阿毘達磨俱舍論

CHAPTER 5: ANALYSIS OF THE LATENT TENDENCIES

Part 19

It was previously stated that the differences in the world arise from karma, and that karma is able to increase precisely through the latent tendencies (anuśayas); without latent tendencies, karma would not have the capacity to bring forth (abhinirvartana) a new existence (punarbhava).

(Question) How many kinds of latent tendencies are there?

The stanza answers:

[The latent tendencies are the root of rebirth;

The latent tendencies are of six kinds:

Craving, and from it, aversion and conceit,

Ignorance, views, and doubt.]

Treatise: When a defilement (kleśa) becomes manifest, it performs ten functions: ⁽¹⁾ It makes its root more firmly established; that is, the acquisition (prāpti) of the defilement by a person possessing that defilement renders the defilement incapable of being abandoned; ⁽²⁾ it establishes a continuous series (saṃtatim avasthāpayati), that is, it continues to arise; ⁽³⁾ it prepares its “field” or “environment of growth,” that is, it makes the person possessing the defilement (āśraya, basis) suitable for the arising of the defilement; ⁽⁴⁾ it produces its offspring (niṣyanda), namely the secondary defilements (upakleśas), as resentment produces anger, and so forth; ⁽⁵⁾ it gives rise to (abhinirharati) karma;

⁽⁶⁾ it gathers its own causal requisites (svasaṃbhāraṃ parigṛhṇāti), namely improper mental attention (ayoniśomanaskāra); ⁽⁷⁾ it causes the person possessing the defilement to be mistaken regarding the object of cognition; ⁽⁸⁾ it bends (namayati) the mental continuum toward the object or directs it toward rebirth; ⁽⁹⁾ it causes the decline (vyutkrāmayati, parihāpayati) of wholesome qualities (kuśalapakṣa); ⁽¹⁰⁾ it becomes a bond (bandhaṇa) and prevents one from passing beyond the realm to which these defilements belong.

(Question) How many kinds of latent tendencies are there?

(Answer) There are six kinds: craving, and from it, aversion, conceit, ignorance, views, and doubt.

The expression “from it” (tathā) implies that it is precisely because craving exists that the other latent tendencies “find their place” (anuśayana) in their objective conditions, where they increase accordingly. This will be explained below.

If craving is analyzed into two kinds, there are altogether seven latent tendencies: ⁽¹⁾ the latent tendency of sensual craving (kāmarāgānuśaya), ⁽²⁾ the latent tendency of aversion (pratigha), ⁽³⁾ the latent tendency of craving for existence (bhavarāga), ⁽⁴⁾ the latent tendency of conceit (māna), ⁽⁵⁾ the latent tendency of ignorance (avidyā), ⁽⁶⁾ the latent tendency of wrong views (dṛṣṭi), and ⁽⁷⁾ the latent tendency of doubt (vicikitsā, vimati).

(Question) What does “the latent tendency of sensual craving” mean? Is it a latent tendency called sensual craving, or is it a latent tendency belonging to sensual craving that is distinct from sensual craving (kāmarāga)? If one maintains that sensual craving itself is the latent tendency, this contradicts the sutra.

The sutra (Saṃtukta, 33, 10; 35, 11) states: “Whoever dwells for a time with a mind not preyed upon (paryavasthita) by sensual craving, and whenever the bondage (paryavasthāna) of craving has just arisen knows the way to relinquish it, the bondage of craving will completely lose all its powerful force, and that person will abandon the latent tendency.” Here, when it is said that sensual craving is abandoned—and this sensual craving is contemporaneous with its latent tendency—the implication is that sensual craving and its latent tendency are two distinct dharmas.

If it is explained as a latent tendency belonging to sensual craving, this would establish the latent tendency as a dharma dissociated from the mind [and would imply the acquisition (prāpti) of sensual craving], which would in turn contradict the Fundamental Treatise. The Fundamental Treatise (Jñānaprasthāna, 6, 4) teaches that “the latent tendency of sensual craving (kāmarāgānuśaya) is associated with [that is, may be accompanied by] three feelings: pleasure, joy, and equanimity.” A dharma dissociated from the mind cannot be accompanied by these feelings.

According to the Vibhāṣā, the latent tendency of sensual craving is a latent tendency called sensual craving; sensual craving itself is the latent tendency. The same applies to the other defilements: doubt (vicikitśa) itself is the latent tendency of doubt.

(Question) But the sutra passage cited above says that sensual craving is abandoned together with its latent tendency; therefore, is the latent tendency not distinct from sensual craving?

(Answer) The Vibhāṣā holds that the expression “together with its latent tendency” means “together with its consequence (anubandha),” that is, together with its attendant bonds. Alternatively, the sutra uses the word anuśaya in the sense of “acquisition” (prāpti), because acquisition is the cause of the latent tendency. The Fundamental Treatise, however, explains matters solely according to their actual meaning and therefore states that latent tendencies are themselves defilements; consequently, latent tendencies are dharmas associated with the mind.

(Question) By what reasoning is it known that they are dharmas associated with the mind?

(Answer) Because the latent tendencies defile the mind, obscure the mind, and oppose wholesome qualities; and when wholesome qualities arise, the latent tendencies are not associated with the mind.

This demonstrates that it is precisely because of the latent tendencies that the mind is defiled, wholesome qualities not yet arisen are obstructed and prevented from arising, and wholesome qualities already arisen decline. Therefore, latent tendencies are not dharmas dissociated from the mind.

(Question) But dharmas dissociated from the mind could still possess such capacities.

(Answer) That is impossible. If latent tendencies were dissociated from the mind, they would always be manifest; and if they possessed such capacities, wholesome qualities could never arise. In reality, however, wholesome qualities do arise. Therefore, latent tendencies are not dharmas dissociated from the mind.

(Explanation) The masters who maintain that the latent tendencies are not associated with mind do not acknowledge that the three functions above belong to the latent tendencies; rather, they belong to the afflictions (kleśa) [that is, to the envelopments (paryavasthāna), and these dharmas do not always arise manifestly]. Therefore, the position of the Sautrāntikas is the most correct. The Sautrāntikas say that the compound “latent tendency of sensual craving” means “the latent tendency belonging to sensual craving.” Yet the latent tendency is neither associated with mind nor dissociated from mind, because it is not a distinct real entity (dravya).

What is called a latent tendency (anuśaya) is simply an affliction in a dormant state (the state of sleep); and what is called an envelopment (paryavasthāna) is simply an affliction in an awakened state. A dormant affliction is an affliction that is not presently active, that is, one remaining in the condition of a seed; an awakened affliction is an affliction presently active. The term “seed” designates a certain capacity (śakti) to produce an affliction, a capacity belonging to the person in question (āśraya, ātmabhāva) and engendered by a previous affliction.

It is just as there exists in a certain person the capacity to produce cognition by recollection (smṛti), a capacity engendered by cognition through direct experience (anubhavajñāna); and just as the capacity to produce a grain of rice—a capacity belonging to the rice plant and its sprout—is itself engendered by a grain of rice. Those masters who hold that the seed of an affliction is a dharma separate from the affliction, dissociated from mind, and called a latent tendency would consequently have to admit the existence of a real entity dissociated from mind that is the cause of cognition by recollection, just as in the case of the rice plant.

(Sarvāstivāda) You have no right to explain the compound “latent tendency of sensual craving” as “the latent tendency belonging to sensual craving,” because the sutra clearly teaches that the latent tendency is sensual craving itself. The Ṣaṭṣaṭka Sutra (Ṣaṭṣaṭkasūtra) says: “This person has the latent tendency of craving (rāgānuśaya) toward pleasant feeling.” [Clearly, the sutra means that when pleasant feeling arises, an affliction—craving (rāga)—is active (samudācar); and the sutra calls this active affliction a latent tendency.]

