阿毘達磨俱舍論

Part 29

The preceding part discussed the absorptions; next, we shall discuss the qualities that practitioners produce through reliance on absorption. First are the immeasurables.

[There are four kinds of immeasurables,

For counteracting anger, and so forth.

Loving-kindness and compassion have non-hatred as their nature;

Sympathetic joy is the feeling of joy; equanimity has non-greed as its nature.

In this order, their respective modes of activity are

To bestow happiness and remove suffering;

To cause beings, and so forth, to rejoice;

They take only sentient beings of the Desire Realm as their objects.

Sympathetic joy exists in the first two absorptions;

The other immeasurables exist in six, five, or ten stages;

They are incapable of eliminating the defilements;

They are cultivated in the human realm; upon entering absorption, one acquires three kinds.]

Treatise: There are four Immeasurables (apramāṇas): Loving-kindness (maitri), Compassion (karuṇa), Sympathetic Joy (muditā), and Equanimity (upekṣā). They are called immeasurable because they are directed toward immeasurable numbers of beings, bring forth immeasurable merit as their outflowing result, and produce immeasurable karmic recompense as their ripened result.

In the order given above, the four Immeasurables counteract anger (vyāpāda, hatred), harmfulness (vihiṃsā), discontent (arati), attachment to sensual pleasure (kāmarāga), and anger (vyāpāda). Loving-kindness enables those afflicted by hatred to eliminate hatred; compassion, and so forth, act correspondingly.

(Question) We know that meditation on impurity (aśubhabhāvanā) is cultivated to counteract sensual desire (kāmarāga); and here we also learn that equanimity counteracts sensual desire. What, then, is the difference between cultivating meditation on impurity and cultivating equanimity?

(Answer) According to the Vibhāṣā (83, 3), with regard to sensual desire one must distinguish attachment to the visible objects (varṇa) of the Desire Realm from carnal attachment, that is, attachment to a certain kind of physical contact. Thus, meditation on impurity counteracts the first kind of attachment, while the cultivation of equanimity counteracts the second. It was previously said that meditation on impurity counteracts lust because this practice removes every desire for shape, color, deportment, physical contact, and gait; whereas the cultivation of equanimity counteracts attachment to one’s father, mother, and children.

What is the essential nature of the immeasurables?

Loving-kindness, like compassion, has the wholesome root of “non-hatred” (adveṣa) as its nature; sympathetic joy is precisely the feeling of joy (saumanasya) experienced in response to the happiness of others; equanimity is the wholesome root of “non-greed” (alobha).

(Question) If equanimity is non-greed, how can it counteract anger (vyāpāda)?

(Vibhāṣā) Because anger arises from greed (lobha). It was previously stated that equanimity is both non-greed and non-hatred.

(Question) What are the modes of activity of the immeasurables?

(Answer) Happy beings (sukhita) are the objects of loving-kindness. With regard to these beings, the practitioner gives rise to a mind having the following mode of activity: “These beings are happy!” and thereby enters the cultivation of Loving-kindness (maitribhāvanā; the attainment of loving-kindness).

Suffering beings (duḥkhita) are the objects of compassion. With regard to them, the practitioner thinks: “These beings are suffering!” and thereby enters the cultivation of Compassion (karuṇābhāvanā).

Joyful beings (mudita) are the objects of sympathetic joy. With regard to them, the practitioner thinks: “These beings are joyful!” and thereby enters the cultivation of Sympathetic Joy (muditābhāvanā).

Beings who are regarded without distinctions of intimacy or remoteness are the objects of equanimity. With regard to them, the practitioner gives rise to a mind having the following mode of activity: “Beings! Beings!” and through what is called this “impartiality” (mādhyasthya), the practitioner enters the cultivation of Equanimity (upekṣābhāvanā).

(Question) If beings who are not happy (atadvatāṃ sukham astīti) are regarded as happy, is this “aspirational perception” (adhimokṣa, resolute conviction)—because it does not accord with reality—not a form of error (viparīta)?

(Answer) It is not erroneous: (1) When the practitioner thinks, “These beings are happy!” its meaning is, “May these beings be happy!” (santv ity abhiprāyat); (2) there is no error in the practitioner’s intention (āśaya), because (3) the practitioner clearly knows that this is “an aspirational perception” (adhimuktisaṃjñānāt, the notion of resolute conviction). And even if the practitioner were mistaken, what fault would there be? Would you say that the four immeasurables are “unwholesome” (akuśala) because they do not “apprehend beings as they truly are”? Yet the immeasurables remain wholesome roots (kuśalamūla) because they counteract hatred, and so forth.

The four immeasurables take all beings (sattva) of the Desire Realm as their objects because they counteract the hatred directed toward these beings.

Nevertheless, according to the sutra (Dīrgha, i. 250; iii, 223), the practitioner gives rise to a mind of loving-kindness toward one region, two regions, and so forth. We hold that in speaking thus, the sutra refers to the container-world (bhājana), while intending to indicate the beings dwelling within that container-world (bhājanagata).

(Question) When producing the immeasurables, upon which stages does the practitioner rely?

(Answer) Sympathetic joy is cultivated only in the first two absorptions because sympathetic joy is precisely the feeling of joy (saumanasya), and the feeling of joy does not exist in the two higher absorptions.

The other immeasurables are cultivated in six stages: the preliminary stage, the intermediate absorption, and the four absorptions. Some masters, however, maintain that there are only five stages, excluding the preliminary stage (anāgamya). Other masters hold that there are ten stages, adding the Desire Realm and the three neighboring stages (sāmantakas) of the higher absorptions. This number varies according to whether these immeasurables are in the stage of absorption, the stage outside absorption, the preparatory stage (sāmantaka), or the fundamental absorption.

(Question) It was stated above that the immeasurables counteract hatred, and so forth; does this mean that the defilements (kleśa) can be eliminated (prahā) by means of the immeasurables?

(Answer) No; for the immeasurables have as their stage, or place of arising, the fundamental absorptions of beings (mauladhyānabhūmikatvāt); because their attention (manasikāra) is of the nature of resolute conviction (adhimukti), rather than attention in accordance with true principles (tattvamanasikāra); and because they take sentient beings (sattva) as their objects, rather than the common characteristics of phenomena (dharma-sāmānyalakṣaṇas).

Nevertheless, when the immeasurables are in their preparatory stage (prayoga), they are capable of suppressing (viṣkambh) hatred, and so forth; they cast off and “distance” (dūrīkaraṇa) the hatred that has already been eliminated. It is precisely for this reason that it was said above that the immeasurables “counteract” (pratipakṣa) hatred, and so forth.

