迴諍論

A Record of the Preface to the Translation of the Vigrahavyāvartanī.

The Vigrahavyāvartanī was composed by Bodhisattva Nāgārjuna. Each śloka consists of thirty-two syllables. The original Sanskrit text of this treatise contains six hundred lines.

In the third year of Xinghe during the Great Wei dynasty, in the cyclic year corresponding to Daliang, in the month of Chen, at the Guiyou hour on the Xinmao day, Tripiṭaka Dharma Master Vimokṣaprajñārṣi, a native of Uḍḍiyāna and a member of the Kṣatriya royal lineage, together with the Indian brahmin Gautama Prajñāruci, translated the scripture at Golden Flower Monastery in the city of Ye, expending more than twenty units of labor.

The greater part was in Sanskrit, comprising 11,918 characters. Śramaṇa Tanlin, who received their instruction, served as scribe for the translation and correspondence of meaning. Gao Zhongmi of Bohai, General of Agile Cavalry, Commander-in-Chief with the rank of the Three Excellencies, and Palace Aide to the Censor-in-Chief, petitioned for the translation and made offerings. At that time, complete annotations were recorded.

Hearing it brings the joy of the Dharma to fulfillment. Wishing everyone to be able to hear and see it, they therefore joined in honoring and supporting its translation.

FIRST SECTION OF THE OPENING VERSES

The questioner’s verses say:

If all things are devoid of substance,

Language too is among all things;

If language itself is devoid of substance,

How can it refute that substance?

If language possesses intrinsic substance,

Your thesis established before is destroyed.

Thus there is certainly a fault;

You must state a further superior reason.

If you say that there is no sound,

This meaning is certainly incorrect.

Only an existent sound can refute;

How could no sound refute anything?

What you say of refutation and the refuted

Is likewise incorrect.

Thus, it is the character of your own thesis

That destroys itself, not I who destroy it.

If that which is manifest exists,

You may turn the objection back;

But if that which is manifest is also nonexistent,

How could you turn the objection back?

Four means of valid knowledge are taught: perception, inference,

Āgama, and analogy.

When perception and āgama are established,

Analogy is also established.

The wise know that the Dharma being taught,

The wholesome Dharma, possesses intrinsic substance.

People in the world know that it has substance;

Other dharmas are likewise.

An existent dharma possesses intrinsic substance:

This is what the noble ones teach.

Accordingly, a nonexistent dharma

Is a dharma without intrinsic substance.

If dharmas are devoid of substance,

The substanceless could not receive names.

What has intrinsic substance has a name;

If there is only a name, what does it designate?

If names exist apart from dharmas,

They do not exist within those dharmas.

One who says, “Names exist apart from dharmas,”

May be challenged on this point.

If dharmas possess intrinsic substance,

One may refute the various dharmas;

But if the various dharmas are devoid of substance,

Ultimately, what is there to refute?

If a pot and clay exist,

One may destroy the pot and the clay.

When an existent thing is seen, it may be destroyed;

When no thing is seen, nothing can be destroyed.

If dharmas lack intrinsic substance,

What does language refute?

If what is no dharma can nevertheless be refuted,

Then no language could also accomplish refutation.

Just as a foolish person

Falsely takes a mirage to be water,

So too, if one falsely clings to the notion of refuting dharmas,

The matter is just the same.

Grasping, the grasped, and the grasper;

Refutation, the refuted, and the refuter—

These six kinds of meanings

Are all, without exception, existent dharmas.

If there are no grasping and no grasped,

There is also no grasper;

Then there are no refutation and no refuted,

And there is also no refuter.

If there are no refutation and no refuted,

And there is also no refuter,

Then all dharmas are established,

And their intrinsic substances are also established.

Your reason is certainly not established;

How could what lacks substance be a reason?

If a dharma has no cause,

How can it be said to be established?

If, without an established reason,

You reject the intrinsic substance of dharmas,

Then I too, without an established reason,

May establish that dharmas possess intrinsic substance.

If a cause exists while being devoid of substance,

This meaning is incoherent.

In the world, a dharma devoid of substance

Certainly cannot be said to exist.

If the refutation comes first and the refuted afterward,

That is incoherent;

So too if the refutation comes afterward or both occur together.

Thus, one knows that substance exists.

SECOND SECTION OF THE OPENING VERSES

If my language were separate from

Dharmas arising through the conjunction of causes and conditions,

Then the meaning of emptiness would not be established:

That the various dharmas lack intrinsic substance.

If dharmas are empty of causes and conditions,

I now state that meaning.

Whatever has causes and conditions—

Those causes and conditions are devoid of substance.

Just as one magically created person deals with another magically created person,

And one illusory person with another illusory person,

So too are refutation and the refuted;

Their meaning is likewise thus.

Language itself is devoid of substance,

And that which it expresses is also devoid of substance.

Thus, I am free of fault

And need not state a superior reason.

Your statement, “There is no sound,”

Is not my analogy,

For I do not use sound

To refute that sound.

Or it is as when a man

Falsely apprehends the body of a magically created woman

And thereby gives rise to lustful desire;

The meaning is likewise thus.

To say that it is thereby established is incorrect,

For there is no cause within an echo.

I rely upon conventional truth,

And therefore speak in this way.

Without relying upon conventional truth,

Ultimate truth cannot be realized;

Without realizing ultimate truth,

Nirvana cannot be realized.

If my thesis existed,

Then I would certainly be at fault;

But because my thesis concerns no entity,

I am therefore free of fault.

If I maintained a counter-refutation,

I would certainly need to employ such means of valid knowledge as perception.

A counter-refutation entails a fault;

But without it, what fault could there be?

If a means of valid knowledge establishes a dharma,

That means must in turn be established by another means.

Tell me: whence comes the means of valid knowledge

That establishes that means of valid knowledge?

If a means of valid knowledge is established apart from any means,

The meaning of your treatise is lost.

Thus there is certainly a fault;

You must state a further superior reason.

“Just as the light of fire

Can illuminate itself and illuminate other things,

So too is that means of valid knowledge:

It establishes both itself and others.”

Your statement is faulty.

Fire does not illuminate itself,

For this is incoherent,

As when a pot is seen in darkness.

Furthermore, if you say,

“Fire illuminates itself and others,”

Then, if fire burns other things,

Why does it not burn itself?

Furthermore, if you say,

“Fire illuminates itself and others,”

Darkness should likewise

Darken itself and darken other things.

There is no darkness within fire;

Where, then, are self and other?

Darkness can extinguish light;

How, then, can fire possess light?

Thus, at the moment fire arises,

If it can illuminate while arising,

Then the arising fire must at once reach darkness;

But that meaning is certainly incoherent.

If fire does not reach darkness

Yet can destroy darkness,

Then the fire in this place

Should destroy all darkness everywhere.

If a means of valid knowledge can establish itself

Without awaiting the establishment of an object of knowledge,

Then it is certainly self-established

And does not await another for its establishment.

If your means of valid knowledge can be established

Without awaiting an object of knowledge,

Then surely no one would

Use a means of valid knowledge to know the various dharmas.

If an object known by that means

Must await a means of valid knowledge to be established,

Then the establishment of the object of knowledge

Must await a subsequent means of valid knowledge for its establishment.

If an object is established without a means of valid knowledge,

Then it certainly does not await such a means.

Which established means of valid knowledge do you employ,

And how is that means itself established?

If your established means of valid knowledge

Must await being known before it is established,

Then the means of valid knowledge would be the object known;

Such a position is incoherent.

If a means of valid knowledge establishes the object of knowledge,

And the object of knowledge establishes the means of valid knowledge,

Then, if this is your position,

Neither of the two kinds is established.

The means of valid knowledge establishes the object of knowledge,

And the object of knowledge establishes the means of valid knowledge;

If the meaning were thus,

How could they establish one another?

Does the father give birth to the son,

Or does the son give birth to the father?

Which is the producer,

And which is the produced?

For what reason is one the father,

And for what reason is the other the son?

Regarding these two kinds of which you speak,

Both father and son remain doubtful.

A means of valid knowledge cannot establish itself;

It cannot be established jointly by self and other;

It is not established by another means of valid knowledge,

Nor is it established without causes and conditions.

If a Dharma master says,

“Wholesome dharmas possess intrinsic substance,”

The intrinsic substance of those wholesome dharmas

Must be distinguished according to the Dharma.

If the intrinsic substance of wholesome dharmas

Arises from causes and conditions,

Then wholesome dharmas have the substance of another;

How could that be intrinsic substance?

