阿毘達磨俱舍論

Part 6

Thus, the explanation of the formations dissociated from mind has been completed. It was previously stated that when the characteristic of arising brings forth a dharma that is to arise, it cannot be separated from the conjunction of causes (hetu) and conditions (pratyaya). What dharmas, then, are causes, and what dharmas are conditions? As for causes, there are six kinds. What are these six?

The verse replies:

[Efficient cause, coexistent cause,

Homogeneous cause, associated cause,

Universal cause, and maturation cause.

There are only these six kinds of causes.]

Treatise: There are six kinds of causes: efficient cause (kāraṇahetu), coexistent cause (sahabhūhetu), homogeneous cause (sabhāgahetu), associated cause (saṃprayuktakahetu), universal cause (sarvatragahetu), and maturation cause (vipākahetu). These are the kinds of causes accepted by the masters of the Abhidharma (Jñānaprasthāna, 1,11).

(Question) What are the characteristics of the first kind, the efficient cause?

The verse replies:

[It serves as an efficient cause for everything except itself.]

Treatise: A dharma cannot serve as an efficient cause for itself. Apart from this single exception, all dharmas are efficient causes for all conditioned dharmas, because no dharma obstructs (avighnabhāvāvasthāna) the arising of dharmas capable of arising (utpattimant).

The above definition shows that dharmas serving as coexistent causes, and so forth, can also serve as efficient causes: all the other kinds of causes are included within the efficient cause. This kind of cause has no name peculiar to itself; it is called an efficient cause merely because it is a “cause that brings about manifestation” (kāraṇa). Thus, it is designated by a general term applicable to all kinds of causes, just as in the case of the sense sphere of visible form (rūpāyatana).

Several questions arise concerning this efficient cause:

(Question) The defilements arise in an ignorant person, but once the truths have been fully understood, they can no longer arise; likewise, the stars (jyotis) are not seen when the sun shines. Therefore, the realization of the truths and the light of the sun are obstructions (vighna) to the defilements and the stars. Thus, it is surely mistaken to say that all conditioned dharmas are efficient causes merely because they do not obstruct arising.

(Answer) We mean only that the realization of the truths and the light of the sun do not obstruct the arising of a dharma that is in the process of arising (utpadyamāna); that is, if a dharma possesses all its causes and conditions, it will arise immediately thereafter (anantarabhāvin).

(Question) How can a dharma be called a cause when it is both an obstruction and not an obstruction? This is like all the people of a country saying together, merely because the king does not oppress them, “We enjoy peace and happiness thanks to the king.” How can a dharma be called a cause merely because it does not obstruct? Nirvana cannot obstruct the arising of any conditioned dharma; future dharmas cannot obstruct past dharmas; beings in hell (nāraka) or animals cannot obstruct beings in the Form Realm. Thus, with regard to obstructing the arising of conditioned dharmas, the existence or nonexistence of nirvana, future dharmas, and beings in hell makes no difference. How, then, can they be regarded as efficient causes?

(Answer) They are nevertheless causes. Likewise, when the king does not harm the people, they may still make the statement above; yet they could not do so regarding a king who did not exist.

The above definition (nirdeśa) of the efficient cause is a general definition and includes only predominant efficient causes (pradhānaḥ kāraṇahetu), or dharmas that serve only as efficient causes. But a predominant efficient cause is a kind of cause possessing the power to produce (janaka). Thus, the eye faculty and color are both efficient causes of eye consciousness; food and drink are efficient causes of the body; and seeds, and so forth, are efficient causes of sprouts.

(Objection) If all dharmas are causes of other dharmas because they are not obstructions, why do all dharmas not arise simultaneously? Why, when a murderer commits a crime, do all other people not commit the same karma of killing as that person?

(Explanation) This objection is incorrect. All dharmas are called efficient causes merely because they are not obstructions; this does not mean that all dharmas possess the power to produce a result.

Some masters hold that an efficient cause has an actual efficacy (sāmarthya) in the production of dharmas, as in the case of nirvana and eye consciousness. A wholesome or unwholesome mental consciousness arises by taking nirvana as its object, and from this mental consciousness eye consciousness subsequently arises. Nirvana has thus exerted an indirect efficacy upon eye consciousness. The same applies to future dharmas, beings in hell, and so forth.

The characteristics of the efficient cause have now been explained. Next comes the discussion of the second kind of cause, the coexistent cause.

[Coexistent causes serve as results for one another,

Like the great elements, the characteristics of the conditioned and conditioned dharmas,

And mind together with the dharmas accompanying it.]

Treatise: Dharmas capable of serving as results of personal activity (puruṣakāraphala) for one another are called coexistent causes (sahabhūhetu).

The great elements (mahābhūta) can serve as coexistent causes for one another. The same applies to mind and the dharmas accompanying it, and to conditioned characteristics such as arising and so forth (the characteristics) and the dharmas possessing these characteristics (the characterized dharmas).

Thus, all conditioned dharmas serve as coexistent causes. In each case, however, the reciprocal causal relationships among these dharmas must be clearly distinguished.

The above definition requires further explanation. A dharma can serve as a coexistent cause for its secondary characteristics (anulakṣaṇa), but there is no reciprocal causal relationship between that dharma and its secondary characteristics, because the secondary characteristics cannot serve as coexistent causes for their dharma.

This case may be added to the definition above.

(Question) What dharmas are called dharmas accompanying mind (cittānuparivartin)?

The verse replies:

[Mental factors, the two kinds of restraint,

And the conditioned characteristics of the foregoing dharmas and of mind

Are dharmas that accompany mind.]

Treatise: All dharmas associated with mind (cittasaṃprayukta), the restraint belonging to meditative concentration and the supramundane restraint, as well as the characteristics of arising, abiding, and so forth (lakṣaṇa) of all the foregoing dharmas and of mind, are dharmas accompanying mind.

(Question) Why are these dharmas called those that accompany mind?

The verse replies:

[Because of time, result, moral nature, and so forth.]

Treatise: Dharmas are called those that accompany mind because of the following characteristics:

⁽¹⁾ With regard to time: They arise, persist, and cease together with mind; they belong to the same temporal period as mind. The word “same” (eka) here is intended to indicate “simultaneous.” This means that all dharmas accompanying mind arise, persist, and cease at the same time as mind; nevertheless, their arising remains distinct.

With regard to minds that do not arise (anutpattidharmin)—that is, they neither arise, abide, nor cease—the accompanying dharmas are likewise. For this very reason, the additional statement is made: “The dharmas that follow the mind undergo the same temporal period as the mind.” {Minds that have not arisen all belong to the future until the moment they arise, if they are capable of arising, and therefore the accompanying dharmas also belong to the future; minds belong to the past from the moment they cease, if they have arisen, and therefore the accompanying dharmas also belong to the past.}

⁽²⁾ Concerning results, etc.: “Result” (phala) refers to the result of human activity (puruṣakāraphala) and the predominant result (visaṃyogaphala); “etc.” refers to the two results of maturation (vipākaphala) and outflow (niṣyandaphala).

The dharmas that follow the mind have the same results and the same maturation as the mind; here, the word “same” indicates identity (saṃkhyāne, sāddhāraṇe).

⁽³⁾ Concerning wholesome nature, etc.: The dharmas that follow the mind may be wholesome, unwholesome, or indeterminate according to the mind they accompany.

Thus, there are altogether ten reasons why a dharma is said to follow the mind.

A principal mind, in the case involving the smallest number of dharmas, serves as a coexistent cause for fifty-eight dharmas: the ten universal wholesome mental factors together with the four conditioned characteristics of each, plus the four primary characteristics and the four secondary characteristics of the principal mind.

Of these fifty-eight dharmas, if the mind’s four secondary characteristics, which have no efficacy with respect to the mind, are excluded, there remain fifty-four dharmas that serve as coexistent causes for this mind.

Some say that only fourteen dharmas serve as coexistent causes for the mind. These are the mind’s four primary characteristics and the ten universal mental factors, because the secondary characteristics have no efficacy with respect to the mind, and the conditioned characteristics of the ten universal mental factors likewise have no efficacy with respect to the mind.

(Vaibhāṣika) This view is incorrect. To maintain that the forty conditioned characteristics of the ten universal mental factors do not serve as coexistent causes for the mind contradicts the Prakaraṇagrantha (13, 5), which states: “The four characteristics—arising, abiding, changing, and ceasing—impermanence, the view of a real self, and the dharmas associated with the view of a real self (among which are the universal mental factors) are all both results and causes of the view of a real self.” Some masters, when reading this treatise, omitted the phrase “and the dharmas associated with the view of a real self.” According to the Vaibhāṣika masters of Kashmir, this phrase was originally present in the passage above;

even if it was not, the context shows that it must be added, for otherwise the passage would not convey its full meaning.

All dharmas that serve as coexistent causes must arise together (sahabhū); nevertheless, some dharmas arise together but are not coexistent causes:

⁽¹⁾ The secondary characteristics of a primary dharma (mūladharma) do not serve as coexistent causes for that dharma.

⁽²⁾ Nor do they serve as coexistent causes for one another.

⁽³⁾ The secondary characteristics of dharmas that follow the mind do not serve as coexistent causes for that mind.

⁽⁴⁾ Nor do they serve as coexistent causes for one another.

⁽⁵⁾ Derived material forms (bhautika, upādāyarūpa), such as blue and so forth, that possess resistance (satpratigha) and arise together (sahaja) do not serve as coexistent causes for one another.

⁽⁶⁾ Certain derived material forms that are nonresistant and arise together do not serve as coexistent causes for one another, with the exception of the two kinds of moral restraint.

⁽⁷⁾ Although all derived material forms arise together with the primary elements (), they do not serve as coexistent causes for those primary elements.

