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Mahāyāna — Northern Canon · Linh Sơn Vietnamese Mahāyāna Canon

阿毘達磨俱舍論

Chinese title:阿毘達磨俱舍論

📖11,318 words · ~45 min read
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Part 9

(Question) What is the form (ākṛti) of the intermediate existence?

The stanza answers:

[It is brought forth by the same karma;

Its form resembles that of the future fundamental existence.

The fundamental existence is before the death existence

And after the moment of birth existence.]

Treatise: The kind of karma that brings forth a particular destiny (gati)—that is, a life in hell, and so forth—is also the very kind of karma that leads the intermediate existence to that realm. Therefore, the intermediate existence has the form of the future fundamental existence (pūrvakālabhava) belonging to the destiny to which it will go.

(Objection) In the womb of a dog, pig, and so forth, a sentient being may die while still in the embryonic state and afterward be reborn in one of the five destinies. Thus, suppose that this embryo is replaced by an intermediate body destined to fall into hell. If this intermediate body had the form of a hell being, it would burn the womb of the dog, pig, and so forth.

(Explanation) Even at the fully developed stage of fundamental existence, hell beings are not always aflame, as, for example, when passing through the subsidiary regions of hell (utsadas). And even if a hell intermediate body could burst into flame, it could still neither be touched nor seen because this body is extremely subtle (accha). Therefore, there is no physical contact with the intermediate body, and the womb is not burned. Moreover, karmic power prevents this burning from occurring.

The stature of an intermediate being is only that of a five- or six-year-old child, yet all its faculties are fully developed (vyaktendriya).

The intermediate body of a bodhisattva is exactly like the bodhisattva's body in youth and possesses all the excellent marks. Therefore, when the bodhisattva is about to enter the womb, he illuminates innumerable worlds throughout all four continents.

(Question) If so, why did the bodhisattva's mother dream that a white elephant entered her side?

(Answer) This was merely an omen, for the bodhisattva had long since abandoned rebirth in the destiny of animals. It is like King Kṛkin dreaming of ten things: an elephant, a well, a dry cake, a sandalwood tree, a grove, a young elephant, two apes, a garment, and a dispute; all of these were merely omens. Furthermore, the intermediate body enters the womb through the birth passage, not through the side. Therefore, in the case of twins, the one born later is the elder.

(Question) If so, how should one explain the stanza of the Venerable Dharmasubhūti: “Transforming his bodily form into a white elephant, complete with six tusks and four legs, he entered his mother's womb and remained there awake, like a seer (ṛṣi) dwelling in seclusion in the forest.”

(Answer) There is no need to explain this stanza, for it is neither Sūtra, Vinaya, nor treatise, but merely a personal composition. Nevertheless, if it must be explained, we hold that the stanza merely describes the bodhisattva as he appeared in his mother's dream.

An intermediate body in the Form Realm has fully developed stature and is completely clothed because it possesses a sense of shame and moral dread. A bodhisattva in the intermediate body is likewise fully clothed. The bhikṣuṇī Śuklā was also so; through the power of her vow, she was fully clothed in the intermediate body, upon entering and emerging from the womb, and until she entered nirvana and was cremated. Other intermediate bodies in the Desire Realm are all naked because they lack a sense of shame and moral dread.

(Question) It was stated above that the intermediate body resembles the fundamental existence. What, then, is the fundamental existence?

(Answer) Existence (bhava) is subsistence, being—namely, the five skandhas.

Presented in sequence, the intermediate existence (antarābhava) consists of the five skandhas between two destinies; the birth existence (upapattibhava) consists of the skandhas at the moment of entering a destiny, that is, at the moment of rebirth-linking (pratisaṃdhi); the fundamental existence (pūrvakālabhava) consists of the skandhas belonging to the subsequent moments up to the death existence (maraṇabhava). Thus, the death existence is the final moment in a destiny and is followed by a new intermediate existence.

In the Formless Realm there is no intermediate existence, but only birth existence, fundamental existence, and death existence.

The form and stature of the intermediate existence have been explained above. Next, its other characteristics will be discussed.

[Seen by those of the same class and by the purified divine eye;

It moves swiftly through karma

And possesses all the faculties;

It is unobstructed and cannot change the destiny in which it will be born;

It craves fragrances and does not endure for long;

With a deluded mind, it seeks desirable objects;

Moisture-born beings delight in fragrances, and spontaneously born beings in dwelling places;

Those destined for the heavens proceed upward headfirst; three destinies proceed horizontally;

Those destined for hell descend headfirst.]

Treatise: The intermediate body is seen by sentient beings of the same class, such as those belonging to the heavenly realm, and so forth. It is also seen by a very pure kind of divine eye. An innate divine eye cannot see an intermediate body.

Some masters hold that an intermediate being of the heavenly realm can see every kind of intermediate body; an intermediate being of the human realm can see every kind of intermediate body except those belonging to the heavenly realm; and the remaining destinies follow the same principle—that is, they cannot see intermediate bodies belonging to realms above their own. (Vibhāṣā, 70, 13)

Through karma, the intermediate body acquires the extraordinary power of movement known as karmically produced swift movement through space (karmarddhivegavān). Even the Blessed One cannot prevent it, because it is an exceedingly powerful force of karma.

All intermediate beings possess the complete set of faculties (sakalākṣa [akṣa = indriya]).

Nothing can repel an intermediate body. Obstruction (pratigha) means resistance; being unobstructed (apratighavān) means being without resistance. Even vajra cannot impede an intermediate body, for it is said that tiny living creatures can be found even within a single mass of red-hot iron.

When an intermediate body is to be born in a certain destiny, no kind of power can cause it to change course. An intermediate body destined for birth in the human realm can never cease to be that kind of intermediate body and become one destined for birth in the heavenly realm. It can be born only in the destiny for which it was formed.

(Question) Is an intermediate body in the Desire Realm nourished by material food, like other sentient beings in the Desire Realm?

(Answer) It consumes only fragrances and is therefore called a gandharva, meaning one who consumes (arvati) fragrance (gandham). Verbal roots often have many meanings, as in the case of the verbal root arv; here this root should properly be understood in the sense of “to go,” hence “one who goes to consume fragrance” (arvati gacchati bhoktum). The word gandharva is used, rather than gandhārva, just as the words śakandhu and karkandhu are used. A gandharva of the lower class, possessing little merit, consumes foul odors; one of the higher class consumes pleasant fragrances.

(Question) How long does an intermediate body endure?

(Reply) The Venerable Bhadanta holds that there is no fixed duration (Vibhāṣā, 72, 3). So long as the conditions for arising have not yet been encountered, the intermediate-existence body continues to exist. This is because intermediate existence and the subsequent mode of existence are both brought forth by the same karma and both constitute part of one common allotment of beings—that is, they belong to the same “existence”; and precisely for this reason, when the life faculty (jīvitendriya) of the intermediate-existence body comes to an end, it cannot be followed by a death existence (maraṇabhava).

(Objection) Suppose a mass of flesh as large as Mount Sumeru (Meru) were transformed into a mass of insects upon encountering the rains of the summer season: Are these insects produced from intermediate-existence bodies that had remained there awaiting rebirth, or did intermediate-existence bodies come from elsewhere?

(Explanation) No sutra or treatise addresses this question. Nevertheless, it may be said that there are innumerable kinds of insects whose lifespans are extremely short and which crave flavors. When they smell an aroma, they recall flavors previously tasted and again give rise to craving; when they die, within their consciousness (vibodhya) there is a kind of karma that draws forth a life among insects (kriminikāyasabhāga).

