中論

CHAPTER ONE:

EXAMINATION OF CONDITIONS

Neither arising nor ceasing. Neither permanent nor annihilated. Neither identical nor distinct. Neither coming nor going. The Buddha was able to set forth and proclaim this teaching of dependent origination, by skillful means, in order to put an end to all conceptual elaborations (prapañca). I bow my head in reverent homage to the Buddha; among all doctrines and sacred teachings, his words are the supreme, the unsurpassed teachings.

The dharmas (all things, all phenomena) are not self-arisen (arisen from their own essence), nor are they arisen from another entity (arisen from another), nor are they arisen from the combination of self and other (arisen from both); still less are they without cause (without any cause). Therefore one should know: the dharmas are originally non-arisen.

Just as the self-nature of the dharmas does not abide (does not exist) within the conditions (the factors, the circumstances), and, because there is no self-nature, there is likewise no other-nature.

Note: Beginning from the next page, all the words enclosed within parentheses ( ) preceded by an asterisk (*) are the translator's abbreviated annotations.

The dharmas are produced from four conditions, namely: the causal condition ( the conditioned dharmas, that which arises and ceases); the sequential condition ( the immediately antecedent and contiguous condition: the mind and mental factors arising and ceasing in continuous succession without interruption); the objective condition ( the condition as object: the mental-factor dharmas together with the mind that corresponds to them) and the dominant condition ( the determining element; matter in relation to mind and vice versa; because of the superior efficacy of the mind's application, matter—that is, the external sense-objects—comes to possess meanings, functions, etc.). Apart from these four conditions, there is no fifth condition.

Is the fruit ( referring to the dharmas, all things, all phenomena) produced from the conditions, or from non-conditions (non-circumstances and non-factors)? Within those conditions, is the fruit ( the dharmas) already present, or is the fruit not present within those conditions?

The cause is precisely the dharma (the entity) that produces the fruit; that dharma is called a condition. If so, then if that fruit has not yet arisen, why—for what reason—is it not called a non-condition (that which is not a condition, the factors and circumstances)?

Whether the fruit is already present beforehand within the condition (or is not already present within the condition), whether it exists beforehand or not—both alternatives cannot be admitted. For if it did not previously exist, then what (or who) acts as the condition? And if it previously existed, what need is there to depend upon a condition?

If the fruit is neither that which has arising (which has an arising) (non-arisen-with-existence), nor that which is without arising (non-arisen-without-existence), and at the same time is neither that which both has and has not arising (non-arisen-with-and-without-existence), then how can one assert: there are conditions?

If, when the fruit has not yet arisen, there should then be no destruction—(for if there is) destruction, how can a dharma have something to depend upon? Therefore: there is no sequential condition.

As the Buddhas have taught: in the subtle, true dharma (the dharma of true reality), therein (in ultimate emptiness) there is no entity whatsoever to depend upon (the dharma without condition); so how could there be (what is called) an objective condition?

The dharmas originally have no self-nature (without self-nature), so they have no characteristic of existence; yet to assert that there is such a thing—therefore this matter (the assertion) of existence is entirely unreasonable.

Whether stated in summary or expounded at length (whether condensed or amply explained), the fruit still cannot be found within the causal condition; but if (the fruit) is not present within the causal condition, then how can one assert that the fruit is produced from the conditions?

And if one holds that within the condition there is no fruit, yet (that fruit) is produced from the condition, then why is that fruit (not able) not to be produced from a non-condition (that which is not a condition)?

And if the fruit is produced from a condition, but (what is called) the condition itself has no self-nature, then, being produced from that which has no self-nature, how can one (assert that it is) produced from a condition?

The fruit is not produced from a condition, nor is it produced from a non-condition; therefore, since the fruit does not exist, the condition and the non-condition likewise do not exist.

CHAPTER TWO:

EXAMINATION OF MOTION

AND NON-MOTION

(Examination of Coming and Going)

If something has already moved, then it is no longer in the process of moving; if it has not yet moved, then it is likewise not in the process of moving. Apart from what is called the already-moved and the not-yet-moved, at the moment of moving there is also no present movement.

Wherever there is displacement, precisely there is the act of moving. It is neither the already-moved nor the not-yet-moved, but precisely the movement that is moving.

How can it be that at the very moment of moving there is a (separate) movement that moves simultaneously? And, if one separates off the movement, then there cannot be what is called the present moving.

