阿毘達磨俱舍論

Part 15

(Question) There are three kinds of discipline: pratimoksha discipline, dhyana discipline, and uncontaminated discipline. If one attains one kind, can one thereby attain the other two as well?

(Answer) No.

(Question) Why?

The stanza answers:

[From all, from two kinds, and from the present,

The discipline of the Desire Realm is attained.

From fundamental actions and the dharmas of the three times,

Dhyana and uncontaminated disciplines are attained.]

Treatise: The discipline of the Desire Realm is pratimoksha discipline.

This discipline pertains to all actions: preparatory actions, fundamental actions, and subsequent actions.

This discipline also pertains to sentient and insentient beings, such as people and plants.

This discipline also pertains to the two kinds of offenses: natural offenses and offenses of “disobedience.” Both kinds may concern sentient beings—such as killing, or a monk touching a woman—or insentient things—such as plucking leaves, or a monk accepting gold and silver.

This discipline also pertains to presently existing things, namely the skandhas, ayatanas, and dhatus, because past and future things are neither sentient beings nor insentient things.

The dhyana discipline and uncontaminated discipline that are attained pertain to fundamental actions, but not to preparatory or subsequent actions; nor do they pertain to offenses of “disobedience.” They do, however, pertain to skandhas, ayatanas, and dhatus of the past, present, and future.

Thus, there are certain kinds of skandhas, ayatanas, and dhatus in relation to which one attains pratimoksha discipline but not the other two. There are four cases: ⁽¹⁾ Preparatory and subsequent actions, offenses of “disobedience,” and present dharmas—as in the case of pratimoksha discipline. ⁽²⁾ Fundamental courses of action belonging to the past and future—as in the case of the latter two disciplines. ⁽³⁾ Fundamental courses of action belonging to the present—as in the case of all three disciplines. ⁽⁴⁾ Preparatory and subsequent actions belonging to the past and future—as in the case of those who cannot attain any of the disciplines.

(Objection) It is unreasonable to say that the attainment of discipline pertains to present courses of action, because when discipline is attained, there is no unwholesome course of action presently existing in relation to which that discipline could be attained. One should instead say: “Discipline is attained in relation to courses of action whose objects, or bases (present bases, adhiṣṭhāna), exist in the present”; for one can relinquish only a future action pertaining to a person or thing that actually exists, and cannot relinquish a past or present action.

(Question) Can discipline and indiscipline be attained in relation to all sentient beings, with respect to all factors, and through all causes?

The stanza answers:

[Discipline: in relation to all sentient beings;

Its factors and causes are not fixed.

Indiscipline: in relation to all

Sentient beings and all factors, but not through all causes.]

Treatise: Discipline is attained only in relation to all sentient beings; discipline pertaining merely to certain sentient beings cannot be attained (there is no principle of partial attainment).

The bhikshu discipline is attained through all the factors, namely the relinquishment of the ten courses of action. The other disciplines are attained through four factors, namely the relinquishment of killing, stealing, sexual misconduct, and false speech; for through these factors, one who receives the precepts also attains the relinquishment of the other courses of action.

If the three wholesome roots—non-greed, non-hatred, and non-delusion—are regarded as the causes through which discipline is attained, discipline is said to be attained through all causes (from all).

If the kind of mind through which one has attained discipline is regarded as the cause—that is, the originating cause (samutthāpaka)—then this cause has three different grades: superior (strong), intermediate (moderate), and inferior (weak). The discipline is attained through one of these three minds alone. From this standpoint, four cases may be distinguished:

⁽¹⁾ There is a person abiding in discipline (saṃvarasthāyin) who practices discipline in relation to all sentient beings, but not with respect to all factors or through all causes. According to whether the originating mind is superior, intermediate, or inferior, this person attains the discipline of a lay devotee, a one-day precept holder, or a novice.

⁽²⁾ There is a person abiding in discipline who practices discipline in relation to all sentient beings and with respect to all factors, but not through all causes. This person attains the bhikshu discipline through a single mind of superior, intermediate, or inferior grade.

⁽³⁾ There is a person abiding in discipline who practices discipline in relation to all sentient beings, with respect to all factors, and through all causes. This person attains one of the three disciplines—that of a lay devotee, novice, or bhikshu—through minds of superior, intermediate, and inferior grades.

⁽⁴⁾ There is a person abiding in discipline who practices discipline in relation to all sentient beings and through all causes, but not with respect to all factors. This person attains one of the three disciplines—that of a lay devotee, one-day precept holder, or novice—according to whether the mind is inferior, intermediate, or superior.

No one abides in discipline without practicing discipline in relation to all sentient beings, because discipline is attained precisely through the wholesome intention to take all sentient beings as objects. Anyone who restricts this intention to only certain sentient beings cannot completely cast off intentions that entail violations of discipline.

Pratimoksha discipline can be attained only when there are none of the following five restrictions (niyama, determinate limitations): ⁽¹⁾ a restriction regarding sentient beings, as when one says, “I relinquish misconduct only toward certain sentient beings”; ⁽²⁾ a restriction regarding the factors of discipline, as when one says, “I relinquish only certain actions”; ⁽³⁾ a restriction regarding place, as when one says, “I refrain from offenses only in certain places”; ⁽⁴⁾ a restriction regarding time, as when one says, “I relinquish offenses only for one month”; and ⁽⁵⁾ a restriction regarding conditions, as when one says, “I relinquish offenses except when engaged in a dispute.” Those who receive precepts in this manner do not attain discipline;

they acquire only wholesome conduct (sucarita) resembling discipline.

(Question) How is discipline pertaining to all sentient beings attained? How can one attain discipline pertaining to sentient beings beyond the range of one’s capability (aśakya), namely, beings whom one is incapable of killing and so forth?

(Answer) Discipline can be attained through adopting the intention never to harm any sentient being whatsoever (sarvasattvajīvitānupaghātāśayenābhyupagamāt).

The Vaibhāṣika masters (Vibhāṣā, 120) offer another explanation. If the discipline acquired pertained only to beings within one’s own sphere, then the discipline would increase and decrease (caya, apacaya, vṛddhi, hrāsa), because some beings within one’s own sphere would be reborn in the heavenly realm and thus become beings outside one’s own sphere, and vice versa. Thus one would acquire discipline in relation to devas reborn as humans, but would lose discipline in relation to humans reborn as devas, even though there were no conditions whatsoever for acquiring or relinquishing discipline (apart from the conditions for acquisition and relinquishment, there would be the fault of acquisition and relinquishment).

(The author of the treatise) The above argument is not reasonable. The movement (saṃcāra) of beings into and out of one’s sphere does not entail an increase or decrease in discipline, because the discipline we acquire in relation to grasses and trees does not increase when more grasses and trees grow, nor decrease when grasses and trees wither and die.

The Vaibhāṣikas do not accept this comparison. Grasses and trees come into existence after not existing and cease to exist after having existed, whereas sentient beings continue to exist, sometimes as humans and sometimes as devas. When humans become beings in the heavenly realm, they leave their own sphere, but when grasses and trees wither, they cease altogether.