To state this more clearly, the immeasurables of loving-kindness, compassion, and so forth, cultivated in the Desire Realm and in the preliminary stage—that is, at the initial stage—are similar to loving-kindness, compassion, and so forth that are “produced through cultivation” (bhāvanāmaya) and are cultivated in the fundamental dhyānas—that is, at the principal stage of the immeasurables. After causing hatred and the other afflictions to waver by means of loving-kindness, compassion, and so forth, the practitioner gives rise, in the preliminary concentration, to an independent “path of abandonment” (prahāṇamārga), distinct from loving-kindness, compassion, and so forth; by means of this path, the practitioner is able to abandon the afflictions.

Once the afflictions have been abandoned, the practitioner attains detachment (vairāgya) from the Desire Realm, enters the fundamental dhyāna, and thereby attains the four immeasurable states of mind belonging to the level of the fundamental dhyāna. The afflictions there are cast off and “removed far away”; and even if the practitioner later encounters stronger conditions for the afflictions, henceforth the practitioner will not be assailed by them (anādhṛṣya).

(Question) How does a beginner cultivate loving-kindness?

(Answer) First, one recalls the happiness that one has experienced, or hears of the happiness experienced by the Buddhas, bodhisattvas, śrāvakas, and pratyekabuddhas; one then forms the aspiration that all sentient beings may obtain this happiness.

If the afflictions are so strong that the practitioner is unable to form such an impartial resolve, sentient beings must be divided into three classes: friends, strangers, and enemies. The first class is further divided into three groups: very close friends, moderately close friends, and less close friends; the third class is likewise divided, while the second class remains a single group. Thus, there are seven groups in all.

After making this division, the practitioner first forms the aspiration that the closest group of friends may be happy; next, for moderately close friends and less close friends. When the practitioner is able to form an impartial aspiration toward all friends, the practitioner then forms it toward strangers and enemies. Through the power of cultivation, the practitioner becomes able to aspire that even the greatest enemy may possess as much happiness as was wished for the closest friend.

When the practice of “impartially forming the aspiration that happiness may be attained” for all seven groups has become firm, the practitioner broadens the scope of this aspiration to encompass a city, a country, a direction, and all worlds. When all sentient beings, without a single exception, are encompassed within the practitioner’s immeasurable mind of loving-kindness, the cultivation of loving-kindness is complete.

One who rejoices in the virtues of others cultivates loving-kindness more easily and rapidly; one who delights in discovering the faults of others cannot do so. For there are persons who have severed their roots of virtue yet are not entirely without virtues; likewise, faults can be found even in the pratyekabuddhas. Thus, in the former case the results of wholesome karma from past lives, and in the latter case the results of unwholesome karma, can both be seen in the bodies and so forth of the persons mentioned above.

The cultivation of Compassion and Sympathetic Joy is likewise. Seeing sentient beings fallen into an ocean of suffering, one forms the aspiration (adhimucyate): “May these sentient beings be freed from suffering!” and “May they be joyful!”

From this, the practitioner begins (prayujyate) to cultivate Compassion and Sympathetic Joy.

Those who cultivate equanimity must begin with the group of strangers because, as we know, the mode of apprehension (ākāra) of equanimity is: “They are sentient beings! They are sentient beings!”

(Question) In what places are the four immeasurables cultivated?

(Answer) Only human beings can cultivate the immeasurables, not sentient beings in the other realms of rebirth.

(Question) When a person attains (samanvāgata) one immeasurable, does that person necessarily attain all the immeasurables?

(Answer) They are not necessarily all attained.

One who enters the third or fourth dhyāna does not attain Sympathetic Joy, because joy is absent from these dhyānas. Therefore, when one attains an immeasurable, one always attains three immeasurables.

(Question) What are the liberations (vimokṣas)?

The stanza answers:

[There are eight kinds of liberation.

The first three have non-attachment as their nature;

Each of the first two liberations relies on two concentrations;

The four Formless concentrations are wholesome.

The liberation of the cessation of perception and feeling

Arises immediately after the “extremely subtle” mind;

One emerges from the concentration through a pure mind of its own level

And an undefiled mind of a lower level.

The objects of the first three liberations are the sphere of visible form in the Desire Realm;

The objects of the next four are the categories of the Path,

And of suffering, its origin, and its cessation belonging to their own and higher levels,

As well as cessation through non-discrimination and space.]

Treatise: There are eight kinds of liberation: (1) having perceptions of internal forms, one contemplates external visible forms (rūpī rūpāṇi paśyati; internally possessing the perception of form, one contemplates external forms); (2) not having perceptions of internal forms, one contemplates external visible forms (internally possessing no perception of form, one contemplates external forms); (3) one realizes the pure liberation and abides in this concentration (having bodily realized the pure liberation, one fully abides therein); (4–7) the four Formless concentrations; and (8) the concentration of the cessation of perception and feeling (saṃjñāveditanirodhasamāpatti).

The first two kinds of liberation have the “cultivation of impurity” (aśubhabhāvanā) as their essential nature, because their mode of apprehension is the perception of a corpse that has turned blue, and so forth (vinīlakādisaṃjñā) [the practitioner contemplates visible forms internally or externally—one’s own body or external bodies—under such aspects as becoming putrid and blue, and so forth]. Thus, the principles (naya) relating to the first two kinds of liberation are exactly the same as in the case of the “contemplation of impurity.”

These two liberations are cultivated only in the first two dhyānas. When cultivated in the first dhyāna, they counteract attachment to visible colors (varṇarāga) in the Desire Realm; when cultivated in the second dhyāna, they counteract attachment to visible colors in the first dhyāna. [In the second dhyāna, there is no attachment to any kind of visible color that would be counteracted in the third dhyāna.]

The third kind of liberation can be cultivated only in the fourth dhyāna. Its essential nature is the wholesome root of non-attachment (alobha), rather than the contemplation of impurity. The object of this liberation is something contemplated as lovely and wholesome; therefore, it has purity (śubha) as its mode of apprehension.

The three liberations above, together with their associated dharmas, have the five skandhas as their essential nature.

The next four kinds of liberation are all the four wholesome (śubha) Formless attainments, whether pure (śuddhaka) or undefiled, and all belong to meditative concentration; they are not the kind of Formless existence that arises at the time of death.

Other masters hold that the minds and mental factors arisen from karmic maturation—in sentient beings born in the Formless Realm—also belong to the “distracted” type.

