阿毘達磨俱舍論

Part 4.

All conditioned dharmas have dissimilar characteristics, and so too do their modes of arising. Do they always arise together?

—They always arise together.

Conditioned dharmas (saṃskṛta) are divided into five categories: material dharmas (rūpa); mind (citta); mental factors (caitta), which are dharmas associated with mind; formations dissociated from mind (cittaviprayukta), which are formations (saṃskāra) not associated with mind; and the unconditioned (asaṃskṛta). Since unconditioned dharmas do not arise, they are not discussed here.

First, let us discuss the simultaneous arising (sahotpāda) of material dharmas.

[In a subtle aggregate of the Desire Realm, if sound is absent,

And no faculty is present, there are eight entities.

If the body faculty is present, there are nine entities.

There are ten entities if another faculty is present.]

Treatise: The most subtle component of aggregates of matter (rūpau) is called a subtle aggregate (saṃghātaparamāṇu, an aggregate of ultimate particles), because within aggregates of matter nothing can be smaller than these subtle aggregates. (Here, an ultimate particle is not understood in its own proper sense as a substantial dharma (dravya) constituting an atomic unit.)

In the Desire Realm, if this kind of subtle aggregate contains no sound (sabda, śabdāyatana) and no faculty, it contains eight substantial entities, none of which can be absent. These eight entities are the four great elements (mahābhūta) and the four kinds of derived matter (bhautika): color, odor, taste, and tangibility.

If a subtle aggregate contains no sound but does contain the body faculty (kāyendriya, kāyāyatana), it contains nine substantial entities, the body faculty being the ninth.

If a subtle aggregate contains no sound but contains some additional faculty besides the body faculty, it contains ten substantial entities, this additional faculty—such as the eye faculty and so forth—being the tenth; for the faculties of eye, ear, nose, and tongue do not arise apart from the body and constitute distinct sense bases.

If sound is present in the subtle aggregates described above, the numbers of substantial entities in the respective cases become nine, ten, and eleven; for sound (śabdāyatana), arising from the great elements, cannot exist independently apart from the faculties.

(Question) If the four great elements are never separate but always arise simultaneously, how can one separately perceive within an aggregate of matter one of the four characteristics—hardness, moisture, heat, or motion—rather than perceiving all four?

(Answer) In an aggregate of matter, whichever great element has the strongest efficacy (paṭutama, sphuṭutama) is perceived. It is just as, when one grasps a bundle of plant shoots mixed with a needle (sūcītūlīkalāpa), the needle is perceived first, or when one eats a cake mixed with salt, the salty taste is perceived first.

(Question) How can it be known that an aggregate of matter contains great elements that are not perceived therein?

(Answer) All the great elements are manifested through their respective functions: supporting, binding, maturing, and expanding (dhṛti, saṃgraha, pakti, vyūhana).

One master (Bhadanta Śrīlābha) maintains that aggregates of matter contain the four great elements because, upon encountering a certain condition, the element of hardness and so forth can become liquid and so forth. The fire element is present in water because, when water is extremely cold, the quality of warmth arises. Although they are not separate, the function of cold can still increase, just as the functions of sensation and sound vary in strength.

Another master (of the Sautrāntika) maintains that the great elements not perceived within an aggregate of matter continue to exist in the state of seeds (bījata, śaktita, sāmarthyata), not yet possessing efficacy. As the Blessed One said: “In this piece of wood there are many elements (dhātu), or minerals” (Saṃyktāgama, 18, 10). Here the Blessed One meant that the piece of wood contains the seeds, the latent powers (śakti), of many elements, because gold, silver, and so forth are not actually present in the wood.

The Sautrāntika further raises this objection: “How can the existence (sadbhāva) of color (varṇa) in wind be known?”

(Answer of the Vaibhāṣikas) This is a matter of faith (śraddhanīya) and cannot be established by inference. Alternatively, color may be known to exist in wind through contact with the wind or with an odor, because odor is never separate from color.

It was previously stated that odor and taste do not exist in the Form Realm. Therefore, the number of substantial entities in subtle aggregates of the Form Realm must be reduced. Thus, there will be six, seven, or eight substantial entities; and when the body is present, there will be seven, eight, or nine. This need not be explained in detail, for it can be understood by comparison with the preceding cases.

(Question) The Vaibhāṣikas say that a subtle aggregate in the Desire Realm contains at least eight substantial entities (dravya). Are these entities so called because each has its own intrinsic nature, or because each occupies a distinct sense base?

If it is on the basis of intrinsic nature that one says, “There will be six, seven, or eight substantial entities,” then the number of substantial entities is far too small. For if a subtle aggregate is said to contain the four kinds of derived matter—color, odor, taste, and tangibility—then, according to us, this subtle aggregate contains not only color (varṇa) but also shape (saṃsthāna), since many ultimate particles are assembled within it.

Moreover, this subtle aggregate also contains derived tangible matter (spraṣṭavya); therefore, according to us, it will be heavy or light, rough or smooth, and may also possess cold, hunger, and thirst. Thus, this subtle aggregate will contain such substantial entities as heaviness, lightness, roughness, smoothness, cold, hunger, and thirst; if so, the number given above is demonstrably too small. Conversely, if the numbers given above by the Vaibhāṣikas are based on the distinct sense bases of the substantial entities, then they are too large, because the great elements constitute part of the tangible sense base.

In that case, it should be said that a subtle aggregate contains only four substantial entities: color, odor, taste, and tangibility.

(Answer of the Vaibhāṣikas) Our explanation above remains correct. In this case, the term “substantial entity” (dravya) refers both to substances mentioned individually and to sense bases. Among the substantial entities of a subtle aggregate, there are ⁽¹⁾ the four substances mentioned individually—that is, the four great elements that serve as the support and generative basis (āśraya) of derived matter; and there are also ⁽²⁾ four sense bases—that is, the four kinds of derived matter sustained by the four great elements: color, odor, taste, and tangibility.

(Question) The preceding answer is unreasonable, because each kind of derived matter is sustained by a group of four great elements. Thus, a subtle aggregate must contain as many as twenty substantial entities: the four great elements of the subtle aggregate and the sixteen great elements belonging to its four kinds of derived matter.

(Answer of the Vaibhāṣikas) It is not so. We have taken as our basis the intrinsic natures of the great elements—hardness and so forth. Therefore, the intrinsic nature of the four great elements of the subtle aggregate is identical with that of the sixteen great elements sustaining the derived matter of color, odor, taste, and tangibility.

(Conclusion of the author of the treatise) But why do the Vaibhāṣikas employ language so ambiguously, using the single term “substantial entity” (dravya) for two different cases?

Although language originates from intention, its meanings must still be carefully considered before it is used.

The first category of conditioned dharmas, material dharmas, has now been discussed. Next comes the discussion of the second category: mind.

[Mind and mental factors necessarily arise together

(also arise together) with the characteristics of the conditioned or with acquisition.]

Treatise: Mind and mental factors cannot arise separately from one another; if one dharma is absent, the other cannot arise either.

The conditioned (saṃskāra) refers to all conditioned dharmas, including all material dharmas, mind, mental factors, and conditionings dissociated from mind. Whenever any of these conditioned dharmas arise, they are accompanied by the four characteristics of the conditioned (conditioned characteristics, saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa): arising, duration, change, and cessation. The meaning of the words “all together” (necessarily arising together) in the first line of the verse is also included in the second line.

At times they also arise together with acquisition (prāpti).

Among conditioned dharmas, those associated with sentient beings (sattvākhya, sattvasaṃkhyāta) necessarily arise together with the kind of acquisition corresponding to those dharmas. In other cases there is no acquisition; therefore, the verse says “or” (at times).

(Question) What are the mental factors?

The verse answers:

[Mental factors are of different kinds:

The universal factors, and so forth.]

Treatise: Mental factors are of five kinds: ⁽¹⁾ universal factors (mahābhūmika), which accompany all minds; ⁽²⁾ universal wholesome factors (kuśalamahābhūmika), which accompany all wholesome minds; ⁽³⁾ universal afflictive factors (kleśamahābhūmika), which accompany all defiled minds; ⁽⁴⁾ universal unwholesome factors (akuśalamahābhūmika), which accompany all unwholesome minds; and ⁽⁵⁾ minor afflictive factors (parīttakleśabhūmika), whose sphere consists of the minor afflictions.