If anyone maintains that the present moving has a (separate) displacement, that person is mistaken, for, having separated off the movement, there still remains a present moving; but in fact, it is precisely the present moving that, by itself alone, moves.

If at the very moment of moving there were a (separate entity that is) displacement, then there would be two movements: one called the present moving and the second called the present moving's having a (separate) movement.

If there were two movements (dharmas), then there would necessarily be two goers ( "goer" is another name for the self, referring to the one who moves), and thus there would necessarily be two moving entities (selves); therefore, separating off the mover ( the original moving force, the entity that is the self), the movement cannot exist.

If one separates off the mover, then the movement cannot exist; and since there is no movement, how can there be what is called the mover?

The mover does not move, and where there is no mover there is likewise no movement; apart from the movement and from where there is no mover, there is no existence of a third thing that is the mover.

If one conceives that the mover has a (separate thing that is) movement, how can that notion subsist? For if one separates off the movement, then the mover cannot exist (cannot be present).

If one maintains that (in itself) the mover has movement, then there would be two distinct kinds of movement: one, the mover's moving, and two, the movement's displacement.

If anyone says that the mover (is) moving, that person is confused, for, having separated off the movement, there still remains a mover, and so they assert that the goer (additionally) has (a separate entity that is) displacement.

The already-moved in itself (therein) has no point (motive) of departure; the not-yet-moved in itself likewise has no motive of setting-out whatsoever; and in the present moving, therein too, no motive of departure can be found. So where, then, is precisely the place that has the motive of departure?

What has not yet set out cannot have present moving, still less can it have what is called the already-moved; these two cases ought to have a motive of departure, but when there is not yet movement, how can there be setting-out?

There is no movement, no not-yet-moved, and likewise no present moving. None of them has a point of departure; so how can one make a clear distinction?

The mover cannot stand still (abide), where there is no mover there is likewise no one called (the one who) stands still; apart from the mover and the non-mover, what third thing could there be that is the one standing still?

(Having said that) the mover cannot be standing still (* for if he were standing still, one could not say that he is moving), what sense would it make to say that the mover is standing still? That is unreasonable: for at the very moment of separating off the movement, precisely then there can be no present mover.

The already-moved, the not-yet-moved, and the present moving—all three cannot stand still; those things that have going and standing (* the dharma of motion and rest: the operation of moving and the cessation of motionlessness) are all synonymous with movement. (movement in the three times).

To assert that the movement is precisely the mover—this is incorrect; but to assert that the movement is distinct from the mover is likewise unreasonable.

If one conceives that precisely the movement itself is the mover, (then) the agent and the action (* the one who performs the karma and the karma that is performed) would be one and the same.

If one maintains that the movement is distinct from the mover, then: apart from the mover there would still be movement, and apart from the movement there would still be a mover.

If the movement and the mover are two, and if their identity and distinction are established, then both are untenable; so how then could (one assert that there is what is called movement, or how could) it be established?

It is because there is movement that one knows there is a mover; one cannot assert that the mover is precisely the movement, for prior to that there is no displacement, and therefore there is also no mover that is in displacement.

By reason of the movement, one knows the mover; one cannot make use of any other movement, for within a single mover there cannot be two movements.

If it is definitely settled that there is a mover, then one cannot apply the three movements (the already-, the not-yet-, and the present-); and if it is not settled that there is a mover, then one likewise cannot apply the three movements.

Whether the movement is settled as existing or not (whether settled or not settled), the mover likewise cannot apply the above three movements. Therefore the movement, the mover, and the place of movement (the locus of going)—all three are empty. (* person, dharma, and time-space: time and place both have no self-nature).

CHAPTER THREE:

EXAMINATION OF THE SIX SENSE-FACULTIES

The eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue, the body, and the mind, and so forth—the six sense-faculties (capacities). The eye and so forth, these six sense-faculties (if they did not rely upon the operation of) the six sense-objects (that is, the external realms such as) formative forces (* the aggregate of formations: this may be understood as karmic force, referring to a group of volitions which includes both activities of a volitional nature and instinctual ones.

The aggregate of formations plays an exceedingly important and decisive role), form (* the aggregate of form refers to the group of matter comprising the four great elements: earth, water, wind, fire) and so forth—then the eye (assuredly) has no capacity to see its own essence by itself, and if it has no capacity to see itself, then how can it see another thing?