The designation “liberation” is also applied to the paths of liberation (vimuktimārga) in the preliminary stages of the Formless concentrations (ārūpyasāmantakasamāpatti), but not to the uninterrupted paths (ānantaryamārga) of those preliminary stages, because their object is a lower level that is being abandoned, whereas the kinds called “liberations” are so designated because they turn away from the lower level (adharabhūmivaimukhyāt).

The attainment of the cessation of perception and feeling is the eighth liberation. This attainment has already been explained above. It is called a “liberation” because it turns away from perception (saṃjñā) and feeling, or because it turns away from all objects.

Other masters hold that these eight are called “liberations” (vimokṣas) because they are freed from the obstacles to concentration.

The attainment of cessation becomes manifest (saṃmukhībhāva) immediately after a subtle-subtle mind.

The mind at the Summit of Existence (the Sphere of Neither Perception nor Non-Perception)—where the practitioner makes the attainment of cessation manifest—is subtle in comparison with all minds associated with perception. The mind that “enters the attainment of the cessation of perception” is subtler still and is therefore called “subtle-subtle” (sūkṣmasūkṣma).

The attainment of cessation ends when there becomes manifest either a pure mind belonging to the plane of the Summit of Existence (the fourth formless attainment), which is the plane of this attainment itself, or a noble (ārya), that is, uncontaminated, mind belonging to the plane of the third formless attainment. Thus, the mind upon entering the attainment of cessation is contaminated, while the mind upon emerging from the attainment may be either contaminated or uncontaminated.

(Question) What are the objects of the liberations?

(Answer) The first three liberations have as their object the forms (rūpa) of the Desire Realm. For the first two liberations, these are repulsive forms (amanojña, disagreeable); for the third liberation, they are pleasing forms.

The formless liberations have as their objects the suffering belonging to the plane of these liberations and to a lower plane; the origin and cessation of this suffering; the entire class of subsequent knowledge (anvayajñāna); that is, non-analytical cessation (apratisaṃkhyānirodha) and space (ākāśa).

(Question) It was stated above that the first liberation belongs to the first two meditative absorptions, whereas the third liberation belongs to the fourth meditative absorption. Why is there no liberation in the third meditative absorption?

(Answer) Because in the second meditative absorption there are no bodily consciousnesses (kāyikavijñāna), there is no attachment to visible color (varṇarāga) on the plane of that absorption [that is, the kind of attachment that would have to be counteracted (pratipakṣitavya) in the third meditative absorption]; and because the third meditative absorption is disturbed by sublime bliss.

(Question) If there is no attachment to visible color belonging to the plane of the third meditative absorption, for what purpose does the practitioner make the third liberation [that is, the contemplation of a pleasing form] manifest?

(Answer) Because the practitioner wishes to invigorate a mind that has become dejected through the contemplation of impurity; or because the practitioner wishes to ascertain (jijñāsārtham) whether success has been attained: The practitioner asks whether the first two liberations have been cultivated to perfection. If, while contemplating a pleasing object (a pure appearance) in the third liberation, no defilement (kleśa) arises, then the first two liberations have been perfected.

In fact, the practitioner cultivates the liberations, the spheres of mastery (abhibhvāyatanas), and so forth for two purposes: (1) to remain far removed from the defilements; (2) to attain mastery over meditative attainments (samāpattivaśitva). This mastery results in the production (abhinirhāra) of qualities (guṇa), such as freedom from conflict (araṇā), and the supernormal powers of the noble ones (āryā ṛddhi). Through these supernormal powers, a noble one can transform things or cause them to remain in a fixed state (vastupariṇāma, adhiṣṭhāna), relinquish the life span (āyurutsarga), and so forth.

(Question) Why do the sutras speak of “personally realizing with the body” (kāyena sākṣātkṛtvā) only in connection with the third and eighth liberations?

(Answer) Because of their excellence and because they occur at the final plane of the two realms.

(Question) What are the spheres of mastery (abhibhvyātanas)?

The stanza answers:

[There are eight spheres of mastery: Two are like the first liberation;

The next two are like the second liberation;

The final four are like the third liberation.]

Commentary: There are eight spheres of mastery: (1) perceiving form internally, one contemplates a few external forms; (2) perceiving form internally, one contemplates many external forms; (3) not perceiving form internally, one contemplates a few external forms; (4) not perceiving form internally, one contemplates many external forms; (5–8) not perceiving form internally, one contemplates external forms that are blue, yellow, red, and white.

Of the eight spheres of mastery, the first two are like the first liberation. The third and fourth spheres of mastery are like the second liberation; the final four spheres of mastery are like the third liberation.

(Question) How do the liberations and the spheres of mastery differ?

(Answer) In the former, there is liberation alone (vimokṣamātra); in the latter, there is mastery over the object (ālambanābhibhāvana). This mastery consists in contemplating the object according to one’s wishes (yatheṣṭamadhimokṣaḥ) and in the non-arising of defilements on account of the object (kleśānutpatti).

(Question) What are the totality spheres (kṛtsnāyatanas)?

The stanza answers:

[There are ten totality spheres: Eight are like the pure liberation.

The final two are pure and formless;

They take the four skandhas of their own plane as objects.]

Commentary: There are ten totality spheres. They are called “totalities” (kṛtsna) because they encompass the entirety of their respective objects. The expression “there are ten” refers to the totalities of earth, water, fire, wind, blue, yellow, red, and white, together with the two spheres of infinity (ānantyāyatanas) of space and consciousness (vijñāna), that is, the first and second formless realms.

The first eight totality spheres have as their intrinsic nature the wholesome root of non-greed (alobha), and the five skandhas as their associated factors. They are produced by a practitioner who has entered the fourth meditative absorption, and their object is the form ayatana (rūpāyatana; visible form) of the Desire Realm. There are, however, differing opinions: Some masters hold that the fourth, the wind totality sphere (vāyukṛtsnāyatana), takes as its object a kind of tangible object called the wind dhatu (vāyudhātu); other masters think that the first four totality spheres take tangible objects as their objects, whereas the final four take visible form as their object.

The final two totality spheres are pure (śuddhaka) formless attainments; their objects are the four skandhas belonging to their respective planes, that is, the first and second formless realms.

The eight spheres of mastery (abhibhvāyatanas) take the eight liberations as their “entrance” (prāveśika), and the ten totality spheres in turn take the eight spheres of mastery as their “entrance,” because each subsequently arising class is more excellent than the preceding one (uttarottaraviśiṣṭatvāt).

