阿毘達磨俱舍論

CHAPTER 3: ANALYSIS OF THE REALMS

Part 8

Previously, the various kinds of mind arising in the three realms were explained; what, then, are these three realms? And how many planes does each realm contain?

[Hells, animals, pretas,

Humans, and the six heavens

Are the twenty planes of the Desire Realm,

Since the hells and the continents are distinct.

Above the Desire Realm are the seventeen planes

Of the Form Realm, within which

Each of the first three dhyānas has three planes,

And the fourth dhyāna has eight planes.

The Formless Realm has no spatial planes;

But according to birth, it is of four kinds;

Depending on commonality of the group and the faculty of life,

Mind and so forth continue in succession.]

Treatise: The Desire Realm comprises altogether four destinies (gati): hell beings, animals, pretas, and humans, together with part of the heavenly destiny, namely the six heavens—the Heaven of the Four Great Kings (Cātumahārājika), the Heaven of the Thirty-Three (Trāyastriṃśa), the Yāma Heaven (Yāma), the Tuṣita Heaven (Tuṣita), the Heaven of Delighting in Creation (Nirmāṇarati), and the Heaven of Controlling the Creations of Others (Paraṇirmitavaśavartin)—as well as the material world that contains these beings (the receptacle world, bhājanaloka).

(Question) How many planes are there in the Desire Realm?

(Answer) Twenty planes. The eight hells are Reviving (Saṃjīva), Black Thread (Kālasūtra), Crushing (Saṃghāta), Wailing (Raurava), Great Wailing (Mahāraurava), Heating (Tapana), Great Heating (Pratāpana), and Uninterrupted (Avīci). The four continents are Jambudvīpa in the south, Pūrvavideha in the east, Avaragodānīya in the west, and Uttarakuru in the north. To the six heavens mentioned above are added the pretas and animals. Thus, from the Avīci Hell up to the Heaven of Controlling the Creations of Others, there are altogether twenty planes. Together with the world whose lowest part is the Wind Wheel, they all belong to the Desire Realm.

Above the Desire Realm are the seventeen planes of the Form Realm.

Each dhyāna has three planes, except for the fourth dhyāna.

The first dhyāna comprises the Heaven of Brahmā’s Assembly (Brahmakāyika), the Heaven of Brahmā’s Ministers (Brahmapurohita), and the Heaven of Great Brahmā (Mahābrahman).

The second dhyāna comprises the Heaven of Limited Radiance (Parīttābha), the Heaven of Measureless Radiance (Apramāṇābha), and the Heaven of Radiant Purity (Ābhāsvara).

The third dhyāna comprises the Heaven of Limited Purity (Parīttaśubha), the Heaven of Measureless Purity (Apramāṇaśubha), and the Heaven of Universal Purity (Śubhakṛtsna).

The fourth dhyāna comprises eight planes: the Cloudless Heaven (Anabhraka), the Heaven Born of Merit (Puṇyaprasava), the Heaven of Great Fruit (Bṛhatphala), the Heaven Free from Affliction (Avṛha), the Heaven Free from Heat (Atapa), the Heaven of Beautiful Appearance (Sudṛśa), the Heaven of Beautiful Vision (Sudarśana), and the Ultimate Form Heaven (Akaniṣṭha). All seventeen planes above belong to the Form Realm.

The masters of Kashmir all say that the Form Realm has only sixteen planes. They hold that within the Heaven of Brahmā’s Ministers there is a lofty terrace called the Heaven of Great Brahmā; it is the dwelling place of the sovereign, like a tower, rather than a separate plane (bhūmi).

There are no spatial planes in the Formless Realm because formless dharmas occupy no place in space. Material dharmas that have passed into the past or have yet to arise in the future, non-informative form (avijñapti), and formless dharmas have no spatial location (adeśastha). Nevertheless, the Formless Realm has four planes according to the different modes of existence arising through karmic maturation.

These are the Sphere of Infinite Space (Ākāśānantyāyatana), the Sphere of Infinite Consciousness (Vijñānānantyāyatana), the Sphere of Nothingness (Ākiṃcanyāyatana), and the Sphere of Neither Perception nor Non-Perception (Naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñānāyatana; the summit of existence, Bhavāgra), which together constitute the Formless Realm. Here, “existence” implies the manifestation of the skandhas in a new life through karma; it does not mean that, because of this kind of karma, beings occupy spatial planes of differing heights.

Such higher and lower locations do not imply a difference in levels (bhūmi). When a being—having attained the kind of concentration capable of producing a life in the Formless Realm—dies in a certain place, that very place is also the point at which the life just described begins; and when that life ends, it is also in that very place that an intermediate body will form before taking rebirth [in the Desire Realm or the Form Realm].

(Question) The continuum of minds and mental factors of beings possessing material bodies can exist only by relying upon form (rūpa), and so forth. Upon what, then, does the continuum of minds and mental factors of beings in the Formless Realm depend?

(Answer) According to the Abhidharma masters (Ābhidhārmika), the continuum of the minds and mental factors of beings in the Formless Realm depends for its existence upon two dharmas dissociated from mind: commonality of the group (nikāyasabhāgatā) and the faculty of life (jīvitendriya).

The continuum of the minds and mental factors of beings possessing material bodies does not depend upon these two dharmas because this continuum is inherently weak; whereas the continuum of the minds and mental factors of beings in the Formless Realm possesses the necessary power because it arises from a kind of concentration in which the perception of form has been eliminated.

(Objection) Yet the commonality of the group and the faculty of life of beings possessing material bodies depend upon form. Upon what, then, do the commonality of the group and the faculty of life depend in beings who possess no material body?

(Explanation) They depend upon each other. In beings possessing material bodies, the commonality of the group and the faculty of life do not possess sufficient power to depend upon each other; in beings without material bodies, however, the commonality of the group and the faculty of life do possess this power because they arise from sublime concentration.

(Sautrāntika) The continuum of the minds and mental factors of beings without material bodies has no external support. This continuum is sufficiently powerful and can exist without a support. Therefore, it may be said that mind depends upon mental factors and mental factors depend upon mind, just as it is said that the commonality of the group and the faculty of life depend upon each other.

When beings take rebirth, the continuum of their minds is set in motion by a cause—the afflictions and karma (karma-kleśa). If this is a cause that has not relinquished material dharmas—that is, attachment to form (rūparāga)—then the mental factors arise together with form, and the continuum of minds consequently depends upon form. If it is a cause that has relinquished attachment to form—as when concentration serves as the cause that gives rise to a life in the Formless Realm—then the mental factors arise and continue to exist without form.

