阿毘達磨俱舍論

CHAPTER 5: ANALYSIS OF THE LATENT TENDENCIES

Part 19

It was previously stated that the differences within the world arise from karma, and that karma can increase precisely because of the latent tendencies (anuśayas); without latent tendencies, karma would be incapable of producing (abhinirvartana) a new existence (punarbhava).

(Question) How many kinds of latent tendencies are there?

The stanza answers:

[The latent tendencies are the root of rebirth;

There are six kinds of latent tendencies:

Craving, and thence aversion, conceit,

Ignorance, views, and doubt.]

Treatise: When a defilement (kleśa) becomes manifest, it has ten functions: ⁽¹⁾ It makes its root more firmly established, meaning that the acquisition (prāpti) of the defilement by a person possessing that defilement prevents the defilement from being eliminated; ⁽²⁾ it establishes a continuous series (saṃtatim avasthāpayati), meaning that it continues to arise; ⁽³⁾ it prepares its “field” or “environment of growth,” that is, it makes the person who possesses the defilement (āśraya, basis) suitable for the arising of the defilement; ⁽⁴⁾ it produces its offspring (niṣyanda), namely the secondary defilements (upakleśas), as enmity gives rise to anger, and so forth; ⁽⁵⁾ it brings forth (abhinirharati) karma;

⁽⁶⁾ it gathers its own causal requisites (svasaṃbhāraṃ parigṛhṇāti), namely improper attention (ayoniśomanaskāra); ⁽⁷⁾ it causes the person possessing the defilement to be mistaken regarding the object of cognition; ⁽⁸⁾ it bends (namayati) the mental continuum toward its object or directs it toward rebirth; ⁽⁹⁾ it causes the wholesome factors (kuśalapakṣa) to deteriorate (vyutkrāmayati, parihāpayati); ⁽¹⁰⁾ it becomes a bond (bandhaṇa) and prevents one from passing beyond the realm to which these defilements belong.

(Question) How many kinds of latent tendencies are there?

(Answer) There are six kinds: craving, and thence aversion, conceit, ignorance, views, and doubt.

The word “thence” (tathā) implies that it is precisely because craving exists that the other latent tendencies “find their place” (anuśayana) in their respective objects, increasing in relation to those objects. This will be explained below.

If craving is analyzed into two kinds, there are seven latent tendencies in all: ⁽¹⁾ the latent tendency of sensual craving (kāmarāgānuśaya), ⁽²⁾ the latent tendency of aversion (pratigha), ⁽³⁾ the latent tendency of craving for existence (bhavarāga), ⁽⁴⁾ the latent tendency of conceit (māna), ⁽⁵⁾ the latent tendency of ignorance (avidyā), ⁽⁶⁾ the latent tendency of wrong views (dṛṣṭi), and ⁽⁷⁾ the latent tendency of doubt (vicikitsā, vimati).

(Question) What does “the latent tendency of sensual craving” mean? Is it a latent tendency called sensual craving, or is it a latent tendency of sensual craving that is distinct from sensual craving (kāmarāga)? If it is maintained that sensual craving itself is the latent tendency, this contradicts the sutra.

The sutra (Saṃtukta, 33, 10; 35, 11) says: “One who abides for a time with a mind that has not become prey (paryavasthita) to sensual craving, and who, whenever the fettering force (paryavasthāna) of craving has just arisen, knows the means of relinquishing it, will cause the fettering force of craving to lose entirely its powerful influence, and that person will eliminate the latent tendency.” Here, in speaking of sensual craving as being eliminated—and this sensual craving as coexisting with its latent tendency—the implication is that sensual craving and its latent tendency are two distinct dharmas.

If it is explained as a latent tendency belonging to sensual craving, this would establish the latent tendency as a dharma (dharma) dissociated from the mind [and would imply the acquisition (prāpti) of sensual craving], which would in turn contradict the Fundamental Treatise. The Fundamental Treatise (Jñānaprasthāna, 6, 4) teaches: “The latent tendency of sensual craving (kāmarāgānuśaya) is associated with [that is, may be accompanied by] three feelings: pleasure, joy, and equanimity.” A dharma that is not associated with the mind cannot be accompanied by these feelings.

According to the Vibhāṣā, the latent tendency of sensual craving is a latent tendency called sensual craving; sensual craving itself is the latent tendency. The same applies to the other defilements: doubt (vicikitśa) itself is the latent tendency of doubt.

(Question) But the passage from the sutra cited above states that sensual craving is eliminated together with its latent tendency. Thus, is the latent tendency not distinct from sensual craving?

(Answer) The Vibhāṣā holds that “together with its latent tendency” means “together with its consequence (anubandha),” that is, together with its accompanying bondage. Alternatively, the sutra uses the word anuśaya in the sense of “acquisition” (prāpti), because acquisition is the cause of the latent tendency. The Fundamental Treatise, however, presents matters solely according to their true meaning and therefore states that the latent tendencies are themselves the defilements; hence, the latent tendencies are dharmas associated with the mind.

(Question) By what reasoning is it known that they are dharmas associated with the mind?

(Answer) Because the latent tendencies defile the mind, obstruct the mind, oppose wholesome dharmas, and, when wholesome dharmas arise, the latent tendencies are no longer associated with the mind.

This demonstrates that it is precisely because of the latent tendencies that the mind becomes defiled, that wholesome dharmas not yet arisen are prevented from arising, and that wholesome dharmas already arisen decline. Therefore, the latent tendencies are not dharmas dissociated from the mind.

(Question) But dharmas dissociated from the mind could still possess such capabilities.

(Answer) This cannot be so. If the latent tendencies were dissociated from the mind, they would always be manifest; and if they possessed such capabilities, wholesome dharmas could never arise. In reality, however, wholesome dharmas do arise. Therefore, the latent tendencies are not dharmas dissociated from the mind.

(Explanation) The treatise masters who maintain that the latent tendencies are not associated with mind do not acknowledge that the three functions above belong to the latent tendencies; rather, they belong to the afflictions (kleśa) [that is, to the envelopments (paryavasthāna), and these dharmas do not always arise manifestly]. Therefore, the position of the Sautrāntikas is the most correct. The Sautrāntikas say that the expression “latent tendency of sensual desire” means “the latent tendency belonging to sensual desire.” Yet the latent tendency is neither associated with mind nor dissociated from mind, because it is not a separate real entity (dravya).

What is called a latent tendency (anuśaya) is simply an affliction in a dormant state (the state of sleep); and what is called an envelopment (paryavasthāna) is simply an affliction in an awakened state. A dormant affliction is an affliction that is not presently active, that is, one that remains in the condition of a seed; an awakened affliction is an affliction that is presently active. The term “seed” denotes a certain capacity (śakti) to produce an affliction, a capacity belonging to the person in question (āśraya, ātmabhāva) and generated by a preceding affliction.

It is just as, within a certain person, there exists a capacity to produce cognition in the form of recollection (mindfulness), and this capacity is produced by a cognition in the form of direct experience (anubhavajñāna, experiential knowledge); and just as the capacity to produce a grain of rice—a capacity belonging to the rice plant or sprout—is itself produced from a grain of rice. Those treatise masters who hold that the seed of an affliction is a dharma distinct from the affliction, not associated with mind, and called a latent tendency would likewise have to admit a real entity not associated with mind that is the cause of cognition in the form of recollection, just as in the case of the rice plant.

(Sarvāstivādins) You have no right to explain the expression “latent tendency of sensual desire” as “the latent tendency belonging to sensual desire,” because the sutra clearly teaches that the latent tendency is itself sensual desire. The Ṣaṭṣaṭkasūtra says: “This person has the latent tendency of craving (rāgānuśaya) toward pleasant feeling.” [Clearly, the sutra means that when pleasant feeling arises, an affliction—craving (rāga)—is active (samudācar); and the sutra calls this presently active affliction a latent tendency.]

