阿毘達磨俱舍論

CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS OF KARMA

Part 13

The preceding section explained the differences within the world of sentient beings (sattvaloka) and the receptacle world (bhājanaloka); this section will discuss the causes from which these differences arise.

[The diversity of the world is produced by karma.

It is volition and that which volition produces.

Volition is mental karma;

That which volition produces is bodily karma and verbal karma.]

Treatise: These differences are not deliberately created (buddhipūrvaka) by a Lord (īśvara), but arise from the karma (karman) of sentient beings.

(Question) If so, why do karmas arising at the same time produce both agreeable things (ramya), such as turmeric plants, sandalwood trees, and so forth, and bodies (āśraya) possessing entirely contrary qualities?

(Answer) Because the projecting karma of sentient beings comprises both good and evil (vyāmiśrakārin), it produces bodies resembling sores, with impure substances flowing from nine orifices; at the same time, to counterbalance these disagreeable features, karma also produces agreeable things to be enjoyed, such as colors, forms, fragrances, flavors, and tactile sensations. For the gods, however, because they perform only wholesome karma, both their bodies and the external things they enjoy are equally agreeable.

(Question) What is karma?

(Answer) The Sutra (Anguttara, iii. 415) speaks of two kinds of karma: volition (cetanā) and action performed after willing (karma after volition). In the stanza, this action performed after willing is called “that which volition produces” (cetayitvā, that which is done by volition).

These two kinds of karma are further divided into three kinds: bodily karma, verbal karma, and mental karma.

(Question) On what basis are these three karmas established? Are they based on the support (āśraya), the intrinsic nature (svabhāva), or the originating cause (samutthāna) of karma?

(Author of the Treatise) Why do you ask this?

(Answer) Because, if they are based on their support, there would be only one kind of karma, since all karmas depend upon the body. If they are based on their intrinsic nature, there would likewise be only one kind, namely verbal karma (vākkarman), because among body, speech, and mind, speech alone is an action whose intrinsic nature is karma. If they are based on their originating cause, there would be only mental karma, because all karmas originate from the mind.

The Vaibhāṣika masters say that the three kinds of karma listed above are established respectively according to three causes: their support, their intrinsic nature, and their originating cause.

Volition itself is mental karma; that which arises from volition, namely the kind of karma performed after willing, is bodily karma and verbal karma.

(Question) What is the intrinsic nature of these three kinds of karma?

The stanza answers:

[The two karmas of body and speech

Both have the nature of manifestation and non-manifestation.]

Treatise: Bodily karma and verbal karma each comprise manifestation (vijñāpti) and non-manifestation (avijñāpti); thus there are bodily manifestation, verbal manifestation, bodily non-manifestation, and verbal non-manifestation.

[Bodily manifestation is only shape,

And is not movement,

Because all conditioned dharmas

Perish from moment to moment;

[Otherwise,] no dharma would perish without a cause,

And the cause of arising would also be the cause of cessation.

Shape, too, is not substantially existent,

Because [if it substantially existed] it would be apprehended by two faculties,

And because it has no distinct atoms.

Verbal manifestation is articulate sound.]

Treatise: Bodily manifestation is precisely the shapes of the body that arise through the power of volition.

According to another school (the Vātsīputrīyas, the Sāṃmitīya school), bodily manifestation is displacement (gati), because bodily manifestation occurs when there is movement (iñjita?), and not when there is no movement.

(Author of the Treatise) This is not so, because all conditioned dharmas are momentary (kṣaṇa).

(Vātsīputrīya) What is implied by saying this?

(Author of the Treatise) A moment (kṣaṇa) means perishing immediately after obtaining existence (ātmalābhādanamtaravināśī). A momentary dharma (kṣṇika) is a dharma that possesses a moment—that is, the characteristic of perishing immediately after obtaining existence—just as the expression “staff-bearer” (daṇḍika) denotes a person who carries a staff.

All conditioned dharmas perish as soon as they obtain their own being. If they arise in one place, they perish immediately in that very place and cannot move from one place to another; therefore, bodily manifestation is not movement.

(Vātsīputrīya) If all conditioned dharmas are momentary, we shall concede that they do not undergo displacement.

(Treatise Master) Conditioned dharmas are momentary because they perish immediately, and because this perishing occurs naturally (ākasmika); this destruction does not arise from anything requisite (akasmādbhava) and does not depend on any cause whatsoever (ahetuka). For: ⁽¹⁾ If it depended on a cause, it would have to be an effect, something produced (kārya); yet destruction (nāśa, vināśa) is nonexistence (abhāva), so how could this nonexistence be called “something produced”?

Therefore, destruction does not depend on a cause (akāryatvādabhāvasya). ⁽²⁾ Since destruction does not depend on a cause, a conditioned dharma perishes as soon as it arises. If it did not perish immediately, it would not perish later either, because it would still be the same dharma as before. Therefore, if you acknowledge that conditioned dharmas perish, you must acknowledge that they perish immediately. ⁽³⁾ You may say that conditioned dharmas undergo change and therefore perish only later.

Yet if a thing has changed and become another thing, while one still maintains that it is the very same thing as before although its qualities have now changed, that would be utterly unreasonable. ⁽⁴⁾ Will you say that there is no means of knowledge (pramāṇa) more certain (gariṣṭha) than direct experience (direct perception, dṛṣṭa, pratyakṣa), and that the world universally recognizes that firewood is destroyed through conjunction (saṃyoga) with fire, so it is erroneous to say that all things perish without a cause?

If you think thus, the foregoing observations are sufficient to answer you. In fact, however, the world cannot directly perceive the destruction of firewood as caused by fire. If you think that firewood is destroyed through conjunction with fire because, once this conjunction occurs, we no longer see the firewood, then your argument rests only on inference, not on direct evidence, and the preceding reasoning loses its force.

The fact that we no longer see the firewood after the conjunction occurs can be explained in two ways: ⁽¹⁾ The firewood may be destroyed by the conjunction; or ⁽²⁾ the firewood itself may have been continually perishing and continually arising anew under ordinary conditions, but upon conjunction with fire it finally ceased to arise again. You yourselves have acknowledged that the destruction of fire is natural (ākasmika).

When fire is no longer seen after conjunction with wind, you acknowledge that this conjunction is not the cause of the fire’s destruction; you also acknowledge that, because of this conjunction, the fire ceases to arise again. The same applies to the sound of a bell: when a hand is placed upon the bell, it is the hand that stops the renewed arising of the bell’s sound. The hand does not destroy the bell’s sound; it does not destroy the dharma that you have acknowledged to be momentary.

Thus, this is the reasoning that decisively settles the matter.

(Vātsīputrīya) For what reason do you maintain that things perish in each moment?

(Treatise Master) We have already said above that destruction, being nonexistence, is not caused by a cause. We also said that if destruction were the effect of a cause, no dharma could perish without a cause.

If destruction arose from a cause just as arising does, destruction could never occur without a cause. Yet everyone acknowledges that cognition (buddhi), flame, and sound—which are momentary dharmas—perish without requiring a cause to produce their destruction. Therefore, the destruction of firewood and so forth occurs naturally.

(Vaiśeṣika) A preceding cognition is destroyed by a subsequent cognition, and a preceding sound is destroyed by the appearance of a subsequent sound.

(Treatise Master) But these two cognitions cannot occur simultaneously (asamavadhāna = ayugapadbhava). Opposed mental states, such as doubt and faith, pleasure and pain, or attachment and hatred, cannot occur together; nor can mental states that are not opposed. Even supposing they could occur together, when a weak cognition or sound (apaṭu; indistinct) immediately follows a stronger cognition or sound (distinct), how could the weaker dharmas destroy stronger dharmas of the same kind?

