeṣika says: If permanence is established by a reason, then because it is based upon a reason, sound is impermanent. Therefore, sound is impermanent.

The Treatise states: This objection is inverted. Why? I do not say that the reason produces impermanence; I say that the reason reveals impermanence. People do not yet know it, so the reason enables them to know. The reason I establish is a revealing reason, not a producing cause. Since you rely upon a producing cause to raise your objection, this objection is inverted.

Furthermore, the Treatise states: What you have stated is both an established proposition and an objection, but I do not accept it. Why? Because we do not believe in or delight in the proposition of permanence. Therefore, I state this proposition.

These ten kinds, called objections based on a common characteristic and so forth, are inverted objections, in which an erroneous proposition is established through inversion. Any objection resembling these falls within the category of inverted objections.

Second, the objection devoid of true meaning is so called because it is untrue on account of false speech. False speech means speech that does not accord with the proposition and is devoid of meaning; this is called the objection devoid of true meaning.

There are three kinds of objections lacking true meaning: first, the objection that reveals an unaccepted meaning; second, the objection that reveals a consequential meaning; and third, the objection that reveals a meaning through a counterexample.

1. The objection that reveals an unaccepted meaning is this: seeking yet another cause in regard to what has already been directly observed is called the objection that reveals an unaccepted meaning.

The treatise states: Sound is impermanent. Why is this? Because it arises in dependence upon causes and conditions, like a roof tile. This proposition has been established.

The opponent says: I see that a roof tile arises in dependence upon causes and conditions. What cause makes it impermanent? If one establishes that a roof tile is impermanent without a cause, then sound likewise should be permanent without depending upon a cause of permanence.

The treatise states: This objection is not valid. Why is this? Once something is clearly known, no additional cause is needed to establish it. It is presently observed that a roof tile has causes and therefore does not exist eternally; why seek yet another cause of its impermanence? Thus, this objection is not valid.

2. The objection that reveals a consequential meaning is this: when, in relation to the contrary proposition, this meaning is held to be a necessary consequence, it is called the objection that reveals a consequential meaning.

The treatise states: There is no self. Why is this? Because it cannot be manifested, like the child of a stone woman. This proposition has been established.

The opponent says: This meaning entails a necessary consequence. If what can be manifested is definitely existent, while what cannot be manifested is definitely nonexistent, then what can be manifested may either exist or not exist, and what cannot be manifested should likewise be so. For example, a circle of fire, a mirage, and a city of the gandharvas can be manifested, yet they cannot be established as existent. If what can be manifested cannot thereby be definitively established as existent, then what cannot be manifested likewise cannot thereby be definitively established as nonexistent.

The treatise states: This objection is not valid. By what reasoning does this meaning entail such a consequence? That what cannot be manifested is ultimately nonexistent—this meaning does not follow.

Things that can be manifested are of two kinds: those for which the meaning follows and those for which the meaning does not follow. A case in which the meaning follows is this: if there is rain, there must be clouds; but if there are clouds, it is not definite whether there will or will not be rain. Fire is known through smoke, yet here the meaning does not invariably follow. If there is smoke, one knows that there is fire; but to know from the absence of smoke that there is no fire—this meaning does not follow. Why is this? In red-hot tin and glowing embers, fire is seen although there is no smoke. This objection based on the inconclusiveness of what is manifested is not valid.

Furthermore, a circle of fire, a mirage, and a city of the gandharvas are only visible forms. Because the faculties are confused and the mind inverted, they appear to exist at one moment and not to exist afterward. Visible form alone truly exists; because the faculties are confused and the mind inverted, at times one sees such appearances as existent. You say that what can be manifested is not definitely existent, but this objection is not valid.

Furthermore, I take the child of a stone woman as an example to render a definitive judgment concerning this meaning: where something cannot be manifested and is ultimately unmoving, that thing is definitely nonexistent, like the child of a stone woman. Something that cannot be manifested yet moves is not my example.