(Question) How are all the qualities of the liberations and so forth acquired, and upon what do they depend for their arising?

The stanza answers:

[The attainment of cessation is as explained above;

All the others are acquired in two ways.

The formless attainments depend on the three realms;

The rest arise only in the human realm.]

Commentary: All these qualities (guṇa) have as their support (āśraya) the mental continuum of either an ordinary being or a noble one, with the exception of the liberation of cessation (nirodhavimokṣa), which can arise only in a noble one.

The attainment of cessation has already been discussed above; the other qualities are acquired either through detachment (vairāgya) or through preparatory practice (prayoga), according to whether or not they have previously been repeatedly cultivated.

The liberations and totalities pertaining to the Formless Realm are cultivated by beings in all three realms; but only human beings can cultivate the other kinds of concentration—the three liberations, the eight spheres of mastery, and the eight totalities—because these kinds of concentration arise through the efficacy of instruction (upadeśa-sāmarthyotpādāt).

(Question) If so, how can beings born in the planes of the Form Realm and the Formless Realm produce concentrations belonging to dhyānas and formless attainments higher than the plane in which they dwell?

The verse replies:

[In the two realms, through causes and karma,

Formless concentrations arise;

In the Form Realm, dhyānas arise

Also through the power of the nature of things.]

Treatise: In the Form Realm and in the lower planes of the Formless Realm, formless concentrations, or higher formless concentrations, arise through the power of a cause: in the preceding life, these concentrations were cultivated very recently and very intensely. They also arise through the power of karma, namely, through a kind of material maturation-result that has been induced and is “to be experienced in a subsequent life,” comprising a plane of maturation—that is, a plane induced by karma—higher than the plane, whether the Form Realm or a lower plane of the Formless Realm, in which the practitioner has been born. For one who has not become detached from a lower plane cannot be reborn in a higher plane.

Beings born on a lower level of the Form Realm can produce dhyānas higher than the level on which they were born through the two powers stated above. Moreover, when the world is about to be destroyed, they can do so through the power of the nature of things (dharmatā; the natural power of the Dharma). At that time, all beings of the lower planes can produce higher dhyānas because the power of wholesome dharmas greatly increases.

(Question) How long will the Blessed One’s True Dharma endure—that is, the period during which these Dharma teachings can be comprehended and clearly perceived?

The verse replies:

[The Buddha’s True Dharma is of two kinds:

The teaching and realization.

So long as there are people who preserve it through exposition and practice,

It will remain in the world.]

Treatise: The Blessed One’s True Dharma has two parts: the Teaching (āgama) and Realization (adhigama).

The Teaching consists of the teachings themselves, such as the sūtras, the vinaya (discipline), and the abhidharma.

Realization [that is, noble nature] consists of the dharmas conducive to awakening (bodhipākṣikadharma) cultivated by the noble ones of the three vehicles, the fruits of the religious life attained in the three vehicles (the fruits of śramaṇahood). These are the two kinds of the Blessed One’s True Dharma.

One who expounds the True Dharma, such as the sūtras and so forth, thereby preserves the Teaching (āgama) portion of this True Dharma. One who cultivates or realizes the True Dharma, such as the dharmas conducive to awakening and so forth, thereby preserves the Realization (adhigama) portion of this True Dharma. So long as such persons remain in the world, the True Dharma continues to exist.

The scripture (Saṃyutta, 25, 20) states in general that the True Dharma endures for one thousand years after the Buddha’s nirvana. It is explained that this number refers to the Dharma of realization, while the Dharma of teaching endures longer.

(Question) This treatise (Abhidharmakośa) is based upon the Abhidharma and encompasses the meaning of the Abhidharma. [Since the Abhidharma has been explained in many ways,] according to what principles has the Abhidharma been explained in this treatise?

The verse replies:

[The Abhidharma has been established through the explanations of the Vibhāṣikas of Kaśmīr;

In general, this is what I have explained.

If there are inaccurate explanations here,

They are our “unavoidable” errors;

For only the Munis have authority to explain the True Dharma.]

Treatise: In general, this treatise on Abhidharma has been stated by me and established according to the interpretations of the Vibhāṣika masters. Whatever has been misconstrued therein is my own fault: only the Buddhas and the Buddha’s children possess the authority to explain the True Dharma.

The Great Teacher, the eye of the world, has closed his eyes; those who bore witness have, in general, departed. The noble teaching has been thrown into confusion by those who do not see the truth, whose thoughts are base, who are estranged from the True Teaching, and who are unrestrained.

Because those who realized it for themselves have entered sublime tranquility, their preservation of the noble teaching has likewise ceased: the world no longer has any guardians. The delusions that destroy virtue now range completely free.

Seeing that the Muni’s True Dharma is breathing its last, and that this is precisely the hour when delusions flourish, those who seek liberation must apply themselves with diligent effort.

CHAPTER 9: REFUTATION OF ATTACHMENT TO A SELF

(Question) Does this mean that, apart from this True Dharma, there can be no liberation through reliance upon other doctrines?

(Answer) No other liberation is possible, because other doctrines are all deluded by the error concerning a “self.” The “self” conceived by other doctrines is not a figurative designation for the continuum of the skandhas (skandhasaṃtāna), but a substantially existent “self” separate from the skandhas. Through the power of belief in a “self,” the afflictions arise; thereafter comes continued revolution through the three modes of existence, or the cycle of the three realms; and liberation becomes impossible.

(Question) How do we know that the designation “self” refers only to a continuum of skandhas and that no truly existent “self” exists?

(Answer) Because there is no proof establishing the existence of a “self” apart from the skandhas: there is no evidence whatsoever, whether through direct perception or inference. If the “self” were a distinct entity like other entities, it would have to be apprehended through direct perception, like all objects of the five sensory consciousnesses and mental consciousness; or it would have to be apprehended through inference, like the five material faculties, which are subtle matter.

These five material faculties are indeed cognized by inference. It is accepted in the world that, although common conditions may be present, an effect still does not arise in the absence of its specific conditions: for a sprout to arise, not only water, soil, and human effort are required, but also a seed. The same applies to common conditions, such as the presence of an external object, attention, and so forth: even when they arise, the blind and the deaf still cannot see and hear, whereas those who are neither blind nor deaf do see and hear.

In the first case, the specific conditions of visual or auditory consciousness are absent, whereas in the second case they are present. These are the faculties, namely, material faculties formed of a very subtle kind of invisible matter and cognized only through inference.

A “self” separate from the skandhas is cognized neither through direct perception nor through inference. We therefore know that no truly existent “self” exists.