(Sautrāntika) The sutra says, “There is the latent tendency of craving”; it does not say, “At that moment there is the latent tendency of craving.” [At the moment of pleasant feeling, the latent tendency of craving is in the process of arising (utpadyate), but has not yet become manifest. In other words, at the moment of pleasant feeling there is an active craving, a kind of “awakened” craving;] when this pleasant feeling ceases, craving subsides into a dormant condition; and at that time there is only the latent tendency of craving, a dormant kind of craving that serves as the seed for “awakened” craving in the future.

Alternatively, when the sutra speaks of the latent tendency of craving (rāgānuśaya), it may intend to designate craving (rāga): the latent tendency of craving is merely the result of craving, and this is a case in which the cause is named after its result.

Further discussion of this matter should cease here, and we shall return to the main subject.

(Question) What is the meaning of the sutra’s division of craving into the two kinds of sensual craving and craving for existence? What is craving for existence?

(Answer) Attachment to the Form Realm and the Formless Realm is called craving for existence (bhavarāga) [in contrast to sensual craving (kāmarāga), which is attachment to sensual pleasures (kāma, kāmaguṇa) belonging exclusively to the Desire Realm].

(Question) Why is craving for existence used only with reference to the two higher realms?

(Answer) It is so named because this kind of craving is directed inward and because the notion that these two realms are realms of liberation must be rejected. Tradition (kila) explains: “In general, the attachment of beings in these two realms adheres to meditative attainment (samāpatti), [or more precisely, it takes as its object the kind of meditative absorption (dhyāna) ‘associated with savoring’ (āsvādanasaṃprayuktadhyāna)].” Here, the expression “in general” implies that these beings also have attachment to their palaces (vimāna), and so forth. The attachment that pertains specifically to these levels of meditative concentration is directed inward (antarmukhapravṛtta); it is therefore called craving for existence.

Moreover, some beings think that these two realms constitute liberation (mokṣa); therefore, the Blessed One called attachment to these two realms craving for existence.

[According to us], “existence” (bhava) here designates the supporting body (ātmabhāva, āśraya). These beings dwell in meditative concentration and, while enjoying meditative attainment (samāpatti), also enjoy their own persons (their own support, svāśraya, svātmabhāva). Precisely because they have become detached from attachment to sensual pleasures (kāmavītarāga), they enjoy only their own persons (their own being), not external objects. This is why attachment to the two higher realms is called craving for existence.

(Question) Why are these six latent tendencies divided into ten kinds, as stated above in the Fundamental Treatise (Jñānaprasthāna, 5, 11)?

The stanza answers:

[Because views differ, the six are established as ten.

The different kinds of views are the view of a real personality,

The extreme view, wrong view,

Attachment to views, and attachment to precepts and observances.]

Commentary: Because view (dṛṣṭi) is of five kinds, the six latent tendencies are established as ten kinds. Thus, the essential natures of the five kinds of latent tendencies—craving (rāga), aversion (pratigha), conceit (māna), ignorance (avidyā), and doubt (vicikitsā)—do not belong to the category of view; while the five kinds of latent tendencies—the view of a real personality (satkāyadṛṣṭi), wrong view (mithyādṛṣṭi), the extreme view (antagrāhadṛṣṭi), attachment to views (dṛṣṭiparāmarśa), and attachment to precepts and observances (śīlavrataparāmarśa)—all have the nature of view.

Moreover, the Fundamental Treatise teaches that these ten latent tendencies are further established as thirty-six latent tendencies belonging to the Desire Realm, thirty-one latent tendencies belonging to the Form Realm, and thirty-one latent tendencies belonging to the Formless Realm, making a total of ninety-eight kinds of latent tendencies.

(Question) On the basis of what distinctions are all the above kinds of latent tendencies established?

The stanza answers:

[Because their modes of activity, categories, and realms differ, the six latent tendencies

Are established as ninety-eight kinds.

In the Desire Realm, seeing the Truth of Suffering and so forth

Eliminates ten, seven, seven, eight, and four latent tendencies;

That is, in the foregoing order, excluding

Three views, two views, all views, and doubt.

In the Form and Formless Realms, aversion is excluded;

The remaining numbers are the same as in the Desire Realm.]

Commentary: All ten latent tendencies mentioned above are eliminated by seeing the Truth of Suffering in the Desire Realm.

Seven latent tendencies are eliminated by seeing the Truth of Origin, and seven latent tendencies are eliminated by seeing the Truth of Cessation; that is, excluding the view of a real personality, the extreme view, and attachment to precepts and observances.

Eight latent tendencies are eliminated by seeing the Truth of the Path; that is, excluding the view of a real personality and the extreme view.

Thus, there are altogether thirty-two latent tendencies that can be eliminated by seeing the Four Noble Truths, because seeing the Four Noble Truths alone is sufficient to eliminate them.

Four latent tendencies are eliminated by the Path of Cultivation: craving, aversion, ignorance, and conceit, because those who have seen the truths can eliminate these latent tendencies through cultivation of the Noble Path (mārgābhyāsa).

Thus, the personality view (satkāya) belongs to only one category (ekaprakāra), since it is abandoned by seeing the Truth of Suffering; the extreme view is likewise. Wrong view belongs to four categories, since it can be abandoned by seeing the Truth of Suffering, the Truth of Origin, the Truth of Cessation, and the Truth of the Path; the same is true of attachment to views (dṛṣṭiparāmarśa) and doubt (vicikitsā). Attachment to precepts and observances belongs to two categories, since it can be abandoned by seeing the Truth of Suffering and the Truth of the Path. Craving, hatred, conceit, and ignorance each belong to five categories, since they can be abandoned by seeing the Four Truths and by the Path of Cultivation.

(Question) What are the characteristics of the latent tendencies belonging to the categories abandoned by seeing suffering through those abandoned by cultivation?

(Answer) When the object (ālambana) of a latent tendency belongs to a category that can be abandoned by seeing a certain truth, that latent tendency is said to be abandoned by seeing that very truth. The other latent tendencies can be abandoned by the Path of Cultivation.

Thus, there are altogether twelve views (dṛṣṭis), four doubts (vicikitsās), five cravings (rāgas), five instances of hatred (pratighas), five conceits (mānas), and five forms of ignorance (avidyās), making a total of thirty-six latent tendencies belonging to the Desire Realm.

The foregoing latent tendencies, with the exception of the five kinds of hatred, constitute thirty-one latent tendencies belonging to the Form Realm and likewise to the Formless Realm.

Therefore, the Fundamental Treatise (Jñānaprasthāna) says: These six kinds of latent tendencies are established as ninety-eight kinds on the basis of differences in their modes of activity (ākāra), categories (prakāra), or manners of abandonment, and realms (dhātu).

Of these ninety-eight latent tendencies, eighty-eight are abandoned by seeing, because they are impaired by receptivity (kṣānti), and ten are abandoned by cultivation, because they are impaired by knowledge (jñāna).

(Question) Is the above classification definitive?

The verse replies:

[Latent tendencies impaired by receptivity,

If at the Summit of Existence, are abandoned by seeing;

If elsewhere, they are abandoned by seeing or cultivation.

Latent tendencies impaired by knowledge are abandoned only by cultivation.]

Commentary: Here, the term “receptivity” (kṣānti) refers to receptivity to Dharma knowledge (dharmajñānakṣāntis) and receptivity to subsequent knowledge (anvayajñānakṣāntis).

Among the latent tendencies impaired by receptivity, only those belonging to the Summit of Existence (bhavāgra) are abandoned by the Path of Seeing, because only receptivity to subsequent knowledge can bring about their abandonment. [Only noble ones, by relying on the undefiled Noble Path, abandon these latent tendencies.]

