阿毘達磨俱舍論

Part 10

(Question) What is ignorance (avidyā, non-comprehension)?

(Answer) It is that which is not knowledge.

(Question) If so, are the eye and so forth also ignorance?

(Answer) In that case, ignorance would be the absence of knowledge (vidyāya abhāvaḥ).

(Objection) That cannot be so. An absence is not a real dharma (dravya), whereas ignorance is a real dharma because it is a condition (pratyaya).

The verse replies:

[Ignorance is opposed to knowledge,

Like “non-friend,” “untruth,” and so forth.]

Treatise: When one says “non-friend” (amitra), this designates someone opposed to a friend—that is, an “enemy”—and not merely someone “different from a friend,” nor does it mean “the absence of a friend.” “Untruth” (anṛta) designates speech contrary to truthful speech—that is, a “lie”—and not merely speech “different from truthful speech,” nor does it mean “the absence of truthful speech.” Other cases, such as “non-Dharma” (adharma), “non-benefit” (anartha), and “improper action” (akārya), are the same: they are things opposed to Dharma, benefit, and proper action, rather than things merely different from them or their absence.

The same applies to ignorance (non-comprehension). It is opposed to Knowledge (comprehension) and is a distinct real dharma (dharmāntara); it does not mean “that which differs from comprehension” or “the absence of comprehension.” The sutra defines ignorance as the cause of the formations; this shows that ignorance is not merely a negation. There is also further evidence.

[Ignorance is a fetter and so forth.

It is not faulty prajñā, for faulty prajñā is view.

Because it is associated with view,

It is said to defile prajñā.]

Treatise: The sutra states that ignorance is a fetter (saṃyojana), a bondage (bandhana), a latent tendency (anuśaya), an outflow (āsrava), a yoke (ogha), a flood (yoga), and so forth. Therefore, ignorance cannot be merely a negation, nor can it be things that “are not knowledge,” such as the eye and so forth.

(Another explanation) The negative prefix nañ, with the form a-, can, however, mean “to make bad or inferior.” Thus, a bad wife and a bad son are commonly called “no wife” (akalatra) and “no son” (aputra). Why, then, could ignorance not be said to be a kind of corrupt understanding—that is, faulty prajñā (kuprajñā)?

(Author of the Treatise) Faulty prajñā, also called defiled prajñā, is one of the five wrong views, whereas ignorance is certainly not view, because ignorance and view are two distinct fetters (saṃyojanas).

(Sautrāntika) If so, ignorance would be a kind of defiled prajñā that does not possess the nature of view, such as the prajñā associated with craving (rāga).

(Author of the Treatise) That cannot be so, because view is associated with ignorance.

Delusion (moha), which is defined as having the characteristic of ignorance (avidyālakṣaṇo mohaḥ), is one of the universal defiled mental factors; and all universal defiled mental factors are associated with one another. Therefore, ignorance, under the name of delusion, is also associated with view—that is, with the five kinds of wrong view—which has prajñā as its essential nature. Thus, ignorance is not prajñā, because two real entities of prajñā (dve prajñādravye) cannot be associated with each other.

Furthermore, ignorance is defined as having the capacity to defile prajñā, as the sutra (Saṃyukta, 26, 30) states: “Because the mind is defiled by sensual craving, it is not liberated; because prajñā is defiled by ignorance, it is not purified.” By contrast, prajñā cannot be defiled by prajñā itself. If sensual craving defiles (upakleśana) the mind, then sensual craving cannot itself be mind, for they are different in kind; and if ignorance defiles prajñā, then ignorance likewise cannot be prajñā.

(Sautrāntika) Wholesome prajñā can nevertheless be intermingled (vyavakīryamāṇa) with defiled prajñā, namely, when moments of wholesome and defiled prajñā succeed one another. Similarly, the statement “because the mind is defiled by craving, it is not liberated” implies not that a mind must necessarily be associated with craving (rāgaparyavasthita = rāgasaṃprayukta), but merely that it is impaired and bound by craving (upahata). [Craving is not presently active (samudācaran);

rather, the traces of craving—the force of habituation by craving—that remain in the mind oppress it.] Once the practitioner has relinquished craving—[meaning that the forces deposited by the habituation of craving have been eliminated and the defiled condition of the mind has been transformed]—the mind is liberated at that very moment.

The same applies to prajñā: the statement “because prajñā is defiled by ignorance, it is not purified” means that prajñā is oppressed by ignorance, even when that prajñā is wholesome.

(Author of the Treatise) Who could prevent a master of the treatises from making distinctions? In any event, the essential nature of ignorance is not prajñā.

Those masters who maintain that ignorance consists of all afflictions are likewise refuted by the foregoing arguments. If ignorance were all afflictions, it could not be enumerated among the fetters (saṃyojanas) and so forth, nor could it be associated with view and the other afflictions. The sutra would then have no need to say, “Because the mind is defiled by craving, it is not liberated,” but would merely say, “Because the mind is defiled by ignorance, it is….” Here you may argue that the sutra speaks in this way because it intends to specify in precise detail which kind of ignorance defiles the mind, and that what it really means is, “Because the mind is defiled by ignorance that includes craving, it is not liberated.” If you argue thus,

then in the case of prajñā the sutra should likewise have specified which kind of ignorance obstructs the purification of prajñā; yet the sutra says only, “Because prajñā is defiled by ignorance, it is not purified.”

(Question) If ignorance is said to be a distinct real dharma rather than some kind of prajñā, this must be explained.

(Answer) Ignorance is non-comprehension (asaṃprakhyāna) of the Four Noble Truths, the Three Jewels, karma, and its results. [Saṃprakhyāna is a dharma resembling prajñā (discernment, prajñā) or cognition (knowing, jñāna).]

(Question) What is non-comprehension?

(Answer) Non-comprehension does not mean “that which is not comprehension,” nor does it mean “the absence of comprehension”; just as in the case of ignorance, ignorance does not mean “that which is not knowledge” or “the absence of knowledge.” Therefore, this non-comprehension is a distinct real dharma opposed to comprehension.

(Question) Very well; nevertheless, just as in the case of ignorance, you have still not clearly explained what the essential nature of this non-comprehension is.

(Answer) The foregoing definitions are entirely conventional definitions established according to the nature of things, not definitions of the particular essential nature of a dharma (svabhāvaprabhāvita nirdeśa), but only definitions based upon its function (karmaprabhāvita). For example, the eye is defined merely as “a kind of subtle, lucid matter that serves as the support for visual consciousness,” because this invisible kind of matter can be known only through inference. [The same applies to ignorance: the intrinsic nature of ignorance can be known only through its action (karman) or function (kāritra). Its action is opposed to that of knowledge; therefore, it is also a dharma that stands in opposition (vipakṣa) to knowledge.]

The Venerable Dharmatrāta (Bhadanta Dharmatrāta) gave another definition of ignorance: It is “the disposition of a sentient being based upon the conceit ‘I am’” (hữu tình thị ngã loại tánh, asmīti sattvamayanā).

(The Treatise Master) How does disposition (mayanā) differ from the conceit “I am” (asmimāna)?

(The Venerable) This was stated in the sutra (Saṃyukta, 34, 16): “I know, I see—and through the abandonment and complete, enduring comprehension (prahāṇa, parijñāna) of cravings, views (dṛṣṭi), dispositions (mayanās), attachments (abhiniveśa), and latent tendencies (anuśaya) regarding the notions of grasping at self (ātmagrāha), grasping at what belongs to self (mamagrāha), and the conceit ‘I am’ (asmimāna)—[one becomes] without appearance and attains final nirvana (parinirvāṇa).” [This sutra shows that disposition (mayanā)—used here in the singular because it is a distinct kind—is entirely different from the conceit “I am.”]

(The Treatise Master) Even if there is a dharma called disposition, how do we know that it is ignorance?

(The Venerable) Because this disposition cannot be identified with any other affliction; it is a distinct dharma apart from craving, views, and the conceit “I am.”

