阿毘達磨俱舍論

Part 2

Among the eighteen elements, which are visible (sanidarśana) or invisible (anidarśana), resistant (sapratighāta) or non-resistant (apratigha), wholesome (kuśala), unwholesome (akuśala), or indeterminate (avyākṛta)?

Verse:

[Only the visible-form element is visible.

Ten elements are resistant,

Namely, excluding the eight elements of visible form, sound, and so forth.

The remaining three kinds are indeterminate.]

Treatise: Among the eighteen elements, the visible-form element is visible because it can be pointed out as being here or there. All the remaining elements are invisible.

The ten elements belonging to the form skandha are resistant elements.

Resistance (pratighāta) means obstruction (abhighāta), and is divided into three distinct kinds: resistance through impediment, resistance through object-domain, and resistance through object of cognition.

⁽¹⁾ Resistance through impediment (āvaraṇapratighāta) comprises the ten material elements. When one such element arises in the place occupied by another, it cannot do so because they mutually obstruct one another, just as one arm obstructs another arm, one stone obstructs another stone, or an arm obstructs a stone and vice versa.

⁽²⁾ Resistance through object-domain (viṣayapratighāta) is the obstruction presented by object-domains (viṣaya), such as visible form and so forth, to the dharmas that have these kinds of objects. These dharmas comprise twelve elements—the five faculties and the seven consciousness elements—and part of the Dharma element. The Prajñāpti Treatise states: There is a kind of eye that is obstructed by water but not by dry land, as in the case of the eyes of fish and so forth.

There is a kind of eye that is obstructed by dry land but not by water, as in the case of the eyes of most people, fishermen excepted. There is a kind of eye that is obstructed by both water and dry land, as in the case of the eyes of crocodiles, crabs, frogs, fishermen, and so forth. There is a kind of eye that is obstructed by neither water nor dry land, namely, apart from the cases above, the eye of one who dies in the womb.

There is a kind of eye that is obstructed by night, such as the eyes of bats, owls, and so forth. There is a kind of eye that is obstructed by day, such as the eyes of most people, thieves excepted. There is a kind of eye that is obstructed by both day and night, such as the eyes of dogs, jackals, horses, leopards, wolves, cats, mongooses, and so forth.

There is a kind of eye that is obstructed by neither day nor night, namely, those other than the kinds mentioned above.

⁽³⁾ Resistance through object of cognition (ālambanapratighāta) is the resistance between mind and mental factors and their objects (svālambana).

(Question) What is the difference between an object-domain and an object of cognition?

(Answer) If one dharma performs an activity, such as seeing, hearing, and so forth, with respect to another dharma, then the latter is the object-domain of the former; whereas objects of cognition are the dharmas apprehended by mind and mental factors.

(Question) Why is it called resistance when the eye-consciousness and so forth proceed (pravṛtti) or exercise their activity (kāritra) toward their object-domains or objects of cognition?

(Answer) Because they cannot proceed or exercise their activity toward object-domains or objects of cognition beyond these object-domains and objects of cognition, just as people commonly say, “Because one is obstructed by a wall, one cannot proceed any farther.” Alternatively, resistance also means encounter or conjunction (nipāta, nipatana); that is, the proceeding or activity of the eye and so forth converges with its object-domain or object of cognition.

It should be understood that when the ten material elements are said here to be resistant because they mutually obstruct one another, this refers to resistance through impediment.

On the basis of the meaning explained above, it can be understood that the remaining dharmas are non-resistant.

(Question) Can a dharma that has resistance through object-domain also have resistance through impediment?

(Answer) There are four cases in this matter:

⁽¹⁾ The seven consciousness elements (cittadhātu) and part of the Dharma element, namely, the associated dharmas, have only resistance through object-domain.

⁽²⁾ The five objects—visible form, sound, and so forth—have only resistance through impediment.

⁽³⁾ The five faculties—eye, ear, and so forth—have both resistance through impediment and resistance through object-domain.

⁽⁴⁾ Part of the Dharma element, namely, the dissociated dharmas, is non-resistant.

(Question) Can a dharma that has resistance through object-domain also have resistance through object of cognition?

(Answer) This should be answered in accordance with the latter part of the preceding question: dharmas that have resistance through object of cognition also have resistance through object-domain. However, some dharmas that have resistance through object-domain cannot have resistance through object of cognition, as in the case of the five faculties—eye, ear, and so forth.

The Venerable Kumāralābha said: “When the mind (manas) intends to arise in a certain place but is obstructed by another dharma and therefore cannot arise, this is called resistance. The opposite case is called non-resistance.”

This is accepted.

Among the ten resistant material elements described above, excluding visible form and sound, the remaining eight elements are all indeterminate because they cannot be definitely designated as wholesome or unwholesome; hence they are called indeterminate.

(Objection) If so, unconditioned dharmas should also be indeterminate.

The remaining ten elements are of all three kinds: wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate.

If the seven consciousness elements are associated with wholesome roots such as non-greed and so forth, they are wholesome; if they are associated with unwholesome roots such as greed and so forth, they are unwholesome. In all other cases, they are indeterminate.

With regard to the Dharma element, that which has the nature of wholesome roots such as non-greed and so forth, the dharmas associated with these wholesome roots, the dharmas arising from these wholesome roots, and analytical cessation are called wholesome. That which has the nature of unwholesome roots such as greed and so forth, the dharmas associated with these unwholesome roots, and the dharmas arising from these unwholesome roots are called unwholesome. All other cases are indeterminate.

With regard to the visible-form element and the sound element, bodily karma and verbal karma arising from a wholesome mind are wholesome, while those arising from an unwholesome mind are unwholesome. All other cases are indeterminate.

(Question) Among the eighteen elements, which belong to the Desire Realm, the Form Realm, and the Formless Realm?

The verse replies:

[The eighteen elements belong to the Desire Realm;

Fourteen elements belong to the Form Realm,

Excluding the two objects of odor and taste and their two consciousnesses.

The final three elements belong to the Formless Realm.]

Treatise: “Belong” means to be bound to, that is, to be fettered. All eighteen elements belong to the Desire Realm. The Form Realm has only fourteen kinds, excluding the two objects of odor and taste and their two consciousnesses, olfactory consciousness and gustatory consciousness. Odor and taste do not exist in the Form Realm because they belong to nutriment taken in morsels (kavaḍīkārāhāra). Craving for nutriment taken in morsels must be abandoned before one can be born in the Form Realm. The two consciousnesses, olfactory and gustatory consciousness, are excluded because they have no objects of cognition there.

(Objection) If so, the tangible-object element should also be absent from the Form Realm, because it too belongs to nutriment taken in morsels.

(Explanation) This is not so. The tangible-object element in the Form Realm does not have the nature of nutriment taken in morsels.

(Objection) If that is so, odor and taste could also be of this kind.

(Explanation) They are not the same. This is because odor and taste, when separated from food, have no function at all; whereas tangible objects have their own function of sustaining the material faculties, clothing, palaces, and so forth (āśrayabhāva). When separated from the craving for food and drink, odor and taste become useless, but tangible objects do not.

A Vaibhāṣika master (Śrīlābha) maintains that one who abides in the Form Realm and cultivates the four dhyānas to perfection can see visible forms, hear sounds, and at the same time experience lightness and bliss because a certain superior kind of tangible object benefits the body. Thus it is known that even after one has entered meditative concentration, the three kinds—visible form, sound, and tangible object—still accompany one there. Odor and taste, however, are different, because they do not exist in these realms (rūpadhātu).

(Objection by the author of the treatise) If there are no odors or tastes in the Form Realm, then the olfactory faculty and the gustatory faculty should not exist there either, since they no longer perform any function (and consequently there should be only ten dhātus belonging to the Form Realm).

(Explanation) It is not so. These two faculties still perform the functions of producing speech and adorning the body.

(Further objection by the author of the treatise) If they serve to adorn the body and produce speech, their supporting bases alone would suffice; what need would there be for these two faculties?

(Explanation) Just as, if the male faculty (the sexual organ) did not exist, its supporting base would not exist, so it is in this case. If the olfactory and gustatory faculties did not exist, their supporting bases would not exist either.

(Objection) In the first case this may be so, because the supporting base alone would also be useless. But the supporting bases of the olfactory and gustatory faculties still have functions; therefore, even without the olfactory and gustatory faculties, their supporting bases should still exist.

(Explanation) There are nevertheless cases in which something is produced without serving any purpose; therefore, the faculties may still arise. For example, an infant who, because of fixed karma, must die in the womb still has a body, although the faculties that have arisen become useless.

(Question) What is the cause for the arising of the faculties?

(Answer) Its cause is the superior karma generated by attachment to the faculties (attachment to the faculties).