There is a doctrine (Sthavira Vasubandhu) that a flame perishes because of the nonexistence of a kind of cause called the “cause of continuance” (avasthānahetvabhāvāt). Yet what is nonexistent cannot be a cause (kāraṇa).

According to the Vibhāṣā, a flame perishes because of dharma and adharma [that is, because of efficacy and inefficacy]. This explanation, however, cannot be accepted, because dharma and adharma would then be the causes both of arising and of destruction. That is, dharma would cause a flame to arise or cause it to perish according to whether that flame was beneficial (anugrahāya) or harmful (apakārāya); and the same would be true of adharma, according to whether that flame was harmful or beneficial. Yet one cannot accept that dharma and adharma become operative and cease to be operative at every single moment (kṣaṇa eva kṣaṇe).

Moreover, if destruction were explained in the foregoing manner, the explanation would apply to all conditioned dharmas. Therefore, there is no need to pursue this debate further. You have no grounds for saying that firewood is destroyed through its conjunction with fire.

If you continue to maintain that the destruction of firewood and so forth has as its cause the conjunction of firewood with fire, you will be compelled to accept that a cause of arising and a cause of destruction exist at the same time.

Cooking (pāka), that is, conjunction with fire, produces various effects (pākaja), namely colors that become progressively darker. The cause producing the first color would also be the cause that destroys that color; or at least—if you deny that this is a new conjunction with fire, since fire is a dharma that perishes momentarily—the kind of cause that destroys the first color would be similar to the kind of cause that produced that color. Yet it is unacceptable that the very cause producing an effect, or a cause similar to it, should also destroy that effect.

Will you say that, because successive flames differ in being long or short, large or small, our conclusion cannot be accepted? If so, we shall give another example. Through the prolonged action of ashes, snow, combustible substances, the sun, water, and earth, “effects of cooking” successively arise and disappear; yet you do not count momentary destruction among the various factors involved in this cooking.

Here a certain treatise master (Saṃmitīya?) will ask: If conjunction with fire (agni) is not the cause of the destruction of water, why does water nevertheless perish when heated?

Because there is conjunction with fire, and through the efficacy of fire, the fire element (tejodhātu)—which is already present in water—increases; and because of this increase, the mass of water gradually diminishes (kṣāmakṣāma) with each successive arising until it is completely diminished (abhikṣāmatā) and ceases to arise again (na punaḥ saṃtānaṃ saṃtanuta iti). This is how conjunction with fire acts upon water.

The destruction of dharmas occurs naturally. They destroy themselves because their intrinsic nature is to perish (bhanguratvāt). Because they perish of themselves, they perish as soon as they arise; and because they perish as soon as they arise, they are momentary (kṣaṇika). Thus, there is no motion or displacement, but only an arising in another place at the second moment of the continuum, just as in the case of the flame that consumes a forest, cited by the school opposed to ours. The assertion that motion exists is an entirely erroneous conception (abhimāna). For bodily action is not motion or displacement, but merely shape (saṃsthāna).

The Sautrāntikas, however, say that shape does not truly exist and is not a real entity (anyad dravyam).

According to the Vaibhāṣikas, the visible-object sphere (rūpāyatana) consists, on the one hand, of color (varṇarūpa), such as blue and so forth, and, on the other hand, of shape (saṃsthānarūpa), such as long, short, and so forth. For the Sautrāntikas, shape does not substantially exist (dravyasat), but exists only as a designation (prajñapti).

When a large quantity (bhūyasi, bahurate) of color arises in the same direction (ekadigmukhe), we conventionally designate this quantity of color as “long”; if, by comparison, this quantity of color is smaller, we designate it as “short.” When this quantity arises in all four directions, we designate it as “square”; if it arises on every side and in every direction, we designate it as “round.” Other kinds of shape, such as high, low, and so forth, are explained in the same way: When a large quantity of visible matter arises from below upward, it is designated as “high,” and so forth. Therefore, shape is not a real entity and is not material form (rūpa).

[Here three problems arise.]

⁽¹⁾ If shape were a real entity, material form would be apprehended by both faculties; for whether we see a shape through the eye faculty or touch it through the body faculty, we know it to be long and so forth. Thus, if this long shape were a real entity, it would be cognized by both faculties; whereas, according to the definition given in the sutra, the visible-object sphere is cognized only by the eye faculty. Here the Vaibhāṣikas will surely reply that touch does not cognize this long shape, but cognizes only softness, hardness, and so forth; and that the notion of a long shape is obtained by relying in some manner upon its relation to softness, hardness, and so forth, not because this long shape forms part of the tangible-object sphere (spraṣṭavyāyatana).

This view is entirely correct; but the same holds true of the visible-object sphere. That is to say, this long shape is not seen; rather, the color that is seen, such as blue and so forth, or the tangible quality that is touched, such as softness and so forth, is in some manner designated as long and so forth.

(Vaibhāṣikas) When a conception of a long shape arises after touching, it is not that we have cognized shape by means of touch; rather, we merely recollect that shape because it is associated with the object touched (sāhacaryāt). It is just as, upon seeing the color of fire, we recollect its heat, which belongs to touch; or, upon smelling the fragrance of a flower, we recollect the flower’s color.

(Sautrāntikas) From the two cases you have just cited, one would think that color calls to mind the object touched and fragrance calls to mind the color of the object seen because the causally connected dharmas are invariably associated (avyabhicārāt): fire is always hot, and a particular fragrance always belongs to a particular kind of flower. Yet a tangible quality, such as softness, hardness, and so forth, is not necessarily associated (niyata) with any particular shape.

How, then, could the apprehension of touch give rise to the recollection of such a shape? If this recollection could arise without a necessary conjunction between touch and shape, then one could also recollect color after touching; or else shape would remain indeterminate after the apprehension of touch, just as color remains indeterminate after the apprehension of touch. That is, one would be unable to discern shape after touching.

But the fact is entirely otherwise; therefore, it should not be said that the apprehension of touch causes one to recollect shape.

⁽²⁾ In a multicolored carpet (citrāstaraṇa), many shapes are seen. Thus, according to you, many forms (rūpa, real shapes) would exist in the same place (ekadeśa); but this is impossible, just as it is in the case of color. [If shape possessed a real substance—that is, if shape were a constituent of a long thread in the carpet—it could not at the same time be a constituent of a short thread.]

⁽³⁾ All real forms—that is, those possessing resistance (sapratigha), such as blue and so forth—contain substantially existent atoms and belong to a particular kind; for example, color, such as blue and so forth, necessarily exists in a group of eight atoms. Yet there is no such thing as a long atom. When a long mass is gradually reduced, at a certain moment we no longer conceive it as long, but conceive it only as short. Thus, this conception does not arise from a form (rūpa) existing within a thing; and what we designate as long is merely a number of real entities (dravya)—namely, atoms of color—arranged in a certain manner.

If you maintain that the appearances of long, short, and so forth contain atoms of shape (saṃsthānaparamāṇu) arranged in a certain manner, and that atoms not belonging to the category of “shape” cannot be designated as long, short, and so forth, this assertion merely repeats your earlier claim without taking any account of the arguments presented above. Indeed, if the existence of distinct atoms of shape were established, you could maintain that, when joined or arranged in a certain manner, they form a long, short, or other shape. But in reality no such atoms exist as atoms of color exist; how, then, could they be joined and arranged?

(Sarvāstivādins) If shape is not distinct from color, and if shape is not a dharma different from a certain arrangement of color, then shape should not change when color does not change. In reality, however, vessels of the same color have many different shapes.

(Sautrantika) Have we not said that length, shortness, and so forth are conceptually designated with respect to certain real dharmas arranged in a particular manner? Although ants are all alike, they may proceed in a straight line or in a circle, thereby producing different shapes. The same is true of jars: their shapes may differ without their colors necessarily differing.

