阿毘達磨俱舍論

Part 16

The sutra teaches that there are four kinds of karma: (1) black karma with black ripening; (2) white karma with white ripening; (3) black-and-white karma with black-and-white ripening; and (4) karma that is neither black nor white, having neither black nor white ripening, but capable of destroying the other kinds of karma. (Madhyama, 27, 12; Anguttara, ii. 230; Dīgha, iii. 230; Vibhāṣā, 114, 1)

[On the basis of the distinctions between black and so forth,

Four kinds of karma are taught:

Unwholesome and wholesome karma of the Desire Realm, wholesome karma of the Form Realm,

And uncontaminated karma capable of eliminating the foregoing;

In the order given above,

They are called black, white, black-and-white, and neither black nor white.]

Treatise: Unwholesome karma is by nature defiled (kliṣṭa) and is therefore entirely black; its ripening is by nature painful (amanojña, disagreeable) and thus is also black.

Wholesome karma belonging to the Form Realm, because it is not mixed with evil, is entirely white; its ripening, being a desirable result, is also white.

(Objection) Why is wholesome karma belonging to the Formless Realm not mentioned?

(Explanation) Because, according to tradition [that is, according to the reply of the third group of Vibhāṣā masters (Vibhāṣā, 114, 4)], the quality of “white” applies only to karma that brings about the two kinds of ripening in the intermediate existence (ātarābhavika) and the birth existence (aupapattibhavikavipāka), and that also comprises the three karmas of body, speech, and mind. Karma of the Formless Realm, however, does not possess these characteristics.

(Challenge) But does the sutra not say that karma of the Formless Realm is white and that its ripening is also white?

Wholesome karma of the Desire Realm, being mixed with evil, is called black-and-white; its ripening is likewise mixed and therefore is black-and-white.

This definition implies that karma is not being considered with regard to its intrinsic nature, but only with regard to the continuum of mind or the supporting body. That is to say, within the same mental continuum, wholesome karma is intermingled with unwholesome karma; it does not mean that there is a single kind of karma that is both black and white, nor that there is a single ripening composed of the mutually opposed black and white.

(Objection) But if evil karma is intermingled with wholesome karma, should it not also be regarded as both black and white?

(Explanation) Evil karma is not necessarily intermingled with wholesome karma; but in the Desire Realm wholesome karma is necessarily intermingled with evil karma, because in this realm evil karma is stronger than wholesome karma.

Uncontaminated karma destroys the preceding three kinds of karma. Because it is undefiled (akliṣṭa), it is not black; and because it has no ripening, it is not white—that is, it is “non-white” (aśukla).

The sutra intentionally employs the expression “non-white.” The Blessed One wished to make clear that uncontaminated karma is not white karma. In the Mahāśūnyatāsūtra, when speaking of the qualities of an arhat (aśaikṣa), he likewise explained: “Ānanda, the qualities of an arhat—the qualities of those beyond training—are entirely white, entirely wholesome, and entirely without blemish.” The Fundamental Treatise (Prakaraṇa, 6, 9; Vibhāṣā, 114, 1) also states: “What are white dharmas? They are wholesome dharmas and unobscured-neutral dharmas.”

Uncontaminated karma has no ripening because it does not belong to the three realms; it brings the process of existence to an end—the continuity of the nature of conditioned existence.

(Question) Are all uncontaminated karmas capable of destroying all the karmas of the first three kinds—black, white, and black-and-white?

The stanza replies:

[Those corresponding to the four acceptances of the Dharma

And the eight uninterrupted paths of detachment

Are twelve uncontaminated volitions,

Which eliminate only black karma.

The volitions corresponding to the ninth uninterrupted paths

Of detachment from the Desire Realm and the four dhyānas

Completely eliminate black-and-white and black karma,

And completely eliminate white karma.]

Treatise: The four kinds of volition (cetanā) corresponding to the four acceptances of the Dharma (dharmakṣāntis) belong to the path of seeing the truths (the path of seeing); eight kinds of volition correspond to the first eight paths of elimination (ānantaryamārga, uninterrupted paths) in the stage of detachment (vairāgya) from the Desire Realm, that is, detachment from its defilements. All these twelve kinds of volition—and thus the same number of uncontaminated karmas—are capable of eliminating evil karma.

The volition corresponding to the ninth path of elimination—the ninth uninterrupted path—is the uncontaminated karma that destroys both black-and-white karma and black karma, because this is the moment when all wholesome karma of the Desire Realm (black-and-white karma), as well as the ninth kind of evil karma (the last black karma), is destroyed.

The volition of the ninth path of elimination, which is also the final path leading to detachment from each level of dhyāna—four kinds of volition in all—destroys white karma.

(Objection) The first eight noble paths at the stage of detachment from the Desire Realm destroy black karma. But with regard to black-and-white karma and white karma—that is, wholesome contaminated karma (kuśala sāsrava)—why do you maintain that only the ninth noble path is capable of destroying them?

(Explanation) Strictly speaking, wholesome dharmas are not eliminated, because even after having been eliminated they can arise again. Nevertheless, when the defilement (kleśa) that takes such a dharma as its object is destroyed, the wholesome dharma is also said to have been eliminated. Thus, as long as this final group of defilements has not been destroyed, the wholesome dharma is still regarded as not yet eliminated. [It is precisely the ninth noble path that can eliminate the acquisition (prāpti) of the ninth group of defilements connected with each plane—the Desire Realm and the dhyānas—and thereby attain detachment from these defilements.]

[Some say that karma experienced in hell

Is black, while that experienced elsewhere in the Desire Realm is mixed.