The latent tendencies belonging to the other eight stages (bhūmis)—namely, the Desire Realm, the Form Realm, and the first three meditative levels of the Formless Realm—can be abandoned either by the Path of Seeing or by the Path of Cultivation. Noble ones abandon these latent tendencies by the Path of Seeing, not by the Path of Cultivation, through receptivity to Dharma knowledge or receptivity to subsequent knowledge, according to whether these latent tendencies belong to the Desire Realm or to the higher stages. Ordinary beings abandon them only by the Path of Cultivation, not by the Path of Seeing, because these latent tendencies can be abandoned through the cultivation of conventional knowledge (lokasaṃvṛtijñāna).

Latent tendencies impaired by knowledge are all abandoned by the Path of Cultivation at every stage, whether in noble ones or ordinary beings. Noble ones abandon them through the cultivation of undefiled knowledge (anāsravajñāna), while ordinary beings do so through the cultivation of conventional knowledge.

Other masters maintain that non-Buddhists (bāhyaka) cannot abandon the kinds of latent tendencies abandoned by seeing. This is because the Mahākarmavibhāgasūtra teaches that a wrong view taking the Desire Realm as its object remains active in a non-Buddhist who has become detached from desire—that is, one who has abandoned the craving (rāga) taking the Desire Realm as its object, which is of the kind abandoned by the Path of Cultivation.

The Brahmajālasūtra also says that non-Buddhists who are detached from desire still possess all kinds of views (dṛṣṭi) taking the Desire Realm as their object: among them are those who formulate doctrines concerning the past (pūrvāntakalpaka), those who maintain that everything is eternal (śāśvatavādin), that some things are eternal, or that everything is without a cause. [If someone were here to raise the objection that the “views” of those who have become detached from the Desire Realm all belong to the Form Realm, then] in that case the Desire Realm could not serve as the object of afflictions (kleśa) belonging to the Form Realm, because these people have already become detached from the Desire Realm; thus, they have not yet abandoned the views belonging to the Desire Realm.

The Vibhāṣā explains this issue by saying that those who are “detached from desire” fall away from [that detachment] as soon as they give rise to such views, just as Devadatta fell away from his supernormal powers (ṛddhi).

(Question) It was previously said that views are divided into five kinds on the basis of their modes of activity (ākāra). What, then, are these five kinds of views?

The verse replies:

[The view of self and what belongs to self,

Of annihilation and permanence,

Of denial, of taking the inferior to be superior,

And of mistaking the cause and the Noble Path.

These are precisely the five kinds of views.]

Commentary: ⁽¹⁾ Grasping at self and what belongs to self (ātmātmayagrāha) is precisely the personality view (satkāyadṛṣṭi). It is called “existing” (sat) because it is perishing; it is called a “collection” (kāya) because it is an accumulation. Thus, “existing collection” means “an accumulation of things that are perishing,” namely, the five aggregates of clinging (upādānaskandhas).

In the compound “existing collection” used here, “existing” serves to eliminate the notion of permanence, while “collection” serves to eliminate the notion of unity (piṇḍagrāha). The aggregates are regarded as self because notions of permanence and unity have previously arisen.

The personality view means a view concerning the existing collection.

In fact, all views whose objects are defiled (sāsravālambana), such as the extreme view (antagrāhadṛṣṭi) and so forth, are views concerning the existing collection—that is, the five aggregates. However, because they are all views concerning the existing collection, they are not therefore the specific “view of self and what belongs to self.” (Vibhāṣā, 49, 11)

According to the teaching of the Blessed One, it is precisely grasping at self and what belongs to self that is called the personality view: “Bhikṣus, all ascetics or brahmins in this world who believe in a self regard as self only the five aggregates of clinging.” (Saṃyukta, 21, 17; Madhyama, 58, 1; Vibhāṣā, 8, 7).

⁽²⁾ With regard to what has been grasped as self, to hold that it is permanent or that it is annihilated is in either case an extreme view, because it is precisely a mistaken belief in the extreme (anta) doctrines of permanence or annihilation.

⁽³⁾ To deny (apavāda) what truly exists—the truth of suffering and so forth—and to declare that “it does not exist” (nāsti) is wrong view (mithyādṛṣṭi). All erroneous views are wrong views; nevertheless, only denials such as these are specifically called wrong view because they are the most grievously erroneous views, just as the word “foul” is used to designate an exceedingly foul odor. Wrong view alone has the nature of denial (apavāda), whereas the other kinds of views have the nature of affirmation, being false superimpositions (samāropikā).

⁽⁴⁾ To regard what is unwholesome, inferior, and ought to be abandoned (hīna) as wholesome and exalted (ucca) is attachment to views (dṛṣṭiparāmarśa). Here, when speaking of what “ought to be abandoned” (hīna), to which dharmas does this refer?—It refers to the contaminated dharmas (sāsrava), because they are all abandoned (prahīna) by the noble ones. The kind of view that includes this attachment is simply called “attachment” (parāmarśa).

Strictly speaking, it should be called “attachment to views and the like” (dṛṣṭiādiparāmarśa), but because the words “and the like” have been omitted, it is simply called attachment to views.

⁽⁵⁾ To regard what is not a cause and not the Noble Path as a cause and as the Noble Path is attachment to rules and observances (śīlavrataparāmarśa): for example, regarding Maheśvara, Prajāpati, or any other entities that are not causes of the world as the cause of the world; regarding sacrificial rites, walking through fire, passing through water, and so forth—which cannot lead to rebirth in the heavenly realms—as causes of rebirth there; regarding rules and ascetic practices alone (śīlavratamātraka) as the path leading to liberation, although such rules and practices alone do not constitute the path leading to liberation; regarding the kinds of knowledge (jñāna) taught by the Sāṃkhyas and Yoga as paths to liberation, although in reality they are not; and so forth.

The above are the five kinds of views.

(Question) If the kind of view that mistakes dharmas that are not causes of the world for causes is therefore called attachment to rules and observances, why is this kind of view not abandoned through insight into the Truth of Origination (samudayasatya), since it is a mistaken understanding (vipratipannatva) of causation?

The stanza answers:

[With regard to Maheśvara and so forth, which are not causes, they are nevertheless grasped as causes

Because they are regarded as permanent and as self;

Therefore, this is abandoned only through insight into suffering.]

Exposition: To regard Maheśvara (Īśvara) or Prajāpati as the cause of the world necessarily entails regarding them as permanent and unique beings, possessing a self (ātman) and the power of agency (kartar). The views that cling to the permanence and selfhood of Maheśvara or Prajāpati are abandoned only through insight into the Truth of Suffering; therefore, when these views are abandoned, the view that grasps Maheśvara or Prajāpati as the cause of the world is also abandoned.

(Question) The view that one will be reborn in a heavenly realm by immolating oneself or leaping into water, and the view that undertaking rules and observances and cultivating ascetic practices will lead to purity (śuddhi), are both unrelated to the wrong views of permanence and self. Why, then, is it said that these views are abandoned through insight into the Truth of Suffering? They should properly be abandoned through insight into the Truth of Origination.

The Root Treatise (Jñānaprasthāna, 20, 11) states: “There are non-Buddhists who give rise to the view that if a person (puruṣapudgala) undertakes the observances of an ox (gośāila), a wild animal (mṛga), or a dog, that person will attain purity, liberation, and deliverance (niḥsaraṇa); will completely transcend the suffering and pleasure [of the three realms]; and will reach a state in which neither suffering nor pleasure remains.

All views that regard dharmas which are not causes as causes belong to attachment to rules and observances, and attachment to rules and observances is always abandoned through insight into the Truth of Suffering.” The Vibhāṣā therefore says that both of the above kinds of views are abandoned through insight into the Truth of Suffering because they both involve delusion (vipratipannatva) concerning suffering.

(Question) This reasoning goes too far (atiprasanga)! All afflictions () whose objects are contaminated dharmas involve delusion concerning suffering [because all contaminated dharmas are suffering]. Furthermore, what kind of attachment to rules and observances is abandoned through insight into the Truth of the Path?

If the Vibhāṣā says that it is the kind that takes as its object a dharma to be abandoned through insight into the Path—that is, one of the eight latent tendencies (anuśayas), the first of which is wrong view—then attachment to rules and observances should likewise involve delusion concerning suffering. Moreover, how can it be said that attachment to rules and observances takes as its objects dharmas to be abandoned through insight into the Path?