(Sautrāntikas) The sutra says, “There is the latent tendency of craving”; it does not say, “At that time there is the latent tendency of craving.” [At the moment of pleasant feeling, the latent tendency of craving is in the process of arising (utpadyate) but has not yet become manifest. In other words, at the moment of pleasant feeling there is active craving, a kind of “awakened” craving;] when this pleasant feeling ceases, craving recedes into a dormant condition; at that time there is only the latent tendency of craving, a kind of dormant craving that serves as the seed for “awakened” craving in the future.

Alternatively, when the sutra speaks of the latent tendency of craving (rāgānuśaya), it may intend to indicate craving (rāga): the latent tendency of craving is merely the result of craving, and this is a case in which the cause is named after its result.

Further discussion of this issue should end here, and we should return to the principal subject.

(Question) What is the meaning of the sutra’s division of craving into two kinds, sensual craving and craving for existence? What is craving for existence?

(Answer) Attachment to the Form Realm and the Formless Realm is called craving for existence (bhavarāga) [in contrast to sensual craving (kāmarāga), which is attachment to sensual pleasures (kāma, kāmaguṇa) belonging exclusively to the Desire Realm.]

(Question) Why is the term “craving for existence” applied only to the two higher realms?

(Answer) It is so named because this craving is directed inward and because the idea that these two realms constitute liberation is to be rejected. Tradition (kila) explains: “Generally speaking, the attachment of beings in these two realms clings to meditative attainment (samāpatti), [more precisely, it takes as its object the kind of dhyana that ‘can be savored’ (āsvādanasaṃprayuktadhyāna)]. Here, ‘generally speaking’ implies that these beings are also attached to their palaces (vimāna), and so forth. The attachment pertaining specifically to these stages of meditative concentration is directed inward (antarmukhapravṛtta); hence it is called craving for existence.

Moreover, some beings think that these two realms constitute liberation (mokṣa); therefore, the Blessed One called attachment to these two realms craving for existence.

[According to us], “existence” (bhava) here denotes the supporting body (ātmabhāva, āśraya). These beings dwell in meditative concentration and enjoy both meditative attainment (samāpatti) and their own persons (the supporting basis, svāśraya, svātmabhāva). Precisely because they have become detached from sensual pleasures (kāmavītarāga), they enjoy only their own being and not external objects. This is why attachment to the two higher realms is called craving for existence.

(Question) Why are these six latent tendencies divided into ten kinds, as stated above in the Fundamental Treatise (Jñānaprasthāna, 5, 11)?

The verse replies:

[Because views differ, the six are established as ten.

The different kinds of view are the view of a real personality,

The extreme view, the false view,

Attachment to views, and attachment to precepts and observances.]

Treatise: Because view (dṛṣṭi) is of five kinds, the six latent tendencies are established as ten kinds. Thus, the intrinsic nature of the five latent tendencies—craving (rāga), aversion (pratigha), pride (māna), ignorance (avidyā), and doubt (vicikitsā)—does not belong to the category of view; while the five latent tendencies—the view of a real personality (satkāyadṛṣṭi), false view (mithyādṛṣṭi), extreme view (antagrāhadṛṣṭi), attachment to views (dṛṣṭiparāmarśa), and attachment to precepts and observances (śīlavrataparāmarśa)—all have the nature of view.

Furthermore, the Fundamental Treatise teaches that these ten latent tendencies are further established as thirty-six latent tendencies belonging to the Desire Realm, thirty-one latent tendencies belonging to the Form Realm, and thirty-one latent tendencies belonging to the Formless Realm, making a total of ninety-eight kinds of latent tendencies.

(Question) On what basis are all these kinds of latent tendencies established?

The verse replies:

[Because their modes of abandonment, categories, and realms differ, the six latent tendencies

Are established as ninety-eight kinds.

In the Desire Realm, seeing the Truth of Suffering, and so forth,

Eliminates ten, seven, seven, eight, and four latent tendencies;

That is, in the above order, one excludes

Three views, two views, all views, and doubt.

In the Form Realm and the Formless Realm, aversion is excluded;

The remaining numbers are the same as in the Desire Realm.]

Treatise: All ten latent tendencies mentioned above are eliminated by seeing the Truth of Suffering in the Desire Realm.

Seven latent tendencies are eliminated by seeing the Truth of the Origin of Suffering, and seven latent tendencies are eliminated by seeing the Truth of Cessation; that is, the view of a real personality, the extreme view, and attachment to precepts and observances are excluded.

Eight latent tendencies are eliminated by seeing the Truth of the Path; that is, the view of a real personality and the extreme view are excluded.

Thus, there are altogether thirty-two latent tendencies that can be eliminated by seeing the Four Noble Truths, because seeing the Four Noble Truths alone is sufficient to eliminate them.

Four latent tendencies are eliminated by the Path of Cultivation: craving, aversion, ignorance, and pride, because those who have seen the truths can eliminate these latent tendencies through cultivation of the Noble Path (mārgābhyāsa).

Thus, the view of a real body (satkāya) belongs to only one category (ekaprakāra), because it is abandoned through seeing the Truth of Suffering; the extreme view is likewise. Wrong view belongs to four categories, because it may be abandoned through seeing the Truth of Suffering, the Truth of Origin, the Truth of Cessation, and the Truth of the Path; the same applies to attachment to views (dṛṣṭiparāmarśa) and doubt (vicikitsā). Attachment to precepts and observances belongs to two categories, because it may be abandoned through seeing the Truth of Suffering and the Truth of the Path. Craving, hatred, pride, and ignorance each belong to five categories, because they may be abandoned through seeing the Four Truths and through cultivation.

(Question) What are the characteristics of the latent tendencies belonging to the categories abandoned through seeing suffering, and so forth, up to the category abandoned through cultivation?

(Answer) When the object (ālambana) of a latent tendency belongs to a category that can be abandoned through seeing a certain truth, that latent tendency is said to be abandoned through seeing that very truth. The other latent tendencies may be abandoned through cultivation.

Thus, there are altogether twelve views (dṛṣṭis), four doubts (vicikitsās), five cravings (rāgas), five instances of hatred (pratighas), five kinds of pride (mānas), and five kinds of ignorance (avidyās), making a total of thirty-six latent tendencies belonging to the Desire Realm.

The foregoing latent tendencies, excluding the five kinds of hatred, constitute thirty-one latent tendencies belonging to the Form Realm and likewise to the Formless Realm.

Therefore, the Root Treatise (Jñānaprasthāna) states: These six kinds of latent tendencies are established as ninety-eight kinds on the basis of differences in their modes of activity (ākāra), their categories (prakāra) or manners of abandonment, and their realms (dhātu).

Of these ninety-eight latent tendencies, eighty-eight are abandoned through seeing because they are impaired by receptivity (kṣānti), and ten are abandoned through cultivation because they are impaired by knowledge (jñāna).

(Question) Is the foregoing classification definitive?

The stanza answers:

[Latent tendencies impaired by receptivity:

If at the Summit of Existence, they are abandoned through seeing;

If elsewhere, they are abandoned through seeing or cultivation.

Latent tendencies impaired by knowledge are abandoned only through cultivation.]

Exposition: Here, the term “receptivity” (kṣānti) refers to receptivities to Dharma knowledge (dharmajñānakṣāntis) and receptivities to subsequent knowledge (anvayajñānakṣāntis).

Among the latent tendencies impaired by receptivity, only those belonging to the Summit of Existence (bhavāgra) are abandoned through the Path of Seeing, because only receptivity to subsequent knowledge enables their abandonment. [Only noble beings, by relying upon the undefiled Noble Path, abandon these latent tendencies.]