(The Treatise Master) Could disposition not be another kind of conceit distinct from the conceit “I am”? [For there are six or seven kinds of conceit.] However, to clarify this matter fully would require far too many troublesome words; therefore, let us end the discussion here.

As for name-and-form, form has already been discussed above; now only name will be discussed:

[Name consists of the four immaterial skandhas.]

Treatise: The four immaterial skandhas are feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness. They are called name (nāman) because “name” means “that which bends of itself” (namatīti nāma).

The immaterial skandhas bend—or, in other words, “turn toward” (pravartante) and “arise” (utpadyante)—toward objects (artha) by virtue of names, faculties, and objects.

In the phrase “by virtue of names,” the word “name” is used in its ordinary sense, namely, an appellation, [a designation-producing convention (saṃjñākaraṇa)]. A name is that which indicates and enables an object to be understood. Such an appellation sometimes denotes a collection (samudāyapratyāyaka), as in “cows, horses, and so forth,” and sometimes denotes an individual object (ekārtha), as in “form, taste, and so forth.”

(Question) Why is a designation-producing convention called “name”?

(Answer) Because a designation-producing convention causes the immaterial skandhas to turn toward their objects.

Some treatise masters explain that the immaterial skandhas are called name because, when the body perishes, these skandhas turn toward—that is, proceed to—another life.

The six ayatanas have been explained above; contact will now be explained:

[Contact is of six kinds, arising from the conjunction (of three dharmas).]

Treatise: Contact is of six kinds, from the first, eye-contact (cakṣuḥ), through the sixth, mental contact (manaḥsaṃsparśa). (Dīgha, iii. 243, etc.)

The contacts arise from the conjunction of three dharmas: faculty, object, and consciousness.

(Question) We can readily understand the conjunction of the five material faculties, their objects, and their corresponding consciousnesses, because all three kinds arise simultaneously. In the remaining case, however, the mental faculty (manas; mental dhatu, manodhātu) has ceased when mental consciousness arises, while the object (dharmas) of mental consciousness may belong to the future. How, then, can these three dharmas be conjoined?

(Answer) It is said that there is nevertheless conjunction because the faculty (manas) and the object (dharmas) are the causes and conditions of mental consciousness; or because the faculty, object, and consciousness together produce a single result, contact (sparśa).

(Question) What is the essential nature of contact?

(Answer) The treatise masters disagree on this matter.

Some treatise masters (the Sautrāntikas) say that contact is precisely the conjunction itself. The sutra (Saṃyukta, 3, 9) states: “The coming together, gathering, and conjunction of these dharmas is contact.”

Other treatise masters (the Sarvāstivādins) say: “Contact is a dharma associated with mind and distinct from the conjunction.”

The Sutra of the Six Sixes states: “Six internal ayatanas of consciousness (such as the eye and so forth); six external ayatanas of consciousness (such as forms and so forth); six consciousnesses; six contacts; six feelings; six cravings.” Thus, in addition to the six groups of external ayatanas and the six groups of consciousnesses, this sutra also speaks of six contacts [and therefore contacts are distinct real dharmas].

(Sautrāntika) If, merely because the sutra does not repeat itself, one maintains that feelings and cravings exist apart from the dharma-ayatana, which is the sixth internal ayatana of consciousness, then the separate presentation of the six contacts does not prove that contact is a dharma distinct from the conjunction of eye, form, and consciousness; ear, sound, and consciousness; and so forth.

(Sarvāstivādin) The separate presentation of the dharma-ayatana can still serve as proof, because in addition to feeling and craving, perception (saṃjñā) and many other dharmas also belong to the dharma-ayatana. However, because you maintain that contact is merely the conjunction of the three dharmas—faculty, object, and consciousness—in the absence of any triad of dharmas capable of forming a conjunction apart from the six faculties, six objects, and six consciousnesses, the mention of the six contacts (in the sense of “conjunction”) would then be meaningless.

We acknowledge that not all faculties and objects are causes of consciousness, but all consciousnesses are results of faculties and objects. [Thus, the mention of the six contacts would add nothing new to what preceded it if contacts were not distinct real dharmas], because you cannot maintain that the first two groups (namely, the six faculties and the six objects) are merely faculties and objects without any relation to consciousness.

(Sautrāntika) [Bhadanta Śrīlābha] Not every eye and form is a cause of eye-consciousness, nor is every eye-consciousness a result of eye and form. Therefore, when the sutra speaks of contact, the meaning of its definition, “the six groups of contact,” is precisely those dharmas—eye, form, and consciousness—that stand in mutual relations of cause and result.

Moreover, how can the Sarvāstivādins, who maintain that contact exists apart from the conjunction of the three dharmas, explain the following passage from the sutra: “The coming together, gathering, and conjunction of these three dharmas is contact”? Have the Sarvāstivādins failed to read this passage accurately, or do they regard it as merely figurative—that is, when the sutra says “gathering,” the reader should understand “the result of gathering”?

However, the foregoing discussion has led us too far afield.

According to the Abhidharma masters, contact is a dharma possessing its own distinct substance.

[Five kinds are resistant;

The sixth is designation-enhancing.]

Treatise: The five kinds—eye-contact, ear-contact, and so forth, that is, the contact of the eye faculty, the contact of the ear faculty, and so forth—have resistant faculties (sapratigha) as their supports and are therefore called resistant contacts; thus, these five kinds are named after their supports.

The sixth kind, mental contact—that is, the contact of the mental faculty—is called designation-enhancing (abhivacana), [meaning the kind of contact that enriches language]. Why is this so? Because designation-enhancing expression is name (an appellation), and name is the supreme object of the kind of contact associated with mental consciousness. As the sutras and treatises have said: “Through eye-consciousness, one knows the color blue but does not know that it is called blue; through mental consciousness, one knows the color blue and also knows that it is called blue.” For this reason, it is said to be supreme.

Thus, the sixth kind of contact is named after its distinctive object.

One theory holds that only mental consciousness turns toward an object and possesses the capacity to apply itself to that object by means of language and expression (adhikṛtya vacanam = vṛcanam avadhārya). Therefore, mental consciousness itself is verbal designation (that is, it is mental consciousness itself that enriches language); and only the contact associated with this mental consciousness is called contact of verbal designation (adhivacanasaṃparśa).

The six kinds of contact mentioned above are further divided, according to their respective associations, into eight kinds:

[Knowledge, ignorance, neither knowledge nor ignorance,

Pertaining to the uncontaminated, the defiled, and the other kinds;

Two contacts associated with craving and hatred;

Three contacts conducive to pleasant feeling, and so forth.]

Treatise: There is contact associated with knowledge, that is, with uncontaminated wisdom; there is contact associated with ignorance, that is, with defiled non-knowledge (kliṣṭa ajñāna); and there is contact associated with neither knowledge nor ignorance (naivavidyā-nāvidyā), that is, with wholesome contaminated wisdom or morally neutral wisdom.

A portion of the contact of ignorance, which is associated with all afflictions and is always active, is further divided into two kinds: contact of craving and contact of hatred, that is, contact associated respectively with craving and hatred.

All contacts are further divided into three kinds: contact conducive to pleasant feeling (sukhavedya), contact conducive to painful feeling (duḥkhavedya), and contact conducive to neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling (asukhāduḥkhavedya). These contacts are so named because they are conducive (hita) to pleasure, pain, and neither pain nor pleasure [that is, conducive to a feeling that is pleasant (sukhavedanīya), and so forth], or because “that” is experienced or can be experienced (vedyate tad vedayitum vā śakyam). Here, the word “that” refers to feeling (vedanā). A contact in which there is pleasure to be experienced (sukhaṃ vedyam) is precisely that which is called contact conducive to pleasant feeling (); for in it there truly is a feeling (vedanā) belonging to pleasure.

The explanation of all six kinds (or sixteen kinds) of contact is now complete; next comes the exposition of feeling.

[From these arise six feelings:

Five belong to the body, and one to the mind.]

Treatise: From the six kinds of contact described above arise six kinds of feeling, namely, the feelings born of eye-contact (cakṣuḥsaṃsparśa), and so forth.