A sphere (bhūmi) means a “domain in which a dharma arises” (sphere of activity, gativiṣaya, utpattiviṣaya). The place from which a dharma arises is that dharma’s sphere. If it is the sphere of a universal dharma—that is, a dharma capable of being present everywhere—it is called the universal sphere (mahābhūmi). Thus, a universal factor (mahābhūmika) is a dharma belonging to the universal sphere, meaning that it is invariably present in every mind.

What are the universal factors?

[Feeling, perception, volition, contact, desire,

Wisdom, mindfulness, and attention,

Resolve and samādhi—

These are present in every mind.]

Treatise: According to tradition (Vibhāṣā, 12, 10), the ten dharmas above are present in every moment of mind (cittakṣaṇa).

Feeling (vedanā) is the threefold experience (anubhava) of pleasure, pain, and neither pain nor pleasure.

Perception (saṃjñā) is the apprehension of the distinguishing characteristics of an object (such as male, female, and so forth) (viṣayanimittagrahaṇa = viṣayaviśeṣarūpagrāha).

Volition (cetanā) is the activity that impels the mind to act (cittābhisaṃskāra, cittaprasyanda).

Contact (sparśa) is the touching (spṛṣṭi) that arises from the conjunction (saṃnipāta) of a faculty, an object, and consciousness (vijñāna). In other words, contact is the dharma capable of bringing the faculty, object, and consciousness into conjunction when they meet one another.

Desire (chanda) is the wish to act.

Wisdom (prajñā), referred to in the Sanskrit verse by the term mati, is the discernment of dharmas.

Mindfulness (smṛti) is the clear retention of objects (ālambanāsaṃpramoṣa); it is the dharma capable of preventing the mind (manas) from forgetting its objects (vismarati). It may be said that, because of mindfulness, the mind retains its object. Attention (manaskāra) is the directing (alert engagement, ābhoga) of the mind (cetas); in other words, attention “bends” or “places” the mind toward its object.

Resolve (adhimukti) is the acceptance of an object.

Samādhi is the unification of the mind upon an object (cittaikāgratā); in other words, samādhi is the dharma capable of causing a continuous stream of mind (prabandhena) to remain (vartate) upon an object.

(Question) How can it be known that these ten mental factors, whose essential natures differ from one another, can be present in one and the same mind?

(Answer) The distinctive characteristics (viśeṣa) of mind and mental factors are truly extremely subtle. It is already difficult to distinguish each mental factor operating within their homogeneous continuum, how much more so to distinguish all the mental factors operating within a single moment. Even differences in the flavors of medicinal herbs, which can be perceived through the material faculties, are difficult to distinguish; how much more difficult, then, is the discernment of immaterial dharmas, which can be distinguished only by mental consciousness.

The ten universal factors have been explained above; next comes the explanation of the universal wholesome factors.

The sphere from which wholesome dharmas capable of arising everywhere proceed is called the universal wholesome sphere (kuśalamahābhūmi). The mental factors capable of causing this “sphere of arising” to flourish are called universal wholesome factors (kuśalamahābhūmika), that is, the dharmas found in all wholesome minds.

(Question) Which dharmas are called universal wholesome factors?

The verse answers:

[Faith, heedfulness,

Tranquility, equanimity, moral shame, moral dread,

The two wholesome roots, non-harming,

And diligence are always present in wholesome minds.]

Treatise: These dharmas are always found in wholesome minds.

Faith (śraddhā) makes the mind pure. (Jñānaprasthāna, 1, 19).

One teaching holds that faith is confidence in the doctrine of karma and its results, the Three Jewels, and the Four Noble Truths.

Heedfulness (apramāda) means cultivation (bhāvanā), that is, the possession and development of wholesome dharmas.

(Question) The possession and development of wholesome dharmas are nothing other than those wholesome dharmas that are possessed and developed. How, then, can heedfulness be established as a distinct mental factor?

(Answer) Heedfulness is attentiveness (avahitatā) toward wholesome dharmas. Here, however, the term “cultivation” (bhāvanā) is used figuratively; in truth, heedfulness is merely the cause of cultivation.

One teaching (Mahāsaṃghika) holds that heedfulness is the capacity to guard (ārakṣā) the mind.

Tranquility (praśrabdhi) is the dharma capable of making the mind vigorous, light, and serviceable (cittakarmaṇyatā, cittalāghava).

(Objection of the Sautrāntikas) Does the sutra not also speak of bodily tranquility?

(Answer) The sutra refers to bodily tranquility in the same manner as it speaks of bodily feeling (kāyikī vedanā). The essential nature of all feelings pertains to mind; nevertheless, when the sutra speaks of “bodily feeling,” it means feelings that have the five material faculties as their bases and are associated with the five groups of consciousness. The same applies to the tranquility of minds based upon the five material faculties; that is, the tranquility of the five groups of consciousness is designated bodily tranquility.

(Explanation of the Sautrāntikas) If it is explained in this way, how could bodily tranquility be established as one of the factors of awakening (saṃbodhyaṅga)? All five groups of consciousness belong to the Desire Realm because they are not concentrated (asamāhita); that is, they never arise in a state of concentration, whereas the factors of awakening are concentrated. Therefore, according to us, the bodily tranquility mentioned in the sutra is precisely bodily vigor or serviceability (kāyavaiśāradya, kāyakarmaṇyatā).

(Objection of the Sarvāstivādins) If it is explained in this way, how could bodily tranquility become a factor of awakening? For bodily vigor is outflow-tainted (sāsrava).

(Explanation of the Sautrantikas) Nevertheless, because bodily pliancy accords with mental pliancy, and mental pliancy is a factor of awakening, bodily pliancy is also called a factor of awakening. This manner of expression is frequently employed in the sutras. For example, a sutra states that joy and the dharmas conducive to joy (prītisthānīya) constitute the factor of awakening called joy; anger and the cause of anger (pratighanimitta) constitute the hindrance that is an unwholesome dharma (vyāpādanīvaraṇa, the hindrance of ill will); and right view (dṛṣṭi), right thought (saṃkalpa), and right effort (vyāyāma) constitute the aggregate of wisdom (prajñāskandha).

Although thought, whose essence is examination (vitarka), and effort, whose essence is vigor (vīrya), are not themselves wisdom, they are nevertheless called wisdom because they accord with wisdom. Likewise, because bodily pliancy is also a condition for mental pliancy, it is counted among the factors of awakening just as mental pliancy is.

Equanimity (upekṣa) is the evenness of mind (cittasamatā); that is, the dharma capable of enabling the mind to remain even without exertion (anābhoga).

(Objection of the Sautrantikas) If all minds are associated with attention, which has the character of exertion, how can wholesome minds be associated with equanimity, which has the character of non-exertion?

(Explanation of the Vaibhashikas) It was previously stated that the subtle characteristics of minds and mental factors are very difficult to distinguish.

(The Sautrantikas) That is not the issue we wish to raise, because however difficult it may be, it can still be understood through careful investigation and deliberation. The difficulty here is how the same mind can be associated with mental factors that are mutually opposed, such as being attentive and being non-attentive, or possessing pleasure and not possessing pleasure.

(The Vaibhashikas) There may be exertion with respect to one object while there is non-exertion with respect to another; therefore, there is no contradiction when both characteristics are present together.

(The Sautrantikas) If so, the associated mental factors would take different objects as their conditions, and this would contradict your definition of associated dharmas. In our view, mutually opposed dharmas, such as attention and equanimity in this case, or examination and investigation in another case, do not arise simultaneously but must occur in succession.

The two kinds of moral shame, shame before oneself (hrī) and shame before others (apatrāpya), will be explained later.

The two wholesome roots are non-greed (alobha) and non-hatred (adveṣa). As for the third wholesome root, non-delusion (amoha), because its nature is discernment (wisdom, prajñā), it is classified among the universal mental factors.

Non-harming (avihiṃsā) is the absence of causing injury or distress.

Effort (vīrya) is the endurance and courageous exertion of the mind (cetaso bhyutsāhaḥ).

All the mental factors described above are associated with every wholesome mind.

The sphere from which the great afflictions arise is called the sphere of the great afflictions (mahākleśabhūmi).

The mental factors belonging to this sphere—that is, those arising in all defiled minds (kliṣṭa)—are called the universal factors of the great afflictions (kleśamahābhūmika).

(Question) Which dharmas are called the universal factors of the great afflictions?