(Statement by the author of the treatise) If attachment to the objects (attachment to objects) has been abandoned, attachment to the faculties must likewise have been abandoned. Thus, if craving for the objects has been abandoned, the two faculties of smell and taste should not exist; otherwise, it would have to be admitted that the male faculty also arises in the Form Realm. If it is claimed that the male faculty cannot arise because it is excessively ugly, then what is ugly about the Tathāgata’s “male organ concealed within a sheath”?

Moreover, the arising of faculties does not require that they perform a function; the mere presence of the causal force is sufficient for them to arise even if they are useless. In the Form Realm, although the male faculty is ugly, if its cause existed, it would still arise. Therefore, if the male faculty does not exist there, the two faculties of smell and taste should not exist there either.

(Objection) Such an assertion contradicts the sutra. The sutra says that beings born in the Form Realm are not deficient in body and suffer no impairment of their faculties.

(Explanation) Because beings possess the faculties appropriate to the conditions there, the sutra says that their faculties are unimpaired. Thus there is no contradiction with the sutra. If this is not accepted, the male faculty should also exist there.

Thus, it is not that the Form Realm lacks the two faculties of smell and taste; rather, it lacks only odors and tastes, because attachment to the six faculties arises by way of the embodied existence (ātmabhāvamukhena), not by way of the objects of these six faculties. Attachment to the male faculty, however, arises by way of sexual contact; and since there is no sexual contact in the Form Realm, the male faculty does not exist there. Therefore, the doctrine that only fourteen of the eighteen dhātus exist in the Form Realm is reasonable.

Only the following three dhātus belong to the Formless Realm: the mental dhātu, the dhātu of mental objects, and the dhātu of mental consciousness.

Because one can be born in the Formless Realm only after abandoning desire for material forms, the ten material dhātus do not exist there. And because the supports (the five faculties) and their objects (the five objects) are absent, the five consciousnesses do not exist there either. Only the final three dhātus belong to the Formless Realm.

(Question) Of the eighteen dhātus, which are contaminated and which are uncontaminated?

The stanza answers:

[The mental dhātu, the dhātu of mental objects, and the dhātu of mental consciousness are of both kinds.

The other dhātus are contaminated only.]

Treatise: When the mental dhātu and the dhātu of mental consciousness belong to the Truth of the Path, they are uncontaminated; in other cases, they are contaminated.

When the dhātu of mental objects belongs to the Truth of the Path or to the unconditioned, it is uncontaminated; otherwise, it is contaminated.

The remaining fifteen dhātus are all contaminated.

(Question) Of the eighteen dhātus, which possess vitarka and vicāra, which possess no vitarka but only vicāra, and which possess neither vitarka nor vicāra?

The stanza answers:

[The five consciousnesses always possess vitarka and vicāra.

The final three dhātus occur in all three cases; the other dhātus possess neither.]

Treatise: The five consciousnesses—visual consciousness and so forth—are always associated with vitarka and vicāra, because these consciousnesses are gross and manifest and move toward external objects. Here the word “always” (Skt. hi) implies definiteness.

The final three dhātus are the mental dhātu, the dhātu of mental objects, and the dhātu of mental consciousness, because they come last among the faculties, objects, and consciousnesses respectively.

These three dhātus occur in all three cases:

In the Desire Realm and the First Dhyāna, the mental dhātu, the dhātu of mental consciousness, and the part of the dhātu of mental objects associated with mind, with the exception of vitarka and vicāra themselves, all possess both vitarka and vicāra.

In the Intermediate Dhyāna (dhyānāntara), these three dhātus possess no vitarka but possess vicāra alone.

From the Second Dhyāna upward through the higher planes to the final plane—the Summit of Existence, the Sphere of Neither Perception nor Non-Perception (naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñānāyatana)—these three dhātus possess neither vitarka nor vicāra.

The part of the dhātu of mental objects that is not associated with vitarka or vicāra, as well as the vitarka and vicāra of the Intermediate Dhyāna, possesses neither vitarka nor vicāra.

At all times, vitarka is always accompanied by vicāra but is not accompanied by vitarka, because there is no second vitarka; there is only that which is associated with vitarka.

However, vicāra in the Desire Realm and the First Dhyāna does not fall into the three cases above: it is always associated with vitarka and is never accompanied by vicāra, because there is no second simultaneous vicāra. Therefore, we say that in the planes possessing vitarka and vicāra there are four kinds of dharmas.

⁽¹⁾ Dharmas associated with vitarka, excluding vitarka and vicāra themselves, are always accompanied by both vitarka and vicāra.

⁽²⁾ Vitarka, which is not accompanied by vitarka, is accompanied by vicāra.

⁽³⁾ Dharmas not associated with vitarka are accompanied by neither vitarka nor vicāra.

⁽⁴⁾ Vicāra, which is not accompanied by vicāra, is accompanied by vitarka.

The remaining ten dhātus (the material dhātus) possess neither vitarka nor vicāra, because they are not associated with vitarka.

(Question) If the first five consciousnesses (the group of five consciousnesses) are always accompanied by vitarka and vicāra, how can they be said to be without discrimination (avikalpaka)?

[The first five consciousnesses are without discrimination.

The two kinds, examination and recollection,

Have as their essences distracted prajñā

And recollections belonging to the mental plane.]

Treatise: According to the Vaibhāṣikas (according to tradition), discrimination (vikalpa) is of three kinds: intrinsic discrimination (svabhāvavikalpa), examination (nirūpaṇā), and recollective discrimination (anusmaraṇa).

The first five consciousnesses possess the first kind of discrimination but not the other two. This is why they are said to be without discrimination, just as a horse with only one leg is called a horse without legs.

Intrinsic discrimination (vikalpa), defined as vitarka, will be discussed later in the chapter concerning mental factors.

The remaining two kinds of discrimination may respectively be regarded as distracted prajñā and recollections belonging to the mental plane.

“Distracted” means unconcentrated, not pertaining to meditative concentration. Distracted prajñā associated with mental consciousness is called discriminative examination.

The acts of mindfulness associated with mind-consciousness, whether concentrated or distracted, are all of the nature of discriminative recollection.

(Question) Among the eighteen dhatus, which have an object (ālambana), which have no object, which are not appropriated (anupātta), and which are appropriated?

[The seven mental dhatus and part of the Dharma dhatu

Have an object; all the remaining dhatus do not.

The first eight dhatus and sound

Are not appropriated. The remaining dhatus are of both kinds.]

Treatise: The six consciousnesses, the mind dhatu, and the dharmas associated with mind (mind-associated dharmas) that form part of the Dharma dhatu have objects, because they always apprehend an object (viṣaya). The remaining ten material dhatus and the dharmas not associated with mind (mind-dissociated dharmas) have no object, because they do not apprehend objects.

Among the eighteen dhatus, nine are not appropriated: the seven mental dhatus, the entire Dharma dhatu, and the sound dhatu.

The other nine dhatus are of both kinds, being appropriated at times and unappropriated at others. The five faculties—the eye and so forth—are appropriated when present; when past or future, they are not appropriated. The four present objects of visible form, odor, taste, and tangible objects that are inseparable from the faculties are appropriated.

If they exist in the present but do not form part of a faculty, or if they are past or future, they are not appropriated. Thus, in the body, apart from those kinds joined to the faculties, all the rest—such as hair of the head, body hair, nails, teeth, feces, urine, tears, nasal mucus, saliva, blood, and so forth—and things outside the body, such as the visible forms, odors, tastes, and tangible objects belonging to earth, water, fire, and so forth, are not appropriated even when present.

(Question) What is the meaning of “appropriated”?

(Answer) Something is appropriated when mind and mental factors uphold (upagṛhīta) and take possession of it (svikṛta) as their basis (adhiṣṭhāna). The material faculties—that is, the material dharmas constituting the five faculties of the eye and so forth—and the matter inseparable from these material faculties are taken possession of and received by mind and mental factors, because whether they are benefited or harmed, there is a reciprocal effect between mind and mental factors and these kinds of material dharmas. The matter that the Abhidharma calls “appropriated” is also called sentient (sacetana, sajīva) in the world, because when the dharmas in contact with it serve as conditions, pleasure, pain, and so forth are experienced. The opposite case is called unappropriated.

(Question) Among the eighteen dhatus, which are great elements, which are derived matter, which are accumulated, and which are not accumulated?

[The tangible-object dhatu is of both kinds;

The other nine are derived matter.

Part of the Dharma dhatu is likewise.

The ten material dhatus can be accumulated.]

Treatise: The tangible-object dhatu is of both kinds: great elements and derived matter. The great elements are the four qualities of hardness, moisture, and so forth. Derived matter comprises the seven qualities of smoothness, roughness, and so forth.

The nine material dhatus are all derived matter: the five material faculties and the four objects of visible form, sound, and so forth.

Part of the Dharma dhatu, namely non-informative matter, is also derived matter.