For ⁽¹⁾ in the case of a person (pudgala) who holds the wrong view (mythyādṛṣṭi) or doubt (vicikitsā) that “there is no Noble Path,” how could that person attain purity through this wrong view or doubt? ⁽²⁾ If this person follows (parāmṛśya, gṛhītvā) the path of liberation established by the Sāṃkhyas and others and says, “This alone is the Noble Path; the Buddha’s path is not the Noble Path,” then this non-Buddhist imagines that purity has been attained through the Sāṃkhya “Noble Path,” not through the wrong view that takes the Noble Path as its object.

Furthermore, when a person thinks that purity has been attained through a wrong view abandoned by insight into the Truth of Origination or the Truth of Cessation, why could that person’s attachment to rules and observances not be abandoned through these very two kinds of insight?

Thus, this issue requires further investigation.

(Question) Two inverted views (viparyaya, viparyāsa), concerning permanence and self, were mentioned above. Are these the only two?

(Answer) There are four kinds: ⁽¹⁾ regarding the impermanent (anitya) as permanent (nitya), ⁽²⁾ regarding suffering (duḥkha) as pleasure (sukha), ⁽³⁾ regarding the impure (aśuci, aśubha) as pure (śuci), and ⁽⁴⁾ regarding what is without self (anātman) as self (ātman).

(Question) What is the essential nature of these four?

The stanza answers:

[The intrinsic nature of the four inversions

Arises from three inverted views,

Through error, conjecture, and conviction;

Perception and mind arise through the power of view.]

Exposition: The intrinsic nature of the four inverted views derives from three kinds of views. The first inverted view is the eternalist aspect of the extreme view; the second and third inverted views are the two aspects of attachment to views that grasp pleasure and purity; and the fourth inverted view is the aspect of the view of self within the view of a real body.

Some masters hold that the entire view of a real body constitutes the inversion concerning self (ātmaviparyāsa), rather than only the view of self (ātmadṛṣṭi); thus, it also includes the view of what belongs to the self (ātmīyadṛṣṭi).

The Vibhāṣā says: “How could the view of self constitute only a part of the inversion concerning self? The Sūtra on the Four Inversions (Viparyāsas) does not speak of this. [The sūtra says only: ‘To regard what is without self as self is an inverted view.’] The sūtra also says: ‘Whoever holds that the self exercises sovereign power over the five aggregates of clinging (upādānaskandhas) possesses the view of what belongs to the self.’ [Therefore, the view of what belongs to the self differs from the view of self from which it arises.]

However, we think that the view of self has two branches (dvimukhī): the view that clings to self and the view that clings to what belongs to the self (aḥmkāra, manakāra). If the view that clings to what belongs to the self were different from the view that clings to self, then views in other cases, such as the view ‘by the self’ (māya) and the view ‘with respect to the self,’ would constitute many different kinds of attachment to self. Therefore, the entire view of a real body is included within the inverted view concerning self.

The other afflictions (kleśa) are not inverted views because they do not possess all three characteristics: ⁽¹⁾ being entirely erroneous (one-sided inversion), ⁽²⁾ examination (saṃtīraka), and ⁽³⁾ definitive assertion (false imputation). The view of annihilation (ucchedadṛṣṭi), which is a part of the extreme view (antagrāhadṛṣṭi), and wrong view (mithyādṛṣṭi) do not have the characteristic of definitive assertion, that is, they do not involve erroneous superimposition (samāropa), because both are directed toward the nonexistence of some existent thing (abhāvamukhapravṛtta, proceeding through the approach of nonexistence).

Attachment to precepts and observances definitively asserts that precepts and ascetic practices can lead to purification; this also means that attachment to precepts and observances is not entirely an inverted view, because precepts and ascetic practices do contribute to purification.

The other kinds of afflictions do not involve examination and therefore are not inverted views.

(Question) But the Blessed One said: “To regard the impermanent as permanent is precisely inversion of perception (saṃjñāviparyāsa), inversion of mind (cittaviparyāsa), and inversion of view (dṛṣṭiviparyāsa)”; the same applies to suffering, impurity, and non-self (Mahāsaṃgītidharmaviparyāsa; Aṅguttara, ii. 52; Vibhaṅga, 376; Visuddhimagga, 683). Yet neither perception nor mind involves examination. Thus, the definition of inverted view presented above is inaccurate.

(Answer) In fact, only view (dṛṣṭi) properly belongs to inversion; but because perception and mind are associated with view and have the same mode of activity as view, they too are called inverted.

(Question) If so, why are feeling and the other mental factors associated with view not called inverted?

(Answer) Because people commonly speak of the inversion of perception and the inversion of mind, but never of the inversion of feeling.

A stream-enterer (Srotāpanna) eliminates all inverted views (Jñānaprasthāna, 8, 4), because seeing (darśana) the Four Noble Truths—the seeing of the truths—which is capable of eliminating views (dṛṣṭi), can also eliminate the perceptions and minds associated with those views.

Another school (the Vibhajyavādins) holds that the inverted view which mistakes the impermanent for the permanent gives rise to three kinds of inversion: inversion of perception, inversion of mind, and inversion of view. The same applies to mistaking non-self for self, and so forth. Thus, there are altogether twelve kinds of inversion arising from these four inverted views.

Among these twelve, eight inversions are eliminated by the Path of Seeing, while four inversions—namely, the perceptions and minds associated with pleasure (sukha) and purity (śuci)—are eliminated by both the Path of Seeing and the Path of Cultivation.

Indeed, noble ones (Āryas), who are regarded as having eliminated all latent tendencies (anuśayas) abandoned by the Path of Seeing, certainly still possess perceptions of pleasure and purity, because, so long as they have not become free from desire (avītarāga), attachment to sensual pleasure still arises in them.

The Vaibhāṣika masters do not accept this argument. If, merely because noble ones still have perceptions of pleasure and purity, one concludes that they remain inverted regarding pleasure and purity, then one would also have to admit that they remain subject to inversion regarding self (ātmaviparyāsa), which is one of the eight inversions they ought not to possess, because they certainly still have perceptions and thoughts concerning sentient beings (sattva). Attachment involving sensual desire (kāmarāga) in relation to a woman or to oneself is precisely a manifestation of such perceptions and thoughts concerning sentient beings.

Furthermore, the sutra says: “The learned noble disciple sees and knows things as they truly are: ‘This is the truth of suffering,’ and so forth. At that time, inverted perceptions, minds, and views—such as taking the impermanent to be permanent—are all eliminated in them”; and so forth. Thus, only perceptions and minds that arise from views and are associated with views (dṛṣṭisamuttha, dṛṣṭisaṃprayukta) are called inverted, not the others, namely, the perceptions and minds eliminated by the Path of Cultivation.

In fact, noble ones give rise to attachment involving sensual desire (kāmarāga) because they are temporarily deceived when first perceiving an object, just as when one first sees a circle of fire or a painting of a Yakṣa.

Nevertheless, the Venerable Ānanda said to the Venerable Vāgīśa: “Because of the inversion of perception, your mind is burning.” If the Vaibhāṣika argument above is accepted, how can these words be explained?

Therefore, trainees have not completely eliminated the eight inversions of perception and mind. In fact, these inversions are eliminated only through correctly seeing and knowing the truths as they truly are (yathābhūtaparijñānāt), and not through anything else. Thus, the scriptural passage cited above by the Vaibhāṣikas merely indicates the means (upāya) by which these inversions are eliminated and does not contradict the passage concerning Vāgīśa.

(Question) The latent tendencies and views (dṛṣṭi) are of many different kinds; is the same true of the other latent tendencies?

(Answer) The latent tendency of pride (māna) is likewise.

[There are seven kinds of pride; nine kinds of pride are formed from three kinds of pride;

All are eliminated by the Path of Seeing and the Path of Cultivation.