It is precisely because of their attachment to flavors that these beings are reborn among those insects. Or perhaps this is precisely the time when the conditions necessary for birth as insects converge in great abundance, enabling the karma that draws forth an insect life to become operative and bring about its ripened result (vipākābhinirvṛttau vṛttiṃ labhante). This is like a being who has accomplished karma that brings the result of becoming a wheel-turning monarch, yet this karma cannot become operative until the human lifespan reaches eighty thousand years.

It is precisely for this reason that the Blessed One taught that the results of karma are inconceivable (Saṃyukta, 21).

The Venerable Vasumitra says that the intermediate-existence body lasts for at most seven days; if the conditions for arising have not yet converged, the intermediate-existence body must perish and arise again.

Other masters (Śmadatta?) hold that it lasts for at most seven weeks.

The Vibhāṣā says: “Because beings in intermediate existence seek rebirth, they remain for only a short time. Suppose the conditions have not yet come together; then one of two cases will occur: If karma from previous lives determines that the being will be born in a certain place and must belong to a certain species, those very karmas cause the conditions to converge. If there is no such definite determination, the being will be born in another place and belong to another species. [Ghoṣaka (Vibhāṣā, 70, 1): If a husband wishes to meet his wife again but the wife does not wish the same, the husband will have to seek another woman.]

According to other masters (Vibhāṣā, 70, 2), if the conditions cannot come together, the intermediate-existence body will be reborn in circumstances resembling those in which it was previously to be born. Cattle do not mate during the rainy season, dogs do not mate in autumn, black bears do not mate in winter, and horses do not mate in summer; but for buffaloes and so forth, there is no fixed season. Thus, an intermediate-existence body destined to be reborn as cattle must, if it arrives during the rainy season, be born as a buffalo; likewise in the remaining cases: It will be born as a wild dog instead of a domestic dog, as a brown bear instead of a black bear, and as a donkey instead of a horse.

(Author of the Treatise) The foregoing explanation cannot be accepted, because we know that intermediate existence and the life of a being—that is, its common allotment as a being—are both brought forth by the same karma. Therefore, it cannot be said that the life of a buffalo will follow the intermediate-existence body of cattle.

(Question) How does rebirth occur?

(Reply) The intermediate-existence body arises in order to proceed to the realm of rebirth to which it must go. Through the power of karma, the intermediate-existence body acquires the divine eye and can see the place where it will be born, even from afar, and can see its parents copulating there. The mind of a being in intermediate existence becomes deluded through the influence of affection and hostility. If male, the intermediate-existence being gives rise to male sexual desire toward the mother; if female, it gives rise to female sexual desire toward the father. If the contrary occurs, the intermediate-existence being gives rise to resentment toward the father or the mother. This is stated in the Prajñāpti Treatise: At that time, desire or anger arises in the gandharva.

Once misled by these two kinds of erroneous thought and deluded by sexual desire, the intermediate-existence body becomes attached to the place where the sexual organs unite and imagines that it itself is copulating. When the impure substances, semen, and blood appear in the womb, the intermediate-existence being gives rise to joy and enters therein. From that point onward, the skandhas begin to solidify; the intermediate-existence body perishes, the birth-existence body arises, and this stage is called “rebirth-linking” (pratisaṃdhi).

If the embryo is male, it crouches on the right side of the womb with its back facing forward; if female, it lies on the left side of the womb with its abdomen facing forward; if of indeterminate sex, it lies in the womb in the same posture in which it gave rise to sexual desire while still in intermediate existence. Because the intermediate-existence body possesses all the faculties, when it enters the womb it assumes a posture appropriate to its sex; after rebirth, however, the embryo may lose its sex during development.

Here one may ask what serves as the support (āśraya) for the material phenomena derived from the great elements in this newly born being—that is, the faculties such as the eye, ear, and so forth. One theory holds that the great elements of the semen and blood themselves serve as the support. Another theory holds that the support consists not of the great elements of the semen and blood, but of other great elements produced by karma that have taken the semen and blood as their basis (saṃniśraya).

The first theory states: The semen and blood do not possess the faculties; but when the intermediate-existence body perishes, the semen and blood come to possess the faculties and constitute what is called the first stage of the embryo (kalala). This is like the arising of a sprout occurring simultaneously with the destruction of the seed. Scripture demonstrates this when it says that “the body is produced from the kalala present in the semen and blood [that is, it lies within the impure substances of the father and mother]” (mātāpitraśucikalasaṃbhūta), and “Bhikshus, for a long time you have enlarged the charnel ground and received a drop of blood.” (Saṃyutta, ii. 178; Aṅguttara, ii. 54)

The second explanation: The faculties take other great elements as their support, just as in the case of the faculties of leaf-worms (parṇakrimi). [In these creatures, through the force of karma, they depend upon the great elements of a leaf (parṇamahābhūtānyupaniśritya), yet they arise from other great elements, and these great elements constitute the essential nature of their faculties]. Someone may object that the passage from scripture cited above does not prove this hypothesis.

According to the scripture, the body (together with the faculties) arises from the kalala, which consists of semen and blood; however, the term “kalala” is used here to designate other great elements that arise in dependence upon semen and blood (that is, by depending upon semen and blood, these great elements arise simultaneously with them and are called the “kalala”), complete with all the faculties.

This is also how beings born from wombs and eggs proceed to their destiny (gati). With regard to other beings, the Abhidharma masters (Abhidharmācārya) say that there is no fixed manner, but that it varies according to each particular case.

Moisture-born beings proceed to rebirth because they delight in odors; whether these odors are pure or impure depends upon their karma.

Transformation-born beings proceed to rebirth because they delight in a dwelling place.

(Question) Can there really be anyone who delights in a dwelling place in hell?

(Answer) [We have already learned above that the mind of a being in the intermediate existence is distorted by sensual desire or hatred when it is about to be reborn in a womb.] In this case, the mind of a transformation-born being in the intermediate existence is similarly distorted. When its intermediate body is tormented by the cold of rain and wind and it sees a warm place, such as a burning hell, it immediately seeks it out from a desire for warmth; when it is tormented by the heat of the sun and hot winds and sees a cool place, such as a freezing hell, it immediately seeks it out from a desire for coolness.

The ancient masters (pūrvācārya), however, maintain that this transformation-born being in the intermediate existence previously saw the retributive manifestations of the karmas it had created that would bring about a hellish result; therefore, when it now sees beings resembling itself, it seeks out the dwelling place of those beings.

An intermediate being of the heavenly realm—that is, an intermediate body destined for rebirth among the gods—moves upward, like a person rising from a seated position. Intermediate beings destined for the human, animal, or ghost realms move in the manner proper to each class, that is, as humans, animals, or ghosts move. When an intermediate body destined for hell moves, its feet are above and its head below. As a verse says: “For reviling seers, hermits, and ascetics, one falls into hell, with the head below and the feet above.” (Saṃyukta, 27, 5; Jātaka, v. 266).

(Question) It was stated above that beings in the intermediate existence enter the mother’s womb (jarāyuja, aṇḍaja) because their minds are distorted by sensual desire. Is this, then, the general rule for all beings in the intermediate existence?

(Answer) No. The scriptures state that there are altogether four kinds of entry into the womb.

[The first kind has right awareness when entering the womb;

The second has it additionally while abiding, and the third additionally when emerging;

The fourth has it throughout all the stages;

Egg-born beings all lack right awareness.

