阿毘達磨俱舍論

Part 20

In a sentient being (pudgala), a latent tendency always adheres (anuśete) to an object, and the sentient being is thereby bound to that object by this very latent tendency. Let us examine to what objects sentient beings are bound and by which latent tendencies—past, present, or future.

[One is bound to an object

By greed, hatred, and conceit that have not been abandoned,

Past or present, and already arisen;

Those of the mind in the future bind one to all objects.

Those belonging to the five consciousnesses and capable of arising bind one to contemporaneous objects;

Those incapable of arising bind one to all.

The other afflictions of the past and future bind one to all;

When their object is present, they bind one to the present object.]

Treatise: Latent tendencies (anuśayas), or afflictions (kleśas), are of two kinds: ⁽¹⁾ afflictions having a specific characteristic (svalakṣaṇakleśa), namely greed, hatred, and conceit; ⁽²⁾ afflictions having a common characteristic (sāmānyakleśa), namely views, doubt, and ignorance.

When afflictions having a specific characteristic have arisen (utpanna) in relation to a certain object—whether past, present, or future, or belonging to what is abandoned through seeing, and so forth—and consequently belong to either the past or the present, and when they have not yet been abandoned, the sentient being in whom these afflictions have arisen is bound to that object by these very afflictions having a specific characteristic. This is because afflictions of a specific characteristic do not necessarily arise in every person in relation to every object; rather, they arise in a particular person in relation to a particular object.

Sentient beings are bound to all past, present, and future objects [belonging to all five categories and abandoned through the Path of Seeing, and so forth, as the case may be] by these very future afflictions having a specific characteristic when those afflictions belong to mind-consciousness (manovijñāna). This is because the mental dhatu encompasses all three times.

Sentient beings are bound to future objects by future greed and hatred that differ from those described above—that is, this greed and hatred do not belong to the mind but pertain only to the five groups of consciousness—because the five groups of consciousness apprehend only objects contemporaneous with themselves.

However, this principle applies only to future greed and hatred that are “certain to arise” (utpattidharmin); if they are not “certain to arise,” the case is different.

Sentient beings are bound to all past, present, and future objects by this very greed and hatred that are not “certain to arise.”

As for the other afflictions, namely afflictions having a common characteristic—whose objects are the five aggregates of clinging and which are capable of arising in all sentient beings in relation to all objects—sentient beings are bound to all objects of the three times and, as the case may be, of all five categories, at the same time as the afflictions in question.

(Sautrantika) Do past and future afflictions and objects substantially exist or not? If it is said that they substantially exist, one must admit that conditioned dharmas (saṃskṛta) always exist, and thus conditioned dharmas would be permanent. If they do not substantially exist, how can it be said that sentient beings are bound (saṃyukta) or unbound (visaṃyukta) to objects by these afflictions?

The Vaibhashikas hold that past and future dharmas both substantially exist (dravya); nevertheless, conditioned dharmas are not permanent, because they possess the characteristics (lakṣaṇas) of the conditioned. To clarify the Vaibhashika position, their tenets should be presented briefly:

[The three times substantially exist because the Buddha taught this,

Because there are two conditions, an object, and a result.

Because they maintain that the three times substantially exist,

They are acknowledged as the Sarvastivada school.]

Treatise: The Blessed One taught the existence of the past and the future in very explicit terms (kaṇṭhatas): “Bhikshus, if past material form did not exist, noble disciples would not be instructed, ‘Do not attend to past material form…’ If future material form did not exist, noble disciples would not be instructed, ‘Do not delight in future material form.’ It is precisely because future material form exists that noble disciples are instructed thus…” (Saṃyuktakāgama, iii. 14)

The Blessed One also implicitly taught (arthatas) this when he said: “Consciousness (vijñāna) arises in dependence upon two conditions. What are the two conditions? They are the eye faculty and material form… the mind and dharmas” (Saṃyutta, ii. 72, etc.). Therefore, if past and future dharmas did not exist, mind-consciousness (manovijñāna) could not arise in dependence upon two conditions.

The foregoing constitutes scriptural proof; next comes logical proof:

Because there is an object (ālambana), consciousness can arise; consciousness cannot arise if its object does not exist.

If past and future objects did not exist, there would be consciousness without an object; therefore, in the absence of an object, there would be no consciousness.

If the past did not exist, how could wholesome and unwholesome karma produce a result in the future? Indeed, at the time when the result arises, the cause of maturation (vipākahetu) has already become past.

On the basis of the foregoing scriptural and logical proofs, the Vaibhashikas affirm the existence of the past and the future.

The masters who call themselves proponents of the existence of everything (Sarvāstivādins) maintain that the past and the future exist as substantial dharmas (dravya).

A master who affirms the existence of all three times—past, present, and future—is regarded as belonging to the Sarvastivada school. A master who affirms the existence of the present and of a portion of the past, namely karma that does not produce a result, while affirming the nonexistence of the future and of a portion of the past, namely karma that has already produced its result, is regarded as belonging to the Vibhajyavada school, not to the Sarvastivada school.

(Question) How many positions are there within this school? How many explanations are there for the existence of all dharmas? And which explanation is the best?

The verse replies:

[Within it there are four positions concerning

Differences in mode, characteristic, state, and relation.

The third position, based upon activity,

To establish the times, is the best.]

Treatise: The Venerable Dharmatrata (Bhadanta Dharmatrāta) defends the position concerning difference in mode (bhāvānyathātva), meaning that he affirms that the three times—past, present, and future—differ because their modes (bhāva) are not identical.

When a dharma passes from one time to another, its substance (dravya) does not change, but its mode changes. The following example illustrates a difference in shape (ākṛti): when a golden vessel is broken and deformed, its shape (saṃsthāna) changes, but its color (varṇa) does not. The following example illustrates a difference in quality (guṇa): when milk is boiled, its taste, potency, and digestive properties cease to be, but its color remains.