As for what cannot be manifested: in such cases as subtle particles, it may sometimes be manifested and sometimes not manifested. Regarding your claim about ultimate meaning, where something of ultimate meaning can be manifested and is ultimately unmoving, that thing definitely exists. Cases such as a wheel of fire are different, for the wheel alone is indeterminate. The wheel is indeterminate because it exists when revolving and does not exist when at rest. Therefore, it is not an ultimate meaning.

You use what is not an ultimate meaning to object to an ultimate meaning; therefore, this objection is not valid.

Furthermore, another person presents an objection based on consequential meaning: If sound is impermanent because it shares characteristics with a roof tile, then, as an ultimate consequence, if it does not share those characteristics, it must be permanent. The dissimilar characteristics are these: sound is apprehended by the ear and has no body, whereas a roof tile is apprehended by the eye and has a body. Since their characteristics are dissimilar, sound is permanent.

The treatise states: If the objection is made in this way, then the objection based on shared characteristics and the objection based on consequential meaning do not differ in essence; therefore, I do not accept it.

3. The objection that reveals a meaning through a counterexample is this: when a proposition is established through the force of an example offered in opposition, it is called the objection that reveals a meaning through a counterexample.

The opponent says: If sound is impermanent because it shares characteristics with impermanent things, then I can likewise demonstrate that it is permanent: because sound shares characteristics with permanently abiding space, sound is permanently abiding. If sharing characteristics with what is permanent cannot make it permanent, then why should sharing characteristics with what is impermanent make it impermanent?

The treatise states: This objection is not valid. Why is this? The mere absence of a thing is called space.

If there were a permanently abiding thing, this example would be established and the objection would also be valid. Since there is no permanently abiding thing, and space is the absence of a thing, it cannot be said to be permanent, nor can it be said to be impermanent. The example in this objection is not established.

Because what is not an example is used as an example, this objection is not valid. If someone believes that there is a thing called space and that it is permanently abiding, this is an inverted objection, an objection lacking true meaning. Why is this?

Because the absence of a body is inconclusive. Space has no body and is permanently abiding, whereas mental states such as suffering, pleasure, and desire have no body yet are impermanent. Since sound has no body, is it permanent like space or impermanent like these mental states?

The absence of a body is inconclusive and cannot serve as a cause; therefore, this objection is inverted.

Furthermore, sound is impermanent because it has a cause. Thus, if any thing has a cause, it is thereby known to be impermanent, like a roof tile and so forth. This proposition has been established.

The opponent says: This meaning is open to doubt. Why is this? A thing whose arising has a cause is impermanent, while a thing whose cessation has a cause is permanent. Since sound has a cause, doubt should arise concerning it: Is it impermanent like a thing whose arising has a cause, or permanent like a thing whose cessation has a cause?

The treatise states: This objection is inverted. Why is this? There is no real thing called cessation. If things are destroyed by being struck with a staff and so forth, would they therefore be called permanent?

Furthermore, sound is impermanent. Why is this? Because it is apprehended by a faculty, like a roof tile. This proposition has been established.

The opponent says: This too is open to doubt. Universality and difference are apprehended by a faculty and are therefore permanent. Sound is apprehended by a faculty, just as universality and difference are; therefore, sound is permanent. If universality and difference are not permanent, then that which is like a roof tile is not impermanent either.

The treatise states: This objection is not valid. Why is this? If the universality and difference of an ox and so forth truly existed, then apart from the ox and so forth they would have a distinct substance that could be grasped and seen. Yet apart from the ox and so forth, universality and difference cannot be grasped or seen and have no distinct substance. Therefore, they are known to be impermanent.

Furthermore, there is no self. Why is this? Because it cannot be manifested. For example, I twist. This proposition has been established.