The stanza replies:

[Delusion, heedlessness, indolence, and lack of faith;

Lethargy and restlessness always belong to defiled dharmas.]

Treatise: Delusion (moha) is foolishness; that is, ignorance (avidyā), absence of knowledge (ajñāna), and absence of clarity (mi gsal ba).

Heedlessness (pramāda) is negligence, the opposite of heedfulness: it neither possesses nor cultivates wholesome dharmas.

Indolence (kausīdya) is laziness, the opposite of effort.

Lack of faith (āśraddhya) is impurity of mind, the opposite of faith.

Lethargy (styāna) is torpor, the opposite of pliancy. The Jñānaprasthāna (2, 9) states: “What is lethargy? It is heaviness of the body, heaviness (gurutā) of the mind, incapacity (akarmaṇyatā) of the body, and incapacity of the mind. Bodily lethargy and mental lethargy are called lethargy.”

(Question) If lethargy is a mental factor, how can there be bodily lethargy?

(Answer) It is analogous to bodily feeling.

Restlessness (auddhatya) is agitation, which prevents the mind from becoming calm (avyupaśama).

Only the six dharmas described above are called the universal factors of the great afflictions.

(Question) However, the Root Abhidharma Treatise (Mūla Abhidharma) states that there are ten universal factors of the great afflictions, while omitting lethargy from those ten dharmas.

What are those ten dharmas? They are lack of faith, indolence, loss of mindfulness (muṣitasmṛtitā), mental distraction (vikṣepa), ignorance, incorrect comprehension (asaṃprajanya), improper attention (ayoniśomanaskāra), false resolve (mithyādhimokṣa), restlessness, and heedlessness.

(Answer) O beloved of the gods (devānāṃpriyaḥ), you cling only to the words and forget their purport!

(Question) What is that purport?

(Answer) Five of the dharmas mentioned in the Abhidharma—loss of mindfulness, distraction, incorrect comprehension, improper attention, and false resolve—have already been counted among the universal mental factors and therefore should not be established once again as universal factors of the great afflictions. The wholesome root of non-delusion should likewise not be established as a universal factor of the great afflictions, because, having wisdom as its essential nature, non-delusion must belong among the universal mental factors.

Loss of mindfulness is nothing other than defiled mindfulness (smṛti). Mental distraction is defiled concentration. Incorrect comprehension is defiled wisdom.

Improper attention is defiled attention, and false resolve is defiled resolve. This is why the Root Abhidharma Treatise enumerates ten universal factors of the great afflictions by presenting the universal mental factors in their defiled state (kliṣṭa).

(Question) Can a universal mental factor also be a universal factor of the great afflictions?

(Answer) There are four cases: ⁽¹⁾ feeling, perception, volition, contact, and desire are only universal mental factors; ⁽²⁾ lack of faith, indolence, ignorance, restlessness, and heedlessness are only universal factors of the great afflictions; ⁽³⁾ mindfulness, concentration, wisdom, attention, and resolve belong to both categories; ⁽⁴⁾ all other dharmas, such as the universal wholesome factors, belong to neither of these two categories.

Some masters (Vibhāṣā, 42, 17) maintain that mental distraction (vikṣepa) is not wrong concentration (mithyāsamādhi), and therefore formulate the four cases differently: they add mental distraction to the second case and remove concentration from the third case.

(Question) If the Abhidharma, despite acknowledging that lethargy is associated with all defiled dharmas, excludes it from the universal factors of the great afflictions, is this our error or that of the Abhidharma masters?

(Reply of the Abhidharma masters) Lethargy should indeed have been included among the universal factors of the great afflictions, but it was not mentioned because lethargy accords with concentration (samādhi). A person disposed toward lethargy (styānacarita), that is, one who is sluggish, can develop concentration more quickly than a person disposed toward restlessness (auddhatyacarita).

(Question) But is there anyone disposed toward lethargy who is not also restless? And is there anyone disposed toward restlessness who is not also lethargic? These two afflictions have never been seen to occur apart from one another.

(Answer) It is true that lethargy and restlessness accompany one another, but here the word “disposition” indicates predominance (adhimātra). One in whom lethargy is excessively strong is called “sluggish,” even though that person may also be experiencing restlessness.

We also understand this in the same way as you do. Nevertheless, because the dharmas are classified into distinct categories on the basis of their intrinsic nature, it must be admitted that these six dharmas are the great defiled mental factors, since only they arise together with all defiled minds.

The great defiled mental factors have been explained above; next is the explanation of the great unwholesome mental factors.

The sphere from which the great unwholesome dharmas arise is called the great unwholesome sphere. The mental factors belonging to this sphere are called the great unwholesome mental factors (akuśalamahābhūmika), because they invariably arise in unwholesome minds.

(Question) Which dharmas are called the great unwholesome mental factors?

The stanza answers:

[Always present throughout all unwholesome minds

(Are) shamelessness and lack of moral dread.]

Exposition: Only two mental factors invariably manifest in unwholesome minds: shamelessness (āhrikya) and lack of moral dread (anapatrāpya). Therefore, only these two dharmas bear the name of this class of mental factors. Their characteristics will be explained below.

The sphere from which the minor afflictions arise is called the sphere of the minor afflictions. Any dharma belonging to this sphere is called a minor-affliction mental factor (parīttakleśabhūmika), that is, it arises together with only a portion of the defiled minds.

(Question) Which dharmas are called the minor-affliction mental factors?

The stanza answers:

[Wrath, concealment, avarice, jealousy, vexation;

Harmfulness, enmity, deceit, fraud, and arrogance:

This class is called

The minor-affliction mental factors.]

Exposition: The mental factors above are so named because their sphere is that of the minor afflictions. Here, “minor affliction” refers to ignorance in an isolated state, that is, ignorance not associated with craving and so forth. These mental factors are associated only with ignorance—an ignorance that belongs solely to mental consciousness and is abandoned on the path of cultivation (bhāvanāmārga). For this reason, these mental factors alone are called the minor-affliction mental factors. They will be discussed in the chapter on the latent tendencies.

The five classes of mental factors have been explained above. In addition, there are indeterminate mental factors (aniyata), which may be associated with a wholesome mind, an unwholesome mind, or a neutral mind. These are remorse (kaukṛtya), torpor (middha), initial application of thought (vitarka), sustained application of thought (vicāra), and so forth.

(Question) How many mental factors arise together with each kind of wholesome, unwholesome, or neutral mind?

The stanza answers:

[In the Desire Realm, because there are vitarka and vicāra,

A wholesome mind

Has twenty-two mental factors;

Sometimes remorse is added.

An unwholesome mind that is independent,

Or one in which a view arises,

Has only twenty.

If one of the four afflictions, wrath, and so forth,

Or remorse is present, it has twenty-one.

A neutral mind, whether obscured or unobscured, has eighteen;

An unobscured neutral mind has twelve.

Torpor is present in all types of mind

With which it is not incompatible;

Whenever this mental factor is present, one is added.]

Exposition: In the Desire Realm there are altogether five kinds of mind: ⁽¹⁾ wholesome mind (kuśala), which constitutes one kind; ⁽²⁾–⁽³⁾ unwholesome mind (akuśala), which constitutes two kinds according to whether it is associated only with ignorance alone (independent ignorance, avidyā) or with other afflictions such as craving (rāga), and so forth; ⁽⁴⁾–⁽⁵⁾ neutral mind (avyākṛta), meaning a mind that does not produce a resultant of maturation, which constitutes two kinds according to whether it is defiled (nivṛta, obscured-neutral)—that is, associated with the view of a real personality (satkāyadṛṣṭi) and the view of extremes (antagrāhadṛṣṭi)—or undefiled (anivṛta, unobscured-neutral)—that is, a resultant mind.

A mind in the Desire Realm is always associated with vitarka and vicāra. When wholesome, this mind has twenty-two mental factors: the ten great mental factors, the ten great wholesome mental factors, and the two indeterminate factors (anityata), vitarka and vicāra. When a wholesome mind takes remorse (kautṛtya) as its object, the number of mental factors reaches twenty-three.

(Question) What does remorse mean?

(Answer) Literally, remorse is the nature of what pertains to an evil deed (kukṛtabhāva). Here, however, when remorse is spoken of, it refers to the mental factor whose object is remorse understood in the foregoing sense; that is, regret (vipratisāra) concerning an evil deed that has been committed. It is just as the gateway to liberation (vimokṣamukha) is called emptiness (śūnya) because its object is emptiness or non-self, and non-greed (alobha) is called impurity (aśubhā) because its object consists of impure dharmas.

