阿毘達磨俱舍論

CHAPTER 6: ANALYSIS OF THE NOBLE ONES

Part 22

Previously, the question of why the abandonment of the afflictions (prahāṇa) is called complete knowledge (parijñā) was discussed. Next, the characteristics of the power of the path in this abandonment will be explained:

[The abandonment of the afflictions has been said

To occur through seeing the truths and the Path of Cultivation.

The Path of Seeing is exclusively uncontaminated;

The Path of Cultivation is of both kinds.]

Treatise: It was previously explained in detail that the abandonment of the afflictions occurs through the path of seeing the truths (the Path of Seeing) and the Path of Cultivation.

(Question) Are the Path of Seeing and the Path of Cultivation uncontaminated (anāsrava) or contaminated (sāsrava)?

(Answer) The Path of Cultivation may be either the mundane path (laukika), which is contaminated, or the supramundane path (lokottara), which is uncontaminated.

The Path of Seeing counteracts the afflictions in all three realms; it simultaneously abandons all nine grades of afflictions to be abandoned through seeing the truths. Therefore, the Path of Seeing is exclusively supramundane. The capacity to abandon them does not belong to the mundane path.

(Question) It was said above, “through seeing the truths.” What, then, does “truth” mean?

[The Four Truths have previously been stated:

Suffering, origin, cessation, and path; their intrinsic natures are likewise as stated.

This order accords with direct realization.]

Treatise: There are four kinds of truth, and they have already been discussed.

(Question) Where were they discussed?

(Answer) In the first chapter it was said: “The uncontaminated dharmas are the truth of the path…” and the truth concerning this noble path was designated the truth of the path; “cessation through discernment (pratisaṃkhyānirodha) is separation from the bonds,” and the truth concerning this dharma of cessation was designated the truth of cessation; and likewise, “suffering, origin, the world….” These truths were designated the truth of suffering and the truth of origin.

(Question) Is that the order of the truths?

(Answer) No. The order of the truths is suffering, origin, cessation, and path. The word “likewise” (tathā) indicates that the essential natures of the truths are the same as the essential natures described in the first chapter.

Their order is precisely the order in which they are “directly realized”; whichever truth is directly realized first is stated first. Were this not so, the causes—the truths of origin and path—would have to be stated first, followed by the effects—suffering and cessation.

Sometimes dharmas are arranged according to the order in which they arise, as in the case of the foundations of mindfulness (smṛtyupasthānas) and the meditative absorptions (dhyānas).

Sometimes they are arranged according to the order most convenient for teaching (pratirūpaṇa = pradarśana). This is the case with the right exertions (samyakprahānas): dharmas that have already arisen and dark dharmas are easier to contemplate than dharmas that have not arisen and bright dharmas. There is no fixed principle requiring the practitioner to strive to abandon dharmas that have already arisen before striving to prevent dharmas that have not yet arisen.

As for the truths, they are enumerated according to the order in which they are directly realized (abhisamaya).

(Question) Why are they directly realized in this order?

(Answer) Because during the stage of preparation for the fundamental noble path—that is, the stage of preparatory practice—the practitioner must first form a conception of the dharma to which he is attached, the dharma that afflicts him, the dharma that he seeks to relinquish: namely, suffering. He then investigates the cause of suffering and forms a conception of this cause, the truth of origin. He next asks himself what the cessation of this dharma is and forms a conception of cessation, the truth of cessation. He then asks himself what the path leading to cessation is and forms a conception of this path, the truth of the path. (Vibhāṣā, 78, 13).

It is just as, after discovering an illness, one investigates the cause of the illness, its cure, and the medicine that cures it. This analogy concerning the truths has also been stated in a sutra.

(Question) Which sutra is that?

(Answer) The Sutra of the Good Physician: “A physician endowed with four virtues is capable of extracting a poisoned arrow. The four virtues are: ⁽¹⁾ clearly knowing the condition of the illness, ⁽²⁾ clearly knowing its cause, ⁽³⁾ clearly knowing how to cure it, and ⁽⁴⁾ clearly knowing the medicine that cures it.”

During the stage of preparatory practice, the practitioner forms conceptions of the truths in this order, and during the stage of direct realization (abhisamaya), the practitioner likewise directly realizes the truths in the same order. This direct realization is induced by the power of the preparatory practice (pūrvāvedhsāt, pūrvākṣepāt), just as a horse can run swiftly and without hesitation because it is thoroughly familiar with a particular region.

(Answer) What is the meaning of the term “direct realization” (abhisamaya)?

(Answer) This term means direct and complete awakening (abhisaṃbodha). The verbal root I means “to know.”

(Question) Why does direct realization belong exclusively to the uncontaminated?

(Answer) Because it is precisely a cognition (aya) directed toward (abhi) nirvana and correct (sam, saṃyak). It is called “correct” because it accords with reality.

When regarded as an effect, the five aggregates of clinging (upādānaskandhas) are precisely the truth of suffering—that is, what must truly be contemplated as suffering. When regarded as a cause, the five aggregates of clinging are precisely the truth of origin, because suffering arises from these aggregates. Thus, suffering and origin differ in name but not in entity, because both are the aggregates of clinging regarded respectively as effect or cause. The truth of cessation and the truth of the path differ both in name and in entity.

(Question) The sutras call these truths the Noble Truths (āryasatya). What, then, does “Noble Truths” mean?

(Answer) These truths are so called because they are truths for the noble ones, truths belonging to the noble ones.

(Question) If this is so, are they false for those who are not noble ones?

(Answer) They are truths for everyone because they are free from error and inversion. However, only the noble ones see them just as they are, which means seeing them under the sixteen aspects. The noble ones see suffering—that is, the aggregates of clinging—as suffering, impermanent, and so forth, whereas others do not see it in this way. Therefore, these truths are called “truths of the noble ones,” not truths of others, because the vision of the latter is not accurate. Indeed, they commonly regard suffering as something that is not suffering. A verse says: “What the noble ones call happiness—nirvana—others call suffering; what others call happiness, the noble ones call suffering.” (Saṃyutta, iv, 127)

Some masters maintain that two truths belong exclusively to the noble ones, while two truths belong both to the noble ones and to others, the non-noble.

(Question) Only one part of feeling (vedanā) has suffering as its intrinsic nature. How, then, can it be said that all contaminated (sāsrava), conditioned (saṃskṛta) dharmas are suffering?

The verse answers:

[Suffering is constituted by three kinds of suffering;

According to the corresponding conditions,

These are all pleasant and unpleasant contaminated conditioned phenomena,

And the other contaminated conditioned phenomena.]