Some say that karma of the Desire Realm eliminated by seeing

Is black, while the other karmas of the Desire Realm are black-and-white.]

Treatise: According to other masters (Vibhāṣā, 114, 2), karma “certain to be experienced in hell” (narakavedanīya, conducive to experience in hell) belongs to black karma; and karma experienced in the Desire Realm—that is, in places other than hell—belongs to black-and-white karma.

Rebirth in hell is produced solely by evil karma—unwholesome karma (akuśala)—and therefore karma experienced in hell is black karma. Rebirth in the Desire Realm, apart from hell, is produced by both wholesome and evil karma, and therefore such karma is black-and-white.

According to other masters (Vibhāṣā, 114, 4), karma eliminated by the path of seeing, because it is not intermingled with wholesome karma, is entirely black (purely black). All other karmas belonging to the Desire Realm—that is, karmas eliminated by the path of cultivation—are black-and-white (combined karma).

The sutra says: “There are three kinds of peacefulness (mauneya, the state of a muni): peacefulness of body, peacefulness of speech, and peacefulness of mind.” (Madhyama, 5, 4; Anguttara, i. 273; Dīgha, iii. 220).

[The bodily karma, verbal karma,

And mind of one beyond training are the three kinds of peacefulness.

The three kinds of purity

Are precisely the three excellent practices.]

Treatise: What are called the tranquility of the body and the tranquility of action are precisely the bodily and verbal actions of an arhat. What is called the tranquility of mind (manomauna) is precisely the mind, the consciousness, of an arhat, rather than mental action (karma). This is because the mind itself is true tranquility, tranquility in the ultimate sense (citta hi paramārthamuniḥ). The Vibhāṣā says that, on the basis of bodily and verbal actions, one can infer and know that the mind is such—that it is beyond training (aśaikṣa).

(The author of the Treatise) But the essential nature of the bodily and verbal actions of an arhat is abstention (virati), whereas mental action does not have the nature of abstention, because there is no unmanifest mental action. Thus, what is called tranquility (mauna) is itself abstention; therefore, when the mind is capable of desisting and abstaining (virama virati), it too should be called tranquil.

Furthermore, why is only the mind of an arhat given this designation? Because the arhat is a truly tranquil sage (paramārthamuni), having brought all the murmuring of the afflictions to an end (sarvakleśajalpoparateḥ).

The sutra says: “There are three kinds of purity (śauceya): purity of body, purity of speech, and purity of mind.” (Madhyama, 5, 19; Anguttara, i. 272; Dīgha, iii. 219).

Good bodily actions—all good bodily actions, whether with outflows (sāsrava) or without outflows—constitute purity of body, because, whether temporarily or permanently, they can remove the defilement of the afflictions and of evil conduct (duścaritamalāpakarṣaka).

The same applies to actions of speech and mind.

This teaching is intended to admonish those who mistakenly regard false tranquility as true tranquility and spurious purity as true purity.

The sutra says that there are three kinds of evil conduct (duścarita). (Saṃyukta, 14, 4; Anguttara, i. 49, 52; Dīgha, iii. 214; Saṃyutta, v. 75)

[Unwholesome actions of body, speech, and mind

Are called the three kinds of evil conduct.

And also covetousness, ill will, and wrong view.

Their opposites are the three kinds of excellent conduct.]

Treatise: Unwholesome bodily actions are precisely evil bodily conduct. The same applies to speech and mind.

There are, in addition, three kinds of evil mental conduct, although their intrinsic nature is not mental action. They are covetousness (abhidhyā), ill will (vyāpāda), and wrong view (mithyādṛṣṭi).

The Dārṣṭāntikas say that covetousness, ill will, and wrong view are themselves mental actions, because they are all regarded as mental actions in the Saṃcetanīya-sūtra.

(The Vibhāṣā) If so, would the afflictions and karma be a single dharma, united as one entity?

(The Dārṣṭāntikas) If they were a single dharma, what fault would there be?

(The Vibhāṣā) To admit that an affliction is karma would contradict both the sutra and the sutra’s definition of karma. When the Saṃcetanīya-sūtra, which you cited above, speaks of “covetousness,” it is referring to volition, because volition arises (pravṛti) under the influence (mukhena) of covetousness.

Because covetousness, ill will, and wrong view bring about painful, disagreeable results, and because unwholesome actions of body, speech, and mind are censured by the wise, they are called evil conduct.

The opposites of evil conduct are the kinds of excellent conduct, namely, actions of body, speech, and mind, together with non-covetousness, non-ill will, and right view (samyagdṛṣṭi).

(Question) How can wrong view and right view be regarded respectively as evil and good? Wrong view does not involve an intention to harm others, and right view likewise does not involve an intention to benefit others (parānugrahopaghātābhisaṃdhyabhāva).

(Answer) That is certainly so; but they are the roots of those two kinds of volition.

[The ten courses of action that are taught

Comprise those kinds of evil and excellent conduct

That are gross and evident;

Thus they become unwholesome and wholesome courses.]

Treatise: Concerning the ten courses of action (karmapatha), the sutra defines the wholesome courses of action as comprising the grossest and most readily evident among the kinds of excellent conduct, and the unwholesome courses of action as comprising the grossest among the kinds of evil conduct.

(Question) Which kinds of evil and excellent conduct are not included among the courses of action?

(Answer) They are a portion of evil bodily conduct, consisting of (1) the preparatory and subsequent bodily actions (prayoga, pṛṣṭhabhūta) associated with the courses of action, and (2) certain defiled (kliṣṭa) bodily actions, such as drinking alcohol, striking, binding, and so forth (Majjhima, iii. 34), because these kinds of evil conduct are not especially gross and evident. Among the kinds of evil bodily conduct, only such acts as taking the lives, possessions, or wives and children of others are courses of action, because they are forms of evil conduct from which one must abstain.