(Question) Do the Vātsīputrīyas in fact maintain a “person” (pudgala) that is neither identical with the skandhas nor different from the skandhas?

(Reply) We must examine whether the “pudgala” exists as a real entity (dravyatas) or merely as a designation (prajñāptitas, conceptual imputation). If it exists separately or exists in itself, like color and sound, then the “pudgala” exists as a real entity. If the “pudgala” is only an aggregate, like milk, then it is conceptually imputed.

(Vātsīputrīyas) What fault is there in admitting that it is either real or conceptually imputed?

(Reply) If the “pudgala” were a real entity, it would be different from the skandhas, because it would possess its own intrinsic nature, just as the skandhas are each distinct from one another; or it would be produced by causes [and thus would not be permanent, as you claim, and you would have to enumerate those causes]; or it would be an unconditioned dharma (asaṃskṛta), and thus would resemble the view held by non-Buddhist sectarians (tīrthikadṛṣṭiprasaṅgaḥ). Moreover, if it were unconditioned, the “pudgala” would have no function (niḥprayojanatva). It is therefore utterly pointless to believe that the “pudgala” is a real entity. But if you admit that the “pudgala” is merely a conventional designation, you must abandon your doctrine and adopt our position.

(Vātsīputrīyas) I say that the “pudgala” exists, but I do not say that it is a real entity; nor do I say that it exists merely as a designation for the skandhas. In my view, the designation “pudgala” is established in relation to (i) the present skandhas (skandhān upādāya), which are internal and appropriated.

(Author of the Treatise) That reply is exceedingly obscure (andhavacana)! What does the phrase “in relation to” mean? If you explain “on the basis of grasping the skandhas” (skandhān upādāya, apprehending the skandhas) as “taking the skandhas as an object” (skandhān ālambya) (ālambya = gṛhītvā, apekṣya), then you would have to say: “The designation ‘pudgala’ is established because the skandhas are taken as its object.” You would thereby again admit that “pudgala” is a designation referring to the skandhas, just as the term “milk” is established by taking the constituents of milk, such as color and so forth, as its object.

If you explain “on the basis of the skandhas” as “because the skandhas exist” (skandhān pratītya, because of the skandhas), the result is the same as above: you have in fact admitted that the skandhas themselves are the condition (pratyaya) for the designation “pudgala.”

(Vātsīputrīyas) That is not how we understand the “pudgala” and its relation to the skandhas. Rather, we understand it in the same way that the world ordinarily understands fire and its relation to fuel. The world knows that fire exists in relation to fuel (indhanam upādāya, dependent upon fuel).

People know that fire cannot exist apart from fuel; they believe that fire is neither identical with fuel nor different from fuel. If fire were different from fuel, the fuel would never become hot; if fire and fuel were one, “that which is burned” would be “that which is capable of burning.” The same applies to the “pudgala”: we cannot apprehend the “pudgala” apart from the skandhas; we hold that the “pudgala” is neither one with the skandhas nor different from them.

If it were different from the skandhas, it would be permanent (śāśvata) and thus an unconditioned dharma; if it were one with the skandhas, it would be annihilated (uccheda).

(Author of the Treatise) Explain fire and fuel clearly so that I may better understand the meaning of the statement: “Fire exists in relation to fuel.”

(Vātsīputrīyas) What more shall I say to you? That which is burned is precisely the fuel, and that which is capable of burning is precisely the fire. If you require an answer, that is the answer.

(Author of the Treatise) But I wish to know precisely what the thing called “that which is burned” is, and what the thing called “that which is capable of burning” is.

(Vātsīputrīyas) In the world, the combustible material that is not aflame—the wood—is called that which is burned. That which performs the act of burning, blazes brightly, is intensely hot, and is aflame is called that which burns, namely fire. Owing to this burner—that is, owing to fire—the continuum constituting that which is burned catches fire (idhyate = dīpyate) and is reduced to ashes (dahyate = bhasmīkriyate); owing to fire, each moment of existence in the continuum of that which is burned differs from the preceding moment. Fire and fuel are each composed of eight substances; but fire arises in dependence upon (pratītya) fuel, just as curds and vinegar arise in dependence upon milk and wine. For this reason, the world says that fire exists “in relation to” (upādāya) fuel.

(Author of the Treatise) If so, fire would be different from fuel because their times are different (bhinnakāla): fuel exists first, and fire arises afterward. If your “pudgala” exists in relation to the skandhas in the same way that fire exists in relation to fuel, the “pudgala” would be different from the skandhas and would consequently be impermanent (anityaś ca prāpnoti).

(Vātsīputrīyas) Within a burning object such as wood, there is a tangible substance—heat (uṣman)—and this heat is precisely fire, while the other substances are all fuel. Therefore, your assertion that the fuel exists first is unreasonable.

(Author of the Treatise) If so, although fire and fuel arise simultaneously, they are nevertheless different things (lakṣaṇabhedāt), because they possess different characteristics. The meaning you assign to the phrase “in relation to” still remains unexplained. If fire and fuel arise simultaneously, how can it be said that fire exists in relation to fuel? If fire is already one of the substances of the burning object, it cannot have fuel—the other substances of that same object under discussion—as its cause, because all the substances arise simultaneously, each from its own causes. Still less can it be said that the term “fire” has fuel as its cause, because this designation applies only to the tangible substance of heat.

(Vātsīputrīyas) The statement “fire exists in relation to fuel” should be understood to mean that fire coexists with fuel (sahabhāva), or that fire takes fuel as its support (āśraya).

(Author of the Treatise) To say this also means that the “pudgala” coexists with the skandhas, or that the “pudgala” takes the skandhas as its support. Thus, you admit that the “pudgala” is different from the skandhas. Moreover, from the standpoint of reasoning, it is clear that the “pudgala” would not exist without the skandhas, just as fire would not exist without fuel. Since you do not admit these conclusions, your explanation becomes unreasonable.

Here the Vātsīputrīyas themselves raise the objection: “If fire were different from fuel, the fuel should not become hot.”

We would like to ask them in turn: What is the substance of “the hot” (heat)? If they explain that “the hot” is precisely the warmth that is contacted [that is, fire], as mentioned above, then firewood would not be hot [because firewood is that which catches fire and cannot itself be the warmth that is contacted]. If they hold that whatever is associated with warmth is also called “hot” [that is, if they admit that firewood is called hot because it is associated with warmth], then the various things [associated with warmth] would all likewise be called hot: “fire” would merely be the name of this warmth that is contacted,

and everything associated with this kind of tangible object would also be called “hot.” To think in this way is to admit that firewood is designated as hot even though it is distinct from fire, or from the warmth that is contacted.