The latent tendencies belonging to the other eight planes (bhūmis)—that is, the Desire Realm, the Form Realm, and the first three meditative levels of the Formless Realm—may be abandoned through the Path of Seeing or through the Path of Cultivation. Noble beings abandon these latent tendencies through the Path of Seeing, not through the Path of Cultivation, by means of receptivity to Dharma knowledge or receptivity to subsequent knowledge, according to whether these latent tendencies belong to the Desire Realm or to the higher planes. Ordinary beings abandon them only through the Path of Cultivation, not through the Path of Seeing, because these latent tendencies may be abandoned through the cultivation of conventional knowledge (lokasaṃvṛtijñāna).

Latent tendencies impaired by knowledge are all abandoned through the Path of Cultivation in every plane, whether by noble beings or ordinary beings. Noble beings abandon them through the cultivation of undefiled knowledge (anāsravajñāna), while ordinary beings do so through the cultivation of conventional knowledge.

Other masters maintain that non-Buddhists (bāhyaka) cannot abandon the kinds of latent tendencies abandoned through seeing. This is because the Mahākarmavibhāgasūtra teaches that wrong view taking the Desire Realm as its object still occurs in non-Buddhists who have relinquished craving for sensual desire—that is, who have already abandoned the craving (rāga) taking the Desire Realm as its object, which is of the kind abandoned through cultivation.

The Brahmajālasūtra also says that non-Buddhists who are free from sensual desire still possess all kinds of views (dṛṣṭi) taking the Desire Realm as their object. Among them are still those who formulate doctrines concerning the past (speculators about the beginning of things, pūrvāntakalpaka), those who maintain that everything is eternal (śāśvatavādin), that some things are eternal, or that everything is without a cause. [If someone here raises the objection that the “views” of those who have relinquished the Desire Realm all belong to the Form Realm, then] in that case the Desire Realm could not serve as an object for the afflictions (kleśa) belonging to the Form Realm, because these persons have already relinquished the Desire Realm;

and thus they have not yet abandoned the kinds of views belonging to the Desire Realm.

The Vibhāṣā explains this matter by saying that those who are “free from sensual desire” fall away from [that freedom] at the very moment they give rise to such a view, just as Devadatta fell away from his supernormal powers (ṛddhi).

(Question) It was previously said that views are divided into five kinds on the basis of their modes of activity (ākāra). What, then, are these five kinds of views?

The stanza answers:

[The view concerning self and what belongs to self,

Concerning annihilation and permanence,

Concerning denial, concerning taking the inferior as superior,

Concerning mistaking the cause and the Noble Path.

These are precisely the five kinds of views.]

Exposition: ⁽¹⁾ Grasping at self and what belongs to self (ātmātmayagrāha) is precisely the view of a real body (satkāyadṛṣṭi). It is called “real” (sat) because it is undergoing destruction; it is called a “body” (kāya) because it is an accumulation. Thus, “real body” means “an accumulation of things undergoing destruction,” namely, the five appropriated skandhas (upādānaskandhas).

In the expression “real body” used here, the word “real” serves to eliminate the idea of permanence, while “body” serves to eliminate the idea of unity (piṇḍagrāha). The skandhas are regarded as the self because there previously arose the ideas of permanence and unity.

The view of a real body means a view concerning the real body.

In fact, all views whose objects are defiled (sāsravālambana), such as the extreme view (antagrāhadṛṣṭi) and so forth, are views concerning the real body—that is, concerning the five skandhas. Nevertheless, although all of them are views concerning the real body, they are not therefore the “view concerning self and what belongs to self.” (Vibhāṣā, 49, 11)

According to the teaching of the Blessed One, it is precisely grasping at self and what belongs to self that is called the view of a real body: “Bhikṣus, whatever ascetics or brahmins in this world believe in a self, what they regard as the self is nothing other than the five appropriated skandhas.” (Saṃyukta, 21, 17; Madhyama, 58, 1; Vibhāṣā, 8, 7).

⁽²⁾ With regard to what has been grasped as the self, the belief that it is either permanent or annihilated is an extreme view, because it is precisely a mistaken belief in the extreme (anta) doctrines of permanence or annihilation.

⁽³⁾ With regard to what truly exists—with regard to the truth of suffering and so forth—to reject it (apavāda) and claim that “it does not exist” (nāsti) is wrong view (mithyādṛṣṭi). All erroneous views are wrong views; nevertheless, only denials such as the foregoing are called wrong view because this is the most erroneous kind of view (because its fault is exceedingly grave), just as the word “foul” is used to indicate an exceedingly foul odor. Wrong view alone has the character of denial (apavāda), whereas the other kinds of views have the character of affirmation, involving false imputation (samāropikā).

⁽⁴⁾ To regard what is unwholesome, inferior, and ought to be abandoned (hīna) as wholesome and exalted (ucca) is attachment to views (dṛṣṭiparāmarśa). Here, to what dharmas does the expression “ought to be abandoned” (hīna) refer?—It refers to the conditioned dharmas with outflows (sāsrava), because they are all abandoned (prahīna) by the noble ones. The type of view that includes this attachment is simply called “attachment” (parāmarśa).

Strictly speaking, it should be called “attachment to views and the like” (dṛṣṭiādiparāmarśa), but the words “and the like” have been omitted; hence it is called merely attachment to views.

⁽⁵⁾ To regard what is neither a cause nor the Noble Path as a cause and as the Noble Path is attachment to precepts and observances (śīlavrataparāmarśa): for example, regarding Maheśvara, Prajāpati, or any other entities that are not causes of the world as the cause of the world; regarding sacrificial rites, walking through fire, passing through water, and so forth—which are practices incapable of leading to rebirth in the heavenly realms—as causes of rebirth in those realms; regarding mere precepts and ascetic practices (śīlavratamātraka) as the path leading to liberation, although precepts and such practices alone do not constitute the path to liberation; regarding the forms of knowledge (jñāna) taught by the Sāṃkhyas and Yoga as paths to liberation, although in reality they are not;

and so forth.

The foregoing are the five kinds of view.

(Question) If the view that mistakenly regards dharmas that are not causes of the world as its cause is therefore called attachment to precepts and observances, why is this view not abandoned through insight into the Truth of Origin (samudayasatya), since it is a mistaken understanding (vipratipannatva) of causation?

The stanza answers:

[Regarding Maheśvara and the like, which are not causes, as causes

Is due to regarding them as permanent and as a self;

Therefore, it is abandoned only through insight into suffering.]

Exposition: To regard Maheśvara (Īśvara) or Prajāpati as the cause of the world necessarily entails regarding them as eternal and unique beings possessing a self (ātman) and the power of creation (kartar). The views that cling to the permanence and selfhood of Maheśvara or Prajāpati are abandoned only through insight into the Truth of Suffering; therefore, when these views are abandoned, the view that regards Maheśvara or Prajāpati as the cause of the world is also abandoned.

(Question) The view that one will be reborn in a heavenly realm by taking one’s own life through burning or by plunging into water, and the view that observing precepts and prohibitions and practicing austerities will lead to purification (śuddhi), are both unrelated to the wrong views of permanence and self. Why, then, is it said that these views are abandoned through insight into the Truth of Suffering? They should properly be abandoned through insight into the Truth of Origin.

The Root Treatise (Jñānaprasthāna, 20, 11) states: “There are non-Buddhists who give rise to the view that if a person (puruṣapudgala) observes the precepts of an ox (gośāila), a wild animal (mṛga), or a dog, that person will attain purification, liberation, and escape (niḥsaraṇa); will completely transcend the suffering and pleasure [of the three realms]; and will reach the state in which neither suffering nor pleasure remains.

All views that regard as causes dharmas that are not causes belong to attachment to precepts and observances, and attachment to precepts and observances is invariably abandoned through insight into the Truth of Suffering.” Thus the Vibhāṣā says that both of the foregoing kinds of view are abandoned through insight into the Truth of Suffering because they both involve confusion (vipratipannatva) concerning suffering.

(Question) This reasoning goes too far (atiprasanga)! All afflictions whose objects are conditioned dharmas with outflows involve confusion concerning suffering [because all conditioned dharmas with outflows are suffering]. Furthermore, what kind of attachment to precepts and observances is abandoned through insight into the Truth of the Path?