If there were even the slightest wholesome dharma

That did not arise from causes and conditions,

Such a wholesome dharma

Would not abide in the holy life.

There would be neither Dharma nor non-Dharma,

And worldly dharmas too would not exist.

Whatever possesses intrinsic substance must be permanent;

Whatever is permanent must be without causes and conditions.

Wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate dharmas—

All conditioned dharmas—

Would, according to this assertion, be permanent.

You incur such a fault.

If someone says, “Names exist,

And words possess intrinsic substance,”

You may challenge that person:

Words, names, and self are not real.

If this name is nonexistent,

Then existence too is nonexistent.

If you speak of existence and speak of nonexistence,

Your thesis incurs two faults.

If this name exists,

Then nonexistence too exists.

If you speak of nonexistence and speak of existence,

Your treatise incurs two faults.

Thus, as I said before:

All dharmas are empty,

Such is the meaning of our doctrine;

It certainly cannot be faulted.

If a distinct intrinsic nature existed

Yet did not abide within phenomena,

Then the concern you raise against me

Would surely be no cause for concern.

If there is being, it can be refuted;

If there is nonbeing, the statement can be established.

If there is neither being nor nonbeing,

How could a refutation be established?

What you say is refuted—

That which is refuted is itself nonexistent.

How can a nonexistent phenomenon be refuted?

Such is the fault in your argument.

I possess not the slightest thing;

Therefore, I am free from fault.

Thus, without reason,

You perversely challenge me.

You say: “Phenomena differ from words.”

I shall now explain this meaning:

There is no way it can be expressed,

Yet I am certainly free from fault.

You cite the example of the Deer-Thirst mirage

To elucidate the great meaning.

I have understood what you say,

As it accords with the analogy.

If that possessed intrinsic nature,

It would not need causes and conditions to arise.

If it requires causes and conditions,

It is thereby said to be empty.

If “apprehension” possessed real substance,

Who could refute it?

The remainder is likewise;

Therefore, I am free from fault.

The meaning of this claim that there is no cause

Has already been fully explained above.

When speaking of a cause in the three times,

They are spoken of as equal.

If a cause is said to exist in the three times,

Being equal in this way as stated before,

Then such a cause in the three times

Accords with the doctrine of emptiness.

Whoever has faith in emptiness

Has faith in all things;

Whoever has no faith in emptiness

Certainly has no faith in anything.

Emptiness, intrinsic nature, and causes and conditions—

These three teachings form a single Middle Way.

I take refuge and reverently bow

To unsurpassed great wisdom.

PART THREE: EXPLANATION OF THE OPENING VERSES

The first verse of the Treatise is explained as follows:

If all things are without substance,

And language is included among all things,

Then language itself is without substance;

How can it refute their substance?

What meaning does this verse express? If all phenomena arise through causes and conditions, then they are causes and conditions—a conjunction of causes and conditions—and apart from those causes and conditions, there is certainly no further intrinsic nature whatsoever. Thus, all phenomena are empty.

For example, a sprout does not exist within the seed; nor does it exist within such causes and conditions as earth, water, fire, wind, and space; nor does it exist within any single cause or condition; nor does it exist within the conjunction of causes and conditions; nor, apart from the conjunction of causes and conditions, does it exist separately elsewhere. If it does not exist in any of these, it is therefore said that the sprout has no intrinsic nature.

If all things are thus without intrinsic nature, they are said to be empty.

If all phenomena are entirely empty, then language certainly does not exist; and if language does not exist, it certainly cannot refute all phenomena. If you intend to say that language is not empty, while what language declares is, “All things are empty,” this meaning is incorrect. Why is this so?

You say that all phenomena are empty; therefore, language is also empty. Why? It does not exist in the cause, in the four great elements, in each one individually, or in their conjunction; whether causes and conditions are conjoined or not conjoined, it does not exist in any of them.

Likewise, language does not exist in the throat; it does not exist individually in the lips, tongue, roots of the teeth, tip of the nose, and so forth; it does not exist in their conjunction; nor does it exist in either of the two places. There are only causes and conditions and their conjunction. Apart from such a conjunction of causes and conditions, no other phenomenon whatsoever exists.

If this is so, then all language is without intrinsic nature. If language is thus without intrinsic nature, then all phenomena are also without intrinsic nature. If this language is without intrinsic nature, then there is only the name “refutation,” and it cannot refute phenomena. For example, without fire there can be no burning; without a knife there can be no cutting; and without water there can be no overflowing. Likewise, if there is no language, how could the intrinsic nature of phenomena be refuted? Since it cannot refute the intrinsic nature of phenomena, yet the mind still conceives of refuting the intrinsic nature of all phenomena, the meaning is incoherent.

There is also another meaning. The verse says:

If language possesses intrinsic nature,

The doctrine previously established is destroyed.

Thus there would certainly be a fault,

And a superior reason must be stated anew.

What meaning does this verse express? If this language possesses intrinsic nature, then the doctrinal proposition you previously established destroys itself and is thereby at fault. If so, you must then state an additional superior reason.

If you intend to say, “Language possesses intrinsic nature, but other phenomena do not,” this contradicts the statement that “all phenomena are empty,” and your doctrine is also destroyed.

There is also another meaning: Language is not excluded from the enumeration of all phenomena. If all phenomena are entirely empty, language is also empty. If language is nonexistent, it certainly cannot refute all phenomena. If this is so, then among the six kinds of corresponding disputation, how could they not also apply to you?

You say that all phenomena are empty; therefore, language is also empty. Why is that? Because language is itself included among all phenomena. If language is empty, it certainly cannot refute them. If, in refuting them, it says, “All phenomena are empty,” this is certainly incoherent.

Furthermore, if it is coherent and language can refute all phenomena, then, although all phenomena are empty, language is certainly not empty. If language is not empty yet refutes all phenomena, that is certainly incoherent. If phenomena are empty while language is not empty, what does language refute?

Furthermore, if this language is included among all things, the analogy is not equivalent. If language is one of all things, and all things are already empty, then language is also empty; if language is empty, it certainly cannot refute. If language is empty and phenomena are also empty, yet emptiness can refute phenomena and render them empty, then emptiness would itself be a cause and condition—which is certainly impossible.

Furthermore, if, fearing that the analogy is not equivalent, you maintain that the emptiness of all phenomena can serve as a cause and condition, then nonexistent language certainly cannot refute the intrinsic nature of all phenomena.

There is also another meaning: There is the fault of maintaining that phenomena are empty on one side and not empty on the other. If this fault exists, a superior reason must additionally be stated.

If one side is empty and the other is not empty, then the statement, “All phenomena are empty and have no intrinsic nature,” is incoherent.

There is also another meaning. The verse says:

You maintain: “It is like one sound silencing another.”

This meaning is certainly incorrect.

A sound that exists can silence another sound;

How can a nonexistent sound silence anything?

What meaning does this verse express? If you intend to say that a sound can silence another sound—as when someone says, “Do not utter a sound,” and that person himself utters a sound capable of silencing another sound—and that likewise, though all phenomena are empty, nonexistent language can refute them, I now say that this is incoherent. Why is this so? Only when this sound exists can it silence the other sound. Since your language does not exist, it certainly cannot refute the intrinsic nature of phenomena. The meaning you establish is that language is also empty and phenomena are also empty; thus, if you maintain that it is like a nonexistent sound, this is certainly faulty.

The verse says:

You say: “The refuter and the refuted

Are likewise.” But this too is faulty.

Thus, the defining mark of your doctrine

Destroys itself, not mine.

What meaning does this verse express? If you intend to say that the refuter and the refuted are likewise, this is incoherent. If you say, “My language can refute the intrinsic nature of all phenomena,” this is incoherent. I now say that this meaning is incorrect. Why is this so?

When the defining mark of the doctrine is understood in this way, the fault lies with you, not with me. You say that all phenomena are empty. Thus, the meaning of your preceding doctrine is faulty; the error does not lie with me. If you say that you refute what is to be refuted, while its meaning is incoherent, then this assertion is incorrect.

There is also another meaning. The verse says:

If that which appears truly exists,

You may turn the argument back;

But that which appears is also empty—

How can the refutation be turned back?

What meaning does this verse express? If all dharmas had an existent being that could be apprehended, then you could reply that I render the dharmas empty. But in truth it is not so. How is this known? Direct perception, being included among all dharmas, must also be empty. If you make distinctions, you rely upon direct perception for inference. Yet if both direct perception and inference are empty, then no direct perception or inference can be obtained. Since direct perception and inference are both empty, how could anything be refuted? Therefore, when you say that all dharmas are empty, the meaning is incorrect.