(Question) Why are these realms called the Desire Realm, the Form Realm, and the Formless Realm?

(Answer) A realm (dhātu) is that which is capable of maintaining (dadhāti) its intrinsic characteristic (svalakṣaṇa), and so forth; or “realm” may also mean lineage (gotra), as explained previously.

The Desire Realm is “the realm belonging to, or associated with (saṃprayukta), desire.” This name is formed by omitting the intervening words, just as one says “diamond ring” (vajravālaka), meaning “a ring adorned with a diamond” (vajreṇa saṃprayukta ’ṅgulīyakaḥ), or “pepper drink” (maricapānaka), meaning “a drink mixed with pepper.”

The same applies to the Form Realm: the Form Realm is the realm belonging to form.

When the “Formless Realm” (arūpa) is spoken of, it implies the nonexistence of form (ārūpa). Or form (rūpa) means “having the nature of being subject to alteration and obstruction (rūpaṇa, bādhanā)”; and formless means “without form (arūpa),” that is, without these characteristics; or it is “the nonexistence of form (ārūpa),” that is, the nonexistence of these characteristics (tadbhāva [:arūpabhāva] ārūpyam). Thus, the Formless Realm (ārūpyadhātu) is the realm associated with the nonexistence of form (ārūpa).

Alternatively, the Desire Realm, the Form Realm, and the Formless Realm are compounds in which the first term is in the possessive relation: the Desire Realm is the realm of desire (kāma), the Form Realm is the realm of form (rūpa), and the Formless Realm is the realm of formlessness (ārūpa).

(Question) What does desire (kāma) mean here?

(Answer) It is craving for food taken in separate morsels (morsel-food, kavaḍīkārāhāra) and for sexual pleasure. [Desire (kāma) does not mean the object of craving, as was precisely expressed by the term kāmaguṇa, but means only “craving” (kāmyata aneneti kāmaḥ).] This is demonstrated by the following verse:

The Venerable Śāriputra said to an Ājīvaka ascetic: “The delightful objects of this world are not desire (kāma); desire is merely the craving produced in a person by conceptual discrimination and has nothing to do with the things of the world. The wise have abandoned longing for them.” The ascetic replied: “If the delightful objects of this world are not desire, and if desire is merely craving produced by conceptual discrimination, then a bhikshu would also be one who ‘enjoys desires’ whenever unwholesome discriminations arise in him.” Śāriputra replied: “If the delightful objects of this world are desire, and if desire is not craving produced by a person’s conceptual discrimination,

then your teacher too would be one who ‘enjoys desires’ whenever he observes the things of this world.” (Saṃyukta, 28, 3)

(Question) Can all dharmas occurring in these worlds be regarded as dharmas belonging (pratisaṃyukta, āpta, patita) to these realms?

(Answer) No. Only those dharmas in relation to which craving (rāga), relying upon one of the three realms, increases—namely, craving of the Desire Realm, craving of the Form Realm, or craving of the Formless Realm—belong to the three realms.

(Question) What is called craving belonging to the Desire Realm?

(Answer) It is the kind of craving that increases by relying upon dharmas belonging to the Desire Realm.

(Objection) This is like the following question and answer concerning a tether for a horse: “To whom does this horse’s tether belong?—To the owner of the horse. To whom does this horse belong?—To the owner of the tether.” Such an answer tells us nothing at all.

(Explanation) It is not like that. The planes constituting the Desire Realm have already been enumerated above. Thus, “craving belonging to the Desire Realm” means the craving of one who has not become detached from these planes and has not relinquished craving for the dharmas of these planes. The same applies to the other two realms. Alternatively, “craving belonging to the Desire Realm” means the craving of beings who lack meditative concentration (samāhita); “craving belonging to the Form Realm, and so forth” means the kind of craving connected with the four dhyānas and the concentrations called formless attainments.

(Objection) The mind of transformation that produces objects belonging to the Desire Realm is a result of dhyāna; therefore, this kind of mind arises only in beings who have become detached from the Desire Realm. How, then, can this mind of transformation be said to belong to the Desire Realm? This mind does not in fact arise in beings who have not relinquished the Desire Realm; and since it arises only in beings who have relinquished the Desire Realm, it cannot be an object of the craving of those belonging to the Desire Realm. If this mind belongs to the Desire Realm (Kāmavacaratva) without requiring the craving of those belonging to the Desire Realm (kāmarāgeṇa vinā), this is very difficult to understand and also contradicts your definition of the three realms.

This mind of transformation belongs to the Desire Realm because craving proper to beings of the Desire Realm arises in one who hears this mind of transformation spoken of, in one who recounts that he formerly attained this kind of mind, or in one who sees the objects produced by this mind of transformation. Alternatively, it is also because this mind of transformation produces odors and flavors, whereas a mind belonging to the Form Realm cannot produce odors and flavors, since beings in the Form Realm are detached from them.

(Question) Are these the only three realms?

(Answer) These three realms are infinite in number, like space. Even if no new beings whatsoever were to arise, and even if innumerable Buddhas were to guide innumerable sentient beings and enable them to attain nirvana, the beings within the innumerable worlds would still never be exhausted.

(Question) How are the three realms arranged?

(Answer) They are arranged horizontally, as stated in the sutra (Saṃyukta, 34, 7): “Just as when snow falls, with flakes as large as the spokes of a wheel continuously pouring down from the sky without ceasing, so too, in the east, worlds continuously come into being and pass away without interruption; and likewise in the south, west, and north.” The sutra, however, does not mention above and below.

Some masters (Dharmagupta? Sthiramati?) maintain that worlds are nevertheless superimposed above and below one another, because other sutras (Saṃyukta, 17, 11; Madhyama, 11, 5) state that worlds extend throughout the ten directions. Thus, there is still a Desire Realm above the Akaniṣṭha Heaven and an Akaniṣṭha Heaven below a Desire Realm.

One who has become detached from one Desire Realm has also become detached from the Desire Realms of all worlds. The same applies to the other two kinds of realms.

One who develops superknowledge (abhijñā) by relying upon the first dhyāna can, through the resulting supernormal power, reach only as far as the Brahmā world (Brahmaloka) of the world in which that supernormal power was developed, and cannot reach another world.