Likewise, the world commonly names what is supported after its support, as when it is said that all the villages and regions have assembled together: the places (sthāna, āśraya) are used to designate the people who dwell in those places (sthānin, āśrayin). An evil deed is the support of regret; because the regret is named after its support, this regret is called remorse. This is a case in which the effect bears the name of its cause, as the sutra states: “The six bases of contact () are precisely karma performed in a former life.”

(Question) When its object is something that has not been done, how can it be called remorse concerning an evil deed?

(Answer) Even in relation to something not done, it can still be called remorse; as when one regrets and says, “It is truly regrettable that I did not do that before.”

(Question) In what cases is remorse called wholesome?

(Answer) Remorse is called wholesome when it concerns a wholesome deed that one failed to perform or an evil deed that one performed; and remorse is called unwholesome when it concerns an evil deed that one failed to perform or a wholesome deed that one performed. Both kinds of remorse arise on the basis of both of the foregoing cases.

An independent (āveṇika) unwholesome mind, or an unwholesome mind associated with a view (dṛṣṭi), has twenty mental factors; when associated with one of the four afflictions, or with wrath and so forth, it has twenty-one mental factors.

An independent mind is a mind associated only with ignorance (avidyā) and not with other afflictions such as craving (rāga), and so forth.

An unwholesome mind associated with a view is a mind associated with wrong view (mithyādṛṣṭi), attachment to views (dṛṣṭiparāmarśa), or attachment to precepts and observances (śīlavrataparāmarśa). If it is associated with the view of a real personality (satkāyadṛṣṭi) or the view of extremes (antagrāhadṛṣṭi), it is not unwholesome (akuśla) but obscured-neutral (nivṛtāvyākṛta).

In both of these cases, the unwholesome mind has the ten great mental factors, the six great defiled mental factors, the two great unwholesome mental factors, and the two indeterminate mental factors, vitarka and vicāra. View is not counted separately because view is merely a kind of wisdom (prajñā), and wisdom is already included among the great mental factors.

When associated with any of the four afflictions—craving (rāga), aversion (pratigha), pride (māna), or doubt (vicikitsā)—the unwholesome mind has twenty-one mental factors: the twenty mental factors mentioned above, with craving, aversion, or another affliction added.

When associated with wrath and so forth, it is associated with one of the secondary afflictions (upakleśa) enumerated above.

A neutral mind has eighteen mental factors if it is obscured, and only twelve if it is unobscured.

In the Desire Realm, a neutral mind is a kind of mind that does not produce a resultant of maturation. When associated with the view of a real personality and the view of extremes, it is obscured—that is, concealed by the afflictions (nivṛta-kleśachādita)—and has eighteen mental factors: the ten great mental factors, the six great defiled mental factors, and the two indeterminate mental factors, vitarka and vicāra.

If it belongs to the unobscured category, the neutral mind has only twelve mental factors: the ten universal mental factors, initial application, and sustained application.

The foreign masters maintain that regret may also be neutral, as in the case of regret experienced in a dream. Thus, an unobscured-neutral mind associated with neutral regret will have thirteen mental factors.

Torpor (middha) is not incompatible with any of the types of mind mentioned above. Any type of mind accompanied by torpor has its number of mental factors increased by one.

Torpor may be wholesome, unwholesome, or neutral. Thus, a mind associated with torpor will have twenty-three mental factors instead of the previous twenty-two, or twenty-four mental factors instead of the previous twenty-three, depending on whether that mind is wholesome and without regret or wholesome and accompanied by regret.

The number of mental factors associated with the types of mind in the Desire Realm has been explained above. Next comes the explanation concerning the higher realms.

[In the first concentration, the unwholesome are excluded,

As are regret and torpor;

In the intermediate concentration, initial application is also excluded.

In the higher concentrations, sustained application and so forth are excluded.]

Commentary: In the first dhyana, there are no unwholesome mental factors, regret, or torpor; all the others are present.

The mental factors absent from the first dhyana are: ⁽¹⁾ hostility (pratigha); ⁽²⁾ all the defilements in the group beginning with anger, except hypocrisy (śāṭhya), deceit (māya), and arrogance (mada); ⁽³⁾ the two universal unwholesome factors, shamelessness and lack of moral dread; ⁽⁴⁾ regret; and ⁽⁵⁾ torpor. The other mental factors belonging to the Desire Realm are all present in the first dhyana.

In the intermediate dhyana, initial application (vitarka) is also excluded.

From the second dhyana upward through the Formless Realm, sustained application, hypocrisy, and deceit are also excluded. (Arrogance is always present in all three realms.)

(Question of the Vibhāṣā) (Vibhāṣā, 129, 1) The sutra says that hypocrisy and deceit arise as far as the Brahmā realm, but these two mental factors do not exist in the higher heavenly realms, where beings do not live together. When the bhikshu Aśvajit (Bhikṣu Aśvajit) asked Great Brahmā (Mahābrahmā), while the latter was seated amid the celestial assembly, “At what stage do the four great elements entirely cease?” Great Brahmā was unable to answer this question but falsely declared: “I am Brahmā, Great Brahmā, the Lord, the Creator, the Bestower, the Sustainer, the father of all.” Brahmā then contrived to lead Aśvajit away from the celestial assembly and advised him to return to his teacher and ask him.

The number of mental factors associated with all types of mind in all three realms has been explained above. Next, the distinctions among a small number of the mental factors explained above will be discussed.

(Question) How do shamelessness and lack of moral dread differ? How do affection and reverence differ?

The stanza answers:

[Shamelessness and lack of moral dread are lack of reverence

And lack of fear before wrongdoing;

Affection and reverence are faith and moral shame,

And exist only in the Desire and Form Realms.]

Commentary: Shamelessness is the absence of reverence; that is, the absence of esteem (apratīśatā) and respectful submission (abhayavaśavartitā) toward one’s own and others’ virtues (maitrī, karuṇā), as well as toward virtuous persons. Shamelessness is the mental factor contrary to reverence (gaurava, sagauravatā, sapratīśatā, sabhayavaśavartitā).

Lack of moral dread is the factor that prevents a person from perceiving the undesirable results (aniṣṭaphala) of wrongdoing.

Wrongdoing (avadya) is that which good persons despise.

The “undesirable results” are called “fear” (bhaya) in the stanza because these results give rise to fear.

The condition of a person who has committed wrongdoing yet does not perceive such results—that is, the factor that produces this condition—is precisely lack of moral dread.

(Objection) Does the phrase “not perceiving undesirable results” (abhayadarśitva) mean “perceiving that no result should be regarded as undesirable” (abhayasya darśitvam), or does it mean “not perceiving those undesirable results” (abhayasya adarśitvam)? Neither of these two interpretations is reasonable, for the first interpretation indicates a type of defiled prajna, namely inaccurate cognition, while the second indicates only ignorance.

(Explanation) The phrase “not perceiving undesirable results” means neither “perceiving” in the sense of defiled prajna nor “not perceiving” in the sense of ignorance. It merely refers to one of the derivative defilements (upakleśa), which has wrong view (mithyādṛṣṭi) and ignorance as its causes and is called lack of moral dread (anapatrāya). (Vibhāṣā, 34, 19)

Some masters maintain that feeling no shame for wrongdoing before oneself is shamelessness, while feeling no shame for wrongdoing before others is lack of moral dread.

(Question) If so, could these two kinds of absence of shame for wrongdoing never occur simultaneously?

(Answer) We do not mean that these two kinds of absence of shame must occur at the same moment. If a person feels no shame for wrongdoing before oneself, this is shamelessness, arising from sensual desire (rāganisyanda); and if one feels no shame before others, this is lack of moral dread, arising from delusion (moha).

Moral shame (hrī) and moral dread (apatrāya) are the two factors opposed to the two described above. If the first explanation given above is understood in reverse, moral shame is reverence, esteem, and respectful submission, while moral dread is fear of the results of wrongdoing. According to the second explanation, moral shame is shame for wrongdoing before oneself, while moral dread is shame before others.

The distinction between shamelessness and lack of moral dread has been explained above. Next, the distinctions between affection and reverence will be presented.