Or perhaps you maintain: Whether through inference, direct perception, analogy, or reliance upon the Agamas, all dharmas are apprehended; all dharmas have intrinsic nature in this way, and thus I can reply. To this I now respond in verse:

Four means of knowledge are taught: inference and direct perception,

Analogy and the Agamas;

When direct perception, inference, and the Agamas are established,

Analogy is also established.

What meaning does this verse express? Among the four means of knowledge—inference, analogy, the Agamas, and direct perception—if direct perception can be established, then inference, the Agamas, and the others can all be established. If all dharmas are entirely empty, direct perception is also nonexistent; thus inference and analogy are also nonexistent.

All dharmas established through means of knowledge are entirely empty. Because these four kinds of means of knowledge apply to all things, whatever dharmas are established through inference are also established through analogy and through the Agamas. All those established dharmas are empty.

If this is so, dharmas are unobtainable, because both the means of knowledge and the objects known through them are empty. Therefore, there is no refutation. Thus, if it is said that all dharmas are empty and lack intrinsic nature, the meaning is inconsistent.

There is a further meaning, expressed in verse:

The wise know the dharmas that are taught;

Wholesome dharmas possess intrinsic nature.

People in the world know existent entities;

Other dharmas are likewise.

What meaning does this verse express? The Dharma master teaches wholesome dharmas. There are one hundred and nineteen wholesome dharmas.

With regard to mind, they are of one characteristic: one, feeling; two, perception; three, awareness; four, contact; five, contemplation; six, desire; seven, confident understanding; eight, diligence; nine, mindfulness; ten, samadhi; eleven, wisdom; twelve, equanimity; thirteen, cultivation; fourteen, combined cultivation; fifteen, accumulation; sixteen, attainment; seventeen, accomplishment; eighteen, eloquence; nineteen, delight; twenty, effort; twenty-one, thought; twenty-two, seeking; twenty-three, power; twenty-four, freedom from jealousy; twenty-five, mastery; twenty-six, skillful eloquence; twenty-seven, absence of regret; twenty-eight, regret; twenty-nine, fewness of desires; thirty, absence of fewness of desires; thirty-one, relinquishment; thirty-two, absence of thought;

thirty-three, absence of seeking; thirty-four, absence of aspiration; thirty-five, delight in teaching; thirty-six, nonattachment to sensory domains; thirty-seven, nonactivity; thirty-eight, arising; thirty-nine, abiding; forty, cessation; forty-one, accumulation; forty-two, aging; forty-three, affliction; forty-four, confusion; forty-five, doubt; forty-six, deliberation; forty-seven, craving; forty-eight, faith; forty-nine, happiness; fifty, nonconcordance; fifty-one, concordance; fifty-two, fearlessness before the assembly; fifty-three, reverence; fifty-four, performing the supreme Dharma; fifty-five, respect; fifty-six, disrespect; fifty-seven, providing support; fifty-eight, failure to provide support; fifty-nine, accord with concentration; sixty, sufficiency; sixty-one, activation;

sixty-two, displeasure; sixty-three, concealment; sixty-four, instability; sixty-five, sorrow; sixty-six, failing to obtain what is sought; sixty-seven, agitation; sixty-eight, indolence; sixty-nine, sorrowful encounter; seventy, purification; seventy-one, inner faith; seventy-two, fear; seventy-three, trust; seventy-four, moral shame; seventy-five, uprightness; seventy-six, freedom from deceit; seventy-seven, tranquility; seventy-eight, freedom from alarm; seventy-nine, freedom from error; eighty, gentleness; eighty-one, understanding; eighty-two, resentment; eighty-three, burning anguish; eighty-four, wakefulness; eighty-five, non-greed; eighty-six, non-hatred; eighty-seven, non-delusion; eighty-eight, non-omniscience; eighty-nine, letting go; ninety, nonexistence;

ninety-one, moral dread; ninety-two, not concealing one's own wrongdoing; ninety-three, compassion; ninety-four, joy; ninety-five, equanimity; ninety-six, supernormal powers; ninety-seven, nonattachment; ninety-eight, non-?; ninety-nine, purity of mind; one hundred, patient relinquishment; one hundred and one, benefit; one hundred and two, capacity for application; one hundred and three, merit; one hundred and four, the concentration of non-perception; one hundred and five, absence of omniscience; one hundred and six, the samadhi of impermanence...thus and thus...there are one hundred and nineteen wholesome dharmas.

Wholesome dharmas thus have the intrinsic nature of wholesome dharmas; unwholesome dharmas, the intrinsic nature of unwholesome dharmas; the morally indeterminate, that of the morally indeterminate; what is by nature morally indeterminate, that of what is by nature morally indeterminate; the desire realm, that of the desire realm; the form realm, that of the form realm; the formless realm, that of the formless realm; the uncontaminated, that of the uncontaminated; suffering, its origin, its cessation, and the path, those of suffering, its origin, its cessation, and the path; the cultivation of concentration, that of the cultivation of concentration...thus and thus...it is seen that immeasurable kinds of dharmas all possess intrinsic nature.

Thus, if it is said that all dharmas lack intrinsic nature—and that this absence of intrinsic nature is called emptiness—the meaning is inconsistent.

There is a further meaning, expressed in verse:

Where there is a dharma, there is its intrinsic nature;

This was taught by the noble ones.

Thus, where there is no dharma,

There is no intrinsic nature of that dharma.

What meaning does this verse express? It is just as it is said: Where there is a dharma, there is the intrinsic nature of that dharma. Thus, where there is no dharma, there is no intrinsic nature of that dharma; the factors of awakening possess the intrinsic nature of the factors of awakening; the factors of bodhi possess the intrinsic nature of the factors of bodhi...all other dharmas are likewise.

If immeasurable kinds of intrinsic natures of dharmas have already been observed in this way, yet it is said that all dharmas lack intrinsic nature and, because they lack intrinsic nature, are therefore called empty, then the meaning is inconsistent.

There is a further meaning, expressed in verse:

If dharmas had no being,

What has no being could not receive a name.

What possesses intrinsic nature possesses a name;

If there were only a name, what would it name?

What meaning does this verse express? If all dharmas lacked intrinsic nature, then when one spoke of the absence of intrinsic nature, language itself would also be nonexistent. Why is this so? Where there is an entity, there is a name; where there is no entity, there is no name. Because all dharmas have names, it should be known that all dharmas possess intrinsic nature. Since dharmas possess intrinsic nature, it cannot be said that all dharmas are empty. Thus, if it is said that all dharmas are empty and lack intrinsic nature, the meaning is inconsistent. The verse says:

If names existed apart from dharmas,

They would not exist within those dharmas.

Whoever says names exist apart from dharmas

Will certainly be challenged.

What meaning does this verse express? Perhaps you intend to say: Dharmas have names, yet names exist apart from dharmas. Thus all dharmas are empty and lack intrinsic nature; consequently, what is nonexistent has a name, and what exists has a name.

To this I now respond: If this were so, there would be some people who say that names exist separately, apart from the being of dharmas. If names existed separately and dharmas existed separately, then this could not be demonstrated. Since it cannot be demonstrated in this way, yet in your mind you distinguish dharmas as existing separately and names as existing separately, the meaning is incorrect.

There is a further meaning, expressed in verse:

If dharmas possessed intrinsic nature,

Dharmas could be refuted.

If dharmas had no being,

What, ultimately, could be refuted?

Just as when a jar and clay exist,

The jar and clay can be broken;

When an entity is seen, it can be broken,

But when no entity is seen, nothing can be broken.

What meaning does this verse express? Only if there is a thing can it be refuted; if there is no thing, there is nothing to refute. Just as, if there were no jar and no earth, there would certainly be no need to break anything.

If there is a jar, it can be broken; if there is no jar, it certainly cannot be broken...so it is, so it is...If a dharma has no intrinsic nature, there is certainly no need to refute it; if a dharma has an intrinsic nature, then it can be refuted. If it does not exist, what is there to refute? If all dharmas are without intrinsic nature, yet one refutes them and then declares, “All dharmas are without intrinsic nature,” the meaning is inconsistent.

What do you refute? If the entity of refutation exists, then the intrinsic nature of all dharmas can be refuted. The verse says:

If dharmas lack intrinsic nature,

What does language refute?

If what does not exist can be refuted,

Then even without words, refutation is accomplished.