Five feelings arise from eye-contact, ear-contact, nose-contact, tongue-contact, and body-contact. Because their supports are the bodily faculties, they all belong to the body. The sixth feeling arises from mental contact; because its support is the mind (citta, cetas), it belongs to the mind.

(Sautrāntika) Does feeling arise after contact, or simultaneously with contact?

(Reply) The Vaibhāṣikas hold that feeling and contact arise simultaneously and are coexistent causes (sahabhūhetu).

(Sautrāntika) How can two dharmas that arise together at the same time (sahotpanna) be respectively “that which is capable of producing” (janaka) and “that which is produced” (janita, janya)?

(Vaibhāṣika) Why could this not be so?

(Sautrāntika) When two dharmas arise at the same time, how can “that which is capable of producing” still exercise any function with respect to “that which is produced” (since the latter has already arisen at that time)?

(Vaibhāṣika) This reasoning merely restates the proposition that “of two dharmas arising together, one cannot be the producer and the other the produced.”

(Sautrāntika) Thus, according to your doctrine, there is nevertheless mutual causal production between two dharmas arising at the same time.

(Vaibhāṣika) There is no error in this, for we do indeed accept that “dharmas which are effects of one another may also be causes of one another.”

(Sautrāntika) Although you maintain this position, the sutras do not accept it. The sutra says, “Because there is eye-contact, there is feeling born of eye-contact”; it does not say, “Because there is feeling born of eye-contact, there is eye-contact.” Moreover, the doctrine that “two dharmas arising simultaneously can be causes and effects of one another” contradicts the nature of causality. A dharma that produces another dharma cannot be simultaneous with the dharma it produces. It is just as the seed precedes the sprout, milk precedes cream, impact precedes sound, and the mental faculty precedes mental consciousness.

(Vaibhāṣika) We do not deny that the cause sometimes precedes the effect; nevertheless, we affirm that cause and effect may be simultaneous, as in the cases of the eye faculty, visible form, and eye-consciousness; and of the great elements and derived matter.

(Sautrāntika) We do not accept the examples just given, because the eye faculty and visible form precede eye-consciousness; and although the great elements and derived matter are simultaneous, they both arise together from a preceding group of causes and conditions.

(Vaibhāṣika) Contact and feeling arise simultaneously, as in the case of a sprout and its shade.

[The Sautrāntika does not reply, because the question of shade has already been discussed above.]

Another master (Bhadanta Śrīlābha) says that feeling arises after contact. In the first moment there are the faculty and the object; then, in the second moment, consciousness arises. Contact is precisely the conjunction, that is, the causal-and-resultant relation, of the three dharmas: the faculty, the object, and consciousness. Finally, in the third moment, feeling arises from contact as its cause.

(Vaibhāṣika) If this were so, where there is consciousness there would be no feeling, because consciousness is present in the second and third moments, and consequently there would be no feeling in the third moment. Moreover, not all consciousnesses would be contact, because contact would exist only in the first two moments.

(Śrīlābha) It is not so. A feeling having a preceding contact as its cause arises in the moment of a subsequent contact; therefore, every contact is accompanied by feeling.

(Vaibhāṣika) Then a contact and a feeling relating to different objects would be simultaneous; that is, a feeling arising from a preceding contact with visible form would exist in the moment of a second contact with sound. Yet the feeling produced by contact with visible form must have visible form as its object, because a feeling cannot have an object different from that of the consciousness with which it is associated [and this consciousness, being produced by visible form, must also have visible form as its object]. Thus you have imposed an unacceptable conclusion.

(Śrīlābha) We say that consciousness is not always contact and is not always accompanied by feeling. A consciousness of visible form, if simultaneous with bodily contact, is not contact but is nevertheless accompanied by feeling. A consciousness of sound is itself contact but is not accompanied by feeling.

(Vaibhāṣika) This doctrine does not accord with the rule (niyama) governing the universally concomitant mental factors (mahābhūmikas). According to this rule, the ten dharmas—feeling, contact, perception, and so forth—are associated with every mind.

(Śrīlābha) On what basis is this rule established?

(Vaibhāṣika) On the basis of the Prakaraṇa (2, 12).

(Śrīlābha) We take the sutras, not the treatises, as our standard. For the Blessed One said that the principal refuge is the sutra (sūtraṃ pratisaraṇam) (Saṃyukta, 8, 4); alternatively, we have given an interpretation of the doctrine of the universally concomitant mental factors different from yours.

(Vaibhāṣika) If so, what is the meaning of “universally concomitant mental factors”?

(Sautrāntikas) There are three spheres: ⁽¹⁾ the sphere with investigation and analysis (savitarkasavicāra), comprising the Desire Realm and the first dhyāna; ⁽²⁾ the sphere without investigation but with analysis (avitarkavicāra), which is the intermediate concentration; and ⁽³⁾ the sphere without investigation or analysis (avitarkasavicāra), which is the second dhyāna, and so forth. Again, there are three spheres: wholesome (kuśala), unwholesome (akuśala), and indeterminate (avyākṛta), that is, wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate dharmas.

Again, there are three spheres: those of learners, those of non-learners, and those of neither learners nor non-learners, that is, the uncontaminated dharmas belonging to learners and non-learners, and contaminated dharmas. Mental factors found in all these spheres are called universal mental factors (such as sensation and volition); factors found only in the wholesome sphere are called universal wholesome mental factors (kuśalamahābhūmika) (such as faith, and so forth); and factors found only in the defiled sphere are called universal factors of the great afflictions (kleśamahābhūmika) (such as ignorance, and so forth).

Nevertheless, all these factors bear the names universal, universally wholesome, and universally afflictive because they may be found in a sphere to which they belong. It is erroneous to maintain that all these factors necessarily arise simultaneously. Sensation, for example, is found in every sphere, as are perception, volition, and so forth; but this does not mean that every state of mind contains all such factors as sensation, perception, and so forth.

Some masters observe that the factors belonging to the universal unwholesome mental factors did not formerly exist but were added only later; the scripture cited above alludes to this issue.

(Vaibhāṣikas) If sensation follows contact, how can you explain the following passage from scripture: “Conditioned by the eye and visible form, eye-consciousness arises; the conjunction of these three dharmas is contact; sensation, perception, and volition arise together (co-arise, sahajāta)”? (Saṃyukta, 11, 2; 13, 4).

(Sautrāntikas) This scripture says that sensation, perception, and volition arise together; it does not say that they arise together with contact. Therefore, we say that these factors arise together with one another. Moreover, we find that the expression “together” (saha) is used not only to denote simultaneity (yugapadbhāva), but also to denote immediate succession (samanatara).

For example, the scripture (Saṃyukta, 27, 25) says: “Cultivate the factor of awakening of mindfulness accompanied (sahagata) by a mind of loving-kindness”; yet loving-kindness always belongs to mundane dharmas and certainly cannot be simultaneous (samavadhāna) with the factors of awakening, which are always supramundane dharmas. It follows that scripture not only fails to prove that sensation is simultaneous with contact, but also does not affirm that sensation, perception, and volition are associated or simultaneous with consciousness (that is, eye-consciousness, and so forth).

(Sarvāstivādins) Yet there is still a scripture (Madhyama, 58, 12) which says: “Sensation, perception, volition, and consciousness—these dharmas are intermingled with one another (saṃsṛṣṭa) and are not separate from one another (visaṃsṛṣṭa).” Intermingled means “arisen together” (sahotpanna). From this we conclude that there is no case in which consciousness, sensation, perception, or volition does not arise simultaneously with the others.

(Sarvāstivādins) Consider the meaning of the word “intermingled.” The scripture you cited above contains the passage: “What I feel (sensation, vedayate), I think about (volition, cetayate); what I think about, I perceive (saṃjānāti); what I perceive, I discern (consciousness, vijānāti).” In other words, the same object serves as the cognitive object (ālambana) of sensation, volition, perception, and consciousness. Thus, the question here is whether sensation, volition, and perception are considered intermingled because they have the same object [which is precisely our position], or because they arise together, as you claim.