Affection, that is, loving regard, has faith as its nature. Affection is of two kinds: defiled (kliṣṭa) and undefiled. (Vibhāṣā, 29, 12)

Defiled affection is craving (rāga), such as affection for one’s wife, children, and so forth. Undefiled affection is faith (śraddhā), such as affection for one’s teacher or a virtuous person.

There are cases in which faith is not affection, such as faith concerning the truths of suffering and its origin.

There are cases in which affection is not faith, such as defiled affection.

There are cases in which faith is itself affection, such as faith concerning the truths of cessation and the path.

Other mental factors and factors not associated with mind are neither faith nor affection.

One theory holds that faith is confidence in virtues (guṇasaṃbhāvanā), and from this confidence affection (priyatā) arises. Therefore, affection is not faith but the result of faith.

Reverence, that is, respectful regard, has moral shame as its nature. As explained above, moral shame is reverence, esteem, and so forth.

There are cases in which moral shame is not reverence, such as the moral shame related to the truths of suffering and its origin.

The moral shame related to the truths of cessation and the path is also reverence.

One theory holds that reverence is esteem (sapratīśata), and that from reverence arises the sense of shame (lajjā) called moral shame (hrī). Thus, reverence is the cause of moral shame, rather than moral shame itself.

Affection and reverence may be analyzed into four cases:

⁽¹⁾ Affection that is not reverence, as toward one’s wife and children, fellow practitioners (sārdhavihārin), and so forth.

⁽²⁾ Reverence that is not affection, as toward another person’s teacher, a virtuous person, and so forth.

⁽³⁾ Reverence that is also affection, as toward one’s own teacher, one’s parents, and so forth.

⁽⁴⁾ Neither reverence nor affection, as toward other people.

Both of these exist in the Desire Realm and the Form Realm, but not in the Formless Realm.

(Question) Was it not just stated above that affection is faith and reverence is moral shame? If so, affection and reverence must also exist in the Formless Realm, because faith and moral shame are both dharmas of the sphere of great wholesome factors.

(Answer) Affection and reverence are each of two kinds: one relating to dharmas and one relating to persons. The first kind exists in all three realms; but since the second kind is being discussed here, it exists only in the Desire Realm and the Form Realm.

The distinction between affection and reverence has been explained above. Next comes the distinction between investigation and examination.

[Investigation and examination are the grossness and subtlety of mind.

Pride arises from comparing oneself with the minds of others.

Arrogance arises from attachment to one’s own qualities, whereby the mind becomes haughty and holds others in contempt.]

Treatise: Investigation (vitarka) and examination (vicāra) are the distinction between the grossness and subtlety of mind. When the mind is gross and active, it is called investigation; when the mind is subtle, it is called examination.

(Question) How can investigation and examination be associated with the mind at the same time?

(Answer) One theory (Vibhāṣā, 42, 14) holds that examination is like cold water, while investigation is like sunlight shining upon a layer of cream through which cold water flows. Because of the water and sunlight, the layer of cream neither melts nor solidifies. The association of investigation and examination with the mind is likewise. The mind is not excessively subtle because of investigation, nor excessively gross and active because of examination.

We maintain, however, that according to the explanation above, investigation and examination are not the subtle and gross qualities of the mind but rather the causes (nimitta) of these two qualities; for cold water and sunlight are not the states of solidification and melting of the layer of cream, but the causes that produce these states.

Another theory (Dārṣṭāntika) holds that the grossness and subtlety of mind are established relatively and have many different degrees: the mind of the first dhyāna is subtle in comparison with the mind of the Desire Realm, but gross and active in comparison with the second dhyāna. Within the same stage, qualities and afflictions may be grosser or subtler, because they have as many as nine degrees. Therefore, if investigation and examination are the gross and subtle qualities of mind, both must arise even up to the highest level of the Formless Realm. (Vibhāṣā, 52, 6).

Yet these two mental factors cease beginning with the second dhyāna. Moreover, these two qualities of grossness and subtlety could not constitute distinct categories (jatibheda), and there would be no basis upon which investigation and examination could be distinguished.

Another theory (Sautrāntika) holds that investigation and examination are two factors (formations) of speech, because the sutra says, “There must first be investigation and examination before speech can occur; there is no instance in which speech can occur without prior investigation and examination.” The factor of speech that is gross and active is called investigation. (Thus, according to this explanation, it may be understood that speech does not arise from two separate dharmas—investigation and examination—but from an assemblage of mind and mental factors that stimulates speech, and this assemblage of mental factors may be gross or subtle.)

(Objection of the Vaibhāṣikas) If two associated dharmas are present within a single mind, and one of these two dharmas is gross while the other is subtle, is there any contradiction in this?

(Explanation of the Sautrāntikas) There is no contradiction if these two dharmas belong to distinct categories. For example, although feeling is gross and perception is subtle, they still arise together. However, if they belong to the same category but differ in strength and weakness, grossness and subtlety, they cannot arise together.

(Vaibhāṣikas) Investigation and examination nevertheless belong to distinct categories.

(Sautrāntikas) What are these distinct categories?

(Vaibhāṣikas) These distinct categories are very difficult to explain; nevertheless, they may be manifested (vyakta) through the strong or weak powers of the mind.

(Sautrāntikas) The strength and weakness of the mind cannot manifest this distinct character, because one and the same category may sometimes be strong and sometimes weak.

(Conclusion of the author of the treatise) Investigation and examination are not associated with one and the same single mind, but arise successively. The Vaibhāṣikas do not accept that the first dhyāna has five factors, among which are investigation and examination. According to us, the first dhyāna still has five factors insofar as these five factors belong to the plane of the first dhyāna, although, considered in terms of a single moment, the first dhyāna will not possess four factors—rapture (prīti), bliss (sukha), concentration (samādhi), and either investigation or examination.

The distinction between investigation and examination has been explained above. Next comes the distinction between pride (māna) and arrogance (mada).

Pride is the elevation of the mind (cetasa unnatiḥ) in relation to others. When one compares the virtues one possesses, or imagines oneself to possess, with those of others, the mind becomes haughty and contemptuous of others. Arrogance, by contrast, is the heedlessness of mind in those who are deluded by their own particular qualities.

Because of attachment to one’s own particular qualities, the mind becomes haughty, elated, and unrestrained.

Some masters explain that, just as wine can produce a special kind of joyful exhilaration (saṃpraharṣaviśeṣa), commonly called intoxication, so too does attachment to one’s own particular qualities.

The various categories, differing characteristics, and the number of mind and mental factors that arise together have been explained above. Next comes an analysis of the various mental factors of mind and mental factors spoken of in the scriptures.

[Mind, mental faculty, and consciousness are identical in essence.

Mind and mental factors possess a basis,

An object, a mode of apprehension,

And association. Association has five meanings.]

Treatise: Mind (citta) is that which accumulates (cinoti) both wholesome and unwholesome dharmas. Mind is called the mental faculty (manas) when it cognizes (reflects, manute), and it is called consciousness (vijñāna) when it discriminates its object (ālambanaṃ vijānāti).

One explanation holds that it is called mind because it is variegated (citra) by pure and impure elements. When the mind serves as the basis (āśrayabhūta) for a subsequent mind, it is called the mental faculty; when it depends upon a faculty and an object (āśritabhūta), it is called consciousness.

Thus, the three terms mind, mental faculty, and consciousness have different meanings but all designate the same entity. Just as in the case of mind, mental faculty, and consciousness, the terms “possessing a basis,” “possessing an object,” “possessing an aspect,” and “possessing association,” as applied to mind and mental factors, have different meanings but all refer to the same entities.

Mind and mental factors are said to “possess a basis” (āśraya) because they all depend upon the faculties; they are said to “possess an object” (sālambana) because they all apprehend their objects (viṣayagrahaṇa); they are said to “possess an aspect” (sākāra) because they all assume different modes according to the different kinds of objects; and they are said to “possess association,” that is, to be “similar and united” (saṃprayukta), because they are similar (sama) to one another and are not separated (aviprayukta) from one another.

(Question) On the basis of what meaning are they said to be “similar and united”?

Answer) Mind and mental factors are called associated because they possess five kinds of sameness (samatā): sameness of basis, object, mode of activity, time (kāla), and number of real entities (dravya). For example, the mental factor of feeling and the other mental factors can be associated with mind because they have the same basis, the same object, and the same mode of activity; because they arise at the same time; and because, within this association, each kind is represented by a single real entity. In a single moment, only one mind—that is, one unique real entity—can arise; and associated with this single mind there is likewise only one mental factor, also a single real entity of each kind: the mental factor of feeling, and so forth.

