阿毘達磨俱舍論

Part 5

Previously, the characteristics of acquisition and non-acquisition were discussed. What is commonality?

[Commonality pertains to sentient beings, and so forth.]

Treatise: There is a real dharma (dravya) called commonality (sabhāgatā); it is the dharma by virtue of which sentient beings, as well as the dharmas included within the continua of sentient beings (sattvasaṃkhyāta), can become identical or similar (sabhāga, sama, sanāna, śadṛśa) to one another. (Vibhāṣā, 27, 4).

The Root Treatise (Jñānaprasthāna, etc.) refers to this real dharma by the name commonality of beings (nikāyasabhāga), but here the author uses the term commonality (sabhāgatā) to conform to the meter of the verse.

Commonality is of two kinds: general (undifferentiated, abhinna) and particular (differentiated, bhinna).

The first kind exists in all sentient beings; through it there is similarity among sentient beings. This is called the commonality of sentient beings (sattvasabhāgatā).

The second comprises many different kinds, each of which exists only in a certain class of sentient beings. Sentient beings differ according to realm (dhātu), the levels (bhūmi) of those realms, destiny (gati), mode of birth, lineage, moral discipline, and the qualities of a lay devotee (Upāsaka), bhikṣu (Bhikṣu), trainee (Śaikṣa), or one beyond training (Aśaikṣa). It is precisely by virtue of these dharmas of commonality that each sentient being belonging to a certain class can resemble other sentient beings of that same class.

There is also a kind of commonality relating to the dharmas belonging to sentient beings, called the commonality of dharmas (dharmasabhāgatā). Through it, the different categories of skandhas, ayatanas, and dhatus can be distinguished, such as the commonality of skandhas (skandhasabhāgatā), and so forth, or the commonality of the form skandha (rūpaskandhasabhāgatā), and so forth. If there were no distinct real dharma called commonality—the commonality of sentient beings (sattvasabhāgatā)—how could general cognitions (buddhi) and conventional designations (prajñāpti) concerning sentient beings, and so forth, be explained with respect to the different classes of sentient beings?

Likewise, it is by virtue of a real dharma called the commonality of dharmas (dharmasabhāgatā) that cognitions and conventional designations concerning the skandhas, ayatanas, and so forth can be established.

(Question) Is there a case in which a sentient being dies without relinquishing this commonality of sentient beings, or is born without acquiring it?

(Answer) There are four cases: (1) When one dies in a certain place—for example, in the Desire Realm—and is reborn in that same place, the commonality remains unchanged, although the transition of death and birth occurs. (2) When one enters the certainty of attaining the noble state (niyāmāvakrānti), without any transition of death and birth, one relinquishes the commonality of an ordinary being and acquires the commonality of a noble one. (3) When one dies in one destiny (gati) but is reborn in another, commonality is both relinquished and acquired. (4) Cases other than the preceding three.

The Sautrāntikas do not accept that there is a dharma called commonality and offer many objections: If there is a real dharma called the commonality of ordinary beings (pṛthagjanasabhāgatā), why also imagine a nature of an ordinary being (pṛthagjanatva), consisting in the non-possession of the dharmas of the noble ones (āryadharma)? For in the case of human beings, apart from the commonality belonging to humans (manuṣyasabhāgatā), no distinct dharma called humanity (manuṣyatva) is ever observed.

Worldly beings do not directly perceive commonality, because it is not a material dharma; nor is it a dharma discerned by awakened wisdom, because it has no distinct function. Nevertheless, although worldly beings know nothing of the commonality of sentient beings (sattvasabhāgatā), they still perceive the absence of difference in kind among sentient beings (sattvānaṃ jātyabheda). Therefore, even supposing that a dharma called commonality truly exists, what is its function (vyāpāda)?

Why do the Vaibhāṣikas not accept a commonality pertaining to insentient things—an insentient commonality—for wheat, beans, gold, iron, mango trees, breadfruit trees, and so forth, since these too have their respective kinds and resemble one another?

The dharmas of commonality accepted by the Vaibhāṣikas are distinct dharmas belonging to the different classes of sentient beings, realms, destinies, and so forth; but why do all people have the same cognitions and conventional designations regarding them, so that all call them commonality (sabhāgatā)?

If this position is maintained, then the Sarvāstivādins are indeed propagating the doctrine of the Vaiśeṣikas. That school maintains that there is a real entity—a category—called “universal” (sāmānya); by virtue of this universal category, identical words and cognitions concerning things can arise. The Vaiśeṣikas also believe that there is another real entity called the category of particularity (viśeṣa), which can give rise to different words and cognitions concerning things.

The Vaibhāṣikas defend themselves by saying that their position is not the same as the Vaiśeṣika doctrine, which holds that a “universal” (sāmānya) is a single entity (padārtha) existing in many different individuals (eko ’py anekasmin vartate). Thus, even if the Vaibhāṣikas agree with the Vaiśeṣikas in accepting a real entity called a “universal,” they nevertheless criticize the Vaiśeṣika explanation of this matter. In fact, commonality is still a real dharma, because the Blessed One, when speaking of a murderer who is reborn in hell, said: “If that person returns here, if that person acquires the dharma of commonality belonging to humans…” (Madhyama, 24, 3).

(Objection of the Sautrāntikas) Although this is indeed said, the sutra does not state that there is a real dharma called commonality.

(Question of the Vaibhāṣikas) If so, what is the meaning of the commonality mentioned in the sutra?

(Reply of the Sautrāntikas) By the phrase “the dharma of commonality belonging to humans,” the sutra means similarity in the mode of existence, just like the commonality of rice, wheat, beans, and so forth.

The Vaibhāṣikas do not accept this explanation because it does not accord with the tenets of their school.

Commonality has now been discussed; next comes the section on non-perception (āsaṃjñika).

[The dharma of non-perception among non-percipient beings

Causes mind and mental factors to cease;

This dharma is a ripened result. Non-percipient beings dwell in Bṛhatphala.]

Treatise: When one is born among non-percipient beings, or non-percipient devas, there is a dharma capable of arresting all minds and mental factors, called “non-perception.” By virtue of this real dharma, future mind and mental dharmas are prevented from arising for a certain period and lack the power to be produced. This dharma of non-perception resembles a dam that holds back the water of a river (nadītoyanirodhavat).

The dharma of non-perception is the ripened result of the absorption of non-perception (asaṃjñisamāpatti).

Non-percipient beings dwell in the heaven of Bṛhatphala. In the Bṛhatphala heaven there is an elevated place where these beings dwell, just as the intermediate meditative absorption (dhyānāntarikā), where the Mahābrahmā devas dwell, is an elevated place in the heaven of Brahmā’s Retinue (Brahmapurohita). (Vibhāṣā, 154, 8)

(Question) Are non-percipient beings so called because they are always without perception, or do they sometimes have perception?

(Answer) They have perception at the time of birth and at the time of death (Vibhāṣā, 154, 9). They are called non-percipient because, throughout the long interval from after birth until death, no perception of any kind arises in them. At the end of this long period, when perception arises again, they die. As the sutra says: “Just as a person awakens after a long sleep, when perception arises in them again, they die.”

Those who die in the heaven of non-percipient beings are reborn only in the Desire Realm and nowhere else. This is because the force of their previous cultivation of the attainment of non-perception, by which they were able to be born in the heaven of non-percipient beings, has then been exhausted, and throughout their lives in that heaven they were unable to continue cultivating this attainment. Therefore, after death they must be reborn in the Desire Realm, just as an arrow whose momentum is spent must fall to the ground.

Moreover, a being who wishes to be born in the heaven of non-percipient beings must possess a kind of karma that “produces its result in the Desire Realm” and “produces its result in the life after the next” (Desire-Realm karma to be experienced in a subsequent life); likewise, any being who wishes to be reborn on the continent of Uttarakuru must possess karma capable of producing its result in a heaven immediately after life on that continent comes to an end.

The Root Treatise (Mūlaśāstra) states: “What are the two attainments? They are the attainment of non-perception (asaṃjñisamāpatti) and the attainment of cessation (nirodhasamāpatti).”

(Question) What are the characteristics of the attainment of non-perception?

The verse answers:

[The attainment of non-perception is likewise.

It arises in the final dhyana,

Is cultivated in pursuit of liberation,

Is wholesome, and brings only fruition to be experienced in the next life;

It is not a noble Dharma and is acquired in only one lifetime.]

Exposition: As stated above, there is a dharma capable of causing mind and mental factors to cease, which is called non-perception. Likewise, there is a kind of dharma capable of causing mind and mental factors to cease that is called the attainment of non-perception. The attainment of non-perception is the attainment of those who are without perception (asaṃjñināṃ samāpattiḥ), or an attainment in which there is no perception.

The expression “likewise” above implies that this attainment can also cause mind and mental factors to cease, just as the dharma of non-perception (āsaṃjñika) does.

(Question) To which plane does the attainment of non-perception belong?

(Answer) To cultivate this attainment, the practitioner must be born in the fourth dhyana.

(Question) For what purpose is the attainment of non-perception cultivated?

