唯識二十論

In establishing that, in the Mahāyāna, the three realms are consciousness-only, it is because the scripture says that the three realms are mind-only. Mind (citta), thought (manas), and consciousness (vijñāna) have different names; here are spoken of mind, thought, and mental factors (caitta). It only negates the external object; it does not eliminate the associated [mental factors]. When the inner consciousness arises, it appears as though an external object manifests, like the eye afflicted with disease seeing strands of hair, flies, and so forth, which have not the slightest bit of real meaning. Concerning this meaning, there are certain objections to be raised.

The verse says:

If consciousness has no real object,

Then place and time would be determinate.

The continuum would be indeterminate,

And function could not be accomplished.

The treatise says: What does this mean? If apart from consciousness there really existed external things such as form and so forth, then [the question is why] form-consciousness arises without taking form as its condition.

Why does this consciousness arise in a place where it is produced, and not in all places? Why, in this place, does consciousness arise at certain times, and not arise at all times?

In one and the same place, at one and the same time, there are many continua of consciousness.

Why is it not determinate that consciousness arises according to a single one?

Like a person whose eyes are afflicted seeing strands of hair, flies, and so forth, whereas a person whose eyes are not afflicted does not give rise to this cognition.

Furthermore, for what reasons does the person with afflicted eyes have the function of seeing hair where there is no [actual] hair seen?

The function and non-function of eating and drinking, knives and staves, poisons and garments seen in dreams; the function and non-function of the gandharva-city [city of fragrance], which has no [real] city, and so forth. Other things such as [actual] hair and so forth are not without function.

If a real external object were entirely absent, like form and so forth [in these examples], and there were only inner consciousness appearing to arise as an external object, then how would there be established things with function at a determinate place, at a determinate time, or with an indeterminate continuum?

It is not that none of these are established.

The verse says:

Place and time are determinate, as in a dream;

The continuum is indeterminate, as with hungry ghosts.

Together they see a river of pus and blood,

And, as in a dream, there is function without [a real object].

The treatise says: "As in a dream" means as in seeing a dream. That is, in a dream, although there is no real object, yet there is a place where one sees villages, men and women, and so forth—it is not that they are seen everywhere. So too, in that place, at certain times one sees villages and so forth—it is not that they are seen at all times.

Therefore, although there is no real object apart from consciousness, place and time are nonetheless established. "As with ghosts" means making clear the hungry ghosts. A river full of pus and blood is called a river of pus and blood, as one says milk is full in a vessel of milk.

That is, hungry ghosts who share the same maturation of karma, gathered together in one place, all see a river of pus and blood—it is not that only one ghost sees it. The word "etcetera" means and so forth—that is, they do not see only pus and blood, but may also see other things such as excrement and so forth, and they see various beings holding knives and staves who block them and prevent them from eating and drinking.

Therefore, although there is no real object apart from consciousness, there are many continua, establishing the meaning of indeterminacy. Again, like the object in a dream, though it is not real, it has the function of losing vital essence and blood. Therefore, although there is no real object apart from consciousness, the meaning of false function is established.

Thus, one should rely on these separate examples to make clear the four meanings: place, [time], determinacy, indeterminacy, and so forth.

Furthermore, the verse says:

All, as in the hells,

Together see the hell-guards,

Who perform acts of torment;

Thus the four meanings are all established.

The treatise says: One should know that one example here makes clear that place, [time], determinacy, and indeterminacy are all established. "As in the hells" speaks of the place of the hells, where the sentient beings undergo various oppressive sufferings. That is, in the hells, although not truly real, the number of sentient beings includes the hell-guards. Because of the dominant force of the shared maturation of karma, those sentient beings, in the same place, at the same time, have many continuous events, all together seeing hell-guards, dogs, crows, iron mountains, and so forth, all coming there to perform acts of torment. Therefore, although there is no real object apart from consciousness, place and so forth—the four meanings—are all established.

For what reason do we not accept that those hell-guards and the like are real sentient beings?

Because it does not accord with reason. Moreover, they are not included among the beings of Naraka, so they would not undergo suffering as those sentient beings do. One should not posit that they mutually torment one another within Naraka. These hell-guards being equal in form and strength would not fear one another, and would not of themselves undergo the sufferings of hot iron and fierce fire that burn them.

How then could they torment others?

And if they are not beings of Naraka, how could they be born there?

How is it that in the heavens there are animals? Well, the hells are likewise.

[The objection:] There are ghosts and animals that are hell-guards and so forth. Upon examination, this is not so.

The verse says:

As animals are [born] in the heavens,

In the hells it is not so.