What meaning does this verse express? If dharmas lack intrinsic nature, then language also lacks intrinsic nature. How can it refute anything and say, “All dharmas are without intrinsic nature”? If refutation could occur in this way, then even without saying anything, language would accomplish refutation; if so, there would be such faults as cold fire, solid water, and so forth.

There is yet another meaning. The verse says:

Just as that foolish person

Falsely takes a mirage for water,

If you refute the “false apprehension,”

This matter is likewise so.

What meaning does this verse express? Suppose your intention is this: Just as a foolish person takes a mirage for water, falsely apprehending water where there is none, a wise person, in order to awaken that person’s mind, tells him, “You have falsely apprehended water”...so it is, so it is...Where there is no intrinsic nature, beings nevertheless grasp the intrinsic nature of dharmas in all dharmas. In order to awaken the deluded minds of those beings, it is said that all dharmas lack intrinsic nature.

I shall now address this. The verse says:

Apprehension, the apprehended, and the apprehender;

Refutation, the refuted, and the refuter—

These six kinds of dharmas

Are all existent dharmas.

What meaning does this verse express? If such beings exist, then apprehension, the apprehended, and the apprehender exist, and only then can the apprehension be called “false”; likewise, refutation, the refuted, and the refuter—thus the meanings of these six are established. If these six meanings are established, yet one says that all dharmas are empty, the meaning is incorrect. The verse says:

If there are no apprehension and apprehended,

And also no apprehender,

Then there are no refutation and refuted,

And also no refuter.

What meaning does this verse express? If you intend to say that there is no fault in there being no apprehension, apprehended, or apprehender, then if a false apprehension of intrinsic nature in all dharmas is refuted in this way, the refutation does not exist, that which is refuted does not exist, and the refuter does not exist. The verse says:

If there are no refutation and refuted,

And also no refuter,

Then all dharmas are established,

And their intrinsic natures are also established.

What meaning does this verse express? If there is no refutation, nothing refuted, and no refuter, then all dharmas are certainly not refuted, and all dharmas therefore possess intrinsic nature. The verse says:

Your reason is certainly not established;

How can what lacks an entity be a reason?

If the doctrine has no reason,

How can it be said to be established?

What meaning does this verse express? If all dharmas are empty and lack intrinsic nature, then within such a doctrine the reason you state is not established. Why is this? If all dharmas are empty and lack intrinsic nature, where can a reason exist? If the doctrine has no reason, by what reason is the proposition “all dharmas are empty” established? Therefore, your statement that all dharmas are empty and lack intrinsic nature is incorrect. The verse says:

If, without a reason, you establish

The denial of the intrinsic nature of dharmas,

Then I too, without a reason, establish

That dharmas possess intrinsic nature.

What meaning does this verse express? If your intention is, “Without a reason, I establish that dharmas lack intrinsic nature,” then if you establish your position without the intrinsic nature of a reason, my position that dharmas possess intrinsic nature is likewise established without a reason. The verse says:

If there is a reason, yet it lacks an entity,

This meaning is inconsistent;

In the world, a dharma lacking an entity

Certainly cannot be said to exist.

What meaning does this verse express? If your intention is, “I possess a reason by which the thesis is established, but the reason itself lacks intrinsic nature,” then the meaning of lacking intrinsic nature is certainly inconsistent. Why is this? Because whatever lacks intrinsic nature in the world cannot be said to exist. The verse says:

If refutation comes first and the refuted afterward,

Such a sequence is inconsistent;

If refutation comes afterward or simultaneously,

Thus one knows that they possess entities.

What meaning does this verse express? If refutation comes first and the refuted afterward, the meaning is inconsistent, for before that which is to be refuted exists, what does the refutation refute? If refutation comes afterward and the refuted comes first, this too is inconsistent, for once that which is to be refuted is already established, how can the refutation refute it?

If the two dharmas—refutation and the refuted—exist simultaneously, they do not serve as causes and conditions for each other: the refutation is not caused by the refuted, and the refuted is not caused by the refutation. Since each possesses its own intrinsic nature, it certainly cannot be called a refutation. It is like two horns arising together, neither serving as the cause of the other: the left is not the cause of the right, and the right is not the cause of the left.

Thus, if one says that all dharmas lack intrinsic nature, the meaning is incorrect.

FOURTH: EXPLANATION OF THE FOREGOING SECTION

The explanation states: In response to what you have said, I shall now answer you. You stated in verse:

If all things lack an entity,

Language is included among all things;

Language itself lacks an entity—

How can it refute the entities of those things?

I now answer this verse with another verse:

If my language were apart from

Dharmas arising through the conjunction of causes and conditions,

Then the meaning of emptiness would not be established:

That dharmas lack intrinsic nature.

What meaning does this verse express? The answer is that language does not exist within its causes, within the great elements, or within their conjunction; nor does it exist when they are separated and dispersed. The throat, lips, tongue, roots of the teeth, tip of the nose, and other such places each possess their respective powers.

Yet language does not exist in any one of these places, nor in their conjunction. Apart from such a conjunction of causes and conditions, there is no other dharma called language. Therefore, it lacks intrinsic nature.

Because it lacks intrinsic nature, I say that all dharmas lack intrinsic nature, and the meaning of emptiness is thereby established. Just as this language lacks intrinsic nature and is empty, so too all dharmas lack intrinsic nature and are empty. Therefore, your statement, “Because your language is empty, you cannot assert emptiness,” is incorrect.

There is yet another meaning. The verse says:

If dharmas arising through causes and conditions are empty,

I now explain this meaning:

Whatever possesses causes and conditions—

Those causes and conditions lack intrinsic nature.

What meaning does this verse express? You are unable to understand that all dharmas are empty and do not know the meaning of emptiness; how, then, can you find fault with me? As you have said, “Your language is empty; language lacks intrinsic nature.

Because it lacks intrinsic nature, it cannot refute dharmas.” If this dharma of language arises through causes and conditions, then because it arises, one can say that all dharmas are empty and that all lack intrinsic nature. By what meaning is it known that dharmas arising through causes and conditions lack intrinsic nature? All your dharmas arise through causes and conditions; therefore, all dharmas lack intrinsic nature.

A dharma that lacks intrinsic nature necessarily depends upon causes and conditions. If it possessed intrinsic nature, why would it need causes and conditions? Apart from causes and conditions, no dharmas exist.

If something arises through causes and conditions, it certainly lacks intrinsic nature; because it lacks intrinsic nature, it is called empty.

Likewise, my language also arises through causes and conditions. If it arises through causes and conditions, it certainly lacks intrinsic nature; because it lacks intrinsic nature, it is called empty. Because all dharmas arise through causes and conditions, their intrinsic natures are all empty.

Just as with jars, garments, grass, and other things, each of these dharmas has its own causes and conditions. In the world, plants and objects made from earth can contain and carry water, honey, and milk, and serve for coming and going and bearing things; there are also useful things that ward off cold, heat, wind, and so forth. Because they arise from causes and conditions, they are all without inherent nature. So it is, and so it is with my words: they arise through the conjunction of causes and conditions and are therefore said to be without inherent nature. Since they are thus without inherent nature, it may be said that their lack of inherent nature is established. Such language of “emptiness” is employed in the world.

Therefore, when you say, “Because they lack inherent nature, your words are also empty and thus cannot refute the inherent nature of dharmas,” this assertion is incorrect.

There is also another point. The verse says:

An emanated person and an emanated person,

An illusory person and an illusory person—

Thus are refuter and refuted;

Their meaning is likewise so.

What does this verse mean? Suppose an emanated man sees another emanated person walking and performing various actions, and then refutes him. Or suppose an illusory man sees another illusory person walking and performing various actions, and then refutes him.

The emanated person who refutes is himself empty. If the emanated person who refutes is empty, then the emanated person being refuted is also empty. If the person being refuted is empty, the refuter is also empty.

The illusory person who refutes is empty. If the illusory person who refutes is empty, then the illusory person being refuted is also empty. If what is refuted is empty, the refuter is also empty.

So it is, and so it is with my words: they are empty, just as illusions and emanations are empty. In this way, empty words can refute the inherent nature of all dharmas.

Therefore, when you say, “Since your words are empty, they cannot refute the inherent nature of all dharmas,” your statement is not tenable.

As for the six kinds of disputation you mentioned, they are likewise refuted in this way. Thus, my words are empty, and so are all dharmas. My words are empty, dharmas are also empty, yet all dharmas are wholly not empty.

Furthermore, you spoke this verse:

If words possess inherent nature,

The thesis established before is refuted;

Thus there would indeed be a fault,

And a superior reason must be stated again.