(Vaibhāṣikas) The word “intermingled” denotes “things arising simultaneously.” The above scripture says that “life (āyus) and warmth (uṣmaka) are intermingled with one another.” Thus, they can be intermingled only because they are simultaneous, not because they share the same object, for they have no object. Furthermore, scripture also says: “The conjunction of the three dharmas is contact.” How, then, could consciousness exist without the conjunction of the three dharmas? How could there be a conjunction of the three dharmas without contact? Therefore, every consciousness is accompanied by contact, and every contact is accompanied by sensation, and so forth.

But this controversy has taken us too far afield, so let us return to our subject. The preceding has been only a brief explanation of mental sensation. [A detailed explanation follows.]

[This sensation is of eighteen kinds

Because of the different mental approaches.]

Treatise: The mental sensation explained above is of eighteen different kinds because there are six approaches (upavicāras) of joy (saumanasya), six approaches of sorrow (daumanasya), and six approaches of equanimity (upekṣā). The approaches of joy are connected respectively with visible forms, sounds, odors, tastes, tangible objects, and dharmas. The same applies to the approaches of sorrow and equanimity.

Why are eighteen distinct kinds differentiated? This question is raised because, considered in terms of intrinsic nature—that is, the essential nature of sensation—there are only three kinds: the approach of joy, the approach of sorrow, and the approach of equanimity. Considered in terms of association, there is only one, because all are associated with mental consciousness. Considered in terms of their objects, however, there are six, namely visible forms, sounds, and so forth.

There is no diversity of objects (asaṃbhinnālambana) among the first fifteen kinds of approach. The objects of the mental approaches relating to visible forms, sounds, and so forth are only visible forms, sounds, and so forth, respectively. As for the three approaches relating to dharmas—that is, the three approaches of joy, and so forth, relating to dharmas—there is diversity of objects. They may take as their objects the distinct dharmas belonging to the five sensory objects; in this case their objects are neither diverse nor commingled (asaṃbhinna, amiśra). They may also take as their objects one, two, three, or as many as six groups of dharmas (visible forms, sounds, odors, tastes, tangible objects, and dharmas); in this case their objects are commingled.

(Question) What does “mental approach” mean? Why are the different kinds of mental sensation, such as joy and so forth, called mental approaches?

(Answer) The Vaibhāṣikas gave the following inaccurate explanation of this matter: “Because the sensations of joy, sorrow, and equanimity rely upon the mind to take (upavica = ālambante) visible forms, sounds, and so forth as their objects.” Another opinion holds that “the sensations of joy, sorrow, and equanimity influence the mind, causing it repeatedly to take (upavicārayanti) visible forms, sounds, and so forth as its objects.” It is because of the sensations of joy, and so forth, that the mind repeatedly seeks out visible forms, sounds, and so forth.

(Objection) Why are bodily sensations not called mental approaches?

(Explanation) Bodily sensation does, of course, also have the mind as a support, but it has another support as well: the material faculties. Moreover, it lacks the capacity for discrimination (vikalpa), just like the eye-consciousness and so forth with which it is associated; therefore, it is not an approach (upavicārikā), that is, a capacity for “examination” (saṃtīrikā).

(Objection) Why, then, is the pleasant sensation of the third dhyāna, which belongs to a realm possessing only the mind, not classified as a mental approach?

(Explanation) According to the Vaibhāṣikas, this is because initially—that is, while still in the Desire Realm—there is no pleasant sensation belonging to the mental sphere [in the Desire Realm, pleasure is only a bodily sensation]; and because there is no approach of pain (duḥkha-upavicāra) opposed to the imagined approach of pleasure.

(Objection) If proximal investigation belongs only to the mental plane (manobhūmika), why does the sutra (Madhyama, 22, 3) say: “After seeing forms by means of the eye faculty, one investigates (upavicārati) forms capable of giving rise to pleasurable feeling (conducive to joy, saumanasyasthānīya).” Thus, the sutra clearly speaks of the connection between the eye faculty and proximal investigation.

(Sarvāstivāda) The Blessed One taught this because he wished to indicate (abhisaṃdadhāti) that proximal investigation can be engendered by the five groups of consciousness. Nevertheless, proximal investigation belongs only to the mental plane, just as in the case of the contemplation of impurity. Although this contemplation is initiated by eye-consciousness, it still belongs to the mental plane, because wherever there is contemplation of impurity, there must necessarily be concentration.

Moreover, the sutra says, “After seeing forms…” rather than “While seeing forms….” This proves that the preceding objection is untenable. There are still cases in which there is proximal investigation concerning forms without seeing forms, and so forth. [For example, when one joyfully “investigates” forms and so forth merely upon hearing others speak of them.] If this were not so, a being in the Desire Realm could not “investigate” the forms, sounds, and tangible objects of the Form Realm, which that being cannot perceive; nor could a being in the Form Realm investigate the odors and tastes of the Desire Realm.

The sutra says, “After seeing forms… one investigates forms,” because such investigation will be more “manifest” (clear, vyakta) when its object is something that has been seen. Certainly, after seeing a form, one may still investigate sounds and so forth [that accompany (sahacara) that form]; and there would then be an investigation (proximal investigation, upavicāra) of a sound that had not been heard. However, to avoid confusion, the sutra speaks only of the correlation between the faculties and their corresponding objects.

(Question) The objects of form, sound, and so forth are described by the sutra as “capable of giving rise to pleasurable feeling, and so forth” (conducive to joy, saumanasyasthānīya). Does this mean that the essential nature of these objects is itself the feelings of joy and so forth?

(Answer) No. The same object may be “conducive to joy” in one case and “conducive to sorrow” (daumanasyasthānīya) in another. Everything depends upon the “continuum” (asti saṃtānaṃ niyamya), that is, upon the characteristics of a particular mind.

(Question) How many mental proximal investigations are connected with the Desire Realm (kāmapratisaṃyukta, kāmāvacara)? Which realm constitutes the object of a mental proximal investigation belonging to the Desire Realm? And what is the case for the other two realms?

[All eighteen mental proximal investigations of the Desire Realm take the Desire Realm as their object;

Of these, twelve take the Form Realm as their object;

Three take the Formless Realm as their object.

The twelve mental proximal investigations of the first two dhyānas take the Desire Realm as their object;

Of these, eight take their own realm as their object; two take the Formless Realm as their object.

The six mental proximal investigations of the last two dhyānas all take the Desire Realm as their object;

Of these, four take their own realm as their object; one takes the Formless Realm as its object.

In the threshold concentration of the first Formless attainment,

There are four mental proximal investigations that take the Form Realm as their object; one takes its own realm as its object.

In the fundamental concentrations of the four levels and the three terminal concentrations,

There is only one mental proximal investigation, which takes its own realm as its object.]

Treatise: Eighteen mental proximal investigations arise in beings of the Desire Realm, and all of them may take the Desire Realm as their object. Twelve of these may take the Form Realm as their object, excluding the three mental proximal investigations—joy, sorrow, and equanimity—relating to odor and the three relating to taste, because odor and taste do not exist in the Form Realm. Three of them, namely the proximal investigations of dharmas, may take the Formless Realm as their object; the remaining fifteen cannot take the Formless Realm as their object, because that realm has no form, sound, and so forth.

As for the Formless Realm, it is divided into two categories: the first two dhyānas and the last two dhyānas.

The Form Realm has no proximal investigation of sorrow. In the first two dhyānas, there are six proximal investigations of joy and six proximal investigations of equanimity. These twelve may take the Desire Realm as their object. Eight of them may take the Form Realm as their object, excluding the proximal investigations relating to odor and taste. Two may take the Formless Realm as their object: the proximal investigations of dharmas associated with joy and equanimity.

The last two dhyānas have neither proximal investigation of sorrow nor proximal investigation of joy. Thus, they have only six proximal investigations of equanimity, which take as their objects the forms, sounds, odors, tastes, tangible objects, and dharmas of the Desire Realm; the forms, sounds, tangible objects, and dharmas of the Form Realm; and the dharmas of the Formless Realm.