The grossest among the kinds of evil verbal conduct are likewise called courses of action for the reasons given above; thus, preparatory actions, subsequent actions, and minor actions are not included.

A portion of evil mental conduct, namely volition (cetanā), is also not included among the unwholesome courses of action.

The kinds of excellent conduct not included among the courses of action are: (1) a portion of excellent bodily conduct, namely preparatory and subsequent actions; abstention from drinking alcohol and so forth; generosity, acts of reverence, and so forth; (2) a portion of excellent verbal conduct, such as affectionate speech and so forth; and (3) a portion of excellent mental conduct, such as wholesome volition.

[Six evil courses of action are only unmanifest;

When personally performed, sexual misconduct has both kinds.

The seven wholesome courses of action arising from undertaking precepts have both kinds.

When arising from concentration, they are only unmanifest.]

Treatise: When one causes another person to commit the six courses of action—killing, stealing, lying, malicious speech, insulting speech, and frivolous speech—these six courses of action are only unmanifest. The person who causes another to perform these actions does not possess the fundamental manifest action, that is, the action of personally committing the killing.

Sexual misconduct always has both manifest and unmanifest action, because this act must be performed by oneself. When one causes another person to commit this offense, one does not experience the same delight as when committing it oneself.

When one personally performs the actions mentioned above, all six courses of action possess both manifest and unmanifest action if death occurs at the same time as the manifest action—that is, at the very moment when one intends to kill. If death occurs later, there is only unmanifest action.

Among the wholesome courses of action, the seven that are material (rūpin)—all the courses of bodily and verbal action—possess both manifest and unmanifest action. This is because morality undertaken through vows (samādānaśīla) depends upon manifest action (vijñapti).

When they arise from concentration, the courses of action are only unmanifest. These are the courses of action included in “morality by nature” (dharmatāśīla), that is, those included in the discipline arising from meditative concentration and the discipline without outflows. These two kinds of discipline depend solely upon the mind; therefore, these courses of action are not manifest actions.

(Question) Are preparatory actions (prayoga) and subsequent actions (pṛṣṭha) of the same kind as the fundamental action or fundamental course of action (maula karmapatha)?

The stanza answers:

[Preparatory action is certainly manifest

And may or may not be unmanifest.

The reverse applies to subsequent action.]

Treatise: Preliminary actions (sāmantakas) are the preparatory actions (prayoga) for the courses of action belonging to the Desire Realm, and they always belong to manifest action.

When they are performed under the influence of a powerful defilement (paryavasthāna, āhrīkya) or with extremely strong faith (parsādaghanarasena), there is non-manifest action; otherwise, there is no non-manifest action.

By contrast, subsequent actions are all non-manifest. They are manifest only when, after the course of action has been accomplished, one continues to perform actions similar to it.

(Question) How are the preparatory action, the fundamental course of action, and the subsequent action established?

(Answer) For example, when a person, wishing to kill an animal (paśu), rises from bed, takes money, goes to the market, handles the animal, pays for it, leads it away, drags it along, brings it into the house, mistreats it, takes up a knife, and strikes it once, twice, and so on until it is killed, all the actions occurring before the animal is killed belong to the preparatory action.

At the very moment this person takes the animal’s life—that is, when the animal dies—the manifest action of that moment and the non-manifest action simultaneous with that manifest action constitute the fundamental course of action; for a person becomes affected by the offense of killing through two causes: through the preparatory action and through the accomplishment of its result.

The succeeding moments—that is, the moments of non-manifest action (avijñapti) produced by the act of killing—are called subsequent action. The continuous series of moments of manifest action (vijñapti), such as skinning, removing the hair, weighing, selling, cooking, eating, and praising its flavor (anukīrtayati), also belongs to subsequent action.

The remaining six courses of bodily and verbal action may be explained in the same way, with the modifications required in each case.

Covetousness, ill will, and wrong view cannot be divided into preparatory and subsequent actions, because at the moment they arise, by their mere presence (saṃmukhībhāvamātreṇa), they are already fundamental courses of action.

(Objection) A question arises here: Is the course of action constituted by the manifest and non-manifest actions belonging to the moment when the living being (prāṇin) is in the state of dying (maraṇabhava), that is, the moment when the being dies; or by the manifest and non-manifest actions belonging to the moment when the being is already dead (mṛtabhava), that is, after the being has been killed? If you accept the first case, a person would commit the offense of killing only if that person died at the same time as the being killed; but this is something your school does not accept.

In the latter case, you erred in saying: “At the very moment this person takes the animal’s life, the manifest action of that moment and the non-manifest action simultaneous with that manifest action constitute the fundamental course of action.” [You should instead have said: “The manifest action (vijñapti) that arises when the living being is already dead…” (mṛte prāṇini yā vijñaptiḥ...).]

Moreover, if you accept the latter case, this contradicts the Vibhāṣā’s explanation of the phrase “when the preparatory action has not yet ceased” in the Root Treatise (Jñānaprasthāna 11, 11). The Root Treatise says: “Is there a case in which a living being has already been killed, yet the act of killing has not ceased?—Indeed there is: when a living being has been deprived of life but the preparatory action [of killing] has not yet ceased.” The Vibhāṣā (11, 11) explains that in this passage the word prayoga—which ordinarily means preparation—here means “subsequent action” (pṛṣṭha).

Thus, you contradict this explanation, because if the fundamental course of action is placed at the moment when the being is already dead (mṛte prāṇini), then, according to your view, the fundamental course of action has not yet ceased at the moment when the being is dead. You have interpreted the word preparatory action (prayoga) in the Root Treatise as meaning the fundamental action.