The example of fire is not (apt) such that it could establish (the reasoning that) the eye sees all things (dharmas). This problem has already been answered in a general way in the chapter that speaks of the already-moved, the not-yet-moved, and the present moving (* Chapter Two).

If seeing has not yet seen (at the time when it has not seen), then it cannot be called seeing; but to assert that seeing has the capacity (to) see—that is incorrect.

Seeing cannot have (the act of) seeing, (that which is) not seeing (non-seeing) likewise does not see; if one refutes seeing, that is to refute the seer (* once seeing is refuted, then naturally the seer too is refuted).

Whether one separates off seeing or does not separate off seeing, one likewise cannot find a seer. And because there is no seer, how could there ever be the act of seeing ( seeing: the eye-faculty) and the visible ( the visible: the form-object)?

And, because seeing and the object that can be seen are both empty, therefore consciousness and so forth—the four dharmas ( consciousness, contact, feeling, and craving)—are likewise empty; (and so) the four graspings ( the grasping of sense-desire, the grasping of views, the grasping of rules and observances, and the grasping of doctrines of self) and so forth—how could those conditions exist?

The ear, the nose, the tongue, the body, the mind, sound (the sound-object) and the hearer, and so forth—these too should be understood in the same way, in the sense already discussed.

CHAPTER FOUR:

EXAMINATION OF THE FIVE AGGREGATES

If one separates off the cause of form (* the source, the cause of form, referring to the sense-realms), then form (the dharma) cannot exist; and if one separates off form (the dharma), then the cause of form cannot exist.

If, apart from the cause of form, the dharma of form still existed, then that form would be without cause (without any cause); but for a dharma to exist without a cause—that is incorrect.

If, apart from form (the resultant dharma), there still were a (form-)cause, then there would be a cause but no fruit (* for without a fruit, it cannot be called a cause); and if one asserts that there is a cause but no fruit, that is an absurdity that cannot be accepted.

If form already exists, then there is no need for a cause of form; and if there is no form, then there is likewise no need for a cause of form.

But if, without a cause, form still existed, that would be entirely absurd. Therefore, the wise should not (give rise to a mind that) discriminates concerning form.

If one conceives that the fruit resembles the cause (if cause and fruit are alike), that is incorrect; but to assert that the fruit does not resemble the cause is likewise mistaken.

The aggregate of feeling and the aggregate of perception, the aggregate of formations and the aggregate of consciousness, and so forth—all the other dharmas, however many, are likewise the same as (alike to) the aggregate of form.

If someone raises a challenge (concerning the appearance or the true essence of the dharmas), whoever wishes to answer, yet abandons and does not rely upon the Meaning of Emptiness (the nature of emptiness) in answering, then that answer is untenable, no different from the questioner himself.

And if someone raises an objection, yet without relying upon the Meaning of Emptiness (apart from the meaning of emptiness) points out the error of the opponent, then that objection is untenable, (since the one answering is also dull and deluded) no different from that questioner.

CHAPTER FIVE:

EXAMINATION OF THE SIX ELEMENTS

(Earth, Water, Fire, Wind, Space, Consciousness)

When the characteristic of space does not yet exist, there is no entity (called) space; if space existed prior to (its characteristics), then it itself (space) would have no characteristic (be without characteristic).

This characteristic-less dharma (this entity without characteristic) cannot be found (does not exist at all) in any place whatsoever. In a characteristic-less dharma (an entity without characteristic) ( being an entity that has no characteristic), that characteristic is itself without characteristic ( for it itself is already characteristic-less—without locus of characteristic: having no characteristic whatsoever).

In the matter of that which has characteristic (possesses a characteristic) and that which is without characteristic (has no characteristic), (if one relies upon) characteristic, there is no support (no abiding-place) ( for it is already characteristic-less); and if one abandons that which has characteristic and that which is without characteristic (possessing form and lacking form), then there is likewise no support whatsoever ( not abiding anywhere else: not existing).

Because the characterizing dharma (the active characteristic) does not exist, the characterizable dharma (* the passive characteristic: the characteristic of the forms, or the characteristic of the dharmas) likewise does not exist; and because the characterizable dharma (passive characteristic) does not exist, the characterizing dharma (active characteristic) likewise does not exist. (Rendered another way: because there is no characteristic of the entity (dharma), there is no characteristic of the entity that possesses a characteristic; and because there is no characteristic of the entity that possesses a characteristic, there can also be nothing called the characteristic of the entity.)