The opponent says: The number of drops in the ocean and the weight of the Snow Mountains exist but cannot be manifested. The self is likewise existent but cannot be manifested. Therefore, the reason, “because it cannot be manifested,” cannot establish the absence of a self.

The treatise states: Number and aggregate are not distinct substances. The aggregate can be successively enumerated and thereby manifested, or one thousand may be its number. Because concepts are retained in thought, they are called one, ten, one hundred, one thousand, ten thousand, and so forth. Since the number of drops and the weight of the Snow Mountains have no distinct substance, they do not truly exist. If there are other objections whose characteristics resemble this objection, their errors are established and they are called objections lacking true meaning.

Third, the contradictory objection: meanings that cannot be established together constitute a contradictory objection. For example, light and darkness, sitting and standing, and so forth cannot be established together; this is called a contradictory objection. There are three kinds of contradictory objection: first, the objection concerning what has not yet arisen; second, the objection concerning permanence; and third, the objection in which one’s own proposition is contradictory.

1. The objection concerning the state prior to arising is: Before it arose, since it did not depend upon effort, it must have been permanent. This is the objection concerning the state prior to arising.

The opponent says: If sound is impermanent because it depends upon effort, then before it arose, when it did not yet depend upon effort, sound must have been permanent.

The Treatise says: This objection is self-contradictory. Why is this? Before it arises, sound does not yet exist. Since it does not exist, how could it be permanent? If someone were to say, “The son of a barren woman is dark, while her daughter is fair,” this proposition would likewise have to be established. If something does not exist, it cannot be permanent; if it is permanent, it cannot be nonexistent. To say that something is nonexistent yet permanent is inherently contradictory. This objection resembles both an extreme objection and an unreal objection. Why? Because the objection has no true meaning.

Because it arises in dependence upon effort, sound is impermanent. This proposition has already been established. Its meaning is conclusive. The proposition that whatever does not depend upon effort must be permanent is untrue. Why is this? Things that do not depend upon effort are of three kinds: permanent, impermanent, and nonexistent. What is permanent is like space. What is impermanent is like thunder and lightning. What is nonexistent is like a flower in the sky. None of these three kinds depends upon effort. Yet you selectively take only one kind and declare it permanent; therefore, your proposition is untrue.

2. The objection concerning permanence is: Because impermanence is permanent, this sound is permanent. This is called the objection concerning permanence.

The opponent says: Within the impermanent, impermanence is always present. Since all dharmas do not relinquish their nature, there is permanence within impermanence; by relying upon impermanence, permanence is established.

The Treatise says: This proposition is contradictory. Why is this? If something is already impermanent, how could it be permanent? If someone were to say, “Within darkness there is light,” this statement would likewise have to be established. If that is not so, your objection is contradictory and untrue. Why? There is no separate dharma called “impermanence” that, while associated with what is impermanent, can additionally be established as permanent. Impermanence has no separate substance. If something that had not arisen comes to arise and, once arisen, subsequently ceases, it is called impermanent. If impermanence is not real, and permanence is then established in dependence upon impermanence, permanence is likewise not real.

3. The objection that contradicts one’s own proposition is: If, apart from the other party’s proposition, one’s own proposition is undermined, this is called an objection that contradicts one’s own proposition.

The Treatise says: Sound is impermanent because it arises in dependence upon causes and conditions, like a tile. This proposition has already been established.

The opponent says: If the reason reaches the locus of impermanence, it becomes identical with impermanence. If it does not reach the locus of impermanence, it cannot establish impermanence itself. Thus, this reason cannot constitute a reason.

The Treatise says: If your objection reaches the proposition I have established, it becomes identical with my established proposition and therefore cannot refute my proposition. If it does not reach the proposition I have established, it likewise cannot refute my proposition. Thus, your objection instead refutes your own proposition.

Furthermore, the opponent says: If the reason comes first and the proposition to be established comes afterward, then while the proposition to be established does not yet exist, of what could this be the reason? If the proposition to be established comes first and the reason afterward, then the proposition has already been established; what further use is the reason? Thus, this also cannot constitute a reason.