The foregoing is a detailed explanation of the characteristics of mind and mental factors.

(Question) What are the formations (saṃskāra) dissociated from mind (cittaviprayukta)?

The stanza answers:

[The formations dissociated from mind

Are acquisition, non-acquisition, commonality,

The two absorptions, non-percipient existence, life,

The characteristics of the conditioned, collections of names, and so forth.]

Treatise: The dharmas dissociated from mind have an intrinsic nature that does not belong to matter (rūpa). They all belong to the skandha of formations (saṃskāraskandha). This is why they are called “formations dissociated from mind” (cittaviprayukta saṃskāra): because they are separate from mind and, like mind, belong to the non-material.

The following explains the characteristics of acquisition and non-acquisition.

[Acquisition is obtaining and possession;

Non-acquisition is the opposite of acquisition.

Acquisition and non-acquisition pertain only to

One’s own continuum and the two cessations.]

Treatise: Acquisition (prāpti) is of two kinds: ⁽¹⁾ obtaining (lābha, pratilambha) what has not yet been acquired (prāpta) or what has been lost (vihīna); and ⁽²⁾ possessing (being endowed with, samanvaga, samanvāgama) what has already been acquired or has not been lost.

Non-acquisition is the opposite of these two cases.

(Question) Which dharmas are subject to acquisition and non-acquisition?

(Answer) An individual and the two dharmas of cessation may be subject to acquisition and non-acquisition.

When a conditioned dharma (saṃskṛta) occurs within an individual’s continuum, there may be acquisition or non-acquisition of that conditioned dharma, but not when it occurs within another individual’s continuum, because no one can possess dharmas belonging to another. Nor can there be acquisition or non-acquisition when this conditioned dharma occurs in no continuum at all, because no one can possess dharmas not pertaining to sentient beings (asattvākhya).

As for unconditioned dharmas (asaṃskṛta), there is acquisition of the two dharmas of cessation: cessation through discernment (pratisaṃkhyānirodha) and cessation not through discernment (apratisaṃkhyānirodha).

All sentient beings may possess cessation not through discernment with respect to dharmas that do not arise because their conditions are absent.

The Jñānaprasthāna (19, 9) states: “Who possesses the uncontaminated dharmas (anāsrava)?—All sentient beings may possess cessation through discernment, except noble ones who remain fully bound in the first moment (sakalabandhana-ādikṣaṇastha)—that is, heavenly beings who, in the first moment of the Path of Seeing, remain bound by the afflictions—and except all ordinary beings (pṛthagjana) who remain fully bound in every respect. All other sentient beings—that is, other heavenly beings and ordinary beings—may possess cessation through discernment.”

No one can possess (samanvāgata) space (ākāśa); therefore, there is no acquisition of space.

According to the Vibhāṣā, acquisition and non-acquisition are established through their mutual opposition. All those who have acquisition also have non-acquisition. This is readily understandable and therefore need not be explained in detail.

(Objection of the Sautrāntikas) How can the Vaibhāṣikas of the Sarvāstivāda know that there is a distinct real dharma (dravyadharma) called acquisition?

(Reply of the Sarvāstivādins) The sutra (Madhyamāgama, 49, 16) says: “Through the arising (utpāda), acquisition (pratilambha), and possession (being endowed with, samanvāgata) of the ten dharmas of an arhat, one beyond training, the noble one becomes a person who has eliminated the five factors of affliction.”

(Sautrāntikas) If so, one could still possess dharmas that do not pertain to sentient beings and dharmas belonging to others. For the sutra (Cakravartisūtra) says: “Bhikshus, you should know that a wheel-turning king possesses seven precious treasures.” (Dīgha, iii. 59) (Among these seven treasures, one does not pertain to a sentient being, such as the wheel, and one belongs to another, such as the woman.)

(Sarvāstivādins) In the passage above, “possesses” conveys the meaning of “having mastery” (vaśitva). The wheel-turning king has mastery over the precious treasures because he can obtain them at will (kāmacāra). But when the sutra speaks of possessing the ten dharmas of an arhat, the word “possessing” refers to a distinct real dharma (dravyadharma).

(Sautrāntikas) If, in the Sutra of the Wheel-Turning King, “possessing” means “having mastery,” how can it be known with certainty that in another sutra the same word refers to the real dharma of acquisition?

This dharma of acquisition is not directly perceived as are matter, sound, and so forth, or greed, hatred, and so forth. Nor can its existence be inferred from its function (kṛtya), as in the case of the faculty of sight, the faculty of hearing, and so forth, because no comparable function is observed in acquisition.

(Sarvāstivādins) To speak thus is mistaken. This dharma of acquisition does indeed have a function: it is the cause for the arising (utpattihetu) of dharmas.

(Sautrāntikas) This reply is lamentable! If dharmas arise by virtue of acquisition, then: ⁽¹⁾ arising and the arising of arising would become useless; ⁽²⁾ dharmas not pertaining to sentient beings (asattvākhya) could not arise; and ⁽³⁾ how could one explain the differences in strength—strong, weak, or intermediate—among the afflictions (kleśa) of persons who remain fully bound (sakalabandhana), since all such persons possess acquisition (prāpti) with respect to all afflictions of the Desire Realm? If you argue that differences nevertheless exist because acquisition has different causes, then these very causes would be the principal causes producing the differing degrees of affliction—strong, weak, or intermediate—and what function would acquisition then serve?

(Sarvāstivādins) Who says that acquisition is the cause that gives rise to dharmas? That is not our doctrine. According to us, acquisition is the cause that establishes the states and circumstances of sentient beings. If there were no acquisition, how could the difference between ordinary beings and noble ones (Ārya) be distinguished at a moment when a mundane mind (laukika) arises? This difference can be known because noble ones, even while a mundane mind is arising, still possess (prāpti) certain uncontaminated dharmas.

(Sautrāntikas) According to us, the difference exists because noble ones have eliminated a portion of the afflictions, whereas ordinary beings have not eliminated them (prahīṇāprahīṇākleśatāviṣeṣa).

(Sarvastivada) Certainly so; but if there were no acquisition, how could one say whether an affliction had or had not been abandoned? An affliction can be abandoned only when one becomes separated (vigama) from “the acquisition of this affliction”; as long as “the acquisition of this affliction” continues to arise, this affliction cannot yet be abandoned.

(Position of the Sautrantikas) Whether an affliction has or has not been abandoned depends principally upon a certain condition of the individual basis (āśraya). In a noble one, through the power of the path of seeing and the path of cultivation, the bodily basis is transformed and becomes different from what it was before. Once an affliction has been destroyed by the path of seeing, it no longer has the capacity to arise again.

Just as a seed burned by fire becomes different from before and can no longer sprout, so it is with a noble one. Once a noble one has abandoned an affliction, the kind of seed that produces that affliction no longer remains within the body. The mundane path cannot completely eradicate afflictions, but it can already damage or disturb them.

Therefore, it is said that an ordinary being, even if able to cultivate only the mundane path, can still abandon an affliction when the bodily basis no longer contains the seeds of the kind of affliction damaged (upahata) by this path of cultivation. Conversely, if these seeds have not been burned or damaged, the afflictions have not yet been abandoned. When a person has not abandoned an affliction in the manner described above, that person is said to “possess” the affliction; when it has been abandoned, that person is said “not to possess” it.

Both “possession” and “non-possession” are not real dharmas but merely conceptual designations (prajñapti).

The possession and non-possession of afflictions have been explained above; next comes the explanation of the possession and non-possession of dharmas.

There are two kinds of wholesome dharmas: ⁽¹⁾ innate wholesome dharmas (aupapattika, upapattilābhika), acquired without effort (āyatnabhavin); and ⁽²⁾ wholesome dharmas acquired through effort or cultivation (prāyogika, prāyogalābhika).

A person is said to possess innate wholesome dharmas when the seeds of those wholesome dharmas remain intact within that person’s bodily basis; if the seeds have been damaged, that person is said not to possess them. Indeed, although the seeds of the afflictions can be completely eradicated (atyantaṃ samudghāta, apoddharaṇa), as in the case of a noble one, wholesome roots can never be utterly eradicated. It is precisely because of this qualification that, when a person severs the wholesome roots through the power of wrong view, that person is said to have severed the wholesome roots, because the seeds of those wholesome roots—that is, the seeds belonging to that person’s bodily basis—have been damaged by wrong view (mithyādṛṣṭi).