(The author of the treatise) But when sentient beings enter nirvana, they too no longer exist (yadā parinirvṛtā na santy eva), just like grasses and trees. Therefore, the discipline acquired in relation to sentient beings would still decrease. Thus the Vaibhāṣikas’ explanation remains invalid.

If someone objects, “In the case of prātimokṣa discipline, if it is acquired in relation to all beings, then the discipline of later Buddhas (later Buddhas)—that is, the moral discipline (śīla) of those Buddhas—would be diminished in comparison with that of earlier Buddhas (earlier Buddhas), because this discipline does not pertain to beings who have entered nirvana, namely the earlier Buddhas and their disciples,” we reply that all Buddhas possess discipline pertaining to all beings; if the earlier Buddhas were still present in the world, the later Buddhas would still possess discipline in relation to those earlier Buddhas.

Non-discipline is acquired in relation to all beings and all courses of action. No one acquires non-discipline with only a portion of non-discipline (vikala). However, non-discipline is not acquired through all causes, but only by means of an intention of inferior, middling, or superior grade. If a “person of non-discipline” has acquired non-discipline through an intention of inferior grade, but subsequently commits the offense of killing with an intention of superior grade, that person’s non-discipline remains of inferior grade, while the non-manifest karma of the killing is of superior grade.

Here, the expression “person of non-discipline” (āsaṃvarika) means “one who abides in non-discipline (asaṃvara), one who possesses non-discipline.”

Persons of non-discipline include slaughterers of sheep (aurabhrika), bird trappers, slaughterers of pigs, fishermen, hunters, thieves and robbers, executioners, prison guards, elephant keepers, slaughterers of poultry, and trappers of wild animals (vāgurikas); and, of course (arthataḥ), kings, witnesses (adhikaraṇastha), judges (daṇḍanetṛka), and so forth are also persons of non-discipline.

The expression “slaughterer of sheep” designates one whose occupation is slaughtering sheep (urabhra); the other occupational terms are to be analyzed in the same manner.

(Sautrāntikas) Everyone knows that if one undertakes discipline with the intention of benefiting all beings, the discipline acquired will pertain to all beings. But one whose occupation is slaughtering sheep has no intention of harming his parents, children, or servants; he would not wish to kill these people even if it were necessary to save his own life. How, then, can it be said that he acquires non-discipline in relation to all beings? (Vibhāṣā, 117, 5).

(Vaibhāṣikas) Because he still has the intention to kill his parents if they are reborn among sheep.

(Sautrāntikas) But if he knew that they were his own parents, how could he have the intention to kill his parents reborn as sheep? Moreover, if his parents possessed the qualities of noble ones and therefore would not be reborn as sheep or other animals, how could he acquire non-discipline in relation to his parents? In the end, your argument turns against you. That is to say, if a sheep slaughterer acquires non-discipline toward the present bodies of his parents merely because he would kill them when they were reborn as sheep, then by the same reasoning one could say that he does not acquire non-discipline in relation to sheep, because he has no intention of killing sheep that will be reborn as humans, such as his own children.

(Vaibhāṣikas) Anyone who has the intention to kill his parents when they have been reborn as sheep necessarily acquires non-discipline in relation to them.

(Sautrāntikas) If so, it may likewise be said that anyone who has no intention of killing sheep when they have been reborn as his own children necessarily does not acquire non-discipline in relation to them. Furthermore, if slaughterers neither steal nor engage in sexual misconduct, and cannot speak because they are mute, how can they acquire non-discipline with regard to all the factors of wrongdoing?

(Vaibhāṣikas) Because their intention is corrupted (vipanna); and a mute person can still express himself through gestures.

(Sautrāntikas) But what if this person has previously undertaken two or three factors of wholesome morality? According to the Vaibhāṣikas, non-discipline is never incomplete (vikala), that is, it never pertains to only certain factors; nor is it ever partial (prādeśika), that is, restricted with respect to the commission of offenses by time, place, and so forth.

According to the Sautrāntikas, however, apart from prātimokṣa discipline, both discipline and non-discipline may be incomplete and restricted. This depends on the manner in which discipline or non-discipline is undertaken, because in whatever way one “restrains” (pratibandha) a portion of unwholesome morality, in that same way one “restrains” a portion of wholesome morality [that is, if one undertakes a certain portion of non-discipline, one can obstruct the corresponding opposite portion of discipline, and vice versa].

(Question) How is non-discipline acquired? How is the type of non-manifest form that is neither discipline nor non-discipline acquired?

The stanza answers:

[Non-discipline is acquired

By performing an act or by vowing to do so.

Other non-manifest forms are acquired

Through fields of merit, vows, and resolute actions.]

Treatise: Non-restraint is acquired through two kinds of causes: ⁽¹⁾ Those born into a family practicing non-restraint (tatkuīna) acquire non-restraint when they perform preparatory actions connected with killing. ⁽²⁾ Those born into other families acquire non-restraint when they wish to live according to that way of life: “We too shall live by this occupation.”

Other non-informative forms are acquired through three kinds of causes: ⁽¹⁾ There are persons who have the nature of fields (kṣetra) of merit, and when one offers them a garden, and so forth, one generates a non-informative form. See the section below concerning meritorious deeds involving material things (aupadhikapuṇyakriyāvastu). ⁽²⁾ A non-informative form is acquired through making a vow, for example: “I shall not eat before I have paid homage to the Buddha”; “On observance days, for half a month, for a month, or for a year, I shall give food in charity,” and so forth. ⁽³⁾ A non-informative form arises from an action undertaken solemnly (ādara), with resolute faith and intense ardor.

(Question) How are the restraints relinquished?

The stanza answers:

[The prātimokṣa restraint is relinquished

By deliberate renunciation, by death,

By the arising of both sexual faculties,

By severing the roots of good,

And by the ending of the night.

Some say it is through committing a grave offense;

Others say it is when the true Dharma disappears.

The Kaśmīr masters say

The offender possesses both, like one who is both wealthy and in debt.]

Treatise: The stanza calls the prātimokṣa restraint “discipline” (dama) because this restraint disciplines the six faculties.

Except for the one-day observance restraint, the prātimokṣa restraint is relinquished through: ⁽¹⁾ deliberately renouncing the training rules (śikṣāpratyākhyāna) before a person capable of understanding; ⁽²⁾ the exhaustion of one’s lifespan or departure from the homogeneous group of beings (nikāyasabhāga); ⁽³⁾ the additional arising of the male or female faculty, as the case may be; or ⁽⁴⁾ the destruction of the roots of good.

The one-day observance restraint is also relinquished through these four conditions and when the night comes to an end.

Deliberate renunciation produces an informative action opposed to the undertaking of the vows (samādānaviruddha); death and the simultaneous presence of both sexual faculties lead to relinquishment (tyāga), as they disturb the bodily basis (āśraya) upon which the recipient formerly depended to acquire the prātimokṣa restraint; the destruction of the roots of good is the destruction of the very foundation of this restraint; and finally, since the one-day observance restraint is established and initiated for only one day and one night, it expires when the night ends.

One school, the Sautrāntikas, says that the restraints of a bhikṣu and a śramaṇa are relinquished if one commits any of the four grave offenses (patanīyas, pārājika) that lead to downfall, namely, the most serious offenses incurring expulsion.