I now answer this verse with another verse:

Words have no inherent nature,

And what they express also has no nature;

Thus I am free of fault,

And need not state a superior reason.

What does this verse mean? These words of mine have no inherent nature because they arise from causes and conditions. As explained before, if they possessed inherent nature, they would not arise; therefore, they are called empty. Thus it can be said that these words are empty and that all other dharmas are entirely empty.

Because this is so, I am free of fault. If I were to say that words are not empty while all other dharmas are entirely empty, then I would indeed be at fault. But I do not say this, and therefore I am free of fault.

In principle, it truly cannot be said, “Words are not empty, while all other dharmas are entirely empty.” For this reason, I need not state a superior reason. If words were not empty while all other dharmas were entirely empty, then a superior reason could be stated.

Therefore, when you say, “Your argument collapses; thus there is a fault, and you must state a superior reason again,” this assertion is incorrect.

Furthermore, you spoke this verse:

If it is said, “Make no sound,”

This assertion is indeed incorrect:

An existing sound can refute sound;

Without sound, how could it refute?

I now answer this verse with another verse:

What you say—“Make no sound”—

Is not an analogy of mine,

For I do not employ one sound

To refute another sound.

What does this verse mean? That is not my analogy. Suppose someone says, “Do not make a sound.” That person himself produces a sound and then uses a sound to refute sound; the sound is not nonexistent. I am not like this.

Words are empty, and the dharmas they refute are also empty. Why is this? If that sound could answer back to this sound, my case would not be like this. What I say is this: All dharmas are without inherent nature, and because they are without inherent nature, they are called empty. Why? If words lacking inherent nature answered back to what lacks inherent nature, then all dharmas would thereby be established as possessing inherent nature. It would be like saying, “Do not make a sound,” where that sound can refute sound. In the same way, words lacking inherent nature would refute dharmas lacking inherent nature. If what lacks inherent nature were refuted in this manner, all dharmas would thereby be established as possessing inherent nature, and all dharmas would be wholly nonempty.

Yet I say that dharmas are empty; I do not say that dharmas are nonempty and then offer such an analogy.

The verse says:

Or suppose there is a man

Who mistakenly apprehends an emanated woman

And thereby gives rise to lust;

The meaning here is likewise so.

What does this verse mean? Suppose there is an illusory, emanated woman who truly has no inherent nature. A man may conceive the body of that emanated woman to be real and give rise to lust.

The deluded apprehension of dharmas is likewise so. The Tathagata or a shravaka disciple of the Tathagata may seek to awaken that man from his deluded state of mind. Through the majestic spiritual power of the Tathagata or the majestic spiritual power of a shravaka disciple of the Tathagata, an emanated person may be produced in this way.

Likewise, empty words are like an emanation, like an emanated woman who has no inherent nature. Dharmas are empty in this way; without apprehending the inherent nature of dharmas, such words can refute delusion and thereby bring about awakening. Likewise, this analogy of emptiness can establish the meaning of emptiness.

Thus it is my position that is tenable, not yours.

The verse says:

The reason being identical to what is to be established is invalid,

For within an echo there is no reason;

I rely upon conventional truth,

And therefore speak in this way.

What does this verse mean? If you maintain that it is like there being no sound, then the reason would be identical to what is to be established. Why? Because the reason does not stand apart from the absence of inherent nature in all dharmas. The echo of that sound does not possess inherent nature; rather, because it arises from causes and conditions, it is without inherent nature.

If it is without inherent nature, yet you say that sound can refute sound, then your assertion indeed collapses. Moreover, what I say does not contradict conventional truth. I do not abandon conventional truth; relying upon conventional truth, I can say that the nature of all dharmas is empty. Apart from conventional truth, dharmas cannot be expressed. The Buddha spoke this verse:

Without relying upon conventional truth,

Ultimate truth cannot be realized;

Without realizing ultimate truth,

Nirvana cannot be realized.

What does this verse mean? That dharmas such as these are not nonempty, and that all dharmas are without inherent nature—these two statements are no different.

Furthermore, you spoke this verse:

When you say, “Refuter and refuted,”

That likewise is incorrect;

Thus the characteristic of your thesis

Destroys itself, not me.

I now answer that verse with another verse:

If my thesis existed,

Then I would indeed be at fault;

But in my thesis not a single thing exists,

And thus no fault is possible.

What does this verse mean? If my thesis existed, it would indeed possess the characteristic of a thesis. If I had a thesis and the characteristic of a thesis, then I would incur the fault you describe. Yet my thesis does not exist in this way, because dharmas are truly quiescent in this way and because their nature is originally empty. Where, then, could a thesis exist? Likewise, where could the characteristic of a thesis be found? Since I have no characteristic of a thesis, how can you impute a fault to me? Therefore, when you say, “You possess the characteristic of a thesis and can therefore incur a fault,” this assertion is incorrect.

Furthermore, you spoke this verse:

If that direct perception exists,

You may answer in return;

But that direct perception is also empty—

How can it be apprehended in return?

Four means of knowledge are taught: direct perception, inference,

Agama, and analogy;

Direct perception, inference, and Agama are established,

And analogy is also established.

To this verse I now reply with a verse:

If I were to employ a rejoinder,

I would necessarily have to use the means of knowledge: perception and so forth.

Employing a rejoinder would entail a fault;

But since it is not so, what fault is there?

What does this verse mean? If I had even the slightest dharma, I would necessarily have recourse to direct perception, inference, Agama, and analogy. Thus, the four means of knowledge would in turn require four means of knowledge. If I were to employ such a rejoinder, I too would indeed be at fault. Yet I have not employed a rejoinder concerning even the slightest dharma. Since I neither turn back nor refute in this way, it is unreasonable for you to ascribe such a fault to me. If means of knowledge such as direct perception and the rest must themselves be established by other means of knowledge, there would be an infinite regress. Thus, your argument cannot establish a fault in mine.

There is yet another point. The verse says:

If means of knowledge establish dharmas,

And they in turn are established by means of knowledge,

Then tell me where the means of knowledge are

That establish those means of knowledge.

What does this verse mean? If you maintain that means of knowledge can establish things, as in the relation between a means of knowledge and its object, then by what means of knowledge are the four means—direct perception, inference, Agama, and analogy—themselves established? If these four means are not established by any other means of knowledge, then they are not self-established.

If, though not self-established, they can nevertheless establish things, your thesis is destroyed. If each means of knowledge is established by yet another means, there will be an infinite regress. If there is an infinite regress, there can be no first moment of establishment, no intermediate moment of establishment, and no final moment of establishment.

Why is this? If a means of knowledge can establish an object of knowledge, that means must itself be established by another means of knowledge; that other means must in turn be established by yet another means. Thus, there is no beginning.

If there is no beginning, there is no middle; and if there is no middle, where could there be an end? Therefore, to say that one means of knowledge is established by another means of knowledge is unreasonable. The verse says:

If means of knowledge are established apart from means of knowledge,

Your doctrinal argument is thereby lost.

Thus, you indeed incur a fault

And must further state a distinguishing reason.

What does this verse mean? If you maintain that a means of knowledge is established apart from any means of knowledge, whereas an object of knowledge is established by a means of knowledge, then in arguing that means of knowledge establish objects of knowledge, you incur a fault: some things are established by means of knowledge, while other things are established without means of knowledge. If so, you must state a distinguishing reason. By stating such a reason, it could be known what is established by a means of knowledge and what is not. Since you cannot indicate and distinguish them in this way, your position is incoherent.

Now I shall state the following. Someone might say that the means of knowledge of which I speak can establish both themselves and others, expressing this in verse:

Just as the light of fire

Illuminates itself and can illuminate others,

So too do those means of knowledge

Establish themselves and others.

What does this verse mean? Just as fire illuminates itself and can also illuminate other things, so too does a means of knowledge establish itself and establish other things. I now reply to that verse:

Your statement entails a fault:

Fire does not illuminate itself,

For that claim is incoherent,

As when a jar is seen in darkness.

What does this verse mean? The contention that means of knowledge are like fire and can establish both themselves and others is incoherent. Why is this?

Fire does not illuminate itself. Initially, before illumination occurs, a jar and other objects in the darkness cannot be seen; only after fire has illuminated them can they be seen. In the same way, if fire illuminated itself, fire would initially have to be dark and only afterward become bright. Only then could one say that fire illuminates itself. If fire is bright from the outset, one cannot say that fire illuminates itself. Thus, the claim that fire illuminates itself and others is unreasonable.

There is yet another point. The verse says:

Moreover, if you say that

Fire can illuminate itself and others,

Then, if fire can burn other things,

Why does it not burn itself?