If the Vibhāṣā says that it is the kind whose object is a dharma abandoned through insight into the Path—that is, one of the eight latent tendencies (anuśayas), the first of which is wrong view—then attachment to precepts and observances should likewise involve confusion concerning suffering. Moreover, how can attachment to precepts and observances be said to take as its objects dharmas abandoned through insight into the Path?

For ⁽¹⁾ in the case of a person (pudgala) who holds the wrong view (mythyādṛṣṭi) or doubt (vicikitsā) that “there is no Noble Path,” how could that person attain purification by means of this wrong view or doubt? ⁽²⁾ If that person follows (parāmṛśya, gṛhītvā) the path to liberation established by the Sāṃkhyas and others and says, “This alone is the Noble Path; the Buddha’s path is not the Noble Path,” then that non-Buddhist imagines that purification has been attained through the “Noble Path” of the Sāṃkhyas, not through the wrong view that takes the Noble Path as its object.

Furthermore, if a person thinks that purification has been attained through a wrong view abandoned by insight into the Truth of Origin or the Truth of Cessation, why could that person’s attachment to precepts and observances not be abandoned through insight into those very two truths?

Thus, this issue requires further investigation.

(Question) Two inverted views (viparyaya, viparyāsa), concerning permanence and self, were mentioned above. Are these the only two?

(Answer) There are four kinds: ⁽¹⁾ regarding the impermanent (anitya) as permanent (nitya); ⁽²⁾ regarding suffering (duḥkha) as pleasure (sukha); ⁽³⁾ regarding the impure (aśuci, aśubha) as pure (śuci); and ⁽⁴⁾ regarding what is not-self (anātman) as self (ātman).

(Question) What is the essential nature of these four?

The stanza answers:

[The essential nature of the four inversions

Arises from three inverted views,

Through error, examination, and firm conviction;

Perception and mind arise through the power of view.]

Exposition: The essential nature of the four inverted views derives from three kinds of view. The first inverted view is the eternalist aspect of the extreme view; the second and third inverted views are the two aspects of attachment to views that cling to pleasure and purity; and the fourth inverted view is the aspect of the view of a real body that clings to a self.

Some masters maintain that the entire view of a real body constitutes the inversion concerning self (ātmaviparyāsa), rather than merely the view of self (ātmadṛṣṭi); thus it also includes the view of what belongs to the self (ātmīyadṛṣṭi).

The Vibhāṣā says: “How could the view of self constitute only a part of the inversion concerning self? The Sutra on the Four Inversions (Viparyāsas) does not say this. [The sutra says only: ‘To regard what is not-self as self is an inverted view.’] The sutra further states: ‘One who believes that the self exercises sovereign power over the five aggregates of clinging (upādānaskandhas) thereby holds the view of what belongs to the self.’ [Therefore, the view of what belongs to the self differs from the view of self from which it arises.]

Nevertheless, we think that the view of self has two branches (dvimukhī): clinging to a self and clinging to what belongs to the self (aḥmkāra, manakāra). If clinging to what belongs to the self were different from clinging to the self, then other forms of clinging—such as clinging to things as being ‘because of the self’ (māya), or clinging to things as being ‘for the self’—would constitute numerous distinct kinds of clinging to self. Therefore, the entire view of a real body is included within the inversion concerning self.

The other afflictions (kleśa) are not inverted views, because they do not possess all three characteristics: ⁽¹⁾ being wholly erroneous (one-sided inversion), ⁽²⁾ examination (saṃtīraka), and ⁽³⁾ decisive affirmation (false imputation). The view of annihilation (ucchedadṛṣṭi), which is a part of the extreme view (antagrāhadṛṣṭi), and wrong view (mithyādṛṣṭi) do not have the characteristic of decisive affirmation, that is, they do not falsely impute (samāropa), because both are directed toward the nonexistence of some existent thing (abhāvamukhapravṛtta, proceeding through the gate of nonexistence).

The attachment to precepts and observances decisively affirms that precepts and ascetic practices can lead to purification; this also means that it is not wholly an inverted view, because precepts and ascetic practices do contribute to purification.

The other kinds of afflictions do not involve examination and therefore are not inverted views.

(Question) But the Blessed One said: “To regard the impermanent as permanent is precisely an inversion of perception (saṃjnāviparyāsa), an inversion of mind (cittaviparyāsa), and an inversion of view (dṛṣṭviparyāsa)”; likewise with regard to suffering, impurity, and non-self (Mahāsaṃgītidharmaviparyāsa; Anguttara, ii. 52; Vibhanga, 376; Visuddhimagga, 683). Yet neither perception nor mind involves examination. Thus, the definition of inverted view given above is inaccurate.

(Answer) In truth, only view (dṛṣṭi) is inverted; but because perception and mind are associated with view and have the same mode of activity as view, they too are called inverted.

(Question) If so, why are feeling and the other mental factors associated with view not called inverted?

(Answer) Because people commonly speak of inverted perception and inverted mind, but never of inverted feeling.

A stream-enterer (Srotāpanna) eliminates all inverted views (Jñānaprasthāna, 8, 4), because seeing (darśana) the Four Noble Truths, that is, seeing the truths, which is capable of eliminating views (dṛṣṭi), can also eliminate the perceptions and minds associated with those views.

Another school (the Vibhajyavādins) maintains that the inverted view which mistakes the impermanent for the permanent constitutes three kinds of inversion: inversion of perception, inversion of mind, and inversion of view; likewise for those that mistake non-self for self, and so forth. Thus, there are altogether twelve kinds of inversion arising from these four inverted views.

Of these twelve, eight belong to abandonment through seeing, while four—the perceptions and minds associated with pleasure (sukha) and purity (śuci)—belong to both abandonment through seeing and abandonment through cultivation.

Indeed, noble ones (Āryas), who are regarded as having eliminated all latent tendencies (anuśayas) belonging to abandonment through seeing, certainly still possess perceptions of pleasure and purity, because so long as they have not become free from desire (avītarāga), attachment to sensual pleasure continues to arise in them.

The Vaibhāṣika masters do not accept this argument. If, merely because noble ones still possess perceptions of pleasure and purity, one concludes that they remain inverted regarding pleasure and purity, then one would also have to admit that they remain inverted regarding self (ātmaviparyāsa)—one of the eight inversions that they ought not to possess—because they certainly still have perceptions and minds concerning sentient beings (sattva). Attachment arising from sensual desire (kāmarāga) in relation to a woman or to oneself is precisely a manifestation of such perceptions and minds concerning sentient beings.

Moreover, the sutra says: “The learned noble disciple sees and knows according to reality: This is the truth of suffering, and so forth. At that time, inverted perceptions, minds, and views, such as regarding the impermanent as permanent, are eliminated in them”; and so forth. Thus, only perceptions and minds that arise from view and are associated with view (dṛṣṭisamuttha, dṛṣṭisaṃprayukta) are called inverted, not the others, namely, perceptions and minds belonging to abandonment through cultivation.

In fact, noble ones give rise to attachment arising from sensual desire (kāmarāga) only because they are temporarily deluded upon first seeing an object, just as when one first sees a firebrand wheel or a painting of a Yakṣa.

However, the Venerable Ānanda said to the Venerable Vāgīśa: “Because of the inversion of perception, your mind is burning.” If the Vaibhāṣika argument above is accepted, how can this statement be explained?

Therefore, trainees have not completely eliminated the eight inversions of perception and mind. In truth, these inverted views are eliminated only through the correct seeing and knowing of the truths—through comprehending the Noble Truths according to reality (yathābhūtaparijñānāt)—and not by anything else. Therefore, the scriptural passage cited above by the Vaibhāṣikas merely indicates the means (upāya) of eliminating these inverted views and does not contradict the passage concerning Vāgīśa.

(Question) The latent tendencies and views (dṛṣṭi) are of many different kinds; is this also true of the other latent tendencies?