The realms have now been explained; next comes the section concerning the five destinies.

[Therein, the names of the hells and so forth

Are precisely the names of the five destinies.

They are exclusively unobscured-neutral in nature

And consist only of sentient beings, not intermediate existence.]

Treatise: Within the three realms are five destinies (gati): beings in hell, animals, ghosts, humans, and devas. In the Desire Realm are the first four and a portion of the deva destiny; in the other two realms there is only a portion of the deva destiny.

(Question) The verse states that the five destinies exist within the three realms; is there, then, a portion of the realms that is not included among the destinies?

(Answer) Yes. These are wholesome dharmas, defiled dharmas, the container-world, and intermediate existence. Although they are included within the realms, they do not belong to the five destinies.

The five destinies are all of the unobscured-neutral nature because they are the results of causes of maturation. If this were not so, the destinies would become confused. [Indeed, a person may perform karma that brings about a result in hell or a result in the heavenly destiny. If all karma belonged entirely (paryāpanna) to the destinies, then at the same time this person's destiny would also be the destiny of hell and that of the gods. A sentient being born in the Desire Realm possesses all the afflictions (kleśa) of this plane (bhūmi) and may also possess all the dharmas of higher planes.]

The destinies are all included among sentient beings (sattvākhya); therefore, the receptacle-world is not included among these five destinies. The intermediate existence is likewise not a destiny.

Several treatises discuss the essential nature of these destinies:

(1) The Prajñāpti Treatise: “Do the four modes of birth (yoni) comprise all five destinies, and do the five destinies comprise all four modes of birth? — The intermediate existence is not included among the five destinies.”

(2) The Dharmaskandha Treatise: “What is the eye-element (cakṣurdhātu)? — The subtle form produced by the great elements is the eye, the eye faculty, the eye-ayatana, and the eye-element among beings in hell, animals, ghosts, gods, humans, beings born from meditative concentration, and beings in the intermediate existence.”

(3) The Saptabhavasūtra also states that the intermediate existence is not included among the destinies: “There are seven kinds of existence (bhava): hell, animals, ghosts, gods, and humans, together with karmic existence (karmabhava) and intermediate existence (antarābhava).” This sutra identifies the five destinies together with their cause—that is, karma or karmic existence—and their means—that is, the intermediate body upon which a sentient being relies in proceeding toward a destiny.

At the same time, the sutra also shows that the destinies into which beings are reborn are of the unobscured-neutral nature, because on the one hand it distinguishes the various destinies, such as hell, animals, and so forth, and on the other hand it distinguishes the various causes that engender those destinies, namely, obscured karmic existences such as wholesome and unwholesome karma.

(4) The foregoing is also stated in a sutra cited by the masters of Kashmir as follows (Vibhāṣā, 172, 3): “Śāriputra said: Venerable One, when the afflictions—the outflows (āsravas)—pertaining to hell become active, one performs and causes to increase karma that brings about retribution in hell, karma conducive to experience in hell. These karmas of body, speech, and mind—these crooked, corrupt, and defiled karmas—bring about as their results of maturation the form, feeling, perception, formations, and consciousnesses pertaining to hell.

When the result of maturation arises, there is an existence called a hell-being. Venerable One, apart from these five skandhas, no other existence of a hell-being can be found.” [This means that a being in hell cannot exist apart from these five skandhas, “which are results of maturation”; they must therefore be of the unobscured-neutral nature.]

(Question) If this is so, how can the foregoing accord with the following statement in the Prakaraṇagrantha (3, 8): “All kinds of latent tendencies (anuśayas) increase by adhering to the destinies”?

The foregoing statement refers to the consciousness that proceeds to rebirth—the rebirth-linking consciousness (saṃdhicitta)—in the destinies (Vibhāṣā, 72, 2), namely, a kind of consciousness that may contain all five classes of afflictions eliminated by the path of seeing or the path of cultivation. Thus all latent tendencies may increase by adhering to it. Just as one may say “the village” while intending “the boundaries of the village,” the Prakaraṇagrantha expresses itself in the same manner.

One school maintains that the destinies are also of wholesome and defiled natures. Its proponents say that the argument drawn from the Saptabhavasūtra is invalid. Although karmic existence is mentioned separately from the five destinies, this does not prove that it lies outside the destinies. Similarly, among the five corruptions (kaṣāya), the two corruptions known as the corruption of afflictions (kleśakaṣāya) and the corruption of views (dṛṣṭikaṣāya) are enumerated separately; can one therefore say that views are not a kind of affliction? Consequently, karmic existence (karmabhava) still belongs to the destinies but is mentioned separately merely because it is their cause.

(Sarvāstivādins) If you argue in this way, the intermediate existence must also be a destiny.

(Explanation) This cannot be so. Destiny (gati) means “that to which one goes” (sở vãng, gacchanti tām iti [gatiḥ]), whereas the intermediate existence begins at the place of death.

(Sarvāstivādins) If so, the same would apply to existences in the Formless Realm; that is to say, these beings too could not return to the destinies [because they are born at the place where they die].

(Explanation) The intermediate existence is so named because it lies between two destinies. If the intermediate existence were itself a destiny rather than an intermediary, it would not be called the intermediate existence.

(Sarvāstivādins) If you do not accept the argument drawn from the Saptabhavasūtra above, do you accept a statement by Śāriputra? Śāriputra said that when the retribution of the hells arises, there is then a hell-being. Śāriputra did not say that the destiny of a being in hell consists solely of the result of maturation; thus this destiny is partly a result of maturation and partly not a result of maturation. The sutra also says that there is no hell-being apart from such dharmas as form and so forth, intending thereby to refute the real existence of an individual who passes from one destiny to another; it does not assert that the skandhas of form and so forth belonging to a hell-being are solely results of maturation.

The Vaibhāṣika masters say that the destinies consist only of unobscured-neutral dharmas. Among these masters, some think that the destinies consist of dharmas born of maturation (vipākaja); others think that they consist of both matured and developed dharmas.

Within these five destinies throughout the three realms, there are altogether seven stations of consciousness (vijñānasthiti), arranged in order.

(Question) What are these seven stations of consciousness?

The stanza answers:

[Different in body and different in perception;

Different in body but alike in perception;

Alike in body but different in perception;

Alike in perception and alike in body;

And the three lower levels of the Formless Realm;

Thus there are seven stations of consciousness in all.

Other places are not such, because they are destructive.]