Treatise: There are three principles of suffering: ⁽¹⁾ suffering because it is suffering (duḥkhaduḥkhatā, the suffering of suffering); ⁽²⁾ suffering because it is conditioned (saṃkāraduḥkhatā, the suffering of conditioned formations); and ⁽³⁾ suffering because it changes (pariṇāmaduḥkhatā, the suffering of change).

Because of the three principles above, all conditioned phenomena with outflows are suffering: agreeable phenomena are suffering because they are subject to change (suffering through change); disagreeable phenomena are suffering because they are suffering in themselves (suffering as suffering); phenomena that are neither agreeable nor disagreeable are suffering because they are conditioned phenomena (suffering inherent in conditioning).

(Question) What are agreeable, disagreeable, and neither agreeable nor disagreeable phenomena?

(Answer) In the order given above, these phenomena are precisely the three kinds of feeling; and because of these three feelings, all conditioned phenomena that conduce to pleasant feeling, and so forth, are called agreeable, and so forth.

Pleasant feeling is suffering because it undergoes change (vipariṇāmaduḥkhatā), as the sutra says: “Pleasant feeling is pleasant when it arises and pleasant while it persists, but is suffering when it changes (pariṇāme, disintegration).”

Painful feeling has an intrinsic nature that is itself suffering (duḥkhaduḥkhatā), as the sutra says: “Painful feeling is suffering when it arises and suffering while it persists (upādaduḥkhā sthitiduḥkhatā).”

Neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling is suffering because it is produced by conditions (pratyayābhisaṃskaraṇāt), as the sutra says: “Whatever is impermanent is suffering.”

Therefore, the conditioned phenomena that conduce to these kinds of feeling are likewise the same as those feelings.

Some masters hold that it is called suffering as suffering because suffering itself is the nature of suffering; it is called suffering through change because change itself is the nature of suffering; and it is called suffering inherent in conditioning because conditioning itself is the nature of suffering. The meaning of this explanation does not differ from the preceding one.

Agreeable phenomena do not fall within suffering as suffering, and disagreeable phenomena do not fall within suffering through change. This means that the second nature of suffering, suffering through change, pertains only to agreeable phenomena, while the first nature of suffering, suffering as suffering, pertains only to disagreeable phenomena. Nevertheless, all conditioned phenomena are suffering because they all possess the nature of suffering inherent in conditioning (saṃkāraduḥkhatā), and only noble ones contemplate them under this aspect.

A verse states (Madhyamakavṛtti, p. 467): “A person does not feel an eyelash (ūrṇapakṣman) placed in the palm of the hand, but if that eyelash lies upon the eye, it causes pain and injury. Likewise, foolish people, resembling the hand, do not feel the eyelash of ‘suffering inherent in conditioning’; but noble ones, resembling the eye, suffer greatly because of it.”

When noble ones think of life at the highest point of the heavenly realms (bhavāgra, the summit of existence), they feel even greater distress than foolish people do when thinking of life in the Avīci hell.

However, one may say that the path is produced by conditions and is therefore conditioned (saṃskṛta); thus, the path too must be suffering because it possesses the nature of suffering inherent in conditioning (saṃkāraduḥkhatā).

In fact, the path is not suffering. This is because suffering is defined as that which is repugnant to the minds of noble ones (pratikūlam hi duḥkham iti lakṣaṇāt), whereas the path is not repugnant to noble ones, for it brings about the destruction of all the sufferings of sentient beings. When noble ones contemplate nirvana as peaceful (śānta), what they regard as peaceful is the destruction of what they have regarded as suffering—that is, conditioned phenomena with outflows, and not the destruction of the path.

(Question) If it is admitted that pleasure (sukha) exists, why is suffering alone a truth of the noble ones, a Noble Truth?

(Answer) ⁽¹⁾ One explanation is that it is because pleasure is so slight. Just as a heap of black beans, although mixed with some green beans, is still called a “heap of black beans,” so no knowledgeable person would regard an ulcerated sore as pleasurable merely because some slight pleasant feeling is experienced when the sore is washed.

⁽²⁾ Another verse explains: “Because it is a cause of suffering, because it arises from many sufferings, and because it is desired whenever one is suffering, pleasure itself is therefore said to be suffering.”

⁽³⁾ In fact, even when accompanied by pleasure, the whole of existence (bhava) still has the single flavor of suffering inherent in conditioning; noble ones therefore regard it as suffering. This is precisely why suffering, rather than pleasure, is a truth of the noble ones.

(Question) How can noble ones contemplate the intrinsic nature of pleasant feelings as suffering?

(Answer) Because pleasant feelings are repugnant to the minds of noble ones owing to their impermanent nature. This is just as noble ones contemplate form (rūpa), perception (saṃjñā), and so forth as suffering, even though form, perception, and so forth are not suffering in the same way as painful feeling.

Some explain that “pleasure is suffering because pleasure is a cause of suffering.” This explanation, however, is incorrect because: ⁽¹⁾ if something is a cause of suffering, that is precisely the aspect (ākāra) of origin—that is, regarding things as causes of suffering rather than regarding them as suffering; ⁽²⁾ how could noble ones born in the Form Realm and the Formless Realm conceive of suffering? For the skandhas in these realms are not causes of suffering; ⁽³⁾ why, then, does the sutra also speak of suffering inherent in conditioning? If noble ones already regarded pleasure as suffering because it is a cause of suffering, for what purpose would the nature of suffering inherent in conditioning—meaning that “whatever is impermanent is suffering”—be taught?

(Question) If noble ones contemplate pleasure as suffering because it is impermanent, what difference is there between the aspects of suffering and impermanence? On the one hand, things are contemplated as suffering; on the other, “things are contemplated as impermanent.” There would thus be confusion between them.

(Answer) Things are contemplated as impermanent because their nature is to arise and cease; things are contemplated as suffering because they are repugnant to the minds of noble ones. Once things have been contemplated as impermanent, they become repugnant to the minds of noble ones. The nature of impermanence entails the nature of suffering, but is not confused with it.

Some masters (Vibhāṣā, 78, 6) maintain that pleasant feeling does not in fact exist and that all feeling is suffering; they offer both scriptural proof and logical proof to establish this.