(Answer) It is likewise true of the latent tendency of conceit (māna).

[There are seven kinds of conceit; nine kinds of conceit are formed from three kinds;

All are abandoned through the Path of Seeing and the Path of Cultivation.

In noble ones, latent tendencies such as murderous bondage, and so forth,

Though belonging to abandonment through cultivation, do not become active.]

Treatise: There are altogether seven kinds of conceit: conceit (māna), excessive conceit (adhimāna), conceit beyond conceit (mānatimāna), the conceit “I am” (asmimāna), overestimation (abhimāna), inferiority conceit (ūnamāna), and wrong conceit (mithyāmāna).

The haughtiness of mind is generally called conceit. Because its modes of activity (pravṛtti, prakāra) differ, conceit is divided into seven kinds: ⁽¹⁾ Conceit is the arising of a haughty mind when one thinks, “I am superior” (viśiṣta), or “I am equal” (sama), in comparison with one who is inferior (hīna) or equal to oneself; ⁽²⁾ excessive conceit is thinking, “I am superior” or “I am equal,” in comparison with one who is equal or superior to oneself; ⁽³⁾ conceit beyond conceit is thinking, “I am superior,” in comparison with one who is superior to oneself; ⁽⁴⁾ the conceit “I am” is the arising of a haughty mind through attachment to the five aggregates of clinging as self and what belongs to self;

⁽⁵⁾ overestimation is thinking that one has attained superior dharmas (viśeṣa)—that is, unconditioned or conditioned dharmas dependent upon meditative concentration (samādhisaṃniśrita)—when one has not attained them; ⁽⁶⁾ inferiority conceit is thinking, “I am only slightly inferior,” in comparison with one who is in fact far superior to oneself; ⁽⁷⁾ wrong conceit is believing that one possesses qualities (guṇa) which one does not in fact possess.

The Root Treatise (Jñānaprasthāna, 20, 6) analyzes conceit into nine kinds: ⁽¹⁾ the conceit “I am superior,” ⁽²⁾ the conceit “I am equal,” ⁽³⁾ the conceit “I am inferior,” ⁽⁴⁾ the conceit “There is one superior to me,” ⁽⁵⁾ the conceit “There is one equal to me,” ⁽⁶⁾ the conceit “There is one inferior to me,” ⁽⁷⁾ the conceit “There is none superior to me,” ⁽⁸⁾ the conceit “There is none equal to me,” and ⁽⁹⁾ the conceit “There is none inferior to me.”

These nine arise from three of the seven kinds above: conceit, excessive conceit, and inferiority conceit.

The first three kinds of conceit—the conceit “I am superior,” the conceit “I am equal,” and the conceit “I am inferior”—are precisely those based on the view of self. Because one first thinks of “I,” excessive conceit, conceit, and inferiority conceit then arise respectively. Among these, one case is called conceit because one says, “I am superior”; another is called excessive conceit because it is based on view (dṛṣṭi), and so forth.

The next three kinds of conceit, in their order, are precisely inferiority conceit, conceit, and excessive conceit.

The last three kinds, in their respective order, are precisely pride, excessive pride, and inferiority-pride.

(Question) When one considers someone far superior to oneself but thinks, “I am only slightly inferior,” this is inferiority-pride because a haughty mind has arisen. But in the case of thinking, “There is no one inferior to me” (the pride of having none inferior to oneself), how can this be called haughtiness (unnatisthāna)?

(Answer) It can still be called haughtiness because, when comparing oneself with a certain group of people superior to oneself, one still considers oneself superior, although one clearly knows that one is actually inferior.

The explanation of the Jñānaprasthāna has been presented above. According to the Prakaraṇapāda, however, the first kind of pride, “the pride that I am superior,” arises from three of the seven kinds of pride: pride, excessive pride, and pride beyond pride, because one thinks oneself superior to one who is inferior, superior to one who is equal, and superior to one who is supreme, respectively (contemplating the distinct objects of the inferior, equal, and superior).

(Question) How are these seven kinds of pride abandoned?

(Answer) All these kinds, including the pride “I am” (asmimāna), are abandoned through the Path of Seeing and the Path of Cultivation.

(Question) Can the latent tendencies abandoned through cultivation that have not yet been abandoned in noble ones continue to become manifest (samudācaranti)?

(Answer) This is not invariably so. Some latent tendencies abandoned through cultivation definitely do not become manifest in noble ones, as in the case of the fettering defilement (paryavasthāna) associated with killing. Although this fettering defilement is abandoned through cultivation, it cannot become manifest in noble ones.

Here, “the fettering defilement of killing” refers to the affliction (kleśa) that causes a person intentionally to commit the offense of killing. “And so forth” refers to other cases such as stealing, sexual misconduct, false speech, craving for nonexistence, and a portion of craving for existence.

Craving for nonexistence (vibhavatṛṣṇā) is also abandoned through the Path of Cultivation. Here, “nonexistence” refers to the impermanent nature of the three realms (traidhātukī anityatā); craving for nonexistence is the longing (prārthana) for this impermanence.

A portion of craving for existence (bhavatṛṣṇā) refers to the desire to become the nāga king Airāvaṇa, and so forth.

(Question) The kinds of pride and so forth have been discussed above. Among them are some that are abandoned through cultivation and have not yet been abandoned; why, then, can they not become manifest in noble ones?

The stanza answers:

[The kinds of pride and so forth, the pride “I am,”

And unwholesome regret,

Do not arise in noble ones,

Because they are fostered by views and doubt.]

Commentary: The kinds of pride (mānavidhā) and so forth cannot arise or become manifest in noble ones; the pride “I am” is likewise. Here, “and so forth” refers to other latent tendencies, such as the fettering defilement of killing, craving for nonexistence, and a portion of craving for existence.

(Question) Why is this so?

(Answer) Because all these latent tendencies are fostered by views (dṛṣṭi); and when that which fosters them has been destroyed, they no longer have the power to arise [or noble ones cannot cause them to arise again].

The kinds of pride (māna) and the pride “I am” (asmitā) are fostered by the view of a real person (satkāyadṛṣṭi); the fettering defilements of killing and so forth are fostered by wrong view; craving for nonexistence is fostered by the view of annihilation (ucchedadṛṣṭi); and a portion of craving for existence is fostered by the view of eternalism (śāśvatadṛṣṭi).

Although unwholesome regret is abandoned through cultivation, it still cannot become manifest in noble ones because it is fostered by doubt (vicikitsā).

(Question) Among the ninety-eight latent tendencies, which are universal (sarvaga, sarvatraga), and which are not universal?

The stanza answers:

[The views and doubts abandoned through seeing suffering and its origin,

The ignorance associated with them,

And independent ignorance,

Take as objects all dharmas within their own realm;

Among these, apart from the two views,

The remaining nine latent tendencies also take the higher planes as objects.

Apart from acquisition, the dharmas arising together with the latent tendencies

Are all universal.]

Commentary: There are eleven latent tendencies: the five kinds of views abandoned through seeing suffering; wrong view and attachment to views abandoned through seeing the origin of suffering; two kinds of doubt and two kinds of ignorance abandoned through seeing suffering and seeing its origin. These eleven latent tendencies are called universal because they take as objects the whole realm and plane to which they belong.

(Question) Here, does “taking all as objects” mean that they successively take as objects all dharmas within their own realm, or that they take them all as objects simultaneously? If they take them successively, then the other latent tendencies should also be universal. If they take them all as objects simultaneously, this cannot be accepted, because no one regards this entire world as a means of attaining purity; only certain practices are objects of attachment to rules and observances. Nor does anyone regard all the dharmas belonging to this realm and plane as the cause of the world.

(Answer of the Vibhāṣā) Universal dharmas do not take the entirety of their own realm as an object simultaneously. Rather, they take their own realm as an object according to five distinct categories. Here, “the entirety” means all five of these categories (prakārasarvatā).