The Treatise says: If your objection comes first and the proposition I establish comes afterward, then while my proposition has not yet been established, what are you refuting? If the proposition I establish comes first and your objection afterward, then my proposition has already been established; what use is your objection? If you say that you have accepted my objection and therefore use my objection to raise a further objection against me, that too is incorrect. Why? I am showing that your objection instead refutes your own proposition; I do not rely upon your objection to establish my proposition. If another objection has characteristics similar to this objection, establishing its error is called an objection of contradiction.

The Treatise says: There are five kinds of valid objections: first, refuting the proposition that the opponent favors; second, revealing a proposition that the opponent does not favor; third, revealing an inverted proposition; fourth, revealing an inconsistent proposition; and fifth, revealing that every irrational proposition would thereby become established.

The opponent says: A self exists. Why is this? Because a collection exists for the sake of another. For example, bedding and the like are assembled for someone else. The faculties, such as the eye, are likewise assembled for another. That other is the self; therefore, we know that a self exists.

The Treatise says: There is no self. Why is this? Because it can definitively not be demonstrated. If a thing can definitively not be demonstrated, that thing certainly does not exist, just as an ordinary person has no second head. As for a second head, it cannot be conceived or distinguished among the characteristics of a head, such as form, smell, and so forth. Therefore, it definitively does not exist. The self is likewise so: it cannot be distinguished or demonstrated among the faculties, such as the eye. Therefore, it definitively does not exist. Your statement that a self exists is thus incorrect. This is called refuting the proposition that the opponent favors.

Furthermore, if you say that the characteristics of the self cannot be distinguished, yet the self nevertheless exists, then a second head likewise cannot be distinguished and should therefore also exist. If you do not believe that a second head exists, you likewise cannot believe that the self exists. This is called revealing a proposition that the opponent does not favor.

Furthermore, if you think that although these two alike cannot be distinguished, you may nevertheless declare without relying upon reasoning that the self exists while not declaring that a second head exists, then I too may, without relying upon reasoning, declare that a second head exists while not declaring that the self exists. This proposition would likewise have to be established. If my proposition is not established, neither is yours. This is called revealing an inverted proposition.

Furthermore, if you say that although the self and a second head alike cannot be distinguished, they are nevertheless different, the fault of inconsistency falls upon you. It is as if someone were to say, “The son of a barren woman has beautiful playthings; the son of a barren woman has no beautiful playthings.” Such statements would likewise have to be established. If speaking in this way incurs the fault of inconsistency, so does your assertion. This is called revealing an inconsistent proposition.

Furthermore, if you say: “Without relying upon reasoning, it is certain that a self exists; without relying upon reasoning, it is certain that no second head exists,” then, if this statement could be established, all the irrational statements of madmen and children would likewise have to be established. For example, that fire can be seen in space and is cold, or that wind can be grasped, and so forth—all these are the words of madmen and do not rely upon reasoning. Yet, just like what you have established, they too would become established. If they are not established, your statement is likewise not established. This is called revealing that every irrational proposition would thereby become established.

CHAPTER THREE: FALLING INTO THE GROUNDS OF DEFEAT (WITHIN THE CHAPTER ON COUNTER-OBJECTIONS)

The Treatise says: There are twenty-two kinds of falling into the grounds of defeat: first, undermining one’s own established proposition; second, adopting a different proposition; third, having a reason that contradicts the established proposition; fourth, abandoning one’s own established proposition; fifth, establishing a different reason; sixth, an irrelevant proposition; seventh, a meaningless proposition; eighth, a meaningful but unintelligible proposition; ninth, an irrational proposition; tenth, a proposition that does not reach its object; eleventh, an incomplete part; twelfth, an excessive part; thirteenth, repetition; fourteenth, inability to recite; fifteenth, inability to explain the meaning; sixteenth, inability to raise an objection;

seventeenth, devising an expedient to evade an objection; eighteenth, assenting to another’s objection; nineteenth, failing to reveal that the opponent has fallen into a ground of defeat; twentieth, declaring a ground of defeat where none applies; twenty-first, failing to accomplish the purpose of one’s established doctrine; and twenty-second, a specious reason.