In noble ones, latent tendencies such as the murderous defilement, and so forth,

Although eliminated by the Path of Cultivation, do not become manifest.]

Treatise: There are altogether seven kinds of pride: pride (māna), overweening pride (adhimāna), pride beyond pride (mānatimāna), the pride “I am” (asmimāna), conceit of superiority (abhimāna), inferiority pride (ūnamāna), and wrong pride (mithyāmāna).

The arrogance of the mind is generally called pride. Because its modes of operation (pravṛtti, prakāra) differ, pride is divided into seven kinds: ⁽¹⁾ Pride is the arising of an arrogant mind when one thinks, “I am superior” (viśiṣṭa), or “I am equal” (sama), in comparison with one who is inferior (hīna) or equal to oneself; ⁽²⁾ overweening pride is thinking, “I am superior” or “I am equal,” in comparison with one who is equal or superior to oneself; ⁽³⁾ pride beyond pride is thinking, “I am superior,” in comparison with one who is superior to oneself; ⁽⁴⁾ the pride “I am” is the arising of an arrogant mind through attachment to the five appropriated skandhas as self and belonging to self;

⁽⁵⁾ conceit of superiority is thinking that one has attained exceptional qualities (viśeṣa)—that is, uncontaminated qualities or contaminated qualities dependent upon meditative concentration (samādhisaṃniśrita)—when one has not actually attained them; ⁽⁶⁾ inferiority pride is thinking, “I am only slightly inferior,” in comparison with one who is in fact far superior to oneself; ⁽⁷⁾ wrong pride is believing that one possesses qualities (guṇa) that one does not actually possess.

The Root Treatise (Jñānaprasthāna, 20, 6) analyzes pride into nine kinds: ⁽¹⁾ the pride that “I am superior,” ⁽²⁾ the pride that “I am equal,” ⁽³⁾ the pride that “I am inferior,” ⁽⁴⁾ the pride that “there is one superior to me,” ⁽⁵⁾ the pride that “there is one equal to me,” ⁽⁶⁾ the pride that “there is one inferior to me,” ⁽⁷⁾ the pride that “there is none superior to me,” ⁽⁸⁾ the pride that “there is none equal to me,” and ⁽⁹⁾ the pride that “there is none inferior to me.”

These nine kinds arise from three of the seven kinds listed above: pride, overweening pride, and inferiority pride.

The first three kinds of pride—the pride that “I am superior,” the pride that “I am equal,” and the pride that “I am inferior”—are precisely those based upon the view of self. First, because one thinks of “I,” overweening pride, pride, and inferiority pride then arise successively. Among them, one case is called pride because one says, “I am superior”; another is called overweening pride because it is based upon a view (dṛṣṭi), and so forth.

The next three kinds of pride are, in their order, inferiority pride, pride, and overweening pride.

The final three kinds, in their respective order, are pride, excessive pride, and inferior pride.

(Question) When one is greatly inferior to another but thinks, “I am only slightly inferior,” this is inferior pride because an arrogant state of mind has arisen. But when one thinks, “No one is inferior to me” (the pride that there is no one inferior to oneself), how can this be called arrogance (unnatisthāna)?

(Answer) It can still be called arrogance because, when comparing oneself with a certain group of people superior to oneself, one still thinks oneself superior, even though one clearly knows that one is actually inferior.

The explanation of the Jñānaprasthāna has been presented above. According to the Prakaraṇapāda, however, the first kind of pride, “the pride that I am superior,” arises from three of the seven kinds of pride: pride, excessive pride, and pride exceeding pride. This is because one thinks oneself superior to one who is inferior, superior to one who is equal, and superior to one who is supreme (contemplating the distinct objects of the inferior, the equal, and the superior).

(Question) How are these seven kinds of pride eliminated?

(Answer) All of them, including the pride of “I am” (asmimāna), are eliminated by the Path of Seeing and the Path of Cultivation.

(Question) Can the latent tendencies eliminated by cultivation that have not yet been eliminated in noble beings continue to become manifest (samudācaranti)?

(Answer) This is not invariably so. Certain latent tendencies eliminated by cultivation definitely do not become manifest in noble beings, as in the case of the fettering defilement (paryavasthāna) associated with killing living beings (the fetter of killing). Although this fettering defilement is eliminated by cultivation, it cannot become manifest in noble beings.

Here, “the fetter of killing” refers to the defilement (kleśa) that causes a person deliberately to commit the offense of killing. “And so forth” refers to other cases, such as stealing, sexual misconduct, false speech, craving for nonexistence, and a certain kind of craving for existence.

Craving for nonexistence (vibhavatṛṣṇā) is also eliminated by the Path of Cultivation. Here, “nonexistence” refers to the impermanence of the three realms (traidhātukī anityatā); craving for nonexistence is the longing (prārthana) for this impermanence.

A certain kind of craving for existence (bhavatṛṣṇā) refers to the desire to become the nāga king Airāvaṇa, and so forth.

(Question) The kinds of pride and so forth have been discussed above. Among them are those eliminated by cultivation that have not yet been eliminated; why, then, can they not become manifest in noble beings?

The stanza answers:

[The kinds of pride and so forth, the pride of “I am,”

And unwholesome remorse,

Do not arise in noble beings,

Because they are fostered by views and doubt.]

Treatise: The kinds of pride (mānavidhā) and so forth cannot arise or become manifest in noble beings; the pride of “I am” is likewise. Here, “and so forth” refers to other latent tendencies, such as the fetter of killing, craving for nonexistence, and a certain kind of craving for existence.

(Question) Why is this so?

(Answer) Because all these latent tendencies are fostered by views (dṛṣṭi); and once that which fostered them has been destroyed, they no longer possess the power to arise [or noble beings can no longer cause them to arise again].

The kinds of pride (māna) and the conceit of “I am” (asmitā) are fostered by the view of a real personality (satkāyadṛṣṭi); the fetters of killing and so forth are fostered by wrong view; craving for nonexistence is fostered by the view of annihilation (ucchedadṛṣṭi); and a certain kind of craving for existence is fostered by the view of permanence (śāśvatadṛṣṭi).

Although unwholesome remorse is eliminated by cultivation, it still cannot become manifest in noble beings because it is fostered by doubt (vicikitsā).

(Question) Among the ninety-eight latent tendencies, which are universally pervasive (sarvaga, sarvatraga), and which are not universally pervasive?

The stanza answers:

[The views and doubts eliminated by seeing suffering and its origin,

The ignorance associated with them,

And unassociated ignorance,

Take as objects all dharmas within their own realm;

Of these, excluding two views,

The remaining nine latent tendencies also take the higher planes as objects.

Except for acquisition, the dharmas that arise together with these latent tendencies

Are all universally pervasive.]

Treatise: There are eleven latent tendencies: the five kinds of views eliminated by seeing; wrong view and attachment to views eliminated by seeing the origin of suffering; two kinds of doubt and two kinds of ignorance eliminated by seeing suffering and seeing its origin. These eleven latent tendencies are called universally pervasive because they take as objects the entirety of their own realm and plane.

(Question) When it is said here that they take all things as objects, does this mean that they successively take as objects all dharmas within their own realm, or that they take them all as objects simultaneously? If successively, the other latent tendencies should also be universally pervasive. If simultaneously, this cannot be accepted, because no one regards this entire world as a means of attaining purity; only certain practices are objects of attachment to rules and observances. Nor does anyone regard all dharmas within this realm and plane as the cause of the world.

(Answer of the Vibhāṣā) Universally pervasive dharmas do not take the whole of their own realm as their object simultaneously. Rather, they take their own realm as their object according to five distinct categories (the five classes). Here, “the whole” means all five of these categories (prakārasarvatā).