The Formless Realm is likewise divided into two parts: the threshold concentration of the Sphere of Infinite Space (ākāśānantyāyatana) and the subsequent levels of concentration.

The expression “formless threshold” (arūpisāmanta) in the stanza means the threshold of the Sphere of Infinite Space (ākāśānantyāyatanasāmanta). At this level of concentration, there are four proximal investigations. They are the proximal investigations of equanimity concerning the forms, sounds, tangible objects, and dharmas of the fourth dhyāna.

This is the opinion of the masters who maintain that the mind in this concentration has individually differentiated objects (vyavacchinnālambana), that is, it separately investigates each object—form, sound, and so forth. Other masters, however, maintain that this mind has a collective object (paripiṇḍitālambana), because it contemplates all five skandhas of the fourth dhyāna together, without distinguishing each skandha separately.

According to these masters, this concentration therefore has only one kind of proximal investigation that takes the fourth dhyāna as its object: the proximal investigation of dharmas with a mixed object (saṃmiśrālambana). At this level of concentration, there is also only one proximal investigation of dharmas whose object is the Formless Realm.

In the Formless Realm proper, also called the “fundamental” (maula), there is only one kind of proximal investigation: the proximal investigation of dharmas that takes the Formless Realm as its object. The question of why the mind in the fundamental concentrations of the Formless Realm does not take the lower realms as its object will be discussed later.

(Question) Can mental proximal investigation be undefiled?

The stanza answers:

[The eighteen proximal investigations are always defiled.]

Treatise: No proximal investigation is undefiled.

A being born in the Desire Realm (kāmadhātūpapanna) who has not attained a wholesome mind (kuśalacitta) belonging to the Form Realm [upon entering the Preliminary Concentration (anāgamya), and who therefore has not become detached from the Desire Realm and cannot enter the dhyānas] possesses: ⁽¹⁾ the eighteen proximal investigations belonging to the plane of the Desire Realm (kāmadhātu-bhūmika); ⁽²⁾ eight proximal investigations belonging to the first and second dhyānas (comprising seven proximal investigations of joy and four proximal investigations of equanimity, whose objects are form, sound, tangible objects, and dharmas).

The proximal investigations of joy and equanimity whose objects are the odors and tastes of the Desire Realm and which arise in the dhyānas are not defiled [because the practitioner who has attained dhyāna has become detached from the Desire Realm]; therefore, this being does not possess these proximal investigations [because a being belonging to a lower plane possesses only the defiled dharmas of higher planes]; ⁽³⁾ four proximal investigations of equanimity belonging to the last two dhyānas; and ⁽⁴⁾ one proximal investigation of dharmas belonging to the Formless Realm, which is also defiled.

If that being has attained a mind belonging to the Form Realm [upon entering the Preliminary Concentration] but has not yet become detached from the Desire Realm, the being possesses: ⁽¹⁾ the eighteen proximal investigations belonging to the Desire Realm; ⁽²⁾ ten proximal investigations belonging to the first dhyāna, namely four defiled proximal investigations of joy, excluding those whose objects are odor and taste, and six proximal investigations of equanimity belonging to the Preliminary Concentration; ⁽³⁾ as for the remaining dhyānas and the Formless Realm, the case is the same as above.

The other cases may be understood according to the foregoing principles.

A being born in the Form Realm possesses only one proximal investigation belonging to the Desire Realm: the proximal investigation of equanimity regarding dharmas, associated with the mind that is the fruit of supernormal knowledge (nirmāṇacitta).

(The author of the treatise:) The foregoing is the Vibhāṣā's explanation of the approaches of mental cultivation; however, in our view, this is not what the scripture intends to present. A person who has become free from attachment (vitarāga) with regard to an object such as visible form, and so forth, cannot be said to initiate an approach of mental cultivation toward that object. Not all joy, and so forth, belong to the approaches of mental cultivation, even if they are contaminated.

They belong to the approaches of mental cultivation only when they are defiled (sāṃkleśika); according to the scripture, this means when “there is desire, aversion, or equanimity not guided by correct discernment (apratisaṃkhyāyaupekṣate).” It was precisely to counteract (pratipakṣa, prativyūha) these approaches of mental cultivation that the “six modes of abiding,” or “six methods of constant abiding” (six constant abidings, satavihāra), were taught (Dīgha, iii. 150;

Vibhāṣā, 36, 15): “Having seen visible forms by means of the eye faculty, one neither delights in them nor hates them, but abides in equanimity, with right mindfulness and right comprehension….” We maintain that our interpretation is reasonable because it is evident that an arhat is not without wholesome worldly joyful feeling (which is, of course, contaminated) when taking a dharma (dharmāyatana) as an object; and what must be prevented is precisely the defiled (sāṃkleśika) kind of joy that constitutes an approach of mental cultivation by the mind.

Furthermore, if joy, sorrow, and equanimity are each divided into the two cases of dependence upon attachment (gredhāśrita, abhiṣvangāśrita) and dependence upon renunciation (naiṣkramya), they constitute the sixteen “statements of the Teacher” (śāstṛpada); they are so called because this division was taught by the Great Teacher.

As one of the factors of existence (bhavānga), feeling has many other meanings besides those just discussed above.

The remaining factors of existence, however, will not be explained here.

[What remains has already been discussed or will be discussed]

Treatise: Consciousness and the six sense bases were explained in the first chapter; formations and existence will be explained in the fourth chapter; craving and birth will be explained in the fifth chapter.

It was previously said that dependent origination consists of afflictions, karma, and the basis of existence.

[Afflictions are described here

As seeds, as a dragon (nāga),

As grass, roots, trees, and branches,

And as the husk of grain.

Karma is like unhusked rice,

Like an herb and like a flower.

The basis of existence, the result of maturation,

Is like food and drink.]

Treatise: From afflictions arise afflictions, karma, and the basis of existence, just as from a seed arise the trunk, leaves, and so forth.

Just as the water in a lake inhabited by a dragon never dries up, so the ocean of birth, guarded by the dragon of affliction, never dries up.

So long as their roots have not been severed, trees continue to put forth shoots and leaves even though their leaves and branches are cut off again and again. Likewise, so long as the afflictions have not been completely uprooted, the destinies (gati) continue to proliferate.

Trees produce flowers and fruits at different times; likewise, afflictions do not give rise to afflictions, karma, and the basis of existence on only a single occasion.

A grain of rice, even when otherwise intact, cannot germinate once its husk has been removed; likewise, karma must possess the husk of affliction in order to produce fruit in a new life.

Karma is like a grain of rice that still has its husk. Just as an herb withers when its fruit has ripened, once karma has ripened, it cannot ripen a second time. And just as a flower is the proximate cause of the production of fruit, karma is the proximate cause of the production of the result of maturation.

Food and drink cannot produce food and drink; they are merely consumed. Likewise, the basis of existence is the result of maturation. A result of maturation cannot produce a new result of maturation, for if it could, liberation would be impossible.

The continuum (saṃtāna) of the skandhas in its conditioned process is simply a succession of the four kinds of existence (bhava) that we explained previously: antarābhava, upapattibhava, purvakālabhava, and maraṇabhava.

[Of the four kinds of existence, birth-existence is defiled

By the afflictions of its own plane;

The other kinds of existence may be of all three types.

Existence in the Formless Realm has three kinds of existence.]

Treatise: Of the four kinds of existence, birth-existence is always defiled (kliṣṭa), never wholesome or morally indeterminate (kuśala, avyākṛta). When birth-existence begins on a particular plane (bhūmi: such as the Desire Realm, the first dhyāna, and so forth), all the afflictions of that plane may defile it. The Abhidharma masters (Ābhidhārmikas) say: “Among the afflictions (kleśa), there is none that does not defile the mind at rebirth-linking (pratisaṃbandha); nevertheless, rebirth occurs because of the afflictions, and not through the independent arising of the secondary defilements [such as envy, avarice, and concealment, which are associated only with ignorance].”