(Answer) It is cultivated in pursuit of liberation. Because non-perception is regarded as true liberation, one cultivates the attainment of non-perception.

It was stated above that non-perception is a result of maturation and therefore morally indeterminate. The attainment of non-perception, however, is entirely wholesome and is capable of bringing about the matured result consisting of the five skandhas of the non-percipient devas.

(Question) If the attainment of non-perception is solely wholesome, what kind of result does it bring about?

(Answer) A result belonging to the next life (to be experienced in the next birth). The attainment of non-perception does not bring about a result belonging to the present life, one belonging to a life subsequent to the next, or an indeterminate result. According to the Vibhāṣā, if one previously aroused the attainment of non-perception but subsequently regressed from it, one can later arouse this attainment again and be reborn in the heaven of non-percipient beings. Therefore, one who has acquired (lābhin) this attainment cannot enter the certainty of the noble path.

Only ordinary beings acquire this attainment, not noble ones. Noble ones regard non-perception as a deep pit and therefore do not wish to enter it. Because ordinary beings regard the attainment of non-perception as true liberation, they conceive it as emancipation and therefore cultivate this attainment. In contrast, all noble ones know that a conditioned dharma subject to outflows cannot be true liberation and therefore do not cultivate this attainment.

(Question) When noble ones enter the fourth dhyana, do they acquire the past and future attainment of non-perception, just as they acquire the past and future fourth dhyana from the time they enter that dhyana?

(Answer) Even those who are not noble ones do not acquire the past and future attainment of non-perception.

(Question) Why?

(Answer) Because this attainment is a state without mind, even if it has been cultivated previously, it can be acquired only through great effort (great preparatory practice, mahābhisaṃskāra). Therefore, when the attainment of non-perception is first acquired, it is acquired only in the present and cannot be acquired in the past or future, just as in the case of those who acquire the restraint of individual liberation (prātimokṣasaṃvara). After this attainment has been acquired, in the second moment and in all subsequent moments until emergence from the attainment, the past attainment of non-perception can be acquired. On the other hand, because it is a state without mind, there can be no acquisition of a future attainment of non-perception (nānāgatā bhāvyate).

Next comes the explanation of the attainment of cessation.

[The attainment of cessation is likewise.

It is an attainment of peaceful abiding and exists at the Summit of Existence;

It is wholesome and brings two kinds of fruition or indeterminate fruition.

It belongs only to noble ones and is acquired through preparatory practice.

The Buddha acquired this attainment upon becoming a Buddha, not before,

And attained the knowledge of exhaustion within thirty-four moments.]

Exposition: The attainment of cessation is like non-perception and the attainment of non-perception, because this dharma causes mind and mental factors to cease.

(Question) How do these two attainments differ?

(Answer) Noble ones cultivate the attainment of cessation because they regard it as an attainment of peaceful abiding (śāntavihāra), whereas non-perception is cultivated because ordinary beings regard it as liberation (niḥsaraṇa = mokṣa).

The attainment of cessation belongs to the Summit of Existence; that is, it proceeds from the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception (naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñāyatana). The attainment of non-perception, however, belongs only to the fourth dhyana.

Like the attainment of non-perception, the attainment of cessation is wholesome rather than morally indeterminate or defiled, because the cause from which it arises is also wholesome.

The attainment of cessation can bring about two kinds of matured result: fruition to be experienced in the next birth (upapadyavedanīya) or fruition to be experienced in a subsequent life (upaparyāyavedanīya). The attainment of cessation may also bring about an indeterminate result, because a noble one who cultivates this attainment may attain nirvana in the present life.

(Question) What does the matured result brought about by this attainment comprise?

(Answer) It brings about the four skandhas at the Summit of Existence; that is, it leads to a single lifetime at the Summit of Existence.

This attainment is acquired only by noble ones, not by ordinary beings, because ordinary beings fear annihilation (ucchedabhīrutva), and because the attainment of cessation can arise only through the power of the noble path. Indeed, only noble ones have seen nirvana and dare resolve to enter it.

Although this attainment is acquired only by noble ones, it is not acquired entirely through detachment (vairāgya); effort in cultivation is also required (acquisition through preparatory practice, prayogalabhya).

The past or future attainment of cessation cannot be acquired; this is explained in the same way as in the discussion of the attainment of non-perception.

(Question) Did the Blessed One also acquire the attainment of cessation through preparatory practice?

(Answer) No. The Blessed One acquired this attainment when he became a Buddha, that is, when he attained the knowledge of exhaustion (kṣayajñāna). No quality (guṇa) of a Buddha is acquired through preparatory practice; all the qualities of a Buddha are acquired through liberation from bondage. Whenever the Buddha wishes these qualities to be present, they arise according to his will.

(Question) How could the Blessed One, who had never previously entered this attainment (nirodhasamāpatti), attain both kinds of liberation (liberation in both respects, ubhayatobhāgavimukta)—namely, liberation from the obstruction of the afflictions and from the obstruction to meditative attainment (samāpattyāvaraṇa)—at the moment he attained the knowledge of destruction (kṣayajñāna)?

(Answer) Because the Blessed One was capable of entering this attainment whenever he wished.

The Western Masters (Pāścātya) maintain that the bodhisattva first entered the attainment of cessation and only afterward attained bodhi. Why not accept this doctrine?

If it were accepted, it would accord with the Netrīpadaśāstra of the Venerable Upagupta (Sthavira, Upagupta), in which he says: “Those who attain the knowledge of destruction after having entered the attainment of cessation should be called Tathagatas.”

The Vaibhāṣika masters of Kashmir do not accept that the attainment of cessation was entered before the attainment of the knowledge of destruction. According to tradition (Vibhāṣā, 153, 10-11), the bodhisattva attained bodhi by means of thirty-four moments of mindfulness. These comprise sixteen moments of mindfulness constituting the “direct comprehension of the truths” (direct realization of the truths, satyābhisamaya), and eighteen moments of mindfulness constituting the abandonment of the afflictions belonging to the Summit of Existence (abandonment of attachment to the Summit of Existence), namely nine uninterrupted paths (ānantaryamārga) and nine paths of liberation (vimuktamārga).

The eighteenth moment of mindfulness is the knowledge of destruction. — These thirty-four moments of mindfulness were sufficient because, before entering the path of seeing, while he was still an ordinary being, the bodhisattva had already abandoned all the planes except the Summit of Existence by means of the mundane path. — These eighteen moments of mindfulness constitute a single noble path during which the noble one never produces a mind of a different nature, such as a mundane, contaminated mind intending to enter the attainment of cessation.

Therefore, while the bodhisattva was still at the stage of one in training—that is, before becoming an arhat, during the interval comprising the path of seeing and the eighteen moments of mindfulness that abandon the Summit of Existence—he did not enter the attainment of cessation.

(Question) The masters of other regions (bahirdeśaka) say: “What fault would there be if, in the interval, the bodhisattva produced a contaminated mind?”

(Answer) If one says this, the bodhisattva would have deviated from his resolve (vyuthānāśayaḥ syāt), but the bodhisattva did not do so.

(Explanation) In truth, the bodhisattva did not deviate from his resolve; however, this does not mean that he could not depart from the uncontaminated noble path in order to produce a contaminated mind.

(Question) If so, how could he avoid deviating from his resolve?

(Answer) Because the bodhisattva had resolved (Madhyamāgama, 56, 6): “Until I have completely destroyed the afflictions, I shall never rise from this seated posture (cross-legged posture, utkuṭukāsana).” Therefore, the bodhisattva did not deviate from this resolve, for by means of that single sitting he was able to accomplish his aim.

The first doctrine is correct, because it is the tenet of our school.

Although the two attainments described above differ in many respects, they nevertheless have points in common.

[Both attainments depend upon the Desire Realm and the Form Realm.

The attainment of cessation is initially entered among human beings.]

Treatise: Both of the above attainments are entered by beings belonging to the Desire Realm and the Form Realm. If one did not accept that the attainment of non-perception can be entered in the Form Realm, this would contradict the fundamental treatise (Jñānaprasthāna, 19, 17), which states: “There is an existence in the Form Realm that does not possess the five skandhas. This is (1) the existence of sentient beings in the Form Realm who possess mind when they enter the attainment of non-perception or the attainment of cessation, and (2) the existence of beings in the Form Realm who have attained the state of non-perception (āsaṃjñika) and are born among the non-percipient gods.”

The passage above shows that both of these attainments are cultivated in the Desire Realm as well as in the Form Realm.

Nevertheless, there remain certain differences:

A person who has never before attained the attainment of non-perception may enter it in either the Desire Realm or the Form Realm. In the case of the attainment of cessation, however, its initial entry can occur only among human beings. A person—a noble one—who previously entered the attainment of cessation but may have fallen away from and lost it, without being reborn outside the Form Realm, may enter it again there.

(Question) Can there still be a case of falling away from the attainment of cessation, which resembles nirvana?