Another school, the Dharmaguptakas, holds that the prātimokṣa restraint is relinquished when the true Dharma disappears, because at that time there are no longer training rules (śikṣā), a place where ordination can be conferred and received with boundaries duly established (sīmābandha), or anyone to confer ordination through the formal act (karmānta).

The Vaibhāṣika masters of Kaśmīr say that a monk who commits a fundamental offense (maulī āpatti), that is, a grave offense (patanīya), still does not lose the bhikṣu restraint; for merely violating one part of the restraint (ekadeśakṣobha) cannot cause the entire restraint to be lost. Those who commit offenses that are not grave offenses have not thereby become immoral (duḥśīla). Those who commit grave offenses are regarded as both transgressing and maintaining the precepts; this resembles a person who possesses both wealth and debt. But when the offender openly confesses and repents of the offense committed, he is no longer a transgressor but only an observer of the precepts, just as a person who has paid off all his debts.

(Question) If so, why did the Blessed One say: “He is no longer a bhikṣu, no longer a śramaṇa, no longer a son of the Śākyan, if he has cut off the qualities of a bhikṣu and has killed, cast away, fallen from, crushed, and destroyed the qualities of a śramaṇa”? (Mahāvyutpatti, 278).

(Vaibhāṣikas) In the passage above, the term “bhikṣu” also encompasses the bhikṣu in the supreme sense (paramārthabhikṣu); because the offender has not seen the truth of the Four Noble Truths, he is not a bhikṣu in the supreme sense.

(Comment) How outrageous! You have overturned the Blessed One’s teaching, whose meaning is perfectly explicit (nītārtha); moreover, you thereby assist those laden with afflictions in committing offenses whenever they please.

(Vaibhāṣikas) How do you know that the teaching above has a perfectly explicit meaning and must be understood literally?

(Answer) Because the Blessed One himself explained: “There are four kinds of bhikṣus: ⁽¹⁾ the bhikṣu in name (saṃjñābhikṣu), one who is called a bhikṣu but has not received ordination; ⁽²⁾ the self-proclaimed bhikṣu (pratijñābhikṣu), one who has broken the precepts and lacks pure conduct; ⁽³⁾ the begging bhikṣu, that is, one who goes seeking alms (bhikṣata iti bhikṣu) and is merely a beggar, neither more nor less; and ⁽⁴⁾ the bhikṣu who has destroyed the afflictions, one who has severed the afflictions (bhinnakleśatvāt), namely, an arhat.” (Mahāvyutpatti, 270, 37-40).

In the passage above (“no longer a bhikṣu, no longer a śramaṇa, ...”), the bhikṣu mentioned refers to a fifth kind of bhikṣu, namely, those who have received ordination but, by committing a grave offense, have lost the qualities and restraint of a bhikṣu. This certainly does not concern a bhikṣu in the supreme sense, an arhat; for after violating the precepts, one who has committed a grave offense (patanīya) is no longer a true bhikṣu, no longer an arhat, but has fallen away from the qualities of a true bhikṣu.

As for the claim that losing only one part of the restraint does not amount to relinquishing the entire restraint, the Great Teacher refuted this by comparing an offending monk to a palm tree whose crown has been cut off and which can therefore never again become verdant, grow, develop, or flourish (Majjhima, i. 250, 331, 464, ii. 256). This means that when one part of the restraint—and this very part is the foundation of the restraint—is severed, the remaining parts can no longer grow.

A pārājika offense, or fundamental offense (māuli āpati), is a form of evil discipline opposed to what is required by the character of a bhikṣu (bhikṣubhāvocita). Such offenses are entirely devoid of any fear of wrongdoing (anapatrāpya); they cut off the root of the restraint, and therefore the entire restraint is lost.

The Great Teacher expels one who has committed a grave offense: he is not permitted to associate (saṃbhoga) with bhikṣus, to partake of communal property even to the extent of a single morsel of food, or to remain in the monastery even with only one foot inside it (ekagrāsaparibhoga āhārasya ekapārṣṇiparibhogo vihārasya). He said: “Those who are not bhikṣus but claim to be bhikṣus—you should remove these weeds, cast away these pieces of rotten wood, and uproot these trees that bear no seed!” ([abhikṣuṃ bhikṣvākṛtim] nāśayata kāraṇḍavakam, kāśambakam apakarṣata, athotplāvinam (?) vāhayata) What qualities of a bhikṣu, then, could an offending bhikṣu still possess?

(The Kaśmīra masters) The quality of this bhikṣu is precisely that which is acquired upon becoming a certain kind of bhikṣu; for the Blessed One said: “Cunda, there are only four kinds of śramaṇa, and there is no fifth: ⁽¹⁾ the śramaṇa who has conquered the path (mārgajina), that is, one who has conquered the noble path; ⁽²⁾ the śramaṇa who teaches the path (mārgadaiśika), that is, one who expounds the noble path; ⁽³⁾ the śramaṇa who lives by the path (mārgajīvin), that is, one who lives in the noble path; and ⁽⁴⁾ the śramaṇa who defiles the path (mārgadūṣin), that is, one who defiles the noble path, namely, a monastic who does not practice pure conduct.” (Cundasutta, Uragavagga; Mahāvyutpatti, 223, 55-58).

(Sautrāntikas) We believe that the Blessed One used the word “śramaṇa” to refer to a monastic who has violated the precepts because that person still retains the outward appearance of a śramaṇa; just as people commonly speak of burnt wood, a dry garment, a lacquer hat, a circle of fire, or a dead sentient being (sattva).

(The Kaśmīra masters) One does not lose the quality of a monastic upon committing a grave offense, because the Blessed One acknowledged that a monastic who has violated pure conduct may still undertake penance (śikṣādattaka). (Mahāvyutpatti, 270, 10; Sūtrālaṃkāra, xi. 4)

(Sautrāntikas) We do not say that all bhikṣus who violate pure conduct incur the offense of “defeat,” the offense of “ruin” (pārājika); we say only that whoever commits this offense is no longer a bhikṣu. It is the mind that conceals the offense (praticchādanacitta) that is decisive in this case. If, by virtue of the excellence of their innate disposition and the excellence of their “continuum” (saṃtativiśeṣa), one who has transgressed does not conceal the offense for even a single moment, the Dharma King still acknowledges that penance may be undertaken.

(The Kaśmīra masters) If one who has committed an offense of defeat (pārājika) is no longer a bhikṣu, why is that person not permitted to receive ordination again?

(Sautrāntikas) Because that person is no longer fit for restraint. Their disposition (saṃtati) has been ruined and disturbed (vipādita) by shamelessness (anapatrāpya) that has reached its extreme; and because that person has cast aside the training precepts (nikṣiptaśikṣa) [after transgressing], they cannot receive ordination again. Yet why should we continue debating this matter? If such a person still remains a bhikṣu, then we should also pay homage to that person’s quality of bhikṣuhood.

When the true Dharma disappears, although the act of conferring ordination no longer exists and therefore there is no further acquisition of restraint, those who have already acquired restraint still do not lose it (Vibhāṣā, 117, 6).