(Vibhāṣā) How should the meaning of the Root Treatise be explained without error? In the passage above, prayoga is precisely the fundamental course of action. [At least this explanation remains reasonable when referring only to the moment immediately following the animal’s death; when referring to the moments following that moment, prayoga, as the Vibhāṣā states, is precisely the subsequent action.]

(Author of the Treatise) But how can the manifest action at the moment when the animal is already dead be the fundamental course of action?

(Vibhāṣā) Why could it not be so?

(Author of the Treatise) Because the manifest action no longer has any efficacy. [The animal is already dead, and it cannot be killed again.]

(Vibhāṣā) If that is so, how can non-manifest action, which is always without efficacy, become a course of action? What makes a manifest action and a non-manifest action into a course of action is not their efficacy, but the fact that they arise at the moment when the result of the preparatory action is accomplished.

(Question) Can one course of action be the preparatory or subsequent action of another course of action?

(Answer) It can. For example, the ten courses of action can serve as preparatory actions for killing. A person wishing to kill an enemy and to ensure the success of this deed may steal another person’s property and kill animals as sacrifices offered in supplication to a deity.

With the stolen property, that person may commit sexual misconduct with the enemy’s wife and incite her to become an accomplice; the person may use false, malicious, insulting, and frivolous speech to sow discord between the enemy and friends capable of assisting the enemy; the person may covet the enemy’s property, give rise to ill will toward the enemy, and harbor wrong views concerning the act of killing that the person intends to perform.

Just as the ten courses of action can serve as subsequent actions for killing, so too can they serve as subsequent actions for stealing and the other courses of action.

(Author of the Treatise) But covetousness, ill will, and wrong view never serve as preparatory actions, because they are not the initiation of an action (kriyārambha); nor do they have preparatory actions, because they are merely the arising of mind (cittapāda).

The Sutra says: “Bhikṣus, there are three kinds of killing: those arising from greed, hatred, or delusion (lobha, dveṣa, moha)”; and so on through: “Bhikṣus, there are three kinds of wrong view.” Here it is necessary to explain what these different kinds of killing and so forth are.

Not all courses of action are brought to completion (niṣṭhā) by greed, hatred, and delusion.

[Preparatory actions arise from the three roots.

Because they arise immediately after these three roots,

Covetousness and the others also arise from them.]

Treatise: The preparatory actions of all courses of action can arise from the three roots. In the preceding teaching, the Blessed One spoke of the initial cause, namely, the cause that constitutes the originating source (samutthāpaka) of the course of action.

(1) Killing arises from greed, as in cases of killing to obtain a part of an animal; killing to obtain wealth; killing for amusement (krīḍā); and killing in self-defense or to protect one’s friends (ātmasuḥṛtparitrāṇārtham).

Killing arises from hatred when it is done to satisfy enmity (vairaniryātanārtham).

Killing arises from delusion because sacrifice is regarded as an act that ought to be performed: as in the case of a king who, relying on the authority of the law (worldly law, dharmapāṭhaka), kills because he thinks it is his duty: “The first meritorious act of a king is to punish wrongdoers”; as in the case of the Persians (Pārasīka): “One should kill parents who are old and ill”; or as in the case of those who say: “One must kill snakes, scorpions, tryambuka flies (Mahāvyutpatti, 213, 91), and so forth, because they are extremely harmful; one must kill wild animals, livestock, birds, and buffaloes to sustain oneself.” Finally, there is killing that is initiated (pravartita) by wrong view;

namely, the act of killing committed by those who maintain that there is no future life and no limit (nirmaryāda).

(2) Stealing arises from greed, as in the case of stealing an object one covets, stealing in order subsequently to obtain another object, to gain honor and respect, or to protect oneself or one’s friends.

Stealing arises from hatred when it is committed to satisfy vengeance.

Stealing arises from delusion: as in the case of a king who relies on the law to seize the wealth of wrongdoers; or as the Brahmins commonly say: “All the possessions of the Brahmins were bestowed by the Great Brahmā, but because the Brahmins became weak, those of the lowly classes (Vṛṣalas) took them away. Therefore, when Brahmins seize (apahar) things, they merely take back (ādā) what belongs to them; they eat what is theirs, wear what is theirs, and give away what is theirs.” Nevertheless, when seizing these things, the Brahmins still conceive of them as the wealth of others. Stealing initiated by wrong view is likewise a kind that arises from delusion.

(3) Sexual misconduct arises from greed. Adultery with another man’s wife is sometimes motivated by lust, sometimes committed to gain honor and respect, and sometimes committed to protect oneself or one’s friends.

Sexual misconduct arises from hatred when it is committed to satisfy vengeance.

Sexual misconduct arises from delusion: as in the case of the Persians and others who have sexual relations with their mothers and with forbidden women (engaging in conduct contrary to chastity); during the cattle sacrifice (gosava), people drink water [in the manner of cattle], chew grass, and have sexual relations with their mothers, their elder or younger sisters, or a woman of their own clan (gotra); wherever they see such persons, they immediately approach them for intercourse. Some also say: “A woman is like a rice mortar, like a flower, like fruit, like a vessel of boiled milk, and like a road.”

(4) (Four–seven) False speech and the other verbal offenses arise from greed and hatred, as explained above.

False speech arises from delusion, as a verse states: “O king, there is no harm in lying in jest, lying to women, lying at a wedding, or lying when one is in mortal danger: It is said that such instances of lying are not offenses” (Syādvādamañjarī, p. 32); and finally, it arises from wrong view.