Scriptural proof: The sutra says, “Whatever is felt is suffering”; “pleasant feeling should be regarded as suffering”; and “it is truly inverted to regard suffering as pleasure.” (Saṃyutta, iv, 216)

Logical proof: ⁽¹⁾ Because the causes of pleasure are not invariably causes of pleasure (sukhahetvavyavasthānāt). Things we suppose to be causes of pleasure, such as food, drink, cold, heat, and so forth, become causes of suffering if enjoyed excessively or at an improper time. It therefore cannot be accepted that a cause of pleasure, merely by increasing or occurring at another time (an improper time), while otherwise remaining the same, could produce suffering. Thus, what are mistakenly regarded as causes of pleasure have, from the very outset, been causes of suffering rather than pleasure. Later, the suffering increases and becomes perceptible, just as in the case of the four postures (iryāpatha), such as lying down and sitting.

⁽²⁾ Because the notion of pleasure has as its object not a real kind of pleasure, but sometimes merely a relief from suffering (duḥkhapratīkāra, remedy for suffering), and sometimes merely a transformation of suffering (duḥkhavikalpa, alteration of suffering). So long as people are not tormented by the suffering caused by hunger, thirst, cold, heat, fatigue, or desire, they will not experience any feeling that they perceive as pleasure (sukham iti). Therefore, when fools entertain a notion of pleasure, it is not a real kind of pleasure but merely a relief from suffering. Fools also entertain a notion of pleasure when suffering undergoes a change, as in the case of shifting a burden from one shoulder to the other. Therefore, pleasure does not truly exist.

The Abhidharma masters say that pleasure does truly exist, and we can clearly see this:

⁽¹⁾ Let us ask those who deny pleasant feeling (deniers of pleasure) what suffering is. If they reply, “It is that which causes pain,” we shall ask further, “How does it cause pain?” If they reply, “Because it produces evil,” we shall say that “that which produces good” is precisely pleasure. If they reply, “Because it is not desired,” we shall say that “that which is desired” is precisely pleasure.

⁽²⁾ But it will be said that this very thing which “is desired” is no longer desirable to a noble one who has attained dispassion (vairāgyakāle); therefore, the nature of pleasure still cannot be established. This argument, however, is invalid, because when a noble one no longer desires it after attaining dispassion, this is only because it is no longer desirable to that noble one.

A feeling that is in itself desirable (agreeable) never becomes undesirable (disagreeable). Therefore, when a noble one no longer delights in pleasant feeling, this is not because of the intrinsic nature of that pleasant feeling, but for another reason: the noble one becomes disenchanted with pleasant feeling because of its defects—because pleasant feeling is an occasion for the decline of wholesome qualities (pramādapada), because great effort is required to obtain it, because pleasant feeling will turn into painful feeling, and because pleasant feeling is impermanent.

If this kind of feeling were intrinsically undesirable, who would desire it? It is only for the sake of dispassion that the noble one contemplates pleasant feeling through its defects (under a different aspect), rather than according to its intrinsic nature (as agreeable); therefore, pleasant feeling itself truly exists.

⁽³⁾ As for the Buddha’s teaching, “Whatever is felt is suffering,” he himself determined the meaning of this statement in the following passage from the scripture (Saṃyutta, iv, 216): “Ānanda, it is precisely to indicate the impermanence, precisely to indicate the changefulness of conditioned phenomena, that I have said: ‘Whatever is pleasant is suffering.’” It can therefore be established that the teaching above was not intended to refer to suffering as suffering (duḥkhaduḥkhatā).

If the intrinsic nature of all feelings were suffering, the noble Ānanda (Ārya Ānanda) ought not to have asked: “The Blessed One has taught that there are three kinds of feeling: pleasant, painful, and neither-painful-nor-pleasant. The Blessed One has taught that whatever is felt is suffering. What, then, did the Blessed One intend when he taught that whatever is felt is suffering?” Ānanda ought instead to have asked: “Why did the Blessed One teach that there are three kinds of feeling?” And the Blessed One ought to have replied: “It was with a particular intention that I taught that there are three kinds of feeling.” Thus, if the Blessed One said,

“I had an implicit meaning when I said that whatever is felt is suffering,” it is precisely because feeling in its intrinsic nature is of three kinds.

⁽⁴⁾ As for the teaching, “Pleasant feeling should be regarded as suffering” (sukhā vedanā duḥkhato draṣṭavyā), pleasant feeling remains pleasant because it is capable of bringing delight (manāpā); but from a certain perspective, pleasant feeling is suffering (paryāyeṇa duḥkhā), because it is subject to change and is not permanent. If pleasant feeling is regarded as pleasure, those who have not become free from desire (rāgin) will be bound, because they continue to savor it. If pleasant feeling is regarded as suffering, noble ones will be liberated, because they have relinquished desire for pleasant feeling. This is why the Blessed One taught that pleasant feeling should be contemplated from a perspective conducive to the attainment of liberation.

(Question) How is it known that the intrinsic nature of pleasant feeling is pleasure?

(Answer) A verse (Saṃyukta, 17, 17) says: “The Buddha, the Perfectly and Completely Awakened One, knowing the impermanence and changefulness of conditioned phenomena, declared that feeling is suffering.”

⁽⁵⁾ As for the teaching, “It is delusion to apprehend suffering as pleasure,” this teaching also contains a certain implicit meaning. The world gives rise to the notion of pleasure with regard to pleasant feeling, to objects that produce sensual pleasure (kāmaguṇa), and to existence (upapatti). Thus, in a certain respect (paryāyeṇa), pleasant feeling is still suffering, and to regard it as entirely (ekāntena) pleasurable is precisely a delusion. Objects of sensual pleasure contain much suffering (bahuduḥkha) but little pleasure (alpasukha); to regard them as absolute happiness is likewise a delusion. The same applies to the notion of existence. Therefore, this scripture does not mean that pleasure does not exist.

⁽⁶⁾ If the intrinsic nature of feeling were suffering, how could the Buddha’s teaching concerning the existence of three kinds of feeling be explained? If it is claimed that, in teaching thus, the Buddha may have conformed to the worldly point of view (lokānuvṛttyā), this cannot be accepted because: ⁽¹⁾ the Buddha said, “If I say that all feelings are suffering, this is a statement with an implicit meaning (esoteric teaching)”; ⁽²⁾ when explaining the three kinds of feeling, the Buddha used the expression “in accordance with reality” (yathābhūtam, as it truly is).

Indeed, after saying, “The faculty of pleasure (sukhendriya) and the faculty of joy (saumanasyendriya) are pleasant feeling (sukhāvedanā),” the Buddha continued: “Whoever, through precise discernment (samyakprajñā, right wisdom), sees these five faculties (or feelings) thus, in accordance with reality, will sever the three bonds…”; ⁽³⁾ moreover, if feeling were nothing but suffering, how could the world arrive at the conclusion (vyavasyet) that feeling is of three kinds?