Although at this stage—that is, at the time of death (maraṇāvasthā)—both body and mind may be enfeebled (mandikā), when a person has habitually possessed a certain kind of affliction, that affliction, being induced in the same manner, also becomes active at the time of death.

The remaining kinds of existence (intermediate existence, prior-time existence, and death-existence) may be wholesome, defiled, or morally indeterminate.

(Question:) Do all four kinds of existence occur in the Formless Realm?

(Answer:) In the Formless Realm there are only three kinds, intermediate existence being excluded. Thus, all four kinds exist in the Desire Realm and the Form Realm.

Dependent origination has now been explained; next comes the explanation of how sentient beings, once born, continue to exist.

[Sentient beings subsist on nutriment.

In the Desire Realm, edible nutriment comprises three sense bases.

The visible-form base is not nutriment,

Because it does not nourish the faculties or those who are liberated.

Contact, volition, and consciousness are nutriment

In the three realms when they are contaminated.

(The names of intermediate existence:) Mind-made, arisen together,

Odor-eater, intermediate existence, and arising.

The first two kinds of nutriment nourish

The supporting basis and that which is supported in this life.

The latter two, respectively,

Lead to and produce future existence.]

Treatise: The scripture says: “The Blessed One has proclaimed one principle that he himself knew and saw: all sentient beings subsist on nutriment.” (Saṃyukta, 17, 20; Ekottara, 41, 11).

There are four kinds of nutriment: edible nutriment (kavaḍīkāra), contact (sparśa), volition (manaḥsaṃcetanā), and consciousness (vijñāna). (Saṃyutta, 15, 6; Vibhāṣā, 120, 15; Dīgha, iii. 228)

Edible nutriment is of two kinds: coarse (audārika) and subtle (sūkṣma). The subtle kind is the nutriment of beings in the intermediate existence (who subsist on odors and are therefore called Gandharvas), of devas, and of human beings at the beginning of a cosmic age (prāthamakālpika); for this kind of nutriment, like oil penetrating sand, permeates the entire body and does not turn into excrement. Alternatively, it is called subtle because it is the nutriment of subtle beings, such as moisture-born beings, newly born beings (bālala) [fetuses], and so forth.

Only beings who have eliminated craving for edible nutriment can be born in the two higher realms; therefore, this kind of nutriment exists only in the Desire Realm.

Material food consists of odor, taste, and tangibles, because only these three can be divided into morsels (kavaḍa) and swallowed (abhyavaharaṇa = gilana). This act is performed through the two channels of the nose and mouth, thereby allowing the various constituents of material food to be absorbed.

(Question) How can odor, etc., present in shade (chāya), in hot sunlight (ātapa), in flame (jvālā), and in light (from a jewel) be called food, when in these cases odor, etc., cannot be divided into morsels and swallowed?

(Answer) According to tradition, the statement that “food consists of three ayatanas (āyatanas)” refers to the general case. [Odor present in shade, etc., is not food; but taken collectively, odor is also food.] We think, however, that although odor cannot be swallowed, it nevertheless contributes to the continued existence of beings (sthitim āharanti, yāpanām āharanti), just as other kinds of food do; therefore, odor may still be regarded as a subtle kind of food, as in the case of bathing and anointing (snānābhyangavat).

(Question) Why is the form ayatana (rūpāyatana)—that is, color and shape—not food, when portions of it can be swallowed?

(Answer) To be food, something must nourish the faculties and the great elements that serve as their supports. Yet visible forms (rūpa), when swallowed—that is, when food is placed in the mouth and swallowed—do not nourish their faculty, the faculty of sight, or the great elements that support the faculty of sight. Nor can the form ayatana nourish the other faculties, because it is not their object.

Certainly, so long as one sees forms, they may give rise to joy and pleasure; in this case, however, what constitutes food is not the objects belonging to form, but rather the kinds of contact that take these objects as their objects. The explanation we have given here is confirmed by the fact that agreeable visible objects are of no benefit to liberated beings when they see them. [If the form ayatana performed the function of food and drink when seen, it would presumably also benefit those liberated from desire for material food—that is, non-returners and arhats—just as odor, taste, etc., benefit these noble ones when they perceive them.]

Contact is a dharma that arises from the conjunction of three dharmas; volition (manaḥsaṃcetanā) is mental karma (mānasa karma); consciousness is the consciousness skandha. These three kinds of food are exclusively contaminated, and they exist in all three realms.

(Question) Why are they not food when they are uncontaminated?

(Answer) The Vaibhāṣika masters explain: “Food means that which causes existence (bhava) to increase, whereas uncontaminated dharmas have the function of destroying existences.” This explanation accords with the sutra, for the sutra says that “food serves to sustain ‘beings that have come into existence’ (bhūta), enabling them to remain (sthiti) and continue (yāpanna), and to support beings seeking rebirth (saṃbhavaiṣin) (Ekottara, 31, 6; Saṃyutta, ii. 11).” But when contact, volition, and consciousness are uncontaminated, they cannot perform these two functions.

(Question) “Beings that have come into existence” are beings that have already been born; but what is meant by “beings seeking rebirth”?

(Answer) This refers to beings in intermediate existence. The Blessed One spoke of this kind of being under five different names:

⁽¹⁾ Mind-made (manomaya), because it arises from mind (manonirjātatvāt) and forms itself (bhāvāt) without depending upon (anupādāya) any external factors such as semen, blood, and so forth.

⁽²⁾ Seeking rebirth, because the nature of this being is to seek the place of rebirth-existence (upapattibhava).

⁽³⁾ Odor-eater (gandharva), because it feeds upon odor.

⁽⁴⁾ Intermediate existence (antarābhava), because these skandhas lie between two destinies.

⁽⁵⁾ Arising (abhinirvṛtti), because its arising (nirvṛtti)—that is, its birth (janman)—is directed toward rebirth-existence. The sutra says: “Having arisen (abhinirvartya) with a suffering body (a perishable individual existence), one will be born into a suffering world (a perishable world).” The sutra also says: “There is one who has severed the fetters leading to arising (abhinirvṛtti) (fetters of arising), but has not severed the fetters leading to rebirth (upapatti) (fetters of rebirth)”;

it then gives four cases: ⁽¹⁾ A noble one who has become detached from the Desire Realm and the Form Realm while belonging to the class of non-returners has severed the fetters leading to arising (abhinirvṛtti), or intermediate existence, because he will no longer be reborn in the realms (dhātus) where rebirth is initiated by a body of intermediate existence;

but he has not severed the fetters leading to rebirth (upapatti), because he will still be reborn in the Formless Realm. ⁽²⁾ A non-returning noble one who is certain to attain nirvana in the intermediate existence (one who attains parinirvana in the intermediate state, antarā-parinirvāyin) is still bound to arising (abhinirvṛtti), but is liberated from rebirth (upapatti). ⁽³⁾ An arhat has severed both kinds of fetters. ⁽⁴⁾ All those who do not belong to the cases described above have severed neither of these two kinds of fetters.

Another explanation holds that “bhūta” refers to arhats, while “seeking rebirth” refers to beings possessing craving (craving for existence, satṛṣṇā)—that is, those who will be reborn.

(Question) Which kinds of food possess the two functions of “sustaining” and “supporting”?

(Answer) According to the Vaibhāṣikas, all four kinds can possess both functions, because material food has as its result a future life (subsequent existence) for those who remain attached to that kind of life (tadrāginām). This is clearly stated in the sutra. The Blessed One said: “These four kinds of food are the roots of disease, abscesses, and thorns [and by the three—disease, abscesses, and thorns—it is understood that the five appropriated skandhas (upādānaskandhas) of a new life are meant]; they are the condition (pratyaya) for aging and death [and aging and death are precisely the aging and death of the next life].” (Saṃyukta, 15, 7; Vibhāṣā, 130, 8)

(Question) [It is evident that material food enables beings that have come into existence to remain.] But how can mental volition (manaḥsaṃcetanā) possess this power?