(Vātsīputrīyas) Because wood catches fire, it is called firewood and may also be called fire.

(Author of the Treatise) Then explain the meaning you have imposed upon the statement, “Fire exists by virtue of its relation to firewood”! The “pudgala” [that is, what “exists in relation to” (upādāya, y)] ought then to be identical with the skandhas [that is, that “in relation to which it exists”], and no argument can prove that they are not identical. The doctrine of the Vātsīputrīyas—that the “pudgala” exists by virtue of its relation to the skandhas, just as fire exists in relation to firewood—cannot reasonably be established under any supposition whatsoever.

The Vātsīputrīyas maintain that it is impossible to say (avaktavya) whether the “pudgala” is identical with or different from the skandhas. If so, how do the Vātsīputrīyas distinguish “the five classes of knowable things” (pañcavidham jñeyam) as follows: (1–3) conditioned things, that is, things belonging to the past, present, and future; (4) unconditioned things (asaṃskṛta); and (5) things of which nothing can be said [namely, the “pudgala”]? If this classification is made, the “pudgala” must belong to the class of “things of which nothing can be said”; but if nothing can be said of it, we cannot say that it is the fifth class or that it is not the fifth class.

Let us examine what the term “pudgala” is based upon. If it is based upon the skandhas, then the “pudgala” exists only as a nominal designation (prajñaptisat), because this term is based upon the skandhas and not upon a “pudgala.” If it is based upon a “pudgala,” why do the Vātsīputrīyas tell us that the nominal designation “pudgala” “exists in relation to the skandhas”? They ought to say, “It exists in relation to the ‘pudgala.’” Yet they do not in fact hold that the “pudgala” is established by virtue of its relation to the “pudgala.” Therefore, the “pudgala” remains merely a provisional designation for the skandhas.

(Vātsīputrīyas) The pudgala can be apprehended when the skandhas exist (satsu skandheṣu); that is why we say that the “pudgala” exists in relation to the skandhas.

(Author of the Treatise) But visible color can also be apprehended when various causes, such as the eye, light, and so forth, exist. Can it therefore be concluded that the designation “visible color” also “exists in relation to its causes”?

There is another point: By which of the six consciousnesses is the “pudgala” apprehended—that is, by eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness, body-consciousness, or mental consciousness?

(Vātsīputrīyas) By all six consciousnesses. When eye-consciousness apprehends visible color and shape (= body), it subsequently apprehends the “pudgala”; therefore, we may say that eye-consciousness cognizes the “pudgala.” Yet whether the relation of the “pudgala” to visible color and shape is one of identity or difference cannot be determined. The same applies to the other consciousnesses: When mental consciousness cognizes dharmas (dharmas = mind and mental factors), it subsequently discerns the “pudgala.” Thus, the “pudgala” is apprehended by mental consciousness, although its relation to mind and the mental factors cannot be determined.

This explanation also shows that the “pudgala” exists only as a nominal designation, exactly as in the case of milk. When eye-consciousness apprehends the visible color of milk, it subsequently discerns milk. Thus, milk is apprehended by eye-consciousness, and we cannot say that milk and its visible color are either identical or different.

The same applies to smell, taste, and tangible objects: Body-consciousness apprehends the tangible object, and from this comes the cognition of milk. Thus, milk is apprehended by body-consciousness, yet it cannot be said that milk and this tangible object are either identical or different. In fact, milk cannot be any of these four things; therefore, it is not color, smell, taste, or tangible object.

On the other hand, one cannot conceive of milk as not being constituted by these four things. The conclusion that must be admitted is this: We provisionally designate an aggregation of skandhas as the “pudgala,” just as the designation “milk” refers to a combination of color, smell, taste, and so forth. All are nominal designations without any real substance.

Furthermore, what do you mean when you say, “When eye-consciousness cognizes visible color and shape, it subsequently discerns the ‘pudgala’”? Do you mean that visible color and shape are the causes of the apprehension (upalabdhi) of the “pudgala”? Or do the apprehensions of visible color and shape and of the “pudgala” occur simultaneously?

If the Vātsīputrīyas reply that visible color and shape are the causes of the apprehension of the “pudgala”—while it cannot be said that the “pudgala” differs from visible color and shape—then the conditions and causes for apprehending visible color, namely the eye, light, and attention, would likewise no longer differ from visible color.

If the Vātsīputrīyas reply that the “pudgala” is apprehended simultaneously with visible color and shape, we ask whether the “pudgala” is apprehended by virtue of the same faculty by which visible color and shape are apprehended, or by virtue of a different faculty.

In the first case, the “pudgala” would be nothing but visible color and shape, and the nominal designation “pudgala” would take only visible color and shape as its object. It would then be impossible to distinguish: “This is visible color and shape; that is the ‘pudgala.’” Without this distinction, how could it be proved that there are both visible color and the “pudgala”? The existence of the “pudgala” could be established only through this distinction.

In the second case, the times of these two apprehensions would be different, and the “pudgala” would differ from visible color and shape just as yellow differs from blue and the earlier differs from the later.

The same reasoning should be applied to the other skandhas.

(Vātsīputrīyas) The apprehension of the “pudgala” is neither identical with nor different from the apprehension of visible color and shape, just as one cannot say that the “pudgala” is the same thing as visible color and shape, nor can one say that it is different from visible color and shape.

(Treatise Master) Given the view stated above, you are necessarily compelled to say that the cognition of the “pudgala,” because it is “indefinable” (avaktavya), cannot constitute part of the category of “conditioned dharmas.” Yet you cannot accept this explanation, because you maintain that every cognition (that which apprehends) belongs to the conditioned.

If the “pudgala” is an entity that cannot be determined to be form (the form skandha) or not form (the feeling skandha, and so forth), why did the Blessed One say, “Form and the other skandhas are not the ‘self’”?

You say that the “pudgala” is apprehended by eye-consciousness. Does this eye-consciousness then arise in dependence on the causal conditions of visible color and shape, on the “pudgala,” or on both? According to the first alternative—that it depends on visible color and shape—we cannot say that this consciousness apprehends (upalabh) the “pudgala,” because the “pudgala” is not the object (ālambana) of this consciousness; the same applies in the case of sound and so forth.

In fact, every consciousness that arises through something serving as its condition (pratyaya) takes that very thing as its object-condition (ālambanapratyaya). Since the “pudgala” is not a condition of eye-consciousness, it cannot be its object. Therefore, eye-consciousness does not cognize the “pudgala.” The latter two alternatives both contradict the sutra.