Harsh speech and the other offenses arise from delusion, as in cases proceeding from wrong view. Moreover, the false doctrines (asatpralāpa) of the Vedas and so forth are all frivolous speech (saṃbhinnapralāpa) arising from delusion.

(Question) Unwholesome courses of action such as covetousness (abhidhyā), ill will (vyāpāda), and wrong view (mithyādṛṣṭi) have no preparatory action, so how can they be said to arise from greed and so forth?

(Answer) Because all three arise immediately after the three roots. When they arise immediately after greed, they are said to arise from greed; the same applies to the other two roots.

The explanation of the unwholesome courses of action and their relation to the roots is now complete; next comes the discussion of the wholesome courses of action.

[Wholesome courses of action, together with their preparation and subsequent continuation,

All arise from the three wholesome roots.]

Treatise: The wholesome courses of action, together with their preparation and subsequent continuation, all have a wholesome mind as their originating cause (pravartaka). This wholesome mind is necessarily associated with the three roots and also arises from the three roots.

Abstention from the preparation for an unwholesome course of action is itself the preparation for a wholesome course of action; abstention from the fundamental action that constitutes the fundamental unwholesome course of action is itself the fundamental wholesome course of action; abstention from the subsequent continuation of an unwholesome course of action is itself the subsequent continuation of a wholesome course of action.

Consider, for example, the taking of the novice precepts. From the moment the candidate enters the ordination hall (nānāvāsa), pays homage to the Sangha, and requests the teacher who will personally instruct him (preceptor, upādhyāya), through the first formal proclamation of the karman (karmavācana) and the second proclamation, all these belong to the preparation. At the completion (parisamāpti, avasāna) of the third proclamation, a manifest action and a non-manifest action arise; together with this manifest action, they constitute the fundamental course of action.

After this moment, when the new monk is informed of the kinds of support (niśrayas, the four supports), when he understands that he has received the four kinds of support, and for as long as the continuum of non-manifest actions constituted by the fundamental action continues—that is, for as long as the monk does not lose the discipline of individual liberation—this is the subsequent continuation.

(Question) It was said above that not all unwholesome courses of action are accomplished through all three roots. Which courses of action, then, are accomplished by which roots?

The verse answers:

[Killing, abusive speech, and ill will

Are all accomplished by hatred.

Stealing, sexual misconduct, and covetousness

Are accomplished by greed.

Wrong view is accomplished by delusion.

The other courses of action are accomplished by the three roots.]

Treatise: Killing, ill will, and abusive speech (harsh speech) are all accomplished by hatred. They are accomplished only when there is the manifestation (saṃmukhībhāvāt) of a mind that has no concern [regarding killing] and of an extremely harsh mind (paruṣacitta) in regard to ill will and abusive speech.

Sexual misconduct, covetousness, and stealing are all accomplished by greed. “Sexual misconduct” (parastrīgamana) means misconduct relating to sensual desire (kāmamithyācāra).

Wrong view is accomplished by delusion, but it must be delusion of the highest degree.

The other courses of action, such as false speech, malicious speech (divisive speech), and frivolous speech, can be accomplished by greed, hatred, or delusion.

(Question) In what objects do the above unwholesome courses of action arise?

The verse answers:

[Sentient beings, objects of enjoyment, name-and-form,

And the aggregate of names, and so forth, are where they arise.]

Treatise: Among the courses of action divided above into four groups—three courses of action, three courses of action, one course of action, and three courses of action—they arise respectively in four objects: sentient beings, objects of enjoyment, name-and-form (nāmarūpa), and name (nāma).

Sentient beings are the objects or material bases of killing, cruelty, and abusive speech; articles of use and enjoyment are the objects of sexual misconduct, covetousness, and stealing; the physical body, that is, the five skandhas, is the object of wrong view; and names, that is, the collection of names (nāmakāya), are the objects of false speech and the other two offenses belonging to speech.

(Question) If a person intends to kill another, but dies before or after that person, does the former accomplish the fundamental course of karma?

The stanza answers:

[If one dies at the same time or beforehand,

It does not occur, because the supporting basis has changed.]

Explanation: If a person who intends to kill dies at the same time as, or before, the person whom they intend to kill, the fundamental course of karma is not accomplished.

This is why the Vibhāṣā says: “When a person has initiated the preparatory action of killing, can it happen that, at the moment when the result of this preparatory action is accomplished, that person is not touched by the offense of killing?—Such a case is possible: namely, when the person intending to kill dies before or at the same time as the person being killed.” Thus, the reason is perfectly clear: As long as the person who was to be killed (vadhya) remains alive, the one intending to kill is not yet touched by the offense of killing; and when the person who was to be killed dies, the one intending to kill is likewise not touched by the offense of killing if the latter has died at the same time or beforehand.

This is because the bodily basis (āśraya) upon which the preparatory action was accomplished has ceased to exist. The person who intended to kill has acquired a new body belonging to another homogeneous class of beings (nikāyasabhāga), and this body did not perform such a preparatory action; it is not the agent (prayoktar) and therefore cannot be touched by the offense of killing.

(Question) When many people gather together to kill—as in warfare, hunting expeditions, or acts of plunder—and one among them carries out the killing, who incurs the offense of killing?

The stanza answers:

[Soldiers and the like, if acting together,

Are all guilty, just like the one who killed.]

Explanation: When they share a common purpose, all are guilty just as is the person among them who committed the killing, because they all encourage one another—not through words, but through the fact that they have joined together to kill.

(Question) However, if a person has vowed not to kill but is compelled to serve as a soldier, does that person incur the offense of killing?

(Answer) Clearly, that person does not incur the offense if they have made the vow: “Even to save my own life, I will not kill any sentient being.”