(Sarvastivada) Yet when one is in darkness or at a distance, one sees only the shape of an object, such as a pillar, a person, and so forth, without seeing its color. Thus shape must certainly exist apart from manifest color.

(Sautrantika) In fact, one first sees the manifest color, but indistinctly (avyakta); afterward, through mental consciousness, the conception of shape is formed. This is just like forming the conceptions of a row or an army after having indistinctly seen birds, ants, elephants, and so forth, and thinking, “This army is arrayed in a circle.” Alternatively, one may be unable to distinguish clearly either the color or the shape (anirdhāryamānapariccheda), and know through mental consciousness only that it is a mere aggregate (saṃghātamātra).

(Sarvastivada) You Sautrantikas persist in denying both motion (gati) and shape (saṃsthāna); according to you, then, to what does the expression “bodily information” refer?

(Sautrantika) We say that bodily information is shape, and therefore we differ from the Sammitiyas; but shape is not a real dharma, and therefore we differ from the Sarvastivadins.

(Sarvastivada) If you maintain that bodily information is not a real dharma but merely a shape existing as a conceptually designated dharma, then according to you, from what kind of real dharma is bodily information constituted?

(Sautrantika) Bodily karma is karma that takes the body as its object or basis (kāyālambanaṃ, kāyādhiṣṭhānaṃ karma); that is, volition (cetanā) impels the body to act (vartayati) in various ways, and because this volition proceeds through the door of the body, it is called bodily karma. The other kinds of karma are likewise defined according to their essential nature: [verbal karma is karma that takes speech as its basis (adhiṣṭhāna); mental karma is the karma of the mind (manas), or karma associated (saṃprayukta) with the mind].

(Sarvastivada) The sutra says that “karma is volition and action performed after willing.” Thus, if bodily karma and verbal karma are both volition, what difference is there between the two kinds of karma defined above by the sutra?

(Sautrantika) There are two kinds of volition. First, at the initial or preparatory stage (prayoga), a volition arises [and at this point it is merely the mental factor of volition] such as, “I must perform such an action.” This is precisely what the sutra calls volitional karma (cetanākarma), that is, karma which is volition itself. Subsequently, an active volition arises, namely, the kind of volition that performs an action corresponding to what was previously intended, moving the body or producing speech. This is precisely what the sutra calls “karma performed after willing” (cetayitvā karman).

(Sarvastivada) If that is so, informative karma certainly does not truly exist, because according to us bodily and verbal karma would then also be merely volition, leaving no place for information (vijñapti) as a material dharma (rūpa). If information does not truly exist, there can likewise be no non-information (avijñapti) belonging to the Desire Realm [because non-information in the Desire Realm depends entirely upon information—that is, the material dharmas of bodily and verbal karma—and does not accompany the mind, as does non-information belonging to the Form Realm]. From this, numerous intractable problems would arise (saṃcarāsaṃvarābhāva, etc.).

(Sautrantika) There is still a way to resolve these difficulties. We can say that non-information is explained quite reasonably according to our school. We acknowledge that the two kinds of volition connected with initiating bodily and verbal activity are precisely the two kinds of informative karma of body and speech that you maintain. These two kinds of volition—designated bodily karma and verbal karma (kāyakarmasaṃśābdita)—are capable of producing a distinctive volition of their own, which is called non-information. If so, what intractable problem remains?

(Sarvastivada) If that is so, this distinctive volition must accompany the mind (cittānuparivartin), just like the non-information that, according to our doctrine, arises from meditative concentration (samāhitāvijñaptivat); yet non-information belonging to the Desire Realm continues to arise while one is asleep, and so forth.

(Sautrantika) It is not so. This distinctive volition is produced by two kinds of volition: deliberative volition as the remote cause and activating volition as the proximate cause. Even if you assert that information (vijñapti) truly exists, non-information must still arise through the power of volition, because information is by nature inert (jaḍa).

The Vaibhasika masters say that shape truly exists and that bodily information is precisely shape.

Verbal information is sound, namely articulated sound (varṇātmaka).

The characteristics of non-information are explained as above.

The Sautrantikas also say that non-information does not truly exist because ⁽¹⁾ it is merely the non-performance of an action after one has vowed not to perform it (abhyupetya akaraṇamātratvāt); ⁽²⁾ it is conceptually designated as a dharma that exists only in dependence upon past great elements (atītāni mahābhūtānyupādāya), whereas whatever is past no longer exists; and ⁽³⁾ it lacks the defining characteristic of a material dharma (rūpalakṣaṇābhāvāt). The defining characteristic of matter is that it is subject to obstruction (rūpayate), whereas non-information is non-resistant (apratigha); therefore, it cannot be a material dharma.

Nevertheless, the Vaibhasikas affirm the existence of non-information.

[Because the sutra speaks of three kinds of matter and of undefiled matter,

Because merit increases, and because there is a course of karma for one who does not act, and so forth.]

Treatise: Because the sutra says that material dharmas are of three kinds, and that all material dharmas are included within these three kinds (rūpasya rūpasaṃgrahaḥ): ⁽¹⁾ matter that is visible and resistant [such as visible objects]; ⁽²⁾ matter that is invisible but resistant [such as the eye, and so forth]; and ⁽³⁾ matter that is invisible and non-resistant; only non-informative matter belongs to this last kind.

The sutra also speaks of undefiled matter (anāsrava): “What are the undefiled dharmas?—All past, future, and present dharmas… (up to) all past, future, and present consciousnesses relating to these material forms that do not give rise to craving or anger—all these dharmas are undefiled dharmas.” (Ekottarāgama, 2, 24).

Thus, apart from non-informative matter, there is no kind of matter that is invisible or non-resistant, nor is there any other kind of matter that is undefiled. [For bodily and verbal karma are not applicable to those who have entered the Truth of the Path (mārgasatyasamāpanna)].

The scriptures also speak of the increase of merit (puṇyarvṛddhi): “There are seven deeds that bring merit associated with material form (the seven bases of meritorious action associated with material support, aupadhika puṇyakriyāvast)… When a faithful person (śrāddha), a son or daughter of a family, is endowed with (samanvāgata) these seven kinds of merit, then whether walking, standing, sleeping, or awake, that merit continually (satatasamita) increases (abhivardhate); merit continues to arise (upjāyata eva puṇyam).

What are these seven kinds of merit associated with material form?... The same applies to the seven kinds of merit not associated with material support…” Thus, apart from non-information, by virtue of what other dharma could merit increase when the mind is not wholesome (anyacitta), or when one is in a state without mind?

If non-information did not exist, those who did not personally perform an act but merely ordered others to perform it would not establish a course of karma (karmapatha), because verbal action in the case of directing another (ājñāpanavijñapti) cannot constitute a course of karma such as killing and so forth; indeed, such an action has not yet actually produced the deed to be performed. Here one might say: once the deed has been carried out, does the act of issuing the order become a course of karma? Yet it is evident that the essential nature of that act is in no way altered by the execution of the order.

The scriptures further state: “Bhikṣus, dharmas belonging to an external object of consciousness (bāhyamāyatanam, external āyatana), which do not belong to the other eleven āyatanas, cannot be seen and offer no resistance.” In this passage, the Blessed One did not say that the dharma-āyatana (dharmāyatana) is immaterial. If the Blessed One did not have regard to non-information, which is also a material dharma and belongs to the dharma-āyatana rather than the visible-form āyatana, then what would be the material dharma included within the dharma-āyatana?

If non-information did not exist, the noble path would not possess eight factors, because the three factors of right speech (samyagvāc), right action (samyakkkarmānta), and right livelihood (samyagājīva) are incompatible with concentration (samādhi). If practitioners in a state of concentration possess these three factors, it is precisely because these factors have non-information as their essential nature.