The first three kinds of entry into the womb

Are those of a wheel-turning monarch and the two Buddhas,

Because of their superior karma and knowledge,

In the order stated above. The fourth kind comprises the remaining beings.]

Commentary: The first kind lacks right awareness while abiding in and emerging from the womb; the second kind lacks right awareness when emerging from the womb; the third kind has right awareness throughout all the stages; and the fourth kind lacks right awareness throughout all the stages. These four kinds of entry into the womb are presented in an order suited to the method of composing verse (śloka), but this differs from the order found in the scriptures (Dīgha, iii. 103, 231; Vibhāṣā, 171, 12).

Egg-born beings always have distorted minds.

(Question) To be egg-born means that one must be born from an egg; why, then, is entry into the womb also mentioned?

(Answer) Although they are born from eggs, they must first enter a womb; alternatively, they are called “egg-born” with reference to the future. This is just as the scriptures commonly say, “one produces what is conditioned” (saṃskṛtam abhisaṃskaroti), or as people in the world commonly say, “cook rice” or “grind flour.”

(Question) What is meant by having right awareness or lacking right awareness during the three stages of entering, abiding in, and emerging from the womb?

(Answer) Beings of little merit enter the womb while thinking: “There is a foul wind, rain is falling, it is cold, there is a storm, and soldiers are raising a tumultuous clamor.” Wishing to escape these disturbances, they believe they must hide in some place, such as a thicket, a hut made of roots or leaves, or beneath a tree or beside a wall. They then believe that they have remained in the grove or hut and have afterward come out. All of this is mistaken understanding, a distortion of perception. The same applies to beings of great merit. They believe that they have entered a park, a garden (ārāma, udyāna), a palace, a mansion, or a splendid pavilion; they believe that they have remained there and then departed.

Beings possessing right awareness know that they are entering the womb, abiding in it, and emerging from it.

The scriptures also say that the first three kinds of entry into the womb belong to a wheel-turning monarch (Cakravartin) and the two Buddhas, the Pratyekabuddha and the Perfectly Awakened Buddha (Saṃbuddha). All these designations refer to the future; that is, they designate a being who in that very life will become a wheel-turning monarch.

A wheel-turning monarch has right awareness when entering the womb, but not while abiding in or emerging from it. A Pratyekabuddha has right awareness while abiding in the womb, but not when emerging from it. A Buddha always has right awareness.

A wheel-turning monarch possesses very great merit and exceptionally superior karma; a Pratyekabuddha possesses understanding through superior teaching, investigation, and meditation; in a Buddha, both merit and wisdom are superior—that is, a Buddha possesses both superior karma and superior knowledge.

The fourth kind of entry into the womb, namely, that without right awareness, applies to beings who lack superior merit and wisdom.

Non-Buddhists who maintain the existence of a self (Sāṃkhya; Vaiśeṣika) say: “If it is admitted that a sentient being (sattva) goes to another world, then our doctrine that a self exists has been proven.”

To refute this view, the author of the treatise says:

[There is no self, but only the skandhas,

Formed by the afflictions and karma;

And through the continuity of the intermediate existence,

They can enter the womb, like the flame of a lamp.

They develop in succession as they are brought forth;

And because of the afflictions and karma,

They can proceed to other worlds.

Thus the revolving cycle of the modes of existence has no beginning.]

Treatise: What you call the self (ātman), and believe to be a real entity capable of relinquishing the skandhas of this life and grasping the skandhas of another life—an inner agent, a person (puruṣa), and so forth—is entirely unreal. Indeed, the Blessed One said: “Where there is karma, there is necessarily a result; yet there is no agent who relinquishes these skandhas and grasps those skandhas. There is only the causal relationship of dharmas (provisionally designated dharmas). What is this causal relationship? When this exists, that exists; through the arising of this, that arises. This is dependent origination.”

(Non-Buddhist) Thus there nevertheless exists a kind of self that you cannot deny.

(Author of the Treatise) We do not deny the provisionally designated self, that is, the self used as a name for the skandhas. Nevertheless, these skandhas are incapable of passing from this world into another as you suppose, because by their nature they arise and perish in every moment (momentary cessation). We say that it is neither a self nor any eternal principle whatsoever, but rather the conditionally formed continuum of the skandhas, constituted by afflictions and karma, that enters the mother’s womb; and this continuum, from the existence at death to the existence at birth, is prolonged and conveyed by a successive series constituting the intermediate existence.

The kinds of karma whose nature is to bring about the fruits of retribution within a life differ according to each sentient being; therefore, not all the skandhas in a continuum arise simultaneously in the life into which that continuum has just arrived. Thus, this continuum grows only after it has arisen, and this growth occurs gradually, as the scriptures (Saṃyutta, i. 206; Mahāniddesa, 120; Mahāvyutpatti, 190) state: “First there is the kalala; from the kalala arises the arbuda; from the arbuda arises the peśin; from the peśin arises the ghana; from the ghana arise the praśākhā, hair of the head, body hair, nails, and so forth, together with their supports, namely, the material faculties.” Kalala and so forth are the names of the five stages of the embryo.

When the embryo—this thorn—has reached its full development, a wind born of matured karma (vipāka) arises within the mother’s womb, causing the fetus to turn and advance toward the birth canal. This movement is extremely difficult, like that of a mass of filth tightly wrapped up. Sometimes, because the mother lacks adequate nourishment, or sometimes because of karma, the fetus dies within the mother’s womb.

At that time, a woman skilled in obstetrics, after applying medicine to both hands, must use a sharp blade and insert her hand into the mother’s uterus—a foul-smelling, filthy, moist place filled with every kind of impurity—to sever some of the limbs before she can extract the fetus. In such a case, it is indeed difficult to know where the fetus’s “continuum” will go at that time, relying upon karma to be experienced in a subsequent life (aparaparyāyavedaniya) that was created in a previous life.

If the birth is not difficult, the mother or midwife must lift the newborn child in both hands; and those hands will then be like the point of a knife or hot ashes against the child’s body, which is exceedingly sensitive, like an unhealed wound. The child is washed and nourished with milk, paste, and gruel, and is gradually trained to eat solid foods. In this way the child grows. Through this development, the faculties mature, and the afflictions begin to become active and produce karma. Thus, because there are afflictions and karma, when the body is destroyed, this continuum again passes into another life through the intermediate existence, just as before.

There is birth because there are afflictions and karma; there are afflictions and karma because there is birth; and again there is birth because there are afflictions and karma. The cycle of arising revolves in this way without a beginning. If it had a beginning, there would have to be an initial period without a cause; and if one dharma could arise without a cause, then all dharmas could also arise without causes. However, the determining conditions of time and place show us that a seed can produce a sprout and fire can bring about cooking; therefore, there can be no arising without a cause. Moreover, the previously asserted doctrine of a single eternal cause has already been refuted; hence this cycle of birth and death certainly has no beginning.

Nevertheless, there are cases in which an arising that proceeds from causes will not occur if those causes have been destroyed, just as a sprout cannot arise if the seed has withered.

The continuum of the skandhas discussed above develops through three periods of existence.

[The chain of dependent origination has twelve links divided into three sections.

The first and last sections each have two links.

The middle section has eight links in the complete case.]