There are ghosts together with animals

That do not undergo those sufferings.

The treatise says: Animals born in the heavens are surely able to experience that karma of pleasurable environs, so being born in that realm they surely experience those pleasurable environs—unlike the hell-guards, who do not experience the sufferings there. Therefore one does not accept that animals or the ghost-destiny are born in Naraka. If so, then one should accept that, through the dominant force of the karma of the beings of Naraka, there arise forms strange and great, manifesting forms and strength far surpassing [the normal], and the so-called hell-guards make them terrified, manifesting various movements of hands and feet of distinct function—like rams and goats, mountains, now parting now joining,

iron forests now low now high—there being nothing that does not accord with reason.

The verse says:

If you say that, through the force of karma,

There arises a different great-element birth,

Giving rise to such transformations,

Why can this not [occur] with consciousness?

The treatise says: For what reason do you not accept that consciousness, through the force of karma, transforms in such a great manner?

The verse again says:

Karmic perfuming is in [one] place,

Yet you make the fruit be in [another] place.

The consciousness that is perfumed has the fruit—

You do not accept that there is [such a] cause.

The treatise says: You maintain that the beings of Naraka, through the force of their own karma, give rise to differences of great elements, producing various transformations of form.

That karma's perfuming reasonably should make [the fruit] be in the continuum of consciousness, not in some other place.

[Yet] where there is the perfuming of consciousness, you do not allow there to be the fruit of transformation; and where there is no perfuming, you maintain that there is fruit.

For this, what cause is there—is there held to be a cause? That is, if there is only consciousness appearing as form and so forth, with no separate form and so forth, the Buddha should not have spoken of a place where there is form and so forth.

This is said not to be a [valid] reason, because [the Buddha] had another intention.

The verse says:

That on which the apparitionally-born depend,

Is the World-Honored One's hidden intent.

He spoke of there being a place with form,

As [he spoke of] the apparitional birth of sentient beings.

The treatise says: As the Buddha said there are apparitionally-born sentient beings. Those, depending on the unbroken continuum of mind, may be spoken of with hidden intent as [passing] to a future life; he did not say that there really exist apparitionally-born sentient beings. He said there are no [real] sentient beings because there is no self, only the dharma-cause. His saying there is a place with form and so forth in the scriptures is likewise: depending on that on which the apparitionally-born rest, [beings] receive the teaching and transformation. This was spoken with hidden intent; it is not that [form] really exists.

With what hidden intent did he say that form and so forth are ten? The verse says:

Consciousness arises from its own seed,

And evolves appearing as the marks of an object.

To establish the inner and outer sense-fields,

The Buddha said these are ten.

The treatise says: What is the meaning of saying this? That is, appearing as form, the manifesting consciousness, from its own seed combined with conditions, transforms and arises as a distinct [thing]. The Buddha, depending on that own-seed and that manifested form, said it is the eye sense-field and the form sense-field. So too, down to appearing as touch, the manifesting consciousness, from its own seed combined with conditions, transforms and arises as a distinct [thing]. The Buddha, depending on that own-seed and that manifested touch, said it is the body sense-field and the touch sense-field. Depending on this, the Buddha with hidden intent said there are the ten kinds of form and so forth.

What superior benefit is there in speaking with this hidden intent? The verse says:

By this teaching one will surely understand

That all the destinies are without self,

And that the dharmas are without self;

And one will further understand the other teachings.

The treatise says: Whoever accepts the meaning of the twelve sense-fields spoken of here can enter the destinies without grasping at a self. That is, if one understands that from the sixty-two dharmas there are the six evolving consciousnesses, then there is no seer and no knower. One who receives the teaching that sentient beings are without self can realize and enter the principle that sentient beings are without self, and can on this basis accept the other consciousness-only teachings.

One who accepts this teaching and transformation can realize and enter the principle that dharmas are without self. That is, if one understands clearly that consciousness-only gives rise to the dharmas appearing as form and so forth, knowing that the marks of these dharmas are all without form and so forth, then one who receives the teaching that dharmas are without self can realize and enter the principle that dharmas are without self.

If one holds that all kinds of dharmas are empty, and [thereby] enters [the principle that] dharmas are without self, then in the end consciousness-only too would be nonexistent—what would there be left to establish?

It is not that all kinds of dharmas being empty is what is called entering [the principle that] dharmas are without self. If one penetrates the imagined nature (parikalpita) of self and its differences, the selflessness of dharmas held by foolish ordinary beings—thus it is called entering [the principle that] dharmas are without self. It is not that the realm of the Buddhas, the dharma-nature that transcends words, is also entirely empty—that is what is called the selflessness of dharmas.