But here one may reply that the scriptures say: “When practitioners know thus and see thus, right view, right intention (samyaksaṃkalpa), right effort (samyagvyāyama), right mindfulness (samyaksmṛti), and right concentration are cultivated to perfection; right speech, right action, and right livelihood have already been purified beforehand.” Therefore, the last three factors are regarded as information and are accomplished prior to concentration.

The Vibhāṣā says that the preceding scriptural passage does not refer to the last three factors of the truth of the path, but to right speech, right action, and right livelihood belonging to the stage of detachment (vairāgya), attained by means of the mundane path (laukikamārga). Nevertheless, this does not prevent right speech and so forth, in the form of non-information, from constituting part of the truth of the path.

If non-information did not exist, neither could there be the prātimokṣa discipline (saṃvara), because if, after undertaking (samādāna) the precepts, practitioners gave rise to an unwholesome or neutral mind—that is, a mind directed toward something else—the precepts would no longer continue, and they could not be called bhikṣus or bhikṣuṇīs.

The scriptures also teach that abstention from wrongdoing (virati; the precepts of abstaining from killing and so forth) is a dike that prevents transgression of the precepts. A “nonexistent thing” (abhāva) could not be a dike. Therefore, abstention from wrongdoing is a real dharma (avijñapti), not merely the noncommission of an act that one has renounced; and the Sautrāntikas themselves have explained this very clearly.

Reply of the Sautrāntikas: Too many different arguments have already been presented above, yet the issue has still not been clarified. Let us therefore examine each argument in turn.

⁽¹⁾ The scriptures teach that material dharmas are of three kinds. The Yogācāra masters say that in the meditative absorptions (dhyānas), through the power of concentration (samādhi), a material form (rūpa) arises and becomes an object of concentration (samādhiviṣaya = samādher ālambanam); that is, this material form is cognized by practitioners who have entered concentration, as, for example, when contemplating a skeleton in the cultivation of the meditation on impurity (aśubhabhāvanā).

This kind of material form is not seen by the faculty of sight and is therefore invisible; nor does it occupy or obstruct any place (deśānāvaraṇa), and it is therefore nonresistant. If you ask how an object of concentration can be a material form when it no longer possesses the ordinary characteristics of material form, you have forgotten that the non-information you maintain would encounter precisely the same difficulty.

⁽²⁾ The scriptures teach that there is only one kind of uncontaminated material form (anāsrava). The Yogācāra masters hold that the material form arising through the power of concentration is uncontaminated when that concentration is uncontaminated.

The Dārṣṭāntikas, however, hold that the material form of an arhat’s body, such as the faculty of sight and so forth, and external material form (bāhya), namely the objects of the five groups of consciousness, are all called uncontaminated because they are not the support (āśraya) of the contaminants (āsrava).

Here one might object that the scriptures explain the matter without making a clear distinction when they say: “What are the uncontaminated dharmas? They are the faculty of sight and whatever can be seen…”

The Dārṣṭāntikas reply that all the dharmas spoken of in the scriptures are contaminated because they do not counteract (pratipakṣa) the contaminants; only mind and mental factors can counteract and eliminate contaminated dharmas.

Here one may object that, if so, these dharmas would at the same time (paryāyeṇa) be both contaminated, because they do not counteract contamination, and uncontaminated, because they are not the support of contamination. With such an unfortunate result, the characteristics of the contaminated and the uncontaminated would become confused.

The Dārṣṭāntikas deny this, for they hold that if these dharmas are contaminated, they cannot be uncontaminated. On the other hand, if the visible-form āyatana and the other āyatanas are exclusively contaminated, why do the scriptures distinguish: “Material dharmas that are contaminated and give rise to grasping (sāsrava upādānīya),… Dharmas that are contaminated and subject to grasping are causes that make the mind rigid and deceitful (bases of mental barrenness and deceit; cetaḥkhilamrakṣavastu).”

⁽³⁾ The sutra teaches that merit increases. The former masters (pūrvācārya, earlier preceptors) say that it is precisely through the intrinsic nature of dharmas (dharmatā; the natural force of dharmas) that merit increases when the recipients of offerings make use of those offerings. That is to say, owing to the recipients’ distinctive qualities (guṇaviśeṣāt), such as meditative concentration and so forth, and owing to the particular benefit they derive from the offerings for themselves or bestow upon all sentient beings (anugrahaviśeṣāt = śarīravarṇabalāt), the mental continua (saṃtatayas) of the donors—even when their minds are unwholesome or neutral (focused on other objects, anyaceta, sāṃdātṛṇām)—are permeated (paribhāvita) by the volition of giving whose object is the recipient.

These mental continua undergo an exceedingly subtle transformation in an upward direction and reach a stage (sūkṣmaṃ pariṇāmaviśeṣaṃ prāpnuvanti) at which they ultimately become capable of producing a great abundance of results. It is in this sense that the sutra teaches: “Merit continually increases and flourishes; merit repeatedly arises without interruption.”

But how is the increase of merit to be explained in the case of non-material meritorious deeds (niraupadhika)?

The mental continuum is transformed through the repeated cultivation of volitions whose objects are the Tathagata and the Śrāvakas (tadālambanacetanābhyāsāt; repeated cultivation of volition directed toward them), just as occurs with the continuum of the mental factor of volition in dreams (svapneṣu).

On the other hand, we do not understand how the Vaibhāṣika masters, who maintain the existence of non-information, can explain the increase of merit in the case of non-material meritorious deeds. Such a meritorious deed involves neither bodily manifest karma nor verbal manifest karma, but only a feeling of joy concerning the Tathagata or a śrāvaka; nor is there any additional meditative concentration. Yet according to the Vaibhāṣikas, non-information cannot arise from either manifestation or meditative concentration; consequently, no non-information can be present here.

According to other Sautrāntika masters, in the case of non-material meritorious deeds, merit increases through the repetition of volition whose object is the recipient of the offering. This view, however, cannot be accepted when compared with the content of the sutra: “When a diligent bhikṣu, fully endowed with pure moral discipline and accomplished in wholesome dharmas, has made use of the offered article and then entered the concentration called the ‘immeasurable mind,’ immeasurable merit, an immeasurable outflow of wholesome dharmas (kuśalābhiṣyanda), and happiness will certainly arise (pratikānkṣitavya) for the donor and lord of the gift (dāyaka dānapati).” (Anguttara, ii. 54; Ratnarāśisūtra, tr. 138).

But can a donor whose merit increases in this way possess a particular volition directed solely toward the person who received the offering (a distinguished volition directed toward that recipient)? For this reason, one must accept the view of the first masters, who maintain that, in the case of non-material meritorious deeds, merit arises from the transformation of the donor’s continuum owing to the qualities of the recipient.

⁽⁴⁾ According to the Vaibhāṣikas, if non-information did not exist, then in the case of instructing another person to perform an action, no course of karma would be constituted.

When a person commits killing because another has instructed him to do so, the mental continuum of the person who gave the instruction naturally undergoes a certain exceedingly subtle transformation that will subsequently produce results. It is the same when one personally commits killing: at the moment when the course of karma—killing and so forth—is completed (kriyāphalaparasamāptau), the mental continuum also undergoes a transformation.

This transformation is called a course of karma, and therefore the person whose mental continuum undergoes this transformation can still constitute a course of karma—for the result, namely the transformation of the mental continuum, must be designated in conformity with its cause, namely the course of karma. This transformation is called bodily or verbal according to whether it proceeds from the body or from speech. By principles such as these, those who maintain the existence of non-information regard non-information as a course of karma, as a path of bodily or verbal action.

The Venerable One (Bhadanta) (Vibhāṣā, 118, 16) holds an entirely different view concerning the nonexistence of non-information: “A person is touched (spṛśyate) by the fault (avadya) of killing through the volition belonging to three times (trikālayācetanayā, volition arising at three times) in relation to the skandhas that constitute a living being (upātteṣu skandheṣu); that is, when the person thinks: ‘I shall kill, I am killing, I have killed.’” [Thus, the course of karma is completed because the preparatory action, the principal action, and the continuation all share the same kind of volition.]