(Question) If universal pervasiveness is understood in the foregoing sense, then craving (tṛṣṇā) and pride must also be universally pervasive. If there is a view of self (ātmadṛṣṭi) regarding the five aggregates of clinging, there will also be craving for self (ātmatṛṣṇā) regarding the five aggregates of clinging. If there is a view of supremacy (agradṛṣṭi, or attachment to views, dṛṣṭiparāmarśa) or a view of purity (śuddhidṛṣṭi, or attachment to rules and observances, śīlavrataparāmarśa) regarding a certain thing, there will also be longing (prārthanā) for that thing. In all the foregoing cases, pride must also be present.

(Vibhāṣā) If this is asserted, how would craving and pride be eliminated? In the case of the view of a real personality and so forth, their objects are eliminated by the Path of Seeing and the Path of Cultivation. Would craving and pride therefore also be eliminated either by the Path of Seeing or by the Path of Cultivation?

(Treatise Master) When their objects are mixed (vyāmiśra), craving and pride are eliminated by the Path of Cultivation. Alternatively, they may also be eliminated by the Path of Seeing because they function through the power of views that gives rise to them (dṛṣṭibalādhānavartitva).

(Vibhāṣā) Craving and pride are defilements having particular characteristics (svalakṣṇa), not common characteristics (sāmānya); therefore, they are not universally pervasive. [Craving and pride may arise with respect to an object regarding which the view of self has arisen, but they cannot arise with respect to the entirety of that object simultaneously, for they lack the power to take all things as objects at once.]

The foregoing describes the eleven universally pervasive latent tendencies [capable of taking all five categories as objects] within their own respective realms and planes—that is, latent tendencies manifesting in a person who belongs to a particular realm and plane (sabhāgadhātusarvatraga).

Apart from the view of a self and the view of attachment to extremes, the remaining nine latent defilements also have the character of being universal with respect to another realm or plane (visabhāga); these latent defilements sometimes take only one other realm or plane as their object, but sometimes take two, as the Prakaraṇapāda (5, 10) says: “There are latent defilements belonging to the Desire Realm (that is, latent defilements arising in beings belonging to the Desire Realm) that can take as their objects dharmas belonging to the Form Realm, dharmas belonging to the Formless Realm, or dharmas belonging to both the Form Realm and the Formless Realm. [There are latent defilements belonging to the Form Realm that can take as their objects dharmas belonging to the Formless Realm].”

(Question) When beings in the Desire Realm have conceived of Great Brahmā as a sentient being (the view of a sentient being, sattvadṛṣṭi) and as eternal (the view of permanence, nityadṛṣṭi), these beings have thereby entertained the view of a self and the view of attachment to extremes regarding something belonging to another, higher realm or plane. It is therefore surely mistaken to exclude these two views from the universal latent defilements relating to another realm or plane.

(Answer) In fact, because they do not conceive of self and what belongs to self with regard to Great Brahmā, the so-called view of a sentient being mentioned above is not the view of a self. Moreover, since the view of attachment to extremes can arise only when the view of a self is present, the view of permanence mentioned above is likewise not the view of attachment to extremes. (Vibhāṣā, 18, 18).

(Question) If so, what kind of view is called the view of a sentient being and the view of permanence with regard to Great Brahmā?

The Abhidharma masters (Ābhidhārmikas) say: “In this case there is no view (dṛṣṭi), but only false cognition (mithyājñāna).”

(Question) Why are other kinds of erroneous views regarding Great Brahmā regarded as views, whereas the view of a sentient being and the view of permanence are not?

(Answer) Because this has been determined on the basis of our own school’s doctrine. (Vibhāṣā, 18, 18)

(Question) Is it only the latent defilements that have the character of being universal?

(Answer) Apart from the factors of acquisition (prāptis), the dharmas concomitant with the universal latent defilements are also called universal. Concomitant dharmas such as feeling (vedanā), and so forth, are universal, but the factors of acquisition are not, because acquisition (prāpti) and that which is acquired (prāpya) do not have a common result.

Thus the question posed here is whether all universal latent defilements are universal causes. The answer should be explained through four cases: ⁽¹⁾ Universal latent defilements belonging to the future are not universal causes; ⁽²⁾ dharmas concomitant with universal latent defilements (the dharmas coexistent with them) belonging to the past and present are universal causes, but these universal latent defilements are not universal causes; ⁽³⁾ universal latent defilements belonging to the past and present are universal causes; ⁽⁴⁾ dharmas concomitant with universal latent defilements belonging to the future are neither universal latent defilements nor universal causes.

(Question) Among the ninety-eight latent defilements, how many kinds take uncontaminated dharmas (anāsrava)—namely cessation and the Truth of the Path—as their objects, and how many kinds take contaminated dharmas (sāsrava) as their objects?

The stanza answers:

[Views and doubt abandoned through seeing cessation and the path,

The ignorance associated with them,

And unassociated ignorance,

Are the six kinds of latent defilements that take uncontaminated dharmas as their objects;

Of these, the latent defilements that take cessation as their object

Take only the cessation belonging to their own plane as their object;

The latent defilements that take the Truth of the Path as their object in the six and nine planes

Do so because their counteractive and reciprocal characteristics differ.

Craving, aversion, conceit, and the two attachments

Never take uncontaminated dharmas as their objects,

Because they must be relinquished,

Because these are not objects that provoke hostility,

And because they are peaceful, pure, and supreme objects.]

Treatise: There are three kinds of latent defilements abandoned through seeing the Truth of Cessation: false view, doubt, and the ignorance associated with them or unassociated ignorance; and there are three kinds of latent defilements abandoned through seeing the Truth of the Path, which are the same as the foregoing. Together these constitute the six kinds of latent defilements whose objects are uncontaminated dharmas. Apart from these six kinds, all other latent defilements take contaminated dharmas as their objects.

The three kinds of latent defilements—false view, doubt, and ignorance—that are abandoned through seeing the Truth of Cessation take cessation as their object, but they do not take all cessations as their objects: when they belong to the Desire Realm, they take only the cessation of the Desire Realm as their object, and so forth in each of the other planes; when they belong to the Summit of Existence (bhavāgra), they likewise take only the cessation of the Summit of Existence as their object.

When the three kinds of latent defilements whose object is the Truth of the Path belong to the Desire Realm, they take as their objects the entire Truth of the Path, a portion of the Dharma-knowledges (dharmajñānas), together with their six planes: the preparatory stage (anāgamya), the intermediate concentration (dhyānāntara), and the four concentrations (dhyānas). When they belong to the Form Realm or the Formless Realm—that is, to the four concentrations and the four Formless attainments (ārūpyas)—they take as their objects the entire Truth of the Path and a portion of the subsequent knowledges (anvayajñānas), together with their nine planes: the six planes mentioned above plus the first three Formless attainments. The paths are mutually dependent upon one another.

Even though Dharma-knowledge and subsequent knowledge are mutually dependent upon one another, because subsequent knowledge does not counteract the Desire Realm, the three kinds of latent defilements connected with the Desire Realm that take the Truth of the Path as their object do not take the path and the portion of the subsequent knowledges as their objects.

However, because Dharma-knowledge is capable of counteracting the Desire Realm, it is also capable of counteracting the Form Realm and the Formless Realm; therefore, Dharma-knowledge will also be the object of the three kinds of latent defilements in these two realms that take the Truth of the Path as their object.

Not all Dharma-knowledges counteract the Form Realm and the Formless Realm, because the Dharma-knowledge of the Truth of Suffering and that of the Truth of Origin do not counteract these two realms. [Therefore, they are not the objects of the three latent defilements belonging to these two realms.]

Nor does Dharma-knowledge counteract the whole of the Form Realm and the Formless Realm [because it does not counteract the dharmas abandoned through seeing]. Therefore, it is not an object [of the three kinds of latent defilements belonging to these two realms], because the first two kinds of Dharma-knowledge do not counteract these realms (ādyābhāvān na bhavaty ālambanam), and because the first group of latent defilements in these two realms—namely, the latent defilements abandoned through seeing—are not obstructed by any kind of Dharma-knowledge (ādyeṣu cābhāvāt).