It is not that the very nature of consciousness-only that is grasped by these consciousnesses, its substance too being nonexistent, is what is called the selflessness of dharmas. Were it not so, then the object grasped by the consciousnesses would exist, and thus the principle of consciousness-only could not be established, since one would have accepted that there is a real object grasped by the consciousnesses. By this principle the teaching of consciousness-only is set forth, causing all to realize and enter [the principle that] all dharmas are without self, without refuting the existence of all kinds [of things].

Furthermore, how is it known that the Buddha, depending on that hidden intent, said there is a form sense-field and so forth?

Is it not that there is no separately real form and so forth, and that, apart from dharmas such as form, are there distinct objects of consciousness?

The verse says:

Because that object is not a unity,

Nor is it many atoms,

Nor again the non-aggregated [atoms];

For the atom is not established.

The treatise says: What is the meaning of saying this? That is, if there were external form and so forth, then form and so forth would all be objects of consciousness. Thus the external object is either a unity, as the Vaiśeṣika school holds that there is a [whole] portion of form; or it is many, as some hold that there really are many atoms each being a separate object; or it is many atoms aggregated and assembled together, as some hold that there are many atoms together aggregated forming the object.

Now, that external object, in accordance with reason, is not a unity, because the substance of one portion of form can differ from the other portions of form; nor is it many, because the atoms are each separate; nor again is it the aggregation assembled as object, because there cannot be a single real substance of the atom.

Why not?

The verse says:

If the atom combines with six [others],

The one must become six parts.

If the six are in one place,

The aggregate would be [but] a [single] atom.

The treatise says: If a single atom in six places combines with [six] atoms, then it becomes six parts, because where one is, the others cannot be. In the place of one atom, if there are six atoms, then the aggregate of form would be of the same measure as the atom; mutually facing one another in turn, it would not exceed [that] measure. Thus the aggregate of form too would be invisible. The Vaibhāṣika masters of the country of Kashmir say: It is not that atoms have the meaning of combining with one another. Having no spatial divisions, they are free of the former fault. However, the aggregates of form do have mutual combination, and so in accordance with reason they have spatial divisions—therefore this too is not so.

The verse says:

Since the atom does not combine,

What is it that aggregates?

Or, [if] mutual combination is impossible,

It is not because there are no spatial divisions.

The treatise says: Now one should ask about the meaning and principle of what they say. If [the aggregate] is other than the atom, then there is no aggregate-form. [If] the atoms do not combine, then what is that aggregate? If, considering the aggregate-form, there is also no meaning of combination, then one should not say that atoms do not combine because they have no spatial divisions. For aggregates have spatial divisions and yet still cannot be said to combine. The atoms' not combining is not due to having no spatial divisions. Therefore a single real atom is not established. Moreover, [whether] one accepts that the atom combines or does not combine, the fault is likewise the same. If one accepts that the atom has parts or has no parts, both have great faults.

Why so?

The verse says:

The atom having spatial divisions,

In principle cannot be established as one.

[Else] there should be no shadow and no obstruction,

And the aggregate would be no different and not two.

The treatise says: Because one atom has six different spatial divisions. With many parts as its substance, how can it be called one? If one atom had no different spatial divisions, then how is it that, when the sun rises and [light] touches it, a shadow appears on the other side?

Because having no other parts, there is no light reaching [the far side].

Furthermore, [if] one holds that the atom has no spatial divisions, then how do this one and that one obstruct each other?

Because having no other parts, [one] does not extend to the other place, [yet you] can say that this one and that one in turn obstruct one another.

[If] they do not obstruct one another, then the atoms must be in one and the same place. Then the aggregate of form would be of the same measure as a single atom. The fault is as stated before.

Why do you not accept that shadow and obstruction belong to the aggregate and not to the atom?

Could it be that, other than the atom, there is an aggregate-form that emits shadow and makes obstruction? It is not so.

If so, then the aggregate must not be two [distinct from the atom]. That is, if the aggregate of form is not different from the atom, then shadow and obstruction must not belong to the aggregate of form.

The differences of arrangement are posited as atoms, or posited as aggregate—neither is one real thing. What need is there to ponder and choose whether it is atom or aggregate? Since one still cannot negate the marks of external form.

What are these marks?

That is, the objects of the eye and so forth are also the real form-nature of blue and so forth. Examine it well: the objects of the eye and so forth, the real nature of blue and so forth—are they one or many?

Suppose they are one, suppose they are many—what fault is there?

Both have faults. [If] many, the fault is as before. And [if] one, it is also irrational.