(Answer of the Vaibhāṣikas) Such a case does exist. If this loss were not accepted, it would contradict the Udāyisūtra. That sutra says: “Venerable sir, a bhikṣu endowed with moral discipline, meditative concentration, and wisdom can repeatedly enter and emerge from the attainment of cessation. If, in this very life, the bhikṣu does not cultivate diligently, even at the time of death, then after the dissolution of this body he will pass beyond the gods who still partake of coarse food (the gods who consume material food) and be reborn among the gods in a mind-made body (a divine mind-made body, divye manomaye kāye). Thus, after being reborn, the bhikṣu can still repeatedly enter and emerge from the attainment of cessation.”

This passage from the sutra truly shows that there can be a case of falling away from the attainment of cessation.

Moreover, according to the Buddha, the mind-made body mentioned above by Śāriputra belongs to the Form Realm. The attainment of cessation, on the other hand, belongs to the Summit of Existence, the highest plane of the Formless Realm. Therefore, if a bhikṣu has attained this attainment and has not lost it, he cannot be reborn in the Form Realm.

One school (the Mahāsāṃghikas, Mahāvyutpatti) maintains that the fourth dhyāna also contains the attainment of cessation and that there is no falling away from this attainment.

The doctrine above is incorrect. The attainment of cessation does not belong to the fourth dhyāna, because the sutra (Dīrgha, 17, 11; Dīgha, iii. 266; Mahāvyutpatti, 68, 7) states that these nine attainments—the four dhyānas of the Form Realm, the four attainments of the Formless Realm, and the attainment of cessation—are attained in sequence.

(Question) If so, how can one explain the attainment called “Transcending” (transcendent attainment, vyutkrāntaka), in which the practitioner can skip various stages of meditative attainment?

(Answer) The statement that these attainments must be entered in sequence refers to beginning practitioners. Those who have gained mastery over meditative attainment may transcend them at will.

Thus, the attainment of non-perception and the attainment of cessation differ in many respects.

(1) Their planes (bhūmi) differ: the attainment of non-perception belongs to the fourth dhyāna (the fourth meditative absorption); the attainment of cessation belongs to the Summit of Existence (the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception, naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñāyatana).

(2) Their preparatory practices (prayoga) differ: the attainment of non-perception arises from the mental application that regards non-perception as true liberation; the attainment of cessation arises from the mental application that seeks serenity.

(3) Their personal continuities (saṃtāna) differ: the attainment of non-perception arises in the personal continuity of an ordinary being; the attainment of cessation arises in the personal continuity of a noble one.

(4) Their ripened results differ: the attainment of non-perception brings about a result in the heaven of the non-percipient gods; the attainment of cessation arises in the heaven of the Summit of Existence.

(5) Difference in the nature of karmic fruition: The fruition of the attainment of non-perception is determinate (niyata), in that it will arise in the immediately following life (fruit to be experienced in the next life); the fruition of the attainment of cessation, in the case of a non-returner (Anāgāmin), is determinate, whereas in the case of an arhat it is indeterminate. In both cases, if it arises, it will arise either in the immediately following life (fruit to be experienced in the next life) or in subsequent lives (fruit to be experienced in a later life).

(6) Difference in their initial arising: The attainment of non-perception can initially arise in two realms; the attainment of cessation initially arises only in the human realm.

The characteristic common to these two attainments is the cessation of mind and mental factors (cittacaittānāṃ nirodhaḥ).

(Question) Why is the attainment of non-perception called the attainment “without perception” (asaṃjñisamāpatti), while the attainment of cessation is called the attainment of the “cessation of perception and feeling” (saṃjñāveditanirodhasamāpatti)?

(Answer) Because the preparatory practice for the attainment of non-perception is opposed (pratikūla) only to perception, whereas the preparatory practice for the attainment of cessation is opposed to both perception and feeling. It is like the case of the knowledge of another’s mind (paracittajñāna) when it takes another person’s mental factors as its objects: This knowledge is called “knowledge of another’s mind” because its preparatory practice is directed solely toward another’s mind.

(Question) In both of the above attainments, the mind is interrupted for a long period. Thus, upon emerging from the attainment, how can a subsequent new mind arise from a mind that has ceased for so long?

(Answer) The Vibhāṣā masters (Vibhāṣā, 152, 10) maintain that past dharmas continue to exist. Therefore, the mind preceding the attainment, namely the “mind of attainment” (samāpatticitta), or the mind at the time of entering the attainment, is the homogeneous and immediately antecedent condition (samanantarapratyaya) that gives rise to the mind following the attainment, or the mind at the time of emergence (vyutthānacitta).

Certain masters (the Sautrāntikas) say that, in the case of birth in the Formless Realm, form (rūpa) has been interrupted for a long period; if one is subsequently reborn in the Desire Realm or the Form Realm, this new form, or subsequent form, does not arise from the continuum of forms that had been interrupted for so long, but instead arises from the mind. The mind upon emerging from attainment is similar: It has no mind preceding the attainment as its cause and must arise from the “body endowed with faculties” (sendriyakāya). Thus the earlier masters said that two dharmas serve as seeds for one another (anyonyabījaka), these two dharmas being the mind and the body endowed with faculties.

The Venerable Vasumitra says in the Paripṛcchā: “The question of how the mind can arise again after emerging from attainment arises only for those who hold that the attainment of cessation is an attainment entirely without mind. In my view, a subtle kind of mind remains in the attainment of cessation; therefore, the above question need not be raised.”

The Venerable Ghoṣaka maintains that Vasumitra’s foregoing statement is incorrect; for if some consciousness (vijñāna) remained in this attainment, there would necessarily be contact (sparśa), the conjunction of the three dharmas—consciousness, faculty, and object. Since there would be contact, there would also be feeling (vedanā) and perception (saṃjñā), as the Blessed One said: “Conditioned by the mental faculty and dharmas, mental consciousness arises; there is then contact, the conjunction of the three, and at that time feeling, perception, and volition arise.” (Saṃyktāgama, 11, 8).

Therefore, if it is admitted that mind (vijñāna, citta) exists in this attainment, feeling and perception likewise cannot have ceased within it. How, then, could it be called the attainment of the cessation of perception and feeling (saṃjñāveditanirodha)?

(Vasumitra) The sutra says: “Conditioned by feeling, craving arises”; yet although an arhat experiences feelings, craving does not exist in an arhat. The foregoing case is similar: Not every contact is a cause of feeling.

(Ghoṣaka) This explanation is incorrect. The sutra speaks elliptically when it says that “craving arises conditioned by feeling that originates from contact accompanied by ignorance” (Saṃyktāgama, 12, 14; Saṃyutta, iii. 96); but in fact the sutra still implies that “feeling arises conditioned by contact.” Thus, according to the Vibhāṣā, the mind is indeed interrupted in the attainment of cessation.

(Vasumitra) If this attainment is entirely without mind, how can it be called an attainment (samāpatti)?

(Ghoṣaka) It is still called an attainment because it causes all the great elements to remain in a state of equilibrium different from their state when the mind arises; or because practitioners enter the attainment (samāgacchanti, samāpadyante) through the power of the mind. For precisely this reason, the meditative absorptions (dhyāna), and so forth, are also called attainments (samāpatti).

(Question) Thus, do these two attainments substantially exist (dravyata, svalakṣaṇata), or do they exist merely by designation?

(Answer of the Sarvāstivādins) They substantially exist because they obstruct the arising of the mind (cittotpattipratibandhanāt).

(Position of the Sautrāntikas) This is not so. The arising of the mind is not obstructed by what you have called an “attainment” above, but by a certain “mind of attainment” (samāpatticitta), namely the mind preceding the attainment. Because this mind is incompatible with the arising of mind, it prevents other minds from arising for a certain period. This “mind of attainment” renders the basis (āśraya), or the bodily continuum (saṃtāna), incompatible (virudha) with the arising of mind. What is called an “attainment” is merely the non-occurrence of mind (apravāṛttimātra) for a certain period; it is not a substantially existent dharma (dravyadharma), but only a provisionally designated dharma (prajñaptidharma).

(Sarvāstivādins) If it is not a real dharma, how can this attainment be said to belong to the conditioned dharmas (saṃskṛta)?

(Sautrāntikas) This phase of the “non-occurrence of mind” does not occur before the “mind of attainment” (samāpatticitta) and ends when the practitioner gives rise to a new mind—the mind subsequent to the attainment, or the mind of emergence (vyutthānacitta). This means that the “non-occurrence of mind” also has a beginning and an end; it may therefore be regarded as a conditioned dharma. Alternatively, what is termed an “attainment” is merely a particular state (avasthāvśeṣa) of the supporting body, brought about by this mind of attainment.

The same applies to the attainment of non-perception. Non-perception (āsaṃjñika) is not a real dharma capable of preventing the arising of mind, but merely the state of being without perception among the devas in the Heaven of Non-Perception, a state brought about by a certain kind of mind.

The Vibhāṣā masters do not accept the foregoing position. They maintain that non-perception and these two attainments are all substantially existent dharmas.

The two attainments have now been explained; next comes the section concerning the faculty of vitality (jīvitendriya).