The seven mental dhatus and part of the Dharma dhatu, excluding non-informative matter, are neither great elements nor derived matter.

The Venerable Buddhadeva (Bhadanta Buddhadeva) says that all ten material ayatanas—the five faculties and the five objects—are great elements.

This assertion is incorrect. The sutra states that only the four qualities of hardness, moisture, and so forth are great elements. These four great elements are included only within tangible objects. The eye faculty cannot perceive the qualities of hardness, moisture, and so forth, and the body faculty cannot perceive color, sound, and so forth. Therefore, the preceding thesis is unreasonable.

The sutra also says: “Bhikshus, you should know that the eye is a subtle kind of matter formed from the great elements, belonging to the internal ayatanas, invisible but resistant; and so it is through the body ayatana. Bhikshus, you should know that visible forms—colors and shapes (rūpāṇi)—are matter formed from the great elements, belonging to the external ayatanas, visible and resistant. Sound is matter formed from the great elements, belonging to the external ayatanas, invisible but resistant.

The odor ayatana and the taste ayatana are likewise. Tangible objects comprise the four great elements and that which is formed from the four great elements; they belong to the external ayatanas and are invisible but resistant.” Thus, the sutra says only that the tangible-object ayatana includes the four great elements. This shows that the other material ayatanas are not great elements.

(Question) If so, why does the sutra (Saṃyutta, 11, 1) say that whatever within a person is hard and of the nature of hardness, and so forth (kakkhaḷa, kharagata), belongs to that person?

(Answer) Here the sutra means the mass of flesh inseparable from the eye faculty; it does not mean that the mass of flesh is a separate faculty.

(Objection) But the Garbhāvakrānti-sūtra says that a person consists of six dhatus: the great elements of earth, water, fire, and wind, together with space and consciousness. Thus, during the embryonic stage, the body is a great element and not derived matter.

(Answer) It is not so. In saying that “a person consists of six dhatus,” this sutra intends to describe the fundamental substance of a person (mūlasattvadravya), not to give an exhaustive definition. This sutra also says that a person consists of the six bases for the mental dharmas called contact—the contact ayatanas (sparśāyatana)—meaning the six faculties. Moreover, if the preceding statement were taken in its narrow sense, mental factors could not exist, because mental factors do not belong to the consciousness dhatu; the consciousness dhatu is mind alone.

(Objection) But one might hold that mental factors are themselves mind and therefore still belong to the consciousness dhatu.

(Answer) That cannot be so. The sutra says that feeling and perception are mental factors dependent upon mind; this means that the dharmas associated with mind (caitasika) all take mind as their support. The sutra also speaks of kinds of mind accompanied by craving, anger, and so forth. Thus, we know that craving is inherently a mental factor and not mind itself.

Accordingly, the preceding statement that “among the various dhatus, some are great elements and some are derived matter” is entirely reasonable.

Among the eighteen dhatus, the ten material dhatus—the five faculties and five objects—are capable of accumulation because they are aggregates of atoms (paramāṇusaṃcaya). The remaining eight dhatus are therefore incapable of accumulation because they are not aggregates of atoms.

(Question) Among the eighteen dhatus, which can cut, which can be cut, which can burn, which can be burned, which can weigh, and which can be weighed?

[Only the four external dhatus

“Can cut” and “can be cut”;

They likewise “can be burned” and “can weigh.”

As for “can burn” and “can be weighed,” these remain matters of dispute.]

Treatise: Visible form, odor, taste, and tangible objects can cut when designated as an axe and so forth, and can be cut when designated as firewood and so forth.

(Question) What is the dharma called “cutting”?

(Answer) The material aggregates of firewood and so forth continually arise in an uninterrupted, extended series. When they are divided into two sections by a hammer or axe, they continue to arise. This case is called “capable of being cut.” But the material faculties of the body are not said to “be cut,” because they cannot be severed into two parts and continue to arise. The body faculty and so forth cannot become two parts, because once one part has been separated from the body, it certainly contains no faculty. Furthermore, the body faculty and so forth are not said to “cut,” because they are exceedingly subtle, like the radiance of a jewel.

Just as both “capable of being cut” and “that which cuts” pertain to the four external elements, so too is the case with “capable of being burned” and “capable of being weighed.” That is, only the four external elements are said to be “capable of being burned” and “capable of being weighed.” The material faculties of the body and so forth are likewise incapable of being burned or weighed, for they are naturally pure and subtle, like the radiance of a jewel. The body element also cannot be so, because it is not continuous.

Concerning “that which can burn” and “that which is weighed,” there are various disputes. One theory holds that the elements pertaining to “that which can burn” and “that which is weighed” are the same as above, namely, the four external elements. Another theory holds that only the fire element is called “that which can burn,” and only heaviness is called “that which is weighed.”

(Question) Among the eighteen elements, which are born of maturation, which are nourished, which belong to homogeneous outflow, which are substantial (dravya), and which are momentary?

[The five internal elements are born of maturation and are nourished.

The body is not born of maturation.

The eight unobstructed dharmas belong to homogeneous outflow

And are also maturation-born.

The remaining elements are of all three kinds.

As for substantiality, only the Dharma element is substantial.

As for momentariness, only the last three elements are momentary.]

Treatise: The five internal elements—beginning with the eye—are born of maturation (vipākaja) and are nourished (aupacayika). They are not homogeneous outflows, because apart from being maturation-born and nourished, they possess no other distinct nature.

“Born of maturation” means arising from a maturation cause (vipākahetuja). This is like saying “ox cart” to mean “a cart drawn by an ox,” with the intervening words omitted in forming the expression.

Alternatively, karma must undergo transformation from the time it is first performed until it bears fruit and becomes mature; hence it is called maturation. The result born from this transformation is called maturation-born. Because the result obtained is of a kind different from its cause, it is called maturation.

Alternatively, “maturation-born” is a designation of the result provisionally established on the basis of the cause, just as the designation of a cause may be provisionally established on the basis of its result. A sutra (Saṃyutta, ii, 65; iv, 132) says: “The six bases of contact are karma performed in the past.”

“That which is nourished” is augmented by such excellent conditions as food and drink, material necessities, sleep and rest, and meditative concentration.

One theory (Dharmatrāta?) holds that the holy life (brahmacarya) is also capable of nourishing; but in truth, the holy life merely prevents harm and does not bring augmentation.

The continuity of that which is nourished can preserve the continuity of maturation, just as the outer fortifications protect the inner citadel.

Sound is a homogeneous outflow and is nourished, but it is not born of maturation, because it occurs in dependence upon volition.

(Objection) If so, the Prajñāptiśāstra should not say that skillful cultivation of abstention from harsh speech brings about the great person’s Brahmā voice (brahmasvaratā).

(Explanation of the Vibhāṣā) One theory holds that there are three stages: first, karma; second, the great elements born from karma, which are the maturation of that karma; and third, sound, which is born from those great elements.

Another theory holds that sound belongs to the final stage in a sequence of five stages: first, karma; second, the matured great elements; third, the nourished great elements; fourth, the homogeneous-outflow great elements; and fifth, sound.

Thus, sound is not a maturation because it is not born directly from karma.

(Objection) If so, bodily feeling, which is likewise born from the great elements produced by karma, could not be called maturation. And if bodily feeling were the same as sound in this respect, this would contradict the Nyāyānusāra Treatise.

(Explanation) This is not so. Feeling is not stimulated by a desire to experience feeling, whereas sound is stimulated by the desire to speak. Whatever is stimulated by desire cannot be a maturation.

The eight unobstructed elements, namely the seven mind elements and the Dharma element, are both homogeneous outflows and maturations. They are homogeneous outflows when born from a homogeneous cause (sabhāgahetu) or a universal cause (); they are maturations when born from a maturation cause (sarvatragahetu). Unobstructed dharmas are not nourished, because the elements that are not material possess no accumulation (saṃcaya). The remaining elements (śeṣa)—the four objects of visible form, odor, taste, and touch—are of all three kinds: maturation-born, nourished, and homogeneous outflows.

Only one element is “substantial” (dravya): the Dharma element. Because the unconditioned dharmas (asaṃskṛta) are permanent (sāratvāt = avināśāt), they are called “substantial.” Since the unconditioned dharmas are included in the Dharma element, the Dharma element is the sole element that possesses substantiality (dravyavat).

The mind element, the Dharma element, and the mind-consciousness element are called the last three elements, because they are mentioned last among the eighteen elements. Only these three elements are momentary. Among momentary dharmas is that called the receptivity to the knowledge of the Dharma concerning suffering (duḥkhedharmajñānakṣānti)—that is, the initial undefiled moment of the path of seeing the truths.