(Question) By virtue of what characteristics does a person who kills, steals, and so forth incur a course of karma?

The stanza answers:

[Killing occurs through deliberate intent,

With thought directed toward another and without killing the wrong person.]

Explanation: When a person carries out an act of killing with the thought, “I must kill such-and-such a person,” and kills that very person rather than mistakenly killing someone else, this is precisely the offense of killing.

(Question) And when a person kills another but does not clearly know whether they have struck a sentient being or merely an insentient object, or whether they have struck that particular person or someone else, is this the offense of killing?

(Answer) It certainly constitutes the offense of killing. That person performed the act of striking, and this means that they had an attitude of disregard [for killing] (parityāga).

How can one incur the offense of killing, that is, the severing of the vital breath (prāṇa, that is, wind) (prāṇātipāta), when all the skandhas perish from moment to moment?

(Answer) The expression “vital breath” refers to a kind of wind (vāyu) whose existence depends upon the body and mind. When the offender severs this vital breath (atipātayati = vināśayati), it is like extinguishing a lamp or stopping the sound of a bell; that is, causing it no longer to continue arising.

Alternatively, “vital breath” refers to the faculty of life (jīvitendriya). When a person obstructs the arising of the faculty of life in the next moment, thereby severing it, that person is touched by the offense of killing.

(Question) However, to whom does this “faculty of life” of which you speak belong? And to whom does the statement, “If there is no life span remaining, one must die,” refer?

(Answer) The true meaning of the expressions “To whom does it belong?” and “To whom does it refer?” will be discussed in the chapter refuting the self. For now, let us examine the teaching of the Blessed One: “When the life span, warmth, and consciousness depart from the body, the body collapses like a piece of wood, devoid of awareness.” Thus, “living” refers to the body when it still possesses its faculties (sendriya), and “dead” likewise refers to the body when it no longer possesses its faculties (anindriya).

According to the Nirgranthas, if one kills, then even without knowing or intending to do so (abuddhipūrvāt), the agent still incurs the offense, just as one who touches fire must be burned.

If this were so, then one who accidentally sees or touches another person’s wife would also incur an offense (pāpaprasaṅga); the person who shaves the heads of the Nirgranthas would also incur an offense; the teacher of the Nirgranthas would also incur an offense because he encourages others to practice austerities; those who offer food that causes a Nirgrantha to suffer stomach pain or die would also incur an offense; a mother and her fetus would both incur an offense because each causes suffering to the other; and the person killed by another would also incur an offense because that person is the object in relation to the other’s act of killing, just as fire burns that upon which it depends.

Conversely, a person who orders another to kill would incur no offense, because if one orders someone else to touch fire, one is not oneself burned. Moreover, because the adherents of this school do not take into account the particular intention (buddhiviśeṣa) [involved in killing], wood and other insentient things would also have to incur an offense when a house collapses and injures or kills sentient beings. If the Nirgranthas wish to avoid these consequences, they must understand that merely presenting an analogy involving fire, without any further argument, cannot defend their doctrine.

[If one takes what another has not given,

One has forcibly appropriated it as one’s own.]

Explanation: The qualification “provided that there is no mistake,” stated above, applies to all cases and therefore need not be repeated here.

If one forcibly or secretly appropriates what belongs to another (svīkṛta), without mistaking that other person for the person from whom one intends to steal or whose property one intends to seize, this is precisely the offense of stealing, that is, taking what has not been given.

Stealing from a stūpa means taking an object that the Buddha did not intend to give, because, when entering nirvana, the Blessed One acknowledged that all offerings made to a stūpa were separately possessed property (parigṛhīta). Some masters (Vibhāṣā, 113, 7) say that the offense is incurred only when one takes something without the permission of the guardian of the stūpa.

When one takes an ownerless object without the permission of the ruler of the land.

When one takes the belongings, robes, bowls, and so forth, of a deceased monk—that is, taking what the Sangha residing within that locality (the Sangha within the boundary) has not permitted, in a case where the formal act of the Sangha has already been performed (kṛte karmaṇi); in the opposite case, it is taking what none of the Buddha's disciples has permitted.

[Four kinds of sexual misconduct

Consist of engaging in improper sexual activity.]

Treatise: The four kinds of sexual misconduct are: (1) committing adultery with a prohibited woman—with another man's wife, one's own mother, one's own daughter, or one's parents-in-law; (2) engaging in sexual intercourse with one's own wife in an unnatural manner; (3) doing so in unsuitable places, such as an exposed place, at a shrine (caitya), or in a remote place (araṇya, forest, desert); and (4) doing so at an unsuitable time (akāla), such as when the woman is pregnant, nursing a child, or observing a religious fast (niyamavatī). Some hold that an offense is committed only when the husband has consented to his wife's observance of the fast.

As in the case of killing, the qualification “provided that there is no mistake” also applies to sexual misconduct; this means that no course of karma is accomplished if one has intercourse with another man's wife while believing her to be one's own wife.

However, concerning a person who mistakenly believes another man's wife to be the wife of some particular person, there are conflicting opinions as to whether a course of karma is accomplished. Some hold that a course of karma is indeed accomplished, because merely “being another man's wife” suffices as the object of the preparatory action for this kind of karma, and also because the person is enjoying another man's wife. Others, however, hold that no course of karma is accomplished, because the object of the preparatory action is not the object actually enjoyed, just as in the case of killing the wrong person.

(Question) If one has intercourse with a bhikṣuṇī, does one commit sexual misconduct?

(Answer) As regards this offense, not even the ruler of a country—the king—can grant dispensation. The ruler of a country is himself prohibited from having intercourse when his wife is observing a religious fast; how much more so in the case of one who has gone forth.