[The essence of the faculty of vitality is lifespan,

Which is capable of sustaining warmth and consciousness.]

Treatise: The essence of vitality (jīvita) is precisely lifespan (āyus); therefore, the Abhidharma treatise states: “What is the faculty of vitality?—It is lifespan in the three realms.”

(Question) What kind of dharma is lifespan?

(Answer) It is a kind of dharma capable of sustaining warmth and consciousness. The Blessed One said: “When the three dharmas—life faculty, warmth, and consciousness—depart from the body, the body collapses like a tree trunk and no longer has any awareness.” Therefore, there is a distinct dharma—capable of preserving warmth and consciousness while also serving as the cause for the continued existence of the bodily continuum—called the “life faculty.”

(Question of the Sautrantikas) If the life faculty preserves warmth and consciousness, what preserves it?

(Answer of the Vaibhashikas) Warmth and consciousness themselves preserve it.

(Sautrantikas) If the three dharmas—life faculty, warmth, and consciousness—preserve one another and continuously arise (saṃtānapravṛtti), then, given this mutual support, how can they cease?

Which dharma would first be extinguished, allowing the other two to be extinguished thereafter? For if none of these three dharmas were extinguished first, they would all be permanent and would never cease (anivṛtti).

(Vaibhashikas) The life faculty is sustained by karma. It is propelled by karma and continues to arise in accordance with the propulsion of that karma.

(Sautrantikas) If so, why not accept that warmth and consciousness are sustained by karma, instead of maintaining this only of the life faculty?

(Vaibhashikas) A dharma sustained by karma must be of the nature of karmic maturation. If consciousness were also sustained by karma, then every consciousness, from conception until death, would be a karmic maturation; and this cannot be accepted. From this we know that it is precisely the life faculty, itself sustained by karma, that sustains warmth and consciousness.

(Sautrantikas) If so, say that karma sustains warmth and warmth sustains consciousness; what need is there for a life faculty?

(Vaibhashikas) There must be a life faculty, because there is no warmth in the Formless Realm. What dharma would sustain consciousness in the Formless Realm if the life faculty did not exist there?

(Sautrantikas) Karma would sustain consciousness in the Formless Realm.

(Vaibhashikas) Can you change your position so arbitrarily? At one moment you say that consciousness is sustained by warmth, and at another that consciousness is sustained by karma. Moreover, above you already accepted that one should not say that every consciousness, from conception until death, is a karmic maturation. Therefore, one must certainly accept that there is a distinct dharma called the life faculty, capable of preserving warmth and consciousness.

(Sautrantikas) We do not deny the life faculty; we merely say that it is not a real dharma.

(Vaibhashikas) Then what kind of dharma is the life faculty?

(Sautrantikas) It is a potency created by past karma in a sentient being at the moment of conception—a kind of potency by virtue of which, for a certain fixed period (duration of abiding), the skandhas are able to arise anew within a homogeneous continuum, thereby constituting a lifetime. It is like a rice seed that can impart to its sprout a potency by virtue of which the plant can develop until it ripens; or like a discharged arrow that can acquire a potency enabling it to fly for a certain period of time.

(The treatise master’s refutation of a doctrine of the Vaisheshikas) The Vaisheshikas believe that a certain quality (guṇa), called impetus (saṃskāra, vega), arises in the arrow; and that through the force of this quality, the arrow can continue flying without interruption until it falls to the ground.

The essence of this quality called “impetus” is only one, and moreover the arrow flies without encountering any obstacle; thus, no alteration could occur in the arrow’s motion, and the arrow would never fall. If you maintain that wind obstructs this quality of “impetus,” then the obstructing wind itself does not vary whether the arrow is near or far; consequently, the arrow ought either to fall immediately upon being discharged or to fly forever.

The Vaibhashikas nevertheless maintain their position that there is a distinct real dharma, called the life faculty, that sustains warmth and consciousness.

(Question) Does death occur because the life faculty has been exhausted, or because of some other cause?

(Answer) The Prajñāptiśāstra states: “Death occurs because the life faculty is exhausted (āyuḥkṣayāt), but not because merit is exhausted. There are four cases: (1) death because the karma that produces the life faculty is exhausted; (2) death because the karma that produces the fruit of prosperous enjoyment (bhoga) is exhausted; (3) death because both kinds of karma () are exhausted; (4) death because harmful causes cannot be avoided (viṣaṃāparihāra), such as excessive consumption of food (atyaśana).” Here one should add the case of death through relinquishing the formations of life (āyuḥsaṃskāra).

When the life faculty has been exhausted, even if the karma that produces prosperous enjoyment is also exhausted, the latter is not capable of causing death; and conversely. Thus, the third case above means “death because both kinds of karma are exhausted.”

The Jñānaprasthāna states: “Can it be said that the life faculty depends upon the bodily continuum (saṃtānavartin), or that, once arisen, it can continue to exist by itself (sakṛd utpannaṃ tiṣṭhati)?

– The first case applies to sentient beings in the Desire Realm who have not entered the attainment of non-perception or the attainment of cessation. The second case applies to sentient beings in the Desire Realm who have entered the attainment of non-perception or the attainment of cessation, and to sentient beings in the Form Realm and Formless Realm.

(Question) What is the meaning of the passage above?

(Answer) When the supporting basis (āśraya) is damaged, the life faculty is also damaged, because the life faculty is bound to the continuum of the supporting basis (āśrayasaṃtatibaddha). If the supporting basis is not damaged, the life faculty continues for as long as it was propelled by karma; this case is called “the life faculty, once arisen, can continue to exist by itself.”

The Vaibhashika masters of Kashmir say that the first kind of life faculty is subject to obstruction (sātarāya), whereas the second is not.

From this it is known that there is death before the appointed time (untimely death).

According to the sutra, there are four cases concerning the attainment of a life, namely, a kind of life that can be destroyed by oneself but not by others, and so forth: (1) destroyed only by oneself; this is the case of beings in the heavens of Those Who Become Corrupted through Play (Krīḍāpradūṣika) and Those Who Become Corrupted through Anger of Mind (Manaḥpradūṣika) in the Desire Realm, who destroy themselves through excessive play or anger; here one should also mention the case of the Buddhas, who enter nirvana by themselves; (2) destroyed only by others; this is the case of beings in a womb or an egg; (3) destroyed by both oneself and others; this is the general case of beings in the Desire Realm;

here one should also mention the case of beings in the hells (nāraka), the intermediate existence, and so forth; (4) destroyed neither by oneself nor by others; this is the case of beings in the intermediate existence, all beings in the Form Realm and Formless Realm, some beings in the Desire Realm, beings in the hells and in Uttarakuru, those who are on the path of seeing, those who are entering the four dhyanas, the absorption of non-perception, or the absorption of cessation, royal seers (rājaṛṣi)—that is, wheel-turning noble kings who have renounced the household life—the Buddha’s messengers, those who have received a prediction from the Buddha, such as Dharmila, Uttara, and Gangila, the sons of the householder Yaśas, Kumāra, Jīvaka, bodhisattvas in their final existence,

the mothers pregnant with these bodhisattvas, wheel-turning kings, and the mothers pregnant with these wheel-turning kings.

(Question) If so, why, when Śāriputra asked the Buddha, “Which beings have a life—the attainment of an individual existence (ātmabhāvapratilambha)—that cannot be destroyed either by themselves or by others?” did the Buddha reply, “They are the beings in the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception,” that is, at the Summit of Existence, the highest plane of the Formless Realm? According to the passage of scripture above, how can it be said that the lives of all beings in the Form Realm and Formless Realm cannot be destroyed either by themselves or by others?

(Reply) Tradition (Vibhāṣā, 151, 12) holds that the lives of beings in the Form Realm and in the first three planes of the Formless Realm can be harmed by themselves—that is, by the noble path belonging to their own plane—and can also be harmed by others—that is, by the noble path belonging to the neighboring preparatory stage (sāmantaka) of the next higher plane. At the final plane of the Formless Realm, the Summit of Existence, however, there is neither a noble path belonging to that plane nor a noble path belonging to a higher plane; therefore, the lives of the beings there cannot be harmed either by themselves or by others.

(The Author of the Treatise) The explanation above is unreasonable, because at the Summit of Existence the noble path belonging to the plane immediately below it, the sphere of nothingness (ākiñcanyāyatana), can still arise. One must therefore accept another explanation, also from the Vibhāṣā: in his reply to Śāriputra, when the Buddha mentioned beings belonging to the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception, he intended to indicate all beings in the Form Realm and Formless Realm, because by stating the last (paryanta), one also indicates (saṃpratyana) the first.

An objection may be raised here: What purpose would this serve?—Sometimes a sutra mentions only the name of the first while intending to indicate all the remaining names, as in the statement: “The first class of gods born in happiness is, namely (tadyathā), the gods of the Brahmā Group.” This means “the gods of the Brahmā Group (Brahmakāyika), the Ministers of Brahmā (Brahmapurohita), and the Great Brahmās (Mahābrahma).” Sometimes a sutra mentions only the name of the last, as in: “The second class of gods born in happiness is, namely, the gods of the Heaven of Radiant Light.” This means the gods of Limited Light (Parītābha), Immeasurable Light (Apramāṇābha), and Radiant Light.