⁽⁸⁾ All acquisitions (prāpti), even when they arise together with the dharmas possessed by them (prāptimat), cannot serve as coexistent causes for those possessed dharmas.

All the dharmas belonging to the eight categories above arise together (sahabhū) but are not coexistent causes (sahabhūhetu), because their results, maturation, and outflow are not identical. In the case of acquisitions (prāpti), this is because they do not invariably accompany the dharmas (sahacariṣṇu): they may arise before a dharma, after it, or simultaneously with it.

(Sautrāntika) Everything stated above may be correct when it is said that “all dharmas serving as coexistent causes must arise together,” and so forth. In the world, however, the relationship of cause and result (hetuphalabhāva) is established only when the cause precedes the result, as a seed is the cause of a sprout, a stalk, and so forth; no such relationship is ever observed between simultaneous things. Therefore, you must clearly demonstrate the causal relationship between dharmas that arise simultaneously.

(Sarvāstivāda) Why can it not be observed? A lamp arises together with its light (saprabha), and a sprout, which grows under the light, arises together with its shadow (sacchāya). The lamp is the cause of the light, and the sprout is the cause of the shadow. This is called simultaneous cause and result.

(Sautrāntika) Such cases cannot be established. It must be examined whether the lamp truly is the cause of the light, or whether, as we ordinarily think, the lamp together with its light is the result of the preceding combination of causes and conditions, such as fuel oil, the lampwick, and so forth. Likewise, the combination of preceding causes, such as the seed and light, is the cause of the sprout, of the shadow, and of the sprout together with its shadow.

(Sarvāstivāda) A causal relationship is established through the presence or absence of the dharma called the result in parallel with the presence or absence of the dharma called the cause. The logicians (hetuvid) have given a most precise definition: “When this is present or absent, that is likewise present or absent. This is regarded as the cause, and that is regarded as the result.” If the dharmas said to arise together (sahabhū) are examined as coexistent causes (sahabhūhetu), it will be seen that all are present when either of two dharmas is present, and all are absent when either of the two is absent. A mutual causal relationship can therefore still be established.

(Sautrāntika) We accept that among dharmas arising together, one dharma may serve as the cause of another, as the eye faculty is the cause of eye-consciousness; but how can all dharmas arising together serve as causes and results of one another?

(Sarvāstivāda) A mutual causal relationship has already been established through the definition of causality that we gave above. When the mind is present, the mental factors (caitta) are also present, and conversely.

(Sautrāntika) That statement is entirely reasonable; nevertheless, the Sarvāstivādins must reconsider the tenets of their own school. The Sarvāstivādins do not accept a mutual causal relationship among derived material forms, such as color, odor, taste, and so forth, even though color never exists (avinābhāvin) without odor and taste. Nor do they accept a mutual causal relationship between derived material forms and the primary elements, or between secondary characteristics and the mind.

(Sarvāstivāda) Just as three staffs remain standing by supporting one another, so too is the causal relationship among simultaneously arising dharmas, such as the mind and mental factors.

(Sautrāntika) The analogy above must be examined. Three sticks remain standing by virtue of the force they acquire when arising simultaneously; or they remain standing by virtue of the combined force of preceding causes and conditions that enabled them to arise at the same time, and that caused them to arise in such a way that they must depend upon one another. Moreover, there is also something else here apart from the aforementioned force of mutual support, such as a cord, a hook, the ground, and so forth.

(Sarvāstivāda) The dharmas said to arise together have, besides the coexistent cause, other causes such as the homogeneous cause (sabhāgahetu), the universal cause (sarvatragahetu), and the maturation cause (vipākahetu). These causes play a role analogous to that of a cord, a hook, and so forth; therefore, the coexistent cause is established.

The characteristics of the coexistent cause have been explained above; next comes the explanation of the third kind of cause, the homogeneous cause.

[Homogeneous causes are similar dharmas

Belonging to the same category and the same realm, and arising earlier.

The Path is a homogeneous cause throughout all nine realms,

But only for results equal to or higher than itself.

The same applies to dharmas produced through preparatory practice,

For they are formed through hearing, reflection, and so forth.]

Treatise: A similar dharma (sabhāga) serves as a homogeneous cause for another similar dharma.

⁽¹⁾ The five wholesome (kuśala) skandhas serve as homogeneous causes for the five wholesome skandhas. If they are defiled (kliṣṭa), namely unwholesome (akuśala) or concealed-neutral (nirvṛtāvyākṛta), they serve as homogeneous causes for the five defiled skandhas. If they are neutral, namely unobscured-neutral (anirvṛtāvyākṛta), they serve as homogeneous causes for the five neutral skandhas.

However, some masters do not agree with the final point above. Some maintain that neutral matter is a homogeneous cause of the five neutral skandhas, but that the four skandhas of sensation, perception, formations, and consciousness are not homogeneous causes of matter. Some maintain that the four skandhas are homogeneous causes of the five skandhas, but that matter is not a homogeneous cause of the four skandhas. Still others maintain that matter is not a homogeneous cause of the four skandhas, and vice versa.

⁽³⁾ With respect to a single present existence, the first embryonic stage serves as a homogeneous cause for ten stages: the five embryonic stages—kalala, arbuda, peśin, ghana, and praśākhā—and the five postembryonic stages—infancy (bāla), childhood (kumāra), youth (yuvan), maturity (madhya), and old age (vāṛddha). The second embryonic stage serves as a homogeneous cause for nine stages, from arbuda through old age; and this continues in the same manner through the tenth stage. Within each stage, an earlier moment serves as a homogeneous cause for the later moments of that stage.

With respect to the stages of present existences of the same kind, each stage of an earlier existence serves as a homogeneous cause for all ten stages.

The same applies to external things such as wheat, rice, and so forth: the character of the homogeneous cause remains restricted according to each species; that is, wheat serves as a homogeneous cause only for wheat, not for rice.

⁽⁴⁾ If the Dārṣṭānikas do not admit that material dharmas are homogeneous causes of material dharmas, this contradicts the fundamental treatise (Jñānaprasthāna, 13, 14), which states: “Past great elements are the cause (hetu) and predominance (adhipati) of future great elements.” Here, “predominance” means the predominant condition (adhipatipratyaya), and “cause” means the homogeneous cause (sabhāgahetu), because the other kinds of causes are clearly not causes in this case.

(Question) Can all similar dharmas serve as homogeneous causes for similar dharmas?

(Answer) No. To serve as a homogeneous cause, similar dharmas must belong to the same category (nikāya) and the same realm (bhū); that is, dharmas belonging to a certain group and plane can serve as homogeneous causes for similar dharmas belonging to that same group and plane. These are the dharmas belonging to the five groups that can be abandoned by the Path of Seeing with respect to each of the Four Truths and by the Path of Cultivation; and the dharmas belonging to the nine realms, namely the Desire Realm, one of the four dhyānas, or one of the four immaterial realms.

A dharma abandoned by the Path of Seeing with respect to the Truth of Suffering serves as a homogeneous cause only for a dharma abandoned by the Path of Seeing with respect to the Truth of Suffering, and not for dharmas belonging to the other four groups; the same applies through the Path of Cultivation. Among the dharmas abandoned by the Path of Seeing with respect to the Truth of Suffering, those belonging to the Desire Realm serve as homogeneous causes only for dharmas belonging to the Desire Realm; the same applies through the highest realm of the Formless Realm.

Furthermore, the homogeneous cause is not invariably so. For only dharmas that have arisen earlier (agrajāḥ)—that is, dharmas belonging to the past or present—can serve as homogeneous causes for a similar dharma that arises or does not arise later. [A future dharma cannot serve as a homogeneous cause.]

(Question) How is this known?

(Answer) It is known from the fundamental treatise (Mūlaśāstra). The Jñānaprasthāna (1, 11) states: “What serves as a homogeneous cause?—A wholesome root that arose earlier serves as a homogeneous cause for a wholesome root that arises later, together with its associated dharmas belonging to the same category and the same realm. Thus, past wholesome roots are homogeneous causes of past and present wholesome roots; past and present wholesome roots are homogeneous causes of future wholesome roots.”

(Objection) A future dharma nevertheless serves as a homogeneous cause, because the Jñānaprasthāna itself also states: “Is there any time when a dharma that is the cause of a certain dharma is not the cause of that dharma?

—There is no time when it is not a cause (na kadācin na hetuḥ).”

(Vaibhāṣika) This passage does not contradict the preceding passage, because here the Jñānaprasthāna does not intend the homogeneous cause, but rather the coexistent, associated, and maturation causes.

The masters who uphold the doctrine of the “final state” (paramāvasthāvādin) maintain that the Jñānaprasthāna’s answer, “There is no time when it is not a cause,” refers to the homogeneous cause and implies the following: A future dharma, when it reaches the stage of arising (jāyamānāvasthā), necessarily serves as a homogeneous cause. Therefore, on the basis of the final state of a future dharma, the Jñānaprasthāna states that a dharma is never not a cause, because at a certain future moment that dharma is indeed a cause.

(Treatise Master) The explanation above does not resolve the issue raised. If a future dharma was previously not a cause and must wait until it arises before becoming a cause, then it cannot always be a cause. This shows that the Jñānaprasthāna definitively states that it is “never not a cause.” Moreover, the explanation above is inconsistent with another answer given by the Jñānaprasthāna (20, 2; Vibhāṣā, 17, 12) to the question: “Is a dharma that serves as the immediately antecedent condition for another dharma ever not the immediately antecedent condition for that dharma? — Yes; when it does not arise.” Thus, the case of the immediately antecedent condition is the same as that of the homogeneous cause;

that is, a future immediately antecedent condition must wait until it arises before it can serve as an immediately antecedent condition.