Treatise: The twelve links are ignorance (avidyā), formations (saṃskāras), consciousness (vijñāna), name-and-form (nāmarūpa), the six ayatanas (saḍāyatana), contact (sparśa), feeling (vedanā), craving (tṛṣṇā), grasping (upādāna), existence (bhava), birth (jāta), and aging-and-death (jarāmaraṇa).

These twelve links are divided into three sections (the three periods): Ignorance and formations lie in the past and belong to the preceding period of existence; birth and aging-and-death belong to the subsequent period of existence; the remaining eight links belong to the present period of existence.

(Question) Do all sentient beings in the present life possess all eight links belonging to the present period?

(Answer) Not all possess them in full.

(Question) If so, why is it said that there are eight links?

(Answer) It is said that there are eight links with reference to the complete case, that is, a complete individual (paripūrin) capable of passing through all the stages constituted by these links. This is not the case for those who die prematurely [for example, those who die while still at the embryonic stage]; nor is it the case for sentient beings in the Form Realm and the Formless Realm. The sutra enumerates all eight links in order to refer to sentient beings in the Desire Realm. The Great Discourse on Causation (Mahānidānaparyāyasūtra) says: “Ānanda, if consciousness did not enter the mother’s womb…” (Dīgha, ii. 63).

The chain of dependent origination can also be divided into only two sections: the past period of existence [comprising the first two links (ignorance and formations), together with their results, the next five links (consciousness, name-and-form, the six ayatanas, contact, and feeling)]; and the causes of the future period of existence [comprising the following three links (craving, grasping, and existence)], together with that future period itself [comprising the final two links (birth and aging-and-death)].

(Question) What dharmas are the links of ignorance and so forth?

The stanza answers:

[The afflictions of the previous life are ignorance.

The karma of the previous life is formations.

Consciousness is the skandhas at the moment of rebirth-linking.

Before the six ayatanas, there is name-and-form.

From this arise the faculties of the eye and so forth.

Before the conjunction of the three dharmas, there are the six ayatanas.

With regard to the different causes of the three feelings

When one is still unable to discriminate, this is called contact.

Prior to sexual craving, there is feeling.

Craving for requisites and sexual desire constitute craving.

In order to obtain various objects,

One must seek everywhere: this is grasping.

Existence is the performance

Of karma leading to future results.

Birth is future rebirth.

[From birth] up to feeling is aging-and-death.]

Treatise: Ignorance is precisely the phase of the afflictions belonging to the preceding life [here ignorance no longer bears its own distinct meaning, nor is it the aggregate of all the afflictions (kleśas)]; rather, it is the continuum, together with its five skandhas, that existed during the phase of affliction (kleśa-avasthā) in the preceding life. Indeed, all afflictions are accompanied by ignorance and become active through ignorance. It is just as when one says that the king is traveling: this also implicitly refers to those accompanying the king.

Formations are precisely the phase of karma belonging to the preceding life. The continuum of the preceding life, considered in terms of the wholesome, unwholesome, and other karmas that it produced, is what is meant by formations.

Consciousness is precisely the skandhas at the time of conception, that is, the five skandhas in the embryo at the moment of rebirth-linking (pratisaṃdhi), or rebirth-existence (upapattibhava).

Name-and-form extends beyond this moment of rebirth-linking until the six ayatanas arise; that is, it consists of the five skandhas in the embryo, beginning with rebirth-existence and continuing for as long as the six faculties have not yet come into being. Here one ought to say “until the four faculties…,” [because the mind ayatana (manāyatana) and body ayatana (kāyayatana) have already arisen from rebirth-existence, from the moment of rebirth-linking (pratisaṃdhikṣaṇe)]; nevertheless, it is only at the moment when the four faculties of the eye, ear, and so forth appear that these two previously existing faculties are classified [among the six faculties]. (Vyākhyā: cakṣurādyāyatanotpattikāle kāyamanāyatanayor vyavasthāpanāt)

The six ayatanas precede the conjunction of the three dharmas, namely contact. The six ayatanas are the five skandhas from the time the faculties appear until the moment when faculty, object, and consciousness come into contact.

Contact [which originally begins at rebirth-linking] continues until the moment when the child first becomes capable of discrimination, that is, capable of knowing, “This is the cause of pleasure…”

Feeling precedes sexual craving. Feeling (vedanā), called vitti in the verse, continues for as long as craving for sexual desire has not yet become active. [This phase is called feeling because the causes of feeling are still being experienced.]

Craving is the state of one who desires sensual pleasures and sexual gratification. At that time, desire for visible forms and so forth, and for sexual gratification, becomes active. This state of “thirsting craving” ends when a person, under the influence of this sensual desire, begins to seek (paryeṣṭi) pleasures.

Grasping is the discrimination of these pleasures, that is, the state of one who ranges everywhere seeking (searching universally and persistently for) pleasures (supreme objects). [Alternatively, grasping is precisely the four kinds of affliction—sensual desire, views, attachment to rules and observances, and doctrines of self: the stage at which these four kinds of affliction become active is called grasping.]

Because one ranges everywhere seeking, one creates karma that brings about the retributive result of a future life.

[Existence means “karma,” because life arises through it (bhavaty anena).] The karma performed and accumulated while seeking pleasures will lead to rebirth. The phase in which karma is performed is precisely existence.

Birth is the subsequent rebirth. After death, the five skandhas at the moment when rebirth occurs are precisely birth. Considered in relation to the present life, this factor is called consciousness (vijñāna); but considered in relation to the future life, this same factor is called birth (jāti).

Aging-and-death extends from birth up to feeling (vedanā), here called vid. The four factors of the present life—name-and-form, the six ayatanas, contact, and feeling—when considered in relation to the future life, are collectively called aging-and-death (jarāmaraṇa), the twelfth factor in the continuum of twelve phases.

However, this dependent origination is further divided into four kinds: (1) momentary (kṣaṇika), that is, belonging to a single moment; (2) extended (prākarṣika), that is, extending across many moments or many existences; (3) connected (sāṃbandhika), that is, through the linkage between cause and effect; and (4) phased (āvasthika), that is, comprising twelve phases or stages of the five skandhas.

(Question) Why is dependent origination called momentary?

(Answer) In a single moment, when a person, disturbed by afflictions, commits the offense of killing, all twelve factors are present: (1) that person’s delusion (moha) is ignorance; (2) volition (cetanā) is formations; (3) the cognition of a certain object is consciousness; (4) the four skandhas that arise together with consciousness are name-and-form; (5) the faculties associated with name-and-form are the six ayatanas; (6) the conjunction that occurs when the six ayatanas encounter their corresponding objects is contact; (7) the reception of contact is feeling; (8) greed (rāga) is craving; (9) the bonds associated with craving are grasping; (10) bodily karma and verbal karma [arising from feeling and craving] are existence;

(11) the arising (unmajjana = utpāda) of all these dharmas is birth; (12) the maturation (paripāka) of these dharmas is aging, and their dissolution (bhanga) is death.

Furthermore, dependent origination is also called momentary and connected. The Prakaraṇapāda states: “What is dependent origination?—All conditioned dharmas. What are dharmas arisen through conditions?—All conditioned dharmas.”

“Phased” dependent origination (āvasthika) is precisely the twelve phases (avasthā) that contain the five skandhas. This kind is also called “extended” because it extends through three successive kinds of existence.

(Question) Of these four kinds, which dependent origination did the Blessed One intend here, that is, in the sutra on the twelve links of dependent origination?

[According to tradition, it is explained solely on the basis of phases;

The factors are named according to whichever dharma is predominant.]