In the same way, when a future dharma passes from the future into the present, it relinquishes its future mode (anāgatabhāva) and acquires the present mode, while its substance (dravya) remains as before; when it passes from the present into the past, it relinquishes the present mode and acquires the past mode, while its substance remains identical.

The Venerable Ghoṣaka defends the doctrine of change in characteristics (lakṣaṇānyathātva):

A dharma proceeds through the periods of time. When it is past, although it is associated (yukta) with the characteristic (lakṣaṇa) of the past, it is not dissociated (aviyukta) from the characteristics of the present and future; when it is future, it is associated with the characteristic of the future, but is not dissociated from the characteristics of the present and past; when it is present, it is associated with the characteristic of the present, but is not dissociated from the characteristics of the past and future. It is just as when a man is enamored (rakta, defiled) of one woman: this does not mean that he is “not enamored” (avirakta) of other women.

The Venerable Vasumitra defends the doctrine of change in state (avasthānyathātva): The periods of time differ because their states (avasthā) differ. As a dharma proceeds through the periods of time, it enters (prāpya) a particular state; therefore, its differences arise from differences of state, not of substance (dravya). This is like a counting token (vartikā, gulikā): if placed in the units column, it is called one; if placed in the tens column, it is called ten; and if placed in the hundreds column, it is called one hundred.

The Venerable Buddhadeva maintains the doctrine of mutual relativity (anyonyathātva), according to which the periods of time are established through their interrelations. As a dharma proceeds through the periods of time, it receives different designations because of its relations to other things. This means that the dharma is called past, future, or present according to its relation to what precedes or follows it; for example, a woman may be both a daughter and a mother.

For the reasons given above, these four masters maintained that everything exists. Among their doctrines, the first, concerning transformation (pariṇāma), must be refuted as the Sāṃkhyas have already been refuted. According to the second doctrine, the past, present, and future would become confused (adhvasaṃkara), because all three characteristics are found everywhere.

Moreover, the example cited lacks similarity, because, in the case of the man, although craving is actively manifest toward one woman (rāgasamudācāra, rāgaparyavasthāna), toward other women there is only the possession of craving (rāgaprāpti). According to the fourth doctrine, all three periods would exist simultaneously. For example, a past dharma would be past in relation to what precedes it, future in relation to what follows it, and present in relation to what both precedes and follows it.

Thus, Vasumitra’s doctrine is the most correct. According to it, the periods and states are established (vyavasthāpita) by function or activity (kāritra): when a dharma has not yet exercised its function, it is future; when it exercises its function, it is present; and when its function has ceased, it is past.

(Sautrāntika) If the past and future exist as real dharmas, then they are present; why are they called past or future?

(Reply) It was stated above that whether the function of a dharma has not yet been exercised, is presently being exercised, or has already been exercised determines the temporal period of that dharma.

(Question) If so, what function would an eye of the corresponding class (tatsabhāga) have? The function of the eye is to see, but an eye of the corresponding class does not see. Will you say that its function is to produce and yield a result (phaladānaparigraha)? If yielding a result is precisely its “function,” then homogeneous causes (sabhāgahetu) also yield their results when they are past, and one would conclude that they are past; yet they would also be exercising their function and would therefore be present. Or, if this function, in order to be completed, requires both the production and the yielding of a result, then these past causes would at least be half present. Thus, the periods of time would become confused.

Let us continue discussing this matter:

[What obstructs the function?

If there is no difference, the periods cannot be established;

If they truly exist, what is unborn or ceased?

The nature of dharmas is exceedingly profound.]

Treatise: If dharmas have always existed, why can they not exercise their function at all times? What obstruction causes a dharma sometimes to exercise its function and sometimes not to do so? It cannot be said that a dharma fails to exercise its function because certain causes are absent, for these very causes also always exist.

How can the function itself be past, and so forth? Do you imagine a secondary function belonging to this function? That would be utterly unreasonable. If the function itself (svarūpasattāpekṣayā) is past, and so forth, why not admit that the same is true of dharmas? And what purpose is served by saying that time depends on whether a function is past, and so forth?

Do you mean that the function is neither past, nor future, nor present? If so, what is it? If the function is unconditioned (asaṃskṛta), it must be permanent (nitya). Moreover, how can it be said that a dharma is future when it has not yet exercised its function, and past when it no longer exercises its function?

(Sarvāstivāda) The errors described above would arise only if one maintained that the function is different from the dharma; in truth, however, the function is not different from the dharma.

(Author of the Treatise) If the function is identical in substance with the dharma, then, since the dharma always exists, its function must also always exist. Thus, why and how can the function be said to be sometimes past and sometimes future? Therefore, the distinction among the periods of time has still not been demonstrated.

(Sarvāstivāda) In what respect has the function not been demonstrated? In fact, a conditioned dharma that has not yet arisen is called future; one that has arisen but has not yet ceased is called present; and one that has ceased is called past.

(Sautrāntika) If past and future dharmas exist, they must exist with the very same intrinsic nature (tevaivātmanā) as when they exist in the present. If the intrinsic nature of a dharma has existed continuously, how can that dharma be unborn or already ceased? Beforeward, what was it lacking, and what did not exist, such that this dharma was said to be unborn? Afterward, what does it lack, and what no longer exists, such that this dharma is said to have ceased? Therefore, unless one admits that “a dharma exists only after having not existed (abhūtvā bhāvaḥ), and no longer exists after having existed (bhūtvā abhāvaḥ),” the three distinct periods of time cannot be established.