(Question) How are the restraints associated with meditative concentration and the undefiled relinquished?

The stanza answers:

[The wholesome qualities of concentration are relinquished

Through changing planes, regression, and so forth.

The undefiled wholesome qualities are relinquished through attaining a fruit,

Refining the faculties, and regression.]

Exposition: The wholesome qualities belonging to all the planes of meditative concentration—that is, all planes of the form and formless realms (rūpa, arūpasvabhāva)—are relinquished for two reasons: ⁽¹⁾ through birth (upapatti) on a higher or lower plane; this concerns the wholesome qualities of those born among the gods of the Form Realm; ⁽²⁾ through regression (parihāṇi), that is, when the practitioner loses meditative concentration.

A third cause must be added here: an ordinary being relinquishes wholesome qualities upon death (nikāyasabhāgatyāga), even when reborn in the same heavenly realm in which they died.

The same applies to wholesome qualities belonging to the Formless Realm: they too are relinquished through a change of planes and through regression. The sole difference is that there is no restraint in the Formless Realm.

Undefiled wholesome qualities are relinquished for three reasons: ⁽¹⁾ attaining a fruit, when a noble one relinquishes the wholesome qualities belonging to the preceding path of practice and path of fruition [pratipannakamārga, comprising the three kinds: preparatory (prayoga), uninterrupted (ānantarya), and liberation (vimukti)]; ⁽²⁾ perfecting the faculties (refining the faculties, indriyasaṃcāra); ⁽³⁾ regression, that is, losing a fruit or a higher path of fruition.

(Question) How is non-restraint relinquished?

The stanza answers:

[Wrong restraint is relinquished through death,

The acquisition of restraint, and the arising of dual sexuality.]

Exposition: Restraint is acquired through undertaking the prātimokṣa restraint (saṃvarasamādāna); or, through the efficacy of an internal cause (hetu = sabhāgahetu) or an external condition (the teaching of another; pratyaya), one attains a meditative concentration endowed with the restraint of concentration. This restraint of concentration destroys non-restraint because it possesses forces opposed to non-restraint.

Death and the condition of dual sexuality are, respectively, the relinquishment and disturbance of the bodily basis (ātmabhāva, āśraya) through which non-restraint had previously been acquired.

Even if a person under non-restraint casts aside the implements of their occupation, such as knives, nets, and so forth, and even if they intend no longer to commit killing, they do not thereby eliminate non-restraint. Only undertaking restraint can eliminate non-restraint. A sick person cannot recover without medicine, even if they avoid the cause of the illness.

(Question) When a person under non-restraint undertakes the upavāsa restraint until the end of the night and must then relinquish the precepts, do they remain a person under non-restraint, or have they entered the “intermediate” state [neither restraint nor non-restraint]?

(Answer) There are various explanations. Some masters say that non-restraint is acquired again because one who undertakes the upavāsa precepts has no intention of abandoning wrong restraint; just as a mass of iron, when it ceases to be heated red-hot, returns to its original blue-black color. Other masters say that when the period for which a person under non-restraint has undertaken the upavāsa precepts ends, they do not reacquire non-restraint, because the acquisition of non-restraint depends upon bodily and verbal manifest action (vijñapti).

(Question) How is the non-manifest action that is neither restraint nor non-restraint relinquished?

The stanza answers:

[Intermediate non-manifest action is relinquished through abandoning the undertaking, its force,

The action, the object, life, and the faculties.]

Exposition: The differences in the acquisition of the two kinds of non-manifest action that are neither restraint nor non-restraint have already been explained.

This kind of non-manifest action is relinquished for six reasons: ⁽¹⁾ when the powerful force (vega) of faith (prasāda) or of the afflictions (kleśa) that generated the non-manifest action has been exhausted, just like the motion of an arrow or a potter’s wheel; ⁽²⁾ when the undertaking (samādāna) is abandoned: “From this moment onward, I shall no longer do the things that I previously undertook voluntarily”; ⁽³⁾ when an action is abandoned, meaning when one ceases to perform the acts that one previously undertook voluntarily, [such as paying homage to the Buddha or wearing a garland before eating]; ⁽⁴⁾ when the object (artha) is destroyed, such as a stūpa (caitya), garden (ārāma), monastery (vihāra), bed, or seat to which one had formerly paid homage or made offerings;

or implements of a trade, fishing nets (jāla), and so forth; ⁽⁵⁾ when life ends; ⁽⁶⁾ when the destruction of the wholesome roots begins (samucchedaprārambhāvasthāyām).

(Question) How are the non-material wholesome karma of the Desire Realm and all non-material defiled dharmas relinquished?

The stanza answers:

[The non-material wholesome karma of the Desire Realm is relinquished

Through severing the roots and birth in a higher realm,

Through the arising of the path serving as its antidote]

And the non-material defiled dharmas are relinquished.]

Treatise: The relinquishment of karma belonging to material form—namely, bodily karma, verbal karma, and non-informative karma—has been explained above. Karma that does not belong to material form but is wholesome in the Desire Realm is relinquished when the wholesome roots are severed and when one is born into the levels belonging to the Form Realm or the Formless Realm. All defiled dharmas belonging to any realm are relinquished when a noble path capable of counteracting that kind of defilement arises.

This is the noble path capable of abandonment (path of abandonment, prahāṇamārga), which may belong to the path of seeing (darśana) or the path of cultivation (bhāvanā), and may be mundane (laukika) or supramundane (lokottara). This noble path enables the abandonment of a particular secondary defilement (upakleśa) and its associated dharmas, such as acquisition (prāptis), and so forth.

(Question) Which sentient beings possess restraint and non-restraint?

The stanza answers:

[The evil discipline exists among humans, except those of the northern continent,

Eunuchs, and hermaphrodites;

Restraint is likewise, but includes the gods as well.

Only humans possess all three kinds.

The gods born in the Desire Realm and the Form Realm

Possess meditative restraint.

Uncontaminated restraint also exists in the Formless Realm,

Except in the intermediate meditation.]

Treatise: Non-restraint exists only among humans, but the cases of eunuchs [ṣaṇḍhas and paṇḍakas], hermaphrodites, and the inhabitants of Uttarakuru must be excluded.

Restraint also exists among humans, apart from the cases mentioned above, and among all the gods; restraint therefore exists in both destinies.

Eunuchs are unfit for restraint. This has been stated in the sutra: “Mahānāman, a white-robed male lay disciple possesses the male faculty in its entirety…” Likewise, the Vinaya states: “Such a person must not be admitted.”

(Question) Why is this so?

(Answer) Because such persons have predominant defilements belonging to both sexes; because they lack the capacity (akṣama) for correct discernment (pratisaṃkhyāna) by which to overcome the defilements; and because they do not possess powerful shame and moral dread (hrī, apatrāpya).

(Question) Why are they also unfit for non-restraint?

(Answer) Because their intention to do evil (pāpāśaya) is not steadfast. Since non-restraint is the opposite (pratidvandva) of restraint, only those capable of acquiring restraint can acquire non-restraint.