The above three elements do not arise from a homogeneous cause, because within the continuum constituting a person, no undefiled dharma has previously appeared to serve as the homogeneous cause of the result that is the receptivity to the knowledge of the Dharma concerning suffering. This is why these three elements are called momentary (kṣānti): in that single moment, they do not arise from a cause of that kind.

Among the dharmas mentioned above, the mind associated with this kind of receptivity is the mind element and the mind-consciousness element; and the dharmas that arise together (sahabhū) with this mind constitute the Dharma element, including undefiled discipline, feeling, perception, volition, and the other mental factors; acquisition (prāpti); and the characteristics of arising, abiding, changing, and ceasing (saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas).

The categories of maturation and so forth have now been explained. The next question to be investigated is this: If one acquires possession (samanvāgamaṃ pratilabhate) of the eye element (cakṣurdhātu), which one did not previously possess (asamanvāgata), can one thereby also possess eye-consciousness (cakṣurvijñānadhātu)? And if one acquires possession of eye-consciousness, which one did not previously possess, can one thereby also possess eye-consciousness?

Verse:

[Regarding the two elements, the eye faculty and eye-consciousness,

One may acquire one, both, or neither.]

Treatise: Cases in which one acquires possession only of the eye element and not of eye-consciousness are: ⁽¹⁾ being born in the Desire Realm and gradually acquiring the eye faculty, because before the eye faculty appears, one already possesses past and future eye-consciousness; and ⁽²⁾ dying in the Formless Realm and being born into the second, third, or fourth meditative absorption, because although the eye faculty is present, eye-consciousness does not exist at these levels of meditative absorption.

Cases in which one acquires possession only of eye-consciousness and not of the eye element are: ⁽¹⁾ one born among the gods of the three higher meditative absorptions may manifest (sammukhīkurvāṇa) the type of eye-consciousness belonging to the first meditative absorption, but does not newly acquire possession of the eye faculty already possessed; and ⁽²⁾ one falls away from one of the three higher meditative absorptions and is born in a lower plane.

The case in which one acquires possession of both elements is when one falls away from the Formless Realm and is reborn in the Desire Realm or in the first meditative absorption—the Brahmā world.

The case in which one acquires possession of neither element comprises all cases other than the three cases above.

The word “and so forth” above implies the question: If one possesses the eye element, can one thereby also possess eye-consciousness?

This may be answered by way of four cases: ⁽¹⁾ One who is born in the second, third, or fourth dhyana does not give rise to eye-consciousness; ⁽²⁾ one who is born in the Desire Realm—thus showing that eye-consciousness has been attained, namely, the kind of eye-consciousness acquired in the intermediate existence—but has not yet acquired the eye faculty, or has acquired it but subsequently lost it; ⁽³⁾ one who is born in the Desire Realm, has acquired the eye faculty, and has not lost it; one who is born in the first dhyana, the Brahma world; and one who is born in one of the three higher dhyanas and presently gives rise to the kind of eye-consciousness belonging to the first dhyana: all three of these attain both the faculty and the consciousness;

⁽⁴⁾ those born in the Formless Realm attain neither the eye faculty nor eye-consciousness.

The acquisition and attainment of the eye dhatu and the visible-form dhatu, the eye-consciousness dhatu and the visible-form dhatu, the ear dhatu (śrotradhātu) and the sound dhatu (śabdadhātu), and so forth, should be understood according to the conditions appropriate to each case. In order to encompass the meaning of what has not been explicitly stated, the stanza therefore uses the general term “and so forth.”

(Question) Among the eighteen dhatus, which are internal and which are external?

The stanza answers:

[The twelve dhatus beginning with the eye are internal;

The six dhatus beginning with visible form are external.]

Exposition: The twelve dhatus comprising the six faculties and the six consciousnesses are called internal; the remaining six objects—visible form, sound, and so forth—are external. That which is the basis of the self (ātman) is internal; whatever else pertains to the self is external.

(Question) Since the self is fundamentally nonexistent, how can it be said that one dhatu is internal and another external?

(Answer) Because the mind is habitually grasped as the self, the mind is provisionally designated as the self. As a sutra (Udānavarga, xxiii; Madhyamakavṛtti, p. 354; Dhammapada, 160) says: “By well subduing the self, the wise are born among the gods.” The Blessed One also spoke repeatedly of subduing the mind: “One should thoroughly subdue the mind. A subdued mind brings happiness.” Thus, with reference to the mind, the designation “self” is provisionally established.

The faculties and consciousnesses are very close (prātyasanna, abhyāsanna) to the mind; therefore, once the mind has been called the self, and because they are also the bases (āśraya) of the mind, they are said to be internal (ādhyātmika). Visible form and the other objects of consciousness, being remote from the mind, are called external (bāhya).

(Question) If so, the six consciousnesses should not be called internal, because they can serve as the basis of mind only after they have ceased, at which time they acquire the characteristics of the mental dhatu or mental faculty.

(Answer) When the consciousnesses cease and become the basis—the mental dhatu—of mind, it is precisely these consciousnesses themselves, and no other dharma, that serve as its basis. Thus, even before they become the basis, these consciousnesses are not alien to the characteristics of a basis. Therefore, the consciousnesses are still called internal on account of their future character as bases.

Were this not so, the mental dhatu would exist only in the past, while the six consciousnesses would exist only in the present and future. This would contradict the tenet of our own school, which accepts that all eighteen dhatus extend throughout the three times. Moreover, if present and future consciousnesses did not possess the characteristics of the mental dhatu, then the past mental dhatu should likewise not be established, because a dharma cannot change its characteristics throughout the three times.

(Question) Among the eighteen dhatus, which are homogeneous and analogous to the homogeneous?

The stanza answers:

[The Dharma dhatu is homogeneous; the other dharmas are of both kinds,

According to whether they perform or do not perform their respective functions.]

Exposition: Only the Dharma dhatu is called homogeneous (sabhāga). If a particular object serves as the object (viṣaya) of a consciousness, and that consciousness has arisen, is arising, or will arise in relation to that object, then this object is called homogeneous. There is no dharma in relation to which an infinite mental consciousness (ananta manovijñāna) has not arisen, is not arising, or will not arise.

This is because the noble ones are certain to give rise to a mind that contemplates all dharmas as being without self, and this mind takes all dharmas—except itself and the dharmas arising together with it (sahabhū)—as its objects. This mind and the dharmas arising simultaneously with it, however, become the objects of another mind in the immediately following moment, the second thought-moment. The mind of the following moment takes all dharmas as its objects, without omitting any kind of dharma whatsoever.

Thus, all dharmas are included among the objects of these two moments of mind, and for this reason the Dharma dhatu is said always to be homogeneous.

The remaining seventeen dhatus are of both kinds: homogeneous and analogous to the homogeneous (tatsabhāga).

(Question) Why are they called homogeneous and analogous to the homogeneous?

(Answer) They are called homogeneous when they perform their respective functions, and analogous to the homogeneous when they do not perform their respective functions. That is, if the eye dhatu has seen visible forms (rūpāṇi), is seeing visible forms, or will see visible forms, it is called homogeneous. The same applies to the other dhatus up to and including the mental dhatu: each has its own object (viṣaya) and its own function (kāritra, puruṣakāra), and is therefore called homogeneous.

The Vaibhāṣika masters of Kashmir (Kaśmir) say that the eye dhatu is analogous to the homogeneous in only four cases: ⁽¹⁾ the eye dhatu has ceased and therefore does not see visible form; ⁽²⁾ the eye dhatu is ceasing and therefore does not see visible form; ⁽³⁾ the eye dhatu will cease and therefore does not see visible form; ⁽⁴⁾ the eye dhatu is of a nature not to arise (anutpattidharma) and therefore does not see visible form.

According to the Western masters of India, the kind of eye dhatu that does not arise is of two kinds: ⁽¹⁾ that accompanied by eye-consciousness, and ⁽²⁾ that not accompanied by consciousness. The same applies to the ear, nose, tongue, and body dhatus. The mental dhatu is analogous to the homogeneous only when it does not arise, because when it arises, the mental dhatu always has an object.

If the visible-form dhatu has been seen, is being seen, or will be seen by the eye, it is called homogeneous. If it is not seen because eye-consciousness has ceased, is ceasing, will cease, or does not arise, the visible-form dhatu is called analogous to the homogeneous. The same therefore applies to the sound, odor, taste, and tangible dhatus; that is, each of these objects has its own function in relation to its corresponding faculty.

It should be understood that, with regard to the two categories of the homogeneous and that which is analogous to the homogeneous, if the eye dhatu is homogeneous for one person, it is also homogeneous for all other persons; and if it is analogous to the homogeneous for one person, it is likewise analogous to the homogeneous for all other persons. The same applies to the ear, nose, tongue, body, and mental dhatus.