(Question) If universality is understood in this sense, then craving (tṛṣṇā) and pride should also be universal. If there is a view of self (ātmadṛṣṭi) regarding the five aggregates subject to clinging, there will also be craving for self (ātmatṛṣṇā) regarding the five aggregates subject to clinging. If there is a view of supremacy (agradṛṣṭi, or attachment to views, dṛṣṭiparāmarśa) or a view of purity (śuddhidṛṣṭi, or attachment to rules and observances, śīlavrataparāmarśa) regarding a certain thing, there will also be longing (prārthanā) for that thing. And in all the foregoing cases, pride must also be present.

(Vibhāṣā) If this were so, how would craving and pride be abandoned? In the case of the view of a real person and so forth, their objects are abandoned through the Path of Seeing and the Path of Cultivation. Would craving and pride, then, also be abandoned through seeing or through cultivation?

(Author of the Treatise) When their objects are mixed (vyāmiśra), craving and pride are abandoned through the Path of Cultivation. Alternatively, they may also be abandoned through the Path of Seeing because they function under the force of views that give rise to them (dṛṣṭibalādhānavartitva).

(Vibhāṣā) Craving and pride are afflictions characterized by particular characteristics (svalakṣṇa), not by common characteristics (sāmānya); therefore, they are not universal. [Craving and pride may arise regarding an object toward which a view of self has arisen, but they cannot arise simultaneously regarding that object in its entirety, because they lack the power to take all of it as an object at once.]

The above are the eleven universal latent tendencies [capable of taking all five categories as objects] within their respective realms and planes—that is, latent tendencies manifest in a person who belongs to a particular realm and plane (sabhāgadhātusarvatraga).

Apart from the view of a self and the view of extremes, the remaining nine latent defilements also have the character of being universal in a different realm or plane (visabhāga); these latent defilements sometimes take as their object only one other realm or plane, but sometimes as many as two, as the Prakaraṇapāda (5, 10) says: “There are latent defilements belonging to the Desire Realm—that is, latent defilements arising in beings belonging to the Desire Realm—that can take as their object dharmas belonging to the Form Realm, dharmas belonging to the Formless Realm, or dharmas belonging to both the Form Realm and the Formless Realm. [There are latent defilements belonging to the Form Realm that can take as their object dharmas belonging to the Formless Realm].”

(Question) When beings in the Desire Realm have conceived of the Great Brahmā as a sentient being (the view of a sentient being, sattvadṛṣṭi) and as eternal (the view of permanence, nityadṛṣṭi), these beings have thereby entertained the view of a self and the view of extremes regarding something belonging to another, higher realm or plane. It is therefore surely mistaken to exclude these two views from the universal latent defilements relating to a different realm or plane.

(Answer) In fact, because they do not conceive of the Great Brahmā in terms of a self or what belongs to a self, the view of a sentient being mentioned above is not the view of a self. Moreover, since the view of extremes can arise only when the view of a self is present, the view of permanence mentioned above is likewise not the view of extremes. (Vibhāṣā, 18, 18).

(Question) If so, what kind of view is called the view of a sentient being and the view of permanence regarding the Great Brahmā?

The Abhidharma masters (Ābhidhārmikas) say: “In this case there is no view (dṛṣṭi), but only false cognition (mithyājñāna).”

(Question) Why are other erroneous views regarding the Great Brahmā all regarded as views, whereas the view of a sentient being and the view of permanence are not?

(Answer) Because this has been determined on the basis of the tenets of our own school. (Vibhāṣā, 18, 18)

(Question) Is it only the latent defilements that have the character of being universal?

(Answer) Apart from the acquisitions (prāptis), the dharmas concomitant with the universal latent defilements are also called universal. Concomitant dharmas such as feeling (vedanā), and so forth, are all universal, but the acquisitions are not, because acquisition (prāpti) and that which is acquired (prāpya) do not share a common result.

Thus the question posed here is whether all universal latent defilements are universal causes. The answer is that this matter should be explained through four cases: ⁽¹⁾ universal latent defilements belonging to the future are not universal causes; ⁽²⁾ dharmas concomitant with universal latent defilements (the dharmas coexistent with them) that belong to the past and present are universal causes, but these universal latent defilements are not universal causes; ⁽³⁾ universal latent defilements belonging to the past and present are universal causes; ⁽⁴⁾ dharmas concomitant with universal latent defilements that belong to the future are neither universal latent defilements nor universal causes.

(Question) Among the ninety-eight latent defilements, how many take untainted dharmas (anāsrava)—namely cessation and the Truth of the Path—as their object, and how many take tainted dharmas (sāsrava) as their object?

The stanza answers:

[The views and doubts abandoned through seeing cessation and the path,

The ignorance associated with them,

And independent ignorance,

Are the six kinds of latent defilements that take untainted dharmas as their object;

Among them, those latent defilements that take cessation as their object

Take only the cessation belonging to their own plane as their object;

Those latent defilements that take the Truth of the Path as their object concern six and nine planes,

Because counteraction and mutual dependence differ.

Craving, aversion, conceit, and the two attachments

Do not take untainted dharmas as their object,

Because these ought to be relinquished,

Because these dharmas are not objects that provoke hostility,

And because they are peaceful, pure, and supreme objects.]

Treatise: There are three kinds of latent defilements abandoned through seeing the Truth of Cessation: false view, doubt, and the ignorance associated with them or independent ignorance. There are likewise three kinds of latent defilements abandoned through seeing the Truth of the Path. Together, these constitute six kinds of latent defilements whose objects are untainted dharmas. Apart from these six, all other latent defilements take tainted dharmas as their objects.

The three kinds of latent defilements—false view, doubt, and ignorance—that are abandoned through seeing the Truth of Cessation take cessation as their object, but they do not take every kind of cessation as their object. When they belong to the Desire Realm, they take only the cessation of the Desire Realm as their object, and the same applies successively to the other planes; when they belong to the Summit of Existence (bhavāgra), they likewise take only the cessation of the Summit of Existence as their object.

When the three kinds of latent defilements that take the Truth of the Path as their object belong to the Desire Realm, they take as their object the entire Truth of the Path, a portion of the knowledges of dharmas (dharmajñānas), together with their six planes: the preliminary stage (anāgamya), the intermediate concentration (dhyānāntara), and the four concentrations (dhyānas). When they belong to the Form Realm or the Formless Realm—that is, to the four concentrations and the four Formless attainments (ārūpyas)—they take as their object the entire Truth of the Path, a portion of the subsequent knowledges (anvayajñānas), together with their nine planes: the six planes mentioned above plus the first three Formless attainments. The paths are mutually dependent upon one another.

Even though knowledge of dharmas and subsequent knowledge are mutually dependent, subsequent knowledge does not counteract the Desire Realm. Therefore, the three kinds of latent defilements belonging to the Desire Realm that take the Truth of the Path as their object do not take as their object the paths and the portion of the subsequent knowledges.

Knowledge of dharmas, however, is capable of counteracting the Desire Realm and is therefore also capable of counteracting the Form Realm and the Formless Realm. Consequently, knowledge of dharmas also becomes an object of the three kinds of latent defilements in these two realms that take the Truth of the Path as their object.

Not every knowledge of dharmas counteracts the Form Realm and the Formless Realm, because the knowledge of dharmas pertaining to the Truth of Suffering and that pertaining to the Truth of Origin do not counteract these two realms. [Therefore, they are not objects of the three latent defilements belonging to these two realms.]

Nor does knowledge of dharmas counteract the entirety of the Form Realm and the Formless Realm [because it does not counteract the dharmas abandoned through seeing]. It is therefore not an object [of the three kinds of latent defilements belonging to these two realms], because the first two kinds of knowledge of dharmas do not counteract these realms (ādyābhāvān na bhavaty ālambanam), and because the first group of latent defilements in these two realms—namely, those abandoned through seeing—is not obstructed by any kind of knowledge of dharmas (ādyeṣu cābhāvāt).