Will you say that one may have the notion or sensation of pleasant feeling with regard to weak painful feeling, the notion of neutral feeling with regard to moderate painful feeling, and the notion of painful feeling with regard to intense painful feeling? If so, pleasure would also have three degrees, and there ought likewise to be three cases: the arising of a strong notion of pleasure with regard to weak painful feeling, the arising of a moderate notion of pleasure with regard to moderate painful feeling, and the arising of a slight notion of pleasure with regard to intense painful feeling.

Furthermore, when the experience of pleasant feeling arises from a particular odor, taste, or tangible object, what weak suffering would then serve as the basis for the arising of the notion of pleasure?

[And if you maintain that the perception of pleasure arises in connection with a weak form of suffering,] then before this weak suffering has arisen, or after it has ceased, there should be an even stronger perception of pleasure (a sensation of extreme bliss), because suffering would then have completely disappeared. The same would apply in the case of odors, tastes, and so forth, and of sensual pleasure (kāmasukhasaṃmukhībhāva).

Furthermore, according to your position, a weak “sensation” (vedita), a slight suffering, is manifested by a clear and intense feeling (the perception of pleasure); while a sensation of medium intensity is manifested by an indistinct feeling (neither agreeable nor disagreeable). This position, however, does not seem very sound. For the sutra teaches that the first three dhyanas are all accompanied by pleasure (sukha); and thus, according to you, a weak painful feeling would also be present there.

The sutra also teaches that in the fourth dhyana there is a feeling that is neither agreeable nor disagreeable (equanimous feeling); and thus, according to you, a medium degree of suffering would also be present there. Therefore, the position that “pleasant feeling and so forth are associated with weak painful feeling and so forth” cannot be accepted.

Finally, the Blessed One said: “Mahānāman, if form were only suffering and not pleasure, if it were not accompanied by pleasure, … there would be no reason for people to become attached to form…” (Saṃyutta, ii. 173).

Consequently, the arguments based on the scriptures cited above are invalid.

⁽⁷⁾ The first argument concerning a rational order, advanced by those who hold a position contrary to ours, is also invalid; for when they say, “The causes of pleasure are not always causes of pleasure,” they have not clearly explained what constitutes a cause of pleasure.

A certain object becomes a cause of pleasure or suffering according to the condition of the person who experiences the feeling (the state of the supporting basis); it is not absolutely a cause of pleasure or suffering. If a certain object is a cause of pleasure when related to a body in a particular condition, that object will always remain a cause of pleasure so long as it continues to be related to that body in the same condition. Thus, a cause of pleasure always remains a cause of pleasure.

For example, the same fire will produce different results in cooking according to the condition of the rice being cooked (pākyabhūtāvasthā), and the food may consequently be edible or inedible; yet the action of the fire remains unchanged, whatever the condition of the rice may be.

Moreover, with regard to the dhyanas, how could one fail to admit that the causes of pleasure are always causes of pleasure?

⁽⁸⁾ As for the argument that “the object of the perception of pleasure is not genuine pleasure but merely a reduction of suffering or a transformation of suffering,” we reply:

(i) When the experience of pleasant feeling arises from odors, tastes, and so forth, the object of the perception of pleasure would be the reduction of what kind of suffering? Before this suffering arose, or after it had ceased—that is, when there was no reduction of suffering at all—the experience of pleasant feeling should have been even stronger. Furthermore, in the dhyanas, pleasant feeling certainly cannot consist in a reduction of suffering, because suffering is absent there.

(ii) When a person shifts a burden from one shoulder to the other, there truly arises a kind of pleasure from the new condition of the body (the bodily state), and this pleasure continues to arise until that new condition of the body disappears. If this were not so, the perception or sensation of this pleasure should become stronger and stronger. The sensation of pleasure arising from changing a fatigued posture among the four bodily postures is explained in the same way.

⁽⁹⁾ If you ask, “If suffering is not present from the very beginning, how can the sensation of suffering arise later?” we reply: “Because of a certain change in the body [following the consumption of food and so forth, suffering does not appear as long as this bodily condition favorable to pleasure continues]”; just as sweet and sour tastes succeed one another in the case of wine and so forth.

Thus, pleasant feeling can indeed be established, while all conditioned and contaminated dharmas are called suffering because of the three characteristics of suffering.

In maintaining that the truth of suffering is identical with the truth of origin—that is, that the skandhas of clinging are suffering while also being the source of suffering—the Abhidharma relies upon the teaching of the sutras (Vibhāṣā, 78, 7). For according to the sutras (Mahāvagga, i. 6, 20; Madhyama, 7, 22), craving (tṛṣṇā) alone is the source of suffering.

The sutra says that craving is the origin because it is predominant. Nevertheless, all other contaminated dharmas are also sources of suffering.

In fact, the other dharmas are also mentioned in the sutras. The Blessed One said: “Karma, craving, and ignorance are the causes of the conditioned formations in the next life.” He also spoke of “five kinds of seeds, namely consciousness (vijñāna) associated with clinging (upādāna); and the earth element, namely the four stations of consciousness (vijñānasthitis).”

Thus, the sutra’s definition (nirdeśa), “Craving is the source of suffering,” is understood from a particular standpoint (ābhiprāyika), as an expression of implicit intent; whereas the Abhidharma’s definition is based upon the manifest characteristics of the thing itself (lākṣaṇika), being stated according to the characteristics of dharmas.

Moreover, when the Blessed One said, “Craving itself is the origin,” he intended to define the cause of renewed arising (abhinivṛttihetu). And when, in the verse, he spoke of karma, craving, and ignorance, he intended to define karma as the cause of particular forms of birth (upapattihetu, the cause of birth), craving as the cause of renewed arising, and ignorance as the cause both of birth and of renewed arising. We shall explain the meaning of these expressions.

The sutra says: “Karma is the cause of birth (upapatti); craving is the cause of arising (abhinivṛtti).” The sutra also describes the successive order of causes and conditions (sahetusapratyayasanidānakrama): “The eye has karma as its cause (hetu-pratyaya-nidāna); karma has craving as its cause; craving has ignorance as its cause; and ignorance has incorrect judgment (improper attention) as its cause.”

That consciousness and the other skandhas are regarded as sources of suffering also follows from the sutra’s statement that these dharmas are like seeds and a field.

(Question) What is birth? What is arising?