The visible-form dhatu, however, is different. For a person who sees it, it is homogeneous; but for one who does not see it, it is analogous to the homogeneous. This is because the visible-form dhatu has the distinctive characteristic that if one person sees it, many others may also see it, as in the case of the moon, a dance, a contest, and so forth; the eye dhatu, however, is different.

There is no case in which two persons see through the same eye faculty. Thus, the eye dhatu is not shared and must depend upon the person seeing for its character as homogeneous or analogous to the homogeneous. By contrast, the visible-form dhatu is shared and may be called homogeneous or analogous to the homogeneous according to the person seeing it.

It is homogeneous for those who see it and analogous to the homogeneous for those who do not see it. The same applies to the sound, odor, taste, and tangible dhatus.

(Objection) With regard to the sound-dhatu, it can be said to be like the form-dhatu; but with regard to the three dhatus of odor, taste, and tangible objects, cognition occurs only when they reach the faculty, and when they are cognized by one person, they cannot be cognized by another. Since they do not have a common character, these three dhatus can only be classified with the eye-dhatu, and so forth, and should not be regarded as being like form, and so forth.

(Explanation) This statement is also reasonable; nevertheless, these three dhatus still have a common character, because they can give rise to inferential cognition in this person as well as in others, whereas the eye-dhatu cannot do so. Therefore, they are still classified with form and sound.

As for the six consciousnesses, they may be corresponding portions or counterparts of corresponding portions according to whether they arise or do not arise, just as in the case of the mind-dhatu.

(Question) Why are they called “corresponding portions” and “counterparts of corresponding portions”?

(Answer) Portion (bhāga) means the reciprocal functioning among faculty, object, and consciousness: the faculty is the support (āśraya) of consciousness, the object is the object-field (viṣaya) of consciousness, and consciousness relies upon the faculty—that which is supported (āśrayin). It may also mean that each possesses (bhajana) its own function or activity (kāritra): the function of the faculty is seeing, and so forth; the function of the object is to serve as the object-field of consciousness; and the function of consciousness is cognition.

Or it may mean that they participate together in contact (sparśa), namely, the contact among the eye, form, and eye-consciousness. Thus, these dharmas are called corresponding portions because they possess (sa-) this kind of portion (bhāga); that is, faculty, object, and consciousness each have their own function, act reciprocally upon one another, and come into contact with one another.

Dharmas that are not corresponding portions but are nevertheless of the same kind as corresponding portions are called counterparts of corresponding portions (tatsabhāga), that is, “of the same kind (sabhāga) as that dharma (tat),” or “of the same kind as a corresponding portion” (sabhāgasabhāga).

(Question) Among the eighteen dhatus, which belong to abandonment through seeing—that is, are abandoned through seeing the truths, also called the path of seeing (darśanamārga) or seeing (darśana)? Which belong to abandonment through cultivation—that is, are abandoned through meditation or continuous contemplation (bhāvana) of the truths, the Four Noble Truths, also called the path of cultivation (bhāvanamārga) or cultivation (bhāvana)? Which are not abandoned or cannot be abandoned?

The stanza answers:

[Fifteen dhatus are abandoned through cultivation;

The final three belong to all three categories.

Being undefiled, not produced by the sixth consciousness,

And being form, they are not abandoned through seeing.]

Treatise: Fifteen dhatus belong to abandonment through cultivation: the ten material dhatus and the five consciousness-dhatus.

The final three dhatus—mind, dharmas, and mind-consciousness—each comprise all three categories:

⁽¹⁾ Those belonging to abandonment through seeing are the eighty-eight latent tendencies (anuśaya), the co-arisen dharmas (sahabhū), including associated and dissociated dharmas, the acquisitions (prāpti) of the aforementioned latent tendencies and co-arisen dharmas, and the dharmas that accompany (anuprāpti) the aforementioned acquisitions.

⁽²⁾ Those belonging to abandonment through cultivation are the other contaminated dharmas, comprising (a) the ten latent tendencies and their co-arisen dharmas and acquisitions; (b) contaminated wholesome formations (kuśalasāsrava) and non-obscuring indeterminate formations (); and (c) non-informative form together with its accompanying dharmas.

⁽³⁾ Those belonging to neither abandonment through seeing nor abandonment through cultivation are the uncontaminated dharmas, comprising the unconditioned dharmas and the dharmas belonging to the path.

(Objection of the Sautrāntikas) There are still two dharmas that belong to abandonment through seeing: the nature of an ordinary being (Pṛthagjana) and bodily and verbal karma that brings about rebirth in an unfortunate destiny. The nature of an ordinary being is a non-obscuring indeterminate dharma, while bodily and verbal karma are form, yet they are classified as belonging to abandonment through cultivation. Moreover, the nature of an ordinary being and the karmas that bring about rebirth in unfortunate destinies are both opposed to the path of seeing (darśanamārga); therefore, according to us, they must belong to abandonment through seeing.

(Explanation of the author of the treatise) Although they have such characteristics, they do not belong to abandonment through seeing, because they are undefiled and are not the kind of form produced by the sixth consciousness. The nature of an ordinary being is indeterminate and undefiled, and it can still be found in those who have become free from desire and in those whose roots of goodness have been severed. If the nature of an ordinary being belonged to abandonment through seeing, it ought to be found at the stage of receptivity to the Dharma with regard to suffering—that is, at the first stage of the path of seeing.

Here, “produced by the sixth” means arising from the mind-ayatana; if it does not arise from the mind-ayatana, it is called “not produced by the sixth,” implying that it arises only from the five faculties, the eye, and so forth. “Form” refers to all bodily and verbal karma. From the foregoing characteristics down to this category of form, none belongs to abandonment through seeing, because none arises from delusion concerning the principles of the Four Noble Truths.

(Question) Among the eighteen dhatus, which are views (dṛṣṭi), and which are not views?

The stanza answers:

[The eye-dhatu and one part of the dharma-dhatu,

Comprising eight kinds, are called views.

Wisdom co-arising with the five groups of consciousness

Is not a view, because it does not ascertain.

It is the eye faculty itself that sees corresponding forms,

Not the eye-consciousness supported by it,

Because, according to tradition, eye-consciousness cannot see

Forms that are obstructed.]

Treatise: The entire eye-dhatu and eight parts of the dharma-dhatu belong to views. All the remaining dharmas are not views.

(Question) What are the eight parts of the dharma-dhatu?

(Answer) They are the five kinds of defiled views, such as the view of a real self in the body (satkāyadṛṣṭi), and so forth; mundane right view (laukikī samyagdṛṣṭi); the right view of one in training (śaikṣī dṛṣṭi); and the right view of one beyond training (aśaikṣī dṛṣṭi). These eight dharmas, which form part of the dharma-dhatu, all belong to views. All the remaining dharmas belong to what are not views.

The five kinds of views will be discussed in the section on latent tendencies. Mundane right view is the wholesome contaminated wisdom associated with mind-consciousness. The right view of one in training is the uncontaminated view belonging to noble ones who are not arhats. The right view of one beyond training is the uncontaminated view belonging to arhats. Just as things seen by day or by night, under cloudy or cloudless skies, differ in brightness and darkness, so the dharmas seen by mundane views, whether defiled or undefiled, by the views of those in training, or by the views of those beyond training, likewise differ in clarity and obscurity.

(Question) Why is mundane right view only the wisdom associated with mind-consciousness?

(Answer) Because the wisdom co-arising with the five groups of consciousness lacks the capacity to ascertain. Only that which deliberates before ascertaining is called a view. The wisdom co-arising with the first five consciousnesses lacks this capacity and cannot analyze or discriminate; therefore, it is not a view. On this basis, one can understand the instances in which defiled or undefiled wisdom and other dharmas are not views.

(Question) If this is so, since the eye faculty lacks the capacity to ascertain, why is it called a view?

(Answer) Because it has the capacity to clearly behold forms, it is still called a view.

(Objection of the masters who maintain that consciousness sees [Vijñānavādin]) If the eye faculty can see, then the other faculties, when consciousness is functioning, should also be able to see.

(Explanation) Not every kind of eye faculty is capable of seeing.

(Objection) If so, what kind of eye faculty sees?

(Explanation) The eye faculty that is a corresponding member has the capacity to see only when conjoined with consciousness.

(Objection) If so, the seeing belongs to the dependent consciousness, not to the eye faculty upon which it depends.

(Explanation) It is not so. Eye consciousness certainly cannot see.

(Question) Why is this?

(Answer) According to the Vibhāṣā (Tradition), eye consciousness cannot observe obstructed forms. It can be clearly recognized that eye consciousness cannot possibly see forms concealed behind a wall. If it were maintained that eye consciousness sees, then, since eye consciousness is non-resistant, it ought in this case to see the forms situated behind the wall.

(Explanation according to the doctrine that consciousness sees) In this case, eye consciousness cannot arise in relation to obstructed forms. If it does not arise, how could it see them?