(Objection) The explanation above can still be refuted. In the two scriptural passages cited above, the word “namely” (tadyathā) signifies an example. It should therefore be rendered “for example,” rather than “namely.” With this form of expression, the name of one case may still be given to indicate other similar cases; hence it may still be accepted that, in the two passages above, mentioning the gods born in happiness (sukhopapattis) is intended to indicate all the other heavens. In the Blessed One’s reply to Śāriputra, however, this word “namely” does not occur.

(Explanation) The expression above is not intended to give an example but to provide an exhaustive enumeration, for this usage can be found in other sutras, as follows: “Form-endowed beings have different bodies and different perceptions, namely (tadyathā), all human beings and some gods, and so forth.” Thus, the word “namely” may be used to give a definition rather than an example. Therefore, in replying to Śāriputra, the Blessed One stated only the last in order to indicate the first; that is, he intended to refer to the two higher realms in their entirety.

The life faculty has been explained above. Next comes the explanation of the characteristics (lakṣaṇa) of conditioned phenomena (saṃskṛtasya).

[The Characteristics of Conditioned Phenomena

Are arising, duration, change, and cessation.]

Treatise: The four phenomena of arising (jāti), duration (sthiti), change (jarā), and cessation (anitya) are the characteristics of conditioned phenomena. Whatever phenomena possess these characteristics are conditioned; whatever phenomena do not possess them are unconditioned (asaṃskṛta).

Arising is the phenomenon that produces or brings forth (utpādayati) conditioned phenomena; duration is the phenomenon that stabilizes or sustains (sthāpayati) conditioned phenomena; change is the phenomenon that causes conditioned phenomena to decline; and cessation is the phenomenon that causes conditioned phenomena to be destroyed.

(Question) Does the sutra not say that conditioned phenomena have only three conditioned characteristics? As the sutra (Trilakṣaṇasūtra) states: “Bhikṣus, conditioned phenomena have three characteristics, and these three characteristics are themselves conditioned phenomena. What are the three? With regard to a conditioned phenomenon, its arising or origination (utpāda) is an object apprehended by consciousness; the disappearance or exhaustion (vyaya) of this arising is an object apprehended by consciousness; and its duration and alteration (sthityanyathātva) are likewise.”

(Reply of the Vibhāṣā) The sutra should have spoken of four characteristics, but it omitted one characteristic, namely duration. The sutra does in fact use the word “duration” (sthiti) in the compound “duration and alteration” (sthityanyathātva); however, this compound signifies only decline, or change. Just as the sutra uses “origination” (utpāda) in place of “arising” (jāti), and “exhaustion” (vyaya) in place of “cessation” (anityatā), so, when it speaks of “duration and alteration” (sthityanyathātva), it intends this expression in place of “change” (jarā).

If the sutra speaks of only three characteristics, it is because, wishing to cause sentient beings to develop disenchantment, it describes as conditioned characteristics those dharmas capable of causing a conditioned dharma to proceed through the three times. That is, the power of arising causes a conditioned dharma to proceed (saṃcārayati) from the future into the present, while the powers of change (change in duration) and cessation cause a conditioned dharma to proceed from the present into the past; for after change has weakened (durbalīkṛtya) the conditioned dharma, cessation itself destroys (vighātāt) that conditioned dharma.

Here, tradition (Vibhāṣā, 39, 6) offers a comparison: It is like a man in a dense forest whom three enemies seek to kill. The first drags him out of the forest, the second weakens him, and the third ends his life faculty. The three characteristics of a conditioned dharma are likewise.

Duration, however, preserves the conditioned dharma and causes it to continue to exist; therefore, the sutra does not regard it as one of the characteristics of the conditioned. Furthermore, the unconditioned inherently possesses the characteristic of permanence (abiding in its own characteristic, svalakṣṇe sthitibhāva), while the “duration” characteristic of a conditioned dharma is unlike this characteristic of the unconditioned.

Therefore, to avoid confusion, the sutra does not enumerate duration as one of the characteristics of a conditioned dharma.

Certain masters (the Sautrāntikas) say that the sutra does speak of duration, but combines it with change; that is, the compound “duration-change” (sthityanyathātva) means “duration” (sthiti) and “change” (anyathātva).

(Question) Why does the sutra combine these two characteristics into one?

(Reply of the Sautrāntikas) Duration is precisely that dharma to which sentient beings are habitually attached. Therefore, to cause sentient beings to develop disenchantment, the sutra mentions duration together with change, just as auspiciousness is spoken of as accompanied by “black ears.” Thus, one should understand that there are four conditioned characteristics.

(Question) The dharmas of arising, duration, and so forth are themselves conditioned dharmas; therefore, they too must arise, endure, change, and cease. If the dharma of arising has the four characteristics of arising and so forth, then the arising characteristic of this arising dharma—that is, the second arising characteristic [the subsidiary characteristic, anulakṣaṇa]—is in turn also a conditioned dharma and must also possess four characteristics: arising (that is, a third arising characteristic), duration, and so forth. Would this not entail the fault of infinite regress?

(Answer) There are indeed these further characteristics, but no fault of infinite regress arises, because:

[The primary characteristics have the subsidiary characteristics of arising-of-arising and so forth.

A primary characteristic acts upon eight dharmas; a subsidiary characteristic acts upon only one dharma.]

Treatise: The first four characteristics (the primary characteristics, mūlalakṣaṇa) are those described above.

The next four characteristics (the subsidiary characteristics, anulakṣaṇa) are the arising of arising, the duration of duration, the change of change, and the cessation of cessation.

All conditioned dharmas are called conditioned because they possess the first four characteristics mentioned above. These primary characteristics, in turn, are called conditioned dharmas because they possess these four subsidiary characteristics.

To suppose that each of the four primary characteristics must possess four characteristics, just as a conditioned dharma possesses four primary characteristics, is to fail to understand the function of these different characteristics (the activity of dharmas, dharmakāritra).

When a dharma arises—that is, a mind or mental factor, called the primary dharma—nine dharmas are included in it and arise together with it: the primary dharma, the four primary characteristics, and the four subsidiary characteristics. The first primary characteristic, arising (primary arising, mūlajāti), is capable of bringing forth the primary dharma, the other three primary characteristics—duration, change, and cessation—and the four subsidiary characteristics: eight dharmas in all.

The primary characteristic of arising cannot bring itself forth; it is brought forth by the subsidiary characteristic called the arising of arising (jātijāti). Just as a hen can lay many eggs, while from each egg only one hen emerges (Vibhāṣā, 39, 4), so it is with the primary characteristic of arising: it can bring forth eight dharmas, whereas the subsidiary characteristic, the arising of arising, brings forth only one dharma, namely, the primary characteristic of arising.

The same applies to the other primary and subsidiary characteristics. The subsidiary characteristic, the duration of duration, causes only the primary characteristic of duration to continue to exist; the primary characteristic of duration itself, however, is capable of sustaining the primary dharma, the other three primary characteristics, and the four subsidiary characteristics, including the subsidiary characteristic of the duration of duration. The two primary characteristics of change and cessation are likewise: they can weaken and destroy eight dharmas, while they themselves are weakened and destroyed by their corresponding subsidiary characteristics, the change of change (jarājarā) and the cessation of cessation (anityatānityatā).

Thus, all the primary characteristics possess characteristics called subsidiary characteristics (anulakṣaṇa); and since these subsidiary characteristics number only four, rather than sixteen, there is no fault of infinite regress.

The Sautrāntika masters say:

(1) Discussing the matters above is like analyzing empty space! The characteristics of arising, duration, and so forth do not exist as real entities (na dravyataḥ saṃvidyante). These characteristics cannot be established through direct perception, inference, or authoritative scripture as possessing substantially real entities.

(Explanation of the Sautrāntikas) The sutra (Saṃyuktāgama, 12, 21; Saṃyutta, i. 152) says: “The arising of a conditioned dharma is an object apprehended by consciousness, and so forth.”

(Sautrāntikas) Dear sirs, you have clung to the words and lost their meaning. The Blessed One taught that one must rely upon the meaning, not upon the words.

(Sarvāstivādins) If so, what is the true meaning of the passage from the sutra quoted above?

(Sautrantika) The ignorant ordinary person, being obscured by ignorance, grasps the continuum (prabandha) of conditioned phenomena (formations, saṃskāra) as “self” and “belonging to the self” (possessions of the self). Wishing to eliminate this attachment, the Blessed One made clear that this continuum is conditioned (saṃskṛta), that is, it arises through a succession of causes and conditions (dependently arisen, pratītyasamutpanna).

What are the three characteristics of dependently arisen dharmas that he taught?—“The three conditioned characteristics of a conditioned dharma are objects apprehended by consciousness.” It is this very continuum that the Blessed One called a conditioned dharma. Clearly, all three characteristics do not belong to the continuum at the same time, because the Blessed One said that they are objects apprehended by consciousness.