(Question) Why do craving (rāga), aversion (pratigha), conceit (māna), attachment to views (dṛṣṭiparāmarśa), and attachment to rules and observances (śīlavrataparāmarśa) not take uncontaminated dharmas as their objects and not take cessation and the path as their objects?

(Answer) Because the latent tendency of craving (rāgānuśaya) must be eliminated: If it were to take an uncontaminated dharma as its object, it would not be relinquished; this is also like the case of desire for wholesome dharmas (kuśladharmacchanda) [although it assumes the form of desire (abhilāṣa), it is nevertheless right view ()]. Anger arises in the presence of something that causes resentment (apakāra, āghātavastu), whereas an uncontaminated dharma such as cessation or the Truth of the Path is not something that causes resentment (not an object of anger).

Nor can one give rise to pride toward cessation or the Path, because these dharmas are inherently peaceful (śānta). Attachment to precepts and observances mistakes dharmas that are not causes of purification for causes of purification; but the uncontaminated truly is a dharma of purification (bhutārthasuddhi), and therefore cannot be an object of attachment to precepts and observances. Attachment to views mistakes dharmas that are not excellent for being excellent; but the uncontaminated truly is excellent, and therefore cannot be an object of attachment to views.

(Question) Of the ninety-eight latent tendencies, how many can increase through their objects (ālambanato ‘nuśerate), and how many can increase through association (saṃprayogata eva) [that is, through dharmas associated with mind, feeling, and so forth]?

The stanza answers:

[The uneliminated universally pervasive latent tendencies

Increase in all the divisions of their own sphere;

The non-universally pervasive kinds increase only in their own division;

Through their objects they can increase.

They do not increase when their objects are the uncontaminated or higher spheres,

Because these are neither appropriated by nor concordant with the latent tendencies.

With whatever dharma they are associated,

They can increase through association with that dharma.]

Treatise: With respect to their objects, the universally pervasive latent tendencies can increase in the five groups (five divisions) of their own sphere. The other latent tendencies increase only in their respective groups: latent tendencies eliminated through insight into suffering increase in dharmas eliminated through insight into suffering, and so forth, up to latent tendencies eliminated through cultivation, which increase only in dharmas eliminated through cultivation. This universal principle is definitive.

The six latent tendencies that take uncontaminated dharmas—namely, nirvana or the Noble Path—as their objects, and the nine latent tendencies that take higher spheres as their objects, do not increase through their objects (ālambana), because one cannot make such an object (vastu) one’s own (svīkṛta) through the view of self (ātmadṛṣṭi) or craving (tṛṣṇā).

With regard to a thing regarded as the self [because of the view of a real body] or regarded as one’s own because of craving, other latent tendencies will increase in relation to it, just as dust can cling to a wet garment. However, uncontaminated dharmas and those of higher spheres cannot be regarded as the self or as belonging to the self; therefore, latent tendencies that take them as their objects cannot increase through those objects.

It was previously stated that aspiration (prārthana) directed toward an uncontaminated dharma or a higher sphere is not the latent tendency called craving, but merely a kind of desire directed toward wholesome dharmas.

Moreover, uncontaminated dharmas such as nirvana or the Noble Path are opposed to the afflictions that take them as their objects; dharmas belonging to higher spheres are opposed to afflictions belonging to lower spheres. Consequently, these afflictions cannot depend upon them in order to increase—that is, they cannot gain a footing there (pratiṣṭhāṃ labhante)—just as a foot cannot stand upon a red-hot stone.

At this point we can understand the term “increase” (anuśayana, anuśete) as meaning “to gain a footing” (pratiṣṭhālābha). Some masters hold that increase means concordance (ānuguṇya). Nirvana and so forth are not concordant (anuguṇa) with the growth of wrong views and so forth (na tadupapattaya, āṇuguṇyena vartante); just as it is said that bitter food does not increase the condition of one afflicted by wind (vātika) (Vyākhyā, i. 4, p. 13).

All latent tendencies associated with a given dharma can increase through their association with that dharma. (yena haḥ saṃprayukto ‘tra sa eva saṃprayogataḥ //).

Here, “with a given dharma” implies association with feeling and so forth.

The word eva indicates a limitation of meaning, namely, “so long as the latent tendencies have not yet been eliminated.”

(Question) Is there a latent tendency that does not take an uncontaminated dharma or a higher sphere (visabhāga) as its object, and that increases only through association rather than through its object (ālambanatas)?

(Answer) Yes. It is a universally pervasive latent tendency that takes a higher sphere as its object. [That is, universally pervasive latent tendencies belonging to the first meditative absorption take the three higher meditative absorptions as their objects.]

(Question) Of the ninety-eight latent tendencies, which are unwholesome (akuśala), and which are indeterminate—that is, neither karmically determinate nor productive of maturation (avyākṛta)?

The stanza answers:

[The latent tendencies of the two higher realms, the view of a real body, the extreme view, and the delusion conjoined with them in the Desire Realm

Are all indeterminate in nature;

All the others are unwholesome.]

Treatise: All latent tendencies belonging to the Form Realm and the Formless Realm are indeterminate in nature, because the maturation of all defiled dharmas is suffering (duḥkha). Thus, suffering does not exist in these two realms, because all the causes (vyāpāda, and so forth) of harming others (paravyābādhahetu) are absent there.

In the Desire Realm, the view of a real body, the extreme view, and the ignorance associated with them are indeterminate in nature.

Indeed, these latent tendencies are not incompatible with generosity and other wholesome actions. Thinking, “I shall obtain happiness in the future!” people therefore practice generosity and observe the precepts.

The annihilationist view (ucchedadṛṣṭi), moreover, is conducive to liberation. It is precisely for this reason that the Blessed One said: “Among the views (dṛṣṭigata) of the non-Buddhist ascetics (Tīrthikas), the most excellent (viśiṣṭa) is when they say, ‘I do not exist; what is mine does not exist; what is mine will not exist.’”

The view of a real body and the extreme view are merely delusions concerning the things that constitute a fictitious individual (svadravyasaṃmuḍhatva); they do not harm others and therefore are also indeterminate.

(Question) If so, reasons such as their not being incompatible with generosity and so forth could also be applied to craving for the heavenly realm (svargatṛṣṇā) and the conceit “I am” (asmimāna), and these too would be indeterminate. However, our school does not accept this.

(Answer) The ancient masters (pūrvācārya) said: “The innate view of a real body (coemergent, sahaja) found among animals is indeterminate; but the view of a real body that arises through discrimination (vikalpitā) is unwholesome.” [The same applies to the innate extreme view and the extreme view arising through discrimination.]

All other latent tendencies in the Desire Realm are unwholesome in nature (aśubha, akuśala).

(Question) Of the ninety-eight latent tendencies, how many are roots of unwholesomeness?

The stanza answers:

[The roots of unwholesomeness

Are the unwholesome craving, anger, and delusion of the Desire Realm.]

Treatise: All craving (rāga), anger (pratigha), and delusion (mūḍḥi = moha) in the Desire Realm, except for the delusion associated with the view of a real body and the extreme view, are respectively the roots of unwholesomeness: greed, hatred, and delusion (lobha, dveṣa, moha).

The view of a personal self and the extreme view are not unwholesome roots, because only those afflictions that are unwholesome in nature and are themselves unwholesome roots are established as unwholesome roots. The other latent tendencies are not unwholesome roots.

(Question) How many latent tendencies are indeterminate roots?

The stanza answers:

[There are three indeterminate roots:

Indeterminate craving, delusion, and wisdom;

Not the other latent tendencies, because they have two courses and are elevated.

The foreign masters establish four kinds;

Among craving, views, pride, and delusion,

There are three kinds of fixation, all due to delusion.]