(Presentation by the Vibhāṣā) Why can eye consciousness not arise in relation to these forms?

If it is admitted that seeing is performed by the eye faculty, then, since the eye faculty is resistant, it lacks the capacity to see obstructed forms. Meanwhile, consciousness and the faculty upon which it depends operate together toward a single object; thus it can be clearly understood that eye consciousness likewise does not arise in relation to the forms mentioned above. If you admit that seeing is performed by eye consciousness, then why does eye consciousness not arise?

(The treatise master’s reply based on the doctrine that consciousness sees) Do you hold that the eye faculty sees its object by coming into contact with it, just as the body faculty experiences tangibles? If you accept this, then, since the eye faculty is resistant, it indeed cannot see obstructed forms. Yet you maintain that the eye faculty can see from a distance, and thus you have no right to say that, because it is resistant, the eye faculty cannot see obstructed forms.

Moreover, people can see forms obstructed by crystal, clouds, glass, and water. How will you explain these cases? Therefore, we say that it is eye consciousness itself that sees; eye consciousness arises in relation to obstructed forms when there are no objects blocking the light.

In the opposite case, eye consciousness does not arise. (Vibhāśā)

(The Vibhāṣā cites scripture to raise an objection) The scripture (Saṃyutta, 13, 4; Vibhanga, in 137; Dhammasangaṇi, 597) says: “Forms are seen by means of the eye faculty.” Thus it is the faculty itself that sees, not eye consciousness.

(Explanation) The scripture speaks in this way with the meaning that forms can be seen through the eye faculty as the basis (tenaāśrayeṇa), by relying (āśritya) upon the eye faculty. Indeed, the scripture says: “Dharmas are discerned () by means of the mental faculty.” Yet since the mental faculty belongs to the past, how could it have the capacity to discern? Therefore, only mental consciousness (manovijñāna) can discern.

Thus, when the scripture says “by means of the mental faculty,” it means “by relying upon the mental faculty, because the mental faculty is the basis of mental consciousness.” Alternatively, it may be understood that the scripture speaks of the activity of the dependent consciousness in terms of its basis, the faculty. Similarly, people in the world commonly say, “A voice is heard on the bed or on the chair,” thereby referring to the people who are on the bed or the chair.

This manner of speaking is also frequently found in the scriptures: “Agreeable and disagreeable forms are discerned (vijñeya) by the eye faculty.” Therefore, one should not maintain that the eye faculty discerns.

The scripture (Saṃyutta, 9, 20) also says: “Brahmin (Braḥmano), the eye faculty is the door (drāva) for seeing (darśanāya) forms.” This proves that eye consciousness sees through the door of the eye faculty. One should not maintain that “the door” denotes seeing, because it would be utterly unreasonable to say that “the eye faculty is the seeing of the seeing of forms.”

(Objection of the Vibhāṣā) If eye consciousness sees (paśyati), then what discerns (vijñāti)?

(Explanation) What difference is there between the two activities of seeing and discerning, such that one would say that a single dharma cannot both see and discern at the same time? Has not a kind of wisdom (prajñā) been admitted that both sees and comprehends (prajānāti)? In the same way, a kind of consciousness such as eye consciousness can both see and discern. Here there is only one single activity, but it is described by two different words.

(Objection of another doctrine that consciousness sees [Vātsīputriyas]) If the eye faculty sees, then the eye faculty is the agent of this act of seeing; to what dharma, then, does this action belong?

(Reply of the doctrine that the eye sees) The above objection is unreasonable. Just as you hold that eye consciousness itself discerns and admit no difference whatsoever between the agent that discerns and the act of discerning, so do we. We hold that the eye faculty itself sees, without needing to offer any explanation of a difference between the agent that sees and the act of seeing.

Another school (Dharmaguptas) says: It is eye consciousness itself that sees, but because the eye faculty is the basis of this consciousness, people commonly say that the eye faculty sees. This is like saying “the bell rings” merely because the bell is the basis of the sound.

(Objection of the doctrine that the eye sees) If so, one would also have to say that the eye faculty discerns, because the eye faculty is precisely the basis of eye consciousness.

(Explanation) It is not so. The world universally recognizes seeing (darśana) as belonging to eye consciousness, because when eye consciousness arises, everyone says that a form is seen, not that a form is discerned (vijñāta). The Vibhāṣā (Vibhāṣā) also says that when something is reached by the eye faculty and cognized by eye consciousness, it is said to have been seen.

Therefore, it is said only that the eye faculty sees—because the eye faculty is the basis of the eye consciousness that sees—and not that the eye faculty discerns, because the function of cognition is the function of seeing, not of discerning. Furthermore, when speaking of the discernment performed by a consciousness, one does not mean that consciousness has the capacity to discern because it is the basis of discernment—as in the case where the eye faculty sees because it is the basis of eye consciousness—but one truly means that consciousness itself discerns, that consciousness in itself is discernment.

This is like saying that the sun makes the day.

The masters of the Sautrāntika school hold that all the foregoing disputes are mere conceptual proliferation. The scripture teaches that because conditions such as the eye faculty, form, and so forth are present, eye consciousness arises. In this there is no faculty that sees, no form that is seen, no act of seeing, and no agent that sees; there is only the play of cause and effect. Merely in conformity with worldly convention, it is provisionally said that “the eye sees and consciousness discerns,” but the wise should not cling to this. As the Blessed One said: “Do not cling to the terminology of particular regions; nor should you insist upon the names and designations of the world.” (Madhyama 43, 18; Saṃyukta, 13, 12)

According to the doctrine of the Vaibhāṣikas of Kashmir, the eye faculty sees, the ear faculty hears, the nose faculty smells, the tongue faculty tastes, the body faculty touches, and the mental faculty discriminates.

(Question) Is form seen by one eye or by both eyes?

(Answer) This is not fixed.

[Or both eyes at the same time,

Because forms can be seen clearly.]

Exposition: The Abhidharma masters (Ābhidhārmikas) say: “Sometimes both eyes see, because when both eyes are open, one sees more clearly.” Moreover, if one eye is open while the other is half-closed, two moons will be seen. But this condition does not occur if one eye is shut or half-closed; therefore, it is known that sometimes both eyes see together. Although there are two supports—the two eye faculties—consciousness is not thereby divided into two, because consciousness is not obstructive matter (rūpa), is not spatially accumulated (amūrta), and does not abide in any particular place (deśāpratiṣṭhita).

(Question) If this school holds that the eye faculty, ear faculty, nose faculty, tongue faculty, body faculty, and mental faculty can all apprehend their objects, then when a faculty apprehends (prāp) an object, does that faculty reach the object or not?

The verse answers:

[The eye faculty, ear faculty, and mental faculty do not reach their objects.

The remaining three faculties are otherwise.]

Exposition: The three faculties of eye, ear, and mind do not reach their objects. The eye faculty can see forms at a distance but cannot see ointment applied to the eye; the ear faculty can likewise hear sounds at a distance; and because the mental faculty is not a material dharma, it cannot reach its object.

If the eye and ear faculties reached their objects, practitioners of meditative concentration (dhyāyins) would be unable to cultivate the divine eye and divine ear, nor could there be a nose faculty belonging to the heavenly realm.

(Objection of the Vaiśeṣikas [Vaiśrṣikas]) If the eye faculty can see an object without reaching it, why can it not see forms at any distance or forms that are obstructed?

(Explanation) Why does a magnet, though capable of attracting iron, not attract every object made of iron? If one maintains that seeing an object requires reaching it, the same objection applies. Moreover, even if it is supposed that the faculty reaches its object, the foregoing difficulty still remains: Why does the eye faculty not see ointment applied to the eye, although it sees every object that it reaches? Likewise, the nose faculty and so forth can apprehend an odor that reaches them but cannot apprehend every odor present together with them. The eye faculty is the same: it can see only certain objects at a distance, not every distant object.

One theory (Sāṃmitīya, Vibhāṣā) holds that, because sounds arising within the ear can be heard, it is known that the ear faculty can hear sounds that reach it as well as sounds at a distance.

The other three material faculties—the nose, tongue, and body—can apprehend objects that they reach.

(Question) How is it known that the nose faculty apprehends only odors that reach it?

(Answer) Because if one holds one’s breath, one cannot smell an odor.

(Question) What is meant by “reaching” (prāp)?

(Answer) “Reaching” means arising without an interval.

(Question) Do atoms come into contact with one another?

(Answer) According to the Vaibhāṣika masters of Kashmir, atoms do not come into contact with one another. If they did, things (dravya) composed of distinct atoms would become intermingled. If they touched only at a particular point, atoms would consequently have parts, whereas atoms are partless.

(Question) If they do not come into contact, how can sound be produced?

(Answer) It is because atoms arise without an interval. If atoms came into contact, then when hand struck hand and stone struck stone, their substances would merge into one another, and no sound would be produced.