Here the arguments of the Sarvastivada must be examined: ⁽¹⁾ According to this school, because conditioned dharmas possess the characteristics of the conditioned—arising, abiding, and so forth—they cannot be permanent, even though they exist in the past and the future. This is mere nonsense, for if they have always existed, dharmas can neither arise nor cease. To say, “A dharma is permanent, and a dharma is not permanent,” is verbally self-contradictory (apūrvaiṣā vāco yuktiḥ). This is explained by the following verse: “The intrinsic nature always exists, yet it is not admitted that the dharma exists permanently, nor is it admitted that the dharma differs from its intrinsic nature: Clearly, this is the conduct of a sovereign.”

⁽²⁾ Another Sarvastivada argument holds that the Blessed One taught the existence of the past and the future. The Blessed One said: “There is past karma; there is future karma.” Therefore, the Sarvastivada also says that the past exists and the future exists (astīti). In fact, the past exists in the sense that it once existed (yadbhūtapūrvam); the future exists in the sense that it will exist (yad bhaviṣyati) when its causes are present. It was precisely in this sense that [the Blessed One] said that the past and the future exist; they do not, however, exist substantially (dravyatas) as the present does.

(Sarvastivada) Who says that they exist in the same way as the present?

(Sautrantika) If they do not exist in the same way as the present, then in what way do they exist?

(Sarvastivada) They exist with the intrinsic natures of the past and the future.

(Sautrantika) But if they do not exist, how can intrinsic natures of the past and the future be attributed to them? In truth, in the scriptural passage cited above by the Sarvastivada, the Blessed One intended only to prevent the erroneous view that repudiates cause and effect. When he said, “The past exists,” he meant, “The past has existed”;

and when he said, “The future exists,” he meant, “The future will exist.” The word “exists” (asti) is a special grammatical usage (nipāta), as is commonly seen in such expressions as: “There exists (asti) the prior nonexistence of the lamp,” “there exists the subsequent nonexistence of the lamp,” and as people commonly say: “The lamp has gone out, but I did not extinguish it.” These expressions are similar to the scripture’s statements: “The past exists” and “The future exists.” If they are not understood in this way, then the past, if it “exists,” would no longer be past.

(Sarvastivada) We find that the Blessed One spoke as follows to the ascetics (parivrājakas) of the non-Buddhist Lāgudaśikhīvaka school: “Past karma, destroyed, ceased, and ended—this karma exists.” This explanation implies: “This karma has existed.” Are we then to suppose that those non-Buddhists did not acknowledge that past karma had existed?

(Sautrantika) When the Blessed One said that past karma exists, he meant the capacity to produce a result—the capacity of that previous karma present within the agent’s continuum. If it is not understood in this way, then if past karma exists substantially in its own nature (svena bhāvena vidyāmānam), how could it be regarded as past?

Furthermore, in the Paramārthaśūnyatāsūtra, the Blessed One said: “Bhiksus, when the faculty of sight arises, it comes from nowhere; when it ceases, it gathers nowhere. Thus, bhiksus, the faculty of sight comes into existence after not having existed, and after having existed, the faculty of sight disappears.” If a future faculty of sight existed, the Blessed One would not have said that the faculty of sight comes into existence after not having existed.

Here the Sarvastivada might say that the statement “comes into existence after not having existed” means “after not having existed in the present” (vartamāne ’dhvany abhūtvā), that is, “after not having existed in the mode of the present” (vartamānabhāvena abhūtvā). This argument, however, is unacceptable, because time—the nature of being present—is not distinct from the faculty of sight.

(Question) Does the Sarvastivada mean that the preceding statement should be understood as “after not having existed in terms of its intrinsic characteristic (svalakṣaṇatas)”?

(Answer) To say so is to admit that the future faculty of sight does not exist.

⁽³⁾ Concerning the argument: “The past and the future exist because consciousness arises through two conditions.” Does this argument mean that mental consciousness arises by virtue of the mental faculty (manas) and past, future, and present dharmas, and that these dharmas are therefore conditions of mental consciousness in the same way as the faculty of sight—that is, that they are capable of serving as productive conditions (janakapratyaya)?

Or are they merely objects (ālambanamātra)? Clearly, future dharmas that will arise thousands of years later, or that will never arise, cannot serve as productive conditions for mental consciousness; and clearly nirvana, which is incompatible with every instance of arising, likewise cannot serve as a productive condition. If dharmas need only be objects, then we say that future and past dharmas, too, are merely objects.

(Sarvastivada) If past and future dharmas do not exist, how can they serve as objects of consciousness?

(Sautrantika) They exist in the manner in which they are regarded as objects. And in what manner are they regarded as objects? They are regarded as objects by virtue of the recollection that they have existed and the anticipation that they will exist.

Indeed, when a person remembers a material dharma (rūpa) or a past feeling, that person does not perceive the material dharma or feeling as “presently existing,” but remembers only that it “has existed”; one who foresees the future does not perceive the future as presently existing, but foresees it as that which will exist (bhaviṣyat). On the other hand, recollection—which is only a part of mental consciousness—apprehends the material dharma just as it was formerly seen and apprehends the feeling just as it was formerly experienced; that is, it apprehends these material dharmas and feelings only in their present state.

If a dharma recalled by someone truly existed exactly as it is apprehended through memory, then the cognition of memory would certainly have a nonexistent object (a consciousness taking a nonexistent object).

If it is said that past or future material dharmas still exist, though they need not exist in the present because these material dharmas are nothing other than atoms (paramāṇu) in a dispersed state (viprakīrṇa), this too is unreasonable. For: ⁽¹⁾ when, through recollection or foresight, consciousness apprehends an object that is a past or future material dharma, it cannot apprehend that object in a dispersed state but must apprehend it in an aggregated state (saṃcita); ⁽²⁾ if past or future material dharmas are themselves present material dharmas, differing only in that their atoms are dispersed (paramāṇuśo vibhaktam), then these atoms would be permanent; that is, they would never arise (utpāda) and never perish, but would merely aggregate or disperse.