A person is said to possess wholesome dharmas acquired through cultivation when those dharmas that have arisen and the capacity to produce new wholesome dharmas have not been damaged.

Thus, when “possession” (samanvāgama) is spoken of, it is not a dharma having a distinct real substance (nānyad dravyam) called acquisition (prāpti), as the Sarvastivada maintains, but merely a certain condition (avasthā) of the basis (āśraya = nāmarūpa). It is used to indicate the following cases: ⁽¹⁾ the seeds of the afflictions have not been completely uprooted (anapoddhṛta) by the noble path; ⁽²⁾ the seeds of the afflictions have not been damaged (anupahata) by the mundane path (laukika); ⁽³⁾ the seeds of innate wholesome roots (aupapattika) have not been damaged by wrong view; and ⁽⁴⁾ the seeds of wholesome roots acquired through cultivation remain intact at the moment when those wholesome dharmas are about to arise.

When a person’s basis is in such a condition, that person is said to “possess afflictions, wholesome roots, and so forth.”

(Question of the Sarvastivada) What is a seed (bīja)?

(Answer) A seed is name-and-form (nāmarūpa), that is, an aggregate of the five skandhas, capable of producing a result either directly or indirectly through a distinctive transformation (pariṇāmaviśeṣa) within a continuum.

A continuum (saṃtati) refers to conditioned formations (saṃskāra) of the past, present, and future that are causally related to one another and form an uninterrupted succession.

Transformation (pariṇāma) refers to the transformation of this continuum, its arising differently at each moment.

Distinctiveness (viśeṣa) is the stage at which this transformation reaches its culmination, the moment when the continuum possesses sufficient power to produce the result directly.

(Objection of the Vaibhasikas) A sutra says: “One who possesses greed (lobhena samanvāgataḥ) cannot cultivate the four foundations of mindfulness.”

(Explanation of the Sautrantikas) In the passage above, “possesses greed” implies “acceptance” (adhivāsana, abhyanujñāna) or “not casting off” (avinodana, avyupaśama) greed. The sutra does not say that a person who has the seed of greed cannot cultivate the four foundations of mindfulness; it merely implies that, while greed is manifestly active, one lacks the capacity to cultivate the four foundations of mindfulness.

In summary, however “possession” (samanvāgama) may be understood, it is still not a dharma with real substance (dravyadharma), but only a conceptually designated dharma (prajñaptidharma). The same applies to “non-possession”; it is merely the contrary of possession.

The Vaibhasika masters say that acquisition and non-acquisition are real dharmas, not conceptual designations.

Both of the foregoing doctrines may be accepted. Why? Because the first doctrine does not contradict reason, while the second expresses the intent of our own school.

The intrinsic nature of acquisition and non-acquisition has been explained above; next comes the presentation of their distinctions.

First is the presentation of acquisition:

[Dharmas of the three times each have three kinds of acquisition.

Wholesome dharmas and so forth have only acquisitions of the corresponding moral quality.

A dharma pertaining to a realm has an acquisition belonging to that realm.

A dharma not pertaining to any realm has four kinds of acquisition.

A dharma belonging neither to the Training nor to the Beyond Training has three kinds of acquisition.

Dharmas that cannot be abandoned have two kinds of acquisition.]

Treatise: Acquisitions of dharmas of the past, present, and future are each of three different kinds.

A past dharma may be the object of a past acquisition, a present acquisition, or a future acquisition.

The same applies to present and future dharmas.

Wholesome dharmas have only wholesome acquisitions; unwholesome dharmas have unwholesome acquisitions; and morally neutral dharmas have morally neutral acquisitions.

A dharma pertaining to a particular realm has an acquisition belonging to that realm. Dharmas pertaining to the three realms are all contaminated dharmas (sāsrava). A dharma belonging to the Desire Realm has only an acquisition belonging to the Desire Realm. The same applies to dharmas in the Form Realm and the Formless Realm.

Dharmas not pertaining to any realm—generally speaking, uncontaminated dharmas—have four kinds of acquisition: three acquisitions belonging to the three realms and one uncontaminated acquisition. However, a more detailed analysis is required:

⁽¹⁾ Non-analytical cessation has acquisitions belonging to all three realms.

⁽²⁾ Analytical cessation has acquisitions belonging to the Form Realm, the Formless Realm, and the uncontaminated.

⁽³⁾ The Truth of the Path (mārgasatya) has only acquisitions belonging to the uncontaminated.

Dharmas belonging to those in training (Śaikṣa) have acquisitions belonging to those in training; dharmas belonging to those beyond training (Aśaikṣa) have acquisitions belonging to those beyond training.

Dharmas belonging neither to those in training nor to those beyond training (naivaśaikṣanāśaikṣa)—that is, contaminated dharmas and the three unconditioned dharmas (asaṃskṛta)—have acquisitions belonging neither to those in training nor to those beyond training.

Generally speaking, acquisitions of this kind fall into three cases:

⁽¹⁾ Contaminated dharmas have acquisitions belonging neither to those in training nor to those beyond training;

⁽²⁾ Analytical cessation not produced by the noble path and non-analytical cessation have acquisitions belonging neither to those in training nor to those beyond training.

⁽³⁾ Analytical cessation produced by the path of those in training has acquisitions belonging to those in training; analytical cessation produced by the path of those beyond training has acquisitions belonging to those beyond training.

Dharmas to be abandoned through seeing or through cultivation have acquisitions to be abandoned through seeing or through cultivation.

Dharmas that are not abandoned through the path of seeing or the path of cultivation—that is, dharmas not subject to abandonment—have different kinds of acquisition:

Uncontaminated dharmas (anāsrava) are dharmas not subject to abandonment.

Non-analytical cessation has acquisitions to be abandoned through cultivation (bhāvanāheya).

Analytical cessation not produced by the noble path has acquisitions to be abandoned through cultivation.

Analytical cessation produced by the noble path and the Truth of the Path both have acquisitions not subject to abandonment, that is, acquisitions belonging to the uncontaminated.

It has already been explained above that dharmas in the three times have three different acquisitions belonging to the past, present, and future. What follows is a more detailed analysis of these different characteristics.

[Neutral dharmas have simultaneous acquisition,

Except for the two superknowledges and transformation.

Obscured material dharmas also have simultaneous acquisition.

Material dharmas of the Desire Realm have no prior acquisition.]

Treatise: Unobscured-neutral dharmas (anivṛtāvyākṛta) have only simultaneous acquisition and none arising before or afterward, because dharmas of this kind possess weak power. An unobscured-neutral dharma in the past has an acquisition belonging to the past; an unobscured-neutral dharma in the future has an acquisition belonging to the future.

This does not apply to all unobscured-neutral dharmas. The two kinds of superknowledge—the divine eye (cakṣurabhijñā) and divine ear (śrotrābhijñā)—and the mind of transformation (nirmāṇacitta) possess great power (balavat), because they are accomplished through the force of a special preparatory practice (prayogaviśeṣa); therefore, they still have acquisitions belonging to the past, present, and future.

Some Vaibhāṣika masters maintain that unobscured-neutral dharmas belonging to craftsmanship (śilpasthānika) and deportment (airyāpathika), when assiduously cultivated (atyartham abhyastam = bhṛśam ātmanaḥkṛtam), may also have acquisitions belonging to the past and future.

Obscured-neutral material dharmas (nivṛtāvyākṛta) have only simultaneous acquisition. Such material dharmas are bodily and verbal karma arising from an obscured-neutral mind. Although this kind of karma arises from a powerful mind, it is incapable of producing non-informative matter (avijñapti); it therefore possesses very weak power and has only an acquisition belonging to the present, with none belonging to the past or future.

(Question) Does the case described above also occur with acquisitions in the three times of wholesome and unwholesome dharmas?

(Answer) Yes. Material dharmas in the Desire Realm have no acquisition arising before them (prior acquisition), but have only simultaneous acquisition or acquisition arising afterward (subsequent acquisition). Such material dharmas, whether wholesome or unwholesome, cannot be acquired before they arise.

(Question) Can non-acquisition (aprāpti), like acquisition, be wholesome, unwholesome, or neutral?

The stanza replies:

[Non-acquisition is only unobscured-neutral.