The inhabitants of Uttarakuru do not undertake vows (samādāna), and therefore do not possess prātimokṣa restraint; nor do they possess concentration (samādhi), and therefore they do not possess the other two kinds of restraint. Furthermore, they have no intention to do evil.

In the evil destinies (āpāyika), shame and moral dread do not exert powerful influence, whereas restraint requires powerful shame and moral dread; and to possess non-restraint, one must first destroy shame and moral dread.

Neither restraint nor non-restraint can arise in the supporting bodies of eunuchs, hermaphrodites, or beings in the evil destinies, because such bodies resemble soil contaminated by salt, in which neither grain nor weeds can grow.

(Objection) But the sutra says: “Bhikshus, there is a nāga born from an egg who, on the eighth day of each fortnight, leaves his dwelling to undertake and observe the eight-branched fasting precepts” (Saṃyutta, iii. 241; Vibhāṣā, 24, 11).

In the case of the nāga, this is not restraint but merely good conduct (sucarita).

Thus, restraint exists only among humans and gods. However, only humans possess all three kinds: prātimokṣa restraint, meditative restraint, and uncontaminated restraint.

Meditative restraint exists only in the heavenly realms of the Desire Realm and the Form Realm, and not in the Formless Realm.

Uncontaminated restraint exists in the Form Realm—except among beings born in the intermediate meditation (dhyānāntarikas) and among non-percipient beings—and also throughout the Formless Realm.

However, the gods of the Formless Realm never actually possess this restraint in immediate presence (saṃmukhībhāvataḥ), because it belongs by nature to material form; they can only be said to have “acquired” it.

While explaining karma, the author of the treatise now wishes to define further the various kinds of karma mentioned in the sutras. There are three kinds of karma: wholesome, unwholesome, and morally indeterminate (Vibhāṣā, 51, 1).

[Karma that brings security, insecurity, or neither security nor insecurity

Is called wholesome, unwholesome, or morally indeterminate karma.]

Treatise: Wholesome karma is karma that brings security; unwholesome karma is karma that brings insecurity; karma other than wholesome and unwholesome karma is that which brings neither security nor insecurity.

The definitions of wholesome karma and the others have now been given.

Wholesome karma (kuśāla, śubha) brings security (kṣema) because it has a desirable ripened result (iṣṭavipāka), thereby enabling one to avoid suffering for a time [this is contaminated wholesome karma (kuśalasāsrava)]; or because it helps one attain nirvana, thereby enabling one to escape suffering forever [this is uncontaminated wholesome karma].

Unwholesome karma (akuśala, aśubha) brings insecurity; it is karma that has an undesirable ripened result. Karma that the Blessed One did not declare to be either wholesome or unwholesome—namely, morally indeterminate karma (avyākṛta)—brings neither security nor insecurity.

The sutras mention three other kinds: meritorious, non-meritorious, and so forth.

[Meritorious, non-meritorious, and immovable.

Wholesome karma of the Desire Realm is meritorious.

Unwholesome karma is non-meritorious.

Wholesome karma of the higher realms is immovable,

Because the result of karma is immovably fixed with respect to the level and place proper to it.]

Treatise: Wholesome karma in the Desire Realm is called meritorious karma (guṇa) because it purifies and because it brings about a desirable result.

Wholesome karma in the higher realms—that is, in the levels of the two higher realms—is called immovable (āniñjya).

(Question) Did the Blessed One not say that the first three meditative absorptions are subject to movement (señjita)? And did the Noble One not also say that initial and sustained application of thought in the first meditative absorption are subject to movement?

(Answer) The Blessed One said that the first three meditative absorptions are subject to movement because these absorptions still have many defects; it is precisely the presence of these defects (sāpakṣatatā) that causes the first absorptions to remain subject to movement. Yet in the Iñjitasūtra, the Blessed One said that these meditative absorptions are immovable because he regarded them as a noble path conducive to immovability.

(Question) But why is that which is subject to movement called immovable?

(Answer) Because, with regard to the result of maturation, karma belonging to the higher realms does not undergo alteration. When it is said that karma belonging to the Desire Realm is mutable, this is stated with reference to its result of maturation. The destination in which the result of maturation comes to fulfillment is not fixed; for karma leading to one particular destiny may still produce maturation in another destiny, and karma originally leading to one particular heavenly realm may produce maturation in another heavenly realm.

Karma capable of producing particular powers, stature, beauty, and pleasures, whose intended destination is a certain heavenly realm, may be affected by causes and conditions and instead lead to another destiny among humans, animals, or hungry ghosts. By contrast, in the Form Realm and the Formless Realm, there is no condition that can prevent karma belonging to these realms from completing its retribution in one of their respective planes (bhūmi).

Evil karma is karma devoid of merit (demeritorious karma). People in the world understand this kind of karma very well, so there is no need to explain it at length.

The sutra also speaks of three other kinds of karma: karma conducive to pleasant feeling, and so forth.

[Conducive to pleasant feeling, painful feeling, and neither pleasant nor painful feeling.

Wholesome karma up to the third dhyāna is conducive to pleasant feeling.

Unwholesome karma is conducive to painful feeling.

Wholesome karma of the higher realms is conducive to neither pleasant nor painful feeling.

Some say that it also exists below.

For “intermediate” karma produces maturation

(In the intermediate dhyāna).

It is further admitted that these three kinds of karma

All have simultaneous results of maturation.

There are five kinds of that which is to be experienced:

By intrinsic nature, through association, as an object, as maturation,

And as presently manifest; these are distinct.]

Treatise: Pleasant feeling (sukhā vedanā) does not exist in the realms above the third dhyāna; therefore, it belongs only to the Desire Realm and the first three dhyānas. Thus, the maturation-result of wholesome karma up to the third dhyāna is pleasant feeling. Because this kind of karma has such a maturation-result, it is called karma conducive to pleasant feeling.

Pleasant feeling and painful feeling (sukhā, duḥkhā vedanā) do not exist above the third dhyāna. There, neutral feeling is the sole maturation-result of wholesome karma produced above that dhyāna.

Unwholesome karma is karma conducive to painful feeling.

The words “below” in the verse indicate that this kind of karma exists only in the Desire Realm.

(Question) Is the result of all this karma only feeling?

(Answer) No. This karma also produces the auxiliary maturation (saṃbhāra) that supports feeling—the provisions for feeling.

Some maintain that intermediate karma—karma conducive to neither of the two, that is, karma producing a feeling that is neither pleasant nor painful—exists below the fourth dhyāna. This is contrary to the position of the Vibhāṣā (115, 4). If such intermediate karma did not exist below the fourth dhyāna, there would be no maturation-result (vipāka) of karma belonging to the intermediate dhyāna (dhyānāntara), that is, the karma of intermediate concentration; or else there would be no maturation there from any kind of karma whatsoever, because neither pleasant nor painful feeling exists there.

Others maintain that the maturation-result of karma belonging to the intermediate dhyāna is precisely the faculty of pleasure (sukhendriya) of that dhyāna; still others say that the maturation-result of this kind of karma is not feeling, [but form (rūpa), and so forth].