To maintain such a position is to follow the doctrine of the Ājīvikas while rejecting the sutra of the Sugata, for the sutra says: “Bhikshus, when the faculty of sight arises, it does not come from anywhere…”; ⁽³⁾ this argument does not apply to feeling and other “incorporeal” dharmas (amūrta): if there is no aggregation of atoms (paramāṇusaṃcita), how could there be any dispersion of atoms in the past and future? In truth, one recollects a feeling as it was experienced when it existed, and one foresees a feeling as it will be experienced when it exists.

If past and future feelings apprehended through recollection or foresight were real, they would be permanent. Therefore, the mental consciousness called “recollection” has as its object something nonexistent, namely an unreal feeling.

(Vaibhāṣikas) If something unreal can nevertheless serve as an object of consciousness, then a thirteenth ayatana could also serve as an object of consciousness.

(Author) If so, according to you, what is the object of the consciousness that thinks, “There is no thirteenth ayatana”? If you say that its very name, “the thirteenth ayatana,” is the object, then it is only a name, and the object remains unreal. Furthermore, what real object could there be for the cognition of the prior nonexistence of sound (prāgabhāva)—that is, the cognition taking the prior nonexistence of sound as its object?

(Vaibhāṣikas) The object of this consciousness is sound itself, not the nonexistence of sound.

(Author) If so, one who seeks (prārthayate) the nonexistence of sound would have to produce a sound!

(Vaibhāṣikas) It is not so, because the sound that does not yet exist is nevertheless present in the future state, and this future sound is precisely the object of the cognition of its prior nonexistence.

(Author) If the future sound that does not yet exist is nevertheless real, how can it be conceived as nonexistent (nāsti)?

(Vaibhāṣikas) It does not exist in relation to the present (vartamāno nāsti); therefore, it is conceived as “nonexistent.”

(Author) This cannot be said, for then one and the same dharma would be past, present, and future. Or, if future sound differs from present sound, and the conception “it does not presently exist” is based on this difference, then admit that the defining characteristic of the present is to exist after having been nonexistent; consequently, you must still accept that both existence (bhāva) and nonexistence (abhāva) can serve as objects of consciousness.

(Vaibhāṣikas) If the nonexistent can also serve as an object (ālambana) of consciousness, how could the bodhisattva in his final existence have said: “I cannot know, I cannot see what does not exist in this world”?

According to us, the meaning of this scriptural passage is perfectly clear: “I am unlike other conceited persons (ābhimānika), who imagine that they possess a nonexistent ‘illumination’ (avabhāsa): as for me, I see as real only that which is real.” Moreover, if your position were accepted, the objects of all thoughts (buddhi) would be real (sadviṣayā). If everything thought of were real, there would be no place for doubt or examination (vimarśa, vicāra); there would be no difference between the bodhisattva and other people.

In truth, every thought has both existent and nonexistent objects (sadasadālambana), for the Blessed One clearly stated this elsewhere: “From the moment I say to them, ‘Come here, bhikshu!’ my disciples are guided by me from morning until evening and from evening until morning: they know what truly exists as truly existing (sac ca satto jñāsyati), what does not truly exist as not truly existing, what is not unsurpassed as not unsurpassed, and what is unsurpassed (anuttarā = Nirvana) as unsurpassed.” (Saṃyukta, 26, 25)

Therefore, the Sarvāstivādins’ reason—“because the object of consciousness must be an existent dharma”—adduced to prove the existence of the past and future is invalid.

⁽⁵⁾ The Sarvāstivādins further derive another argument from the fruit of karma, but the Sautrāntikas do not accept that a fruit arises directly from past karma. Rather, it arises from a particular condition of the continuum of mind (cittasaṃtānaviśeṣāt), a condition originating from that karma (tatpūrvakāt). We shall encounter this at the end of this treatise, in the chapter refuting the self, in the section that rejects the doctrine of the Vātsīputrīyas.

However, those masters who affirm the substantial reality (dravyata) of the past and future must admit the permanence of the fruit. If so, what additional efficacy could they attribute to karma? The efficacy of bringing about arising (utpāda)? What efficacy could it have in causing something to “become present” (vartanānīkaraṇa)?

Thus, one should admit that this arising exists only after having been nonexistent (abhūtvā bhavati). If it is held that arising itself already existed beforehand, what further efficacy could you attribute to any dharma whatsoever? You have done nothing more than follow the non-Buddhist Vārṣagaṇayas, who maintain: “What exists necessarily exists; what does not exist necessarily does not exist; what does not exist does not arise; what exists does not perish.”

Furthermore, what is meant by “becoming present”? Does it mean being drawn to another place (deśantarākarṣaṇa)? If this position is maintained, three difficult problems arise: ⁽¹⁾ a fruit brought forth in this manner would become permanent; ⁽²⁾ in the case of fruits that are not material (arūpin), how could they be brought forth?; ⁽³⁾ as for those things that are brought forth, they exist only after having been nonexistent.

Does “becoming present” mean altering the intrinsic nature of a kind of result that already existed previously (svabhāvaviśeṣaṇa)? If this is what is meant, would this not entail the arising (bhāvanā, prādurbhāva) of a change that did not previously exist in reality?

Thus, the Sarvāstivāda thesis that “all exists” (sarvāstivāda), advanced by the Sarvāstivādins to affirm the real existence of the past and future, is not a correct Buddhist doctrine. The expression “all exists” should not be understood in the above sense. Properly understood, this expression affirms the existence of all; and the word “all” must be understood in the sense set forth in the sutra. How does the sutra affirm that “all exists”?—“Brahmin (Brāhmane), when one says, ‘All exists,’ this refers to the twelve ayatanas: this is an expression of equivalent meaning.” Alternatively, “all exists” refers precisely to the three times. The manner in which the three times exist has been explained as follows: “That which existed previously is the past, and so forth.”