The sutra states that eye-consciousness arises through two things: the eye and visible color and shape. The sutra (Saṃyukta, 9, 6) says: “Bhikṣus, eye-consciousness arises with the eye as its cause (hetu) and visible color and shape as its condition (pratyaya = ālambanapratyaya). All eye-consciousness depends on the eye and visible color and shape.”

If the “pudgala” were a cause of eye-consciousness, it would be impermanent (anitya), for the sutra says: “All causes and all conditions from which consciousness arises are impermanent.”

(Vātsīputrīyas) Thus, we must admit that the “pudgala” is not an object and is not an object-condition of consciousness (vijñāna).

(Treatise Master) Precisely so; but then it could not be discerned (vijñeya) as an object of consciousness. If it cannot be discerned, then the object cognized by cognition (jñāna) also cannot be known (jñeya); and if it cannot be known, how can the existence of the “pudgala” be established? If the existence of the “pudgala” cannot be established, your doctrine collapses.

You also say that the “pudgala” is discerned by the six consciousnesses. But if it is discerned by eye-consciousness, it will differ from sound because it resembles visible color and shape; if it is discerned by ear-consciousness, it will differ from visible color and shape because it resembles sound. The same applies to the other kinds of cognition.

Moreover, your doctrine contradicts scripture. The sutra says: “Brahmin (brāhmane), the five faculties—the eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body—each have their own distinct sphere (gocara) and object (viṣaya). Each faculty experiences (anubhavati) its own sphere and its own object, but does not experience the spheres or objects of the other faculties. Only the mental faculty experiences the spheres and objects of the first five faculties, and all these faculties take refuge in the mental faculty.” Or will you admit that, in conformity with the sutra, the “pudgala” does not discern the objects (viṣaya) [of the five faculties]? If so, the “pudgala” will not be discerned [by the five faculties], and you yourselves will contradict your own doctrine.

(Vātsīputrīyas) [You assert that, according to scripture, each of the five faculties has its own object, and you conclude that the “pudgala” is not an object of eye-consciousness, and so forth.] But according to the sutra, the mental faculty also has its own object [and this contradicts your doctrine]. Indeed, the Discourse on the Simile of the Six Animals (Ṣaṭprāṇakopamasūtra) says: “Each of these six faculties has its own object and its own domain; each faculty seeks its own object and domain.”

(Treatise Master) That sutra is not referring to the six faculties themselves, for the five material faculties and the five consciousnesses are dependent by nature and therefore cannot possess the intention to see, hear, and so forth. When the sutra speaks of the eye faculty and so forth, it means the kind of mental consciousness that is induced and governed by the eye and so forth. In fact, the mental faculty operates alone (independently)—that is, it is not induced and governed by the five material faculties, but only by the mental faculty—and thus it does not direct its intention toward the domains and objects of the five faculties, but only toward the dharma ayatana (dharmāyatana). Therefore, the Discourse on the Simile of the Six Animals does not contradict the sutra cited above.

The Blessed One said: “Bhikṣus, I declare to you that all dharmas that must be directly penetrated (abhijñeya) and fully comprehended (parijñeya) (ānantaryamārga, vimuktimārga) are the eye, visible color and shape (rūpa), eye-consciousness, eye-contact, and the feeling that arises with eye-contact as its cause—painful feeling, pleasant feeling, and neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling…” continuing through “the feeling that arises with mental contact as its cause: these are what must be directly penetrated and fully comprehended.” (Saṃyutta, iv. 29).

This passage enables us to understand that the dharmas to be directly penetrated and fully comprehended are only those enumerated above. The “pudgala” is not among those dharmas; therefore, it is not something that can be discerned (vijñeya). Indeed, the wisdom (prajñā) upon which the practitioner relies to penetrate and fully comprehend has the same sphere (viṣaya) as mental consciousness (vijñāna).

Those masters who maintain that the eye can see the “pudgala” should understand that the eye sees only what truly exists within the “pudgala” [namely visible color and shape, just as in the case of the five faculties]. To say that one sees the “self” in what is not the “self” is to fall into the deep pit of wrong views.

The Buddha also explained that the term “pudgala” refers to the skandhas. In the Discourse on the Person (Pudgala-sūtra), he said: “Dependent upon the eye, with visible color and shape as object and condition, eye-consciousness arises; through the conjunction of these three factors, contact arises; and feeling, perception, attention, and so forth also arise at the same time.” The last four factors [consciousness (vijñāna), feeling (vedanā), perception (saṃjñā), volition (cetanā)] are the immaterial (arūpin) skandhas; the eye and visible color and shape are all the form skandha.

This is all that is meant when one speaks of a “person.” To express different nuances, various terms are used, such as “sentient being” (sattva), “person” (nara), “mind-born one” (manuja), “youth” (mānava), “one sustained by food” (poṣa), “living being” (jīva), “creature” (jantu), and “individual” (pudgala). One says of the first: “My eye sees visible color and shape”;

and in conventional usage: “This elder has such-and-such a name (Devadatta), belongs to such-and-such a people, is of such-and-such a lineage (Kāśyapa), consumes such-and-such food and drink, experiences such-and-such pleasure and pain, possesses such-and-such longevity, lives for such-and-such a time, and ends his life in such-and-such a manner.” Bhikṣus, you should know that these are merely expressions, modes of speech, and terms conforming to worldly usage.

For in the “pudgala” there are only impermanent things, conditionally formed, born from causes and conditions, and produced by karma.”

The Blessed One declared that only scriptures of explicit meaning should be relied upon and regarded as authoritative. The scripture we have just cited is of explicit meaning; no other interpretation can be given.

Furthermore, (1) the Buddha said to a brahmin: “If I say that all exists, this refers to the twelve bases of cognition.” Therefore, if the “pudgala” is not included among these twelve ayatanas, it does not exist; if it is included among them, one cannot say that it is ineffable.

(2) The masters of the Vātsīputrīya school recite a scripture that says: “Whatever pertains to the eye, whatever pertains to visible color and shape…” and continues: “Bhikṣus, because the Tathagata wished to encompass all these [that is, the twelve ayatanas], he called them ‘all’ and established that ‘all’ exists and consists of dharmas possessing intrinsic nature.” Since the “pudgala” is entirely absent from the foregoing dharmas, how can you say that it is a real entity?