Treatise: According to tradition, the Blessed One distinguished the twelve factors on the basis of phased dependent origination.

(Question) If each factor comprises all five skandhas, why are only such names as ignorance and so forth established?

(Answer) Because in these phases there are predominant dharmas such as ignorance and so forth, the factors are named ignorance and so forth according to what is predominant. This means that if ignorance is the most important dharma in a particular phase, all five skandhas belonging to that phase are called ignorance. The same applies to the other factors. Although the intrinsic nature of all the factors is the same, there is no error in distinguishing them in this way.

(Question) Why does the sutra define dependent origination only according to the continuum of the twelve factors, whereas the Prakaraṇapāda states: “What is dependent origination?—All conditioned dharmas”?

(Answer) Because the sutra presents it with a particular intention, whereas the Abhidharma aims to reveal the characteristics of dharmas (dharma-lakṣaṇa). On the one hand, dependent origination is presented as phased and extended, pertaining to sentient beings (sattvākhya); on the other hand, it is presented as momentary and connected, pertaining to both sentient and insentient things (sattvāsattvākhya).

(Question) Why does the sutra speak only of dependent origination as it pertains to sentient beings?

The verse answers:

[In order to dispel delusion

Concerning the preceding, subsequent, and intermediate phases.]

Treatise: It is precisely for this reason that the sutra expounds dependent origination in three divisions.

One is deluded regarding the past when asking oneself: “Did I exist or not exist in the past? How did I exist? What did I exist as?” One is deluded regarding the future: “Will I exist in the future or not?...” One is deluded regarding the present: “What is this? How does this exist? Who are we? Who shall we become?” (Saṃyutta, iii. 26; Majjhima, i. 8, 111; Visuddhimagga, 599; Saṃyukta, 12, 9).

These three kinds of delusion are all eliminated through the teaching of the chain of dependent origination from ignorance through aging and death; for the sutra says: “Bhikshus, one who, by right wisdom in accordance with reality, contemplates dependent origination and the dharmas arisen through conditions no longer turns toward the past to ask whether one formerly existed, did not exist, and so forth.”

Some masters hold that the teaching concerning the final three factors of the intermediate period—craving, clinging, and existence—is also intended to eliminate delusion concerning the future, because all these factors are causes of a future existence.

Dependent origination with these twelve factors has the three natures of affliction (kleśa), karma (karman), and basis (vastu); it also includes both cause and result.

[Three factors belong to the afflictions; two factors belong to karma;

Seven factors are bases and are also results.

Result and cause are presented in summary.

For, based on the intermediate period, the other two divisions can be inferred.]

Treatise: The nature of the three factors of craving, clinging, and existence is affliction; the nature of the two factors of formations and existence is karma; the nature of the seven factors of consciousness, name-and-form, the six ayatanas, contact, feeling, birth, and aging and death is basis. These factors are called bases because they are the supports (āśraya) of affliction and karma. The factors whose nature is basis are all results; the five factors that are not bases are all causes, being of the nature of affliction and karma.

(Question) Why are both cause and result presented in the present life—that is, two factors of affliction, two factors of karma, and five factors of basis—whereas no similar presentation is made for the past and future periods? For with respect to the future, we still have two factors that are results.

(Answer) Because merely by relying on the presentation of affliction, karma, and basis belonging to the present period, we can infer the entire meaning of cause and result in the preceding and following periods. Any additional presentation would be useless and has therefore been omitted.

(Objection) If dependent origination has only twelve factors, then samsara must have a beginning, because the cause of the factor of ignorance is not stated; and it must also have an end, because the result of the factor of aging and death is not stated. To avoid this, new factors would have to be added; but doing so would entail the fault of an infinite regress.

(Explanation) It is not so. The Blessed One intended to indicate the cause of ignorance and the result of aging and death.

[From affliction arise affliction and karma;

From karma arises basis;

And from basis again arise basis and affliction.

Such is the manner in which the factors of existence arise.]

Treatise: From affliction arises affliction: That is, craving gives rise to existence.

From affliction arises karma: That is, clinging gives rise to existence, and ignorance gives rise to formations.

From karma arises basis: That is, formations give rise to consciousness, and existence gives rise to birth.

From basis arises basis: That is, consciousness gives rise to name-and-form, name-and-form gives rise to the six ayatanas, …, contact gives rise to feeling, and birth gives rise to aging and death.

From basis arises affliction: That is, feeling gives rise to craving.

The foregoing is the manner in which the factors arise. From this it can be seen that ignorance has either affliction or basis as its cause, and that aging and death have affliction as their result. Thus, the above presentation of dependent origination is in no way incomplete. The Blessed One wished to illustrate the manner in which the factors arise, and therefore the sutra concludes as follows (Madhyama, 34, 3): “Such is the arising of this entire great mass consisting solely of suffering (the accumulation of the wholly great aggregate of suffering).”

Some masters explain: One sutra (Sahetusapratyayasanidānasūtra) says that ignorance has improper mental application (ayoniśo manasikāra) as its cause; and another sutra (Saṃyukta, 11, 8) further says that improper mental application has ignorance as its cause. Thus, it is not the case that ignorance has no cause, nor is there the fault of an infinite regress. If it is argued that improper mental application is not mentioned in the sutra on dependent origination, this is indeed true; however, because it is included within the factor of clinging (upādāna), there is no need to present it separately here—that is, in the Pratītyasamutpādāsūtra.

(Author of the Treatise) This explanation is invalid. How could improper mental application be included within the factor of clinging? It is, of course, associated with clinging, but it is also associated with ignorance and craving.

Even if improper mental application were included within clinging, could one thereby conclude that, in naming one factor “clinging,” the sutra states that improper mental application is the cause of ignorance? In other words, even if improper mental application were included within clinging, this could not prove that improper mental application is the cause of ignorance. If it were said to be a cause or a result merely because it is included within clinging, then craving and ignorance should likewise not have been established as separate factors, because they too are included within clinging.

Another master (the Sautrāntika Śrīlābha) explains that one sutra (Saṃyukta, 13, 20) says that ignorance has improper mental application as its cause. Another sutra (Saṃyukta, 11, 8) says that improper mental application has ignorance as its cause, while also observing that improper mental application occurs at the moment of contact: “Through the eye and visible form, there may arise a kind of defiled (āvila) mental application born of delusion (moha = avidyā).” Another sutra (Saṃyukta, 2 4) explains the origin of craving as follows: “Craving arises because there is feeling, and feeling in turn arises from a kind of contact in which ignorance is present.” Thus, the ignorance that arises together with feeling has arisen from improper mental application,

which appears at the moment of contact.

This shows that ignorance is not without a cause and that there is no need to add a new term, “improper mental application,” as something that causes ignorance and arises from ignorance under the designation “delusion” (moha).

(Author of the Treatise) That is indeed so; however, this is not explained in the Pratītyasamutpāda Sutra. The Pratītyasamutpāda Sutra ought to have mentioned it.

(Explanation) There is no need to explain this matter explicitly, because such a conclusion can still be reached through reasoning. Indeed, in an arhat, feeling is not a cause of craving. From this it can be concluded that feeling is a cause of craving only when it is defiled, that is, when it is associated with ignorance.

Contact, when not accompanied by error (aviparīta), cannot be the cause of this kind of defiled feeling. Such erroneous contact does not arise in an arhat who has eliminated ignorance. Therefore, the kind of contact spoken of in the Pratītyasamutpāda Sutra as the cause of feeling and the cause of craving is precisely contact accompanied by error.