Therefore, the answer “there is no time when it is not a cause” must, to be accurate, be understood to mean “a future dharma serves as a homogeneous cause only when it arises”; and when discussing the immediately antecedent condition, the Jñānaprasthāna should have answered as it did in the case of the homogeneous cause: “there is no time when it is not an immediately antecedent condition,” or “it is not an immediately antecedent condition before it arises.” Thus, the word “cause” in the first answer is not intended to denote the homogeneous cause.

(Masters Who Uphold the Doctrine of Ultimate States) In answering the first question, the Jñānaprasthāna says: “There is no time when it is not a cause”; but in answering the second question, it says: “It is not a cause before it arises.” This shows that there may be two ways of answering while still expressing the same meaning. One could answer the first question in the same way as the second, and answer the second in the same way as the first.

(Treatise Master) If that were so, the text of the treatise would be exceedingly crude and obvious, and its author would possess no skill whatsoever! The first explanation remains the most reasonable one.

(Objection) If a future dharma is not a homogeneous cause, why does the Prakaraṇa-pādaśāstra (p. 251, 2B1b) say that a future view of a real self (satkāyadṛṣṭi) has the view of a real self as its cause and serves as a cause for the view of a real self? That treatise states: “excluding the future view of a real self and the truth of suffering associated with it.”

(Vaibhāṣikas) To understand it in this way is indeed mistaken. The passage above must be understood as: “excluding the truth of suffering associated with the view of a real self.” Even supposing that your interpretation were correct, in light of the overall meaning of the passage it could still be regarded as lacking authority, because the meaning is determined by the entire context [that is, by analogy with the preceding passage].

(Objection) If a future dharma is not a homogeneous cause, how can the following passage from the Prajñāptipādaśāstra be explained: “All dharmas are determined by four points (catuṣke niyatāḥ): cause, result, support (āśraya), and object (ālambana)”?

(Vaibhāṣikas) When the treatise says, “This dharma is never not the cause of this dharma,” it does not intend all kinds of causes. Here, “cause” denotes the conjoined cause and the coexistent cause; “result” denotes the dominant result and the result of human activity; “support” denotes the six faculties; and “object” denotes the six objects (viṣaya).

(Objection) If a future dharma cannot serve as a homogeneous cause, then a homogeneous cause that previously did not exist must now necessarily come into existence (abhūtvā bhavati).

(Explanation) This is precisely what the Vaibhāṣikas affirm. The state (avasthā) of serving as a homogeneous cause is always new, because it has never arisen before; nevertheless, the substance of a homogeneous cause is never new. A dharma in the future is not a homogeneous cause; yet once it has arisen, it serves as a homogeneous cause. This is because the result of the conjunction of causes and conditions is a state (avasthā), not a real entity (dravya). [A future dharma arises as a real entity (dravyatas); the conjunction of causes and conditions causes this real entity to pass from the future into the present, thereby producing in it the present state (vartamānāvasthā) and at the same time producing in it the character of being a homogeneous cause.]

(Objection) Since a future dharma can serve as a maturation cause, what would be wrong with its also serving as a homogeneous cause?

(Explanation) If a future dharma could serve as a homogeneous cause, the Jñānaprasthāna should have mentioned this. In answering the question, “What is a homogeneous cause?” the treatise does not say that a future wholesome root serves as a homogeneous cause for a future wholesome root.

We do not think that this treatise’s failure to mention future dharmas is a matter requiring debate. Indeed, the treatise merely designates as a homogeneous cause that which has the capacity to “receive” and “give” a result (phaladānagrahaṇasamartha).

(Treatise Master) This is not so, because the result of a homogeneous cause is a uniform result, namely, a result similar to its cause. Such a result is incompatible with a future dharma, because in the future there is no earlier and later (pūrvapaścimatābhāvāt). Furthermore, one cannot admit that a dharma which has arisen, whether past or present, is the uniform result of a future dharma, because a result cannot precede its cause. Thus, a future dharma cannot serve as a homogeneous cause.

(Objection) If so, a future dharma likewise cannot serve as a maturation cause, because ⁽¹⁾ a maturation result can neither be simultaneous with nor precede its cause, and ⁽²⁾ dharmas belonging to the future have no earlier and later.

(Vaibhāṣikas) This case is not the same. A homogeneous cause and its result both belong to the same continuum and are therefore similar dharmas. Supposing they could arise in the future, then, since there is no earlier and later in the future, they would mutually serve as causes for one another and would consequently mutually serve as results for one another.

It is therefore impossible to admit that two dharmas could serve for one another as cause and result of the same continuum. By contrast, a maturation cause and a maturation result are dissimilar dharmas. Even in the absence of earlier and later, the cause remains the cause and the result remains the result.

The character of being a homogeneous cause is formed from a state or condition (avasthā): a future dharma is not a homogeneous cause, but when it is in the present or past state, it becomes a homogeneous cause. The character of being a maturation cause, however, is formed from the intrinsic characteristic (lakṣaṇa) of a dharma.

(Question) It was stated above that a dharma serves as a homogeneous cause only for dharmas belonging to the same sphere. Does this statement apply to all dharmas?

(Answer) No. It applies only to conditioned dharmas with outflows, not to unconditioned dharmas without outflows.

The paths without outflows (the noble paths) serve as homogeneous causes for paths without distinction among any of the nine spheres.

The path pertains to nine grounds: the preliminary concentration (anāgamya), the intermediate concentration (dhyānāntara), the four dhyānas of the Form Realm (the fundamental concentrations), and the three lower attainments of the Formless Realm. This means that practitioners dwelling in any of these nine stages of concentration can cultivate the noble path.

The dharmas constituting the noble path serve as homogeneous causes for the dharmas constituting the noble path, from one ground to another. The noble path is like a guest lodging at different levels and does not depend upon the realms (dhātu) to which these levels belong; that is, craving in the Desire Realm, the Form Realm, and the Formless Realm cannot adhere to the noble path. Regardless of the stage in which it is cultivated, the noble path upon which the practitioner relies retains the same essential nature; therefore, the noble path can serve as a homogeneous cause for the noble path.

Nevertheless, not every noble path is a homogeneous cause of every other noble path. One does not consider the stage in which the noble path is cultivated, but only the distinctive qualities of the noble path.

A noble path serves as a homogeneous cause for a noble path that is equal (sama) or superior (viśiṣṭa), but not for one that is inferior (hīna), because the noble path is always attained through preparatory effort.

Consider the meaning of the terms inferior, equal, and superior noble paths.

⁽¹⁾ When the receptivity to the Dharma-knowledge of suffering (duḥkhe dharmajñānakṣānti), which is the first moment of the path of seeing (darśanamārga), in the past or present serves as a homogeneous cause for this same receptivity in the future, the noble path produced is equal to the noble path that produces it.

When this receptivity serves as a homogeneous cause for the Dharma-knowledge of suffering, which is the second moment of the path of seeing, the noble path produced is superior to the noble path that produces it.

This continues in the same manner up to the knowledge of non-arising (anutpādajñāna). Since there is no dharma superior to this knowledge, it can serve as a homogeneous cause only for an equal noble path, namely, a future knowledge of non-arising.

⁽²⁾ In brief, the path of seeing is a homogeneous cause of the path of seeing, the path of cultivation (bhāvanāmārga), and the path of no further training (aśaikṣamārga); the path of cultivation is a homogeneous cause of the path of cultivation and the path of no further training; and the path of no further training is a homogeneous cause of an equal or superior path of no further training.

⁽³⁾ When the noble path is cultivated by a practitioner of dull faculties (mṛdvindriya) or sharp faculties (tīkṣṇendriya), the noble path belonging to one of dull faculties serves as a homogeneous cause for that same noble path in both those of dull faculties and those of sharp faculties; and the noble path belonging to one of sharp faculties serves as a homogeneous cause for that same noble path in those of sharp faculties.

Thus, the noble paths of practitioners who are, respectively, followers through faith (Śraddhānusārin), those liberated through the predominance of faith (Śraddhādhimukta), and those liberated at the proper time (samayavimukta) serve as homogeneous causes for six, four, and two noble paths; while the noble paths of practitioners who are, respectively, followers through Dharma (Dharmānusārin), those who have attained through right view (Dṛṣṭiprāpta), and those liberated irrespective of time (Asamayavimukta) serve as homogeneous causes for three, two, and one noble paths.

(Question) When a noble path cultivated on a higher ground serves as a homogeneous cause for a noble path cultivated on a lower ground, how can it be the cause of a noble path that is equal or superior?

(Answer) A noble path cultivated on a lower ground can be equal or superior by virtue of ⁽¹⁾ the dullness or sharpness of the faculties, irrespective of the ground to which they belong, and ⁽²⁾ the accumulation of causes (hetupacayata).

There is no case in which the same person possesses both the noble path of a follower through faith and that of a follower through Dharma; nevertheless, the former noble path in the past or present can serve as a homogeneous cause for the latter noble path that subsequently arises.

(Question) Does the case in which the result is equal or superior occur only with uncontaminated dharmas, that is, dharmas constituting part of the noble path?

(Answer) No. Mundane dharmas (laukika) attained through preparatory effort all serve as homogeneous causes for dharmas that are equal or superior, but not for those that are inferior.

(Question) Which dharmas are produced through preparatory effort (prayogaja)?

(Answer) Dharmas produced through preparatory effort are those opposed to “innately acquired” dharmas (upapattipratilambhika). They are qualities arising from hearing the Buddha’s teaching (merit produced through hearing), from reflection (produced through reflection), and from meditation (produced through cultivation). Because they are attained through preparatory effort, these dharmas serve as homogeneous causes for dharmas that are superior or equal, but not for those that are inferior.