(Question) If atoms do not come into contact, why do aggregates of matter (saṃcita) not disintegrate when they collide with one another (pratyāhata)?

(Answer) Because the wind element (vāyudhātu) sustains them and prevents them from disintegrating. One kind of wind element causes dispersal, as during the period when the world is destroyed—the eon of dissolution; another kind causes aggregation, as during the period when the world is formed—the eon of formation.

(Objection of the Vaibhāṣikas) If it is said that the three faculties reach their objects because the objects arise without an interval in relation to the faculties, then what does “without an interval” (nirantaratva) mean?

(Answer) It means that nothing intervenes between them. Furthermore, aggregates of matter (saṃghāta), because they have parts, can indeed come into contact with one another. The Vibhāṣā itself acknowledges this when it says: “Do things in contact (spṛṣṭa) arise from a cause that is in contact (spṛṣṭahetuka), or from a cause that is not in contact?

The same question may be asked concerning things not in contact. No categorical answer can be given concerning this matter. Sometimes a thing in contact serves as the cause for the arising of a thing not in contact, as when something presently joined in contact becomes dispersed.

Sometimes a thing not in contact serves as the cause for the arising of a thing in contact, as when something presently dispersed and not in contact comes together. Sometimes a thing in contact serves as the cause for the arising of another thing in contact, as when aggregates of matter remain joined together. Sometimes a thing in contact serves as the cause for the arising of another thing not in contact, as in the case of dust motes floating in the open space of a window frame.” (Vibhāṣā, 73, 16)

The Venerable Vasumitra (Bhadanta Vasumitra) says: “If atoms could come into contact with one another, they would have to endure for two moments”—that is, they would arise in the first moment and make contact in the second.

(Presentation of the author of the treatise) ⁽¹⁾ The Bhadanta (Dharmatrāta, ?) says that in reality no atoms come into contact with one another; but because they occupy distinct positions without any interval between them, they are conventionally said to be in contact.

(Vibhāṣā, 132, 1) The foregoing statement is entirely reasonable. For if it were otherwise, there would have to be empty space between the atoms; and what, occupying that empty space, would obstruct the movement of those atoms so that they could be said to possess resistance? Therefore, it must be admitted that all atoms are without mutual obstruction (sapratigha). ⁽²⁾ Aggregates of matter are nothing other than atoms.

When these atoms are conjoined, they themselves constitute what is in contact, just as they themselves constitute form—that which is subject to alteration and obstruction (rūpa). It is therefore wholly unreasonable to deny that atoms come into contact while admitting that aggregates of matter come into contact. ⁽³⁾ If it is admitted that atoms possess directional parts (digbhāgabheda), then atoms must certainly have directional parts whether or not they come into contact.

If this is not admitted, we see no reason why atoms should have directional parts even if they do come into contact.

(Question) Do the eye faculty and the other faculties apprehend only an object of the same size as themselves—because they move extremely rapidly, as when seeing a mountain, a circle of fire, and so forth—or can they apprehend an object of either the same or a different size?

The verse answers:

[The nose and the other faculties

Apprehend only objects of the same size.]

Treatise: Three kinds of faculties—the olfactory, gustatory, and bodily faculties—engage objects only when the objects are of corresponding size.

The number of atoms in the object corresponds to the number of atoms in the faculty in order for consciousness to arise. This is the case with the olfactory, gustatory, and bodily faculties, but the visual and auditory faculties are different. Sometimes the object is smaller than the faculty, as when one sees the tip of a hair; sometimes the object is larger than the faculty, as when, immediately upon opening one’s eyes, one sees a great mountain; and sometimes the object is equal in size to the faculty, as when one sees a grape. The same applies to the auditory faculty, as when one hears the buzzing of a mosquito or the crashing of thunder. Since the mental faculty is not material, no distinction in size can be made regarding it.

(Question) How are the atoms arranged in the visual faculty and the other faculties?

(Answer) The atoms of the visual faculty are arranged upon the surface of the pupil, whose surface resembles a flower of the śirīṣa tree. They are covered by a thin, transparent membrane that prevents the atoms from dispersing. According to another theory, the atoms are layered one upon another like a pill, transparent as crystal and presenting no obstruction to one another.

The atoms of the auditory faculty lie within the ear canal, coiled like a birch leaf.

The atoms of the olfactory faculty lie within the nostrils.

These first three faculties form shapes resembling garlands.

The atoms of the gustatory faculty lie upon the upper surface of the tongue in the shape of a crescent. According to tradition (kila), in the center of the tongue there is a space the size of the tip of a hair, within which there are no atoms of the gustatory faculty.

The atoms of the bodily faculty have the same shape and dimensions as the body.

The atoms of the female faculty are shaped like a drum.

The atoms of the male faculty resemble a thumb.

The atoms of the visual faculty are sometimes all participating, sometimes all nonparticipating, and sometimes partly participating and partly nonparticipating. The same applies to the atoms of the auditory, olfactory, and gustatory faculties. As for the bodily faculty, its atoms are never all participating. Even when one is being burned by fire in the Pratāpana hell, innumerable atoms remain nonparticipating; for, according to tradition, the body would disintegrate if all the atoms of the bodily faculty were active at the same time.

There is no case in which consciousness is produced by a single atom of a faculty or a single atom of an object. Only aggregates of matter (saṃcita), serving as objects, can produce the five sensory consciousnesses. For this reason, the atom is called invisible (anidarśana), because an atom cannot be seen.

(Question) The first five consciousnesses apprehend only present objects, whereas the sixth consciousness can apprehend objects of the three times—past, present, and future. Is the same true of the bases of these six consciousnesses?

The stanza answers:

[The basis of the last consciousness is only past.

The bases of the first five may be simultaneous.]

Treatise: The sole basis of mental consciousness is the mental faculty (manodhātu), namely, the consciousness that has just ceased. The bases of the first five consciousnesses may be simultaneous—that is, they may either precede the consciousness or be simultaneous with it. Indeed, the bases of these consciousnesses are of two kinds: ⁽¹⁾ the faculties belonging to the body, namely the visual faculty and so forth, which are simultaneous with consciousness; and ⁽²⁾ the mental faculty, which has become past when consciousness arises. Therefore, each of the first five consciousnesses has two bases.

(Question) Can the basis of visual consciousness simultaneously serve as the “immediately antecedent condition of the same continuum” (samanantarapratyaya) for visual consciousness?

(Answer) There are four cases: ⁽¹⁾ the visual faculty serves only as a basis; ⁽²⁾ the mental factors, such as feeling and so forth, that have just ceased serve only as the immediately antecedent condition; ⁽³⁾ the consciousness that has just ceased, also called the mental faculty, serves both as the basis and as the immediately antecedent condition; and ⁽⁴⁾ other dharmas serve neither as the basis nor as the immediately antecedent condition.

The same applies to auditory, olfactory, gustatory, and bodily consciousness.

With regard to mental consciousness, the answer should accord with the first part of the preceding question: the basis of mental consciousness always serves as the immediately antecedent condition for that consciousness. The converse, however, is not true, because in some cases the immediately antecedent condition of mental consciousness does not serve as its basis, as with the mental factors that have just ceased.

(Question) When visual consciousness arises, it depends upon both the visual faculty and its object. Why, then, is only the visual faculty called the basis of consciousness, and not the object?

The stanza answers:

[Consciousness changes according to changes in the faculty;

Therefore, the visual faculty and the others are called its bases.]

Treatise: “The visual faculty and the others” refers to the six elements—the visual, auditory, and so forth. The basis of consciousness is precisely the faculty, because consciousness changes according to changes in the faculty. According to whether the faculty is strengthened or impaired, consciousness becomes clear or obscure; whereas changes in visible form, sound, and so forth do not cause consciousness itself to change. Therefore, the faculty, and not the object, is the basis of consciousness.

(Question) Since the object is what consciousness cognizes, why is consciousness named after the faculty—as visual consciousness, auditory consciousness, and so forth—instead of being called visible-form consciousness, sound consciousness, and so forth?

The stanza answers:

[Because it serves as the basis and is exclusive,

Consciousness is therefore designated according to the faculty.]

Treatise: “It” refers to the bases—the visual faculty and so forth—mentioned above. Since the faculty is the basis, consciousness is designated according to the faculty. “And is exclusive” means that the visual faculty serves as the basis only for visual consciousness, whereas visible form is common, because it is also the common object of another person’s visual consciousness and is apprehended by one’s own mental consciousness as well as by that of others. The same applies to the auditory faculty and sound, down through the bodily faculty and tangible objects.

Thus, consciousness is named according to the faculty rather than the object because the faculty is its basis and is exclusive, just as people ordinarily speak of “the sound of a drum,” not “the sound of a drumstick,” or “a rice sprout,” not “a field sprout,” and so forth.