Thus, on the basis of the reasoning presented above, it can be established that, according to the sutra, improper mental application becomes manifest at the moment of contact.

(Treatise Master) Nevertheless, it is truly unreasonable to maintain that, when a principle is established by other sutras, one may omit words that cannot properly be omitted—as in the case of unwise attention, together with the reciprocal relationship in which unwise attention and ignorance serve as causes for one another. [Moreover, in this case, contact, feeling, formations, and birth might all be omitted as well.] The most satisfactory answer to the objection, “Since no other factors of dependent origination are mentioned before the factor of ignorance or after the factor of aging and death—that is,

factors serving as causes of ignorance or as effects of aging and death—the cycle of birth and death (saṃsāra) would therefore not be without beginning and end,” is as follows: The enumeration of the factors in the chain of dependent origination is already fully sufficient.

The sole question that the sutra intends to clarify is: “How can it be known in what way the present life is connected with the past life, and in what way the future life will be connected with the present life?” For, as the sutra has said, this teaching is “for bringing to an end delusion concerning past existence, future existence, and the existence between these two.”

(Question) The Blessed One said: “Bhikshus, I shall teach you dependent origination and dependently originated dharmas.” What, then, is the difference between dependent origination and dependently originated dharmas?

(Answer) According to the Fundamental Treatise, there is no difference. For, as we can see, both dependent origination and dependently originated dharmas are defined as “all conditioned dharmas.”

(Question) The expression “all conditioned dharmas” refers to dharmas belonging to all three times: past, present, and future. How, then, can future dharmas, which have not yet arisen, also be called “dependently originated” (pratītyasamutpanna)?

(Treatise Master) If so, how can future dharmas, which have not yet been produced (kṛta), also be called conditioned (saṃskṛta)?

(Explanation) Because they are determined (cetita) by a kind of volition (cetanā) capable of producing karmic maturation (ābhisaṃskārikā).

(Treatise Master) If so, how can future uncontaminated dharmas—that is, dharmas belonging to the noble path—be called conditioned?

(Explanation) Because they too are determined by a wholesome mind that aspires to attain them.

(Treatise Master) If so, even nirvana would be conditioned, since people also aspire to attain nirvana.

It should properly be said that calling future dharmas “dependently originated” is an inexact usage, yet it is regarded as valid because future dharmas are identical in kind (tajjātīyatvāt) with past and present dharmas that have arisen. It is just as in the case of future material form: Although at present it cannot be said to undergo alteration and decay, it is nevertheless called form (rūpa) because it is identical in kind with material form.

(Question) What does the sutra intend by distinguishing dependent origination from dependently originated dharmas?

The stanza answers:

[Here the intended meaning is:

Dependent origination is the cause; the dependently originated is the effect.]

Treatise: The factors that serve as causes are called dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda), because arising (samutpadyate) occurs through them. The factors that serve as effects are called dependently originated (pratītyasamutpanna), because they arise; yet they too are called dependent origination, because arising also occurs through them. Since all the factors are both causes and effects, they are all both dependent origination and dependently originated.

Nevertheless, there is no indeterminacy or confusion (avyavasthāna), because a factor cannot be dependent origination in relation to the same factor in relation to which it is dependently originated. Just as a father is a father only in relation to his child, and the child is a child only in relation to that father, so too is the relation between cause and effect; it is also like the relation between the two banks of a river (pārāpāravat).

The Venerable Pūrṇāśa (Sthavira Pūrṇāśa), however, says that dharmas which are dependent origination may not be dependently originated. He presents four cases: (1) future dharmas [are dependent origination because they serve as causes of future dharmas (eṣyadharmahetu), but are not dependently originated because they have not yet arisen (utpanna)]; (2) the final dharmas of an arhat [are only dependently originated]; (3) past and present dharmas, except for the final dharmas of an arhat, [are both dependent origination and dependently originated]; (4) unconditioned dharmas [are neither dependent origination nor dependently originated, because they have no effects and do not arise].

Statement of the Sautrāntikas: Is everything presented above [from “dependent origination as states…” through “dharmas which are dependent origination may not be dependently originated”] your own interpretation, or is it the meaning of the sutra? If it is the meaning of the sutra, it is incorrect, because in speaking of dependent origination as states, you have maintained that all twelve factors are states composed of the five skandhas.

This contradicts the sutra, for the sutra says: “What is ignorance? It is lack of knowledge concerning the past (ignorance regarding the antecedent limit)…” The meaning of this sutra is perfectly explicit (of definitive meaning, nītārtha = vibhaktārtha); you cannot render it implicit—that is, as requiring further interpretation [of non-definitive meaning, neyārtha].

(Sarvāstivādins) There is nothing to prove that this sutra has an explicit meaning; nor does the fact that it presents the matter through definitions establish anything. For when the Blessed One gives definitions, he reveals only the principal features of what is to be defined. For example, in the Discourse on the Simile of the Elephant’s Footprint (Hastipadopamasūtra), in response to the question, “What is the internal earth element?” the Blessed One answered, “It is hair of the head, body hair, and so forth.” Of course, hair of the head and so forth are also other dharmas, such as form, odor, and so forth, but the Blessed One intended only their principal constituent, the earth element.

So too in the present case, the Blessed One gives the name “ignorance” to an entire state because ignorance is its principal constituent.

(Sautrāntikas) This example proves nothing. In fact, in the Discourse on the Simile of the Elephant’s Footprint, the Blessed One does not define hair of the head and so forth by means of the earth element; he does not say, “What are hair of the head and so forth? They are the earth element,” for with such wording the definition would be incomplete. Rather, he defines the earth element by means of hair of the head and so forth; and this definition is complete, because within the body of a sentient being there is no earth element that is not included among what is described as hair of the head and so forth. The case of dependent origination is the same: this definition is fully sufficient, and nothing whatsoever needs to be added to it (na sāvaśeṣaḥ).

(Sarvāstivādins) The definition in the Discourse on the Simile of the Elephant’s Footprint is still incomplete. Indeed, the earth element is also present in tears, mucus, and so forth, as we can see in another text (Śijaṣāmuccaya, 228; Madhyamakavṛtti, 57); yet the earth element in tears is not mentioned in the Discourse on the Simile of the Elephant’s Footprint.

(Sautrantika) If the definition in the Elephant’s Footprint Simile Sūtra is incomplete, it is because you have focused on matters not stated in that sūtra. Moreover, you speak of things absent from the definitions of ignorance and so forth as presented in the sūtra. Why define ignorance as “a phase consisting of the five skandhas” by introducing (prakṣepa) into ignorance dharmas of a different kind, namely, the five skandhas?

A dharma cannot be regarded as a “link” if the existence or nonexistence of that dharma requires the existence or nonexistence of another “link.” Therefore, “a phase of the five skandhas” is not a “link.” In an arhat, the five skandhas—feeling and so forth—still exist, but there are no formations (saṃskāras) capable of producing the link of consciousness (vijñāna); the same applies to the remaining links. Therefore, the meaning of the sūtra must be understood in strict accordance with its wording.

Regarding the four alternatives of Wangman, the first alternative—the claim that “future dharmas are not dependently arisen”—contradicts the sūtra, because the sūtra teaches that the two links of birth and aging-and-death are dependently arisen dharmas. The sūtra says: “What is dependent origination? It is ignorance… birth, aging-and-death.” If birth and aging-and-death are said not to be future dharmas, this rejects the doctrine that dependent origination has three divisions.