Therefore, at present there is not only no characteristic (active) (any characteristic whatsoever), but there is also no characterizable (passive) (entity possessing a characteristic) either; and, having abandoned both characteristic and characterizable (the characteristic and the entity possessing a characteristic), one can likewise not find (what is called the self-essence of) a thing.

If one supposes that there is no such thing as existence ( existence: the true reality of self-nature), then how could there be what is called non-existence? Since there is neither existence nor non-existence ( being and non-being), then one knows full well who that one is who cognizes existence and non-existence (* meaning that such a one has no wisdom sufficient to contemplate and perceive the true reality of all things—the dharmas).

Therefore one should know that space is non-existent yet at the same time also non-non-existent (neither existent nor yet non-existent); it is both non-characteristic (active) and non-characterizable (passive) ( neither the characteristic nor the entity possessing a characteristic, or neither the active characteristic nor the passive characteristic). Moreover, the other five (earth, water, fire, wind, and consciousness) are likewise the same as space ( that is: non-existent and also non-non-existent, non-characteristic and non-characterizable).

Those of shallow wisdom (those whose level of understanding is superficial, whose wisdom is shallow and unclear, lacking clear insight) see the dharmas (all things) only through the characteristic of existence or the characteristic of non-existence (the being and non-being of characteristics), and so they lack the capacity to cognize the dharma of bliss, the quiescence of nirvāṇa.

(* Those of shallow, dull wisdom see the dharmas only as having form or as lacking form. They cannot see and clearly understand the true reality of the dharmas, do not clearly understand the principle of dependent origination and emptiness—that is, they do not perceive the Dharma of the Cessation of Views and Tranquil Security, namely the quiescent nature of the dharmas, which is nirvāṇa, the bliss of liberation.)

CHAPTER SIX:

EXAMINATION OF DESIRE AND

THE ONE WHO IS TAINTED BY DESIRE

If, separating off the desires, but prior to that (before there is desire), the one tainted by desire still existed, still existed by itself (that would be incorrect). Because it is on account of there being one tainted by desire that the desires arise.

If there were no one tainted by desire, then how could desire come into existence? If (one reasons in this way, then) whether or not there is desire, the one tainted by desire remains the same (as in the reasoning above).

To conceive that desire and the one tainted by desire come into existence and are established simultaneously is something unreasonable. For if desire and the one tainted by desire existed simultaneously, then the two would have no mutual dependence (reciprocity).

If the one tainted by desire and the desire were identical, were one and the same, then, being a single entity (dharma), how could they conjoin? And if the one tainted by desire and the desire were distinct from each other, then, being two entities (dharmas) distinct from each other, how could they conjoin?

If they were identical and yet there were conjunction, then, even upon abandoning mutual dependence, there ought still to be conjunction; and if they were distinct (desire being other than the one tainted by desire) and yet conjunction still existed, then, upon separating off mutual dependence, there ought likewise still to be conjunction.

If they were distinct from each other and yet there were conjunction, then what sort of entities are desire and the one tainted by desire? And the two characteristics (the essential natures of the two dharmas) were previously distinct, but (why) is it then asserted afterward that they are of conjoined characteristic (conjoined essence and characteristic)?

If desire and the one tainted by desire—the essential nature (characteristic) of each—have become distinct (* if desire and the one tainted by desire, the one side having already an independent self-essence, and) have become a distinct characteristic, (and having already become a distinct characteristic) then why (for what reason) does one still assert that there is conjunction?

A distinct characteristic (a separate characteristic) is not established; therefore, although you wish for conjunction, in the end (ultimately) the conjoined characteristic (the characteristic of conjunction) is still not established, and yet you still assert a distinct characteristic (a separate characteristic)!

Because the distinct characteristic is not established, the conjoined characteristic is likewise not established; so why, with respect to the matter of a distinct characteristic, do you still wish to speak of a conjoined characteristic?

Thus desire and the one tainted by desire are established neither through conjunction (non-conjunction) nor through non-conjunction (non-non-conjunction). The dharmas too are like this: they are established neither through non-conjunction nor through non-non-conjunction. (The dharmas too are thus: they are not established from the matter of either non-conjunction or non-non-conjunction.)