Dharmas constituted by hearing (śrutamaya) in the Desire Realm serve as homogeneous causes for dharmas constituted by hearing and reflection (cintāmaya) in the Desire Realm, but not for dharmas constituted by cultivation (bhāvanāmaya), because the latter do not exist in the Desire Realm and because a dharma serves as a homogeneous cause only for dharmas within the same realm.

Dharmas constituted by hearing in the Form Realm serve as homogeneous causes for dharmas constituted by hearing and cultivation in the Form Realm, but not for dharmas constituted by reflection, because the latter do not exist in the Form Realm: in the Form Realm, as soon as reflection begins, one enters concentration (samādhi).

Dharmas constituted by cultivation in the Form Realm serve as homogeneous causes for dharmas constituted by cultivation in the Form Realm, but not for dharmas constituted by hearing in the Form Realm, because the latter are inferior.

Dharmas constituted by cultivation in the Formless Realm serve as homogeneous causes only for dharmas constituted by cultivation in the Formless Realm, because dharmas constituted by hearing and reflection do not exist in this realm.

Furthermore, dharmas produced through preparatory effort are divided into nine grades: lower-lower, lower-middle, and so forth. Dharmas of the lower-lower grade serve as homogeneous causes for dharmas of all nine grades; dharmas of the lower-middle grade serve as homogeneous causes for dharmas of eight grades, excluding the first, the lower-lower grade; and so forth up to the ninth grade, the higher-higher grade.

With regard to innately acquired wholesome dharmas, all nine grades can serve as homogeneous causes for one another. The same is true of defiled dharmas (kliṣṭa).

There are altogether four kinds of unobscured-neutral dharmas, each succeeding kind being superior to the preceding one. These four are dharmas born of karmic maturation (vipākaja), dharmas pertaining to deportment (airyāpathika), dharmas pertaining to skilled craftsmanship (śailpasthānika), and transformation-mind (nirmāṇacitta). In the order given, these four kinds serve as homogeneous causes for four, three, two, and one kind, respectively.

Moreover, because a transformation-mind in the Desire Realm can be the result of any one of the four dhyānas, it can be analyzed in the same way. That is, transformation-mind is also of four kinds; and, in this order, these kinds of transformation-mind can serve as homogeneous causes for four, three, two, and one transformation-mind, respectively. Indeed, when it is the result of a higher dharma, a transformation-mind cannot serve as a homogeneous cause for another transformation-mind that is the result of a lower dharma; that is, from a transformation-mind serving as a homogeneous cause and attained through greater preparatory effort, there cannot arise an inferior dharma attained through weaker preparatory effort.

This principle is established, and thereby many of the following questions are resolved:

(Question) Is there a case in which an unconditioned? no, uncontaminated dharma (anāsrava) that has arisen (utpanna) does not serve as a cause for an uncontaminated dharma that will not arise (a non-arising dharma, anutpattidharma)?

(Answer) Yes. A cognition of the Dharma regarding suffering that will not arise does not serve as a cause for an acquiescence in the Dharma regarding suffering that will not arise. Furthermore, a superior dharma (viśiṣṭa) does not serve as a cause for an inferior dharma.

(Question) Is there a case in which an uncontaminated dharma previously attained within a continuum does not serve as a cause for an uncontaminated dharma that arises afterward?

(Answer) Yes. A future acquiescence in the Dharma regarding suffering, although already attained at the first moment of the noble path, does not serve as a cause for the cognition of the Dharma regarding suffering that has arisen, because an effect cannot precede its cause, or because a future dharma cannot serve as a homogeneous cause.

(Question) Is there a case in which an uncontaminated dharma that arose previously does not serve as a cause for an uncontaminated dharma that arises afterward?

(Answer) A superior dharma (adhimātra = viśiṣṭa) does not serve as a cause for an inferior dharma. For example, when one falls away from a higher fruit and realizes a lower fruit, the higher fruit does not serve as a cause for the lower fruit. Furthermore, the attainment of the cognition of the Dharma regarding suffering that arose previously does not serve as a cause for the attainments of the cognition of the Dharma regarding suffering that will arise in subsequent moments, because the later attainments are inferior.

The characteristics of the homogeneous cause have been explained above. Next comes the explanation of the fourth kind of cause, the associated cause.

[Associated causes are

Minds and mental factors having the same support.]

Treatise: Only minds and mental factors serve as associated causes (saṃprayuktakahetu).

(Question) Can minds and mental factors arising at different times and in different continua serve as associated causes for one another?

(Answer) No.

(Question) If so, can minds and mental factors that share a common mode of apprehension (ekākāra)—that is, which all apprehend blue, and so forth—and a common object—that is, which all take blue, and so forth, as their object—serve as associated causes for one another?

(Answer) No. This is because minds and mental factors belonging to different times and different continua can still share the same mode of apprehension and object.

(Question) Must minds and mental factors that share the same mode of apprehension and object, then, exist at the same time?

(Answer) This is still insufficient, because several people may behold the new moon at the same time.

Finally, the author of the treatise reaches this conclusion: Minds and mental factors having the same support can serve as associated causes for one another.

Here, the word “same” (sama) means “one and the same” (abhinna), as when a single moment of the eye faculty (cakṣurindriya) serves as the support for eye-consciousness, for feeling (vedanā), and for the other mental factors associated with that consciousness. The same applies to the other faculties: A certain moment of the mental faculty serves as the support for mental consciousness and the mental factors associated with mental consciousness.

(Question) Dharmas that serve as associated causes can also serve as coexistent causes. What, then, is the difference between them?

(Answer) Dharmas are called coexistent causes when they mutually serve as effects for one another (anyonya-phalārthena), like a company of merchants (sahasārthika) who must rely on one another during their journey, or like the mind being the effect of the mental factors and the mental factors being the effects of the mind.

Dharmas are called associated causes when their activity is identical (samaprayogāthena = pravṛtti), meaning that they possess five similarities or identities. The merchants’ journey is kept safe through their mutual reliance; moreover, they share food, drink, and so forth. The same is true of minds and mental factors: They share the same support, mode of apprehension, and so forth. If even one of these five similarities is absent, they do not have the same activity and are not associated.

The characteristics of the associated cause have been explained above. Next comes the explanation of the fifth kind of cause, the universal cause.

[Universal causes are previously arisen universal dharmas

That serve as causes for defiled dharmas of the same sphere.]

Treatise: Universal dharmas (sarvaga) that have previously arisen—that is, those existing in the past or present—and that belong to a certain sphere serve as universal causes (sarvatragahetu) for defiled dharmas arising afterward within the same sphere. Universal dharmas will be discussed in the chapter on latent tendencies (anuśaya).

Universal dharmas serve as causes only for defiled dharmas. They are causes of defiled dharmas of the same category (nikāya) and of defiled dharmas belonging to other categories: Through their power, afflictions belonging to categories different from their own arise and develop (upajāyante), together with their attendant dharmas (parivāra).

(Question) Do the defiled dharmas of a noble one (Ārya) take universal dharmas as their causes,

when the noble one has eliminated all universal dharmas, since they are all eliminated by the path of seeing?

(Answer) The Vaibhāṣika masters of Kashmir maintain that all defiled dharmas have as their causes dharmas eliminated by the path of seeing. This is because the Prakaraṇapāda states as follows: “Which dharmas have as their causes dharmas eliminated by the path of seeing?—Defiled dharmas and the ripened results of dharmas eliminated by the path of seeing. Which dharmas have morally indeterminate dharmas as their causes?—Conditioned morally indeterminate dharmas and unwholesome dharmas.

Is there a case in which the truth of suffering (duḥkhasatya) takes the view of a real self (satkāyadṛṣṭi) as its cause but is not itself a cause of the view of a real self?”… And so forth, down to: “Apart from the characteristics of arising, duration, alteration, and cessation belonging to a future view of a real self and to the dharmas associated with it, all the remaining defiled constituents of the truth of suffering.”

(Objection) If unwholesome dharmas have morally indeterminate dharmas as their causes, and not merely unwholesome dharmas alone, how is the following passage from the Prajñaptiśāstra to be explained: “Is there a case in which an unwholesome dharma takes only an unwholesome dharma as its cause?—Yes. It is the first defiled mental factor of volition that arises in a noble one who has fallen away from detachment from desire”?

(Explanation) The morally indeterminate dharmas eliminated by the path of seeing serve as universal causes for this unwholesome mental factor of volition. The Prajñaptiśāstra does not mention this because that treatise speaks only of causes that have not been eliminated.

The characteristics of the universal cause have been explained above. Next comes the explanation of the sixth cause, the cause of ripened result (vipākahetu).

[Causes of ripened result are only unwholesome dharmas and contaminated wholesome dharmas.]

Treatise: Only contaminated unwholesome dharmas and contaminated wholesome dharmas serve as causes of ripened result, because it is their nature to ripen (vipākadharmatvāt = vipaktiprakṛtitvāt).

Morally indeterminate dharmas do not serve as causes of ripened result because they are weak, just as damaged seeds do not sprout even when soaked in water.

Uncontaminated dharmas do not serve as causes of ripened result because they are not moistened (abhiṣyandita) by craving (tṛṣṇā), just as sound seeds do not sprout when they have not been soaked in water.

Furthermore, uncontaminated dharmas are not bound to any realm whatsoever. How, then, could they bring about a ripened result belonging to a particular realm?

All dharmas that are neither morally indeterminate nor unconditioned possess the two qualities necessary for maturation: their own inherent efficacy and the moistening influence of craving, just as an intact seed that has been soaked in water.