One school maintains that dependent origination is an unconditioned dharma, because the sūtra (Saṃyukta, 12, 19) says: “Whether Tathagatas appear or Tathagatas do not appear, the dharma-nature of dharmas remains established” (utpādād va tathāgathānām anutpādād vā tathāgatānāṃ sthitaiveyaṃ [dharmāṇāṃ] dharmatā). Whether this position is correct or incorrect depends on how it is interpreted. If it means that formations and so forth arise precisely because of ignorance and so forth, and not because of some other dharma or without a cause, and that in this sense dependent origination is constant (nitya), then the foregoing statement is accepted.

But if it means that there is some eternal dharma called dependent origination, this view cannot be accepted. For arising (utpāda) is a characteristic of the conditioned (a conditioned characteristic, saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa); if arising or dependent origination were an eternal dharma, it could not be a characteristic of the transformation of conditioned dharmas. Moreover, “arising” (utpāda) implies “existence subsequent to nonexistence.” What relation (abhisaṃbandha), then, could be posited between an unconditioned dharma of arising and ignorance and so forth—a relation that would permit one to call it the “dependent origination of ignorance and so forth”?

Finally, the expression “dependent origination” would become meaningless, because if dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda) means “arising by reaching the conditions” (pratyayaṃ prāpya samudbhavaḥ), how could a dharma be both eternal and dependently arisen?

(Question) What is the meaning of the term dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda)?

(Answer) Prāpti means “arrival” (prāptī); the verbal root i means “to go” (gati), but when modified by a prefix, prati-i means “to arrive,” and pratītya means “having arrived.” Pad means existence (sattā), but when modified by the prefixes sam-ut, it means “manifest arising” (prādurbhāva). Thus, dependent origination means “manifest arising upon having arrived.”

However, the grammarians say that this explanation cannot be accepted because the word pratītyasamutpāda is not correctly formed. When two actions have the same agent, the prior action is marked by a verb used in the absolutive, as, for example, in snātvā bhunkte, meaning “after bathing, he eats.” Yet one cannot conceive of a dharma “existing before it is produced”—that is, first reaching the conditions and then arising. There can be no action—reaching the conditions—without an agent.

This objection is expressed in the following verse: “If it is said that the agent reaches the conditions before arising, this cannot be accepted, because at that time the agent does not yet exist. If it is said that the agent reaches them and arises simultaneously (together), the absolutive (having) is thereby excluded, because the absolutive is used to indicate a preceding action.”

(Sautrantika or Sarvastivada) The objection of the grammarians (Śābdika = śabdavid) has no validity. We ask: Does the arising dharma belong to the present or to the future? If it arises in the present, then since this dharma has not yet arisen, how can it be present? If it has already arisen, it would have to arise once again; how could the fault of infinite regress be avoided? If it arises in the future, then the future means that which does not yet exist; how, then, could there be an agent? And if there is no agent, how could there be an action of arising? Therefore, the stage at which a dharma arises is precisely the stage at which that dharma reaches its conditions.

(Grammarians) If so, what is the stage of a dharma’s arising?

(Sautrantika or Sarvastivada) It is the stage at which “future formations are poised to arise” (utpādābhimukho ‘nāgataḥ); and this is also the time at which they reach the conditions.

The reasoning and method by which the grammarians raise their objection concerning agent and action are unsound. According to them, there must be an agent (kartar)—here, “that which arises” (bhavitar)—and an action (kriyā)—here, “the action of arising” (bhūti). Yet no one can maintain that bhūti is distinct from bhavitar.

Therefore, there is no fault in saying that “a dharma is born, a dharma arises after having reached the conditions,” even though this expression is conventional. The meaning of the phrase “dependent origination” is clearly stated in the sūtra (Saṃyukta, 12, 20; Majjhima, iii. 63; Mahāvastu, ii. 285): “When that exists, this exists; from the arising of that comes the arising of this.” In this passage, the first proposition speaks of dependence on conditions, and the second speaks of arising (samutpāda).

The foregoing can be presented in the following verses: (1) “If one accepts that a dharma arises without having existed previously, the same applies when it reaches the conditions. If one claims that a dharma which arises already existed previously, then what has already arisen would arise again, leading to infinite regress; or one might also say that the dharma already existed before its arising.” (2) “The absolutive (having) can also signify simultaneity (together), [as when one says], ‘Upon encountering light, darkness ceases,’ and ‘He yawns and falls asleep.’ One does not say, ‘After yawning, he closes his mouth, and only then falls asleep.’”

One master (Bhadanta Śrīlābha) gives an entirely different explanation of the expression pratītyasamutpāda in order to refute the objection concerning the absolutive. According to this explanation, prati means diversity (vīpsārtha); sam means aggregation (samavāya); itya means “readily passing away,” “unable to endure (non-abiding)”; and the root pad with the prefix ut means “appearance,” “arising” (prādurbhāva). Thus, the term pratītyasamutpāda means “the conjoint arising (aggregated elevation into arising) of dharmas capable of ceasing (conditioned dharmas) through diverse conditions (various kinds of conditions).”

(Treatise Master) The explanation above is highly pertinent to the expression pratītyasamutpāda; however, it has no bearing on such sutra passages as: “Dependent on (pratītya) the eye and forms, eye-consciousness arises” (Saṃyutta, ii. 72, iv. 32; Milinda, 56, etc.).

(Question) Why did the Blessed One define dependent origination in two ways (paryāyadvayamāha): “When that exists, this exists,” and “From the arising of those, this arises”?

(Treatise Master) There are several reasons. The first formulation serves to determine the matter precisely (avadhāraṇārtham). From it, one may know that formations exist when ignorance exists; however, one cannot conclude that formations exist solely because ignorance has arisen.

The second formulation serves to determine that it is precisely from the arising of ignorance that formations arise. A second reason is to reveal the successive continuity of the links (aṅgaparaṃparā): When that (ignorance) exists, this (formations) exists; from the arising of that (formations)—and not of some other dharma—this (consciousness) arises. A third reason is to reveal the successive continuity of the three periods (janmaparaṃparā): When the former period exists, the middle period exists; from the arising of the middle period, the latter period arises.

A fourth reason is to reveal the nature of conditionality (pratyayabhāva), which may vary according to the case (sākṣāt pāraṃparyeṇa). The conditioning of the links may be immediate, as in “when that exists, this exists,” or not immediate, as in “from the arising of that, this arises.” Defiled formations may immediately follow ignorance, or they may be separated from it by wholesome formations. Furthermore, ignorance is the direct cause of formations but the indirect cause of consciousness.

Another explanation (Vasumitra, Vasuvarman) holds that the two definitions above are intended to refute the doctrine of causelessness (ahetuvāda) and the doctrine of a permanent cause—that is, a single unproduced cause—such as primordial nature (prakṛti), the self (puruṣa), and so forth. This explanation, however, is unreasonable, because if that were the case, the second definition alone would suffice to refute both doctrines.

In fact, certain non-Buddhist teachers maintain: “Because there is a self (ātman) serving as the basis [of ignorance], formations, consciousness, and so forth exist and arise; and because ignorance arises, formations arise,” continuing in this way through aging and death. In other words, they posit a self as the substantial entity underlying the causal sequence of dharmas. To refute this doctrine, the Blessed One affirmed: “That which arises (formations) through the arising of another thing (ignorance) arises precisely because this dharma alone arises, and not through the arising of any other substantial entity.”