But we would say that this volition belonging to three times does not constitute a course of karma, because according to this view of the Venerable One, a son would commit an immediate offense (ānantarya) when saying, “My mother has been killed,” even though his mother had not actually been killed by anyone at all. Nevertheless, the entire activity of volition (cetanāsamudācāra), from “I shall kill” through “I am killing” to “I have killed,” applies only to one who kills personally (svayaṃ ghnatas); and this is also the essential meaning intended by the Venerable One in his explanation of this act of killing.

Here the Sarvāstivādins raise the objection: “But what hostility could cause you so obstinately to reject the existence of non-information while accepting the transformation of the mental continuum (saṃtatipariṇāmaviśeṣa)?”

In truth, both the Sarvāstivāda doctrine of non-information and the Sautrāntika doctrine of the transformation of the mental continuum are very difficult to understand (duḥkhabodha); thus, we harbor no hostility toward the former thesis. We are merely dissatisfied (na pariloṣo ‘smākam) with the doctrine that “at the moment when a course of karma is completed through a bodily action dependent upon a mind (cittānvayakāyaprayogeṇa), a dharma called non-information can arise in the person who commissioned that course of karma”—a dharma that is entirely separate (pṛthagbhūta) both from the mind of the person who gave the instruction and from the body of the person who was instructed.

We are, however, satisfied with the doctrine that “at the moment when a course of karma is completed through an action commissioned by a certain person (yatkṛtaprayogasaṃbhūta), that action can produce a transformation in this very person’s mental continuum.” And we readily accept that the result arises from this transformation of the continuum, rather than from non-information.

There are, moreover, other arguments already mentioned above, such as: “If there is no manifestation, how can there be non-information?”; “Non-information means only that one no longer performs a certain action”; and “Non-information does not depend upon past great elements.”

⁽⁵⁾ The dharma-ayatana is not regarded as immaterial.

The answer to this objection has already been presented above. There is a kind of matter that is invisible and non-resistant (apratigha), constituting part of the dharma-ayatana; this is non-information. This very kind of matter is an object of meditative concentration and arises through the power of concentration (dhyāyināṃ samādhiviṣayo rūpaṃ samādhiprabhāvād utpadyate).

⁽⁶⁾ The Vaibhāṣikas say that the Truth of the Path would then not possess eight factors.

According to you, when noble ones abide in the Noble Path while contemplating or reflecting upon the Four Truths, how do they accomplish right speech, right action, and right livelihood? Do you mean that they utter right speech, perform right actions, and seek robes and alms bowls?

The Sarvāstivādins reply: That is not our intention. While abiding in the Noble Path, noble ones nevertheless acquire certain uncontaminated non-informations; for example, after emerging from insight meditation (vipaśyanā), through the power of these uncontaminated non-informations, noble ones are able to give rise to right speech, action, and livelihood. Because a cause (nimitta) may be designated by the name of its effect, non-information is therefore established as speech, action, and livelihood.

If so, why not accept our doctrine? Although there is no non-information, while abiding in the Noble Path, noble ones acquire such an intention (āśaya) and such a personal basis (āśraya) that, after emerging from meditation, through the power of these two they thereafter invariably give rise to right speech, right action, and right livelihood. These causes (āśaya, āśraya) bear the names of their effects; it may therefore still be affirmed that the Noble Path possesses all eight factors.

Other masters say that the factors of the Noble Path signify only “noncommission” (tadakriyāmātra). What does noncommission mean? Through the power of the Noble Path, a person abiding in meditative concentration may attain relative or absolute “nonperformance.” Because this “nonperformance” is attained in dependence upon the uncontaminated Noble Path, it too is uncontaminated; and it is precisely a factor of the Noble Path.

Certainly, factors such as right speech and so forth are not real dharmas (Aṅguttara, iv. 157; Dīgha, iii. 260), but are merely “nonperformance.” Yet dharmas are not established solely from real entities possessing their own distinct substance; for example, the eight worldly dharmas are gain, non-gain, honor, dishonor, praise, blame, pleasure, and pain. The non-acquisition of clothing, food, and so forth is not a real dharma.

⁽⁷⁾ The Vaibhāṣikas say that if non-information does not exist, neither does the prātimokṣa discipline. This objection may be refuted according to principles like those given above, by appealing to the power of intention (āśaya). Discipline (saṃvara) is precisely a kind of volition (cetanā) capable of preventing evil actions and restraining (saṃvṛṇotti) body and speech after it has been manifested through the firm resolve (vidhi) not to commit transgressions and through the vow to observe the precepts; hence the prātimokṣa discipline is established on this basis.

Here the Vaibhāṣikas may object that, if the prātimokṣa discipline is merely volition, then whenever a practitioner thinks about something other than this kind of mental state—when the mind takes a different object—the discipline would cease to exist, because at that time the practitioner would no longer possess the volition capable of restraining body and speech. This objection, however, has no force; for when the practitioner gives rise to the intention to commit an evil deed, through the force of the conditioning of the continuous mental series, recollection of what was vowed will also arise and prevent this evil intention.

⁽⁸⁾ Moreover, this volition also has the nature of an embankment. When a person has made a firm vow not to commit evil, upon recalling this vow, moral shame and moral dread will arise, and that person will restrain himself from violating the precepts.

By contrast, according to your doctrine, if violation of the precepts is prevented by a non-informative dharma having no connection with recollection, then one should be unable to violate the precepts even when mindfulness is lost, because non-information is always present.

We should end the debate here. The Vaibhāṣika masters have said that there is a real, distinct entity (dravya) called non-informative matter (avijñaptirūpa).

It was stated above that non-information arises in dependence upon the great elements. Are these great elements the same great elements that serve as the basis of information (vijñapti)—that is, the great elements of the body that produces informative karma—or are they different great elements?

The stanza answers:

[The great elements that constitute this non-informative karma

Differ from the great elements serving as the basis of informative karma.]

Commentary: Non-information arises from great elements different from those serving as the basis of information, because one and the same assemblage (sāmagrī) of the four great elements cannot constitute both a subtle derived matter (bhautika, upādāyarūpa), namely non-information, and a gross, manifest derived matter, namely information.

Informative karma appears simultaneously with the great elements that produce it; and the same is true of non-information.

As a general principle, all derived matter arises simultaneously with its great elements; nevertheless, some derived matter belonging to the present and future arises from past great elements.

[Non-information of the Desire Realm, at the second moment,

Arises from past great elements.]

Commentary: At the first moment when non-informative karma arises, it arises from great elements simultaneous with its arising. After this moment, non-informative karma belonging to the Desire Realm—that is, other than the non-information born of concentration and uncontaminated non-information—arises, meaning that it continues to arise anew, from the very same great elements of the first moment; thus, at the second moment, these great elements have become past.

From this moment onward, the past great elements serve as the basis (āśraya) of non-information because they are its initiating cause (pravṛtti), the productive cause (ākṣepakāraṇa) that brings non-information into being; the great elements simultaneous with each subsequent moment merely support non-information because they are only its sustaining cause (anuvṛtti), the maintaining cause (abhiṣṭhānakāraṇa) of non-information.

This is like the hand that sets a wheel rolling and the ground that supports it: they are respectively the initiating cause and sustaining cause of the wheel’s motion.

(Question) Bodily and verbal karma in the various planes are constituted by great elements belonging to which plane among the planes of the Desire Realm and the four dhyānas?

The stanza answers:

[Contaminated karma depends upon its own plane;

Uncontaminated karma follows the realm of birth.]