(Sarvāstivādins) If the past and future do not really exist, how can one be bound (saṃyukta) to a past or future object (vastu) by a past or future defilement (kleśa)?

(Sautrāntikas) One is bound by a past defilement because of the existence within the continuum of a latent tendency that arose from that past defilement; one is bound by a future defilement because of the existence of a latent tendency that serves as the cause of that future defilement. One is bound to a past or future object because of the latent tendency of a defilement that has taken or will take that object as its object of cognition.

Vibhāṣā: “The past and future truly exist. Regarding what cannot be explained, one should understand that the intrinsic nature of phenomena (the nature of dharmas) is exceedingly profound: this nature of dharmas cannot be established through reasoning (it is not an object of discursive investigation).” [Therefore, the past and future should not be denied] (this is an addition by Paramārtha).

It may be said (asti paryāyaḥ) that the very thing that arises is the thing that ceases: for example, the form that arises is the form that ceases [but the substance remains the same (dravyānanyatvāt)]. It may also be said that what arises differs from what ceases, because what arises is future and what ceases is present. Time, too, arises, because whatever arises is encompassed within time and has time as its intrinsic nature; and a dharma arises from time by virtue of the many moments of the future period.

Here we conclude the question raised by the doctrine of the latent tendencies.

(Question) When a person eliminates an object (yad vastu prahīṇam) by relinquishing the acquisition previously possessed in relation to that object (prātivigamāt), can that person become dissociated from the object (tadvisaṃyoga) by having eliminated the defilement that takes it as its object (tadālambakakleśaprahāṇāt)? Conversely, if one has become dissociated from it, has one necessarily eliminated it?

(Answer) Dissociation from an object is always accompanied by the elimination of that object; but there can still be elimination without dissociation.

[The objects abandoned through the seeing of suffering have been eliminated,

Yet one remains bound to them by pervasive latent tendencies;

The first grade has been eliminated,

Yet because other defilements still take it as their object, it remains a bond.]

Treatise: Consider a person who is at the stage of the Path of Seeing and in whom the seeing of suffering has arisen, but the seeing of its origin has not yet arisen. This person has thus eliminated the objects (vastu) abandoned through the seeing of suffering, but has not yet become dissociated from them, because the person continues to be bound to these initial objects (the preceding category) through pervasive defilements—defilements whose elimination depends upon the seeing of the origin of suffering and which remain connected with these initial objects.

At the stage of the Path of Cultivation, where the nine grades of defilements must be successively relinquished, when the first grade has been eliminated but the others have not, these other grades—which take the first grade as their object—continue to bind one to it.

(Question) How many latent tendencies adhere to and increase (anuśerate) in relation to each object?

(Answer) It is impossible to discuss every detail of this question. The Vibhāṣā masters (Vibhāṣā, 87, 5) have presented it briefly as follows: Generally speaking, there are sixteen kinds of dharmas, that is, sixteen kinds of objects (vastu) to which latent tendencies adhere: in each realm there are five groups (those abandoned through the seeing of suffering, and so forth), with the addition of undefiled dharmas (anāsrava). The number of cognizing consciousnesses (citta; vijñāna) is the same. Once it is known how many different dharmas serve as objects of cognition (ālambana) for a given consciousness, it can be calculated how many kinds of latent tendencies adhere to those dharmas.

(Question) Which dharmas serve as objects for which consciousnesses?

The stanza answers:

[Dharmas abandoned through the seeing of suffering and its origin, and through cultivation,

If pertaining to the Desire Realm,

Are objects of three consciousnesses of their own realm, one consciousness of the Form Realm,

And the undefiled consciousness;

If pertaining to the Form Realm, they are objects of three consciousnesses of their own realm, three of the lower realm,

One of the higher realm, and the pure consciousness;

If pertaining to the Formless Realm, they are objects

Of three consciousnesses of each realm and the pure consciousness;

If abandoned through the seeing of cessation or the Path,

In each case, the consciousness of their own category is added;

Undefiled dharmas are objects

Of the last three consciousnesses of the three realms and the pure consciousness.]

Treatise: ⁽¹⁾ The dharmas of the Desire Realm abandoned through the seeing of suffering, the seeing of its origin, and cultivation are objects of three consciousnesses of this realm, one consciousness of the Form Realm, and the undefiled consciousness.

All these dharmas are objects of five consciousnesses: three consciousnesses of the Desire Realm belonging respectively to what is abandoned through the seeing of suffering, the seeing of its origin, and cultivation (abhyāsa); one consciousness of the Form Realm belonging to what is abandoned through cultivation; and the undefiled consciousness.

⁽²⁾ The dharmas of the Form Realm abandoned through the seeing of suffering, the seeing of its origin, and cultivation are objects of three Form Realm consciousnesses, three Desire Realm consciousnesses, one Formless Realm consciousness, and the undefiled consciousness.

The three consciousnesses of the Desire Realm and those of the Form Realm are the same as above, that is, they belong respectively to what is abandoned through the seeing of suffering, the seeing of its origin, and cultivation. The Formless Realm consciousness belongs to what is abandoned through cultivation. All these dharmas are objects of eight consciousnesses.

⁽³⁾ The dharmas of the Formless Realm abandoned through the seeing of suffering, the seeing of its origin, and cultivation are objects of three consciousnesses of each realm and of the undefiled consciousness. All these dharmas are objects of ten consciousnesses.

⁽⁴⁾ All dharmas abandoned through the seeing of cessation and the seeing of the Path are objects of these same consciousnesses, with the addition of the consciousnesses belonging to their respective categories.

(a) Desire Realm dharmas abandoned through the seeing of cessation are objects of the five consciousnesses mentioned above, with the addition of the consciousness belonging to what is abandoned through the seeing of cessation; thus there are six consciousnesses in all.

(b) Desire Realm dharmas abandoned through the seeing of the Path are objects of the five consciousnesses mentioned above, with the addition of the consciousness belonging to what is abandoned through the seeing of the Path; thus there are six consciousnesses in all.