This means that arising in a single moment, and so forth, cannot be an object apprehended by consciousness; and what is not an object apprehended by consciousness cannot be established as a characteristic. If the sutra repeats the word “conditioned” twice in the statement, “There are three conditioned characteristics of a conditioned dharma,” it is precisely to make known that these three characteristics are not evidence demonstrating the existence of a conditioned dharma, as when a heron indicates life near water; nor are they signs indicating the nature of a conditioned dharma, as when the outward manifestations of a girl enable us to know whether she is gentle or malicious.

The above characteristics arise in a real entity solely to show that this real entity is conditioned. (Thus, the passage from the sutra may be understood as follows: “A conditioned dharma has three observable features by which one may recognize it as a conditionally formed dharma, meaning one that arises through a succession of causes. These features are arising, decline, and destruction.”)

(2) When arising or birth (utpāda, jāti) is spoken of, it means that this continuum begins (pravāhasya ādiḥ); when exhaustion or cessation (vyaya, anityatā) is spoken of, it means the ending or termination (nivṛtti, uparati) of this continuum; when duration (sthiti) is spoken of, it means that this continuum continues (anuvartamāna) from its beginning until its end; when alteration during duration (sthityanyathātva), or change (jarā), is spoken of, it means the transformation of this continuum, namely, the difference between its successive stages.

It is precisely because the characteristics of arising, cessation, and so forth belonging to conditioned dharmas are regarded merely as the beginning, termination, continuance, and transformation of a continuum that the Blessed One said to Nanda: “Good man, you clearly know your feelings as they arise, your feelings as they remain, and your feelings as they cease and are destroyed.” (Saṃyukta, 11, 14). Therefore, we say: “The commencement of a continuum is called arising; its reaching an end is called cessation; its continuance in the interval is called duration; and the difference between its earlier and later stages is called alteration during duration.”

And: “What did not exist before but now exists is called arising; the continuing flow of the continuum is called duration; the difference between its earlier and later stages is alteration during duration; and the interruption of the continuum is precisely its cessation.”

And: “If it is maintained that, because a dharma belongs to a single moment, it would immediately perish in the absence of duration, this is entirely unreasonable; for if it belongs to a single moment, it will perish immediately whether or not duration exists.”

Thus, when the sutra speaks of duration, it intends this continuum; and this proves that the Abhidharma treatise (Prakaraṇapāda, 14b7) is correct when it states: “What is duration?—It is formations that have arisen and have not yet ceased.” For “having arisen and not yet ceased” is never said to be the intrinsic nature of a moment (the nature of a momentary dharma, kṣaṇadharmatā).

The Jñānaprasthāna (2, 13) says: “With regard to a mind, what does arising mean?—Birth (jāti). What does exhaustion mean?—Death (maraṇa). What does alteration during duration mean?—Aging.” Although it speaks in this way, the treatise intends the mind belonging to the same class of sentient existence (niāyasabhāgacitta), rather than a single moment of mind. (Within one class of sentient existence there are many minds; nevertheless, these minds may be regarded as a single mind.)

(3) Furthermore, without maintaining that the conditioned characteristics are real entities, we may still say that every individual moment possesses these four characteristics.

(Question) How can they be said to possess them?

(Answer) Because (a) each presently arising moment did not previously exist (abhūtva bhāvaḥ), and because this arising is contrasted with its previous non-arising, it is called arising; (b) after having arisen, it again becomes nonexistent (bhūtvā abhāvaḥ), and is therefore called exhaustion (vyaya); (c) the duration of a moment is precisely the extended series of succeeding moments (uttarottarakṣaṇānubandha), because a later moment resembles the preceding moment and can therefore stand in place of it (pratinidhībhūta), so that the preceding moment may be said still to exist.

Thus, the later moment may be regarded as the prolongation of the preceding moment; (d) the differentiation within this extended series of moments may likewise be understood in the above manner, and this is the characteristic of transformation, or alteration during duration (sthityanyathātva), of the moment.

(Question) Do you say that there would be no differentiation when successive moments are all alike (sadṛśa)?

(Answer) No. Differentiation still exists, just as there is a difference in how quickly or slowly a diamond falls depending on whether or not it has been thrown, or whether it has been thrown with great force or without force. The difference is due to the particular transformation of the great elements (mahābhūtapariṇāmaviśeṣa) in each distinct case. When dharmas succeed one another within a homogeneous continuum, the difference is insignificant; therefore, although they differ, the dharmas are still regarded as similar.

(Objection of the Sarvastivadins) Your definition (vyavasthā) of the conditioned characteristics is not valid for all conditioned dharmas. The definition of the characteristic of duration requires a succeeding moment, but such a moment does not exist for the final moment of a sound or a flame, or for the final moment of an arhat’s mind. Thus, the final moment of a sound, a flame, or an arhat would possess neither duration nor alteration.

(Reply of the Sautrantikas) We do not attribute the characteristic of duration to conditioned dharmas, but merely say that this characteristic depends upon the characteristic of alteration. The Blessed One taught all three of these characteristics because, in certain cases, all three are present; nevertheless, in the final moment of a flame, there are only the two characteristics of arising and cessation, without any need for duration and alteration.

In summary, because conditioned dharmas did not exist before but now exist, and after existing again become nonexistent, the continuum of these dharmas is spoken of as duration, while the differentiation within this continuum is spoken of as alteration. This is precisely the Blessed One’s teaching concerning the three conditioned characteristics. Therefore, it is unnecessary here to posit additional real entities such as arising, duration, and so forth.

(4) (Objection of the Vaibhāṣikas) According to you, arising is precisely a dharma that is presently coming into manifestation and that previously had not arisen; thus a dharma possessing this characteristic (that which is characterized, lakṣya) would itself also be this very characteristic (that which characterizes, lakṣaṇa).?

(Reply of the Sautrāntikas) Even so, there is no fault; for the characteristics of a Great Man (Mahāpuruṣa) are not different from the Great Man himself. The characteristics of a zebu—such as its horns, hump, dewlap, hooves, and tail—are likewise not different from the zebu. Nor do the great elements (mahābhūta) exist apart from their particular characteristics of hardness, moistness, and so forth. In the same way, for the Vaibhāṣika masters, who maintain the doctrine that dharmas perish from moment to moment (kṣaṇikavādin), the rising of a cloud of smoke is nothing other than that very cloud of smoke.

Nevertheless, the intrinsic nature (svabhāva) of form, sound, and so forth, which are conditioned dharmas, can still be apprehended even without knowing that these conditioned dharmas had never existed before and will no longer exist afterward. Likewise, these continua can still be seen undergoing change even without knowing that their nature is conditioned. It is therefore known that the essence of a conditioned dharma is not the conditioned characteristics mentioned above, but merely its “previously not existing and subsequently existing,” and so forth. Nor can there be real entities such as arising, abiding, and so forth that exist apart from these dharmas of form, sound, and so forth, or from other conditioned dharmas.

(5) If the characteristics of conditioned dharmas are accepted as substantially existent because they are held to arise simultaneously (sahabhūta), it must also be accepted that a dharma arises, abides, changes, and perishes all at the same time.

Here the Sarvāstivādins raise the objection that the conditioned characteristics do not exercise their functions simultaneously (kāritrakālabheda): The characteristic of arising performs its function of bringing about arising before it itself has arisen and therefore still belongs to the future; once it has arisen, it no longer performs the function of bringing about arising again. The characteristics of abiding, change, and cessation perform their functions only when they actually arise, not while they are in the future; hence they perform their functions only at the moment when the first characteristic, that of arising, no longer functions. Thus, although these four characteristics arise simultaneously, they are not incompatible.

First, let us examine the function of the characteristic of arising—a characteristic that remains in the future. We must consider whether a future dharma truly exists substantially (dravyata), and, if it truly exists, whether this future dharma has any function. If this future dharma, namely the characteristic of arising, has the function of bringing about arising, how can it be said to belong to the future? For according to the Vaibhāṣikas, a future dharma is one that does not exercise a function (aprātakāritraṃ hy anāgatam iti siddhāntaḥ); why, then, do you continue to call it future? Moreover, when a dharma has arisen, the function of the characteristic of arising has already passed. How, then, can it presently arise so that you may claim it exists in the present?

As for the remaining three characteristics, if they all function at the same time, then while the characteristic of abiding causes a dharma to persist, the characteristic of change causes that dharma to change, and the characteristic of cessation causes it to be destroyed. Thus a dharma would persist, change, and perish all at the same time. If these three characteristics do not function simultaneously, then three different moments must be admitted; and this means that you must reject your own doctrine of momentary cessation.

(Reply of the Vaibhāṣikas) When we speak of a moment, we mean the period in which all the conditioned characteristics have completed the exercise of their respective functions.