Both explanations contradict the Root Treatise (ucchāstra) (Jñānaprasthāna, 11, 5): “Can the maturation of karma consist solely of the mental factor of feeling?—Yes. Such is the maturation of wholesome karma free from examination (vitarka).” The Root Treatise also says: “Can the maturation-results of the three kinds of karma arise simultaneously?—Yes. At the same moment there may arise: ⁽¹⁾ the maturation-result of karma conducive to pleasant feeling, namely material dharmas [such as the faculty of sight, and so forth]; ⁽²⁾ the maturation-result of karma conducive to painful feeling, namely mind and mental factors [with the exception of the feeling of dejection];

and ⁽³⁾ the maturation-result of karma conducive to neither pleasant nor painful feeling, namely dharmas associated with mind [such as the faculty of life].” Thus, outside the Desire Realm, all three kinds of karma cannot produce their maturation-results simultaneously, because the maturation-result of karma conducive to painful feeling exists only in the Desire Realm (Vibhāṣā, 118, 10).

(Question) Is karma conducive to neither pleasant nor painful feeling [when it belongs to a plane below the fourth dhyāna] wholesome or unwholesome?

(Answer) It is wholesome, but its power is very weak.

(Question) But have you not said that “wholesome karma, up to the third dhyāna, is entirely karma conducive to pleasant feeling”?

(Answer) That statement was made with reference to the general case (bāhulika nirdeśa).

(Question) But how can karma be said to be conducive to pleasant feeling (sukhavedanīya, sukhavedya)? Is not the intrinsic nature of karma something other than feeling and not itself experienced (avedanāsvabhāva)?

(Answer) It is so called because karma accords with pleasant feeling (sukhavedanāhita, anukūla), or because its maturation-result is experienced pleasantly. Just as the expression “bathing garment” (snānīyakāṣāya) denotes a garment worn while bathing, so here karma is called “conducive to feeling” (vedanīya) to indicate karma whose maturation-result may be experienced.

There are altogether five kinds of that which is conducive to feeling:

⁽¹⁾ Conducive to feeling by intrinsic nature: feeling whose intrinsic nature is to be experienced; for example, pleasant feeling is the experience (anubhava) of pleasure, and so forth.

⁽²⁾ Conducive to feeling through association: contact (sparśa) is experienced because it is associated with feeling; for example, contact conducive to pleasant feeling, and so forth (Saṃyukta, 13; Saṃyutta, v. 211).

⁽³⁾ Conducive to feeling as an object: the six objects (viṣaya) of the six faculties are experienced as objects (ālambana). The sutra (Saṃyutta, iv. 41) says: “When the eye sees form, one experiences form but does not experience attachment to form.” Form is precisely the object of feeling.

⁽⁴⁾ Conducive to feeling as maturation: karma is experienced with respect to its result. The sutra (Madhyama, 3, 1) says: “Karma to be experienced in the present life.”

⁽⁵⁾ Conducive to feeling as presently manifest: feeling that is being experienced at present (saṃmukhībhāva). The sutra says: “When one feels, when one experiences (anubhavati), a pleasant feeling, the other two feelings—painful feeling and neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling—are then inhibited by that pleasant feeling” (compare Dīgha, ii. 66). Thus, when pleasant feeling is active (pravartate), another kind of feeling cannot be experienced. Therefore, if this feeling is said to be experienced (vedanīya), it is only because it is presently manifest (saṃmukhībhāva vedanīyatā).

(Question) Are these three kinds of karma determinate or indeterminate?

The verse answers:

[This karma is sometimes determinate and sometimes indeterminate.

Determinate karma is of three kinds: to be experienced in the present life, and so forth.

Some say that karma is of five kinds.

Other masters analyze it by means of a tetralemma.]

Treatise: The kinds of karma just described above—karma conducive to pleasant feeling, and so forth—are sometimes determinate (niyata), meaning that they will certainly be “experienced”; but at other times they are indeterminate (aniyata), meaning that it is not certain that they will be “experienced.”

Karmas of a determinate nature are further divided into three kinds: ⁽¹⁾ karma to be experienced in the present life (dṛṣṭadharmavedanīya); ⁽²⁾ karma to be experienced after rebirth, that is, in the immediately following life (upapadyavedanīya); and ⁽³⁾ karma to be experienced later (aparaparyāyavedanīya). Thus, with respect to maturation, if indeterminate karma is added, there are four kinds.

Some hold that karma is of five kinds. That is, indeterminate karma is further divided into two kinds: ⁽¹⁾ karma indeterminate with respect to the time of its maturation but certain to have a maturation (niyatavipāka); and ⁽²⁾ karma indeterminate with respect to maturation (aniyatavipāka), which may therefore fail to bring about a result.

Karma to be experienced in the present life is karma performed in this life that “ripens,” or produces its result, in this very life. Karma to be experienced after rebirth is karma whose result occurs in the life immediately following the life in which it was performed. Karma to be experienced later is karma whose result occurs in a subsequent life, beginning with the third life.

But some masters (Sautrāntikas) say that one cannot accept that powerful karma produces only a slight maturation. Therefore, the maturation of karma to be experienced in the present life may continue into other lives; nevertheless, because this maturation begins (vipākārambha) in the present life, such karma is called karma to be experienced in the present life.

The Vaibhāṣika masters do not accept this view. They say that some karmas have a proximate result (saṃnikṛṣṭaphala), while others have a remote result (viprakṛṣṭa). In the same way, the thorn plant (suvarcala) bears fruit after only two and a half months, whereas barley (yava) and wheat (godhūma) bear fruit only after six months.

Other masters (Dārṣṭāntikas, Masters of Illustrations) distinguish four cases: ⁽¹⁾ karma determinate with respect to the time of maturation but not necessarily determinate with respect to having a maturation—if this karma produces a maturation, it necessarily does so at a particular fixed time; however, it is not certain to bring about a maturation. This is karma determinate (niyata), or determinate as to the time of experience (niyatavedanīya), but indeterminate as to maturation (aniyatavipāka); ⁽²⁾ karma determinate with respect to maturation but indeterminate with respect to the time of maturation—this karma will have a maturation, but the time of maturation is indeterminate.

This is determinate maturation (niyatavipāka) but indeterminate experience (aniyatavedanīya); ⁽³⁾ karma determinate in both respects, that is, determinate as to maturation and determinate as to experience; and ⁽⁴⁾ karma indeterminate in both respects, that is, indeterminate as to maturation and indeterminate as to experience.

According to the preceding analysis, there will be eight kinds in all: ⁽¹⁾ karma to be experienced in the present life and certain to have a maturation; ⁽²⁾ karma to be experienced in the present life and certain to have a maturation; and so forth; ⁽⁷⁾ karma that may be experienced in any life (indeterminate experience, aniyatavedanīya) and is certain to have a maturation; and ⁽⁸⁾ karma that may be experienced in any life but is not certain to have a maturation.

However, karmas classified by the sutras as karma to be experienced in the present life, and so forth, always have a maturation; karmas classified as indeterminate (aniyata) may have no maturation.

[Four kinds are reasonable; they may be performed simultaneously;

Only three kinds produce the common nature of a class of beings.

In all realms, all four kinds of karma may be performed.

Wholesome karma in the hells is not experienced in the present life.