(Question) When a sentient being abides on a particular plane (bhūmi) of existence, such as the desire realm, the first dhyāna, and so forth, and sees visible form with the eye, do the body, the visual faculty, the visible form, and that consciousness all belong to the same plane?

(Answer) Sometimes they belong to the same plane, and sometimes they do not. For example, when one is born in the desire realm and sees a visible form of the desire realm by means of a visual faculty belonging to the desire realm, the body, visual faculty, visible form, and consciousness all belong to the desire realm. If one sees a visible form of the desire realm by means of a visual faculty belonging to the first dhyāna, the body and visible form belong to the desire realm, while the faculty and consciousness belong to the first dhyāna.

If one sees a visible form belonging to the first dhyāna by means of a faculty belonging to the first dhyāna, only the body belongs to the desire realm, while the faculty, visible form, and consciousness all belong to the first dhyāna. If one sees a visible form of the desire realm by means of a visual faculty belonging to the second dhyāna, the body and visible form both belong to the desire realm, the faculty belongs to the second dhyāna, and the consciousness belongs to the first dhyāna.

If one sees a visible form of the second dhyāna by means of a visual faculty belonging to the second dhyāna, the body belongs to the desire realm, the faculty and visible form belong to the second dhyāna, and the consciousness belongs to the first dhyāna. The same applies when one whose body is born in the desire realm sees visible form of the third or fourth dhyāna, or of a lower dhyāna plane, by means of a visual faculty belonging to the third or fourth dhyāna.

In the case of one born in the first dhyana who sees forms of the first dhyana by means of an eye faculty that also belongs to the first dhyana, the body, faculty, form, and consciousness all belong to the first dhyana. If one sees forms belonging to a lower plane by means of an eye faculty belonging to the first dhyana, the body, faculty, and consciousness all belong to the first dhyana. If one sees forms of the first dhyana by means of an eye faculty belonging to the second dhyana, the body, form, and consciousness all belong to the first dhyana, while the faculty belongs to the second dhyana.

If one sees forms of the desire realm by means of an eye faculty belonging to the second dhyana, the body and consciousness belong to the first dhyana, but the forms belong to a lower plane and the faculty belongs to the second dhyana. If one sees forms of the second dhyana by means of an eye faculty that also belongs to the second dhyana, the body and consciousness belong to the first dhyana, while the faculty and forms belong to the second dhyana.

The same applies when one whose body is born in the first dhyana sees forms belonging to the third or fourth dhyana, or to a lower plane, by means of an eye faculty belonging to the third or fourth dhyana.

The same also applies when the body is born in the second, third, or fourth dhyana and sees forms on its own plane or on another plane by means of an eye faculty belonging to its own plane or another plane. These cases are analyzed according to the following rules:

Verse:

[The eye faculty is not lower than the body;

Form and consciousness are not higher than the eye.

In relation to consciousness, form may be equal, higher, or lower.

Both are likewise so in relation to the body.

The ear dhatu is like the eye dhatu.

The next three dhatus belong only to their own plane;

Body-consciousness belongs to its own plane or a lower plane.

The mind is not fixed.)

Commentary:

⁽¹⁾ The body, eye faculty, and forms may belong to any of the five planes, namely, the desire realm and the four dhyanas.

⁽²⁾ The eye faculty is not on a plane lower than the body; form is not higher than the faculty; consciousness is likewise not higher than the faculty. Form in relation to consciousness, and both form and consciousness in relation to the body, may be of all three kinds.

⁽³⁾ Eye-consciousness belongs to only two planes: the desire realm and the first dhyana.

⁽⁴⁾ From this it is known that a person’s eye faculty may be on the same plane as that person’s body—that is, the plane on which that person abides—or may belong to a higher plane, but never to a lower plane.

⁽⁵⁾ Form and consciousness, in relation to the faculty, belong either to the same plane or to a lower plane, but never to a higher plane; for a form on a higher plane is never seen by an eye faculty belonging to a lower plane, and an eye-consciousness belonging to a higher plane cannot arise from a faculty belonging to a lower plane.

⁽⁶⁾ Form, in relation to eye-consciousness, may be on the same plane, a higher plane, or a lower plane.

⁽⁷⁾ Form and eye-consciousness, in relation to the body, are likewise the same as form in relation to consciousness; that is, they may be on the same plane, a higher plane, or a lower plane.

The same applies to the ear faculty. The ear faculty is not lower than the body; sound is not higher than the ear faculty; the same is true of ear-consciousness. Sound in relation to consciousness, and both sound and consciousness in relation to the body, may be of all three kinds.

The three faculties of nose, tongue, and body depend entirely on their respective planes. These three faculties, together with the body, their objects, and their consciousnesses, belong only to their own plane—that is, to the plane into which the body has been born.

Body-consciousness may belong to its own plane or to a lower plane. The body, the body faculty, and tangible objects always belong to the same plane into which the body has been born. Body-consciousness, however, may belong to its own plane when one is born in the desire realm or the first dhyana; or it may belong to a lower plane, namely the first dhyana, when one is born in the second dhyana or above.

As for the mind faculty, it is not fixed. Sometimes the mind faculty is on the same plane as the body, the dharmas, and mind-consciousness; at other times, the mind faculty belongs to a higher or lower plane. The body belongs only to the first five planes—the desire realm and the four dhyanas—but the mind faculty, the dharma-dhatu, and mind-consciousness, in such cases as entering meditative attainment (samāpatti) or taking rebirth (pratisaṃdhi), do not belong to any fixed plane: depending on the particular case, they may be on the same plane or on another plane.

This matter will be discussed in the eighth chapter, concerning meditative concentration. It is therefore not discussed here, so as to avoid prolixity. Since it will later have to be presented in full detail, there is no need to expend effort here to little benefit.

(Question) Among the eighteen dhatus and six consciousnesses, which dhatus are discerned by consciousness, which are permanent, which are impermanent, which are faculties, and which are not faculties?

The verse answers:

[The five external dhatus are discerned by two consciousnesses.

The unconditioned within the dharma-dhatu is permanent.

A part of the dharma-dhatu is a faculty,

And the twelve internal dhatus are likewise faculties.]

Commentary: Form, sound, odor, taste, and tangible objects are respectively experienced (anubhūta) by eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness, and body-consciousness; at the same time, all five of these dhatus are discerned (vijñeya) by mind-consciousness. Thus, each of these five external dhatus is discerned by two kinds of consciousness.

Because the remaining thirteen dhatus are not the objects of the five sensory consciousnesses, they are discerned only by mind-consciousness.

No dhatu is wholly permanent. Only the unconditioned dharmas belonging to the dharma-dhatu (dharmadhātu) are permanent; therefore, a part of the dharma-dhatu is permanent.

The twelve internal dhatus and a part of the dharma-dhatu are faculties (indriya).

The sutra speaks of twenty distinct faculties: the eye faculty (cakṣurindriya), ear faculty (śrotrendriya), nose faculty (ghrāṇendriya), tongue faculty (jihvendriya), body faculty (kāyendriya), mind faculty (mana-indriya), male faculty (puruṣendriya), female faculty (strīndriya), life faculty (jīvitendriya), pleasure faculty (sukhendriya), pain faculty (duḥkhendriya), joy faculty (saumanasyendriya), sorrow faculty (daurmanasyendriya), equanimity faculty (upekṣendriya), faith faculty (śraddhendriya), energy faculty (vīryendriya), mindfulness faculty (smṛtīndriya), concentration faculty (samādhindriya), wisdom faculty (prajñendriya), the faculty of one who will come to know what is not yet known (anājñātamājñāsyāmīndriya), the faculty of having known (ājñendriya),

and the faculty of one endowed with perfect knowledge (ājñātāvīndriya).

The Abhidharma masters (Ābhidhārmikas) do not follow the sutra’s order in arranging the six ayatanas: the eye faculty, ear faculty, nose faculty, tongue faculty, body faculty, and mind faculty. They place the mind faculty not after the body faculty but after the life faculty, because the mind faculty, like the faculties associated with feeling, has an object (ālambana) and does not merely have an objective field, as do the five faculties associated with the sensory consciousnesses.

Among the twenty faculties, eleven faculties—namely, the life faculty, the five faculties associated with feeling, and the five faculties of faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration, and wisdom—together with a portion of the final three faculties, constitute a part of the dharma-dhatu (dharmadhātu).

The twelve internal dhatus are: ⁽¹⁾ the five faculties associated with the sensory consciousnesses, which constitute five dhatus and five faculties bearing the same names; ⁽²⁾ the mind faculty, the sixth faculty, which constitutes seven dhatus; and ⁽³⁾ a portion of the final three faculties.

The remaining five dhatus—form, sound, and so forth—and a part of the dharma-dhatu are not faculties.