The verse says:

[If] one, there would be no successive movement,

Simultaneous arrival and non-arrival,

And many separated [things],

And the difficulty of seeing tiny things.

The treatise says: If there were no separation, as with blue and so forth, then wherever the eye reaches, the object would be grasped as one thing. There would be no reason for not going to the other places in turn. As one says, with a single step one would arrive at all places.

It could not be that, at one and the same time, one is here and also there, has arrived and also not arrived. A single thing, at one time, could not be both attained and not attained. Furthermore, in one place there could not be many separate things such as elephants, horses, and so forth.

If one says that in one place there is one thing—that is, there are also the other things—then how would one distinguish the difference between this and that? Or how could two be in one and the same place, since the place arrived at and the place not yet arrived at must have an empty interval in between? Moreover, there should not be the kinds of worms too small to be seen in the water, such that one would say they and the coarse thing—the water—being in one place are the same.

If one says that, by taking the differing marks of this and that, it becomes a different thing, and not by some other meaning—then thus one should also accept that this distinct thing, upon analysis, would become many atoms. And it has already been said that the atom is not one real thing. Then, apart from consciousness, the eye and so forth, form and so forth, the faculties and objects, are all not established. Thereby the meaning of consciousness-only is established.

The dharmas are determined to exist or not exist through reasoned measurement. Among all means of measurement, direct perception (pratyakṣa) is the most excellent of all.

If there were no external object, how would there be this cognition: "I now directly perceive—is this not the object?"

That [proof of] perception is not established.

The verse says:

When perception occurs, it is like a dream,

[The cognition] having already arisen; at the time of waking,

The seeing and the object become nonexistent—

How could one allow there to be direct perception?

The treatise says: As at the time of dreaming there is no external object, yet one sees as though there is an object just as when awake. So too, even in waking states, one should know it is thus. Therefore the perception cited there as proof is not established. Furthermore, if at the time [one is] awake one says, "I now directly perceive form and so forth thus," at that moment, with respect to the object, the seeing has already ceased. It is only the discriminating mind-consciousness, because at that moment the eye-consciousness and so forth have certainly faded away. The Momentarist masters too hold that, at the time [of the perceptual judgment], form and so forth, the manifest objects, have all already perished—how then could one accept there is direct perception at that time?

[The objection:] There must have been a prior direct experience for the mind-consciousness to be able to remember it. Therefore there must certainly have been a previously experienced object. Seeing that object is accepted as direct perception. Therefore the external object really exists.

[Reply:] Thus, [granting] that one first experiences and only afterward recollects, this still does not establish a principle proving that there is an external object. Why so?

The verse says:

As was said, [there is] consciousness appearing as an object,

And from it arises recollection.

The treatise says: As was said before, although there is no external object, the eye-consciousness and so forth appear as though an external object manifests, and afterward, associated with recollection, the mind-consciousness discriminates, appearing as though the prior object manifests. That is, [this is] called recollecting what was previously experienced; therefore, taking the later recollection as proof for the prior seeing being a really existing external object [is invalid].

That principle too is not established. If, as in a dream, although there is no real object, consciousness can still arise, then while awake it is likewise. If worldly people themselves know that the dream-object does not exist, while awake it is likewise—why do they not know it of themselves? Since they do not themselves know that the object while awake is nonexistent, then how would they know that the dream-object, which the mind-consciousness takes to be real, is all nonexistent? This too cannot be proven.

The verse says:

Not yet awakened, one cannot know

That the dream-object is nonexistent.

The treatise says: As [one who has] not yet awakened does not know that the external object in the dream is unreal, only upon awakening does one know it. Thus worldly people, through habituated false discrimination, are deluded as though within a dream. All the objects they see are not really existent.

Not having truly awakened, they cannot know it of themselves. When one attains non-discriminating wisdom (nirvikalpa-jñāna), the supramundane antidote, only then is it called truly awakening. Afterward, attaining the worldly pure wisdom that manifests before one, one understands as it really is that those objects are not really existent.

Its meaning is equal [in both cases]. But if sentient beings, through the differing transformations of their own continua, have consciousness arising as though there were an external object—not that an external object serves as the cognized condition giving rise [to it]—those sentient beings, drawing near to good friends or evil friends, hearing the right Dharma or wrong dharma, definitely have two [kinds of] consciousness.

If there were no companions and one did not hear the teaching, how could this be accomplished?

It is not that it cannot be accomplished.

The verse says:

Through the mutual force of dominance,

The two [kinds of] consciousness are definitely accomplished.