When steadfast, in a defiled plane from which attachment has been relinquished,

An ordinary being does not perform karma to be experienced after rebirth;

And a noble one performs neither karma to be experienced after rebirth nor karma to be experienced later,

Including a noble one detached from the Desire Realm or the Summit of Existence, and one who has fallen away.]

Exposition: Can a person perform all four kinds of karma at the same time? Suppose a person, at another’s command, commits killing, stealing, and false speech, while personally committing sexual misconduct. Although these four karmas belong to four different kinds, they are all committed at the same time.

Karma to be experienced in the present life does not produce the present existence—the common nature of a class of beings (nikāyasabhāga)—for this existence has already been produced by previous karma.

(Question) How many kinds of karma may be performed in the various realms (dhātu) and destinies (gati)?

(Answer) In the three realms and in all destinies, all four kinds of wholesome or unwholesome karma may be performed; but this general principle is subject to many limitations. On the one hand, there are no unwholesome karmas above the Desire Realm. On the other hand, in the hells one can perform only wholesome karma to be experienced after rebirth, wholesome karma to be experienced later, or indeterminate wholesome karma; one cannot perform wholesome karma to be experienced in the present life, because there is no agreeable (manojña, manāpa) maturation in the hells.

“When steadfast” (sthira) means when one is not subject to falling away (aparihāṇadharma).

“Fool” (bāla) refers to an ordinary being (Pṛthagjana).

Having abandoned a certain level, having become detached (virakta) from a certain plane—such as the Desire Realm, the first dhyāna, and so forth—an ordinary being never performs in that plane karma to be experienced after rebirth, that is, karma to be experienced at the immediately following rebirth.

When steadfast, a noble one does not perform in the plane from which attachment has been relinquished either karma to be experienced after rebirth or karma to be experienced later.

Indeed, ordinary beings who are not subject to falling away (aparihāṇadharma) will not, in their next life, be reborn in the plane associated with the plane from which they have become detached; and noble ones who are not subject to falling away will never again be reborn in that plane. In the plane into which they have been born, they perform only karma to be experienced in the present life and indeterminate karma.

The same applies to a noble one who is not steadfast when becoming detached from the Desire Realm or the Summit of Existence.

A noble one detached from the Desire Realm is a Non-returner (Anāgāmin).

A noble one detached from the Summit of Existence (bhavāgra), or the Sphere of Neither Perception nor Non-perception (naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñāyatana), the highest level of the Formless Realm, is an arhat.

Even when they fall away, that is, when they lose the fruit they have attained, these noble ones still do not perform karma to be experienced after rebirth or karma to be experienced later in the Desire Realm or at the Summit of Existence.

We shall explain how a noble one who has fallen away always regains the fruit before death.

(Question) Do beings in the intermediate existence (antarābhava) perform karma?

The stanza answers:

[In the intermediate existence of the Desire Realm, one may perform

Twenty-two kinds of karma,

All belonging to karma experienced in the present life,

And there is only one kind of common nature of a class of beings.]

Exposition: In the womb, there are five stages: kalala, arbuda, peśin, ghana, and praśākhā. Human life likewise passes through five stages: infancy, childhood, youth, middle age, and old age.

Beings in the intermediate existence perform actions that are certain to be experienced during the intermediate existence, the kalala, the arbuda... up to infancy, childhood, and so forth. Thus, there are altogether eleven kinds of determinate karma; they also perform indeterminate actions in the same way.

The eleven kinds of determinate karma of beings in the intermediate existence all belong to karma to be experienced in the present life.

(Question) Why is this so?

(Answer) Because the intermediate existence and the ten subsequent stages (one common class of beings) are all brought forth by a single karma. Nor is a separate category of “karma to be experienced in the intermediate existence” distinguished, because the intermediate existence is produced by the same kind of karma that is experienced in the life following the intermediate existence.

(Question) On the basis of what characteristics is karma said to be determinate, that is, karma that will definitely produce a result?

The stanza answers:

[Because the afflictions are grave or the pure mind is strong,

Because it is repeatedly performed, because it concerns a field of merit,

And because one harms one’s father or mother, karma becomes determinate.]

Treatise: Karma performed under the influence of grave afflictions, with pure faith, in relation to a field of merit, or continually performed is determinate karma.

The term “field of merit” (puṇyakṣetra) refers to the Three Jewels, or to certain persons, such as those who have attained a fruit or are noble ones (stream-enterers, and so forth), and those who have attained meditative absorption (such as the absorption of cessation, and so forth). Karma performed in relation to these fields of merit, even without grave affliction or powerful faith, is nevertheless determinate and may be wholesome or unwholesome.

In the case of killing one’s father or mother, whatever the intention may be, the act is always determinate karma.

Other kinds of karma, namely those performed under the influence of weak afflictions (mandakleśa), and so forth, are indeterminate.

(Question) On the basis of what characteristics is karma said to be “karma to be experienced in the present life”?

The stanza answers:

[Because of an eminent field of merit or an eminent intention,

Because its maturation is determinate,

And when one permanently abandons the realm in which karma would ripen,

It will certainly produce its result in the present life.]

Treatise: Because of the eminence of the field of merit, even though the intention may be weak; for example, a bhikshu was transformed into a woman because he insulted the Sangha by saying, “You are only women!” (striyoyūyam) (uttering the words “women”).

Because of the eminence of the intention; for example, a eunuch regained his sex by saving bulls from being castrated (the incident of the eunuch).

Or, when a person has permanently abandoned a certain realm, that person will no longer be reborn in that realm. Therefore, karma—whether wholesome or unwholesome—that could have produced maturation in that realm in another life is altered so as to produce maturation in the present life.

Or it is karma whose maturation is determinate but whose time of fruition is not determinate; this kind of karma will bear fruit in the present life.

Karma whose time of fruition is determinate will produce its maturation at the appointed time. A person whose actions must certainly be experienced as maturation upon the first rebirth in a particular realm cannot abandon that realm.

Karma whose maturation is indeterminate will not produce maturation if the person who performed it succeeds in abandoning the realm in which that person would otherwise have undergone its result.

(Question) What kind of field of merit gives rise to actions that will definitely produce results in the present life?

The stanza answers:

[With regard to the Sangha headed by the Buddha,

And those emerging from the absorption of cessation, the absorption free from conflict,

The absorption of loving-kindness, the path of seeing, or the fruit of arhatship,

Whether one benefits or harms them, the result is experienced in the present life.]

Treatise: In general, it is the community of bhikshus headed by the Buddha. With regard to individual persons, there are altogether five kinds:

Those emerging from the absorption of cessation (nirodhasamāpatti). In this absorption, the practitioner has attained a most tranquil mind (śānti), because this absorption resembles nirvana. When the practitioner emerges from it (vyutthita), it is as though one who had entered nirvana had manifested once again.

Those emerging from the absorption free from conflict. In this absorption, the practitioner’s mental continuum (saṃtati) is filled with the aspiration to lead immeasurable beings to a state entirely devoid of afflictions (free from conflict, araṇā). Therefore, upon emerging from the absorption, the practitioner’s continuum is imbued with immeasurable and supreme merit.