Commentary: Bodily and verbal karma in the Desire Realm are constituted by great elements belonging to the Desire Realm; and so on, up to bodily and verbal karma in the fourth dhyāna, which are constituted by great elements belonging to the fourth dhyāna.

Uncontaminated bodily and verbal karma are constituted by great elements belonging to the plane into which the person producing this bodily and verbal karma has been born: because uncontaminated dharmas tend to transcend the realms, such as the Desire Realm and so forth; because there are no uncontaminated great elements that constitute uncontaminated karma; and because uncontaminated bodily and verbal karma arise through the great elements, not merely through the mind, since this kind of karma is derived matter (upādāyarūpa). (Vibhāṣā, 140, 15)

(Question) What characteristics do informative karma and non-informative karma possess? From what characteristics of the great elements are they produced?

The verse answers:

[The non-informative is not appropriated,

It is also outflow and pertains only to sentient beings.

When the mind is distracted, it arises from outflowing great elements

That are appropriated and distinct from one another;

When born of concentration, it arises from developed great elements.

They are unappropriated and not distinct from one another.

The informative has only outflowing great elements;

If bodily, it is appropriated.]

Commentary: The non-informative is a kind of material dharma that is not constituted by mass (amūrta) and has no spatial extension or resistance (apratigha, non-obstructive). It therefore cannot serve as a support for the mind and mental factors, nor is it integrated with the sense faculties (anupātta, unappropriated). The non-informative is never morally neutral and therefore is not born of maturation; it is not developed but is only outflow, meaning that it is produced by a homogeneous cause (sabhāgahetu). [The verse says “also outflow” because the non-informative can also be momentary (kṣaṇika): the first undefiled non-informative is not an outflow.]

When one is not in a state of concentration (asamāhita, vikṣipta), that is, when it pertains to the Desire Realm, the non-informative is produced by appropriated, outflowing great elements. These great elements are not the same but are distinct great elements, because each of the seven kinds of non-informative—such as abstention from killing and so forth—belonging to the prātimokṣa discipline is produced by a separate group of four great elements.

When it arises from concentration (samādhija)—without distinction between the discipline pertaining to meditative absorption and the undefiled discipline, which arise respectively from defiled and undefiled concentrations—the non-informative, or discipline (saṃvara), is produced by developed great elements (aupacayika) generated by concentration, namely unappropriated great elements. The seven precepts constituting the discipline are distinct, but all of them—from abstention from killing to abstention from false speech—are produced by the same group of four great elements, not by distinct great elements. Only one kind of mind produces these precepts, and the great elements serving as their support are likewise only one group.

The informative is only an outflow; and if it is bodily, it is appropriated.

Here one may ask whether, when it arises, bodily informative action destroys or does not destroy the configuration-continuum of the body (saṃsthānasaṃtāna) that belongs to maturation. This case is very difficult to resolve. If it is said to destroy it, this is untenable, for it contradicts the Vaibhāṣika doctrine that a material dharma resulting from maturation arises again (punaḥprabandha) after being interrupted. On the other hand, if bodily informative action does not destroy the preexisting configuration, then two kinds of configuration (saṃsthānadvaya)—the former resulting from maturation and the latter being an outflow—would coexist in the same place.

Thus it must be accepted that bodily informative action is produced by newly arisen outflowing great elements and does not destroy the preexisting material configurations.

But if this is so, the part of the body upon which bodily informative action depends in order to arise would become larger than before, because this part of the body would be further permeated (abhivyāpana, pervasive increase) by newly arisen great elements producing this bodily informative action. If this part of the body contained no additional new great elements, it could not be said that the non-informative was produced by this entire part of the body.

We reply that the body resulting from maturation contains spaces (śuṣiratvāt kāyasya), and therefore there is room for newly arisen outflowing great elements to produce the non-informative.

Above, two kinds of karma have been described: volition (cetanā) and that which is produced by volition (cetanākṛta); three kinds of karma: mental, bodily, and verbal; and five kinds of karma: volition, bodily informative action, bodily non-informative action, verbal informative action, and verbal non-informative action. Next, the wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral natures of these kinds will be explained, together with the realms (dhātu) and planes (bhūmi) to which they belong.

[The non-informative is determinate;

The rest are of all three kinds.

The unwholesome exists only in the Desire Realm;

The non-informative exists in both the Desire and Form Realms.

The informative exists only in the two planes possessing examination;

In the Desire Realm there is no obscured informative action,

Because there is no cause that could produce it.]

Commentary: The non-informative is only wholesome (kuśala) or unwholesome (akuśala). Neutral volition is weak and therefore incapable of producing powerful (balavat) karma such as the non-informative. The resultant non-informative can continue to arise after the cause that produced it has ceased.

The remaining kinds of karma are volition and informative action. These may be wholesome, unwholesome, or neutral.

Unwholesome karma exists only in the Desire Realm, because in the other realms there are none of the three unwholesome roots, shamelessness, or lack of moral dread. The verse mentions only unwholesome karma; it can therefore be understood that the wholesome and the neutral exist in all three realms.

The Form Realm also has the non-informative, but the Formless Realm does not, because there are no great elements there to produce non-informative matter.

Wherever bodily and verbal actions occur (pravartante), there also exists the non-informative discipline (saṃvara) pertaining to those bodily and verbal actions.

(Objection) There are no undefiled great elements, yet undefiled non-informative action exists. Undefiled non-informative action arises from the great elements belonging to the plane in which the person producing it was born. Thus, when a person born in the Desire Realm or Form Realm enters a concentration belonging to the Formless Realm, that person could still produce a Formless-Realm non-informative action arising from the great elements of the Desire Realm or Form Realm.

(Explanation) This is not so, because undefiled non-informative action transcends the realms (adhātupatti, not falling within any realm). This kind of non-informative action shares no characteristic with the afflictions belonging to the realm in which the person possessing it abides; and undefiled non-informative action is neither homogeneous nor heterogeneous (sabhāga, visabhāga) with the great elements of that realm. By contrast, a Formless-Realm non-informative action could not arise from the heterogeneous great elements (visabhāga) belonging to the Desire Realm or Form Realm.

Furthermore, because formless concentration turns away (vaimukhya) from all material dharmas—since in the Formless Realm there is no longer any perception of material form—it is incapable of producing the non-informative, which is a material dharma (rūpa).

The Vaibhāṣika masters say that discipline (śīla) exists as an antidote to misconduct (dauḥśīlyapratipakṣeṇa). Misconduct exists only in the Desire Realm, and the discipline belonging to the Form Realm, including the non-informative, serves as its antidote. But the dharmas of the Formless Realm are remote (dūra) from the Desire Realm in four respects: support (āśraya), mode of activity (prakāra), object (ālambana), and antidote (pratipakṣa). (Vibhāṣā, 96, 6)

Bodily and verbal informative actions exist only in the two planes possessing examination (vicāra): the Desire Realm and the first meditative absorption.

Obscured-neutral informative action (nivṛtāvyākṛta) does not exist in the planes without examination, nor does it exist in the Desire Realm, where all defiled (kliṣṭa) informative actions are unwholesome rather than neutral.

This also means that unobscured-neutral informative action (nivṛtāvyākṛta) exists only in the Brahmā world. It is related that Great Brahmā performed deceptive verbal action (māya): when he was before the assembly of devas, in order to evade Aśvajit’s question, Great Brahmā had to utter a falsehood. (Dīgha, i. 18, 221).

(Question) But if there is no vocal expression above the first dhyana, how can there be a sound ayatana (śabdāyatana) in the second dhyana and the dhyanas above it?

(Answer) It still exists there, but its cause consists of external great elements (bāhyamahābhūtahetuka); that is, it is the kind of sound produced by wind, and so forth.