(Question) Does intercourse with an unmarried maiden constitute a course of karma?

(Answer) If the maiden is betrothed, the offense is committed against the person to whom she is engaged; if she is not betrothed, the offense is committed against her guardian (rakṣitar); if she has no guardian, the offense is committed against the king (antato rājñaḥ). (Vibhāṣā, 113, 8)

[When, with a defiled mind and a conception contrary to fact, one speaks,

And another understands, false speech is accomplished.]

Treatise: The offense of lying consists of speech uttered with an intention or conception contrary to the meaning expressed (arthavāda), in the presence of someone who understands that meaning (the person deceived). If the hearer does not understand, this speech becomes frivolous speech (miscellaneous defiled speech) (saṃbhinnapralāpa).

(Question) Speech may consist of many syllables; which syllable belongs to the course of karma, and which belongs to the lie?

(Answer) The final syllable is the manifest action and is accompanied by non-manifest action; alternatively, it is the syllable upon which the hearer relies to understand the meaning. All the preceding syllables constitute the preparatory action for the offense of lying.

(Question) How should the expression “one who understands the meaning” (arthābhijña) be understood? Does it refer to the moment when the hearer understands the meaning, or to the hearer himself as being capable of understanding the meaning (abhijñātuṃ samartha)? In the first case, you must admit that the course of karma arises when the hearer understands the meaning; the course of karma would then be only non-manifest action, because the hearer understands the meaning through mental consciousness (manovijñāna), which follows auditory consciousness (śrotravijñāna), while the manifest action—that is, the verbal action—has already ceased simultaneously with the auditory consciousness.

In the latter case, this problem does not arise; but what does it mean to say that the hearer himself is “capable of understanding the meaning”?

(Answer) “Capable of understanding the meaning” refers to a person who knows the language and in whom auditory consciousness has arisen accordingly.

(Author of the Treatise) The preceding passage must be interpreted in some manner that avoids this criticism. The sutra (Dīrgha, 8, 13; Vibhāṣā, 171, 7; Aṅguttara, ii. 246, iv. 307) teaches that there are sixteen “modes of expression” (vyavahāra): the eight unwholesome modes (anārya, ignoble speech) are: having not seen, one says that one has seen; having not heard, known, or experienced, one says that one has heard, known, or experienced; having seen, one says that one has not seen; and having heard, known, or experienced, one says that one has not heard, known, or experienced. The eight wholesome modes (ārya, noble speech) are: having not seen, one says that one has not seen, and so forth.

(Question) What is the meaning of the terms “seen” (dṛṣṭa), “heard” (śruta), “known” (vijñāta), and “experienced” (mata)?

The verse replies:

[By visual consciousness, auditory consciousness, and mental consciousness,

Three kinds of objects are cognized;

In the order given above, they are called

The seen, the heard, the known, and the experienced.]

Treatise: That object which is cognized by visual consciousness is called “the seen,” … and those objects cognized by olfactory, gustatory, and tactile consciousness are all called “the experienced” (sensed).

(Question) How can this final explanation be proved?

(Vaibhāṣikas) Odors, tastes, and tangible objects, because they are indeterminate (avyākṛtya), are like a dead person; this is why they are called “experienced.”

(Sautrāntikas) On what basis do you maintain that the expression “experienced” refers to what is smelled, tasted, and touched?

(Vaibhāṣikas) On the evidence of the sutras. A sutra says: “Mālakīmātar, what do you think? With regard to visible forms that you have not seen, have never seen, do not now see, and do not think, ‘I shall see them,’ do you have desire (chanda), lust (rāga), craving (kāma), affection (preman), attachment (ālaya), longing (nikānti), or seeking (adhyeṣaṇā)?—No, Venerable Sir.—With regard to sounds that you have not heard … With regard to dharmas not known by your mind, do you desire or seek them?—No, Venerable Sir.—Mālakīmātar, with regard to what is seen, you should think only, ‘This is merely the seen’; with regard to what is heard, known, and experienced, you should think only, ‘This is merely the heard, merely the known, merely the experienced’ (matamātraṃ bhaviṣyati).”

(Buddhaghosa) [Visuddhimagga, 451] The terms “seen,” “heard,” and “known” are certainly used to refer respectively to visible forms, sounds, and dharmas; therefore, the term “experienced” (mata) refers to odors, tastes, and tangible objects.

Moreover, if this were not so, experiences relating to odors, tastes, and tangible objects would not have been mentioned in the teaching of the Blessed One.

(Sautrāntika) This sutra does not have the meaning you have just explained, nor does it confirm that your interpretation of the term “what is cognized” (mata) is correct. The Blessed One did not intend to give a definition of the characteristics of the four kinds of experience (vyavahāra): “what is seen, what is heard, what is known, and what is cognized.” His meaning is very clear: “Among the four kinds of experience—seeing, hearing, and so forth—each of which has as its six objects form, sound, odor, taste, tangible objects, and dharmas, you will know only that this kind of experience has occurred, that you have seen, heard, and so forth, without additionally imputing to the object any characteristic (nimitta) of being agreeable or disagreeable.”

(Question) If so, what are the characteristics of “what is seen,” “what is heard,” and so forth?

(Answer) Some masters (of the Sautrāntika) say that what is directly apprehended (an object directly realized in the present) by the five bodily faculties is “what is seen” (dṛṣṭa); what we know through communication from others is “what is heard” (śruta); what is apprehended through correct reasoning (yuktyanumāna) is “what is cognized” (mata); and what is apprehended by the mental faculty is “what is known” (vijñāta).