(Objection) What is the meaning of “cause of maturation”? Is a cause of maturation the “cause of a maturation” (vipāka), or is it a “kind of cause that has the nature of maturation (vipāka)”? [In the first case, the suffix a (ghañ) denotes a state (bhāva); thus maturation (vipāka = vipakti) is the result of the action indicated by the verbal root vi-pac. In the latter case, the suffix a denotes an action (karma); thus maturation (vipāka) is precisely that which is ripening (vipacyate), meaning an action that has reached the time of yielding its result.] Which of these two interpretations will you choose? If you accept the first, how do you explain the following statement in the treatise (Jñānaprasthāna, 11, 9): “the eye born of maturation (vipākajaṃ cakṣus)”?

If you accept the second, how do you explain the phrase “the maturation of karma”?

(Explanation) We have previously shown that both explanations of the word “maturation” are correct. When considered in relation to the result, it must be understood according to the first explanation, namely, as meaning “result” or “retribution.” Meanwhile, the phrase “the eye born of maturation” must be understood as “the eye born of a cause of maturation.”

(Question) What is the meaning of maturation (vi-pāka)?

(Answer) The prefix vi means “different.” Maturation (vipāka) is a result (pāka) that is dissimilar (visadṛśa) to its cause.

(Question) What does this mean?

(Answer) In the Desire Realm: ⁽¹⁾ a cause of maturation (vipākahetu) comprising only one skandha produces only one result: namely, acquisition (prāpti), together with its characteristics (lakṣaṇa) of arising and so forth; ⁽²⁾ a cause of maturation comprising two skandhas produces only one result: namely, bodily karma and verbal karma, together with their characteristics of arising and so forth; ⁽³⁾ a cause of maturation comprising four skandhas produces only one result: namely, wholesome and unwholesome mind and mental factors, together with their characteristics of arising and so forth.

In the Form Realm: ⁽¹⁾ a cause of maturation comprising only one skandha produces only one result: namely, acquisition together with its characteristics of arising and so forth, and the attainment of non-perception together with its characteristics; ⁽²⁾ a cause of maturation comprising two skandhas produces only one result: namely, the manifest karma of the first dhyana, together with its characteristics of arising and so forth; ⁽³⁾ a cause of maturation comprising four skandhas produces only one result: namely, a wholesome mind not belonging to meditative concentration (because a concentrated mind always includes the material dharma of restraint and thus comprises five skandhas), together with its characteristics of arising and so forth;

⁽⁴⁾ a cause of maturation comprising five skandhas produces only one result: namely, a concentrated mind (samāhita), together with its characteristics of arising and so forth.

In the Formless Realm: ⁽¹⁾ a cause of maturation comprising one skandha produces only one result: namely, acquisition and the attainment of cessation, together with their characteristics of arising and so forth; ⁽²⁾ a cause of maturation comprising four skandhas produces only one result: namely, mind and mental factors, together with their characteristics of arising and so forth.

There is a kind of karma whose maturation result is included in only one ayatana, namely, the dharma-ayatana (dharmāyatana): this is the karma that brings about the maturation result of the faculty of vitality (jīvitendriya). Indeed, the karma that brings about the maturation result of the faculty of vitality must necessarily have the faculty of vitality and its characteristics of arising and so forth as its maturation result; and these constitute a part of the dharma-ayatana.

The kind of karma that brings about the mental faculty as its maturation must necessarily have two ayatanas as its maturation result: the mental ayatana (mana-āyatana) and the dharma-ayatana (the dharma-ayatana comprising feelings and so forth, together with the characteristics of arising and so forth that accompany the mental faculty).

The kind of karma that brings about the tangible-object ayatana as its maturation must necessarily have two ayatanas as its maturation result: the tangible-object ayatana and the dharma-ayatana (the dharma-ayatana comprising the characteristics of arising and so forth of the tangible-object ayatana).

The kind of karma that brings about the body ayatana (kāyāyatana) as its maturation must necessarily have three ayatanas as its maturation result: the body ayatana, the tangible-object ayatana (that is, the four great elements that sustain the body ayatana), and the dharma-ayatana (the dharma-ayatana comprising the characteristics of arising and so forth).

Likewise, the kind of karma that brings about the visible-form ayatana, the odor ayatana, or the taste ayatana as its maturation result must necessarily have three ayatanas as its maturation result: the tangible-object ayatana and the dharma-ayatana, as above, together with the visible-form ayatana, the odor ayatana, or the taste ayatana, as the case may be.

The kind of karma that brings about the eye ayatana, the ear ayatana, the nose ayatana, or the tongue ayatana as its maturation must necessarily have four ayatanas as its maturation result: one of these four faculties, the body ayatana, the tangible-object ayatana, and the dharma-ayatana.

A single karma may bring about five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, or eleven ayatanas as its maturation result.

Karma is of two kinds: that which has many results and that which has few results, just as in the case of the various seeds of the lotus, pomegranate, fig, millet, rice, and so forth.

There are cases in which karma belonging to one lifetime (ekādhvika) brings about maturation results in three lifetimes (traiyadhvika); however, the reverse does not occur, because the result cannot be less than the cause. There are cases in which karma belongs to only a single moment (ekakṣaṇika), while its maturation result may continue for many moments; however, the reverse does not occur, for the same reason as above.

A maturation result is not simultaneous with the karma that brings it about, because while karma is being performed, its result is not yet experienced. A maturation result is not brought about immediately after the karma is performed, because the immediately preceding condition (samanantarapratyaya) itself serves to lead into the next moment of the karma; furthermore, a cause of maturation can yield its result only in dependence upon the development of the bodily continuum.

(Question) To which temporal period do the dharmas constituting these six causes belong?

(Answer) We have already briefly discussed this, but it was not included in the verses; therefore, we shall now explain it once again.

[Pervasive causes and homogeneous causes

Belong to two periods; three causes belong to three periods.]

Exposition: A past dharma or a present dharma may serve as a pervasive cause or as a homogeneous cause. Dharmas belonging to the past, present, and future may serve as associated causes, coexistent causes, and causes of maturation. The verses do not mention efficient causes, because all conditioned dharmas belonging to the three periods are efficient causes, while unconditioned dharmas do not belong to any temporal period.

(Question) To which kinds of results do the six causes correspond? By virtue of which kinds of results are they called causes?

The verse answers:

[Results are conditioned dharmas and separation.

The unconditioned has neither cause nor result.]

Exposition: The fundamental treatise states: “Which dharmas are results?—Conditioned dharmas and cessation through discernment (pratisaṃkhyānirodha).”

(Objection) If an unconditioned dharma is a result, it must have a cause, because it can be called a result only in relation to a cause. Furthermore, if an unconditioned dharma is a cause (kāraṇahetu), it must have a result, because it can be called a cause only in relation to a result.

(Sarvastivada) Only conditioned dharmas have causes and results.

Unconditioned dharmas have neither causes nor results, because the six causes and the five results cannot be attributed to them.

(Question) Why not accept a portion of the path, namely, the uninterrupted path (ānantaryamārga), as the efficient cause of the result of separation (visaṃyogaphala)?

(Answer) Because the efficient cause is the kind of cause that does not obstruct arising, whereas liberation, being an unconditioned dharma, does not arise. Therefore, it cannot be said to have an efficient cause.

(Question) If so, how can liberation be a fruit? Of what is it the fruit?

(Answer) It is the fruit of the path (the fruit of the path), because it is attained through the power of the path; in other words, it is precisely through the path that the practitioner attains liberation.

(Objection) If so, it is the acquisition (prāpti) of liberation that is the fruit of the path, not liberation itself, because the path acts upon the acquisition of liberation, not upon liberation.

(Explanation) It is not so. There is a difference between the action of the path upon acquisition and its action with respect to liberation. The path produces acquisition; the path enables liberation to be acquired. Thus, although the path is not the cause of liberation (analytical cessation), analytical cessation may still be called the fruit of the path.

(Question) Since unconditioned dharmas have no dominant fruit (adhipatiphala), how can they be said to be efficient causes?

(Answer) An unconditioned dharma is an efficient cause because it does not obstruct the arising of other dharmas; nevertheless, it has no fruit, because that which lies outside time (adhvavinirmukta) neither has a fruit nor possesses the capacity to produce one.

The Sautrāntika masters do not accept unconditioned dharmas as causes, because no sutra states that a cause is an unconditioned dharma, but only that a cause is a conditioned dharma. The sutra (Saṃyukta, 1, 5) says: “All the causes and all the conditions whose fruit is the arising of visible form, …, and consciousness are impermanent. Since form, …, and consciousness arise from impermanent causes and conditions, how could they be permanent?”

(Sarvāstivāda) If an unconditioned dharma, that is, a permanent dharma, is not a cause, it cannot serve as an “object-condition” (ālambanapratyaya) for the consciousness that apprehends it.

(Sautrāntika) The sutra says only that the causes and conditions capable of producing arising are impermanent; it does not say that all conditions of consciousness are impermanent. Thus, an unconditioned dharma may still serve as an object-condition for consciousness, because an object-condition does not possess the capacity to produce arising.

(Sarvāstivāda) It is precisely the causes capable of producing arising (janaka) that the sutra declares to be impermanent; therefore, the sutra does not deny that an unconditioned dharma is an efficient cause, namely, the kind of cause that “does not obstruct,” does it?

(Sautrāntika) The sutra recognizes an unconditioned dharma only as an object-condition; it does not say that an unconditioned dharma is an efficient cause. Therefore, it should not be established as a cause merely because it has the character of “not obstructing.”

(Sarvāstivāda) Although the sutra does not say that all dharmas that do not obstruct are causes, neither does it state the contrary. Moreover, a great many sutras have been lost; how can one be certain that there was no sutra stating that unconditioned dharmas are efficient causes?