If we relied upon the first formulation of the doctrine above, we could say: “Because there exist a self serving as the basis and ignorance, and so forth, formations and so forth exist.” If we relied upon the second formulation, we could say: “Formations and so forth do indeed arise because ignorance and so forth arise, but only on the condition that some substantial entity exists.” With these two formulations, however, we see that the following explanation would become untenable: “Formations have ignorance as their cause (meaning: ignorance alone, without requiring any other substantial entity…)… And likewise through to the arising of an entirely (kevala = ātmarahita) great mass of suffering alone (the accumulation of a wholly great mass of suffering).”

The earlier masters of the treatises thought that the first definition was intended to reveal the quality of not being relinquished or interrupted: “Ignorance exists—that is, it is not interrupted—and therefore formations exist—that is, they are not interrupted”; while the second definition was intended to reveal the quality of arising: “Through the arising of ignorance, formations arise.”

Another master (Śrīlābha) holds that the first definition was intended to reveal existence, while the second was intended to reveal arising: “For as long as the continuum of the cause (kāraṇasrotas) exists, the continuum of the effect (kāryasrotas) exists; through the arising of the cause, the effect also arises.”

(Treatise Master) We can all see that the issue under discussion here is arising (utpāda), for the Blessed One said: “I shall teach you dependent origination.” Why, then, is it claimed that the Blessed One taught existence before teaching arising?

(Explanation by the master above) When the Blessed One gave the first definition, “when that exists, this exists,” he implied that because the effect exists, the cause has ceased. Yet one should not think that the effect arises without a cause, for the Blessed One then continued: “From the arising of that, this arises.”

(Treatise Master) If this were the meaning to be expressed, the Blessed One should have said: “Because that exists, this does not exist”; and he should first have revealed the arising of the effect. Once the effect had arisen, one could then say: “Because the effect has arisen, the cause no longer exists.” If the sutra were meant to reveal what the master above claims, how could the Blessed One first explain the cessation of the cause when he intended to teach dependent origination?

(Question) How is it to be explained that formations exist because ignorance exists? How is it to be explained that aging and death exist because birth exists?

(Answer) We shall answer this question briefly.

A fool (bāla), or ordinary person (pṛthagjana), failing to understand (apajānan) that dependent origination consists solely of formations—that is, conditioned dharmas (saṃskṛta)—gives rise to the view of self (ātmadṛṣṭi), attachment to self, and the conceit “I am” (asmimāna). Such a person performs the three kinds of karma of body, speech, and mind with the aim of obtaining pleasant feeling (sukha) and neutral feeling (neither painful nor pleasant, aduḥkhāsukha): he performs demeritorious karma (apuṇya) to obtain pleasant feeling in this life; meritorious karma (puṇya) to obtain the pleasant feeling of a future life in the Desire Realm; and imperturbable karma (āniñjya) to obtain the pleasant feeling of the first three dhyānas and the neutral feeling of the higher states.

All these karmas are formations that arise through ignorance.

Once endowed with the propulsive force of karma, the continuum of consciousnesses, relying upon the continuum of the intermediate existence, proceeds to a particular realm of rebirth; no matter how distant that realm may be, it still reaches it. This is like the flame of a lamp, in the sense that it occurs within an uninterrupted continuum. This is precisely the kind of consciousness that arises through formations. Understanding consciousness in this way accords very well with its definition in the Sutra on Dependent Origination: “What is consciousness? It is the six kinds of consciousness.”

Because consciousness has preceded it (pūrvaṃgama), name-and-form (nāmarūpa) arises in that realm of rebirth. This is precisely the five skandhas, as accords very well with the definition in the Vibhaṅga: “What is name? It is the four immaterial skandhas. What is form? It is all material dharmas… This name and this form are collectively called name-and-form.”

In accordance with the development of name-and-form, the six faculties arise in succession; these are precisely the six ayatanas (ṣaḍāyatana).

Thereafter, when an object is encountered, a consciousness arises; and through the conjunction of the three dharmas—consciousness, the six ayatanas, and the object (viṣaya)—there is contact (sparśa), which is capable of giving rise to the experience of pleasure, pain, and so forth.

From this, the three feelings (vedanā)—pleasure and so forth—arise.

From these three feelings arise three kinds of craving (tṛṣṇā): craving for sensual desire, namely, the desire for pleasant feeling belonging to the Desire Realm among beings afflicted by suffering; craving for form, namely, the desire for the pleasant feeling of the first three dhyanas and the equanimous feeling of the fourth dhyana; and craving for the formless.

From this craving connected with feeling arise four kinds of clinging (upādāna): clinging to sensual desire (kāmopādāna), clinging to views (dṛṣṭyupādāna), clinging to precepts and observances (śīlavratopādāna), and clinging to assertions of self (ātmavādopādāna). Sensual desire (kāma) consists of the five objects of sensual pleasure (kāmaguṇa). Views are the sixty-two kinds of views explained in the Brahmā’s Net Sutra (Brahmajālasūtra).

Precepts mean abstaining from misconduct (dauḥśīlya); observances include vows to behave like a dog, an ox, and so forth—as when the Nirgranthas vow to live naked, Brahmins carry staffs and wear garments of deerskin, the Pāśupātas wear their hair in braids and smear ashes upon their bodies, and the Parivrājakas use three staffs and live naked, and so forth. Because they voluntarily grasp and maintain such precepts and observances, this is called clinging to precepts and observances.

Clinging to assertions of self is the person himself—individual existence (ātmabhāva)—that is, it concerns what people call the self (ātman). Some masters (Sautrāntikas) hold that assertions of self are precisely the view of self and the conceit “I am” (asmimāna), because it is through these two that one can speak of a self and assert a self. If the sutra employs the word vada (assertion), it is because the self does not truly exist, as the sutra (Madhayma, 11, 19) says: “The foolish, the unlearned, ordinary beings, following conventional expressions, cling to self and what belongs to self;

yet in truth there is neither self nor anything belonging to self.” The four kinds of clinging—clinging to sensual desire, views, and so forth—are precisely desire (chanda) and attachment (rāga), as the Blessed One said in the sutra (Saṃyukta, 29, 7; Saṃyutta, iv. 15): “What is clinging?

It is desirous attachment (chandarāga).”

Through clinging, karma that has already been accumulated becomes capable of bringing about a new existence, a future existence: this is precisely becoming (bhava). The sutra says: “Ānanda, the karma that brings about future existence is precisely becoming.”

Through becoming, by way of the continued course of consciousness, there is birth (janman) in the future (anāgata); this is precisely birth (jati), complete with the five skandhas and having name-and-form as its essential nature.

Through birth, there are aging and death (jarāmaraṇa), as explained in the sutras (Majjhima, i. 49; Dīgha, ii. 305; Vibhanga, 99).

It is solely because the requisite causes and conditions are thus complete (kevala)—and not because there is a self or anything belonging to a self—that this great mass (skandha = samuha) of suffering arises (samudeti). It is called great because it has neither beginning nor end.

The doctrine of dependent origination that explains the twelve links as twelve stages constituted by the five skandhas, as presented above, is precisely the doctrine of the Vaibhāṣika school.

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Translation source: Linh Sơn Pháp Bảo Đại Tạng KinhLicense: Linh Sơn Pháp Bảo Đại Tạng Kinh (Việt dịch) · nguồn: rongmotamhon.net (Liên Phật Hội) · EN: AI translation from Vietnamese source, awaiting source English

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