(Question) Why do craving (rāga), aversion (pratigha), conceit (māna), attachment to views (dṛṣṭiparāmarśa), and attachment to precepts and observances (śīlavrataparāmarśa) not take untainted dharmas as their objects and not take cessation or the path as their objects?

(Answer) Because the latent tendency of craving (rāgānuśaya) must be abandoned: if it took an unconditioned Dharma as its object, it could not be relinquished; this is similar to the case of aspiration for wholesome dharmas (kuśladharmacchanda) [which, although it takes the form of desire (abhilāṣa), is nevertheless right view ()]. Anger arises in relation to something that causes resentment (apakāra, āghātavastu), whereas an unconditioned Dharma such as cessation or the Truth of the Path is not something that causes resentment (not an object of anger).

Nor can one give rise to conceit regarding cessation or the Path, for these dharmas are intrinsically peaceful (śānta). Attachment to precepts and observances mistakes dharmas that are not causes of purification for causes of purification; the unconditioned, however, is truly pure (bhutārthasuddhi), and therefore cannot be the object of attachment to precepts and observances. Attachment to views mistakes dharmas that are not supreme for supreme; the unconditioned, however, is truly supreme, and therefore cannot be the object of attachment to views.

(Question) Among the ninety-eight latent tendencies, how many can increase through their objects (ālambanato ‘nuśerate), and how many can increase through association (saṃprayogata eva) [that is, through dharmas associated with mind, feeling, and so forth]?

The stanza answers:

[The unabandoned universally operative latent tendencies

Increase in all the divisions of their own plane;

Those that are not universally operative increase only in their own division;

Through their objects they can increase.

They do not increase when their objects are the unconditioned or higher planes,

Because these are neither appropriated nor congenial to the latent tendencies.

With whatever dharma they are associated,

They can increase through association with that dharma.]

Treatise: With respect to their objects, the universally operative latent tendencies can increase in the five divisions belonging to their own plane. The other latent tendencies increase only in their respective divisions: latent tendencies abandoned through seeing suffering increase in dharmas abandoned through seeing suffering, and so forth, up to latent tendencies abandoned through cultivation, which increase only in dharmas abandoned through cultivation. This universal principle is definitive.

The six latent tendencies that take unconditioned dharmas—namely, nirvana or the Noble Path—as their objects, and the nine latent tendencies that take higher planes as their objects, do not increase through their objects (ālambana), because one cannot make such an object (vastu) one’s own (svīkṛta) by means of the view of self (ātmadṛṣṭi) or craving (tṛṣṇā).

With regard to a thing regarded as the self [because of the view of a substantial self] or regarded as belonging to oneself because of craving, other latent tendencies increase in relation to that thing, just as dust adheres to a damp garment. Unconditioned dharmas and higher planes, however, cannot be regarded as the self or as belonging to the self; therefore, the latent tendencies that take them as objects cannot increase through those objects.

It was stated previously that aspiration (prārthana) directed toward an unconditioned Dharma or a higher plane is not the latent tendency called craving, but merely a form of aspiration directed toward wholesome dharmas.

Moreover, unconditioned dharmas such as nirvana or the Noble Path are opposed to the afflictions that take them as objects, and dharmas belonging to higher planes are opposed to afflictions belonging to lower planes. Therefore, these afflictions cannot depend upon them in order to increase; that is, they cannot establish themselves there (pratiṣṭhāṃ labhante), just as a foot cannot stand upon a red-hot stone.

Thus we can understand the term “increase” (anuśayana, anuśete) here in the sense of “gaining a foothold” (pratiṣṭhālābha). Some masters hold that increase means congeniality (ānuguṇya). Nirvana and so forth are not congenial (anuguṇa) to the growth of wrong view and so forth (na tadupapattaya, āṇuguṇyena vartante); just as it is said that bitter food does not increase the ailment of a person suffering from a wind disorder (vātika) (Vyākhyā, i. 4, p. 13).

All latent tendencies associated with a certain dharma can increase through association with that dharma. (yena haḥ saṃprayukto ‘tra sa eva saṃprayogataḥ //).

Here, the phrase “with a certain dharma” implies association with feeling and so forth.

The word eva indicates a restriction [of meaning], namely, “so long as the latent tendencies have not been abandoned.”

(Question) Is there a latent tendency that neither takes an unconditioned Dharma nor a higher plane (visabhāga) as its object, and that increases only through association and not through its object (ālambanatas)?

(Answer) Yes. It is the universally operative latent tendency that takes a higher plane as its object. [That is, the universally operative latent tendencies belonging to the first meditative absorption take the three higher meditative absorptions as their objects.]

(Question) Among the ninety-eight latent tendencies, which are unwholesome (akuśala), and which are indeterminate, that is, neither karmically determinate nor yielding a specific result (avyākṛta)?

The stanza answers:

[The latent tendencies of the two higher realms, the view of a substantial self, the extreme views, and the delusion associated with them in the Desire Realm

Are all indeterminate in nature;

All the others are unwholesome.]

Treatise: All latent tendencies belonging to the Form Realm and the Formless Realm are indeterminate in nature, because the karmic result of every defiled dharma is suffering (duḥkha). Thus, suffering would exist in these two realms, but all the causes (vyāpāda, and so forth) of harming others (paravyābādhahetu) are absent there.

In the Desire Realm, the view of a substantial self, the extreme views, and the ignorance associated with them are indeterminate in nature.

Indeed, these latent tendencies are not incompatible with generosity and other wholesome actions. Thinking, “I shall attain happiness in the future!” people therefore practice generosity and observe the precepts.

The annihilationist view (ucchedadṛṣṭi), moreover, is conducive to liberation. For this very reason, the Blessed One said: “Among the views (dṛṣṭigata) of non-Buddhist ascetics (Tīrthikas), the most excellent view (viśiṣṭa) is that expressed when they say: ‘I do not exist; what is mine does not exist; what is mine will not exist.’”

The view of a substantial self and the extreme views are merely delusions concerning the things that constitute a fictitious individual (svadravyasaṃmuḍhatva); they do not harm others and therefore are also indeterminate.

(Question) If that is so, reasons such as not being incompatible with generosity and so forth could also be applied to craving for the heavenly realms (svargatṛṣṇā) and the conceit “I am” (asmimāna), and these too would be indeterminate. The school, however, does not accept this.

(Answer) The ancient masters (pūrvācārya) said: “The innate (sahaja) view of a substantial self found among animals is indeterminate, but the view of a substantial self that arises through conceptual discrimination (vikalpitā) is unwholesome.” [The same applies to innate extreme views and those arising through conceptual discrimination.]

All other latent tendencies in the Desire Realm are unwholesome in nature (aśubha, akuśala).

(Question) Among the ninety-eight latent tendencies, how many are roots of unwholesomeness?

The stanza answers:

[The roots of unwholesomeness

Are the unwholesome craving, anger, and delusion of the Desire Realm.]

Treatise: All craving (rāga), anger (pratigha), and delusion (mūḍḥi = moha) in the Desire Realm, except for the delusion associated with the view of a substantial self and the extreme views, are respectively the roots of unwholesomeness: greed, hatred, and delusion (lobha, dveṣa, moha).

The view of a real body and the extreme view are not unwholesome roots, because only those afflictions that are unwholesome in nature and are themselves unwholesome roots are established as unwholesome roots. The other latent tendencies are not unwholesome roots.

(Question) How many latent tendencies are indeterminate roots?

The stanza answers:

[There are three indeterminate roots:

Indeterminate craving, delusion, and wisdom;

The other latent tendencies are not, because they have two courses or are elevated.

The foreign masters establish four kinds;

Among craving, views, pride, and delusion,

There are three kinds of concentration, all due to delusion.]

Treatise: The Vaibhāṣika masters of Kaśmīr say that craving (tṛṣṇās), ignorance (avidyas), and wisdom that are indeterminate in nature—irrespective of whichever previously mentioned kind of indeterminate nature they belong to, including wisdom born of karmic maturation—are all indeterminate roots.