What does this verse mean? If you say that fire can illuminate itself and other things—illuminating itself and illuminating other things in this way—then likewise, since it can burn other things, it should also burn itself. Yet in truth no such thing is observed. Therefore, to say that fire can illuminate itself and other things is incoherent.

There is yet another point. The verse says:

Moreover, if you say:

“Fire can illuminate itself and others,”

Darkness should likewise

Darken itself and darken others.

What does this verse mean? If you say that fire illuminates itself and other things and can dispel darkness, then why does darkness not conceal itself and conceal other things? Yet in truth no such thing is observed. Therefore, to say that fire illuminates itself and others is incoherent.

There is yet another point. The verse says:

Within fire there is no darkness;

Where, then, are self and other?

Brightness destroys and extinguishes darkness—

How, then, can fire possess brightness?

What does this verse mean? There is no darkness within fire, nor is there darkness where fire is present. How, then, can its brightness be said to destroy darkness? If there is no darkness within fire, where is the darkness that fire can destroy? If there is no darkness to be destroyed and extinguished, how can fire illuminate both itself and others?

Now one might say: Darkness is not within fire, nor is darkness where fire is present. Even so, fire illuminates itself and illuminates others; as soon as fire arises, it illuminates and can immediately destroy darkness. Thus, although there is no darkness within fire and no darkness where fire is present, when fire arises it can illuminate itself and others. To this I now reply in verse:

Thus, when fire arises,

It illuminates at the very moment of arising;

Yet to say that, upon arising, fire reaches darkness

Is necessarily incoherent.

What does this verse mean? If, when fire arises, it can illuminate itself and others, that claim is incoherent. How is this known? At its initial moment, fire cannot reach the place of darkness. How is this known? If it has not yet reached the place of darkness, it cannot destroy the darkness; and if it does not destroy the darkness, there can be no illumination. The verse says:

If fire, without reaching darkness,

Could nevertheless destroy darkness,

Then fire situated in this place

Should destroy all darkness everywhere.

What does this verse mean? If you maintain that fire can destroy darkness without reaching the place of darkness, then fire situated here should be able to destroy every place of darkness in the world. Why is this? Because it equally fails to reach any of them. Yet in truth no such thing is observed. If fire equally fails to reach them, how could it destroy only the darkness here and not destroy the darkness throughout the entire world? Therefore, if you maintain that fire can destroy darkness without reaching the place of darkness, your position is incoherent.

There is yet another point. The verse says:

If a means of knowledge can establish itself

Without depending upon the object of knowledge for its establishment,

Then it must be self-established,

Without depending upon another for its establishment.

What does this verse mean? If you maintain that a means of knowledge and its object are established in the same way as fire, then a means of knowledge must establish itself without depending upon the object of knowledge. Why is this? If it establishes itself, it does not depend upon another; if it depends upon another, it does not establish itself.

Now one might say: If they do not depend upon one another, why should the means of knowledge not be self-established? Depending upon another means that it is not self-established. I now ask: What fault is there if a means of knowledge does not depend upon an object of knowledge? I reply in verse:

If your means of knowledge could be established

Without depending upon objects of knowledge,

Then no one would ever

Use means of knowledge to know any dharmas.

=What meaning does this verse express? If you maintain that a means of valid cognition can be established without depending upon an object of cognition, then no one would use a means of valid cognition to cognize dharmas. There would be such an error. If those who need to employ a means of valid cognition could obtain valid cognition without depending upon an object of cognition, what error would arise from its being established without such dependence? It would follow that all dharmas are independent of valid cognition. If all dharmas could be established without depending upon valid cognition, what error would there be in that? What has been established would be called established, while what has not yet been established would likewise be established, because it depends upon nothing.

If you maintain instead that a means of valid cognition can be established only by depending upon an object of cognition, then all four means of valid cognition are established only through dependence. Why is this? If things have not yet been established, how could they depend upon one another? If they have already been established, there is no need for them to depend upon one another. What has not yet been obtained or established cannot depend upon a thing; if it has already been established, it does not need further dependence in order to be established. Just as something already done does not serve as a cause and condition for its own doing.

There is yet another meaning. The verse says:

If an object of cognition

Is established only by depending upon valid cognition,

Then the object of cognition must be established

Only after depending upon valid cognition.

What meaning does this verse express? If an object of cognition must depend upon valid cognition in order to be established, it follows that valid cognition is used to establish that object of cognition. Why is this? Because that which is to be established has not been established, valid cognition establishes the object of cognition.

There is yet another meaning. The verse says:

If a thing is established without valid cognition,

Then it does not depend upon valid cognition.

Why, then, do you use valid cognition to establish it,

And how can that valid cognition be established?

What meaning does this verse express? If you maintain that the object of cognition is established without depending upon that valid cognition, why do you now still seek valid cognition in order to establish it? Why is this? For the sake of what is that valid cognition sought? If an object of cognition is established apart from valid cognition, what use is that valid cognition?

There is yet another meaning. The verse says:

If your valid cognition is established

By depending upon the establishment of the object of cognition,

Then valid cognition and the object of cognition

Are thus inseparable.

What meaning does this verse express? If you maintain that valid cognition exists by depending upon an object of cognition—because you fear the error described above—then valid cognition and the object of cognition are one and cannot be separated. If this is your position, valid cognition itself is the object of cognition. How is this known? Because the object of cognition establishes valid cognition, the object of cognition is valid cognition; because valid cognition establishes the object of cognition, valid cognition is the object of cognition. Valid cognition and the object of cognition are one.

The verse says:

If valid cognition establishes the object of cognition,

And if the object of cognition establishes valid cognition,

Then, if this is your position,

Neither of the two can be established.

What meaning does this verse express? If you maintain that valid cognition establishes the object of cognition because the latter is seen to depend upon valid cognition, and that the object of cognition establishes valid cognition because the latter is seen to depend upon the object of cognition, then, if this is your position, neither can be established. Why is this? The verse says:

Valid cognition establishes the object of cognition,

And the object of cognition establishes valid cognition;

If the meaning is thus,

How can they establish each other?

What meaning does this verse express? If valid cognition can establish an object of cognition, and that object of cognition can establish valid cognition, then valid cognition has not yet established itself—its causes and conditions have not been established—so how could it establish the object of cognition?

There is yet another meaning. The verse says:

The object of cognition establishes valid cognition,

And valid cognition establishes the object of cognition;

If the meaning is thus,

How can they establish each other?

What meaning does this verse express? If the object of cognition can establish that valid cognition, and that valid cognition can establish the object of cognition, then, since the causes and conditions have not been established, how can valid cognition be established? The verse says:

Does the father beget the son,

Or does the son beget the father?

Who is the one who begets?

Who is the one begotten?

What meaning does this verse express? Suppose someone says, “The father can beget the son.” If so, the son would also beget the father. You must now explain: Who is the one who begets, and who is the one begotten? You say that valid cognition can establish the object of cognition and that the object of cognition establishes valid cognition. You must now explain: What is that which establishes, and what is that which is established?

There is yet another meaning. The verse says:

For what reason is one the father?

For what reason is one the son?

Of these two that you speak of,

Both father and son remain doubtful.

What meaning does this verse express? The two—the father and the son—have already been discussed. Which is the father, and which is the son?

If the two, father and son, mutually arise by depending upon one another, both remain doubtful: Which is the father, and which is the son? In just the same way...if you speak of valid cognition and the object of cognition, which is valid cognition, and which is the object of cognition? Of these two, that which can establish a thing may be called valid cognition, and the thing that can be established is called the object of cognition.

There is then no doubt as to which is valid cognition and which is the object of cognition. That which is capable of establishing in this manner is called valid cognition, and that which can be established in this manner is called the object of cognition. There is no doubt concerning which is valid cognition and which is the object of cognition.

The verse says:

Valid cognition cannot establish itself,

Nor is it established by self and other;

Nor is it established by another valid cognition,

Nor is it established without causes and conditions.

What meaning does this verse express? Thus, valid cognition does not establish itself. Direct perception is not established by direct perception; inference is not established by inference; analogy is not established by analogy; and the Agama is likewise not established by the Agama. Nor are they established through the mutual interaction of self and other.

Direct perception is not established by inference, analogy, or the Agama. Inference is not established by direct perception, analogy, or the Agama. Analogy is not established by direct perception, inference, or the Agama. The Agama is not established by direct perception, inference, or analogy.

Nor, apart from direct perception, inference, analogy, and the Agama, are there other means of valid cognition—other direct perceptions, inferences, analogies, or Agamas—by which they could be established.