(Sautrāntikas) If so, you must explain how the characteristic of abiding, which arises simultaneously with change and cessation, can complete its function of “causing the dharmas that are to be made to abide to abide” (sthāpyam sthāpayati) before the characteristics of change and cessation complete their functions of weakening and destroying them. If you reply that the characteristic of abiding has greater power and can therefore complete its function first, we ask: By what means does the characteristic of abiding then become weak, so that upon encountering the characteristics of change and cessation it is weakened and destroyed together with the fundamental dharma that it is itself supposed to cause to abide?

Perhaps you will reply, “Because the characteristic of abiding has completed its function (kṛtakṛtya), it cannot perform it again, just as the characteristic of arising, once it has brought about arising, cannot bring about arising again.” But this comparison is unreasonable. The function (puruṣakāra) of the characteristic of arising is to lead a dharma out of the future and bring it into the present; once that dharma has entered the future, the characteristic of arising cannot bring it in once again.

The function of the characteristic of abiding, however, is to cause a dharma “that is to be made to abide” (sthāpya) to abide (sthāpayati), preventing the dharma it sustains from being weakened and destroyed. So long as the dharma exists, the characteristic of abiding must cause it to abide forever; therefore, the characteristic of abiding is capable of repeating its own function.

Thus the question posed here is: “Because of what obstruction or opposing forces does the function of the characteristic of abiding cease once it has arisen? Are these forces the characteristics of change and cessation? Does the characteristic of change weaken the characteristic of abiding so that it is subsequently destroyed by the characteristic of cessation?

If the characteristics of change and cessation possess greater power, they ought to perform their functions before the characteristic of abiding. Moreover, according to your view, not only the fundamental characteristic, but even the characteristics of change and cessation, must rely upon the function of the characteristic of abiding in order to persist. Thus, when the function of the characteristic of abiding ceases, the fundamental dharma, the characteristic of change, and the characteristic of abiding itself can no longer continue to exist.

Here one may ask: How, and for what purpose, are the characteristics of change and cessation to perform their functions of weakening and destroying?”

We truly see no function at all for the characteristics of change and cessation; for it is precisely through the characteristic of abiding that, after arising, a dharma is temporarily not destroyed and does not perish immediately upon merely having arisen (utpannamātra). If the characteristic of abiding, after completing its task, can no longer sustain the fundamental dharma, then the fundamental dharma certainly cannot continue to exist; and this means that the fundamental dharma ceases by itself.

The two characteristics of a dharma—abiding and cessation—have now been explained: abiding means that the dharma has arisen but has not yet ceased, while cessation means that the dharma is destroyed after abiding. Yet how can an additional characteristic of change be attributed to this dharma? Change is transformation, the dissimilarity between two successive states. How, then, can it be said that a dharma becomes different from itself?

The verse replies: “If this dharma remains just as it is, it is not a different dharma; if it undergoes change, it is no longer this dharma. Thus the transformation of a dharma (the characteristic of change) cannot be established.”

One school (the Saṃmitīyas) maintains that, because external causes and conditions of destruction—such as fire, an axe, and so forth—are encountered, the characteristic of cessation can then destroy such things as firewood, a jar, and so forth. This doctrine is truly unreasonable! To say this would be like a sick person who, after taking medicine, thanked the gods for helping him recover; for if external causes and conditions of destruction are already present, those very causes and conditions possess the capacity to destroy, so what need is there for a characteristic of cessation?

This doctrine further maintains that mind and mental factors, sounds, and flames are all destroyed in the very instant (instantaneous cessation, kṣaṇanirodha) by virtue of the characteristic of cessation, without requiring external causes and conditions. If the characteristic of cessation and the characteristic of duration both exercise their functions at the same time, then a dharma would have to both exist and perish at one and the same moment.

This cannot be accepted.

It is therefore known that the Blessed One taught the characteristics of conditioned phenomena precisely on the basis of continuity. This does not contradict correct reasoning and is also consistent with the sutra (when the sutra states: “There are three characteristics showing that a conditioned phenomenon is conditioned, that is, that it is produced by a continuity of causes and conditions…”).

(Question) If the characteristic of arising in the future produces the dharma that it is to produce, why do all future dharmas not arise at the same time?

The verse replies:

[The characteristic of arising can produce the dharma that is to arise,

But it cannot do so apart from the conjunction of causes and conditions.]

Explanation: Apart from the conjunction (sāmagrya) of causes and conditions, the characteristic of arising alone lacks the capacity (sāmartha) to produce the dharma that it is to produce. Therefore, all future dharmas do not arise at the same time.

(Objection of the Sautrāntikas) If so, we believe that the causes and conditions themselves produce the dharma, not the characteristic of arising—the characteristic of arising merely associates with a dharma from the outset and assists that dharma in arising when all the causes and conditions have finally come together. When the causes and conditions are complete, the dharma arises; when the causes and conditions are complete, the dharma does not arise: what function, then, does the characteristic of arising serve?

(Reply of the Sarvāstivādins) Can you truly know all existing dharmas? The intrinsic nature of dharmas is extremely subtle. Although they may be perceived, their intrinsic nature still cannot be known.

Furthermore, if there were no characteristic of arising, there could be no notion of “arisen” (jātabuddhi—jāta iti). And if the characteristic of arising were not a real dharma distinct from the dharma that “did not previously exist but is now arising,” then genitive expressions such as “the arising of form,” “the arising of feeling,” and so forth could not be established as valid; for one would then have to say “the form of form,” “the feeling of feeling,” and so forth.

The same applies to the characteristic of alteration, the characteristic of alteration, and the characteristic of cessation.

(The Sautrāntikas) The doctrine above will carry you very far astray, for in order to validate the notion of emptiness (śūnya) and the notion of non-self, you would have to admit the existence of a real entity called “emptiness” and a real entity called “non-self.” To validate notions such as one, two, large, small, separate, conjoined, divided, this, that, real existence, and so forth, you would, like the Vaiśeṣikas, have to admit a class of “entities” such as number (saṃkhyā), magnitude (parimāṇa), separateness (pṛthaktva), conjunction (saṃyoga), disjunction (vibhāga), priority (paratva), posteriority (aparatva), existence (sattā), and so forth; and you would also have to create a “jar-entity” (ghaṭatva) to validate the notion of a jar.

As for the genitive construction, you do not maintain that the intrinsic nature (svabhāva) of form and form itself are different real dharmas, yet you nevertheless say, “the intrinsic nature of form.”

Thus, you have not succeeded in establishing the characteristic of arising as a real dharma; you have not succeeded in establishing that the characteristic of arising is anything other than a mere conceptual designation (prajñāptimātra) for a dharma that did not exist before but now exists.

When we wish to show another person that a certain dharma did not exist previously but now exists, we say, “This dharma arises”; and in saying this, we assume that this dharma has been produced. There are many dharmas, such as forms, feelings, and so forth, that are produced in this manner; that is, “they did not exist previously but now exist.” Thus, there are many arisings, namely, many dharmas that arise. Such arisings—the characteristics of arising—are numerous; and because we wish to distinguish these arisings so that another person may know that this arising is called “form” and not “feeling,” we employ the genitive expressions “the arising of form” and “the arising of feeling,” although the arising—the characteristic of arising—of form is in fact simply “form arising”;

that is, the characteristic of arising is itself the dharma that arises.

It is just as people commonly say “the fragrance of sandalwood,” although sandalwood itself is the fragrance, or “the body of the statue,” although the statue itself is the body. (Madhyamakavṛtti, p. 66; Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya, pp. 84, 148).

(The Sarvāstivādins) By admitting that the characteristic of arising belongs to conditioned dharmas but not to unconditioned dharmas, one can easily explain why unconditioned dharmas cannot arise. If conditioned dharmas arise without a characteristic of arising, why can unconditioned dharmas such as space and so forth not arise?

(The Sautrāntikas) Conditioned dharmas arise because, having previously not existed, they now come into existence (abhūtvā bhavanti); whereas unconditioned dharmas already exist, so how could they arise? If it is explained that certain dharmas, such as unconditioned dharmas, lack the characteristic of arising because this is the nature of reality (dharmatā), then we shall say that it is precisely by virtue of dharmatā that all dharmas do not arise.

Furthermore, you wish to maintain that all conditioned dharmas equally possess the characteristic of arising, the very kind of characteristic that you say unconditioned dharmas cannot possess; yet you also admit that certain causes and conditions are capable of producing form but are incapable of producing feeling. According to us, conditioned and unconditioned dharmas are alike in this respect: they all lack a characteristic of arising, and all the causes and conditions that produce conditioned dharmas have no effect upon unconditioned dharmas.

The Vaibhāṣika masters maintain that the four characteristics—arising and so forth—are all real dharmas. Why is this so? Can there truly be so many objections that one must abandon the authoritative teachings (Āgamas = Abhidharmaśāstras) of one’s own school? One should not refrain from sowing seed for fear of deer, nor discard delicious food because flies are present. The objections must be refuted so that the meaning of one’s own school may be upheld.

The characteristics of conditioned phenomena have been discussed above. Next comes the section concerning collections of names (nāmakāya), collections of phrases (padakāya), and collections of syllables (vyañjanakāya).