Exposition: The sutra (Madhyama, 24, 11) says:

(1) Form-endowed sentient beings differ in body and in perception, as among humans and some of the gods; this is the first station of consciousness.

(Question) Who are these gods?

(Answer) They are the gods of the six heavens of the Desire Realm and the gods of the first meditative absorption (the Brahmā world, Brahmaloka), except for those at the beginning of the kalpa (prathamābhinirvṛtta).

These sentient beings have different bodies (nānātvakāya) because their color (varṇa), appearance (linga; clothing, ornaments, and so forth), and physical form (saṃsthāna; height, and so forth) are not identical. They have different perceptions (nānātvasaṃjñin) because their perceptions of suffering, pleasure, and neither suffering nor pleasure are not identical.

(2) Form-endowed sentient beings differ in body but are alike in perception, as are the beings in the Brahmā Assembly Heaven at the beginning of a kalpa; this is the second station of consciousness.

All the beings belonging to this initial period of the kalpa have the same perception because they share the common perception of a single cause. The Great Brahmā forms the perception: “All these sentient beings were created by me,” while the followers of the Great Brahmā form the perception: “We were created by the Great Brahmā.” Their bodies differ because one is the Great Brahmā while the others are his followers; hence they differ in height and stature, bodily form, speech, clothing, and ornaments.

(Question) The sutra says that these devas recollect: “We saw this being live so long and remain for such a long time,” … “And when this being formed the aspiration, ‘May other sentient beings be born here to keep me company!’ all of us were born to keep this being company.” Thus, where were these beings when they saw the Great Brahmā?

(Answer) According to certain masters [who cite the sutra as saying that the Brahmā hosts are reborn in the realm of the Great Brahmā after dying in the Ābhāsvara Heaven], these devas saw the Great Brahmā while they were in the Ābhāsvara Heaven. However, if they had fallen from the Ābhāsvara Heaven, which belongs to the second dhyana, they would necessarily have lost the second dhyana, which is indispensable for the ability to recollect a former life in a heaven belonging to the second dhyana.

Moreover, these devas could not regain the second dhyana, because they fell on account of the wrong view of attachment to rules and observances (śīlavrataparāmarśa), which regards the Great Brahmā as the creator. It cannot be said that this wrong view can accompany the second dhyana, because a wrong view—or any defilement—belonging to a certain sphere can never take a lower sphere as its object.

According to another master, these devas saw the Great Brahmā while they were in the intermediate existence before being born in the heaven of the Great Brahmā. However, it may be objected that the intermediate existence cannot endure for a long time, because nothing can delay rebirth in that world. How, then, could the devas say, “We saw this being live so long and remain for such a long time”?

Therefore, it was in the heaven of the Great Brahmā itself that these devas recollected the Great Brahmā’s past. At the time of their birth, they saw that the Great Brahmā, who had been born before them, had already existed for a long time. Having seen him, they formed the perception: “We have previously seen this being …”; and they knew of this being’s aspiration through recollection associated with the first dhyana, and knew that this aspiration had been fulfilled by the fact that they were born there; or else the Great Brahmā told them this.

(3) Form-endowed beings whose bodies are alike but whose perceptions differ, such as the beings in the Ābhāsvara Heaven—this is the third station of consciousness.

(Question) Here, when the sutra refers to the devas of Ābhāsvara, the highest heaven of the second dhyana, it also intends to include the two heavens of Parīttābha and Apramāṇābha. If this were not so, to which kind of station of consciousness would these two heavens belong?

(Answer) Because there is no difference in color, shape, or appearance, these beings have bodies that are alike; but because they have perceptions associated with pleasure and with neither-pain-nor-pleasure, their perceptions differ. According to tradition (Vibhāṣā, 38, 6), when these beings become weary of the faculty of joy (saumanasya) belonging to the fundamental sphere—that is, the feeling belonging to the second dhyana—they produce the faculty of equanimity belonging to the preliminary sphere (sāmantaka)—that is, the first concentration of this dhyana possessing the feeling that is neither painful nor pleasant.

When they become weary of this second feeling—the faculty of equanimity belonging to the preliminary sphere—they again produce the faculty of joy belonging to the fundamental sphere. It is just as a king, when weary of sensual pleasure (kāmasukha), experiences the bliss of the Dharma, and when weary of the bliss of the Dharma, again experiences sensual pleasure.

(Question) If this is so, the devas of the third dhyana—that is, those of the Śubhakṛtsna Heaven and so forth, who belong to the fourth station of consciousness—should likewise resemble the devas of the second dhyana. Yet the devas belonging to the third dhyana do not enter the preliminary sphere and always experience pleasant feeling.

(Answer) The devas of Śubhakṛtsna do not become weary of pleasant feeling because their pleasure is tranquil (śānta), whereas the joyful feeling (saumanasya) of the Ābhāsvara devas agitates the mind and is not tranquil in nature.

The Sautrāntika masters hold that the sutra (Saptasūryavyākaraṇa; Dīrgha, 21, 8; Madhyama, 2, 8) says: “Because beings newly born in the Ābhāsvara Heaven do not yet clearly understand the law governing the formation and destruction of the world, when they see the conflagration consuming the world and the flames reaching as far as the palace of the Great Brahmā, they become frightened, sorrowful, and alarmed, saying, ‘May these flames not reach this place!’ But beings who have lived for a long time in the Ābhāsvara Heaven understand clearly the formation and destruction of the world, and therefore console the frightened beings, saying, ‘Friends, do not be afraid!

The flames that previously consumed the palace of the Great Brahmā have already died out.’” From this passage of scripture, we can see how the devas of the second dhyana differ in their perceptions: regarding the conflagration that occurs in the heavenly realms of the second dhyana, the devas have differing perceptions such as “The flames will reach us” and “The flames will not reach us,” or “This is frightening” and “This is not frightening.” We therefore know that the Vaibhāṣika explanation—that perceptions differ because of the alternation between pleasant feeling and equanimous feeling—is unreasonable.

(4) Form-endowed beings whose bodies and perceptions are alike, such as the beings in the Śubhakṛtsna Heaven—this is the fourth station of consciousness.

Their perceptions are alike because they experience only pleasant feeling.

In the first dhyana, beings have the same defiled perception because it is associated with attachment to rules and observances (śīlavrataparāmarśa). In the second dhyana, they have differing perceptions, namely, the two kinds of wholesome perception belonging respectively to the fundamental sphere and the preliminary sphere. In the third dhyana, they again have the same perception because they are born from karmic maturation.