Dharmas of the past and future have three kinds of non-acquisition.

Dharmas belonging to the three realms and those not bound to any realm also have three kinds.

The non-acquisition of the noble path is held

To constitute the nature of an ordinary person.

When the dharma is acquired or the plane is changed, non-acquisition is relinquished.]

Treatise: Non-acquisition is always unobscured-neutral in nature.

A dharma in the past or future may have non-acquisitions belonging to the past, present, and future.

Dharmas in the present are necessarily acquired; therefore, they have only non-acquisitions belonging to the past and future.

Dharmas bound to the Desire Realm may have non-acquisitions belonging to the Desire Realm, the Form Realm, or the Formless Realm; this depends upon the realm to which the supporting body possessing that non-acquisition belongs. Uncontaminated dharmas likewise have such non-acquisitions.

Non-acquisition is never uncontaminated in nature.

(Question) Why?

(Answer) Because ordinary persons are those who never acquire the noble path. The Fundamental Treatise (Jñānaprasthāna, 2, 21) states: “What is the nature of an ordinary person (pṛthagjanatva)? It is the non-acquisition of the dharmas of noble ones (āryadharmāṇāmalābhaḥ).” The nature of an ordinary person is itself not uncontaminated; therefore, this non-acquisition (alābha = aprāpti) cannot be uncontaminated either.

Let us examine this definition further. When the Fundamental Treatise says that the nature of an ordinary person is the non-acquisition of the dharmas belonging to noble ones, which noble dharmas does it mean?

—They are all dharmas beginning with the stage of receptivity to the knowledge of the Dharma concerning suffering (duḥkhe dharmajñānakṣānti), and they include the entire uncontaminated path, or noble path.

(Sarvāstivādins) The Fundamental Treatise means all the dharmas mentioned above, because it does not specify any single dharma separately.

(Author of the Treatise) Take care. According to your interpretation, a person who has not acquired receptivity concerning suffering (duḥkhe kṣānti) would be an ordinary person if that person did not possess all the noble dharmas.

(Sarvāstivādins) When the Fundamental Treatise says “non-acquisition,” it implies a non-acquisition unaccompanied by acquisition (prāpti). In the case you cite above, although the person has not acquired the other dharmas of the noble ones, that person is nevertheless not an ordinary person, because the non-acquisition of those dharmas is accompanied by the acquisition of receptivity. This is perfectly evident; for otherwise, the Buddha, the Blessed One, who does not possess the dharmas belonging to śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, would have to become an ordinary person.

(Author of the Treatise) That is so, but the Fundamental Treatise should have stated clearly: “The nature of an ordinary person is solely the non-acquisition (alābha eva) of the noble dharmas,” rather than merely “the non-acquisition.”

(Sarvāstivādins) The Fundamental Treatise need not state this explicitly, because the use of “a single expression” (ekapada) already implies restriction (avadhāraṇa), and the word “solely” (eva) is therefore unnecessary. It is just as when one says that a certain creature “eats water” (abbhakṣa), implying that it “subsists solely on water,” or “eats wind” (vāyubhakṣa), implying that it “subsists solely on wind.”

One explanation (Vibhāṣā) maintains that the nature of an ordinary person is the non-acquisition of the first stage of the path of seeing—receptivity to the knowledge of the Dharma concerning suffering—and of the dharmas co-arising with it (sahabhū).

(Objection by the author of the Treatise) If this were so, upon reaching the stage of subsequent knowledge concerning the path (mārge ’nvayajñāna), the practitioner would be an ordinary person and no longer a noble one, because receptivity to the knowledge of the Dharma concerning suffering has then been relinquished.

(Explanation of the Vibhāṣā) This is not so, because the non-acquisition of this receptivity—the very non-acquisition that constitutes the nature of an ordinary person—has already been completely destroyed at the first stage.

(Objection) The type of patience under discussion belongs to all three vehicles: the shravaka, pratyekabuddha, and Buddha vehicles. When defining the nature of an ordinary being, to the non-acquisition of which patience do you refer?

(Explanation) All three kinds.

(Objection) Take care! If this is understood in that way, one who has not acquired these three kinds of patience would then have to become an ordinary being.

(Explanation) When we say “non-acquisition,” we mean that this non-acquisition is not accompanied by acquisition…, as explained above, through to the two analogies of “drinking water” and “feeding on wind.”

(Reply of the Treatise Master) If this is asserted, then the attempts to resolve the foregoing objections become futile; the most reasonable explanation is that of the Sautrantikas. According to the Sautrantikas, the nature of an ordinary being is precisely a continuum in which no noble Dharma has yet arisen (anutpannāryadharmā saṃtatiḥ).

(Question) At what time is non-acquisition relinquished?

(Answer) The non-acquisition of a dharma is relinquished when that dharma is acquired or when one passes to another sphere. For example, the non-acquisition of the noble path, which constitutes the nature of an ordinary being, is relinquished when that noble path is acquired or when one passes to another sphere. The same applies to the non-acquisition of other dharmas.

(Objection) Non-acquisition is relinquished (vihīyate) when ⁽¹⁾ the non-acquisition of this non-acquisition arises—that is, when the nature of an ordinary being is no longer acquired because one has passed to another sphere—and when ⁽²⁾ the acquisition of this non-acquisition is cut off—that is, when the nature of an ordinary being is eliminated because the noble path has been attained. Can it therefore be said that there is an acquisition (prāpti) of acquisition and non-acquisition? And is there a non-acquisition of acquisition and non-acquisition?

(Explanation) In relation to acquisition and non-acquisition (aprāpti), there are indeed acquisition and non-acquisition, commonly called “secondary acquisition” (anuprāpti) and “secondary non-acquisition.” Thus, a distinction is made between “fundamental acquisition” (mūlaprāpti) and “secondary acquisition” (anuprāpti), also called the “acquisition of acquisition.”

(Objection) If so, would this not entail the fault of infinite regress (anavasthā)?

(Explanation) It does not entail the fault of infinite regress, because one acquires the acquisition (prāpti) by means of the acquisition of acquisition (prāptiprāpti = anuprāpti), and conversely. One dharma is still acquired by means of another (parasparasamanvāgama). What we mean here is that when a dharma arises in the personal continuum—this dharma being called the fundamental dharma (mūladharma)—two other dharmas arise together with it: the acquisition of this fundamental dharma (acquisition) and the acquisition of that acquisition (acquisition of acquisition).

This personal continuum comes to possess (samanvāgama) the fundamental dharma (mūladharma) and the acquisition of acquisition (prāptiprāpti) through the arising of acquisition (prāpti); and it comes to possess that acquisition (prāpti) through the arising of the acquisition of acquisition. Therefore, there is no fault of infinite regress. When a wholesome or defiled dharma arises, three dharmas—including that wholesome or defiled dharma—arise together at that time: the fundamental dharma, acquisition, and acquisition of acquisition.

In the second, immediately following moment, six dharmas arise together: ⁽¹⁾ the acquisition (prāpti) of the fundamental dharma, ⁽²⁾ the acquisition (prāpti) of the acquisition belonging to the preceding moment, and ⁽³⁾ the acquisition (prāpti) of the acquisition of acquisition belonging to the preceding moment; together with three “secondary acquisitions” (anuprāpti), through which those three aforementioned acquisitions (prāpti) are possessed.

In the third moment, eighteen dharmas arise together: nine acquisitions—three acquisitions (prāptis) of the three dharmas that arose in the first moment and six acquisitions (prāptis) of the six dharmas that arose in the second moment—together with nine “secondary acquisitions” (anuprāpti), through which those nine aforementioned acquisitions (prāptis) are possessed.

In this way, acquisitions (prāpti) continue to increase in number at every moment. With respect to all present and future afflictions and secondary afflictions (kleśa, upakleśa), as well as innately acquired wholesome dharmas (upapattilābhika), together with their associated (saṃprayukta) and coexistent (sahabhū) dharmas, acquisitions (prāpti) continue to arise in every moment, without limit, throughout the beginningless and endless course of samsara.

If one considers the personal continuum of a single sentient being wandering through samsara, innumerable acquisitions arise in every moment; if one considers the personal continua of all sentient beings, then immeasurable and boundless acquisitions arise together. Fortunately, although they are so numerous, acquisitions are all non-obstructive dharmas and can make room for one another. Were this not so, even space could scarcely contain the acquisitions of a single sentient being, much less those of two.