Thus, the five kinds of objects—form, sound, odor, taste, and tangible objects—may be seen, heard, cognized, and known; the sixth kind—dharmas—is not seen, with the exception of views. These are the four kinds of experience intended by the sutra. It is therefore mistaken to maintain that “what is cognized” does not refer to odors, tastes, and tangible objects, and that the kind of experience relating to these objects was not mentioned in the sutra.

It follows that the above argument of the Vaibhāṣikas cannot be sustained.

Other masters (the Pūrvācāryas, the former masters) say that what is seen is that which is apprehended by the visual faculty; what is heard is that which is apprehended by the auditory faculty and learned from others (paratas cāgamitam); what is cognized is that which one has personally ascertained; and what is known is that which one experiences within oneself (pratyātmaṃ pratisaṃvedita, pleasant feeling, and so forth), as well as that which is realized upon entering meditative concentration (adhigata), that is, personally realized.

(Question) If, through bodily expression rather than verbal expression, one causes another person to understand something different from what one has in mind, does one commit the offense of false speech?

(Answer) One still commits it, for the Fundamental Treatise says: “Can a person incur the offense of killing when the body has performed no act and made no attack?—One can, if speech has been uttered. Can one incur the offense of false speech when no speech has been uttered?—One can, if the body has moved. Can one incur the offenses of killing and false speech even though the body has not moved and no speech has been uttered?—One can; as when seers (ṛṣis), upon becoming angry, thereby commit the offense of killing, or when a bhikṣu remains silent during the recitation of the precepts at the poṣadha [and thereby commits the offense of false speech].”

(Question) How can a seer or a bhikṣu produce a course of karma that belongs both to manifest and nonmanifest action? Neither the seer nor the bhikṣu moves his body or utters speech, and therefore there is no manifest karma; yet nonmanifest karma belonging to the Desire Realm does not arise without manifest karma.

(Answer) This is a difficulty that [the Vaibhāṣika masters] must explain in detail.

False speech has been discussed above. Next comes the discussion of the remaining three offenses of verbal karma.

[Speech uttered from a defiled mind with the wish to divide others

Is malicious speech.

Speech that abuses another is insulting speech.

All defiled speech is frivolous speech.

According to one view, it is defiled speech distinct from the preceding three,

Such as boastful speech, singing, false doctrines, and so forth.]

Treatise: Words arising from a defiled mind and intended to divide others and cause dissension constitute malicious speech. The conditions required to constitute a course of karma, such as “the hearer understands, and there is no error,” as stated above, also apply here.

Speech arising from a defiled mind, intended to humiliate another, deliberately uttered for the other person to hear, in accordance with one’s intention to abuse, and understood by the other upon hearing it, constitutes insulting speech.

The stanza says, “All that is defiled,” but in fact this refers only to verbal karma. All defiled speech belongs to the category of frivolous speech (saṃbhinnapralāpa). Those who speak in this way are “speakers of frivolous speech” (saṃbhinnapralāpin); hence the stanza uses the term bhinnapralāpita instead of saṃbhinnapralāpa.

Other masters say that frivolous speech is defiled speech distinct from the preceding three kinds. False speech, malicious speech, and insulting speech are also defiled speech; nevertheless, the term “frivolous speech” is used to designate defiled language that is neither false, malicious, nor insulting. Examples include a bhikṣu who speaks boastfully merely to obtain offerings and the like; useless activities such as singing and recitation, in which idle and pointless words are employed merely to please others; and the recitation, through belief in false doctrines, of scriptures that do not embody right view.

Other cases must also be included, such as lamentation (parideva), joking chatter (saṃgaṇikā), and all words arising from a defiled mind that are neither false nor malicious nor intended to humiliate others.

(Question) In the time of a wheel-turning king there is also singing and recitation; why is this not called “frivolous speech”?

(Answer) Because at that time the contents of songs are inspired by a mind of renunciation (naiṣkramya), not by sensual desire. Or, according to one view, “frivolous speech” does exist at that time, because people still make marriage proposals and the like; nevertheless, such words do not constitute this course of karma.

[Desiring the possessions of others is the course of karma of covetousness;

Hostility toward sentient beings is the course of karma of ill will;

Holding that good and evil do not exist, and so forth,

Is the course of karma of wrong view.]

Treatise: The desire to seize another person’s property improperly (viṣameṇa), unjustly (anyāyena), whether by force or stealth, is called the course of karma of covetousness (abhidhyā). According to one view, all craving (tṛṣṇā) belonging to the Desire Realm is called the course of karma of covetousness, because the Sutra on the Five Hindrances (nīvaraṇas), when speaking of sensual desire (kāmacchanda), says: “Having abandoned covetousness (abhidhyā)…” (Saṃyukta, 29, 3; Dīrgha, iii. 49; Majjhima, iii. 3).

Other masters, however, say that wheel-turning kings and the inhabitants of Uttarakuru do not commit the course of karma of covetousness, although they have not relinquished craving belonging to the Desire Realm. It may therefore be admitted that all craving belonging to the Desire Realm is covetousness (abhidhyā), but not all covetousness constitutes a course of karma, because only the most manifestly gross unwholesome conduct is regarded as a course of karma.

The course of karma of ill will is hostility toward sentient beings. It is precisely because of this hostility that one forms the intention to harm others.

The karmic path of wrong view is the kind of view that holds that there is neither good nor evil; as the sutra states: “There is no giving, no sacrifice, no wholesome conduct, no unwholesome conduct, and so forth; there are no arhats in the world.” As the passage from the sutra above shows, wrong view includes the denial of karma, its results, and noble beings; however, the root verse cites only the first case.