(5, 6, 7) The first three concentrations of the Formless Realm are the final three stations of consciousness, as stated in the sutra.

(Question) What is a station of consciousness (vijñānasthiti)?

(Answer) For the first stations of consciousness, it consists of the five skandhas belonging to the Desire Realm or the Form Realm; for the final three stations, it consists of the four skandhas.

(Question) Why are the remaining states not stations of consciousness?

(Answer) “The remaining states” refers to the evil destinies (durgati, apāya), the fourth dhyana, and the fourth concentration of the Formless Realm—the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception—namely, the Summit of Existence (Bhavāgra).

Consciousness is impaired in the states mentioned above. In the evil destinies, painful feeling impairs consciousness. In the fourth dhyana, the practitioner can cultivate the concentration of non-perception, and there is also the state of non-perception that constitutes the Non-Percipient Beings (asaṃjñisattva). At the Summit of Existence, the practitioner can cultivate the concentration of cessation, the concentration in which feeling and perception completely cease. Therefore, in these states there is no station of consciousness.

There are other explanations (Vibhāṣā, 137, 9) which hold that a station of consciousness is “a place that beings wish to reach and, having reached it, do not wish to leave.” Neither of these meanings applies to the evil destinies.

In the fourth dhyāna, all beings dwelling there wish to leave. If they are ordinary beings born through maturation, they wish to enter the absorption of non-perception (asaṃjñikapravivikṣā); if they are noble ones, they wish to enter the Pure Abodes (Śuddhāvāsika) [or the formless spheres (Ārūpyāyatanas)]; all beings in the Pure Abodes wish to attain cessation in peace (śāntanirodha). At the summit of existence, the activities of consciousness are feeble. Therefore, these places cannot serve as stations of consciousness.

Thus the explanation of the seven stations of consciousness is complete. In connection with them, the nine abodes of sentient beings are now also explained.

[Together with the summit of existence and

Beings without perception,

They constitute the nine abodes of beings.

Other places are not abodes, because beings do not wish to enter them.]

Treatise: The seven stations of consciousness mentioned above, together with the summit of existence and beings without perception, constitute the nine abodes of sentient beings, because all sentient beings wish to dwell in these places.

“Other places” refers to the evil destinies. Because beings are led there by the rākṣasa of evil karma, they dwell there without experiencing happiness. These places resemble prisons (bandhanasthāna) and are therefore not called “abodes of sentient beings.” [In the fourth dhyāna, apart from the Heaven of Non-Perception, the remaining places are not abodes of sentient beings; this has already been explained in the discussion of the stations of consciousness.]

The sūtra above states that there are seven stations of consciousness, but other sūtras speak of four additional kinds.

[The four stations of consciousness are

The four skandhas belonging to their own plane.

Consciousness alone is not a station of consciousness.

All are defiled; there are four cases.]

Treatise: The sūtra (Saṃyutta, iii. 54) states that there are four kinds of stations of consciousness: consciousness abiding by way of form (rūpopagā vijñānasthitiḥ), consciousness abiding by way of sensation (vedanopagā vijñānasthitiḥ), consciousness abiding by way of perception (saṃjñopagā vijñānasthitiḥ), and consciousness abiding by way of formations (saṃskāropagā vijñānasthitiḥ).

Consciousness (vijñāna) can take form and the remaining skandhas of another plane as its objects; but it cannot cognize these dharmas while driven by the force of craving (tṛṣṇā). Therefore, these dharmas cannot be regarded as stations (sthiti) of consciousness.

(Question) Why is the fifth skandha, consciousness (that is, consciousness comprising mind and mental factors), not a station of consciousness?

(Answer) The Vibhāṣā masters hold that an abode (that in which something abides, sthiti) is not the thing that abides there (that which abides, sthātar), just as a king is not his throne. Furthermore, the expression “station of consciousness” refers to dharmas upon which consciousness “rides” in order to direct them (vāhayati, pravartayati), like a helmsman and a boat. Consciousness, however, cannot “ride” upon consciousness in order to direct consciousness; therefore, consciousness is not a station of consciousness.

(Question) If that is so, why does a sūtra (Saṃyukta, 15, 7; Saṃyutta, ii. 101) state: “Where there is consciousness as nutriment, there are delight and attachment”? If there are delight and attachment toward consciousness, consciousness will take possession of and abide there. Moreover, you also say that the five skandhas, which include consciousness, constitute the seven stations of consciousness. Why, then, is consciousness not added to the four stations of consciousness?

(The Vibhāṣā answer) If one observes the process by which consciousness becomes attached to an individual being—namely, a place of rebirth (upapattyāyatana, nikāyasabhāga) constituted by the five skandhas—without analyzing each skandha separately, then it may be said that consciousness is a station of consciousness. But if each skandha is examined separately, it will be seen that form, sensation, perception, and formations—which serve as the supports of consciousness and are associated and co-arise with consciousness—are precisely the causes that defile consciousness (saṃkleśa), whereas consciousness is not a cause that defiles consciousness, because two consciousnesses cannot exist at the same moment.

Furthermore, the Buddha described these four stations of consciousness as “fields,” while consciousnesses accompanied by craving (consciousnesses involving appropriation) are like “seeds.” Since a seed cannot also be a field, it can be seen that the dharmas co-arising (sahavartin) with consciousness alone are like fields for consciousness.

(Question) Do the four stations of consciousness include the seven stations of consciousness, or do the seven stations of consciousness include the four stations of consciousness?

(Answer) This can be analyzed in four cases:

(1) Consciousness is included among the seven stations of consciousness but has no place among the four stations of consciousness.

(2) The four skandhas (that is, excluding consciousness) in the evil destinies, the fourth dhyāna, and the summit of existence are included among the four stations of consciousness.

(3) The four skandhas included among the seven stations of consciousness are also included among the four stations of consciousness.

(4) The remaining dharmas are included neither among the seven stations of consciousness nor among the four stations of consciousness [that is, the consciousness of the evil destinies and so forth, and undefiled dharmas].

Within the five destinies of the three realms explained above, there are altogether four kinds of birth (yoni).

(Question) What are these four kinds of birth? Which kinds occur in which places?

The stanza answers:

[Among them are four kinds of birth of sentient beings,

Namely, birth from an egg and so forth.

Humans and animals undergo all four kinds.