(Answer) Birth (upapatti) means being born or existing specifically within a particular realm—the Desire Realm and so forth—a particular destiny—gods, humans, and so forth—a particular mode of birth—womb, egg, and so forth—a particular sex, and so forth. Arising (abhinivṛtti) is renewed manifestation and is not specific to any particular category.

Karma is the cause of birth, and craving is the cause of arising; just as a seed is the cause of a sprout possessing a specific character, such as a sprout of rice, barley, and so forth, whereas water is merely the cause of germination (prarohamātra) for all kinds of sprouts and does not differentiate among their species.

(Question) How can it be demonstrated that craving is the cause of arising?

(Answer) Because one who has relinquished craving is no longer reborn. When a person who still has craving and a person who is free from craving die, we know that the former will be reborn, whereas the latter will not. Thus, because there is no rebirth wherever craving is absent, we know that craving is precisely the cause that produces an existence, the cause of renewed existence (bhavābhinirvṛtti). This is also demonstrated by another fact: the continuum is led onward by craving. We know that the continuum of mind ceaselessly turns toward the object for which it yearns. The same is true of rebirth.

No affliction (kleśa) adheres to existence (ātmabhāva) as craving does, just as dried bean flour clings tightly to the hand. No kind of cause binds one to rebirth as self-attachment (ātmasneha) does. This is why craving is established as the cause of arising.

(Question) The Blessed One taught the Four Truths; at the same time, he also spoke of two truths: relative truth (saṃvṛtisatya, conventional truth) and ultimate truth (paramārthasatya). What, then, are these two truths?

The verse replies:

[Knowledge of it ceases when it is broken;

That which is analyzed by wisdom, and other such things, is likewise.

Like a pot and water, these are conventional truth.

What differs from this is called ultimate truth.]

Exposition: If knowledge of a thing no longer exists when that thing is broken into pieces, then that thing exists only relatively (saṃvṛtisat); for example, a pot: the idea of the pot no longer exists when the pot has become mere shards. If knowledge of a thing no longer exists when that thing is analyzed by wisdom, it too is regarded as existing only relatively; for example, water. If we abstract from water such dharmas as color and so forth, the idea of water will also disappear.

According to a relative way of viewing things or conventional usage (saṃvṛtitas), various names have been assigned to these things, such as pot, garment, water, fire, and so forth. Therefore, if from the relative standpoint (saṃvṛtivaśena) one says, “There is a pot (ghatośti); there is water,” one has spoken truthfully, not falsely. Thus, this remains a relative truth (conventional truth).

Ultimate truth differs from the foregoing. When a thing has been broken apart or analyzed by wisdom, yet the idea of it remains, that thing exists ultimately (paramārthasat); for example, material form (rūpa): one may reduce material form to atoms, and one may use wisdom to abstract taste and other dharmas from it, yet knowledge of the intrinsic nature of material form remains. The same is true of feeling and so forth. Because material form exists ultimately (paramārthasat), it is ultimate truth (paramārthasatya).

The ancient masters said that the dharmas belonging to ultimate truth are those perceived by supramundane knowledge (lokottarajñāna) or by the mundane knowledge (laukikajñāna) subsequently attained (pṛṣṭhalabdha) after supramundane knowledge. These dharmas are ultimately real by virtue of the way they are perceived by all other kinds of defiled or undefiled mundane knowledge.

The truths have been explained above; next comes the explanation of how these truths are to be seen:

[Before proceeding toward the path of seeing the truths,

One must abide in moral discipline and diligently cultivate

The wisdoms accomplished through hearing, reflection, and cultivation,

Whose objects are name, both name and meaning, and meaning.]

Exposition: Those who wish to see the truths must first observe moral discipline (śīla). They should then recite the teachings (śrutra) concerning the seeing of the truths, or listen to the meaning of the seeing of the truths. Having understood them (śrutvā), they must reflect correctly and without error (aviparīta). Only after reflecting correctly should they begin to cultivate concentration (samādhibhāvanā). In dependence upon the wisdom arising from the teachings (śrutamayī, wisdom born of hearing), there arises the wisdom born of reflection (cintāmayī); and in dependence upon the wisdom born of reflection, there arises the wisdom born of cultivation (bhāvanāmyī).

(Question) What are the characteristics of these three kinds of wisdom?

(Answer) According to the Vibhāṣā, the wisdom born of hearing has name (nāman) as its object; the wisdom born of reflection has both name and meaning (artha) as its objects. Indeed, sometimes the wisdom born of reflection apprehends (ākarṣati) the meaning by relying upon the words (vyañjanena), and sometimes it apprehends the words by relying upon the meaning. The wisdom born of cultivation has meaning as its object, because it apprehends only the meaning and does not grasp the words. It is like three people crossing a river together: one who cannot swim cannot let go of the flotation device; one who has only recently learned to swim sometimes must cling to it and sometimes lets go of it; one who knows how to swim need not rely upon anything at all (Vibhāṣā, 81, 14, 41, 8).

(Sautrāntika) According to the explanation above, the wisdom born of reflection cannot be established. When its object is name, the wisdom born of reflection is itself the wisdom born of hearing; and when its object is meaning, the wisdom born of reflection is itself the wisdom born of cultivation. Consequently, there would be no wisdom born of reflection.

It should therefore be explained that the wisdom born of hearing is a certainty (niścaya) arising in dependence upon the valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa) called “the words of a trustworthy person” (āptavacana); the wisdom born of reflection is a certainty arising from examination in accordance with reason (yuktinidhyāna = yuktyā nitīraṇam); and the wisdom born of cultivation is a certainty arising from concentration.

Thus, the distinct characteristics of these three kinds of wisdom are correctly established.

In the expression “accomplished through hearing” (śrutamayī), and so forth, the suffix maya (“accomplished through”) indicates a cause: wisdom (prajñāna) accomplished through hearing (śrutamayī) is the wisdom that takes hearing (śruta) as its cause (hetu), meaning that it takes “the words of a trustworthy person” (āptavacana) as its cause. Alternatively, the suffix maya is used in the sense of “a transformation of ...”; that is, the wisdom accomplished through hearing is merely a transformation of hearing (śruta).

This term “transformation,” however, should be understood metaphorically: it is only an approximation, for in reality other characteristics must also be included. It is like saying, “The vital energies are made from nutrients; cows are made from grass” (anamayāḥ prānāḥ tṛṇamayā gāvaḥ).

(Question) If this cultivation (bhāvanā) is undertaken, how can it succeed?

The verse replies:

[The body and mind dwell in seclusion;

Not being “discontented” or “greatly desirous”;

That is, whether one already possesses something or does not,

Yet wishes to possess much—these are called the opposites of contentment and fewness of desires.