Likewise, the conjunction of valid cognition within its own division cannot be established, nor can the conjunction of the spheres of self and other be established.

Nor are they established without causes and conditions.

Nor are they established through aggregation.

The reasons for this have already been stated above: twenty, thirty, or four, five, and six; twenty, thirty, forty, fifty, or perhaps sixty.

If, as you say, because valid cognition exists, objects of cognition may be spoken of, and because valid cognition and objects of cognition exist, it is proven that all dharmas possess intrinsic nature, then this meaning is untenable.

Furthermore, you state in verse:

The wise know the dharmas that are taught:

Wholesome dharmas possess intrinsic nature.

People in the world know that this is possible;

Other dharmas are also thus.

Dharmas that exist and possess intrinsic nature

Are taught by the noble ones.

Thus, nonexistent dharmas

Are dharmas without intrinsic nature.

I shall now answer this verse. The verse says:

If the Dharma teacher declares:

“Wholesome dharmas possess intrinsic nature,”

Then the intrinsic nature of these wholesome dharmas

Must be analyzed according to the Dharma.

What meaning does this verse express? If that Dharma teacher maintains that wholesome dharmas possess intrinsic nature, then the intrinsic nature of this wholesomeness must be analyzed. Do these wholesome dharmas and those wholesome minds possess the intrinsic nature of a wholesome mind...? In this way...in this way, no such thing is seen among any dharmas. If one speaks in this manner to demonstrate the intrinsic nature of dharmas, the meaning is untenable.

There is yet another meaning. The verse says:

If the intrinsic nature of wholesome dharmas

Arises from causes and conditions,

Then wholesome dharmas have the nature of another;

How could this be intrinsic nature?

What meaning does this verse express? If the nature of wholesome dharmas arises from causes and conditions, then it is the nature of another. How could it possess intrinsic nature? The nature of such dharmas is thus, and the remaining dharmas are likewise. If you say that wholesome dharmas possess the intrinsic nature of wholesome dharmas, while unwholesome dharmas possess the intrinsic nature of unwholesome dharmas..., then the meaning is untenable.

There is yet another meaning. The verse says:

If there were even the slightest wholesome dharma

That did not arise from causes and conditions,

Then, if wholesome dharmas were thus,

They would not abide in the holy life.

What meaning does this verse express? If you maintain that there is some wholesome dharma that does not arise from causes and conditions, then likewise the unwholesome would possess the intrinsic nature of the unwholesome, and the indeterminate would possess the intrinsic nature of the indeterminate...

If this were so, one would not abide in the holy life. Why? If you maintain this, you necessarily abandon the twelve links of dependent origination; and if you abandon the twelve links of dependent origination, you necessarily abandon the vision of the twelve links of dependent origination. If there were no twelve links of dependent origination, one could not perceive the twelve links of dependent origination; and if one could not perceive the twelve links of dependent origination, one would not perceive the Dharma.

The Blessed One said: If any bhikshu sees the twelve links of dependent origination, that person sees the Dharma; if one does not see the Dharma, one does not abide in the holy life. If one departs from the twelve links of dependent origination, one necessarily departs from the cause of suffering. Since the twelve links of dependent origination are the cause of suffering, if one departs from the cause of suffering, one necessarily departs from suffering; for if there is no cause, where could suffering exist?

If there is no suffering, how could there be cessation? If there is no cessation of suffering, where could one cultivate the path leading to the cessation of suffering? If this were so, there would be no Four Noble Truths; if there were no Four Noble Truths, there would necessarily be no paths or fruits of the shravakas. By seeing the Four Noble Truths, one realizes the paths and fruits of the shravakas. If there were no fruits of the shravakas, there would be no holy life.

There is a further meaning. The verse says:

There is neither Dharma nor non-Dharma,

And worldly dharmas likewise do not exist.

What possesses intrinsic nature must be permanent;

What is permanent has no causes or conditions.

What meaning does this verse express? If things were to arise apart from the conjunction of causes and conditions, you would incur many errors. Because neither Dharma nor non-Dharma could be attained, all worldly dharmas would be unobtainable. Why? All dharmas arise through the conjunction of causes and conditions. Since all dharmas arise through the conjunction of causes and conditions, if there were no conjunction of causes and conditions through which they arise, none of the dharmas of the world could be obtained.

Furthermore, if intrinsic nature did not arise through the conjunction of causes and conditions, then, because it would have no causes or conditions, it would necessarily be permanent. Why? A dharma without causes and conditions is necessarily permanent. If this were so, one would not abide in the holy life.

Furthermore, your doctrine contains an error of its own. Why? The Blessed One said that all conditioned dharmas are entirely impermanent. What intrinsic nature do they possess? They are entirely impermanent. The verse says:

The wholesome, the unwholesome, and the indeterminate—

All conditioned dharmas—

According to what you say, must be permanent.

You therefore incur this error.

What meaning does this verse express? If it is said that wholesome dharmas possess the intrinsic nature of wholesome dharmas, and the same is said of the unwholesome and the indeterminate, then you are saying that all conditioned dharmas are permanent. Why? If a dharma has no cause, it does not arise, abide, or cease. If it does not arise, abide, or cease, it is not a conditioned dharma; thus all dharmas would be unconditioned. If you say that the wholesome and all other dharmas possess intrinsic nature, then no dharma whatsoever would be empty. Such a proposition is incoherent.

Furthermore, you stated this verse:

If dharmas were without substance,

What is without substance could have no name.

What has intrinsic nature has a name;

If there were only names, what would they name?

I shall now answer this verse with another verse:

If someone says that names exist

And says that they possess intrinsic nature,

That person may be challenged;

But words, names, and self are not real.

What meaning does this verse express? If someone says that names possess intrinsic nature, such a person may be challenged by you. That person says: “What possesses intrinsic nature has a name; what does not possess intrinsic nature has no name.” I do not say that names and intrinsic nature exist in this way. How is this known? All dharmas are without intrinsic nature, and because they are without intrinsic nature, they are called empty. Because they are empty, they may be said to be unreal. If you maintain that whatever has a name possesses intrinsic nature, that proposition is incoherent.

There is a further meaning. The verses say:

If this name is empty,

Then existence too is empty.

If one speaks of existence and speaks of emptiness,

Your thesis incurs two errors.

If this name exists,

Then emptiness too exists.

If one speaks of emptiness and speaks of existence,

Your argument incurs two errors.

What meaning do these verses express? If this name is empty, your thesis is thereby lost; if it exists, your argument is thereby lost. My thesis is not like this. The claim that if a thing exists, it has a name, and if no thing exists, there is no name, and that dharmas therefore possess intrinsic nature, is incoherent.

There is a further meaning. The verse says:

Thus I previously said:

All dharmas are empty.

Such is the meaning of my thesis;

It therefore cannot be erroneous.

What meaning does this verse express? I previously stated that the thesis concerning all dharmas is also called empty. You merely seize upon the name “empty” as though there were something thereby expressed. If all dharmas are without intrinsic nature, names too are without intrinsic nature. This is what I say, and the meaning of my thesis contains no error, because I do not say that names possess intrinsic nature.

Furthermore, you stated this verse:

If a name exists apart from a dharma

And does not reside within the dharma,

One who says, “A name exists apart from the dharma,”

Will necessarily be challenged.

I shall now answer this verse with another verse:

If intrinsic nature existed separately

And did not reside within dharmas,

Your concern for me would be warranted;

But there is no need for such concern.

What meaning does this verse express? There is no need for such concern; your challenge to me is merely false. I do not destroy the intrinsic nature of dharmas. I do not separate something from a dharma and then apprehend it as an independently existing thing. Whoever grasps dharmas has cause for concern. Since I do not grasp dharmas, I do not destroy dharmas; how, then, could there be any error? If I grasped dharmas as possessing intrinsic nature, you could challenge me by saying, “Your position is incoherent.” But I do not do so. Your challenge therefore strays far from my meaning and is wholly inapplicable.

Furthermore, you stated these verses:

If dharmas possessed intrinsic nature,

One could destroy those dharmas.

Since dharmas have no intrinsic nature,

What, ultimately, is there to destroy?

Just as, when a jar and clay exist,

One can destroy the jar and the clay,

When one sees an existing thing, one can destroy it;

When one sees that nothing exists, one cannot destroy it.

I shall now answer these verses with another verse:

If something substantial exists, it can be destroyed;

If it does not, the assertion is thereby established.

If there is neither substance nor emptiness,

How could destruction be established?