These are called the twenty-two kinds of falling into the grounds of defeat. If anyone falls into any one of these grounds of defeat, there is no need to continue debating with that person.

1. Undermining one’s own established proposition means accepting the other party’s proposition regarding the very proposition one has oneself established. This is called undermining one’s own established proposition.

The opponent says: Sound is permanent. Why is this so? Because it has no body, like space. This thesis is established.

The Treatise replies: If sound is permanent because it shares a common characteristic with space, then if it does not share that characteristic, it must be impermanent. The dissimilar characteristics are these: sound has a cause, whereas space has no cause; sound is apprehended by a sense faculty, whereas space is not apprehended by a sense faculty. Therefore, sound is impermanent.

The opponent says: Whether they share a common characteristic or do not share one, I do not examine this at all. I say that sound shares a common characteristic with what is permanent; if something shares a common characteristic with what is permanent, then it is permanent.

The Treatise replies: Sharing a common characteristic with what is permanent does not definitively establish permanence, for things without bodies may also be impermanent, such as thoughts of suffering, pleasure, and so forth. Therefore, your reason is not established. Dissimilarity, however, definitively reveals that everything impermanent is distinct from what is permanent. Therefore, impermanence can be established.

The opponent says: I too accept that the impermanent has a cause and the permanent has no cause. This is called destroying one’s own established thesis and constitutes a point of defeat.

2. Adopting a different thesis of one’s own means: When one’s own thesis has been refuted by the opponent, one then devises and establishes another proposition as one’s thesis. This is called adopting a different thesis of one’s own.

The opponent says: Sound is permanent. Why is this so? Because it is intangible, like space. This thesis is established.

The Treatise replies: If you establish that sound is permanent on the basis of its intangibility, then the reason of intangibility is inconclusive. Thoughts of desire, anger, and so forth are all intangible, yet they are impermanent. Sound is likewise intangible; therefore, it cannot be definitively determined whether it is permanent like space or impermanent like thoughts, since both are intangible. Because the matter is not definitively determined, your reason cannot be established. If the reason is not established, the thesis founded upon it is likewise not established. This thesis has been refuted.

The opponent says: Neither sound nor permanence by itself is my thesis. The thesis I establish is that permanence and sound mutually encompass one another: sound encompasses permanence, and permanence encompasses sound. By “sound,” I mean that which excludes form and the other such things.

By “permanence,” I mean that which excludes impermanence and the other such things. Permanence is not separate from sound, nor is it separate from form and the other such things. Sound is not separate from permanence, nor is it separate from being apprehended by the faculty of hearing and the other such things.

Their not being separate from one another is called mutually encompassing one another—this is the thesis I establish. Moreover, my established thesis does not establish permanence by itself. Your objections concerning sound and permanence therefore do not address my thesis.

This is called adopting a different thesis of one’s own and constitutes a point of defeat.

3. Contradiction between the reason and the established thesis means: When the reason and the established thesis cannot be consistent with each other, this is called contradiction between the reason and the established thesis.

The opponent says: Sound is permanent. Why is this so? Because everything is impermanent, like space. This thesis is established.

The Treatise replies: You say that because everything is impermanent, sound is permanent. Is sound included within “everything,” or is it not included within “everything”? If it is included within everything, then because everything is impermanent, sound must also be impermanent. If it is not included within everything, then “everything” is not established. Why? Because it does not include sound. If you affirm the reason, the established thesis is destroyed; if you affirm the established thesis, the reason is destroyed. Therefore, your thesis is not established. This is called contradiction between the reason and the established thesis and constitutes a point of defeat.