Their antidotes are contrary dharmas in the three realms,

And are undefiled because their nature is non-greed.

The four noble lineages are likewise;

The first three are simply contentment,

Serving to counteract the requisites of life,

While the last counteracts activity;

They counteract the arising of the four cravings;

They temporarily bring to an end or permanently eliminate

Desire concerning possessions regarded as mine and activities regarded as mine.]

Treatise: When practitioners restrain (vyapakṛṣta) body and mind by distancing themselves (dūrīkaraṇa) from entanglement (saṃsarga) and unwholesome thoughts (akuśalavitarka), they will succeed.

(Question) Who can easily accomplish the two things mentioned above?

(Answer) Those who have renounced, or those who have few desires (alpeccha) and are content (saṃtuṣṭa), rather than those who are “discontented” and “insatiable in desire.”

(Question) To what do “discontentment” and “insatiability in desire” refer?

(Answer) The Abhidharma masters (Vibhāṣā, 41, 16) say: With regard to fine possessions (praṇīta) already obtained, such as clothing and so forth, wanting still more of them is precisely “discontentment.” Craving things not yet obtained is “insatiability in desire.”

(Question) Can “discontentment” not also arise with regard to things not yet obtained? If so, what is the difference between these two faults?

(Answer) Discontentment is dissatisfaction with what one already possesses because one considers it too inferior (apraṇīta) or too little (aprabhūta). Insatiability in desire is the craving for things better or more abundant than those one presently possesses.

The qualities contrary to discontentment and insatiability in desire—namely contentment and fewness of desires—are precisely those capable of counteracting these two faults. They belong to all three realms and may be undefiled. Discontentment and insatiability in desire, by contrast, exist only in the Desire Realm.

(Question) What is the essential nature of contentment and fewness of desires?

(Answer) Their essential nature is the wholesome root of non-greed. The lineage of the noble ones (āryavaṃśas) is precisely non-greed (alobha). It is so called because noble ones arise from non-greed, and the essential nature of the noble lineage is itself non-greed.

Of the four kinds of noble lineage, the first three—contentment with robes (cīvara), contentment with food and drink received as alms (piṇdapāta), and contentment with requisites used for lying down and sitting (śayanāsana)—have contentment as their essential nature.

The fourth noble lineage—delighting in cessation and in the noble path, that is, delighting in abandonment and cultivation—is not contentment.

(Question) How is it known that the fourth noble lineage is also non-greed?

(Answer) Because it turns away from attachment to sensual desire and attachment to existence (bhavarāga).

(Question) What did the Blessed One intend to teach through these four noble lineages?

(Answer) The Blessed One, the King of Dharma, taught his disciples how to make moderate use of the requisites of food and lodging, and how to conduct their lives—disciples who, after relinquishing their former requisites and way of life, had begun to seek liberation. Through the first three noble lineages, he taught about the requisites of life; through the last noble lineage, he taught about conduct: “If you perform these practices while living in this manner, before long you will attain liberation.”

(Question) Why did the Blessed One establish these two matters?

(Answer) To obstruct, or counteract, the arising of craving. The sutra (Mahāsaṃgīti = Dīgha, iii. 228; Aṅguttara, ii. 10, 248) teaches that craving arises in four circumstances: “Bhikshus, when craving arises, it arises from clothing, food, a place for lying down, and a place for sitting; when craving abides, it abides in clothing and so forth; when it clings, it clings to clothing and so forth. Bhikshus, when craving arises, it arises from existence and nonexistence in this manner…” It was precisely to prevent craving that the four noble lineages were proclaimed.

In other words, the four noble lineages were proclaimed to arrest, either temporarily or permanently, desire for the objects of the consciousness of “mine” and “I.” The object of the consciousness of “mine” is clothing. The object of the consciousness of “I” is the supporting body (āśraya). The desire itself is craving.

The first three noble lineages are intended to eliminate desire for the aforementioned things regarded as “one’s own.” The last noble lineage is intended to eliminate all such desire permanently.

(Question) The qualities required for successful cultivation (bhāvanā) have been explained above. Thus, once a practitioner has become like a suitable vessel serving as the basis for cultivation, through which gateway does one enter the path of cultivation?

The stanza answers:

[There are two gateways for entering the path of cultivation:

Contemplation of impurity and mindfulness of breathing;

Those in whom desire and discursive thought predominate

Should cultivate these respectively.]

Treatise: Practitioners enter the path of cultivation through contemplation of impurity (aśubhā) and mindfulness of breathing (ānāpānasmṛta).

(Question) Who cultivates contemplation of impurity, and who cultivates mindfulness of breathing?

(Answer) Respectively, those in whom desire and discursive thought strongly predominate. They are said to be “dominated by desire” (rāgādhika) and “dominated by discursive thought” (vitarkādhika) because desire and discursive thought increase with great intensity in them. A person in whom desire arises swiftly and intensely even from a slight stimulus (pratyāsannam atyarthaṃ rāgacarita) enters the Path of Cultivation through contemplation of impurity; one whose mind is disturbed by discursive thought (vitarkacarita) cultivates mindfulness of breathing.

Some masters say that mindfulness of breathing (ānāpānasmṛti), because its object is not diverse (avicitra)—for example, it takes only the “breath” (vāyu) as its object, and the breath has no distinctions of shape or color—is capable of arresting the process of discursive thought (vitarka). Contemplation of impurity, however, because its objects include both shape and color, will give rise to discursive thought.

Other masters maintain that mindfulness of breathing can arrest discursive thought because it does not turn outward (abhirmukhatvāt), but proceeds inwardly by taking only the breath as its object. Contemplation of impurity turns outward, as does visual consciousness (cakṣurvijñānavat); yet it is not visual consciousness, but only the contemplation (upanidhyāna = nirūpaṇa) of the object of visual consciousness.

(Question) What is contemplation of impurity?

The stanza answers:

[It counteracts all four kinds of desire.

Now, as for contemplating the joints of the skeleton:

Expanding the contemplation as far as the ocean’s shore,

And then contracting it again,

Is called the stage of “initial cultivation”;

Excluding the bones of the feet and contemplating up to half the skull

Is called “mature cultivation”;

Focusing the mind between the “two rows” of the eyebrows

Is called the stage of “accomplished attention.”]