(c) Form Realm and Formless Realm dharmas abandoned through the seeing of cessation and the seeing of the Path are objects of nine consciousnesses [if abandoned through the seeing of cessation] and eleven consciousnesses [if abandoned through the seeing of the Path].

⁽⁵⁾ Undefiled dharmas are objects of the last three consciousnesses of the three realms and of the undefiled consciousness.

They are the objects of ten kinds of consciousness, namely, the consciousnesses in the three realms belonging to abandonment through seeing cessation, abandonment through seeing the path, and abandonment through cultivation, as well as unconditioned consciousness.

These are the two summary verses: “The dharmas in the three realms belonging to abandonment through seeing suffering, abandonment through seeing arising, and abandonment through cultivation are, according to the order of the three realms above, the objects of five, eight, and ten kinds of consciousness.”

“With regard to abandonment through seeing cessation and abandonment through seeing the path, add one consciousness of their own respective class. Unconditioned dharmas are the objects of ten kinds of consciousness.”

The foregoing describes the sixteen kinds of dharmas that serve as objects of the sixteen kinds of consciousness. At this point, it must be examined which kinds of latent tendencies adhere to which kinds of things (vastu).

An analysis of every case would be excessively detailed; therefore, only one representative case is presented here:

⁽¹⁾ Among the objects to which attachment is bound (saṃyogavastu), how many latent tendencies adhere to the faculty of pleasure (sukhendriya)?

There are altogether seven kinds of the faculty of pleasure: one in the Desire Realm, belonging to abandonment through cultivation; five in the Form Realm, belonging to all five groups; and one that is unconditioned.

The unconditioned faculty of pleasure is not adhered to by any latent tendencies.

The faculty of pleasure in the Desire Realm is adhered to by the latent tendencies belonging to abandonment through cultivation and by all universally operative latent tendencies.

The faculty of pleasure in the Form Realm is adhered to by all universally operative latent tendencies.

⁽²⁾ How many latent tendencies adhere to a consciousness that takes the faculty of pleasure as its object?

There are altogether twelve kinds of consciousness that take the faculty of pleasure as their object: (a) four consciousnesses in the Desire Realm belonging to four groups, that is, excluding consciousness belonging to abandonment through seeing cessation; (b) five consciousnesses in the Form Realm belonging to all five groups; (c) two consciousnesses in the Formless Realm, comprising one belonging to abandonment through seeing the path and one belonging to abandonment through cultivation; and (d) unconditioned consciousness.

When adhered to, the consciousnesses classified above, in their respective order (yathāsaṃbhavam), have: (a) four groups of latent tendencies in the Desire Realm; (b) the latent tendencies in the Form Realm that take conditioned dharmas as their objects; (c) two groups of latent tendencies in the Formless Realm; and (d) the universally operative latent tendencies. (Vibhāṣā, 88, 2)

⁽³⁾ How many latent tendencies adhere to a consciousness whose object is a consciousness that apprehends the faculty of pleasure?

The very twelve kinds of consciousness that apprehend the faculty of pleasure, enumerated above, serve as the objects of one among fourteen kinds of consciousness: the same twelve kinds as above, together with two kinds of consciousness in the Formless Realm belonging to abandonment through seeing suffering and abandonment through seeing arising.

When adhered to, these consciousnesses, according to the order of the fourteen kinds, have: (a) the latent tendencies just described above in the case of the first two realms; and (b) in the case of the Formless Realm, four additional groups of latent tendencies, that is, excluding the group of latent tendencies belonging to abandonment through seeing cessation.

The remaining dharmas—the twenty-two faculties—should be understood by analogy with this example.

(Question) If, because latent tendencies are present, a mind is called “accompanied by latent tendencies” (sānuśaya), then in this case do all the latent tendencies increase and “lie dormant” (anuśerate) in this mind that is “accompanied by latent tendencies”?

(Answer) This is not necessarily so. Those that “lie dormant” therein (santy anuśayānāḥ) are the latent tendencies that have not been abandoned, whose objects have not been abandoned, and that are associated (saṃprayukta) with this kind of mind. Those that do not “lie dormant” are the latent tendencies that have already been abandoned but are associated with this kind of mind.

[The mind “accompanied by latent tendencies” is of two kinds:

Defiled and undefiled.

The defiled mind includes both cases;

In the undefiled mind, they only increase by adherence.]

Treatise: A defiled mind is called “accompanied by latent tendencies” because: ⁽¹⁾ there are latent tendencies that “lie dormant” within it; they are associated with this mind and their objects have not yet been abandoned; and ⁽²⁾ there are latent tendencies that do not “lie dormant” within it; they have already been abandoned but are associated with this mind, because this kind of mind continues to have these latent tendencies as concomitant dharmas (tatsahitatvāt).

An undefiled mind is called “accompanied by latent tendencies” because latent tendencies “lie dormant” within it; they are associated with the mind and have not yet been abandoned.

(Question) In what order do these ten latent tendencies arise?

The verse answers:

[Ignorance, doubt, wrong view, view of a self,

Extreme view, attachment to rules and observances, attachment to views,

Craving, conceit, and anger—in this order,

The preceding gives rise to the following.]

Treatise: First, because of ignorance, one is deluded (saṃmuhyate) regarding the truths, does not wish (icchati) to contemplate the Truth of Suffering, and does not accept the Truth of Suffering. From delusion, doubt (vicikitsā) arises: upon hearing two doctrines, one does not know whether suffering is real or non-suffering is real. From doubt, wrong view (mithyādṛṣṭi) arises; that is, through erroneous instruction and reasoning, one comes to consider that this is not suffering.