Hell beings, devas,

And intermediate beings are only transformation-born.

Pretas include both womb-born and transformation-born beings.]

Treatise: Sentient beings are born in four ways: from eggs, from wombs, from moisture, and through transformation. Birth (yoni) means coming into being. All beings must be born and thus belong to kinds of birth; nevertheless, these modes of birth are not identical but comprise various different types.

Some beings are born from eggs (oviparous birth), such as geese, cranes, peacocks, parrots, songbirds, and so forth.

Some are born from wombs (viviparous birth), such as elephants, horses, cattle, buffaloes, donkeys, pigs, and so forth.

Some are born from moisture (moisture-born), namely, from the moisture of the great elements of earth, water, and so forth, such as insects, butterflies, mosquitoes, and so forth.

Some are born through transformation (transformation-born). These beings appear instantaneously with all their faculties and bodily parts complete. This is called transformation birth because they are capable of manifesting a bodily form and because they arise instantaneously [without requiring a womb, semen, or blood]. Beings in the heavenly realms, the hells, and the intermediate state all belong to this kind.

Humans and animals undergo all four kinds of birth mentioned above.

Humans born from eggs include Śaila and Upaśaila, who were born from cranes’ eggs; the thirty-two children of Viśākhā; and the five hundred princes of King Pañcala.

Humans born from wombs include all human beings today.

Humans born from moisture include Māndhātar, Cāru and Upacāru, Kapotamalinī, Āmrapālī, and so forth.

Humans born through manifestation (transformation-born) include the people born at the beginning of a kalpa.

Among animals, the first three kinds of birth can be directly observed by everyone; transformation-born animals include nāgas, garuḍas, and so forth.

All hell beings, devas, and intermediate beings are only transformation-born.

Ghosts are of two kinds: womb-born and spontaneously born. The case of birth from a womb can be known from the following words spoken by a female ghost to Maudgalyāyana: “At night I give birth to five sons; as soon as each is born, I eat him. During the day I likewise give birth to five and eat them all, yet I am still not satisfied.” (Vibhāṣā, 120, 12)

(Question) Of all four modes, which kind of birth is the most excellent?

(Answer) Spontaneous birth.

(Question) If so, why, in his final birth (as the bodhisattva in his last existence), did a bodhisattva who possessed mastery over birth (upapatttivaśitva) choose to be born from a womb? (Mahāvastu, i. 145).

(First answer) Because the bodhisattva foresaw great benefits: Through their kinship with the bodhisattva, the Śākya clan would be able to enter the true Dharma; knowing that the bodhisattva was born into the lineage of a Wheel-Turning Holy King, people would develop reverence and admiration; and seeing that the bodhisattva, though merely human, had attained perfection, sentient beings would arouse a superior aspiration.

If the bodhisattva had not been born from a womb, others would not have known his lineage and would have said: “Who is this person of such great magical power? Is he a deva or a ghost?” Indeed, certain non-Buddhist teachers gave rise to slanderous thoughts and declared that, at the end of one hundred kalpas, a person possessing such magical power would appear in the world and devour the entire world. For this reason, the bodhisattva chose womb-birth in order to put an end to such doubts.

(Second answer) Some teachers (Vibhāṣā, 8, 9) maintain that the bodhisattva chose womb-birth so that he could leave bodily relics after entering nirvana; and through solemnly making offerings to these relics, human beings and other sentient beings could be born in the heavenly realms as many as a thousand times and attain liberation. If he had chosen spontaneous birth—that is, birth not dependent upon external seeds such as semen, blood, and so forth—the bodies of such beings could not remain after death, just as nothing remains after a lamp has gone out. This explanation, however, is not accepted by those who believe that the Buddha possessed the supernatural power of sustaining his resolve (ṛddhiādhiṣṭhānikī).

From this issue another question arises. If a spontaneously born body disappears entirely after death, how can the scriptures (Dīrgha, 19, 20; Saṃyutta, iii. 240, 246) say: “A spontaneously born Garuḍa () seizes a spontaneously born nāga () in order to eat its flesh”? (revision ends here)

(Explanation) The scripture says that the Garuḍa seizes the nāga in order to eat its flesh (uddharati bhakṣārtham); it does not say that the Garuḍa actually eats the nāga’s flesh. Alternatively, the Garuḍa may eat the nāga’s flesh while the nāga is still alive, rather than eating it after it has died (na punar mṛtasyāsya tṛpyati).

(Question) Of the four modes of birth, which contains the greatest number of sentient beings?

(Answer) Spontaneous birth, because it includes all beings in the hells, all beings in the heavenly realms, all intermediate beings, as well as a portion of the beings in the other three destinies.

(Question) What is intermediate existence? Why can intermediate existence not be called birth?

The stanza answers:

[Between death-existence and birth-existence,

The five skandhas are called intermediate existence.

Because it has not yet reached the place it must reach,

Intermediate existence is not birth.]

Commentary: Between death-existence (that is, the five skandhas at the moment of death) and birth-existence (that is, the five skandhas at the moment of birth), a mode of existence arises—namely, a body comprising the five skandhas [as its intrinsic nature]—in order to proceed to the place where it is to be born, the place of birth. Because this mode of existence lies between two destinies (gati), it is called intermediate existence.

(Question) If this mode of existence arises, why is it not said to be born (upapanna), and why is it not said to undergo birth (upapatti)?

(Answer) Although this mode of existence is said to be “in the process of taking birth” (upapadyamāna), it is not yet born. An etymological analysis shows that birth means arrival (pad = gam, upapanna = upagata): when the intermediate body first begins, it has not yet reached the place it must reach, namely, the place where the karmic result of maturation arises. Therefore, the intermediate body cannot be called birth.

According to other schools (Mahāsaṃghika), there can be no intermediate existence, because there is a discontinuous break between death-existence and birth-existence. Both reasoning and scriptural testimony, however, show that this view cannot be accepted:

[Like the continuity of rice and so forth,

Rebirth can occur through places without interruption.

The real existence of a reflection cannot be established;

Since they are dissimilar, they cannot be compared.

Because two things do not exist in the same place,

There is no continuity, and it arises from two causes.

The scriptures speak of intermediate existence, which is precisely the gandharva;

This is demonstrated by five scriptures and by seven scriptures.]