The treatise says: Because for sentient beings, the self-continuum and the other-continuum, the consciousnesses mutually serve as dominant conditions. Accordingly, as is fitting, the two [kinds of] consciousness will definitely be accomplished. That is, however many continua of consciousness there are, because of their differences, they cause the arising of differing continua of consciousness, becoming definite—not due to an external object. Just as the object in a dream, though not really existent, yet consciousness can still arise; while awake it is likewise.

For what reason do the wholesome and unwholesome actions performed during a dream and while awake bear fruit-retributions that are not the same?

The verse says:

Because the mind is impaired by sleep,

The fruits of dream and waking differ.

The treatise says: During a dream, the mind is impaired by sleep and its power is weak. But the mind while awake is not so. Therefore it bears the maturation-fruit of the actions performed with a difference of strong and weak. This is not due to an external object.

If there were only consciousness, with no body to perform that deed or mouth to command that deed, and so forth, then how could animals such as sheep be killed by those butchers? If the sheep and so forth die not due to being killed by them, then why are those butchers guilty of the sin of killing?

The verse says:

Because that evolving-consciousness transforms,

There are the various karmas of killing and harm,

As the mental force of a ghost

Causes another to lose mindfulness.

The treatise says: As, through the force of the mental intention of a ghost and so forth, another person actually [has] mindfulness [disturbed] and sees a dream, or, through ghostly possession or haunting, is transformed into experiencing strange things; or [as] the force of the mental intention of a person with supernatural power causes that person to dream-see many things. Like the force of the aspiration of the great Mahā-Kātyāyana, which caused King Sāraṇa and others to dream-see strange things.

And like the wrathful force of the sage of Araṇya, which caused King Vemacitra to dream-see strange things. This is because of the transformation of another's consciousness, which causes that person to do a wrong deed harming the life-faculty. One should know that death is the cutting off of [continuity within] the same class [of beings], which, through the differing transformation of consciousness, brings about the severing of the continuum.

Furthermore, the verse says:

[That] Daṇḍaka and the rest were emptied

Is because of the sages' anger.

[That] mental punishment is the greater sin—

How is this established?

The treatise says: If one does not accept that, through the dominant force of the transformation of another's consciousness, those sentient beings died, then why did the World-Honored One [declare] the accomplishment of mental [punishment] to be the greater sin? The World-Honored One further asked the householder Upāli:

Have you ever heard, for what cause and condition the Daṇḍaka forest, the Mātaṅga forest, and the Kaliṅga forest all became desolate and empty?

The householder said to the Buddha:

Venerable Gautama! I have heard it is because of the sages' anger.

If [it were] that ghosts and spirits who revered the sages, hating [them] for the killing of their sentient beings, [did it], and not due to the sages' angry intent, then how could they be commanded to do it? Therefore one should know that establishing mental punishment as the greater sin—greater than body and speech—and that solely through the sages' wrath sentient beings died, is the principle thus.

If there is only consciousness, then does the wisdom that knows another's mind know the mind of another person?

If it knows, what fault is there; but if it does not know, then why is it called the wisdom that knows another's mind?

If it can know, then the principle of consciousness-only is not established.

[Reply:] Although it knows another's mind, it is not as it really is.

The verse says:

Why does the wisdom that knows another's mind

Know its object not as it really is?

Like the wisdom that knows one's own mind,

It does not know [it] as does the object [-knowing] of the Buddha.

The treatise says: Why does the wisdom that knows another's mind not know its object as it really is?

Because it is like the wisdom that knows one's own mind.

Why does this wisdom that knows one's own mind not know its object as it really is?

Because of nescience (avidyā). These two wisdoms, with respect to their objects, are both obscured by nescience and do not know [them] as does the pure wisdom of the Buddha—therefore it is not said to be [knowing] the object [as it really is]. These two wisdoms do not know their objects as they really are, because they are similar to an external object, falsely manifesting, since one has not yet eliminated the discrimination of grasper and grasped. The meaning and principle of consciousness-only is profound and vast, boundless, and the differences of its categories are hard to ascertain. Only the Buddha can ascertain them broadly and completely.

The verse says:

I, according to my own ability,

Have briefly explained the meaning of consciousness-only.

Among these, all the kinds [of it],

Except for the Buddha, are hard to know.

The treatise says: The meaning, principle, and categories of consciousness-only are boundless; I, according to my own ability, have established it thus. As for the meaning of the all-kinds-wisdom, it is an object beyond the reach of seeking and reasoning. This is something only the Buddha, the World-Honored One, is truly unobstructed [in regard to], concerning all objects and the all-kinds-wisdom.

The Treatise of the Twenty Verses on Consciousness-Only

(End)