(3) The Bimbisāra-sūtra says: “Ignorant ordinary beings, clinging to conventional designation, conceive that there is a ‘self’; yet there is no ‘self’ and nothing belonging to a ‘self,’ but only painful dharmas of the future, present, and past.”

(4) The holy woman (Arhati, an arhat bhikṣuṇī) Śila said to Māra: “You have fallen into the domain of wrong views (kudṛṣṭigata) because you falsely grasp a sentient being within an empty assemblage of conditioned formations (saṃskāras); the wise know that this being does not exist. Just as we call an assemblage of parts a ‘chariot,’ so too, when the world speaks of a ‘sentient being,’ it is the same: You should know that it is merely an assemblage of skandhas.”

(5) In the Kṣudrāgama, it is said to the brahmin Bādari: “Bādari, one who hears the truths can be liberated from the fetters: Through the mind one becomes defiled, and through the mind one is purified. The ‘self’ truly has no essential nature of a ‘self’; it is only through delusion that one conceives an existing ‘self.’ There is no sentient being (sattva), no ‘self,’ but only dharmas arising from causes: the skandhas, the ayatanas, and the dhatus—which constitute the twelve links of existence (bhavānga). When they are examined down to their very roots, no ‘pudgala’ can be found. Having seen that the internal is empty, one also sees that the external is empty, and there is not even a practitioner who contemplates emptiness.”

(6) The scripture says: “The five calamities arising from belief in a ‘self’ are: (a) establishing doctrines concerning a ‘self,’ a sentient being, and a living principle; (b) being unable to distinguish oneself from the non-Buddhist teachers; (c) following a path that is not the noble path; (d) the mind does not enter emptiness, does not become serene through faith, does not abide, and has no inclination toward it; (e) the qualities of the noble ones cannot be purified within oneself.”

(Vātsīputrīya) The foregoing scriptures are not authoritative, because they are not recited in our school.

(Treatise Master) Then, according to your doctrine, what is authoritative: your school or the Buddha’s teaching? If your own school is authoritative, then the Buddha is not your teacher, and you are not children of Śākya. If the Buddha’s teaching is authoritative, why do you not acknowledge the authority of all the Buddha’s teachings?

(Vātsīputrīya) The scriptures cited are not authentic teachings of the Buddha, because our school does not recite them.

(Treatise Master) That is not a valid reason. You will ask, “Why?”—Because all the other schools recite these scriptures, because these scriptures do not contradict other scriptures, and because they do not conflict with the nature of dharmas (dharmatā). If you brazenly and vehemently repudiate these scriptures by saying, “These scriptures are not authentic because we do not recite them,” that is truly shameless and contrary to every true meaning.

The position of the Vātsīputrīya school is even less acceptable because this school itself recites a scripture stating that “dharmas are not the ‘self’ and do not contain the ‘self.’” (Saṃyukta, 10, 7).

(Vātsīputrīya) We certainly recite this scripture, but the “pudgala” is neither the dharmas serving as its basis nor different from these dharmas; that is why the scripture says that “no dharma is the ‘self.’”

(Treatise Master) Indeed, that is so; and therefore the “pudgala” cannot be distinguished from mental consciousness, because the scripture clearly establishes that mental consciousness arises in dependence upon two conditions: the mental faculty (manas) and dharmas. Moreover, how will you explain the scripture’s statement: “To apprehend a ‘self’ in what is not the ‘self’ is precisely a distortion of perception, mind, and view”?

(Vātsīputrīya) The scripture merely says that there is distortion because one “apprehends a ‘self’ in what is not the ‘self’”; it does not say that “apprehending a ‘self’ in what is the ‘self’” is a distortion.

(Treatise Master) What does “that which is not the self” mean? Do you say that it refers to the skandhas, ayatanas, and dhatus? Your claim that the pudgala is neither identical with nor different from visible color, shape, and so forth contradicts your own position.

Moreover, the sutra (Saṃyutta, iii. 46) says: “Bhikshus, you should know that all brahmins and śramaṇas who contemplate a ‘self’ contemplate only the five aggregates of clinging.” Thus, it is not within a self, because there is a self, that people maintain the existence of a self; rather, it is only among dharmas that are not the self that they falsely grasp at the existence of a self. The sutra (Saṃyukta, 2, 15) also says: “All those who have recollected, are recollecting, or will recollect their former lives do so only by taking the five aggregates of clinging as their objects.” Thus, there can be no pudgala.

(Vātsīputrīyas) Yet this very sutra says: “In the past, I possessed material form.”

(Treatise Master) This statement is intended to show that a noble one capable of recollecting past lives recollects only the various characteristics of the continuum in those lives. The Buddha did not mean that this noble one perceives a real pudgala that actually possessed material form and so forth in those past lives, for to think in this way would be to fall into the view of a real personality (satkāyadṛṣṭi). Or, if the above statement bore such a meaning, the only course would be to reject this sutra as unreliable.

We conclude that when this sutra attributes the possession of visible color and so forth to a “self,” it is referring to a nominal self—just as when one speaks of a heap, this refers merely to an assemblage without any unity, or when one speaks of a stream of water, this refers merely to a succession without any permanence whatsoever.

(Vātsīputrīyas) If that is so, the Blessed One would not be one who knows all things, an Omniscient One. For mind and mental factors cannot know all dharmas when they themselves change, arising and ceasing at every moment. This capacity to know all things could therefore belong only to the self, to the pudgala.

(Treatise Master) The pudgala would become permanent (śāśvata) if it did not cease when the mind ceased, and this argument contradicts your doctrine that the pudgala cannot be determined as either permanent or impermanent. As for us [together with the Mahāsāṃghikas], we do not say that the Buddha is Omniscient in the sense of knowing all dharmas at the same time. The designation “Buddha” refers to a certain continuum—a continuum possessing an extraordinary capacity whereby, as soon as it directs the mind toward an object, an accurate cognition free from error immediately arises regarding the object one wishes to know.

Therefore, we call this continuum “Omniscient.” A single moment of mind is incapable of knowing everything. There is a verse on this point: “Just as fire can burn everything through the power of its continuum, so it is with Omniscience, and not through the capacity to know everything all at once.”

(Vātsīputrīyas) How can you prove that the term “Omniscient” refers to a continuum rather than to some self capable of knowing everything?

(Treatise Master) The scriptures speak of past, present, and future Buddhas (atītādivacanāt). For example, a verse says: “The Buddhas of the past, the Buddhas of the future, and the Buddhas of the present all dispel the sorrows of many beings.” Thus, according to your own school, it is the aggregates of existence that belong to the three times, not the pudgala.