(Answer) It is said that there was once a father who, when facing death from hunger and thirst, wished to travel to a distant land; but he had already been exhausted by hunger, while his two children were still very young. When he realized that he could no longer survive, he took a sack, filled it with ashes, placed it upon a wall, and tried to persuade his two children that the sack was full of rice. Believing this to be true, the two children managed to live for some time longer.

Then one day, someone came, took down the sack of ashes, and opened it. Only then did the two children realize that the sack contained nothing but ashes, and they died in despair. There is another similar story concerning a caravan of merchants shipwrecked at sea.

Tormented by hunger and thirst, when they saw a mass of pumice, they all imagined it to be the shore. This illusion gave them the strength to swim toward it and thereby prolonged their lives. However, when they arrived and discovered the truth, they too died in despair.

The Saṃgītiparyāya also states: “In the sea there is a species of large animal that regularly climbs ashore to lay its eggs. After laying them, it buries the eggs in the sand and then returns to the sea. If the mother continually thinks of these eggs, they will not spoil; but if she forgets to think of them, they will rot.”

(Observation of the Sautrāntikas) This inference is incorrect, because another being’s recollection is not a kind of food for oneself. It should therefore have said: “If the offspring within the eggs think of their mother, they will not die; if they forget their mother, they will die.”

(Question) All contaminated dharmas cause existence (bhava) to increase; why did the Blessed One teach that there are only these four kinds of food?

(Answer) Because he enumerated only the principal kinds. The first two of these benefit the support (āśraya) and that which is supported (āśrita); the latter two give rise to a future existence.

The support is the body endowed with faculties, which serves as the basis for mind and mental factors (cittacaitta). Edible food nourishes the body, while contact nourishes perception. These two kinds of food, like a wet nurse, enable beings who have already been born to survive and are therefore the principal conditions for the continued existence of beings already born.

Mental volition is itself karma and gives rise (ākṣipati) to a new life, a future existence (punarbhava); the new life thus projected is produced from a seed that is consciousness (vijñānabījāt), permeated (paribhāviti) by karma. Thus mental volition and consciousness are both kinds of food capable of producing birth, like the generative capacity of a mother, and are therefore the principal conditions for bringing into existence beings not yet born.

(Question) Is everything that is taken in portions (kavaḍīkāra) food?

(Answer) Something may be taken in portions without being food. There are four cases: ⁽¹⁾ something taken in portions but not food, such as that which is eaten in morsels but damages the faculties and the great elements that sustain those faculties; ⁽²⁾ food that is not taken in portions, such as contact, mental volition, and consciousness; ⁽³⁾ something both taken in portions and constituting food, such as that which is eaten in morsels and causes the faculties and the great elements that sustain those faculties to increase; ⁽⁴⁾ something neither taken in portions nor constituting food, such as sound, and so forth.

The other kinds of food are also analyzed in the same manner, merely by substituting their respective names.

(Question) Are there cases in which contact, mental volition, and consciousness cause the faculties and great elements to increase but are nevertheless not food?

(Answer) Yes. These are contact and so forth belonging to a plane different from the plane in which the being in question lives, and, on those planes, instances in which these three dharmas are uncontaminated.

Everything that is consumed (paribhukta) and can harm the one who consumes it (paribhoktar) is also called food. According to the Vaibhāṣikas, there are two moments at which something, after being consumed, functions as food: ⁽¹⁾ immediately upon being consumed, when it dispels hunger and thirst; ⁽²⁾ after being digested, when it increases the faculties and great elements (Vibhāṣā, 130, 7).

Here another question arises:

(Question) How many kinds of food are present in the various destinies (gati) and modes of birth (yoni)?

(Answer) All of them are fully present.

(Question) How many kinds of food are present in the hells? Are red-hot iron balls and molten copper not food? If this is indeed the case—if things that cause harm (vyābādhāya) are also food—then this would contradict the preceding explanation of the four cases [in the Saṃgītiparyāya], as well as the following definition in the Prakaraṇagrantha (7, 5): “What is edible food?—Edible food is that by means of which the faculties are augmented (upacaya), and the great elements are increased and sustained (yāpanā); and so forth.”

The doctrine that edible food is present in the hells does not contradict the definitions you have just cited. It is true that these definitions describe food as something that produces augmentation (upacaya). Nevertheless, although certain things cause deterioration (apacaya) when swallowed, in the hells they still possess the nature of food, because they can relieve hunger and thirst, even if only for an instant.

Moreover, in the isolated hells (prādeśika), there are foods similar to those of human beings. Edible food is therefore present in all five destinies. Still concerning edible food, let us examine the following passage from a sutra: “Suppose one person gives food to one hundred non-Buddhist sages who are free from desire, while another gives food to just one ordinary being in Jambu Grove (Pṛthagjana jambuṣaṇḍagata); the latter acquires greater merit than the former.

What, then, does the expression ‘an ordinary being in Jambu Grove’ mean?

(First explanation in the Vibhāṣā [130, 12]) Here “Jambu Grove” (jambudvīpa) means “Jambudvīpa” (jambudvīpa); it should therefore be understood as “all beings living in Jambudvīpa who have a single belly.”

This explanation is unacceptable, because the words “just one ordinary being…” cannot be understood to mean “all beings….” Even if they did have such a meaning, it would still be difficult to understand why the sutra compares an offering to innumerable ordinary beings, saying that it yields greater merit than an offering to one hundred sages; for this is already perfectly obvious and contains nothing especially worthy of mention.

(Second explanation) The ordinary being referred to here is none other than the bodhisattva who is approaching awakening, the bodhisattva near Buddhahood (saṃnikṛṣtabodhisattva = āsannābhisaṃbodhi).

(Explanation of the third interpretation) According to those who favor the third interpretation, the second interpretation is still unacceptable. An offering to such a bodhisattva truly yields immeasurable merit, greater even than the merit of making offerings to one hundred koṭis of arhats; therefore, the comparison should not be made in the manner above [that is, by comparing him with a seer]. Finally, the Vibhāṣā says that the ordinary person mentioned here is one who has attained the wholesome roots called the aids to penetration (nirvedhabhāgīyas).

(The author of the treatise) In our view, the expression jambuṣaṇḍagata does not etymologically mean “one who has attained the aids to penetration”; such a usage does not accord with the meaning of this expression, nor does any sutra or treatise use it in that sense. Thus, the above explanation is merely an invention. In fact, the term jambuṣaṇḍagata, meaning “seated beneath a jambu tree,” is appropriate only in the case of a bodhisattva, [as is commonly said: “The bodhisattva Sarvārthasiddha, wishing to meet Kṛṣigrāmaka, sat beneath a jambu tree and entered the second dhyana”].

Since this bodhisattva was an ordinary person who had become free from desire, he may be compared with non-Buddhist seers who were free from desire, so as to say that making an offering to him yields more merit than making an offering to a seer. Certainly, making an offering to this bodhisattva yields more merit than making offerings to innumerable seers. If the sutra says that it yields more merit than making offerings to one hundred seers, this is because the sutra wishes to explain a degree of merit exceeding theirs by more than a hundredfold.

We see that after this comparison, the sutra no longer mentions the case of one “seated beneath a jambu tree.” The sutra does not say: “Making an offering to a noble one proceeding toward stream-entry yields immeasurable and boundless merit compared with making offerings to ordinary persons of the Jambu grove”—these are precisely the words the sutra ought to have used if the term jambuṣaṇḍagata meant “one who has attained the aids to penetration.” Instead, the sutra makes a comparison with seers: “Making an offering to a noble one proceeding toward stream-entry yields more excellent merit than making offerings to one hundred non-Buddhist seers….”

The dependent arising and continued existence of sentient beings have been explained above. It was also previously stated that death is the termination of the life faculty (āyus), and so forth. The following section will therefore proceed to discuss what kind of consciousness is present at the time death occurs and at the beginning of life.

[The cutting off and restoration of wholesome roots, relinquishment and loss of relinquishment, death and birth,

All occur in mental consciousness.