What meaning does this verse express? If something exists, it can be destroyed; if it does not exist, it necessarily cannot be destroyed. I say that all dharmas are without intrinsic nature. It is indeed as you say: all dharmas are without intrinsic nature. How is this known? If you say that refuting dharmas as possessing intrinsic nature establishes that dharmas are without intrinsic nature, then the assertion that all dharmas are empty is established.

The verse says:

Whatever you seek to refute—

That object of refutation is necessarily nonexistent.

If what is nonexistent can nevertheless be refuted,

Your argument is thereby lost.

What meaning does this verse express? If all dharmas were refuted as possessing intrinsic nature, then, being without intrinsic nature, they would be called empty; yet that emptiness too is empty. Therefore, your statement that an existing thing can be destroyed, whereas a nonexistent thing cannot be destroyed, is incoherent.

There is a further meaning. The verse says:

I possess not the slightest thing;

Therefore, I destroy nothing.

Thus, without reason,

You perversely challenge me.

What meaning does this verse express? If I destroyed even the slightest thing, you could challenge me. But I destroy no thing, and because I destroy no thing, there is nothing destroyed by me. Thus, without destroying anything, all dharmas are empty; consequently, there is neither a destroyer nor anything destroyed. Therefore, when you direct the challenge “What do you destroy?” at me, you are perversely challenging me without reason.

Furthermore, you stated this verse:

If dharmas have no intrinsic nature,

What can words destroy?

If nonexistent dharmas can be destroyed,

Words too can accomplish destruction.

I shall now answer this verse with another verse:

Your dharmas and your words are different;

I shall now explain this meaning:

There is no way it can be expressed,

Yet I incur no error.

What meaning does this verse express? If you say that even without language a refutation can be established, then: Whatever those dharmas may be—all those dharmas are devoid of intrinsic nature. The statement, “Dharmas are devoid of intrinsic nature,” does not mean that this language causes them to be devoid of intrinsic nature. I now answer this: the statement, “Dharmas are devoid of intrinsic nature,” does not cause dharmas to become devoid of intrinsic nature.

There is also another meaning: because dharmas are devoid of intrinsic nature, one knows that they are devoid of intrinsic nature; because dharmas possess intrinsic nature, one knows that they possess intrinsic nature. It is like a house in which there is truly no celestial being. Someone asks, “Could there be a celestial being here?” One person answers, “There could be”; another answers, “There is none.”

The one who answers that there is none does not, by his words, create the absence of a celestial being in that house; he merely knows that the house is empty and contains no celestial being.

Likewise, if one says, “Dharmas are devoid of intrinsic nature,” that statement cannot cause dharmas to become devoid of intrinsic nature; it merely makes known that the intrinsic nature of dharmas is empty. If you say, “If there were no thing, one could not say that dharmas are devoid of intrinsic nature; because there would be no language, the absence of intrinsic nature in dharmas could not be established,” then this meaning is incoherent.

Furthermore, you spoke this verse:

Like that foolish person

Who falsely takes a mirage for water,

If you falsely apprehend a refutation,

The matter is likewise.

The grasping, the grasped, and the grasper;

The refutation, the refuted, and the refuter—

These six kinds of meanings

Are all existent dharmas.

If there are no grasping and grasped,

And no grasper either,

Then there are no refutation and refuted,

Nor is there any refuter.

If there are no refutation and refuted,

And no refuter either,

Then all dharmas are established,

And their intrinsic natures are also established.

I now answer these four verses with this verse:

You cite the example of a mirage

To elucidate the great meaning;

Listen attentively to my answer,

Which accords with the example.

What meaning does this verse express? The example of a mirage serves to illuminate the great meaning. Listen to my answer, which accords with the example. The verse says:

If that possessed intrinsic nature,

It would not need causes and conditions to arise;

If it requires causes and conditions,

It is thereby called empty.

What meaning does this verse express? In the example of the mirage, the apprehended appearance of water does not arise without causes and conditions. Your example corresponds to the causes and conditions of the mirage—it is perceived through inverted vision.

This vision is inverted because one does not examine how it arises through causes and conditions. Thus, it may be said to arise through causes and conditions. If it arises through causes and conditions, its intrinsic nature is empty. This meaning has already been explained above.

There is also another meaning. The verse says:

If one clings to intrinsic nature as real,

That person is subject to counter-refutation;

The remaining cases are likewise,

Therefore, I am not at fault.

What meaning does this verse express? If, in the example of the mirage, the act of apprehending water were real in essence, who could reverse it? If it possessed intrinsic nature, it could not be reversed, just as fire is hot and water is cool, without any obstruction. Since this apprehension can be reversed, the essence of the “grasping” is empty, and so forth. The same meaning should likewise be understood regarding the remaining dharmas.

Just as that “grasping” has no reality, so too are the remaining five kinds. If you say that those six dharmas exist, and therefore it may be said that the remaining five dharmas are not empty, then this meaning is incoherent.

Furthermore, you spoke this verse:

Your reason cannot be established;

If there is no essence, what could be the reason?

If a dharma is without a reason,

How can it be said to be established?

If, without a reason, you establish

The refutation of the intrinsic nature of dharmas,

Then I too, without a reason, establish

That dharmas possess intrinsic nature.

If there is a reason for absence of essence,

This meaning is incoherent;

If worldly dharmas are without essence,

They cannot be said to exist.

I now answer this verse with another verse:

Regarding this absence of a reason,

The meaning has already been fully explained;

The reason stated within the three times

Is discussed equally in every case.

What meaning does this verse express? This great meaning has already been explained above. One should understand that there is necessarily no reason here; such is the meaning of the treatise. The reason explained earlier, the counter-refutation of the six kinds, and the meaning discussed previously are now stated here.

Furthermore, you spoke this verse:

If the refutation comes first and the refuted later,

This is incoherent;

If the refutation comes later, or both arise together,

One thereby knows that they possess real essence.

I now answer this verse with another verse:

If the reason is discussed in the three times,

As before, each case is equal;

Such a reason within the three times

Accords with the teaching of emptiness.

What meaning does this verse express? If this refuting reason is expressed in language within the three times, it has already been answered above; it should be understood accordingly. Why? Because the reason applies equally. Just as refutation in the three times is incoherent, that language also falls within the categories of “refutation” and “the refuted.” If you intend to say that there are no refutation and refuted, yet because they are alike a refutation is possible, I have already refuted this above. This reason within the three times accords with the language of one who teaches emptiness.

Furthermore, how has this already been fully explained? As the verse says:

I have not the slightest thing,

Therefore, I refute nothing;

Thus you are without reason

And falsely raise objections against me.

If you further maintain that refutation is established in the three times, perceiving a prior reason, a subsequent reason, or a simultaneous reason—a prior reason being like father and son, a subsequent reason like teacher and disciple, and a simultaneous reason like a lamp and its light—I now say that this is not so. Of the three kinds discussed above, each entails three kinds of faults. This has already been explained. When these are refuted successively, the thesis you establish is erroneous. The refutation of intrinsic nature is established.

The verse says:

Whoever has faith in emptiness

Has faith in all things;

Whoever has no faith in emptiness

Surely has faith in nothing.

What meaning does this verse express? Whoever has faith in emptiness has faith in all worldly and supramundane dharmas. Why is this? Whoever has faith in emptiness has faith that things arise through the confluence of causes and conditions. Whoever has faith that things arise through the confluence of causes and conditions has faith in the Four Noble Truths. Whoever has faith in the Four Noble Truths has faith in all supreme attainments. Whoever can have faith in all supreme attainments has faith in the Three Jewels: the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Sangha.

Whoever has faith that things arise through the confluence of causes and conditions has faith in the dharma of cause and the dharma of result. Whoever can have faith in the dharma of cause and the dharma of result has faith in the causes and results of what is contrary to Dharma. Whoever can have faith in the dharmas of cause and result, and in the causes and results of what is contrary to Dharma, has faith in afflictions, the confluence of afflictions, and the dharmas and phenomena of affliction.

Such a person has faith in all these. As explained above, that person has faith in evil conduct and wholesome conduct. Whoever can have faith in wholesome conduct and evil conduct knows the means of transcending the three evil destinies.

Such a person has faith in all worldly dharmas; their number is immeasurable and cannot be fully expressed.

Emptiness, intrinsic nature, and causes and conditions—

These three teachings form a single Middle Way.

I take refuge and bow my head in homage

To the Unsurpassed One of Great Wisdom.

This treatise was composed by Bodhisattva Mahasattva Nagarjuna, who was able to explain the meanings of all treatises.