Commentary: According to the Nyāyānusāra Śāstra, momentarily perishing dharmas always exist within a continuous series. When they arise in a place far removed from the place where they previously arose, this is possible precisely because they have arisen without interruption in the intervening places. This is like the continuity of a grain of rice when it is transported to a distant village and must pass through the villages lying between. The same applies to the continuity of mind: the continuous series of mind at birth (birth-existence) arises only after having arisen continuously and without interruption (intermediate existence) from the place where the preceding death occurred (death-existence).

(Objection) The reflected image of an object (pratibimba) can appear in a mirror, on the surface of water, and so forth, without being connected to that object (bimba) so as to form a continuous series. It may therefore be understood that the primary elements of birth-existence do not depend upon primary elements forming an uninterrupted continuous series between the location of death-existence and the location where the primary elements of birth-existence arise.

(Explanation) The real existence of such a reflected image cannot be established; and even if it were truly existent, the reflected image would still not be identical (unequal) to the object reflected. It therefore cannot serve as an analogy.

When we speak of a “reflected image,” we mean a real entity (dravya) belonging to a certain kind of color (varṇa). Here, however, the reflected image cannot be established as something substantially existent, because two things cannot coexist in the same place. That is to say, with regard to the same mirror, a person standing beside it can see the visible form (rūpa) of the mirror—that is, a form derived from the primary elements (upādāyarūpa)—while a person standing before it can see his own reflected image, which is likewise “a certain kind of visible color,” and thus also a derived form.

Yet it cannot be accepted that two derived forms can exist in the same place at the same time, because each derived form must have its own primary elements as its support. Moreover, when two people look at the same object, such as a jar, both see it simultaneously; but if two people stand on opposite shores of a lake, each sees the reflected images of the objects facing him. This means that one and the same reflected image is not seen simultaneously by both persons.

Furthermore, shadow and light cannot coexist in the same place. For example, if a mirror is placed in a hut beside a lake reflecting sunlight, the mirror will display the reflected image of the sun that is reflected upon the lake. These three observations show that a reflected image is not a substantially existent dharma (dravya).

The stanza above may also be explained in another way. In the statement, “because two things do not exist in the same place,” the “two things” refer to the surface of the mirror and the reflected image of the moon. We cannot see the mirror’s surface and the moon’s reflected image upon that surface in the same place.

The reflected image appears within the mirror as contracted and possessing depth, like water at the bottom of a well; whereas if a real form—that is, the reflected image—were to arise, it would arise only upon the surface of the mirror and would be perceived solely as existing on that surface. Therefore, this image is merely an erroneous cognition apprehending the form of the reflected object (pratibimbākāraṃ bhrāntaṃ vijñānam).

The perception of a reflected image resembling the reflected object can arise through the power of the mirror and the object; but the powers of dharmas and the distinctions among these powers are indeed difficult to comprehend.

Even if the reflected image were admitted to be substantially existent, it still could not serve as an example in your argument, because it cannot be compared with birth-existence. It does not resemble birth-existence, since it has no continuity. A reflected image does not form a continuum with the reflected object, because the image arises in dependence upon the mirror and arises simultaneously with the reflected object.

Death-existence and birth-existence, however, form a continuum: birth-existence follows death-existence and manifests in a place different from that of death-existence, yet there is no break between them [because of the intermediate existence]. Moreover, the reflected image arises from two causes: the mirror and the reflected object. Of these two causes, the principal cause—the support upon which the reflected image depends for its manifestation—is the mirror.

Birth-existence, by contrast, proceeds from only one cause, and has no principal cause other than death-existence. In the case of spontaneously born beings, because they always appear suddenly in space, birth-existence has no external support whatsoever. As for beings born together with seed, semen, and blood, these external conditions likewise cannot be the principal cause, because they are devoid of consciousness.

The foregoing rational demonstration has established the substantial existence of the intermediate existence, because birth-existence proceeds from death-existence without any interruption between these two kinds of existence. We shall now establish the substantial existence of the intermediate existence on the basis of scriptural testimony.

The Sūtra (Saptabhavasūtra) says: “There are seven kinds of existence: hell (naraka), animal birth (tiryagyoni), hungry ghost (preta), gods (deva), humans (manuṣya), karma, and intermediate existence (antarābhava).” If the school mentioned above does not recite this sūtra, it must at least recite the sūtras concerning the gandharva. Such a sūtra says: “Three conditions are necessary for entry into the mother’s womb: the mother must be healthy and capable of conception, the father and mother must unite, and a gandharva must be present at that time.” If this is not the body of the intermediate existence, then what could the gandharva be? (Majjhima, ii. 156).

However, the school mentioned above does not read this sūtra in the foregoing sense, but replaces the third condition with a reading stating that “at that time there remains only the dissolution of the skandhas [that is, the person who is dying].” Such an explanation may indeed be acceptable, but how can the Āśvalāyanasūtra be explained when it says: “Do you know whether this gandharva now present belongs to the Brahmin, Kṣatriya, Vaiśya, or Śūdra lineage?

And do you know whether it has come from the east, south, west, or north?” The word “come” here is intended to indicate the intermediate existence, because once the skandhas have dissolved, they cannot be said to “come.” If the school mentioned above also does not recite this sūtra, the intermediate existence can still be established through the sūtra concerning the five kinds of non-returners (Saṃyukta, 37, 20; Dīgha, iii. 237).

The Blessed One taught that there are five kinds of non-returners: one who attains nirvana in the intermediate existence (antarāparinirvāyin), one who attains nirvana after being reborn (upapadyaparinirvāyin), one who attains nirvana without exertion (anabhisaṃskāraparinirvāyin), one who attains nirvana through exertion (sābhisaṃskāraparinirvāyin), and one who proceeds upstream (ūrdhvasrotas). The first are noble beings who attain nirvana while still “in between,” that is, while in the intermediate existence; the second attain nirvana after being reborn…

Certain treatise masters (Vibhāṣā, 79, 7) maintain that those who attain nirvana in the intermediate existence are noble beings who attain nirvana after being reborn in a heavenly realm named Antaras, “Intermediate.” If this were so, however, one would also have to accept other heavenly realms named Upapadyas, “Rebirth,” and so forth; and that would be utterly unreasonable.

Furthermore, according to the sutra concerning the seven destinations of the good person (satpuruṣagatis) (Madhyama, 2, 1; Anguttara, iv, 70), intermediate nirvana is divided into three kinds according to differences in place and time. The first kind resembles a spark that is extinguished as soon as it arises; the second resembles a fragment of red-hot metal extinguished while flying through the air; the third resembles a fragment of red-hot metal extinguished while flying through the air, but more slowly and before it falls to the ground.