Treatise: Desire (rāga) is of four kinds: ⁽¹⁾ desire for color, ⁽²⁾ desire for shape, ⁽³⁾ desire for pleasant touch, and ⁽⁴⁾ desire for service and attendance. To counteract the first kind of desire, one contemplates impurity with a corpse that has turned blue (vinīlaka), decomposed (vipūyaka), and so forth as the object. To counteract the second kind of desire, one contemplates impurity with a corpse that has been devoured (vikhāditaka) and torn apart (vikṣiptaka) as the object. To counteract the third kind of desire, one contemplates impurity with a corpse that has been bored through by insects (vipaḍumaka = utpannakrimika), or of which only bones and sinews remain, as the object. To counteract the fourth kind of desire, one contemplates impurity with a motionless corpse as the object.

In general, none of the four objects of desire—color, shape, varieties of touch, and service and attendance—can be found in a connected skeleton. Therefore, cultivating contemplation of impurity by contemplating a skeleton can counteract every kind of desire.

The cultivation of the contemplation of impurity is not intended to eliminate (prahāṇa) the afflictions (kleśa), but only to suppress (viṣkambhaṇa) them, because the contemplation of impurity is an act of attention whose object is not an actuality but a representation produced by volition; it does not take the totality of things as its object, but only a portion of the material dharmas of the Desire Realm.

A practitioner (yogācāra, master of yoga) who cultivates the contemplation of impurity may be merely a beginner (ādikārmika), one who has become proficient through practice (kṛtaparijaya), or one who has completely mastered attention (atikrāntamanaskāra).

A practitioner wishing to cultivate the contemplation of impurity must first direct attention to a part of his own body—to a toe, the forehead, or any other chosen part. He then “cleanses” the bone in that part, which means separating the flesh from the bone by imagining that the flesh has decomposed. He extends his contemplation until, by contemplating only that bone, he can perceive the entire body.

To develop his capacity for resolute perception (adhimukti), he practices in the same way: that is, he produces the same perception with regard to a second person, the inhabitants of a monastery (vihāra), a park (ārāma), a village, a country, and onward to the very limits of the universe and the oceans, all of which are to be perceived as filled with skeletons. He then gradually contracts the scope of his vision so as to make it more powerful, until he perceives his entire body as nothing but a skeleton.

At that point, the cultivation of the contemplation of impurity is complete; and from then on, the practitioner is called a “beginner” (ādikārmika).

To increase the power of this contracted contemplation, the practitioner then disregards the bones of the feet and successively narrows the scope of his vision, examining the remaining bones until he attends only to one half of the skull, leaving aside the other half. At that point, the practitioner is called “one proficient through practice” (kṛtaparijaya); that is, he has attained proficiency in the type of attention that constitutes this contemplation.

The practitioner then disregards that half of the skull and directs attention solely to the point between the eyebrows. At that time, he is called one who “has perfected the attention of the contemplation of impurity” (one who has transcended attention).

The contemplation of impurity may be limited because of the limited extent (parītta) of its object (ālambana), but not because of the practitioner’s degree of mastery (vaśitā). Thus, there are four cases: ⁽¹⁾ the practitioner has mastered the type of attention that forms the capacity for contemplation (jitamanaskāra; atikrānta manasikāra) and contemplates only his own body (saṃkṣepacitta); ⁽²⁾ the practitioner has not mastered attention but contemplates the entire universe as filled with skeletons (vistāracitta); ⁽³⁾ the practitioner has not mastered attention and contemplates only his own body; ⁽⁴⁾ the practitioner has mastered attention and contemplates the entire universe as filled with skeletons.

(Question) What is the essential nature of the contemplation of impurity? To how many stages does it belong? What is its object? Who gives rise to this contemplation?

The stanza answers:

[Its nature is non-greed; it abides in ten stages;

It takes material dharmas of the Desire Realm as its object;

It is produced by human beings;

Its aspect is impurity, and its object is contemporaneous with it;

It is contaminated and is acquired in two ways.]

Exposition: The essential nature of the contemplation of impurity is non-greed (alobha).

The ten stages in which a practitioner can give rise to this contemplation are the four dhyānas, the four preliminary stages of dhyāna (sāmantakas), the intermediate dhyāna (dhyānāntara), and the Desire Realm.

Its objects are visible things (dṛśya) belonging to the Desire Realm. Here, the word “form” refers both to color and shape. This means that the contemplation of impurity takes a “thing” (arthālambana, meaning) as its object, rather than a “name” (nāman).

Only human beings give rise to this contemplation; beings in other modes of existence do not, even if they belong to the higher realms. The inhabitants of the Northern Continent (Uttarakuru) also do not give rise to this contemplation.

Because it is called the contemplation of impurity (aśubhā), this contemplation has impurity as its sole aspect (ākāra). [It does not have other aspects, such as impermanence (anitya), and so forth: it contemplates visible objects and regards them as impure, not as impermanent, and so forth.]

If the contemplation is past, its object is past; if it is present, its object is present; if it is future, its object is future. In other words, the object of the contemplation of impurity belongs to the same time as the contemplation itself (yadadhvikā tadadhvikālambanā). When the contemplation of impurity is of the kind that is “not certain to arise” (anutpattidharmikā), its objects belong to all three times.

Because the contemplation of impurity is an act of attention directed toward an imagined object (adhimuktimanasikāra, resolute attention), it is contaminated.

The contemplation of impurity may or may not have been cultivated in a previous life; therefore, it may be acquired either through detachment (vairāgyalābhikī) or through practice (prayoga).

The foregoing constitutes all the characteristics of the contemplation of impurity. Next comes the explanation of mindfulness of breathing.

[Mindfulness of breathing is wisdom and belongs to five stages;

It takes wind as its object and depends upon a body in the Desire Realm;

It is acquired in two ways, is correct attention, and cannot be cultivated by non-Buddhists;

It has six stages: counting, and so forth.]

Exposition: Mindfulness of breathing is ānāpānasmṛti (a-na-a-ba-na mindfulness).

Āna means inhalation (śavāsa), that is, the entry of wind; apāna means exhalation, that is, the departure of wind. Mindfulness (smṛti) that takes inhalation or exhalation as its object is called mindfulness of breathing.

The essential nature of mindfulness of breathing is wisdom (prajñā), namely, the cognition of inhalation and exhalation. This wisdom is called mindfulness, just as in the case of the foundations of mindfulness (smṛtyupasthānas), [which are applications of wisdom, or foundations of wisdom, but are nevertheless called “applications of mindfulness,” or foundations of mindfulness], because this wisdom—namely, the wisdom of breathing (ānāpānaprajñā)—functions through the empowering force of mindfulness (smṛtibalādhānavṛttitvāt).