4. Abandoning one’s own established thesis means: When the opponent has refuted the thesis one established, and one abandons it without defending it, this is called abandoning one’s own established thesis.

The opponent says: Sound is permanent. Why is this so? Because it is apprehended by a sense faculty. Just as universality and difference are permanent because they are apprehended, sound is also permanent because it is apprehended by a sense faculty. This thesis is established.

The Treatise replies: You say that sound is permanent because it is apprehended by a sense faculty. Yet whatever is apprehended by a sense faculty is also encompassed by impermanence, as are tiles and the like. Because tiles and the like are apprehended by a sense faculty, they are impermanent; sound must likewise be impermanent.

Your claim that universality and difference are permanent is incorrect. Why? Are the universality and difference of an ox and the like identical with the ox, or are they distinct from the ox?

If they are identical, then the ox is real, whereas universality and difference are not real. If they are distinct, then the intrinsic nature of the universality and difference of the ox and the like should be capable of being revealed independently. Since universality and difference cannot be perceived apart from the ox, they cannot serve as examples of permanence.

The thesis you establish cannot be established. This thesis has been refuted.

The opponent says: Who established this thesis? This is called abandoning one’s own established thesis and constitutes a point of defeat.

5. Establishing a different reason means: After establishing a reason that shares a common characteristic with the thesis, one subsequently states another reason. This is called establishing a different reason.

The opponent says: Sound is permanent. Why is this so? Because it is not manifest at two times. Whatever is permanent is not manifest at two times, like space and the like. Sound is also so. This thesis is established.

The Treatise replies: You say that sound is permanent because it is not manifest at two times, like space and the like. This reason is incorrect. Why? Because not being manifest at two times does not definitively establish permanence. For example, wind and tactile sensation are manifest at one time, yet wind is impermanent. Sound is likewise so.

The opponent says: Sound does not share a common characteristic with wind. Wind is apprehended by the bodily faculty, whereas sound is apprehended by the auditory faculty. Therefore, sound and wind do not share a common characteristic.

The Treatise replies: You previously said that sound is permanent because it is not manifest at two times. Now you say that sound and wind do not share a common characteristic because they are apprehended by different faculties. You have abandoned your former reason and established a different reason; therefore, your reason cannot be established. This is called establishing a different reason and constitutes a point of defeat.

6. An irrelevant thesis means: Stating a proof that is unrelated to the thesis established is called an irrelevant thesis.

The opponent says: Sound is permanent. Why is this so? Form and the other constituents, the five skandhas, and the twelve links of dependent origination. This is called an irrelevant thesis.

7. Meaninglessness means: When intending to debate a thesis, one instead recites a mantra. This is called meaninglessness.

8. Having meaning but being incomprehensible means: If something is stated three times but the audience and the opponent do not understand it, this is called having meaning but being incomprehensible. If someone expounds a proposition that the audience and the opponent wish to understand, yet after it has been stated three times they still do not understand it at all—for example, someone says: “Dust has no body; it gives rise to joy and gives rise to distress; without arriving, it undergoes diminution or increase; xả di đa; if it is not relinquished, it will be destroyed. Sound is permanent. Why is this so? Because impermanence is permanent.” This is called having meaning but being incomprehensible and constitutes a point of defeat.

9. An illogical thesis means: A statement whose parts possess meaning but do not connect with one another from beginning to end is called an illogical thesis. For example, someone says: “Eat ten kinds of fruit, three kinds of ? One kind of food and drink.” This is called illogical.

10. Being untimely means: After one’s established thesis has already been refuted, one then establishes a reason. This is called being untimely.

The opponent says: Sound is permanent. Why is this so? Just as a minute spherical particle rests upon the permanent and is therefore permanent, sound is likewise so.

The Treatise replies: You establish the thesis of permanence but state no reason. Your five-membered argument is incomplete; therefore, your thesis cannot be established. This thesis has been refuted.