Those emerging from the absorption of loving-kindness (maitrīsamāpatti). In this absorption, the practitioner’s mental continuum is filled with the aspiration that immeasurable beings may all attain happiness. Therefore, upon emerging from the absorption, the practitioner’s continuum is likewise imbued with immeasurable and supreme merit.

Those emerging from the path of seeing. On this noble path, the practitioner has abandoned all afflictions to be abandoned through seeing. Therefore, upon emerging from the noble path, the practitioner’s continuum is completely purified, because the practitioner’s supporting basis (āśraya = śarīra) has just been transformed (parivṛti) (attaining the supreme transformation of the basis).

Those emerging into the fruit of arhatship (emerging from the path of cultivation), namely those who have just attained the fruit of arhatship. They have just accomplished the abandonment of all afflictions to be abandoned through cultivation (bhāvanā). Their continuum is purified because their supporting basis has just been transformed.

These are the reasons why wholesome or unwholesome actions, deeds of benefit (kāra) or harm (apakāra), relating to the five cases above all bring results in the present life. (Vibhāṣā, 154, 3).

As for the other paths of cultivation through which practitioners attain the fruits of once-returning and non-returning, these noble paths are not yet complete in themselves and have not yet brought about the supreme result (aparipūrṇasvabhāvaphala). Those who emerge from the attainment of these two fruits are not fields of merit comparable to arhats. Their continua are not purified, and their supporting bases have not just been transformed.

The principal factor in maturation (vipāka) is feeling.

(Question) Can the maturation of a particular karma be only mental feeling (caitasikī) and not bodily feeling (kāyikī)? Or can it be only bodily feeling and not mental feeling?

The stanza answers:

[Wholesome karma without initial application of thought

Produces only mental feeling;

Unwholesome karma produces only bodily feeling.

Such is the distinction among actions that produce feeling.]

Treatise: Actions belonging to the intermediate dhyāna (dhyānāntara)—that is, the dhyāna situated between the first and second stages of meditative absorption—and actions belonging to the higher stages are without initial application of thought (vitarka). Bodily feeling, however, which is associated with the five sensory consciousnesses, always possesses initial and sustained application of thought (vicāra). Therefore, bodily feeling cannot be the maturation of karma without initial application of thought.

The feeling that is the maturation of unwholesome karma is painful feeling. Thus, the mental feeling belonging to pain is precisely what is called the faculty of mental displeasure (daurmanasyendriya). We previously explained that mental displeasure can never be a maturation. (Vibhāṣā, 115, 9).

(Question) But if grief—that is, painful mental feeling—is not a result of maturation, then does madness pertain to the mind, or in which consciousness (among eye-consciousness, mental consciousness, and so forth) does mental derangement (cittakṣepa, madness of mind), which is a kind of painful feeling, arise? And from what causes does it arise?

The stanza answers:

[Madness of mind arises in mental consciousness

And is born from the maturation-result of karma,

From terror, injury, imbalance, and grief;

It occurs throughout the Desire Realm, except in the Northern Continent.]

Treatise: Madness of mind arises in mental consciousness. The compound manaścitta, “mind,” used in the stanza is equivalent to the expression manovijñāna, “the consciousness of manas, mental consciousness.”

The five groups of consciousness cannot have the nature of “madness” (kṣipta), because they are without conceptualization (discrimination, avikalpaka), examination, and recollection (abhinirūpaṇa, anusmaraṇa), whereas madness of mind consists precisely in imagining things that do not exist at all.

Madness of mind arises from the maturation-result of karma.

Those who disturb and injure the minds of others through sorcery and spells; who force others to drink poison or alcohol against their will; who terrify animals by pursuing them in the hunt, setting forests ablaze, or laying traps; or who in some way disrupt the memory and composure of others—their minds will become deranged and deprived of the support of mindfulness (bhraṣṭasmṛtikaṃ cittaṃ vartate) through the maturation-result of these karmas.

Madness of mind also arises in the following cases:

When people see terrifyingly formed beings who are “not human” (nonhuman beings, amanuṣya) approaching, they may become so frightened that they go mad; when those “nonhuman” beings, angered by the people’s conduct, strike and injure their vital points (marman); when the great elements of the body become imbalanced, as when wind, heat, and phlegm conflict with one another and cause a person to go mad; or when grief disturbs the mind, as in the case of Vāsiṣṭhī.

(Question) If madness of mind—that is, the derangement of mental consciousness—arises from the maturation-result of karma, how can it be said that their mind is not itself a result of maturation?

(Answer) We do not say that madness of mind proceeds from karma that has maturation as its result; we say only that it proceeds from the maturation-result of karma. The great elements in a state of imbalance are the maturation-result, and madness of mind proceeds from that condition; it is therefore said to be “born from a maturation-result.” The mind is said to be mad when, owing to an imbalance or conflict among the great elements caused by some karma, it becomes disturbed (prakopa) and loses mindfulness (bhraṣṭasmṛtika).

There are four cases: ⁽¹⁾ the mind is mad (kṣpta) but not distracted (vikṣipta), as when a mad mind is undefiled (akliṣṭa); ⁽²⁾ the mind is distracted but not mad, as when a mind that is not mad is defiled; ⁽³⁾ it is both mad and distracted; ⁽⁴⁾ it is neither mad nor distracted.

(Question) Among which classes of beings does madness of mind arise?

(Answer) Among beings of the Desire Realm, except those of the continent of Kuru.

Even among the gods of the Desire Realm there are some who become insane (unmattaka), how much more so among humans, ghosts, and animals.

Beings fallen into hell (nāraka) always have mad minds, because their bodily parts, understanding, and life are continually injured by thousands of different torments. They are oppressed by suffering (parinunna = paripīḍita); they know nothing even about themselves, much less what they should do to escape. Here we may mention the typical case of a being tormented in hell who can do nothing but lament and cry out: “Alas! My mind!”

With the exception of the Buddha, all noble ones may suffer madness of mind if their minds are affected by an imbalance (vaisaṃya) of the great elements. In this case, however, the imbalance of the great elements is never a maturation-result, because determinate karma whose maturation-result gives rise to madness of mind must bear fruit before a person attains the noble path; indeterminate karma cannot bear fruit after the noble path has been attained.

Terror, injury inflicted by “nonhuman” beings, and even grief cannot cause noble ones to become mad, because they have transcended the five kinds of fear, because they commit no offensive deed (aprasādika) that would anger such beings, and because they have clearly realized the true nature of phenomena.

The sutra teaches that there are three forms of crookedness (kauṭilya): crookedness of body, of speech, and of mind. Likewise, there are three forms of corruption (doṣa) and three forms of defilement (turbidity, kaṣāya).

[Crooked, corrupt, and defiled karmas

Are born from deceit, hatred, and craving.]

Treatise: Bodily, verbal, or mental karma that arises from hypocrisy (śāṭhya)—that is, that proceeds from crookedness (kuṭilānvaya)—is called “crooked”; karma that arises from hatred (dveṣa)—that is, that proceeds from anger—is called corrupt (foul); karma that arises from attachment (craving, rāga)—that is, that proceeds from being dyed (rañjana)—is called defiled (turbid).