Mindfulness of breathing is cultivated in five stages: the first three preliminary stages of dhyāna, the intermediate dhyāna, and the Desire Realm. This is because it is associated only with equanimity (upekṣā). According to tradition, pleasant and painful feeling [in the Desire Realm] are compatible with discursive thought (vitarka), whereas mindfulness of breathing is opposed to discursive thought and therefore cannot be associated with pleasure or pain. Moreover, joy and pleasant feeling [in the dhyānas] often obstruct (pratyanīka, paripanthin) the mind’s focused attention upon its object (avadhāna, ābhoga), while mindfulness of breathing cannot be cultivated without such attention.

However, according to the masters who hold that the faculty of equanimity (upekṣendriya) is also present in the fundamental dhyānas (mūladhyānas), mindfulness of breathing may be cultivated in eight stages, with the addition of the first three dhyānas. In the stages above these, beings no longer require breathing.

The object of mindfulness of breathing is wind, and its supporting basis (āśraya) is the Desire Realm. This means that mindfulness of breathing is cultivated by humans and devas of the Desire Realm because there is much discursive thought there (vitarkabhūya stvāt). Mindfulness of breathing may be acquired through detachment or through practice. It is a kind of true mental application (tatvamanasikāra), that is, an examination whose object is something real. It belongs exclusively to Buddhists (idaṃdharman), not to non-Buddhists, because non-Buddhists have not received instruction on mindfulness of breathing and are also incapable of discovering (avabodha) subtle dharmas by themselves.

Mindfulness of breathing is cultivated to perfection when the following six activities are complete: counting, following, fixing, observing, turning, and purification.

Counting (gaṇanā) means directing the mind to the inhalations and exhalations without exertion (abhisaṃskāra), relaxing both body and mind, and relying solely on mindfulness to count from one to ten. Because there is a danger that the mind may become overly concentrated (abhisaṃskṣepa, excessive cultivation) or overly distracted (vikṣepa), one must not count fewer or more than ten. Three faults must be avoided: ⁽¹⁾ undercounting, that is, two breaths have occurred but are counted as one; ⁽²⁾ overcounting, that is, only one breath has occurred but is counted as two; and ⁽³⁾ miscounting, that is, an inhalation is counted as an exhalation.

If these three faults are avoided, this is called correct counting. If, during the practice (antarā), the mind becomes distracted (vikṣipta), one must begin counting again from the start until concentration is attained.

Following (anugama) means calmly tracing the course of inhalation and exhalation to wherever they proceed in their two respective directions: Does the inhaled breath pervade the whole body, or does it reach only part of the body? The practitioner follows the inhaled breath into the throat, heart, navel, waist (kaṭi), thighs, and onward in this manner down to the two feet; the practitioner likewise follows the exhaled breath as far as the hands and the fingertips. Some masters maintain that one should follow the exhaled breath as far as the wind-disc (vāyumaṇḍala) that sustains the world and as far as the Vairambha winds (Divya, 105).

This view is unacceptable, because mindfulness of breathing is a kind of true mental application that examines things just as they really are.

Fixing (sthāna) means binding mindfulness so that it remains at the tip of the nose, between the eyebrows, or at some other point down to the toes, concentrating upon a single place; observing the breath abiding within the body like the thread of a string of pearls (manisūtravat); and examining whether the breath is cold or warm, unobstructed or obstructed (Vibhāṣā, 26, 12).

Observation (upalakṣaṇā) means observing and analyzing: “These breaths are not merely wind (vāyu), but also the four great elements (mahābhūta) and derived matter; and the mind together with its mental factors depends upon these breaths.” Thus, through this analysis, the practitioner ultimately discerns the five skandhas (upalakṣayati).

Turning (vivartanā) means redirecting this mind that takes wind as its object (that is, the cognition whose object is wind), directing it toward dharmas that become progressively more wholesome (smṛtyupasthānas, uṣmagata), until the highest worldly dharmas (lokottaradharmas, the highest worldly dharmas) are attained.

Purification (pariśuddhi) means entering the Path of Seeing (darśanamārga) and the Path of Cultivation (bhāvanāmārga).

According to other masters (Vibhāṣā, 26, 12), the stage of turning (vivartanā) is precisely the progression from the foundations of mindfulness up to the vajra-like samādhi (Vajropamasamādhi). The stage of purification (pariśuddhi) consists of the knowledge of exhaustion (kṣayajñāna), the knowledge of non-arising (anutpādajñāna), and the right view of one beyond training (aśaikṣī samyagdṛṣṭi).

A verse says: “It is taught that mindfulness of breathing has six modes of practice: counting, following, fixing, observing, turning, and purification.”

Question: How are these modes of practice to be understood?

The verse answers:

[Inhalation and exhalation depend upon the body,

And proceed in two different directions;

They pertain to sentient beings, but are not appropriated,

They are outflows and are not objects of a lower plane.]

Explanation: The two kinds of breath are parts (pradeśa) of the body and therefore belong to the same plane as the body.

Breath is absent in beings of the Formless Realm, in beings that are still in the embryonic stage (kalala), in non-conscious beings (acitta), and in beings who have entered the fourth dhyāna. Thus, breath depends upon the body—the body does not exist in the Formless Realm; upon a particular kind of body—a body containing cavities, which beings in the embryonic stage do not possess; upon consciousness—non-conscious beings have no consciousness; and upon a particular kind of consciousness—this kind of consciousness is absent in the fourth dhyāna. Only when there is a body containing cavities (śuṣirakāya) and a mind belonging to a plane in which inhalation and exhalation occur (āśvāsapraśvāsabhūmicitta) are inhalation and exhalation present ().

There is inhalation at birth and when emerging from the fourth dhyāna; there is exhalation at death and when entering the fourth dhyāna.

Breath pertains to sentient beings (sattvākhya, counted among sentient beings), not to non-sentient things (asattvākhya, counted among non-sentient things), yet it does not form part of the faculties and is therefore not appropriated (indriyapṛthavṛtti, indriyavinirbhāgin; separate from the faculties).

Breath is of the outflow type. It diminishes as the body grows; it continues again after having been interrupted; therefore, it is neither nutritionally developed (aupacayikī) nor produced by karmic maturation (vipākaja). Indeed, a material dharma produced by karmic maturation cannot continue again (punaḥpratisaṃdhāna) after having been interrupted (chinna).

Nor is breath observed by a mind belonging to a lower plane. Only a mind in the same plane as the breath, or a mind in a higher plane, can observe these breaths; the mind associated with bodily deportment (airyāpathika) or the mind resulting from supernatural transformation (naimāṇika) of a lower plane cannot do so.