Because the aforementioned masters relied on this sutra, they supposed that those who attain intermediate nirvana are noble ones dwelling in the heaven of the Intermediate Devas (Antaras); yet the devas in this heaven cannot be divided into three different kinds on the basis of place and time.

Another master (Vibhāṣā, 69, 7) offers the following explanation: “Those who attain intermediate nirvana are noble ones who realize nirvana—that is, the elimination of the afflictions—during the interval in which a life continues, or during the interval in which they dwell together with the devas. There are three cases in all. The first is called Arrival at the Realm (dhātugata) if the noble one realizes nirvana immediately upon arriving in the realm—that is, upon reaching a heaven belonging to the Form Realm—and thereby eliminates the afflictions that, if they still remained in the form of seeds, could cause the noble one to be reborn in the Form Realm.

The second is called Arrival at Perception (saṃjñāgata) if the noble one realizes nirvana later, at the moment when perception (saṃjñā) of things belonging to the Form Realm first becomes active within that noble one. The third is called Arrival at Discursive Thought (vitarkagata) if the noble one realizes nirvana still later, at the moment when the kinds of discursive thought arising from these things, such as volition and so forth, first become active within that noble one.

Thus there are three kinds of intermediate nirvana conforming to the definitions given in the sutra, and all three realize nirvana during the interval in which their lives still continue—that is, before reaching the final limit of the lifespan of the devas in the heaven where they have been reborn.

“Alternatively, the first case of intermediate nirvana comprises noble ones who realize nirvana immediately upon obtaining a life among the devas (taking possession of common membership in a group within the Form Realm, nikāyasabhāgaparigrahaṃ); the second comprises those who realize nirvana after enjoying celestial bliss (devasamṛddhim anubhūya); and the third comprises those who realize it after entering the Dharma assembly of the devas (dharmasaṃgīti = dharmasāṃkathya).

An objection is raised here: If one who attains intermediate nirvana is a practitioner who is reborn, enjoys celestial bliss, and enters the Dharma assembly of the devas, then what is the meaning of nirvana upon rebirth, which likewise designates a kind of noble one who realizes nirvana after being reborn? The answer is that one who attains nirvana upon rebirth becomes fully integrated into the assembly (prakarṣayuktā saṃgīti).

If this answer is still unclear, a further answer is that one who attains nirvana upon rebirth will have diminished the greater part of the duration of his life—that is, more of it than in the case of intermediate nirvana; he is not called one who attains nirvana upon rebirth merely because he has just been born.”

Nevertheless, we shall observe here that all the above cases—Arrival at the Realm, Arrival at Perception, and so forth—reach the same place; this therefore does not accord with the similes of the sparks and so forth stated in the sutra. Moreover, in the Formless Realm there should likewise be noble ones who realize nirvana without having to live out their entire lifespan, yet intermediate nirvana does not exist in this realm. This matter, however, is clarified by the following verse: “The four dhyānas each have ten cases; the three formless concentrations each have seven cases; the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception has six cases. Such is the succession of the noble ones.”

If the above school also refuses to read this sutra, what else can we do? The Great Teacher has entered nirvana, and the true Dharma no longer has a guide. Many schools have established themselves and freely altered both the meaning and the wording of the scriptures. It may be said that, for the masters who accept these sutras, the real existence of the intermediate state, or “the skandhas between the existence at death and the existence at rebirth,” is established by both scriptural authority and reasoning.

(Objection) If so, why does the sutra concerning Māra say: “Māra, whose name was Dūṣin, [after striking the head of Vidura, an attendant of the Buddha Krakucchanda,] fell bodily (svaśarīṇaiva prapatitaḥa) into the Avīci hell”?

(Explanation) The accumulated consequences of extremely evil karma may bring about retribution immediately before death. Māra therefore first underwent retribution in this very life and afterward underwent the retribution of hell. The sutra here means that Māra was surrounded by the fires of hell while still alive; when he died, he possessed an intermediate-state body, and this very body went to hell, where the existence of rebirth in hell would arise.

(Objection) Why does the sutra say: “There are five deeds of immediate retribution (ānantarya). Any being who commits these deeds will be reborn directly in hell (samanantaraṃ narakeṣūpapadyate)”?

(Explanation) By saying “reborn directly,” the sutra means “without an intervening state”—that is, without passing through another destination (gati)—because this is karma that brings about retribution in the immediately following life. If one were to cling rigidly to the wording of the sutra, it would lead to highly unreasonable interpretations, such as: one must commit all five offenses before being reborn in hell; the offender must be reborn in hell immediately after committing the offense;

or one must be reborn in hell at once, without waiting to die here. [Moreover, according to our doctrine, rebirth in hell can occur immediately without requiring a prior “arising” such as the arising of the intermediate-state body.] We maintain that the essential nature of the intermediate-state body has “the character of coming into rebirth” (upapadyamāna), because it is proceeding toward the rebirth (upapatti) that immediately follows the existence at death; but we do not say that it has been reborn (upapanno bhavati).

(Objection) If so, how can the following scriptural verse be explained: “O Brahmin, your life has reached its term; you are old, feeble, and diseased; you are about to meet King Yama; there is no resting place for you in the interval (antarā), and you have no money for the journey.” (Saṃyukta, 5, 3; Vibhāṣā, 69, 5).

(Author of the Treatise) You think that this verse implies that there is no intermediate state; but we understand the phrase “resting place in the interval” (antarā vāsa) to mean “a resting place among human beings” (manuṣyeṣu), because “once one has died, one will not return to this place again.” Alternatively, the verse means: “Nothing can delay the course of the intermediate state; therefore, you are about to reach your place of rebirth in hell.”

Those who deny the intermediate existence will ask, “On what basis do we say that this is the intended meaning of the scripture rather than some other meaning?” If so, we shall reply by posing this very same question in return. Since these two objections are identical, what further evidence can you offer? With regard to the scriptures that speak of Māra and so forth, neither the interpretation of those who deny the intermediate existence nor our interpretation entails any contradiction.

Therefore, the scriptural text does not establish either the existence or the nonexistence of the intermediate existence. If it did establish the matter and provide evidence, the scriptural text could be interpreted in only one way. This also means that if it can be interpreted in several different ways, the argument is not established.