Exposition: The Vaibhāṣika masters of Kaśmīr say that craving (tṛṣṇās), ignorance (avidyas), and wisdom that are indeterminate in nature—regardless of which previously mentioned kind of the indeterminate they belong to, including wisdom born of maturation—are all indeterminate roots.

Doubt (vicikitsā) cannot be regarded as a root because it is wavering in nature and has two courses. Pride (māna), which is the elevation of the mind (unnati), is likewise not a root, because pride entails rising upward, which is incompatible with a root. Everyone knows that roots must be firm and extend downward (adhovṛtti).

The foreign masters (Aparāntakas) say that the four kinds—craving (tṛṣṇā), views (dṛṣṭi), pride (māna), and delusion (moha)—are all indeterminate. Indeed, because of ignorance, there are three kinds of fixation. They are distinguished as “fixation dominated by craving” (tṛṣṇottaradhyāyin), “fixation dominated by views” (dṛṣṭyuttaradhyāyin), and “fixation dominated by pride” (mānottaradhyāyin). These are so called because of delusion (moha), or ignorance (avidyā).

(Question) The sutras (Saṃyutta, 32, 1; 34, 12; Ekottara, 43, 13) speak of fourteen indeterminate matters (avyākṛtavastu). Do these also belong to the category of the indeterminate discussed above?

(Answer) No. The fourteen indeterminate matters spoken of in the sutras designate questions that must be set aside (sthāpanīyapraśna). This means that such a question is called “unanswered” (avyākṛta); it is not explained (kathita), because it must be rejected. The subject of such a question is called an indeterminate matter.

There are four kinds of questions:

[One should answer categorically, by making distinctions,

By asking a counterquestion, or by setting the question aside,

As when asked about death, birth, superiority,

Whether the self and the skandhas are the same or different, and so forth.]

Exposition: ⁽¹⁾ If someone asks, “Will all sentient beings die?” one should answer categorically, “All will die.”

⁽²⁾ If someone asks, “Will all sentient beings be born again?” one should answer by making a distinction: “Sentient beings who have afflictions (kleśa) will be born again; sentient beings who have no afflictions will not be born again.”

⁽³⁾ If someone asks, “Are human beings superior (viśiṣṭa) or inferior (hīna)?” one should answer with a counterquestion: “In comparison with whom?” If the questioner says, “In comparison with the devas,” one should answer, “Human beings are inferior.” If the questioner says, “In comparison with beings in the other destinies,” one should answer, “Human beings are superior.”

⁽⁴⁾ If someone asks, “Are the skandhas identical with or different from a sentient being?” this question must be set aside, because what is called a “sentient being” does not truly exist. It is just as one would decline to answer the question, “Is the child of a barren woman black or white?”

(Question) How can it be said that this fourth question has been “answered” when no answer has been given as to whether the skandhas are identical with or different from a sentient being?

(Answer) To say that the question must be “set aside” is itself to give an answer.

One master, the Venerable Rāma, says that the second kind of question also leads to a categorical answer like the first: “No sentient beings are born.” According to the author, however, to substantiate the Vaibhāṣika example of the second kind of question, if someone were to ask, “Can those who have died be born again?” one should answer by making a distinction: [“Not all who have died will be born again. Those who have afflictions will be born again, but those without afflictions will not.”]

The Venerable Rāma further says that the third kind of question also leads to a categorical answer, because human beings may simultaneously be superior or inferior according to the object of comparison. It is just as when someone asks, “Is consciousness an effect or a cause?” [one should answer, “It is a cause in relation to an effect, and an effect in relation to a cause.”] But the author says that when someone poses a categorical question such as, “Are human beings superior or inferior?” it is inappropriate to answer categorically, “Human beings are superior,” or, “Human beings are inferior.” Instead, one must answer by making a distinction; that is, one must first ask the questioner’s intention.

The Abhidharma masters speak of four kinds of questions:

⁽¹⁾ A categorical answer is given when someone asks: “Is the Blessed One a Tathāgata, Worthy One, and Perfectly Awakened Buddha (Tathāgata Samyaksaṃbuddha)? Is the Dharma taught by him well proclaimed? Is the Sangha of śrāvakas well guided? Is form (rūpa) impermanent? … Is consciousness (vijñāna) impermanent? Has suffering been clearly expounded? … Has the Path been clearly expounded?” Such questions should be answered categorically because they are connected with genuine benefit (arthopasaṃhitatvāt).

⁽²⁾ An answer by making distinctions is given when a sincere person (aśaṭha) asks, “I wish the Venerable One to teach me the Dharma.” One must distinguish that the dharmas are of many kinds—past dharmas, present dharmas, and future dharmas—and ask which kind the questioner wishes to hear. If the questioner wishes to hear about past dharmas, one must distinguish that past dharmas are also of many kinds: form, feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness.

If the questioner wishes to hear an exposition of form, one must further distinguish that form is of three kinds: wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate. If the questioner wishes to hear about wholesome form, one must further distinguish that wholesome form is of seven kinds: abstention from killing and so forth, up to abstention from false speech. If the questioner wishes to hear an exposition of abstention from killing, one must distinguish three kinds of abstention from killing arising from the three wholesome roots: non-greed, non-hatred, and non-delusion.

If the questioner wishes to know about the abstention from killing that arises from non-greed, one must distinguish its two kinds—the manifest abstention from killing and the unmanifest abstention from killing—and ask which kind the questioner wishes to hear about.

⁽³⁾ Answering with a counterquestion: If the same question is posed by an insincere person (śaṭha), one must answer by asking a counterquestion (paripṛcchāvyākaraṇa). If this person asks, “I wish the Venerable One to teach me the Dharma,” one must ask in return, “There are many dharmas; which Dharma does the questioner wish to hear?” In this case, one need not distinguish past, future, and present dharmas, but should simply continue asking counterquestions until the person is forced to remain silent or provide an explanation himself (vyākar). (Vibhāṣā, 15, 14)

(Venerable Rāma) If both the insincere person and the sincere person ask no question but merely request that the Dharma be taught to them, and if one does not answer them or explain it to them but merely asks them in return what kind of Dharma they wish to have taught, how can this be said to be a question and an answer?

(The Treatise Master) If someone asks, “Please show me the way,” he has thereby posed a question concerning the road, just as if he had said, “Where is the way?” Furthermore, by asking a question in return, one has explained to the questioner what he wishes to ask. Thus, has the way not thereby been explained (vyākṛta)?

(Venerable Rāma) If so, in the cases of the second and third kinds of questions, would there still be an answer by means of a counter-question?

(The Treatise Master) It cannot be so. In the case above, the answer is different, because sometimes the answer is given with distinctions and sometimes without distinctions.

⁽⁴⁾ The kind of question that must be set aside. If someone asks, “Is the world finite or infinite?” one must decline to answer.

The Treatise Master holds that one must rely upon the sutras to ascertain the definitions of these four kinds of questions and answers (praśnavyākaraṇa). The venerable elders of the Mahāsāṃghikas quote the sutra (Dīrgha, 8, 16; Madhyama, 29, 6), saying: “Bhikṣus, there are four ways of answering questions. What are the four?—There are questions that must be answered categorically…; and there are questions that must be set aside without an answer.

What kind of question must be answered categorically?—The question whether all skandhas are impermanent. What kind of question must be answered with distinctions?—The question of what kind of result is brought about by a particular kind of intentionally performed karma (saṃcetnīya). What kind of question must be answered with a counter-question?—The question whether perception (saṃjñā) is the self (ātman) of a person.

One must then ask in return what that person understands the self to be. If he replies that the self is gross and manifest (andārika), one must answer that perception is distinct from the self (Dīgha, i. 195). What kind of question must be set aside without an answer?—The questions whether the world is eternal, non-eternal, both eternal and non-eternal, or neither eternal nor non-eternal; whether the world is finite, infinite, both finite and infinite, or neither finite nor infinite; whether the Tathagata continues to exist after death…; and whether the life-principle is distinct from the body.

Bhikṣus, such questions must be set aside.”