The opponent says: I have a reason; I merely did not state its name. What is the reason? It is because sound rests upon permanent space.

The Treatise replies: This is like seeking fire to save a house after it has already burned down. To withhold a reason until an untimely moment and then use it to rescue one’s thesis is likewise so. This is called being untimely.

11—An incomplete member is this: When, among the five members of an argument, one member is missing, it is called an incomplete member. The five members are: first, the statement of the thesis; second, the statement of the reason; third, the statement of the analogous example; fourth, the statement applying the analogy; and fifth, the statement of the conclusion. For example, someone says: “Sound is impermanent”—this is the first member.

“Why is this so? Because it arises from causes”—this is the second member. “Whatever arises in dependence upon causes is impermanent.

For example, a tile, because it arises in dependence upon causes, is impermanent”—this is the third member. “Sound is likewise”—this is the fourth member. “Therefore, sound is impermanent”—this is the fifth member.

If any one of these five members is lacking, it is called incomplete, and one falls into a point of defeat.

12—An excessive member is this: Stating many reasons or giving too many examples is called an excessive member. For example, someone says: “Sound is impermanent. Why is this so? Because it arises through effort, because it arises without an interval, because it is apprehended by a faculty, because it arises and ceases, and because it serves as speech.” This is called an excess of reasons.

Furthermore: “Sound is impermanent because it arises in dependence upon causes, like a tile, like clothing, like a house, or like karma.” This is called an excess of examples.

The Treatise says: You state many reasons and many examples. If one reason cannot establish the thesis, why state that one reason? If it can establish the thesis, why employ many reasons? The same applies to many examples. Saying too much is necessarily useless. This is called an excessive member.

13—Repetition is this: There are three kinds of repetition: first, repetition of a word; second, repetition of meaning; and third, repetition of an implication. Repetition of a word is like saying: “Shakra, Shakra.” Repetition of meaning is like saying: “the eye-organ.” Repetition of an implication is like saying: “Samsara is truly suffering; nirvana is truly bliss.” The first sentence should be stated, but the latter need not be stated. Why is this so? Because the preceding sentence has already disclosed the meaning. If the preceding sentence has already disclosed the meaning, what does the latter sentence disclose? If it discloses nothing, the latter sentence is necessarily useless. This is called repetitive speech.

14—Inability to recite is this: If a thesis has been stated and understood by the assembly, yet after it has been repeated three times someone is unable to recite and retain it, this is called inability to recite.

15—Failure to understand the meaning is this: If a thesis has been stated and understood by the assembly, yet after it has been repeated three times someone does not understand its meaning, this is called inability to understand.

16—Inability to challenge is this: Seeing that another has established a thesis in accordance with reason, yet being unable to refute it, is called inability to challenge.

The Treatise says: Failure to understand the meaning and inability to challenge—these two do not constitute points of defeat. Why is this so? If someone neither understands the meaning nor is able to raise a challenge, that person is not worthy of discussing the thesis with.

The Treatise says: These two are exceedingly grave and (do not) constitute points of defeat. Why is this so? In other cases of falling into a point of defeat, if there is a fault in one’s statement, another expedient may be used to remedy it. For these two, however, there is no expedient by which they can be remedied. Previously, such a person gave rise to arrogant pride in their own intelligence, but afterward was unable to display any sign of intelligence; this is a foolish person worthy of shame. This is called inability to challenge.

17—Contriving an expedient to evade a challenge is this: Knowing that the thesis one has established is faulty, one expediently evades the issue by speaking of other matters. One may say that one is ill, or that one wishes to examine another person’s illness. At that time, unless the matter is set aside, it will be impossible to debate and refute that person’s thesis and challenge. Why is this so? Because one fears losing the bonds of familial affection and mutual regard. This is called contriving an expedient to evade a challenge, and one falls into a point of defeat.