From wrong view, the view of a self (satkāyadṛṣṭi) arises, because when one fails to recognize the skandhas as suffering, one regards them as constituents forming a self. From this, extreme view (antagrāhadṛṣṭi) arises, because once one believes in a self, one clings to the view that the self is either eternal or annihilated. From this comes the attachment to rules and modes of practice (śīlavrataparāmarśa) as means of purification; from this attachment arises the disparagement of inferior dharmas, that is, attachment to views (dṛṣṭiparāmarśa).

From this arises craving for one’s own view (svadṛṣṭau), followed by conceit concerning that view; and then anger (pratigha) arises, because when one knows only one’s own view, one detests the opposing views of others. Some masters hold that anger, or resentment, arises here when one changes—adopts or rejects—one’s own view, because craving and the other latent tendencies belonging to abandonment through seeing all take one’s own continuum and one’s own view as their objects (svasaṃtānikadṛṣṭi).

(Question) From how many causes do the afflictions arise?

The verse answers:

[Because a latent tendency has not been abandoned,

Because its object appears,

And because of unwise attention, it arises;

Thus it is said that all the causes and conditions must be present.]

Treatise: For example, sensual craving (kāmarāga) arises: ⁽¹⁾ when the latent tendency of craving (rāgānuśaya) has not been abandoned—that is, when the acquisition (prāpti) of this latent tendency has not been severed—and has not yet been fully comprehended (aparijñāta), that is, when its antidote (pratipakṣa) has not yet arisen; ⁽²⁾ when dharmas conducive to the arising of sensual craving (kāmarāgaparyavasthānīya), such as visible forms and so forth, are present; and ⁽³⁾ when there is erroneous judgment, that is, unwise attention (ayoniśomanaskāra).

The latent tendency is the cause (hetu), the dharmas are the object (viṣaya), and unwise attention is the immediate preparatory activity (prayoga): these are three distinct powers (bala).

The other afflictions arise in the same manner.

The foregoing concerns the arising of afflictions when all the causes and conditions are present. In addition, an affliction may also arise solely through the power of its object (viṣayabala), as in the case of arhats who fall away from their attainment.

According to the sutras, the ninety-eight latent defilements, together with the ten envelopment-defilements (paryavasthānas), constitute the three outflows (āsravas): the outflow of sensual desire (kāmāsrava), the outflow of existence (bhavāsrava), and the outflow of ignorance (avidyāsrava); the four floods (oghas): the flood of sensual desire (kāmaugha), the flood of existence (bhavaugha), the flood of views (dṛṣṭyogha), and the flood of ignorance (avidyaugha); the four yokes (yogas): the yoke of sensual desire (kāmayoga), the yoke of existence (bhavayoga), the yoke of views (dṛṣṭyoga), and the yoke of ignorance (avidyāyoga);

and the four kinds of clinging (upādānas): clinging to sensual desire (kāmopādāna), clinging to views (dṛṣṭyupādāna), clinging to precepts and observances (śīlavratopādāna), and clinging to the doctrine of self (ātmavādopādāna).

(Question) What is the substance of the outflows?

The verse answers:

[The defilements and envelopment-defilements of the Desire Realm,

Excluding delusion, are called the outflow of sensual desire.

In the two higher realms, the outflow of existence

Consists only of defilements, but excludes delusion.

Because they are morally indeterminate, turn inward,

And pertain to meditative concentration, they are combined into one.

Ignorance is the root of the various forms of existence,

And is therefore established separately as one outflow.

The floods and yokes are likewise.

Views are established separately because they are acute;

Because they do not conduce to abiding,

They are not established separately as an outflow.

The yokes of sensual desire and existence, together with delusion,

And the two kinds of views, constitute the kinds of clinging;

Ignorance is not established separately,

Because it is not capable of grasping.]

Exposition: Forty-one entities (dravyas)—namely, the defilements of the Desire Realm, excluding the five kinds of ignorance (avidyās), together with the ten envelopment-defilements—constitute the outflow of sensual desire.

The fifty-two entities of the Form Realm and Formless Realm—namely, the twenty-six latent defilements of each realm, excluding the kinds of ignorance—constitute the outflow of existence (bhavāsrava).

However, in the two higher realms there are also two kinds of envelopment-defilement: torpor (styāna) and restlessness (auddhatya). The Prakaraṇaśāstra states: “What is the outflow of existence? Apart from ignorance, all the fetters (saṃyojana), bonds (bandhana), latent defilements, secondary defilements (kleśa), and envelopment-defilements of the Form Realm and Formless Realm are called the outflow of existence.” The Vaibhāṣika masters of Kaśmīr maintain that the envelopment-defilements are not counted as part of the outflow of existence because, in these two realms, they do not possess an autonomous character.

(Question) Why are the latent defilements of the two higher realms combined into a single outflow of existence?

(Answer) They share three characteristics: they are morally indeterminate, they are directed inward—that is, they do not depend predominantly upon an object (na viṣayapradhānāḥ)—and they all pertain to the spheres of meditative concentration. Therefore, they are combined into a single kind of outflow (āsrava). They are also called the outflow of existence (bhavāsrava) for reasons similar to those applying to craving for existence (bhavarāga).

From what has been stated above, it can be understood that the fifteen kinds of ignorance in the three realms constitute the outflow of ignorance.

(Question) Why are the kinds of ignorance established separately as one kind of outflow?

(Answer) Because ignorance is the root of all latent defilements.

The floods and yokes are explained in the same way as the outflows. Views (dṛṣṭi), however, constitute a separate flood and yoke because of their acute nature.

The outflow of sensual desire (rāgāsrava), excluding views, is itself the flood of sensual desire and the yoke of sensual desire. The same applies to the outflow of existence (bhavāsrava): excluding views, the outflow of existence is itself the flood of existence and the yoke of existence. According to the author of the treatise, it is precisely because of their acute nature (gsal-ba, paṭu) that views are established as a separate flood and yoke.