[Collections of names and so forth are

Aggregates of designations, phrases, and syllables.]

Explanation: The words “and so forth” above include collections of phrases and collections of syllables.

A name (nāman) (meaning a name or word) is a dharma that produces a designation (saṃjñākaraṇa), such as the words form, sound, odor, taste, and so forth.

A word (pada) (meaning a sentence) denotes a passage (vākya), that is, a verse or sentence capable of expressing a complete meaning, such as the statement “All conditioned phenomena are impermanent…” and the rest. Or a word may also mean a dharma that enables us to understand the various modes of actions, qualities, and times relating to a certain person; for example: he cooks, he reads, he walks; he is black, yellow, red; he cooks, he will cook, he has cooked.

A phoneme (vyañjana) means a letter (akṣara), a sound-element (varṇa) that is a vowel or consonant, such as [a], [ā], [i], [ī], and so forth.

(Question) Are not sound-elements names for written letters?

(Answer) No. This is because the concept of written letters is made known only after the sound-elements produced have been uttered; but written letters were created and inscribed precisely to make known the concept of sound-elements. Their purpose is that, even when sound-elements are not heard, they may still be conceived through written letters. Therefore, sound-elements are not names denoting written letters.

A collection (kāya) is an aggregation (collective designation, samukti) of notions and so forth. According to the Dhātupāṭha, iv. 114, the word samukti (collective designation) carries the meaning of samavāya (aggregation).

Thus, a collection of names consists of “form,” “sound,” “odor,” and so forth; a collection of words consists of “All conditioned phenomena are impermanent, all dharmas are without self, nirvana is quiescent…”; and a collection of phonemes consists of [ka], [kha], [ga], and so forth.

(Objection of the Sautrāntikas) Are not the nature of names, words, and phonemes speech (vāc), and their substance sound (śabda)? If their substance is sound, they must belong to the form skandha (rūpaskandha), rather than to the class of dharmas dissociated from mind, as the Sarvāstivādins maintain.

(Reply of the Sautrāntikas) Names, words, and phonemes are not speech. Speech is a sound emitted from the mouth (vocal sound, ghoṣa); a mere sound emitted from the mouth, such as a cry, is not sufficient for an object to be apprehended. A name (an appellation or term), however, is both a sound emitted from the mouth (vācam upādāya) and that which illuminates (dyotayati) an object and enables it to be apprehended (pratyāyayati).

(Sautrāntikas) When we speak of speech, we do not mean merely a kind of sound emitted from the mouth; rather, we mean “a kind of sound emitted from the mouth that enables us to apprehend an object,” that is, a kind of sound concerning which speakers have mutually agreed that it will signify the meaning of a certain object. It was in this way that the ancients jointly established the sound “go” as capable of signifying nine different meanings, as stated in the following verse: “The wise established the sound ‘go’ to signify the meanings of its own class: direction, animal, earth, light, speech, diamond, eye, sky, and water.”

Those masters who maintain that “a name can illuminate an object” must also acknowledge that this sound “go” was collectively assigned many different meanings by many people. If the meaning of an object can be conveyed to a listener through such a word or name, then a mere “sound emitted from the mouth” (vocal sound, ghoṣa) is already sufficient to express the meaning of the object. What need is there to posit an entity called a “name”?

A name may be produced by speech (utpādya, janya)—that is, when speech occurs, a name, which belongs to the class of dissociated dharmas, arises—or it may be manifested by speech (prakāśya, vyaṅgya)—that is, the name, which belongs to the class of dissociated dharmas, arises together with the speech that is also arising.

In the first case, since speech has sound—that is, the kind of sound emitted from the mouth—as its nature, this kind of sound alone, such as the cry of an animal, would suffice to produce a name. If you reply only that a name is produced by a sound possessing a certain quality, such as a clearly articulated sound, then we observe that the aforementioned “sound emitted from the mouth,” being capable of producing a name, is itself already capable of indicating the object clearly.

The second case is analyzed in the same manner, merely replacing the verb “produce” with the verb “manifest.”

It is, however, unreasonable to maintain that speech produces a name, because sounds do not arise simultaneously. For example, in the word (name) rūpa, the sounds r-ū-p-a cannot arise at the same time; and a name (nāman), which you regard as a single dharma and a real entity, cannot be produced part by part in successive stages. How, then, could speech produce a name? Here you might reply that this case resembles that of non-information (avijñapti): the final moment of manifest karma belonging to body or speech is able, by virtue of the preceding moments, to produce non-information. According to us, however, if the final moment of the sound of speech can produce a name, then merely hearing the final sound should suffice to apprehend the object.

If it is accepted that speech produces phonemes (vyañjana), phonemes produce a name, and the name enables us to apprehend the object, this position will also encounter the same refutation stated above, namely, “The phonemes do not arise simultaneously, and so forth.”

For these reasons, it is unreasonable to maintain that speech manifests a name. {Sounds cannot arise simultaneously, and a “real dharma” such as a name cannot be manifested by separate components.}

Furthermore, if phonemes were distinct from speech, then even when a learned person attentively investigated them, that person would be unable to apprehend their characteristics. Moreover, speech can neither produce nor manifest phonemes, for the same reasons that speech can neither produce nor manifest a name.

If the Sarvāstivādins maintain that a name arises together with the object, just as in the case of the characteristic of arising, then there would no longer be any need to inquire whether a name is produced or manifested by speech. This is because there would then be no dharma called a presently existing name that could denote an object belonging to the past or future. Furthermore, fathers, mothers, and others can name their children and so forth according to their wishes; how, then, could it be accepted that a name arises simultaneously with the object, as in the case of the characteristic of arising? Consequently, unconditioned dharmas would also have no names, because they cannot arise—a consequence the Sarvāstivādins could never accept.

(Sarvāstivādins) The Blessed One said: “Verses all depend upon names…” (Saṃyuktāgama, 36, 27; Saṃyutta, i. 38)

(Sautrantikas) A name (nāman) is a sound (śabda) that people have collectively established to express the meaning of a particular thing. A verse (gāthā) or sentence (vākya, pada) is an arrangement (racanā) of names (words), and it is for this reason that the Blessed One said that a verse depends upon (saṃniśrita) names. If one maintains that there is a real entity called a sentence (pada), this is utterly unreasonable; it would be like maintaining that, apart from ants and minds, there is a real dharma called an “army of ants” or a “stream of mind.” Therefore, one should know that only letters (phonemes, akṣara), which are themselves sounds, truly exist.

The Vaibhāṣika masters acknowledge formations dissociated from mind, such as collections of names, collections of sentences, and collections of letters, because they hold that not all dharmas fall within the range of comprehension. If this is so, then: (1) To which realm do letters, names, and sentences belong? (2) Do they pertain to sentient beings (sattvākhya)? (3) Are they resultant, nurtured, or outflowing? (4) Are they wholesome, unwholesome, or morally indeterminate?

[They pertain to sentient beings in the Desire Realm and Form Realm,

And are outflowing results of morally indeterminate nature.]

Treatise: Letters, names, and sentences belong to the Desire Realm and the Form Realm. According to one view, they also belong to the Formless Realm, but cannot be uttered aloud (inexpressible, anabhilāpya, akathya).

Letters, names, and sentences pertain to sentient beings, because they arise through the power of sentient beings and consist of articulated sounds (varṇa); for they belong to the speaker, not to the object being spoken of.

They are outflowing results (naiṣyandika) produced by homogeneous causes (sabhāgahetu). They are not resultant, because they proceed from the speaker’s intention; nor are they nurtured (aupacayika), because they are not material dharmas.

Their nature is unobscured and morally indeterminate (anivṛtāvyākṛta).

The characteristics of the other formations dissociated from mind that have not been discussed above will now be briefly presented:

[Commonality is likewise,

But additionally pertains to the Formless Realm and is resultant.

Acquisition and the characteristics of the conditioned are of all three kinds.

Non-acquisition and the two absorptions are only outflowing.]

Treatise: “Likewise” means that commonality (sabhāgatā), like letters, names, and sentences, pertains to sentient beings in the Desire Realm and Form Realm, is an outflowing result, and is unobscured and morally indeterminate. However, commonality is not only outflowing but also resultant; and it belongs not only to the two realms mentioned above but also to the Formless Realm.

Acquisition (prāpti) is of three kinds: momentary, outflowing, and resultant.

The characteristics of arising, duration, and so forth are likewise of three kinds, just as acquisition is.

The two absorptions and non-acquisition (aprāpti) are only outflowing. Here, “only” means that they are not resultant, and so forth.

The formations dissociated from mind that had not previously been discussed have now been explained. As for non-perception and the life faculty, they are as explained earlier.

(Question) Why is it not said that acquisition and so forth pertain only to sentient beings?

(Answer) Because it has already been said that they are possessed by sentient beings, and so forth.

(Question) Why is it not said that the characteristics of arising, duration, and so forth encompass both sentient and insentient things?

(Answer) Because it has already been said that they arise together with all conditioned dharmas.

As for the remaining dharmas that have not been discussed, their nature may be understood on the basis of their characteristics.