Doubt (vicikitsā) cannot be regarded as a root because it is unstable in nature and has two courses. Pride (māna), which is the elevation of the mind (unnati), is likewise not a root, because pride entails rising upward and is therefore incompatible with being a root. Everyone knows that roots must be firm and extend downward (adhovṛtti).

The foreign masters (Aparāntakas) say that the four—craving (tṛṣṇā), views (dṛṣṭi), pride (māna), and delusion (moha)—are all indeterminate. Indeed, because of ignorance, there are three kinds of concentration. They are classified as the “concentration dominated by craving” (tṛṣṇottaradhyāyin), the “concentration dominated by views” (dṛṣṭyuttaradhyāyin), and the “concentration dominated by pride” (mānottaradhyāyin). They are so called because of delusion (moha), or ignorance (avidyā).

(Question) The sutras (Saṃyutta, 32, 1; 34, 12; Ekottara, 43, 13) speak of fourteen indeterminate points (indeterminate matters, avyākṛtavastu). Do these, then, also belong to the kind of indeterminate nature discussed above?

(Answer) No. The fourteen indeterminate points spoken of in the sutras designate questions that must be set aside (sthāpanīyapraśna). That is to say, this kind of question is called “unanswered” (indeterminate, avyākṛta); it is not explained (kathita), because it must be rejected. The subject of such a question is called an indeterminate matter.

There are four kinds of questions:

[One should answer categorically, by analysis,

With a counter-question, or by setting aside,

As when asked about death, birth, superiority,

Whether the self and the skandhas are identical or different, and so forth.]

Treatise: ⁽¹⁾ If someone asks, “Will all sentient beings die?” one should answer categorically, “All will die.”

⁽²⁾ If someone asks, “Will all sentient beings be born again?” one should answer analytically: “Sentient beings who have afflictions (kleśa) will be born again; sentient beings who have no afflictions will not be born again.”

⁽³⁾ If someone asks, “Are human beings superior (viśiṣṭa) or inferior (hīna)?” one should reply with a question: “In comparison with whom?” If the person says, “In comparison with the devas,” one should answer, “Human beings are inferior.” If the person says, “In comparison with beings in the other realms of rebirth,” one should answer, “Human beings are superior.”

⁽⁴⁾ If someone asks, “Are the skandhas identical with or different from a sentient being?” this question must be set aside because what is called a “sentient being” does not truly exist. It is like refusing to answer the question, “Is the child of a barren woman black or white?”

(Question) How can one say that this fourth question has been “answered” when no answer has been given as to whether the skandhas are identical with or different from a sentient being?

(Answer) By saying that the question must be “set aside,” an answer has already been given.

One master, the Venerable Rāma, says that the second kind of question also leads to a categorical answer like the first: “No sentient beings are born.” According to the author of the treatise, however, to substantiate the Vaibhāṣika example of the second kind of question, if someone were to ask, “Can those who have died be born again?” one should answer analytically: [“Not all those who have died will be born again. Those who have afflictions will be born again, but those without afflictions will not.”]

The Venerable Rāma also says that the third kind of question leads to a categorical answer, because human beings may at the same time be either superior or inferior, depending on the comparison. It is just as when someone asks, “Is consciousness an effect or a cause?” [one should answer, “It is a cause in relation to an effect and an effect in relation to a cause.”] But the author of the treatise says that when someone asks categorically, “Are human beings superior or inferior?” it would be inappropriate to answer categorically either “Human beings are superior” or “Human beings are inferior.” One must answer analytically; that is, one must first ask what comparison the questioner intends.

The Abhidharma masters speak of four kinds of questions:

⁽¹⁾ A categorical answer is given when someone asks: “Is the Blessed One a Tathagata, Worthy One, and Perfectly Awakened Buddha (Tathāgata Samyaksaṃbuddha)? Is the Dharma taught by him well proclaimed? Is the Sangha of śrāvakas well guided? Is form (rūpa) impermanent? … Is consciousness (vijñāna) impermanent? Has suffering been clearly expounded? … Has the Path been clearly expounded?” Such questions should be answered categorically because they are connected with genuine benefit (arthopasaṃhitatvāt).

⁽²⁾ An analytical answer is given when a sincere person (aśaṭha) asks, “I wish the Venerable One to teach me the Dharma.” One should distinguish that the dharmas are of many kinds—past dharmas, present dharmas, and future dharmas—and ask which kind the questioner wishes to hear. If the questioner wishes to hear about past dharmas, one should distinguish that past dharmas are also of many kinds: form, feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness.

If the questioner wishes to hear an exposition of material dharmas, one should further distinguish that material dharmas are of three kinds: wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate. If the questioner wishes to hear about wholesome material dharmas, one must further distinguish that wholesome material dharmas are of seven kinds: abstention from killing, and so forth, up to abstention from false speech. If the questioner wishes to hear an exposition of abstention from killing, one should distinguish three kinds of abstention from killing arising from the three wholesome roots: non-greed, non-hatred, and non-delusion.

If the questioner wishes to know about the kind of abstention from killing that arises from non-greed, one must distinguish its two kinds—manifest abstention from killing and unmanifest abstention from killing—and ask which kind the questioner wishes to hear about.

⁽³⁾ Answering with a counter-question: If the same question is raised by an insincere person (śaṭha), it must be answered by posing a counter-question (paripṛcchāvyākaraṇa). If this person asks, “I wish the Venerable One to teach me the Dharma,” one must ask in return: “The dharmas are many; which Dharma does the questioner wish to hear?” In this case, one need not distinguish past, future, and present dharmas, but should merely continue asking questions until the person is compelled to remain silent or explain the matter himself (vyākar). (Vibhāṣā, 15, 14)

(Venerable Rāma) If both the insincere person and the sincere person ask no question but merely request that the Dharma be taught to them, and if one does not answer them or explain it to them but merely asks them in return what kind of Dharma they wish to have taught, how can this be called a question and an answer?

(The Treatise Master) If someone says, “Please show me the way,” he has thereby asked a question about the road, just as if he had said, “Where is the way?” Moreover, by asking in return, one explains what the questioner wishes to ask. Thus, has the way not thereby been explained (vyākṛta)?

(Venerable Rāma) If so, in the cases of the second and third questions, is there still an answer by means of a counter-question?

(The Treatise Master) It cannot be so. In the case above, the answer is different, because sometimes one answers by making distinctions and sometimes one answers without making distinctions.

⁽⁴⁾ The kind of question that must be set aside. If someone asks, “Is the world finite or infinite?” one must decline to answer.

The Treatise Master maintains that one must rely on the sutras to ascertain the definitions of these four kinds of questions and answers (praśnavyākaraṇa). The venerable elders of the Mahāsāṃghikas cite a sutra (Dīrgha, 8, 16; Madhyama, 29, 6), saying: “Bhikshus, there are four ways of answering questions. What are the four?—There are questions that must be answered categorically…; and there are questions that must be set aside without an answer.

What kind of question must be answered categorically?—The question of whether all skandhas are impermanent. What kind of question must be answered by making distinctions?—The question of what kind of result is produced by intentional karma (karma deliberately created with intention, saṃcetnīya). What kind of question must be answered with a counter-question?—The question of whether perception (saṃjñā) is the self (ātman) of a person.

One must then ask in return what that person conceives the self to be. If he replies that the self is gross and manifest (andārika), one must answer that perception is distinct from the self (Dīgha, i. 195). What kind of question must be set aside without an answer?—The question of whether the world is eternal, non-eternal, both eternal and non-eternal, or neither eternal nor non-eternal; whether the world is finite, infinite, both finite and infinite, or neither finite nor infinite; whether the Tathagata continues to exist after death…; whether the life principle is distinct from the body.

Bhikshus, questions such as these must be set aside.”