Some masters say that expression still exists in the second dhyana and above, but it is unobscured-neutral rather than wholesome or defiled; for beings in these dhyanas cannot bring forth (saṃmukhīkar) a wholesome or defiled mind belonging to a lower plane that could produce wholesome or defiled expressive karma. Wholesome minds of a lower plane are all inferior (nyūna), while defiled minds have already been abandoned.

The Vaibhāṣikas, however, maintain that the first explanation is more reasonable.

(Question) Why are there no kinds of expressive karma in the planes above the Brahma world? Why is there no obscured-neutral expression in the Desire Realm?

(Answer) Because the cause that produces it is absent. ⁽¹⁾ Only a mind associated with initial application (vitarka) and sustained application (vicāra) is capable of producing expressive karma, whereas the second dhyana and those above it have no such mind. ⁽²⁾ An obscured-neutral mind can produce expressive karma of the same nature when that mind is “to be abandoned through cultivation” (bhāvanāheya). In the Desire Realm, however, obscured-neutral mind is associated only with the view of a real self (satkāyadṛṣṭi) and the extreme view (antagrāhadṛṣṭi). This mind is “to be abandoned through seeing” (darśanaheya) and is directed inward (); therefore, it cannot produce expressive karma.

(Question) Is it because the nature of the initiating mind (arising cause, samutthāpaka) is wholesome or unwholesome that dharmas possess a wholesome or unwholesome nature?

(Answer) No. Dharmas are wholesome or unwholesome in four senses: in the absolute sense (paramārthatas, ultimate meaning), by intrinsic nature (svabhāvatas = ātmatas), through association (saṃprayogatas), and through an initiating cause (samuthānatas).

[Liberation is wholesome in the ultimate sense.

The wholesome roots, moral shame, and moral dread are intrinsically wholesome;

What is associated with the wholesome roots is wholesome through association.

Karmas, and so forth, are wholesome through their initiating cause.

The opposites are unwholesome.

Neutral in the ultimate sense are the two unconditioned dharmas.]

Treatise: Nirvana, that is, the cessation of all suffering, is entirely secure and peaceful (kṣema), and therefore is wholesome in the ultimate sense, just as in the case of freedom from illness (ārogya). (Majjgima, i. 510)

The three wholesome roots, moral shame, and moral dread—independently of the dharmas associated with them and of their causes—are intrinsically wholesome, just like good medicine (auṣadha).

Dharmas such as volition and the mental factors associated with the wholesome roots and with moral shame and moral dread are wholesome through association. When associated, they are wholesome; when not associated, they are not wholesome, just like a drink mixed with good medicine (auṣadhapānīya).

When they arise from intrinsically wholesome dharmas or dharmas wholesome through association, bodily karma, vocal karma, the four conditioned characteristics (lakṣṇas), acquisitions (prāptis), the attainment of cessation (nirodhasamāpatti), and the attainment of non-perception (asaṃjñisamāpatti) are also wholesome through their initiating causes (wholesome arising causes), just like the milk of a cow that has drunk water mixed with good medicine.

Here one must further consider how acquisitions (prāptis), and so forth, can be wholesome when they arise from a mind that is not wholesome, that is, a mind of a different class (visabhāgacitta). The opposites of the four cases of wholesomeness described above are unwholesome.

The essential nature of samsara (saṃsāra) is precisely the continuing course of all suffering; it is therefore wholly insecure (akṣema), and thus unwholesome in the ultimate sense, like a person afflicted with illness.

The unwholesome roots, shamelessness, and lack of moral dread are intrinsically unwholesome, just like poison.

The dharmas associated with these roots are unwholesome through association, just like a drink mixed with poison.

When they arise from these roots or from dharmas associated with these roots, bodily karma, vocal karma, the characteristics (arising, duration, and so forth), and the acquisitions (prāptis) of unwholesome dharmas are unwholesome through their initiating causes (unwholesome arising causes), just like the milk of a cow that has drunk water mixed with poison.

(Objection) All contaminated dharmas (sāsrava) belong to (abhyantara, paryāpanna) samsara (saṃsāra), and thus no contaminated dharma could be wholesome or neutral.

(Explanation) If one speaks with complete precision, in accordance with the ultimate meaning, this is indeed so. Nevertheless, on the basis of maturation (vipāka), a contaminated dharma capable of producing a desirable (iṣṭa) result of maturation is called wholesome, while a contaminated dharma whose character has not yet been determined (vyākṛta), as when it has not yet brought about a result of maturation, is called neutral.

Neutral in the ultimate sense are the two unconditioned dharmas, space and non-analytical cessation, because they are entirely neutral in nature.

(Objection) The Vaibhāṣikas say that bodily karma and vocal karma are wholesome or unwholesome because of their initiating cause, namely, a wholesome or unwholesome mental factor of volition (cetanā). Thus, this could also be applied to the great elements that constitute bodily and vocal karma.

(Vaibhāṣika explanation) This is not so, because the intention of the agent concerns only the action, not the great elements; that is, the agent intends to perform a certain action but does not intend to produce the great elements.

(Author of the Treatise) Although this is said, how can the non-expression produced by meditative concentration be wholesome? When the agent enters concentration, he does not direct his attention toward the non-expression, nor does he think, “Let a non-expression be produced!” Nor can we accept that the non-expression produced by concentration arises from a preceding mind that does not belong to concentration, because that mind is of a different class. Therefore, the non-expression produced by meditative concentration is not wholesome; or, if the Vaibhāṣikas insist that it is wholesome, then the divine eye and divine ear must also be wholesome, whereas the Vaibhāṣikas hold that these two are neutral. This is a problem that the Vaibhāṣikas must resolve (kartavyo ‘tra yatnaḥ).

(Objection) It was also stated above that a mind “to be abandoned through seeing” cannot produce non-expression. Yet the Blessed One said: “Because of wrong view (mithyādṛṣṭi), wrong intention (saṃkalpa), wrong speech, wrong action, and wrong livelihood arise.” Wrong view, however, is abandoned by the Path of Seeing.

(Explanation) The preceding doctrine does not contradict the sutra, because:

[There are two kinds of arising cause:

The causal and the momentary;

In the order given above,

They are called the instigator and the concomitant instigator.

Consciousness abandoned through seeing is the instigator;

The five consciousnesses are concomitant instigators;

Mental consciousness abandoned through cultivation is both.

The uncontaminated and the maturation-born are neither.

When the instigator is wholesome, and so forth,

The concomitant instigator may be of any of the three natures.

In the Blessed One, both are wholesome;

Or, if the instigator is neutral, the concomitant instigator is wholesome.]

Treatise: The dharma that initiates an action (samutthāna, origination) is divided into two kinds: The origination that serves as the cause is called causal origination (hetusamutthāna); the origination that occurs simultaneously with the action is called momentary origination (tatkṣaṇasamutthāna).

At the time when one is about to act, causal origination is capable of impelling (ākṣepaka), that is, producing (utpādaka), the action; therefore, it is the initiating dharma (pravartaka). At the time when one is acting, momentary origination is inseparable from the action; therefore, it is the second initiating dharma, the accompanying initiator (anuvartaka).

(Question) What efficacy (sāmarthya) does momentary origination have with respect to manifest action (vijñapti)?

(Answer) If there were no momentary origination, the action would not occur even though it had been impelled by the initiating dharma; it is just as an action cannot occur when the person who initiated it, thinking, “I shall go to the village,” has just died.

(Question) If manifest action cannot arise in the absence of an accompanying initiator, how can a person in a state without mind who obtains the precepts have manifest action? (Vibhāṣā, 113, 7)

(Answer) A different explanation must be given here: Manifest action is more evident (sphuṭa, vyakta) in persons possessing mind. At the moment when manifest action arises, these persons possess the “second initiating” kind of mind, the accompanying mind; and this is precisely the efficacy of that kind of mind.