(Sautrāntika) If so, what dharma is called liberation (visaṃyoga)?

(Sarvāstivāda) The Fundamental Treatise (Jñānaprasthāna, 2, 2) says that liberation is analytical cessation.

(Sautrāntika) When we asked what analytical cessation is, you answered, “It is liberation”; then, when we asked what liberation is, you answered, “It is analytical cessation.” These two answers merely refer back to each other and fail to explain the intrinsic nature of the unconditioned dharma; therefore, you must provide another explanation.

(Sarvāstivāda) The intrinsic nature of this dharma is substantially real and cannot be expressed in words; it can only be personally realized by noble ones. Therefore, only its general characteristics can be indicated: it is a real entity (dravya), distinct from other dharmas, wholesome in nature, permanent, called analytical cessation, and also called liberation.

The Sautrāntika masters say that all unconditioned dharmas lack substantial existence. They are not separate real entities like form, feeling, and so forth.

If so, why are they called space (ākāśa), analytical cessation, and non-analytical cessation?

(Answer) It is called space merely because it is intangible (apraṣṭavya); that is, because there is no resistant substance (sapratighadravya). In darkness, because people encounter (avindantaḥ) no obstruction, they say that there is space.

When the latent defilements and existence that had previously arisen are eliminated, and no further latent defilements or existence arise owing to the power of discernment (pratisaṃkhya = prajñā), this is called analytical cessation or nirvana.

When dharmas do not arise, not through the power of analytical discernment but because the necessary conditions are lacking, this is called non-analytical cessation. For example, when premature death cuts a life short, there is the non-analytical cessation of the dharmas that would have arisen in the course of that life had it continued.

One master (Sthavira) maintains that analytical cessation is the non-arising of latent defilements in the future through the power of wisdom (prajñā); non-analytical cessation is the non-arising of suffering, referring solely to future existence, not through the power of wisdom but because latent defilements are absent.

(Sautrāntika comment) The non-arising of suffering is due to the power of analytical discernment; therefore, this non-arising belongs to analytical cessation.

One master (Mahāsāṃghika) says that non-analytical cessation is the subsequent nonexistence (paścād abhāva) of dharmas that have arisen, because they cease naturally.

If this position is maintained, non-analytical cessation cannot be permanent (nitya), because there will be no non-analytical cessation so long as the causal dharma remains—that is, so long as the latent defilement has not ceased.

(Objection) Was analytical cessation not likewise without the power of analytical discernment before that power arose? If so, analytical cessation is also not permanent, because what did not exist before likewise did not exist afterward.

(Explanation) You cannot say that analytical cessation is impermanent because the power of analytical discernment existed before it. In fact, analytical cessation does not have the power of analytical discernment prior to it. One is not entitled to say that analytical cessation first exists and that afterward there comes “the non-arising of dharmas that have not yet arisen.” Non-arising has always existed in itself.

In the absence of the power of analytical discernment, the dharmas would arise; in the presence of that power, the dharmas will absolutely not arise. The efficacy (sāmarthya) of the power of analytical discernment with respect to the non-arising of dharmas is as follows: ⁽¹⁾ before that power arose, there was no obstruction to the arising of the dharmas; ⁽²⁾ when that power arises, the dharmas whose arising had previously never been obstructed (akṛtotpattipratibandha) can no longer arise.

(Sarvāstivāda objection to the Sautrāntika) If nirvana is merely non-arising (anutpāda), how can the following passage from the sutra (Saṃyukta, 26, 2) be explained: “The practice, cultivation, and development of the five faculties—faith and the others—will bring about the abandonment of past, future, and present suffering”? In fact, this abandonment is nothing other than nirvana itself (non-arising), yet only a future dharma can undergo non-arising, not a past or present dharma.

(Sautrantika) The above sutra does not contradict our definition of nirvana, because when it speaks of “the abandonment of past and present suffering,” it implies the abandonment of the afflictions (kleśa) that cling to past and present suffering. Our interpretation can also be confirmed by another sutra (Saṃyukta, 3, 17): “Abandon sensual desire (chandarāga) for form, feeling, … consciousness. When sensual desire has been abandoned, form, … consciousness can also be abandoned and fully understood (prajñā).” We understand in the same way the sutra’s statement about “the abandonment of past and future suffering” in its teaching on the five faculties of faith and so forth.

If someone cites another sutra concerning the five faculties of faith and so forth, such as, “The cultivation of the faculties will abandon past, future, and present afflictions,” the explanation remains the same.

Alternatively, “past afflictions” may mean the afflictions of a past life (paurvajanmika: pūrve janmai bhava), while “present afflictions” means the afflictions of the present life (aihajanmika), rather than afflictions belonging to a single past or present moment (ekakṣaṇika). It is the same in the case of the eighteen courses of craving (tṛṣṇāvicarita). (Aṅguttara, ii. 212): Courses of craving belonging to a past life are called past courses of craving; courses of craving belonging to the present life are called present courses of craving; courses of craving belonging to a future life are called future courses of craving.

The two kinds of past and present afflictions produce within the present continuum the seeds called the seeds that engender future afflictions. When these seeds are abandoned, the past and present afflictions are also said to be abandoned, just as when the maturation-result is exhausted, karma is said to be exhausted.

As for future suffering and afflictions, they absolutely do not arise because there are no seeds; hence they are said to be abandoned.

If this were not so, what meaning could the abandonment of past or present suffering have? If a dharma has already ceased or is now ceasing, there is no need to labor to abandon it.

(Sarvastivada) If there are no unconditioned dharmas, why does the Sutra (Saṃyukta, 31, 12) say: “Dispassion is supreme among conditioned and unconditioned dharmas”? How could a dharma that does not exist (asat) be supreme among nonexistent dharmas?

(Sautrantika) We do not say that unconditioned dharmas do not exist, but that they exist only in the manner we have described. Likewise, before a sound is produced, people commonly say, “There is the prior nonexistence of the sound”; after the sound has ceased, they say, “There is the subsequent nonexistence of the sound.” In speaking thus, they do not intend to assert that this nonexistence itself exists. The same applies to unconditioned dharmas.

Although it does not exist, an unconditioned dharma is still worthy of praise because it is dispassion (virāga), that is, the definitive non-arising of all evils. This nonexistent dharma is the most excellent (viśiṣṭa) among nonexistent dharmas, and in praising it as supreme, the sutra intends to inspire joy in those who have faith.

(Sarvastivada) If cessation through discernment or nirvana does not exist, how can it be one of the Four Noble Truths? How can it constitute the third Noble Truth?

(Explanation) What does Noble Truth (āryasatya) mean? Surely a Noble Truth means that which is unmistaken (aviparīta). Noble ones see existent and nonexistent dharmas without error. With respect to dharmas that are suffering (duḥkha), noble ones see only suffering; with respect to the nonexistence of suffering, noble ones see only the nonexistence of suffering. Thus, what contradiction is there in the nonexistence of suffering—namely, cessation through discernment—being a Noble Truth?

And this nonexistence is the third Noble Truth because noble ones see it and declare it immediately after the second Noble Truth.

(Sarvastivada) If the unconditioned consists of nonexistent dharmas, then when consciousness takes space and the two cessations (nirvana, nirodha) as its objects, its objective sphere will consist of nonexistent dharmas.

(Explanation) There is nothing wrong even if this is said. We shall explain this matter when discussing the past and the future.

(Sarvastivada) What is wrong with maintaining that the unconditioned is substantially existent?

(Author of the Treatise) What benefit is there in maintaining this?

(Sarvastivada) This benefit is supported by the doctrine of the Vibhāṣā.

(Author of the Treatise) If it could indeed be supported, the gods would already have undertaken to uphold it! Yet to maintain that unconditioned dharmas possess real substance is merely to regard something nonexistent as truly existent. Why? The intrinsic nature of an unconditioned dharma cannot be perceived as color, feeling, and so forth can be; nor can its function be perceived as that of the bodily faculties can be.

Furthermore, if this cessation (nirodha) possesses a distinct substance, how can the genitive construction be established in such expressions as “the cessation of suffering” (duḥkhasya nirodhaḥ) or “the cessation of the afflictions”? According to us, it is entirely appropriate to say, “The cessation of this thing is simply the nonexistence of this thing.” “The cessation of suffering” means that “suffering will no longer exist.” Yet between this thing—namely, an affliction—and cessation conceived as a substance, we cannot conceive of any relation such as that of cause to effect, effect to cause, whole to part, and so forth, by which this genitive construction could be justified.

(Sarvastivada) We affirm that cessation is a real dharma, since one can clearly see that this cessation is related to such a thing—as in the cessation of sensual desire and so forth—because one can acquire that cessation at the time when the acquisition of such a thing is abandoned.

(Author of the Treatise) What determines the acquisition of this cessation?

(Sarvastivada) The Sutra says that a bhikshu attains nirvana in this very life. If nirvana is not truly existent, how could it be attained?

(Sautrantika) Through attaining an opposing or counteractive force, namely the Noble Path, the bhikshu acquires a basis (āśraya) opposed to the afflictions (kleśa) and opposed to the supporting body of a future existence; therefore, the Sutra says that the bhikshu attains nirvana.

Furthermore, the Sutra (Saṃyukta, 13, 5) shows that nirvana is sheer nonexistence (abhāvamātra) when it says: “The complete abandonment (aśeṣaprahāṇa), purification (vyantibhāva, vātībhāva), exhaustion (kṣaya), relinquishment (virāga), cessation (nirodha), pacification (vyupaśama), and permanent passing away (astaṃgama) of suffering; the absence of renewed continuity (apratisaṃdhi), non-appropriation (anupādāna), and non-arising (aprādurbhāva) of any further suffering—truly peaceful (śānta), truly sublime (praṇītam), is the relinquishment of every basis of attachment (upadhi), the exhaustion of every form of craving (tṛṣṇākṣaya), dispassion (virāga), cessation (nirodha), nirvana.”