At death and birth, it is associated only with neutral feeling;

It is neither concentrated nor unconscious.

Nirvana is attained with two morally indeterminate minds.

If death occurs gradually, at the feet, navel, or heart

There is the cessation of the final mental consciousness

Of those descending, humans, gods, and those not to be reborn.

The severing of the vital points is caused by water.]

Treatise: The cutting off and restoration of wholesome roots; relinquishment of a realm or a sphere—such as the first dhyana, and so forth—and the loss of that relinquishment; death and birth: all these can occur because of mental consciousness (manovijñāna). What is said concerning birth is also what occurs at the beginning of the intermediate existence; therefore, nothing further need be said about the intermediate existence.

Cyuta is equivalent to cyuti, meaning death; and udbhava is equivalent to uppatti, meaning birth.

At death as well as at birth, mental consciousness is associated with neutral feeling, that is, feeling that is neither pleasant nor painful. Neutral feeling is not acute (paṭu), whereas the other kinds of feeling are acute. Therefore, the consciousnesses of birth and death cannot be associated with them; for if they were associated with them, the consciousness itself would also become acute.

Death and birth both occur in mental consciousness, with respect to mental consciousness and by reason of mental consciousness. However, death cannot occur in a person whose mind (citta = manovijñāna) is concentrated. A concentrated mind is found in a sphere (bhūmi)—for example, the first dhyana—that is different (visabhāga) from the Desire Realm, where, according to us, death and the taking of birth alone occur.

On the other hand, if we consider a being dying or being born in a sphere belonging to meditative concentration, we find that this person’s mind certainly cannot be concentrated, because a concentrated mind can become concentrated only through preparatory effort; therefore, a concentrated mind is always acute. Moreover, a concentrated mind is of a kind that tends to endure and to prolong continuity; therefore, it is inappropriate for the severance of the continuum.

Nor is there death or the taking of birth for “those without mind” (the mindless); [that is, those who have entered the attainment of cessation or the attainment of non-perception, and gods experiencing the ripened result of the attainment of non-perception.] Mindless beings cannot die. When their body (the basis, āśraya = the body endowed with faculties) begins to deteriorate (viparinantum), because it is pierced by a sword or burned by fire, or because the karmic result of their meditative concentration has been exhausted, then the kind of mind connected with the body (the mind pertaining to the basis) [and existing in the body in the form of a seed] will necessarily arise; only afterward does death occur.

The mindless state is likewise unsuitable for the taking of birth, because all the causes that make the mind discontinuous are absent, and because the taking of birth cannot occur without afflictions.

The existence at death may be wholesome, unwholesome, or morally indeterminate; but when one enters nirvana, there are only two morally indeterminate minds: that associated with deportment (airyāpathika) and that born of karmic maturation (vipākaja). Some masters believe that in the Desire Realm a mind born of karmic maturation may be associated with equanimity (upekṣā); according to masters who maintain the contrary view, however, one can enter nirvana only with a mind associated with deportment.

(Question) Why is the final mind of an arhat only morally indeterminate?

(Answer) Because this kind of mind is very weak and therefore is suited to the termination of mind, that is, the final severance of mind.

(Question) At death, in which part of the body does consciousness cease?

(Answer) When death, or “falling away” (cyuti), occurs in a single instant (sudden death), the bodily faculty deteriorates simultaneously with mental consciousness. When death occurs gradually, mental consciousness ceases at the feet, the navel, or the heart, respectively, according to whether the being is one who “descends,” becomes human, becomes a god, or is not reborn.

“One who descends” (adhoga) is one who must be reborn in an evil destiny; “one who becomes human” (nṛga) is one who must be reborn in the human destiny; and “one who becomes a god” (suraga) is one who must be reborn in a heavenly destiny.

“One who is not reborn” (aja) is one who will not be born again, namely, an arhat. The consciousness of an arhat also ceases at the heart, although another doctrine says that it ceases at the head.

(Question) How can consciousness cease in the aforementioned part of the body?

(Answer) Because in those parts the destruction of the bodily faculty occurs. [In this faculty—which is the sole support of consciousness—there is a connection with the activity of consciousness, which is non-material and lies outside space.] Consciousness ceases because the deterioration of the bodily faculty occurs at some particular place. Toward the end of life, the bodily faculty gradually deteriorates, and eventually it no longer exists in a certain part of the body but disappears of itself, just as when water is poured onto a hot stone, it gradually dries up and finally disappears at some particular spot.

Such is the course of a death that takes place gradually. In general, a dying person suffers greatly from sensations that destroy the vital parts of the body one by one.

The vital parts, also called marmans (marmāṇi, mortal points), are those parts of the body whose injury leads to death. When one of the great elements of water, fire, or wind becomes predominant, these vital parts are, as it were, split apart (chidyanta iva) by terrible sensations resembling sharp knives. To say that these parts are “split apart” (marmaccheda) does not mean that they are split like firewood, but only that, once damaged, they can never function again (na punaś ceṣṭante).

(Question) Why are these vital parts not damaged by the predominance of the earth element?

(Answer) Because the three internal disorders (doṣas)—inflammation, heat, and wind—arise in dependence upon the predominance of the three great elements of water, fire, and wind. Some say that because the world is destroyed by these three great elements, death likewise occurs because of these three great elements.

For devas (devaputra, sons of the devas), their vital parts are not damaged. However, when a being in the heavenly realm is about to die, five signs of decline appear. They are: ⁽¹⁾ the garments and ornaments emit unpleasant sounds; ⁽²⁾ the radiance issuing from the body diminishes; ⁽³⁾ after bathing, drops of water still cling to the body; ⁽⁴⁾ the mind becomes fixed upon a single object, although by nature it is exceedingly agile; ⁽⁵⁾ the eyes, normally steady and composed, now open and close with discomfort. There are also five other signs of death: ⁽¹⁾ the garments become foul-smelling, ⁽²⁾ the flower garlands wither, ⁽³⁾ sweat appears in the armpits, ⁽⁴⁾ the body emits a foul odor, and ⁽⁵⁾ one no longer delights in one’s own seat. (Vibhāṣā, 70, 16; Ekottara, 26, 15)

The Blessed One divided beings who are born, persist, and die into three classes (groups, rāśi).

[Those fixed in rightness, those fixed in wrongness, and those not fixed

Comprising noble ones, beings who commit offenses of immediate retribution, and other beings]

Treatise: The first is the class “certain of liberation” (fixed in rightness); the second is the class “certain of falling away” (fixed in wrongness); and the third is the class “not fixed” (indeterminate in nature).

(Question) What is liberation (samyaktva)?

(Answer) According to the sutra, it is the complete eradication of greed, hatred, and delusion, and of all afflictions (kleśa), [that is, nirvana].

(Question) What is a noble one (ārya)?

(Answer) Those in whom the noble path, that is, the uncontaminated noble path, has arisen. They are called noble because they have “gone far away from” (ārād yātaḥ) evil, having attained separation from the afflictions (visaṃyoga).

(Question) Why are noble ones certain to attain liberation?

(Answer) Because noble ones will assuredly realize nirvana.

(Question) Those who attain the factors conducive to liberation (mokṣabhāgīyas) will likewise realize nirvana; why, then, are they not called “certain of liberation”?

(Answer) Because they may still commit faults and thereby enter the class “certain of falling away”; or they may be certain to realize nirvana, but the time of realization is not yet fixed, unlike the case of noble ones beginning with those who have “at most seven more rebirths” (stream-enterers).

(Question) What is falling away (mithyātva)?

(Answer) It is the destinies of hell beings, animals, and hungry ghosts (preta). Those who commit offenses of immediate retribution (ānantaryas) will certainly be reborn in hell and therefore also belong to the class “certain of not falling back.”

Belonging to the class “not fixed” (indeterminate, aniyata) are those who are not certain either to attain liberation or to fall away. Whether they will enter the class “certain of liberation or falling away,” or continue to belong to the class “not fixed,” depends entirely upon the force of future karma.