(Question) Why are views not established separately as an outflow?

(Answer) The meaning of “outflow” will be explained below: they are so named because outflows cause beings to abide (āsayantīty āsravāṇāṃ nirvacanam). Views by themselves (asahāya) do not conduce to abiding (āsana), because they are acute. Therefore, views cannot be established as a separate kind of outflow. They are included among the outflows, but are combined with the other latent defilements.

Thus, there are altogether: ⁽¹⁾ twenty-nine entities belonging to the flood of sensual desire—five kinds of craving, five kinds of hatred, five kinds of pride, four kinds of doubt, and ten envelopment-defilements; ⁽²⁾ twenty-eight entities belonging to the flood of existence—ten kinds of craving, ten kinds of pride, and eight kinds of doubt; ⁽³⁾ thirty-six entities belonging to the flood of views—the twelve views of each of the three realms; and ⁽⁴⁾ fifteen entities belonging to the flood of ignorance—the five kinds of ignorance of each of the three realms. The same applies to the yokes.

There are four kinds of clinging: ⁽¹⁾ clinging to sensual desire consists of the yoke of sensual desire together with the kinds of ignorance belonging to the Desire Realm; thus, it comprises thirty-four entities altogether: five kinds of craving, five kinds of hatred, five kinds of pride, five kinds of ignorance, four kinds of doubt, and ten envelopment-defilements; ⁽²⁾ clinging to the doctrine of self consists of the yoke of existence together with the kinds of ignorance belonging to the two higher realms; thus, it comprises thirty-eight entities altogether: ten kinds of craving, ten kinds of hatred, ten kinds of ignorance, and eight kinds of doubt;

⁽³⁾ clinging to views consists of the yoke of views, excluding attachment to precepts and observances (śīlavrataparāmarśa), and thus comprises thirty entities altogether; ⁽⁴⁾ clinging to precepts and observances (śīlavratopādāna) consists of the six remaining entities of the yoke of views.

(Question) Why is attachment to precepts and observances (śīlavrata) separated from the views and established as a distinct kind of clinging?

(Answer) Because precepts and observances stand in opposition to the Noble Path (mārgapratidvandva) and delude (vipratilambhana) two classes (pakṣa): although they are not the Noble Path, they are grasped as the Noble Path. Thus, householders believe that they can be reborn in the heavenly realm by fasting, while renunciants believe that they can attain purity (śuddhipratyāgamana) by abandoning desirable things (Vibhāṣā, 48, 4).

(Question) But why is ignorance not established as a separate kind of clinging?

(Answer) Because ignorance is incapable of grasping. Its nature is “non-comprehension” (asaṃprakhyāna), and it is not acute; therefore, it is incapable of grasping (agrāhikā). To function as clinging, it must be associated with other defilements.

(Question) But the Blessed One said in a sutra: “What is the yoke of sensual desire? In relation to objects of sensual desire, those who do not know their origin experience sensual craving (kāmarāga), sensual desire (kāmacchanda), sensual embodiment, sensual affection, sensual pleasure, sensual infatuation, sensual indulgence, sensual attachment, sensual delight, sensual concealment, sensual pursuit, and sensual fixation, which envelop and oppress the mind: this is the yoke of sensual desire.” The Blessed One likewise defined the other kinds of yoke. In another sutra, he said that desirous craving (chandarāga) is called clinging. Therefore, desirous craving for objects of sensual desire, views, and so forth is called clinging to sensual desire (kāmopādāna), and so forth.

(Question) What is the meaning of latent defilement, outflow, flood, yoke, and clinging?

The verse answers:

[Subtle, increasing in two ways,

Following and binding,

Causing abiding, streaming forth, sweeping away, fastening, and grasping—

These are the meanings of latent defilement and the rest.]

Treatise: When the afflictions become manifest, their modes of activity are very difficult to discern; hence they are called subtle. They adhere through the adherence of their acquisitions (prāptis): They increase concomitantly in two ways, both by relying on their objects and by relying on the associated dharmas. They bind continuously (concomitant bondage), because even when no effort is made to arouse them, or even when an effort is made to prevent them, the afflictions continue to arise.

The latent tendencies cause sentient beings to remain (āsayanti) within the cycle of birth and death (saṃsāra); they flow (āsravanti, gacchanti) from the highest heaven (bhavāgra, the summit of existence) down to the Avīci hell; they ooze through the six faculties like wounds and are therefore called outflows (āsravas). Because they sweep beings away (haranti), they are called floods. Because they cause sentient beings to adhere (śleṣayanti), they are called yokes.

Because they grasp (upādadati, upagṛhṇanti), they are called graspings.

The best explanation is as follows: ⁽¹⁾ Because of the latent tendencies, the mental continuum flows (āsravati) through its objects (spheres, viṣayeṣu); therefore, the latent tendencies are precisely the outflows (āsrava). This accords with the simile in the scripture (Saṃyukta, 18, 9): “Just as great exertion (mahātābhisaṃskāreṇa) is required to pull a boat upstream, and just as, when those exertions gradually weaken (teṣāṃ saṃskārāṇāṃ pratipraśrabdhyā), the boat is again swept away (haryate) by the current;

[so too, it is through diligent effort that the mental continuum is drawn away from its objects by wholesome dharmas.]” ⁽²⁾ When the latent tendencies become exceedingly powerful (predominant in strength), they are called floods, because they sweep away what is connected with them (tadyukta) and what is subject to their influence (tadanuvidhānāt). ⁽³⁾ When they do not manifest with excessive intensity, the latent tendencies are called yokes (anatimātrasamudācārin), because they connect beings with the various kinds of suffering in the stream of saṃsāra, or because they adhere with great persistence (abhikṣṇānusanga). ⁽⁴⁾ The latent tendencies are also called graspings, because through them there is grasping at sensual desire (kāmādyupādāna), and so forth.