When the Sarvāstivādins say that nirvana is the non-arising of another suffering (aprādurbhāva), the sutra merely means that there is no arising of suffering in nirvana.

(Sautrāntika) We see that the use of the locative case (the seventh case-ending), “in nirvana,” serves no purpose in proving that nirvana is a real existent. What do you intend to indicate by using the locative “therein” (asmin)? If this means, “when nirvana already exists, therein suffering does not exist” (asmin sati), then suffering would never arise, since nirvana is eternal. If it means, “when nirvana has been attained” (asmin prāpte), then you must admit that future suffering will not arise when the noble path—the means upon which, according to you, one may rely to attain nirvana—exists or is attained.

Therefore, the simile stated above in the sutra (Dīgha, ii. 157; Saṃyutta, i. 159; Theragāthā, 906) provides the clearest explanation: “Just as the nirvana (nirvāna) of a flame is, so too is the liberation of the mind.” This means that just as the extinction of a flame is merely the “passing away” (aty-aya) of the flame and not the passing away of some other entity, so too is the liberation of the Blessed One’s mind.

The Sautrāntikas further cite a passage of questions and answers from the Abhidharma: “What dharmas are without a basis (dharma avastuka)?—Unconditioned dharmas.” Here, the term “without a basis” means unreal, that is, devoid of intrinsic nature.

The Vaibhāṣika masters do not accept this explanation. The term “basis” (vastu) has five different meanings: ⁽¹⁾ intrinsic nature (svabhava), as in: “When one obtains (prāptilabh) this basis, one also comes to possess (samanvāgam) this basis” (Jñānaprasthāna, 20, 3; Vibhāṣā, 179, 8); ⁽²⁾ object (ālambana), as in: “All dharmas cognized (ya) by the various kinds of knowledge (jñnena) are each cognized according to their respective basis (yathāvastu)” (Prakaraṇa, 31b9); ⁽³⁾ that which binds (saṃyojanīya), as in: “If one is bound to this basis by craving, is one also bound to this basis by hatred?” (Vibhāṣā, 58, 2); ⁽⁴⁾ cause (hetu), as in: “What dharmas have a basis (savastuka)?—Conditioned dharmas” (Prakaraṇa, 33b);

⁽⁵⁾ possession (parigraha), as in: “Agricultural affairs, household affairs, commercial affairs, and wealth: the elimination of possession is liberation” (Vibhāṣā, 56, 2).

According to the Vaibhāṣikas, in the passage of questions and answers above, the term “basis” means cause; hence, “without a basis” means without a cause. Although unconditioned dharmas truly exist, are eternal, and have no activity, they have no causes that produce them, nor do they produce any effects.

This concludes the preceding general discussion.

(Question) Which kinds of effects are obtained from which kinds of causes?

The stanza answers:

[Maturation is the effect of the last cause.

Dominance is the effect of the first cause.

Homogeneous outflow is the effect of the homogeneous and universal causes.

Personal efficacy is the effect of the coexistent and associated causes.]

Exposition: The last cause is the cause of maturation (vipākahetu), because it is mentioned last among the six kinds. The first effect, namely the effect of maturation (vipākaphala), is the effect of this cause.

The first cause is the efficient cause (kāraṇahetu). The last effect is obtained through this cause. This effect is called dominance, meaning that it is born from dominance (adhipaja) or belongs to dominance (ādhipata), because it is the effect of dominance (adhipatiphala). The efficient cause is regarded as a cause having the character of dominance (adhipati).

(Question) The mere state of non-obstruction (anāvaraṇabhāvamātrāvasthāna) is sufficient to establish the efficient cause; why is it also said to have the character of dominance?

(Answer) An efficient cause may be “a cause that exerts no activity” (upekṣaka)—and is therefore regarded as dominant because it does not create an obstruction—or it may be “a cause that exerts activity” (kāraka)—and is therefore regarded as dominant because it possesses sovereign, productive, and preeminent power (pradhāna, janaka, angībhāva). For example, the ten ayatanas—that is, visible form and the eye faculty, sound and the ear faculty, and so forth—have a dominant relation to the five groups of consciousness; the collective karma of sentient beings has a dominant relation to the receptacle world. The ear faculty has an indirectly dominant influence upon eye-consciousness, because after hearing something, one may wish to look.

The effect of homogeneous outflow (niṣyandaphala) arises from the homogeneous cause (sabhāgahetu) and the universal cause (sarvatragahetu), because the effects of these two causes resemble their respective causes.

The effect of the coexistent cause (sahabhūhetu) and the associated cause (saṃprayuktakahetu) is called “person” (puruṣa), because it is the effect of personal activity (personal efficacy, puruṣakāra). Personal activity is not distinct from the person himself (puruṣabhāva), because an action is not distinct from the one who acts. Therefore, this kind of effect is called an effect belonging to a person (puruṣa).

(Question) What is personal efficacy?

(Answer) The activity (kāritra, kriyā, karma) of a dharma is called personal efficacy (puruṣakāra), because this activity resembles the activity of a person (puruṣa). Similarly, people in the world call a kind of grass “crow’s foot” (kākajanghā) because its shape resembles the foot of a black crow; or they call a general “Drunken Elephant” (mattahastin) because he is as fierce as a drunken elephant.

(Question) Is it only the associated cause and the coexistent cause that produce the effect of personal efficacy?

(Answer) Some say that, with the exception of maturation, the other causes also have the effect of personal efficacy. Indeed, this kind of effect arises simultaneously with its cause or immediately after it, whereas the effect of a cause of maturation is otherwise. Some masters hold that the cause of maturation also has a remote effect of personal efficacy, as in the case of a farmer’s harvested crop.

[Thus, a dharma is ⁽¹⁾ an effect of homogeneous outflow because it arises resembling its cause, ⁽²⁾ an effect of personal efficacy because it arises through the power of its cause, and ⁽³⁾ an effect of dominance because it arises without being obstructed by its cause.]

(Question) What are the characteristics of the various kinds of effects?

The stanza answers:

[Maturation is a morally neutral dharma,

Belonging to a sentient being and born from morally determinate karma.

Homogeneous outflow resembles its cause.

Disconnection is cessation attained through wisdom.

If something arises through personal power,

Its effect is called personal efficacy.

All conditioned dharmas are effects of dominance,

Except those that occur after them.]

Exposition: Maturation is an unobscured, morally neutral dharma.

Among unobscured, morally neutral dharmas, some belong to sentient beings and some do not. Therefore, the author briefly specifies that it “belongs to a sentient being”; that is, it arises within the continuum of a sentient being’s body.

Those pertaining to sentient beings are the nurtured dharmas (aupacayika), namely, dharmas that grow through food, drink, and so forth, and the outflow dharmas (naiṣyandika), namely, dharmas arising from causes of a kind similar to themselves. Therefore, the author of the treatise states only briefly that they “arise later from morally determinate karma.” Morally determinate karma is also called maturation because it brings about a maturation result; it comprises unwholesome karma and wholesome karma with outflows (kuślasāsrava). Only much later does a maturation result arise from this kind of karma, rather than simultaneously with it or immediately afterward.

(Question) Why are dharmas not pertaining to sentient beings, such as mountains, rivers, and so forth, not called maturation? Do they not also arise from wholesome or unwholesome karma?

(Answer) Dharmas not pertaining to sentient beings are common because they may be used and enjoyed by everyone, whereas maturation results are individual: One can never experience the maturation result of karma created by another person. Besides a maturation result, karma may also bring about a dominant result; this is a kind of result that may be shared by everyone because it is brought about by collective karma.

A dharma similar to its cause is an outflow result. This kind of result is brought about by the homogeneous cause and the universal cause.

(Question) If the result of a universal cause is an outflow result, that is, similar to its cause, why is the universal cause not called an outflow cause?

(Answer) The result of a universal cause is always similar to its cause because ⁽¹⁾ the result belongs to the same realm as the cause—that is, both belong to the Desire Realm, and so forth—and ⁽²⁾ both are defiled (kliṣṭa); nevertheless, the result differs in category from the cause. “Category” means being eliminated in the same manner, such as that which is eliminated through seeing the truth of suffering, and so forth. Only when cause and result are similar in category in this way can a universal cause simultaneously serve as a homogeneous cause.

This may be analyzed in four cases:

⁽¹⁾ A homogeneous cause that is not a universal cause, as in the case of non-universal afflictions (such as craving [rāga]) in relation to afflictions belonging to their own division;

⁽²⁾ A universal cause that is not a homogeneous cause, as in the case of universal afflictions in relation to afflictions belonging to another division;

⁽³⁾ A universal cause that is a homogeneous cause, as in the case of universal afflictions in relation to an affliction belonging to their own division;

⁽⁴⁾ All other dharmas that are neither homogeneous causes nor universal causes.

Disconnection (visaṃyoga), or the result of disconnection (visaṃyogaphala), is the cessation (kṣaya = nirodha) attained through wisdom (dhī = prajñā); therefore, the result of disconnection is precisely cessation through discernment (pratisaṃkhyānirodha).

The result of personal effort is the result of a dharma when it arises through the power of that dharma. It is related to a conditioned dharma (saṃskṛta). For example, the concentration of the first meditative absorption is the result of personal effort of the preparatory mind (tatprayogacitta) belonging to the Desire Realm; the concentration of the second meditative absorption is the result of personal effort of the mind belonging to the first meditative absorption.