The mind abandoned by the path of seeing is solely the causal initiator of manifest action, because it is the basis or cause (nidāna, hetu) of the mental process of deliberation and investigation (vitarka, vicāra) that impels (samutthāpaka) manifest action. This mind is not an accompanying mind: ⁽¹⁾ because it no longer exists at the moment when the manifest action occurs. This manifest action operates by virtue of a mind “directed outward,” which is abandoned by the path of cultivation (bhāvanā) and is the accompanying mind;

⁽²⁾ because, if it were the accompanying mind, the material dharma—the manifest action—that it produced would subsequently also be abandoned by the path of seeing, just as manifest action produced by a mind belonging to the category abandoned through cultivation would be abandoned by the path of cultivation.

This would contradict the Abhidharma.

Indeed, material form (rūpa = vijñapti) is opposed (virudhyate) neither to correct knowledge (vidyā) nor to ignorance (avidyā); it therefore cannot be abandoned by the path of seeing.

(Sautrāntikas) The assertion that “material form is not opposed to knowledge” must be demonstrated. Those who maintain that material form belongs to the category abandoned by seeing will not concede that material form is not opposed to knowledge.

(Vaibhāṣikas) If material form (vijñapti) proceeds from a mind belonging to the category abandoned by seeing, it too would be abandoned by the path of seeing; and the great elements serving as the support (āśraya) of that material form, of that manifest action, would likewise be abandoned by the path of seeing because they also proceed from that kind of mind. This is unacceptable, because these great elements belong to the class of unobscured and indeterminate dharmas, whereas all dharmas abandoned by seeing are defiled (kliṣṭa).

(Sautrāntikas) We do not accept this conclusion. The great elements discussed above are not wholesome or unwholesome by virtue of the mind that initiates them; the same applies to manifest action. Otherwise, it must be admitted that these great elements all belong to the category abandoned by seeing.

(Vaibhāṣikas) This is unacceptable. The great elements cannot belong to the category abandoned by seeing, nor are they “not subject to abandonment.” This is because all undefiled dharmas are opposed neither to knowledge nor to ignorance.

[Indeed, undefiled dharmas, whether unobscured and indeterminate or wholesome but conditioned by outflows, are not opposed to knowledge, that is, to the undefiled noble path; just as, when a defiled dharma is destroyed, it is because the acquisition (prāpti) by which it is possessed is abandoned by the noble path mentioned above…]

Thus, the scripture cited above does not invalidate our position when it says, “A mind abandoned by seeing does not initiate manifest action,” because this scripture refers only to wrong view (mithyādṛṣṭi) as the causal initiator (pravartaka). (Vibhāṣā, 117, 10)

Mental consciousness (manovijñāna) belonging to the category abandoned through cultivation (bhāvanāheya) is both an initiator and an accompanying initiator.

The five consciousnesses—that is, visual consciousness and so forth—are only accompanying initiators because they lack discrimination (vikalpa). (Vibhāṣā, 117, 10)

Thus, there are altogether four cases:

⁽¹⁾ An initiator but not an accompanying initiator: Mental consciousness belonging to the category abandoned by seeing.

⁽²⁾ An accompanying initiator but not an initiator: The five sensory consciousnesses.

⁽³⁾ Both an initiator and an accompanying initiator: Mental consciousness belonging to the category abandoned through cultivation.

⁽⁴⁾ Neither an initiator nor an accompanying initiator: Undefiled mind.

(Question) Is the accompanying mind of the same moral nature—wholesome, unwholesome, or indeterminate—as the initiating mind?

(Answer) This is not necessarily so. From a wholesome initiating mind there may arise a wholesome, unwholesome, or indeterminate accompanying mind; the same is true of an unwholesome or indeterminate initiating mind.

In the case of the Blessed One alone, the accompanying mind is of the same category as the initiating mind: From a wholesome initiating mind there arises a wholesome accompanying mind; from an indeterminate initiating mind there arises an indeterminate accompanying mind. Alternatively, a wholesome accompanying mind may sometimes arise in dependence upon an indeterminate initiating mind; but an indeterminate accompanying mind never arises from a wholesome initiating mind, because the teaching of the Buddhas never diminishes.

Certain schools (the Mahāsāṃghikas and others) say that the minds of the Buddhas are never indeterminate, because the Buddhas are always in meditative concentration; the mental continuum of the Buddhas consists exclusively of wholesome minds (kuśalaikatāna). The scripture (Aṅguttara, iii. 346; Theragāthā, 696–697) says: “The Blessed One, the nāga, is in concentration while walking, standing, lying down, and sitting.”

(Vaibhāṣikas) The scripture says this because the Blessed One’s mind does not become distracted (avisaraṇa) among objects unless he wishes it (anicchayā). [That the Blessed One is always concentrated (nityasamāhita) means that mindfulness is always present in him: When walking, he knows that he is walking.] This does not mean, however, that the Blessed One lacks indeterminate dharmas, such as those produced by maturation (vipākaja), those pertaining to deportment (īryāpatha), and the mind resulting from supernormal transformation (nīrmāṇacitta).

We have learned that mental consciousness belonging to the category abandoned through cultivation is both an initiator and an accompanying initiator, and may be wholesome, unwholesome, or indeterminate.

A mind produced by maturation that arises naturally, without preparatory effort (nirabhisaṃskāravāhin), is neither an accompanying mind nor an initiating mind.

(Question) Does manifest action possess a wholesome, unwholesome, or indeterminate nature according to the nature of the accompanying mind or that of the initiating mind?

(Answer) What is the point of the foregoing question? If bodily action is of the same nature as the initiating mind, then the two views—satkāyadṛṣṭi and antagrāhadṛṣṭi—are both initiating minds, since they are of the defiled-neutral nature. If the manifest action they engender is of the same nature as they are, then in the Desire Realm there should be an action of the defiled-neutral kind; yet this conclusion cannot be accepted. If you stubbornly cling to your position, you must admit—although this runs counter to your own doctrine—that none of the minds abandoned by seeing are initiating minds. This would also mean that satkāyadṛṣṭi and antagrāhadṛṣṭi are not initiating minds, whereas the other kinds of views (dṛṣṭi) are initiating minds.

If manifest action were of the same nature as the accompanying mind, then the manifest action through which a person can acquire the discipline of individual liberation would not be wholesome if that person had an unwholesome or neutral mind while being ordained (upasaṃpādyamāna).

(Vaibhāṣikas) Manifest action is of the same nature as the initiating mind when that initiating mind belongs to what is abandoned through cultivation; but it is not of the same nature when the initiating mind belongs to what is abandoned through seeing. For example, when one thinks, “The self exists,” another initiating mind intervenes between the initiating mind and the manifest action—a kind of mind abandoned through cultivation, directed outward, accompanied by vitarka and vicāra, through which one expounds the self, for example.

The first initiating mind is neutral in nature; the second is unwholesome in nature; and the manifest action is likewise unwholesome in nature. From an initiating mind abandoned through seeing arises another initiating mind abandoned through cultivation, which may be wholesome, unwholesome, or neutral; and from this second initiating mind arises a manifest action of the same nature.

(Author of the Treatise) But if it is not through the accompanying mind that manifest action is wholesome, unwholesome, or neutral, then the explanation you cite from the sutra will have no validity. You have said that the sutra takes only “view” (dṛṣṭi) as the initiating mind, and therefore, in asserting that wrong view gives rise to manifest action, the sutra does not contradict the principle that “a mind abandoned through seeing does not engender manifest action,” nor does it conflict with the corollary that “there is no defiled-neutral manifest action in the Desire Realm.” Therefore, it should be said that the sutra regards “view” (dṛṣṭi) only as the kind of initiating mind that is followed by another initiating mind,

which separates the preceding initiating mind from the manifest action and belongs to the category abandoned by the path of cultivation.