An uncontaminated dharma may be the result of personal effort of a contaminated dharma: the highest worldly dharmas (laukikāgradharma) have as their result the receptivity to the Dharma knowledge of suffering (duḥkhe dharmajñānakṣānti).

A mind of transformation (nirmāṇacitta) is the result of personal effort of a mind belonging to a certain meditative absorption.

Cessation through discernment, or nirvana, is regarded as a result of personal effort; however, the definition of the result of personal effort given above does not apply to kinds of cessation (nirodha) that are permanent and do not arise. It may therefore be said that the result of personal effort of a dharma is the kind of result attained through the power of that very dharma.

Every conditioned dharma is the dominant result of conditioned dharmas, except for those that occur after it (apūrvaḥ saṃskṛtasyaiva saṃskṛto ‘dhipateḥ phalam).

(Question) What is the difference between the result of personal effort and the dominant result?

(Answer) The result of personal effort is related to an agent (kartar); the dominant result is related both to an agent and to what is not an agent. For example, a completed work is both the result of personal effort and the dominant result of the artisan who created it, but in relation to others it is only a dominant result.

(Question) Among the six causes described above, when each cause takes its result and gives its result, in which temporal state does it exist—in the future, the present, or the past?

The stanza answers:

五取果唯現　　 二與果亦然

過現與二因　　 一與唯過去.

[Five kinds take their result only in the present.

Two kinds likewise give their result in the present.

Two kinds give their result in the present and the past.

One kind gives its result only in the past.]

Treatise: What do “taking a result” (gṛhṇāti, ākṣipati) and “giving a result” (prayacchati, dadāti) mean?

A dharma takes a result when it becomes the seed of that result. A dharma gives a result at the moment when it can impart to the result a power of arising—that is, at the moment when the future result is directed toward arising and ready to arise (utpādābhimukha); that dharma gives the future result a capacity that enables it to enter the present state.

Five kinds of causes take their results only while they are present, because if they were past, they would already have taken their results, and if they were future, they would have no activity.

The same applies to the efficient cause (kāraṇahetu), but the stanza does not mention it because an efficient cause does not necessarily have a result.

The coexistent cause and the associated cause give their results only while they are present because both kinds take and give their results at the same moment.

The homogeneous cause and the universal cause give their results while they are present and past.

(Question) How can they give an outflow result while they are still present? We know that these two kinds of causes always precede their results.

(Answer) They give their results while the causes are still present because this kind of cause gives its result immediately (samanantaranirvartanāt). When the result arises, they have already entered the past because they have given their result and cannot give the same result twice.

There are occasions when a wholesome homogeneous cause only takes a result without giving it. Four cases occur: only taking a result, only giving a result, both taking and giving a result, and neither taking nor giving a result.

⁽¹⁾ The acquisition (prāpti) of roots of goodness—relinquished at the final moment by a person who severs the roots of goodness—only takes a result and does not give a result.

⁽²⁾ The acquisition of roots of goodness—acquired at the first moment by a person who regains the roots of goodness—only gives a result and does not take a result.

Here it should be said that, at the moment when this person regains the roots of goodness, the acquisitions (prāpti) relinquished at the final moment by the person who severed the roots of goodness only give a result and do not take a result.

⁽³⁾ The acquisition of a person who has not severed the roots of goodness—apart from the two cases above, namely, severing the roots of goodness and regaining the roots of goodness—both takes and gives a result.

⁽⁴⁾ In other cases, acquisition (prāpti) neither takes nor gives a result. For example, the acquisition of roots of goodness by those who have severed the roots of goodness; and the acquisition of roots of goodness belonging to a higher realm from which a person has fallen away: these acquisitions have already taken their results and therefore cannot take them again, and they do not give their results because that person is no longer capable of acquiring those roots of goodness.

Regarding the homogeneous cause that is unwholesome, the Vibhāṣā also analyzes it through the four cases given above:

⁽¹⁾ The acquisition (prāpti) of unwholesome dharmas—which is relinquished at the final moment—by a person who has attained freedom from sensual desire (kāmavairāga).

⁽²⁾ The acquisition—obtained at the first moment—by a person who has fallen away from that freedom.

⁽³⁾ The acquisition of a person who has not attained freedom, except for the two cases above.

⁽⁴⁾ Acquisition in all other cases: for example, the acquisition of a person who has attained freedom and has not fallen away from it.

Regarding the homogeneous cause that is defiled-neutral, there are likewise the four cases given above:

⁽¹⁾ The final acquisition (prāpti) of defiled-neutral dharmas relinquished by a noble one upon attaining arhatship.

⁽²⁾ The first acquisition by an arhat who has fallen away.

More precisely, this is the first acquisition in an arhat who has fallen away.

⁽³⁾ The acquisition of a person who has not yet attained freedom from the summit of existence (bhavāgra); the two cases above do not belong to this case.

⁽⁴⁾ Acquisition in other cases; that is, the acquisitions of an arhat.

Regarding the homogeneous cause that is undefiled-neutral, the time when it gives its fruit is also the time when it takes its fruit, because the undefiled-neutral persists until nirvana. Nevertheless, it may take a fruit without giving a fruit, because the final skandhas of an arhat have no outflowing fruit.

The case of dharmas that do not take an object (sālambana) has now been explained. If mind and mental factors are analyzed within their continuous succession of moments, four cases can likewise be established for a wholesome homogeneous cause:

⁽¹⁾ It takes a fruit but does not give a fruit. For example, when a wholesome mind is immediately followed by a wholesome or undefiled-neutral mind, this wholesome mind, being a homogeneous cause, can take—that is, produce—as its outflowing fruit a future wholesome mind; this future wholesome mind may or may not arise. The preceding wholesome mind does not give an outflowing fruit: the kind of mind following it is defiled or undefiled-neutral and therefore is not the outflowing fruit of a wholesome mind.

⁽²⁾ It gives a fruit but does not take a fruit. For example, when a wholesome mind is immediately preceded by a defiled or undefiled-neutral mind, an earlier wholesome mind gives as its outflowing fruit the wholesome mind of which we are speaking; that earlier wholesome mind does not take a fruit because it already took its fruit in the past.

⁽³⁾ It both takes and gives a fruit. For example, when two wholesome minds occur successively, the first wholesome mind both takes and gives the second wholesome mind as its outflowing fruit.

⁽⁴⁾ It neither takes nor gives a fruit. For example, when defiled or undefiled-neutral minds occur successively, the preceding wholesome mind, which served as a homogeneous cause in the past, has already taken its fruit and will give its fruit later; therefore, in the present, it neither takes nor gives a fruit.

The four cases of an unwholesome homogeneous cause can be established according to the methods given above.

A retributive cause gives its fruit when it is in the past, because this kind of fruit does not arise simultaneously with it or immediately afterward.

Some masters of the western region [Vibhāṣā, 121, 6] hold that there are four other kinds of fruit in addition to the five kinds mentioned above:

⁽¹⁾ The fruit of establishment (pratiṣṭhāphala); for example, the water-disc (jalamaṇḍala) is the fruit of the wind-disc (vāyumaṇḍala), and so on, down to the case in which grass is the fruit of the great earth (mahāpṛthivī).

⁽²⁾ The fruit of preparatory practice (prayogaphala); for example, the knowledge of non-arising (anutpādajñāna), and so forth, is the fruit of the contemplation of impurity (aśubha), and so forth.

⁽³⁾ The fruit of conjunction (sāmagrīphala); for example, visual consciousness is the fruit of the eye faculty, visible form, light, and so forth (Madhyamakvṛtti, 454).

⁽⁴⁾ The fruit of cultivation (bhāvanāphala); for example, a mind capable of transformation is the fruit of meditative concentration.

(Hb) The first of these four kinds of fruit belongs to the dominant fruit, while the remaining three belong to the fruit of personal effort.

The explanation of causes and fruits is now complete. Next comes the discussion of how many causes produce the various fruits.

Dharmas may provisionally be divided into four kinds: ⁽¹⁾ defiled dharmas (kliṣṭa), comprising the afflictions (kleśa), dharmas associated with the afflictions (saṃprayukta), and dharmas arising from the afflictions (samuttha); ⁽²⁾ retributive dharmas, or those born from a retributive cause; ⁽³⁾ the first uncontaminated dharmas, comprising the receptivity to the Dharma knowledge of suffering and the dharmas arising together with this receptivity; ⁽⁴⁾ other dharmas: namely, neutral dharmas other than retributive dharmas, and wholesome dharmas other than the first uncontaminated dharmas.

The stanza says:

[The defiled, the retributively produced,

Other dharmas, and the first noble dharmas—in order—

Exclude the retributive cause, the universal cause, and the homogeneous cause.

Apart from these, they all arise from the remaining causes;

The foregoing applies to mind and mental factors.

Other dharmas further exclude the associated cause.]

Commentary: If minds and mental factors are defiled, they arise from five causes, the retributive cause being excluded. If they are retributively produced, they arise from five causes, the universal cause being excluded. If they are other than the two kinds above, namely, the fourth kind, they arise from four causes, the retributive cause and universal cause being excluded. If they are uncontaminated dharmas arising for the first time, they arise from three causes, the two causes just mentioned and the homogeneous cause being excluded.

Dharmas that are neither mind nor mental factors—namely, material dharmas (rūpin) and conditioned dharmas (saṃskāra) dissociated from mind—arise, according to whichever of the four kinds they belong to, from the causes pertaining to that kind, with the associated cause excluded: if they are defiled or retributively produced, they arise from four causes; if they are other than the two kinds above, namely, the fourth kind, they arise from three causes; and if they are uncontaminated dharmas arising for the first time, they arise from two causes.

There is no case in which a dharma arises from only one cause, because the efficient cause and the coexistent cause are always present.